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PREFACE

PLATO'S *Symposium* is undeniably one of the masterpieces of classical literature. The subtlest and most brilliant of Greek artists in prose has left us no finer, no more fascinating specimen of his skill than this dialogue in which, with the throbbing pulse of life for his theme, he matches that theme by the dramatic verve and vigour of his style. The interest of the book is not merely literary or philosophical: it appeals also to the wider circle of the students of culture and of life and of the "criticism of life" by its richness of suggestion and by its vividness of portraiture. To mention one point alone,—nowhere else, not even in the *Phaedo*, does the personality of Socrates shine before us so full and clear, "in form and gesture so express and admirable," as in the pages of the *Symposium*. To miss reading it is to miss the enjoyment of a veritable ἐστίαμα λόγων, blended and seasoned with curious art.

In the preparation of this edition I have been indebted mainly to the labours of continental scholars, for the sufficient, if surprising, reason that no English commentary has existed heretofore. It was, indeed, this singular fact, together with the recent publication of an interesting Papyrus fragment of the text, which chiefly moved me to attempt a commentary myself. On many of the interesting questions connected with the literary form and philosophical substance of the dialogue much more might have been said, but I have thought it best to keep both the Introduction and the Notes within a moderate compass. In the framing of the
text, although I have ventured on several innovations of my own, I have been more conservative than the majority of the foreign critics, a considerable selection of whose “restorations” will be found in the Critical Notes in addition to the evidence of the leading mss. and of the Papyrus: in all doubtful cases I have cited also the opinion of Schanz and of the Oxford editor, Prof. Burnet, whose admirable recension has been before me constantly and has aided me much. For expository material I must acknowledge in special my indebtedness to the useful and scholarly edition of A. Hug.

To gild with comment the refined gold of Plato's work is at the best a temerarious task; but if my book helps a single reader more justly to appraise the gold it will not have been wrought wholly in vain.

R. G. B.

October 4, 1909.
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INTRODUCTION

§ i. Summary of the Argument.


Apolldorus, in reply to the enquiry of some friends, explains the occasion on which the supper-party at Agathon’s was held, when Socrates and others delivered Discourses on Eros. The matter is fresh in his memory and, as a φιλόλογος himself, he is quite ready to repeat the whole story as he had it from Aristodemus,—an eye-witness and an intimate disciple of Socrates,—just as he had repeated it a few days before to his friend Glaucon.

II. Aristodemus’s Prologue: 174 a—178 a.

Aristodemus meeting Socrates smartly attired expresses his surprise at so unusual a circumstance. Socrates explains that being invited to dine with Agathon he feels bound to go “in finery to the fine”; and he presses Aristodemus, although uninvited, to accompany him. On the road Socrates, immersed in thought, lags behind, and Aristodemus arrives at Agathon’s alone. Not till they are half-way through the meal does Socrates appear; and Agathon rallies him on his devotion to σοφία. The proposal of Pausanias to restrict the potations, in view of yesterday’s banquet, and that of Eryximachus to dismiss the flute-girl and amuse themselves by λόγοι, are unanimously agreed to. Then Eryximachus propounds an idea of Phaedrus, that Eros is the best possible theme for encomia, and suggests that each of the party in turn, commencing with Phaedrus, should now deliver an encomium on Eros. This suggestion is applauded by Socrates. Of the encomia the most noteworthy were the following:—
INTRODUCTION

III. The Discourse of Phaedrus: 178 a—180 b.

Prologue: Eros is a great and wondrous god.

(a) He is wondrous in origin, being eldest of gods and unbegotten—witness what Homer and others say of him.

(b) He is the supreme benefactor of mankind, (1) as inspiring a high sense of honour in private, civic and military life; (2) as inspiring self-sacrifice, which wins divine favour (e.g. Alcestis and Achilles, contrasted with the cowardly Orpheus).

Epilogue: Thus Eros is most ancient, venerable, and beneficent.

IV. The Discourse of Pausanias: 180 c—185 c.

Prologue: Eros being not single but dual, we must begin by defining which Eros is to be our theme.

(a) The dual nature of Eros follows from the dual nature of Aphrodite: as there is an Aphrodite Urania and an Aphrodite Pandemos, so there is Eros Uranios and Eros Pandemos.

(b) From the principle that no action is in the abstract good or bad but derives its moral quality solely from the manner of its execution it follows that Eros is bad or good according to the kind of love-making to which it prompts.

(c) The general characteristics (1) of Eros Pandemos are that it is directed to women as well as boys, to the body rather than the soul, to unscrupulous satisfaction of lust; (2) whereas Eros Uranios shuns females and seeks only such males as are noble and nearly mature both in mind and body. It is the followers of Eros Pandemos who have brought paederastia into disrepute.

(d) The varying vómos concerning Eros may be classified thus:

(1) In all Greek states except Athens the vómos is simple, either (a) approving paederastia, as in Elis and Boeotia; or (β) condemning it, as in Ionia and states subject to barbarian rule, where it is held to foster a dangerous spirit of independence (e.g. Harmodius and Aristogiton).

(2) At Athens the vómos is complex. (a) Eros is approved, and its excesses condoned, when directed towards superior youths approaching manhood. (β) It appears to be condemned, in so far as parents forbid their boys to hold converse with “erastae.” The explanation of this ambiguous attitude must be sought in the principle laid down above,
that the moral quality of an act depends upon the conditions of its performance. The Athenian νόμος provides a test for distinguishing between good and bad forms of Eros: the test of time shows whether or not the right motive (desire for ἀληθῆ) actuates both the lover and his object. This motive alone justifies all erotic pursuits and surrenders, even mutual deception: hence we conclude that καλὸν ἀληθῆ ἐνακα λαβεῖν.

Epilogue: This Eros Uranios, which inspires zeal for ἀληθῆ, possesses the highest value alike for the individual and for the State.

V. The first Interlude: 185 c—e.

It was the turn of Aristophanes next; but being seized with a hiccup he called upon Eryximachus either to cure him or to speak in his stead. So Eryximachus, having first prescribed a number of remedies, spoke next.

VI. The Discourse of Eryximachus: 185 e—188 e.

Prologue: Pausanias was right in asserting the dual nature of Eros; but he failed to observe that the god’s sway extends over the entire universe.

(a) The body, with its healthy and diseased appetites, exhibits the duality of Eros; and medicine is “the science of bodily erotics in regard to replenishment and depletion.” It is the object of “the Art” of Asclepios to produce the Eros which is harmony between the opposite elements—the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry, etc. Eros is, likewise, the patron-god of gymnastics and husbandry.

(b) Similarly with music. The “discordant concord” of Heraclitus hints at the power of music to harmonize sounds previously in discord, and divergent times. Thus music is “the science of Erotics in regard to harmony and rhythm.” It is less in the pure theory than in applied music (metrical compositions and their educational use) that the dual nature of Eros comes to light; when it does, the Eros Pandemos must be carefully guarded against.

(c) Again, in the spheres of meteorology and astronomy we see the effects of the orderly Eros in a wholesome temperate climate, of the disorderly Eros in blights and pestilences; for astronomy is “the science of Erotics in regard to stellar motions and the seasons of the year.”

(d) Lastly, in religion, it is the disorderly Eros which produces the
INTRODUCTION

impiety which it is the function of divination to cure; and religion may be defined as "the science of human Erotics in regard to piety."

Epilogue: To Eros, as a whole, belongs great power; to the virtuous Eros great influence in effecting human concord and happiness.—If my eulogy is incomplete, it is for you, Aristophanes, to supplement it, if you choose.

VII. The second Interlude: 189 a—c.

Aristophanes explains that he is now cured of his hiccough, as a result of sneezing according to Eryximachus’ prescription. He makes a jocular allusion to Eryximachus’ discourse, to which the latter retorts, and after some further banter Aristophanes proceeds to deliver his encomium.

VIII. The Discourse of Aristophanes: 189 c—193 d.

Prologue: Men have failed to pay due honour to Eros, the most "philanthropic" of gods, who blesses us by his healing power, as I shall show.

(a) Man’s original nature was different from what it now is. It had three sexes—male, female, androgynous; all globular in shape and with double limbs and organs; derived respectively from sun, earth and moon.

(b) Man’s woes were due to the pride of these primal men which stirred them to attempt to carry Heaven by assault. In punishment Zeus sliced them each in two, and then handed them to Apollo to stitch up their wounds. But, because they then kept dying of hunger, owing to the yearning of each for his other-half, Zeus devised for them the present mode of reproduction, altering the position of the sex-organs accordingly. Thus Eros aims at restoring the primal unity and healing the cleft in man’s nature.

(c) Each of us is a split-half of an original male, female, or androgynon; and the other-halves we seek in love are determined accordingly. Courage is the mark of boy-loving men and of man-loving boys, as both derived from the primal male. In the intense passion of Eros it is not merely sexual intercourse that is sought but a permanent fusing into one (as by the brazing of an Hephaestus); for Love is "the pursuit of wholeness."

(d) As it was impiety that caused our "dioikismos" and bisection, so in piety towards the god Eros lies the hope of meeting with our proper halves and regaining our pristine wholeness.

Epilogue: Let us, then, laud Eros as the giver both of present blessings and of bright hopes of healing and restoration in the future.
INTRODUCTION

IX. The third Interlude: 193 d—194 e.

Some conversation ensues between Aristophanes, Eryximachus, Socrates, and Agathon. Upon Socrates attempting to entangle Agathon in an argument, Phaedrus intervenes and bids Agathon proceed without further delay to offer his meed of praise to the god.

X. The Discourse of Agathon: 194 e—197 e.

Prologue: The method of previous speakers needs amendment. The correct method, which I shall adopt, is to laud first the character of Eros, and secondly his gifts to men.

(A) The attributes of Eros are (1) supreme felicity, (due to) (2) supreme beauty and (3) goodness.

(2) Eros is most beautiful, since he is (a) the youngest of gods (all tales to the contrary being false), witness his aversion to old-age; (b) most tender, witness his choosing soft souls for his abode; (c) supple, witness his power to steal unnoticed in and out of souls; (d) symmetrical, because comely as all allow; (e) fair-of-skin, for he feeds on flowers amid sweet scents.

(3) Eros is supremely good, since he is (a) most just, having no lot in violence or injustice; (b) most temperate, for he is the master of pleasure since no pleasure is greater than love; (c) most courageous, as holding sway over Ares, the most courageous of the gods; (d) most wise, being expert (a) in both musical and creative poesy, and (β) in the practical arts, as instructor of Zeus, Apollo and Athene in their respective crafts (he, too, inspired the gods with love of beauty and de-throned Necessity).

(B) The blessings conferred by Eros are, like his attributes, beauty and goodness. He produces peace and pleasantness in all spheres of life: he is the object of universal admiration, the author of all delights, best guide and captain for gods and men alike, whose praises it behoves all to chant in unison.

Epilogue: Such is my tribute of eulogy, not wholly serious nor wholly playful.

XI. The fourth Interlude: 198 a—199 c.

Agathon "brought down the house" with his peroration; and Socrates remarked to Eryximachus that its eloquence left him in despair—petrified by the Gorgon of Agathon's brilliant Gorgianisms. "Now,"
he said, "I must retract my rash tongue-pledge to join in a eulogy of Eros, since I perceive that I was quite astray in my ideas about the encomiastic art: for I supposed that truth came first, ornamental compliment second, whereas the contrary is evidently the fact. Such an encomium is quite beyond my poor powers; but if you care for an unvarnished speech about Eros, that I am ready to make." Phaedrus and the rest bidding him proceed in his own fashion, Socrates began by the following conversation with Agathon.

XII. Socrates' preliminary Discussion with Agathon:
199 c—201 d.

(1) "Your exordium on Method was admirable, Agathon. But tell me further, is Eros a relative notion, like 'father' or 'brother'?" "Certainly it is."

(2) "Next, you agree that if Eros desires its object it must lack it; and if a man wishes for some good he already possesses, what he really desires is what he lacks, viz. the future possession of that good." "True."

(3) "Again, if Eros is (as you said) love for beauty, Eros must lack beauty, and therefore goodness too, and be neither beautiful nor good." "I cannot gainsay you."

XIII. The Discourse of Socrates (Diotima): 201 d—212 c.

Prologue: I will now repeat the discourse on Eros which I once heard from my instructress in Erotics, Diotima the prophetess—assuming the conclusions formulated just now, and treating first of the character and secondly of the effects of Eros, according to Agathon's own method.

A. [The nature of Eros, 201 e—204 c.]

(1) Diotima showed me that Eros, although (as we have seen) neither beautiful nor good, is not therefore ugly and bad but rather a mean between these contraries.

(2) She argued also that Eros is not a god, since godhead involves the possession of just those goods which Eros desires and lacks. But neither is he a mortal, but stands midway between the two, being a great daemon; and the function of the daemonian is to mediate between gods and men.
(3) As to origin, Eros is son of Poros and Penia, and partakes of the nature of both parents—the fertile vigour of the one, the wastrel neediness of the other. As he is a mean between the mortal and the immortal, so he is a mean between the wise and the unwise, i.e. a wisdom-lover (philosopher). The notion that Eros is a beautiful god is due to a confusion between subjective Eros and the object loved.

B. [The effects, or utility, of Eros, 204 d—212 A.]

(1) [The object or end of Eros.]

What does Eros as "love of the beautiful" precisely imply? In the case of the good, its acquisition is a means to happiness as end. But Eros is not used in this generic sense of "desire for happiness," so much as in a narrower specific sense. And if we say that Eros is "the desire for the good," we must expand this definition into "the desire for the everlasting possession of the good."

(2) [The method or mode of action of Eros.]

Eros works by means of generation, both physical and psychical, in the beautiful.

(a) Generation, being an immortal thing, requires harmony with the divine, i.e. beauty; without which the process is hindered. And generation is sought because it is, for mortals, the nearest approach to immortality. It is in the desire for immortality that we must find the explanation of all the sexual passion and love of offspring which we see in the animal world, since it is only by the way of leaving a successor to take its place that the mortal creature, in this world of flux, can secure a kind of perpetuity.

(b) But the soul has its offspring as well as the body. Laws, inventions and noble deeds, which spring from love of fame, have for their motive the same passion for immortality. The lover seeks a beautiful soul in order to generate therein offspring which shall live for ever; and the bonds of such soul-marriages are stronger than any carnal ties.

(c) After this elementary prelude, we reach the highest stage of the Mysteries of Love. The right method in Erotic procedure is to pass in upward course from love of bodily beauty to love of soul beauty, thence to the beauty of the sciences, until finally one science is reached which corresponds to the Absolute, Ideal Beauty, in which all finite things of beauty partake. To gain the vision of this is the goal of Love's endeavour, and to live in its presence were life indeed. There, if anywhere, with truth for the issue of his soul, might the lover hope to attain to immortality.
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Epilogue: Believing that for the gaining of this boon Eros is man's best helper, I myself praise Eros and practise Erotics above all things and I urge others to do likewise. Such is my "encomium," Phaedrus, if you choose to call it so.

XIV. The fifth Interlude: 212 c—215 a.

Applause followed. Then suddenly, when Aristophanes was on the point of making an observation, a loud knocking was heard at the door. Presently Alcibiades, leaning on a flute-girl, appeared. "I am come to crown Agathon," he cried, "if you will admit a drunken reveller." Being heartily welcomed, he took the seat next Agathon, where Socrates had made room for him. And as soon as he perceived Socrates, he began playfully to abuse him. Then, taking some of the ribbands with which he had bedecked Agathon, he crowned "the marvellous head of Socrates, the invincible in words."

Next Alcibiades insisted on all the company drinking along with him. And, when Eryximachus protested against bare drinking without song or speech and explained to him what the previous order of procedure had been, Alcibiades replied, "In the presence of Socrates I dare not eulogize anyone else, so that if I am to deliver an encomium like the rest, Socrates must be my theme."

XV. Alcibiades' eulogy of Socrates: 215 a—222 c.

Prologue: My eulogy will take the form of parables—aiming not at mockery but at truth. Socrates resembles (a) Silenus-statuettes which serve as caskets for sacred images; (b) the Satyr Marsyas.

I. In form he resembles both (a) the Sileni, and (b) the Satyr.

II. (In character) he resembles (b) the Satyr, being (1) a mocker, (2) a flute-player. As to (2) he excels Marsyas, since his words alone, without an instrument, fascinate all, old and young. Me he charms far more than even Pericles could, filling me with shame and self-contempt, and driving me to my wit's end.

III. He resembles (a) the Sileni in the contrast between his exterior and interior. (a) Externally he adopts an erotic attitude towards beautiful youths: (b) but internally he despises beauty and wealth, as I know from experience. For I tried to bribe him with my beauty, but all my many attempts came to nothing. Private conversations, gymnastics together, a supper-party à deux, even a night on the same couch—all was of no use. Against my battery of charms he was
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armed (by his temperance) in "complete steel"; and I charge him now before you with the crime of ἵβρος. His hardihood was shown in the Potidaea campaign, where none could stand the cold like him. His valour was displayed in the battle where he saved my life, and in the retreat from Delium. Especially amazing is his unique originality, which makes it impossible to find anyone else like him—except Satyrs and Sileni.

IV. His speeches too, I forgot to say, are like the Silenus-statuettes, in outward seeming ridiculous, but in inner content supremely rational and full of images of virtue and wisdom.

Epilogue: Such is my eulogy, half praise, half blame. Let my experience, and that of many another, be a warning to you, Agathon: court Socrates less as an "erastes" than as an "anterastes"!

XVI. Concluding Scene: 222 c—end.

The company laughed at the erotic candour of Alcibiades. Then ensued some banter between Socrates and Alcibiades as rival "erastae" of Agathon, which was interrupted by the entrance of a band of revellers who filled the room with uproar. Some of the guests left, and Aristodemus himself fell asleep. On awaking, about dawn, he found only three of the party still present and awake—Agathon, Aristophanes, and Socrates: Socrates was trying to convince the others that the scientific tragedy-writer must be capable also of writing comedy. Presently Aristophanes, and then Agathon, dozed off; whereupon Socrates, still "shadowed" by Aristodemus, departed.


(A) The Method of Narration and the Preface.

The Platonic dialogues, viewed from the point of view of literary form, may be divided into two chief classes. To the first class belong those in which the story of the discussion is told directly by one of the protagonists; to the second class belong those in which the story is told indirectly or at second-hand,—a mode of narration which involves the further characteristic that dialogues of this class are necessarily prefaced (and concluded) by some explanatory paragraphs. This second class, moreover, falls into two subdivisions, according as the narrator is or is not represented as being himself present at the
discussion. It is to the latter of these subdivisions, in which the narrator is not an eye-witness but reports the matter only at second-hand, that the Symposium (together with the Theaetetus and Parmenides) belongs.

It is noteworthy also that, with the exception of the Phaedo and Parmenides, ours is the only dialogue in which the narrating witness is not Socrates himself. The reason for this is obvious: eulogy of Socrates being one of the main purposes of the dialogue, it would be unseemly to put the story into his mouth, and make him the trumpeter of his own praises. Instead of doing so, Plato selects as the sources of the narrative persons of such a character as to produce the effect of verisimilitude. The way in which Aristodemus, the primary source, and Apollodorus, the secondary source, are described is evidently intended to produce the impression that in them we have reliable witnesses. Apollodorus¹, “the fanatic,” is put before us not only as a worshipper of Socrates, imbued with a passionate interest in philosophical discourses such as are here to be related, but also as an intimate disciple who had “compared with” Socrates for the space of nearly three years past and during that time had made it his peculiar task to study the every act and word of the Master (172 e). Moreover, the story of the special occasion in question he had diligently conned (οὐκ ἀμελέτητος, 172 λ, 173 c).

Aristodemus², the primary source and actual narrator, is spoken of by Apollodorus as “an old disciple” and one of the most intimate with the Master in earlier years, and in his own narrative he represents himself as following Socrates with dog-like fidelity, and showing the closest familiarity with his ways and habits—a man so single-hearted, so engrossed in matters of fact, as to be constitutionally incapable of tampering with the truth. As the “minute biographer,” Aristodemus is the prototype of all later Boswells.

Further, the impression of veracity made by the character of the

¹ Apollodorus appears also in Phaedo 59 a, as one of those present with Socrates “on the day when he drank the poison in the prison”; as characteristically exhibiting most marked symptoms of grief [this statement would support the epithet μαλακός as well as μαυρός in Symp. 173 b]; and as a native of Athens (τῶν ἐπικρατῶν). In Apol. 34 λ he is one of those present at the trial of Socrates; and (in 38 n) one of those who offered to go bail to the extent of 30 minae. Pfeiderer takes Apollodorus to represent Plato himself, by a piece of ironical “Selbstobjektivierung,” a notion which had already occurred to me.

² For Aristodemus, see also Xen. Mem. i. 4. 2 where Socrates converses περὶ τοῦ δαίμονον πρὸς Ἀριστόδημον τῶν μικρῶν ἐπικαλούμενον, καταμαθὼν αὐτὸν ὡσεὶ θύουτα τοῖς θεοῖς ὡσεὶ μαυτίκη χρώμενων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ποιοντων ταῦτα καταγελώντα.
narrators is enhanced by the express statement that in regard to some points at least (ἐνα 173 b) the account of Aristodemus was confirmed by Socrates. The points in question are probably (as Hug observes) those which specially concern the picture drawn of Socrates himself. At any rate, it is in regard to these that we have the detailed testimony of Alcibiades, emphasized by repeated asseverations (214 ε, 215 λ, etc.), and endorsed by the silence of Socrates.

In addition to the evidence it contains for the dates of the narration and of the banquet¹, and the vivid picture in miniature which it presents of a certain group of Socrates in whom an ardent admiration for the Master was blended with a limited capacity for understanding the deeper side of his practice and doctrine—as if to go barefoot and to rail at filthy lucre were the sum and substance of Socraticism,—there are two further points in the Preface which deserve attention.

Apolloodorus, although asked only for the λόγαρ spoken at the banquet (172 ε, 173 ε), proceeds to give a full account of the accompanying incidents as well (ἐς ἄρτην...διηγήσεσθαι 174 λ). This may be taken to indicate that for estimating the effect of the dialogue as a whole we are meant to pay regard not only to the series of encomia but also to the framework of incident and conversation in which they are set.

Glaucagon, in asking Apollodorus for the desired information concerning the “erotic discourses,” states (172 ε) that he has already heard an account of them from “another man” (ἄλλος τις), which account was unsatisfactory (οὐδὲν σαφές), and that the authority quoted by this unnamed informant was “Phoenix, son of Philippus.” To this Apollodorus adds the fact (173 ε) that this Phoenix was indebted to the same source as himself, namely Aristodemus. What precisely these statements signify it is not easy to determine, since the identity of Phoenix, as well as that of the anonymous informant (ἄλλος τις), is unknown to us. But it seems reasonable to infer that there was already in existence, when Plato wrote, at least one other account of a banquet at which Socrates, Alcibiades and Agathon figured, and that it is Plato’s intention to discredit it. That such is the intention is shown not only by the phrase οὐδὲν εἶχε σαφές λέγαν, but also by the statement that the evidence of ἄλλος τις was one degree further off from the primary source (Aristodemus) than is that of Apollodorus. Further, the assumption of some such controversial

¹ With regard to this evidence, see Introd. § viii.
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intention throws light on the emphasis laid on the veracity of the narrative—to which attention has been drawn above—and gives it a more definite motive. It is as if the author means us to read into his preface something to this effect: “Socrates has been misrepresented: it is my task to clear his reputation by putting the facts in their true light.”

If this, then, be a right reading of the hints thus given, what is the distorted account which Plato thus discredits, and who its author? Unfortunately this must remain a matter of conjecture. The most obvious suggestion to make is that the author in question is Xenophon, and the account alluded to his Symposium. But Xenophon’s Symposium is most probably a later work than Plato’s; and it is a further objection that the persons represented by Xenophon as present at the banquet are not—with the exception of Socrates—the persons mentioned by Glaucon.

We are obliged, therefore, to look further afield for the author whose identity is thus shrouded. The best suggestion I can offer is that Polycrates the rhetor is the writer intended. In favour of this we may adduce the fact that Polycrates is ὁ κατηγορός whose calumnies Xenophon aims at refuting in his Memorabilia. It is by no means improbable a priori that Polycrates in his attacks on Socrates described, amongst other incidents, a banqueting-scene in which Socrates and Alcibiades were pictured in an odious light. And if we take the Banquet of Xenophon to be a genuine work, the very fact that Xenophon thought it necessary to supplement his Memorabilia by such a work might be construed as showing that the author of the slanders he is at such pains to refute had already libelled Socrates in connexion with a similar scene. But unless, by some happy chance, further light

1 See Cobet, Nov. Lec. pp. 662 ff.; Gomperz, G. T. ii. pp. 63, 118. Gomperz (ii. 343) supposes the Gorgias to be a counterblast to Polycrates’ indictment of Socrates, and Alcibiades’ eulogy in Symposium to have the same motive: “Plato had a definite motive for placing such praise in the mouth of Alcibiades—we refer to the pamphlet of Polycrates....This writer had spoken of Socrates as the teacher of Alcibiades—in what tone and with what intention can easily be guessed....Plato himself had touched on the subject (of the liaison between the two men), harmlessly enough, in his youthful works, as, for example, in the introduction to the ‘Protagoras.’...But after the appearance of Polycrates’ libel, he may well have thought it advisable to speak a word of enlightenment on the subject; which is exactly what he does, with a plainness that could not be surpassed, in the present panegyric” (op. cit. 394–5). Gomperz, however, does not bring this hypothesis into connexion with the passage in the Preface of Symposium, discussed above. There may be an allusion to the same matter in Protag. 347 c (cp. Xen. Symposium vii. 1).
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should be shed upon the history of Polycrates' literary activity, it is hardly possible to get beyond the region of conjectural speculation, or to hope for a definitive solution of this obscure literary problem.

(B) The Prologue of Aristodemus.

In the Prologue, with which Aristodemus's narrative opens, special attention may be drawn to the following points:—

(a) It is significant that the first person to appear on the scene is Socrates. We are led at once to admire his good humour and ready wit as shown in the playful tone of his conversation (1) with Aristodemus (174 a, b), in which he makes jesting quotations from Homer and indulges in a pun on the name of Agathon (cp. the pun he makes on Gorgias, 198 c); and (2) with Agathon (175 c—e). These amiable traits in the character of Socrates are further illustrated in other parts of the dialogue.

(b) Socrates on the way becomes lost in thought and fails to put in an appearance till the banquet is already far advanced (174 d, 175 c). Aristodemus explains to Agathon (175 n) that this is no exceptional occurrence (εἴδος τε τοῦτον ἡξει). That this incident is intended to be specially emphasized as typical of Socrates' habits becomes clear when we notice how Alcibiades in his speech (220 c) describes a similar incident as taking place in one of the campaigns in which he served. The corroboration thus effected is one of many examples of the literary care and ingenuity with which Plato in this dialogue interweaves incident with speech. Another example occurs a little further on (176 c) where Eryximachus, discussing the question "to drink or not to drink," describes Socrates as ἰκανὸς ἀμφότερα: this statement, too, we find amplified and confirmed by Alcibiades (220 a). Both these matters illustrate that entire subordination of flesh to spirit in which Socrates was unique.

(c) Agathon (175 c ff.) expresses a desire to share in the "witty invention" which Socrates had discovered on his way: Socrates with his usual mock-modesty disclaims for himself the possession of σοφία, except of a poor kind, but congratulates Agathon on the fine and abundant σοφία he has just been displaying so conspicuously: and the conversational banter concludes with Agathon's remark—"Presently, with the Wine-god as umpire, you and I will fight out our wisdom-match." Here, at this early stage, we have struck for us one of the key-notes of the dialogue. For one main motive of the dialogue as a whole is to exhibit the σοφία of Socrates, his intellectual as well as
moral supremacy. And we find, in the sequel, that this is done largely by pitting him against Agathon, over the wine-bowl. In this we have the reason for the juxtaposition of the two speeches, matched, as it were, one against the other. His speech is, in itself, one sufficient proof of the superiority of Socrates over his rival. But there are also other proofs: there is the masterly criticism and confutation to which Socrates subjects the belauded poet; there is the express statement, confirmed by expressive action, of Alcibiades, in which is asserted the superiority of Socrates not merely to Agathon but to all others who make claim to σοφία (213 ε, 215 c ff.); and finally the Wine-god himself bestows on Socrates the palm when, in the concluding scene, we see him alone pursuing discussion with unflagging zeal and with a clearness of head undimmed by long and deep potations while his rival drowses and succumbs to sleep. Thus the διαδικασία περὶ τῆς σοφίας runs through the book, and always, from beginning to end, νικᾶ δ Σωκράτης.

To this we may add one minor point. Agathon, in this preliminary play of wit, applies to Socrates the epithet ὁμιλητής, "a mocker." And this, too, is a trait upon which Alcibiades, in the sequel, lays much stress. ὁμιλητής is one of the most striking characteristics of the Satyr-Socrates (216 ε, 219 c).

(d) Another example of the literary interweaving—or the method of "responsions," as we might term it,—which is so marked a feature of the dialogue, is to be found in the statement of Socrates concerning the character of his own knowledge. His speciality in the way of science is, he announces, "erotics," and this is his only speciality (177 ν). Accordingly, when we find Socrates in the sequel delivering a discourse on this subject we are evidently intended by Plato to feel that his views are to be taken seriously as those of one who professed to be an expert in this subject if in nothing else. And this intention is emphasized when we come to the later passage (the "responsion") in 198 δ where Socrates again refers to his conviction that concerning "erotics" he knew the truth (εἰδὼς τὴν ἀλήθειαν). It is hardly necessary to add that "erotics," construed in the Socratic sense, constitutes by no means an insignificant department of knowledge (φαύλη τις σοφία 175 ε), as Socrates modestly implies, inasmuch as it is practically coextensive with a theory of education and involves an insight into the origin, nature and destiny of the human soul.

(e) In 177 β we have an interesting parallel between Plato's language and that of Isocrates. In Ἰθή. 210 β (ὑπὸ τῶν μὲν γὰρ τοὺς
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βουμβιλίους καὶ τὸν ἄλας καὶ τὰ τοιοῦτα βουληθέντων ἐπανεῖν κ.τ.λ.) Isocrates scoffs at the eulogists of “bees and salt and such-like trumpery,” and his language is echoed in the allusion (put in the mouth of Eryximachus quoting Phaedrus) to a βιβλίον ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ ἐν ὧν ἐνήσαν ἄλες ἐπαινον βασιλάτων ἐχοντες πρὸς ὠψέλαις (177 B). This eulogist of salt is commonly supposed to be Polycrates, since enomia on similar paltry subjects—mice, χύτραι, ψήφων—are ascribed to him. Dummler, however, takes the reference to be to Antisthenes (Protreptikos), on the strength of the statement in Pollux vi. 16. 98: βουμβιλίους δὲ τὸ στενὸν ἐκπώμα καὶ βουμβιοῦ ἐν τῇ πόσει, ὡς Ἀντισθένης ἐν προτρεπτικῷ. And for ἄλες as eulogized in the same work he quotes also Rep. 372 b ff. (ἄλες ἐξουσιών ἄλας). It may be added that a further allusion to the βουμβιλίους, as στενὸν ἐκπώμα, may be discovered in the mention of ἐκπώμα μέγα in Sympos. 213 B. Since Antisthenes seems to have devoted a good deal of attention to the subject of μέθητα, one is inclined to suppose that his views are alluded to in Sympos. (176, 213–14); and another allusion to him may be found in the mention of the χροστοὶ σοφισταὶ who eulogized Heracles (177 B), since Heracles was, notoriously, the patron-saint of the Cynics. However much they might differ on other points, Plato and Isocrates were agreed in so far as both found the Cynic leader an objectionable person.

(f) A significant indication is given us at the conclusion of the Prologue that the account of the speeches which follows is not an exhaustive account, but only a selection. And it is a selection that has been sifted twice. For Apollodorus states (178 a) that neither did Aristodemus remember all the views put forward by every speaker, nor did he (Apollodorus) remember all that Aristodemus had related. This statement is further confirmed by the later statement (180 c) that Aristodemus passed over the discourses of several speakers who followed next after Phaedrus. We are to infer, therefore, that there was a good deal of speechifying at the banquet which was not ἄξιο-μνημόνευτον. But why Plato is at pains to emphasize this point is

1 So Hug (Sympos. ad loc.) following Sauppe and Blass: also Jebb, Att. Or. ii. 99. I may note here an inconsistency as to the date of Polycrates’ “Accusation” in Jebb, Att. Or. i. 150–51 compared with ib. xlv: in the latter place it is set in 383 B.C.

2 In this Dummler (Akad. p. 66) follows Winckelmann (Antisth. fr. p. 21). Polycrates, however, may be alluded to as well as Antisthenes, as the terms of the reference are wide (ἄλα τοιοῦτα συχνῶδες); moreover, a close relation may have existed between these two writers.

3 See Dummler, Antisthenica, pp. 17 ff.

not wholly clear. It may, of course, be merely a literary device meant to enhance the verisimilitude of the account, since the speeches actually related might be thought insufficient to occupy the length of time supposed to elapse between the end of the δείπνον and the hour of Alcibiades’ arrival—which would probably not be early. It is possible, however, that we should look for a deeper reason. If so, may not the intention be to brush aside and discredit other speeches stated by another author (ἄλλος τις, 172 b) to have been delivered on this occasion?

(C) The Interludes.

The first Interlude, worthy of the name, occurs between the second and third encomia (185 c—e), and it is noticeable, first, for the reference to the “isology” of the rhetorical sophists; secondly, for the device by which the natural order of speakers is changed (Eryxiramachus taking the place of Aristophanes); and thirdly, for the alleged cause which renders such a change necessary, namely the hiccough (λύγε) of Aristophanes. As regards the significance of this last matter considerable diversity of opinion exists among the commentators. Of the ancients, Olympiodorus (vit. Plat. 3) supposed that Plato here ἐκμισθάσας Ἀριστοφάνην when he εἰσάγει αὐτόν μετάξι λυγγί περιπεσοντα καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον πληρώσαι τὸν ἄμνον: and similarly Athenaeus (187 c) writes τὸν μὲν ὅπως τῆς λυγγός ὄχλοιμεν...κωμῳδεῖν ἔθελε καὶ διασώρευν: and Aristides (or. 46, ii. p. 287), ἀλλ’ ἀνύμοι λύγεις αὐτὸν ἐδει, ἵνα εἰς ἀπληστιάν σκωφθῇ. Of the moderns, some have followed the ancients in supposing that the incident is meant to satirize Aristophanes and his intemperate habits (so Stallbaum, Rücker, Steinhart); while some (Stephens, Sydenham, Wolf, Schwegler) take the object of the ridicule to be not so much the habits of the poet as his speech with its “indelicate ingredients.” On the other hand, Schleiermacher held the view that Eryximachus with his “physiological and medical notion of love” is here being satirized; while Ast—whose view is shared in the main by Hommel, van Prinsterer and Rettig—argued that the real object of the ridicule is Pausanias, by whose speech Aristophanes implies that he has been “fed up” to the point of loathing. This view Rettig thinks is supported by the phrase Παυσανίου πανσαμένου, which he takes to indicate Apollodorus’ ridicule,—by the allusion made by Aristophanes to Pausanias’ speech in 189 c,—and by his mention of Pausanias again in 193 b; and he construes the hint of another

1 See above, § ii. A, ad fin.
possible cause (ἡ ὀπίσθι τινος ἄλλου, 185 c) as “affording the key to the hidden meaning of the word πληγομένη.” This view, however, is open to the objections (urged by Rückert against Ast) that, first, it makes Aristophanes guilty of excessive rudeness in feigning a hiccup to show his disgust (“aliud est in convivio iocari, aliud in scena,” e.g. Nub. 906 ff., Ach. 585 ff., the places cited by Rettig); and that, further, there is no plain sign that the hiccup was feigned, but on the contrary the whole incident is stated by Aristodemus as matter-of-fact. It seems safe, therefore, to conclude that the most obvious view—that of the ancients—is nearest to the truth. The incident shows up Aristophanes in a ludicrous light, and at the same time it gives further occasion to Eryximachus to air his medical lore; so that we can read in it the intention of satirizing gently both these personages. But to construe it as aimed at Pausania is far-fetched and improbable: he is already disposed of in the satirical reference to sophistical “isology”; and to discover a fresh allusion to him in the “other cause” of the hiccup is to discover a mare’s nest, for—as the Scholiast ad loc. informs us—other physical causes of this symptom were as a matter of fact recognized by the medical profession, and it is only polite on the part of Aristodemus to leave the matter open.

The second Interlude (189 a—c) and the third (193 d—194 e) call for no special remark.

The fourth Interlude (198 a—199 c), which follows on the speech of Agathon, is linked to the third both by a remark which Socrates addresses to Eryximachus, and also, at the close, by his appeal to Phaedrus (cp. 199 b with 194 d). Here, in even a greater degree than in the previous Interludes, Socrates is the central figure of interest, and this position he continues to hold throughout the rest of the dialogue. This Interlude, indeed, may be regarded as one of the cardinal points of the structure, in which the First Act, as we may term it, passes on into the Second; and in the Second Act we reach at length the theoretical climax, in the doctrine of Socrates-Diotima. To this climax the present Interlude, wherein is laid before us Socrates’ confession of rhetorical faith, serves as prologue.

The fifth Interlude (212 c—215 a) is by far the longest and, as regards the action of the piece, the most important. For it introduces a new actor, and he a protagonist, in the person of Alcibiades. The contrast is striking between the prophetess in her soaring flights to the heavenly places of the spirit and the tipsy reveller with his lewd train who takes her place in claiming the attention of the audience. The
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comic relief which, in the earlier scenes, had been supplied by Aristophanes, as γελωτητως, is now supplied by Alcibiades. We should notice also how a link with the Second Act is furnished here, at the commencement of the Third Act, by the mention of an attempt by Aristophanes to reply to an observation made by Socrates in the course of his speech. But apart from this, the rest of the speakers and banqueters are left out of account except only Agathon, Socrates and Eryximachus. The action of the last of these here is parallel to his action at the commencement of the First Act where he had taken the lead in fixing the rules for the conduct of the symposium. As regards Agathon and Socrates, the most important incident in this Interlude is the decision concerning their contest in σοφία which is pronounced by Alcibiades, when, acting the not inappropriate part of Dionysus, he awards the crown to Socrates,—an incident to the significance of which we have already (§ ii. B, C) drawn attention.

Of the Epilogue or concluding scene (222 c—end) it is unnecessary to say much. The persons that figure most largely in it are the three central characters, Alcibiades, Agathon and Socrates; while towards the close the rest of the characters receive, as it were, a farewell notice. When the curtain finally falls, it falls significantly on the solitary figure of Socrates, the incarnation of the Eros-daemon, behind whom in his shadow stands the form of his erastes, the "shadow"-biographer Aristodemus.

§ iii. The First Five Speeches.

1. Phaedrus, son of Pythocles, belonged to the Attic deme Myrhrinus. Lysias describes him as "impoverished" in circumstances, but respectable. In the Protagoras he is represented as a disciple of Hippias; while in the Phaedrus—named after him—his chief characteristic is his ardent interest in erotic oratory (λόγοι ἐρωτικοί), a specimen of which, by Lysias, he has learnt almost completely by heart. It is, then, in accordance with this character that we find Phaedrus, in the Symposium, made responsible for the theme of the series of speeches (viz. ἔπαινος Ἐρωτος, 177 d), and entitled παρήρ τοῦ λόγου. We may gather also from certain indications contained both in the Phaedrus and in the Symposium that Phaedrus was neither physically strong nor mentally vigorous. The ostensibly prominent

1 See Phaedr. 227 b, Symp. 176 c, 223 n, and, generally, his cultivation of medical friends. Also the probable word-play in the deme-name Μυρρηνωτης, Symp. 176 n, Phaedr. 244 a.
position assigned to such a man in the Symposium is more natural if we assume that it is due to the desire to make him a link between this dialogue and the Phaedrus.

Phaedrus's speech, although not without merit in point of simplicity of style and arrangement, is poor in substance. The moral standpoint is in no respect raised above the level of the average citizen; the speaker pays little regard to consistency, and the method of argument, with its want of logical coherence, savours much of the sophists. As examples of this self-contradiction we may point to the statement that Achilles, as younger than Patroclus, must be παιδικό not ἐραστής, whereas Alcestis, though younger than Admetus, is treated as the ἐρώτα, not the ἐρωμένη; we may point also to the other inconsequence, that the self-sacrifice of Achilles, the παιδικό, is cited in support of the contention that oi ἐρωτείς μόνοι are capable of such self-sacrifice. The arbitrary handling of the Orpheus myth is another striking illustration of the sophistic manner.

What is, however, most characteristic of the speech of Phaedrus is its richness of mythological allusion. Lacking, it would seem, in native force of intellect, Phaedrus relies upon authority and tradition. He quotes Hesiod and Homer, Acusilaos and Parmenides: he builds his argument, such as it is, on the sayings of "them of old time," and on the legendary histories of the son of Oeagrus and the daughter of Pelias; and when he can confute Aeschylus on a point of mythology his joy is great. As a lover of religious tradition, we may credit Phaedrus with a capacity for genuine religious feeling; certainly, in his rôle as high-priest of Eros, on the present occasion, he shows a strict regard for ritual propriety when he rebukes Socrates for interrupting the service of speech-offerings to the god (194 ν)

In point of literary style we may notice the following features:

(a) Rhetorical ornamentation: chiasmus (178 ν), paronomasia (179 ς), special compound verbs (ἀγαυθέντες 179 σ, ὑπεραγαυθέντες 180 Α; ἀποθανεῖν 179 Ε, ὑπεραποθανεῖν, ἐπαποθανεῖν 180 Α);


2 Hug sums up the position of Phaedrus thus (p. xvi): "Phædros stellt den gewöhnlichen athenischen Bürger dar, den eine rastlose Neugierde zu den rhetorischen und philosophischen Kreisen hindrängt, der da und dort etwas aufschnappt und sich aneignet, jedoch ohne tieferes Verständnis, aber mit desto grössem Selbstbewusstsein." Cp. Jowett (Plato 1. p. 528): "The discourse of Phaedrus is half-mythical, half-ethical; and he himself...is half-sophist, half-enthusiast."
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(b) Monotony of expression (οὖτε...οὖτε 178 C (4), 178 D (2); οὖτως...ὡς 178 D (2), οὖτω...ὡς 179 A, C, τοσοῦτον...ὡς 179 C; καὶ μὴ...γε 179 A, B; οὖτω καὶ 179 D, τοιγάρτοι διὰ ταῦτα 179 D, δὴν δὲ καὶ 180 A);

(c) Anacolutha: 177 A (οὐ δεινὸν κτλ.), 179 A (καὶ μὴ...οὖτω κακός).

2. Of Pausanias, of the deme Κεραμῆς, little is known beyond what we are told in this dialogue¹ and in Xenophon’s Symposium, where also he appears as notorious for his love for the tragedian Agathon. Xenophon represents Pausanias as a vigorous champion of παιδεραστία², and Plato here assigns to him a similar rôle, although he paints the fashion of the man in less crude colours.

The speech of Pausanias is a composition of considerable ability. Although, like Phaedrus, he starts by grounding his conception of the dual Eros on mythological tradition, yet when this conception is once stated the distinction is maintained and its consequences followed out with no little power of exposition. The manner in which the laws regarding παιδεραστία in the various states are distinguished, and in special the treatment of the complex Athenian νόμος, display the cleverness of a first-rate pleader. The general impression, in fact, given us by the speech is that it forms an exceedingly smart piece of special pleading in favour of the proposition καλὸν ἑρασταῖς χαρίζονταί. The nakedness of this proposition is cloked by the device of distinguishing between a noble and a base Eros, and by the addition of the saving clause ἀρετὴς ἐνεκά³. None the less, it would seem that the speaker’s main interest is in the χαρίζονταί, rather than in the accruing ἀρετὴ, and that he is fundamentally a sensualist, however refined and specious may be the form in which he gives expression to his sensualism.

Pausanias is a lawyer-like person in his style of argumentation; and, appropriately enough, much of his speech is concerned with νόμοι.

¹ He is also mentioned in Protag. 315 ν.
² Xen. Symp. vii. 82 ἀποδογόμενος ὑπὲρ τῶν ἑραστῶν συγκυλινδομένων.
³ We must, of course, bear in mind that, as Jowett puts it (Plato, vol. 1, p. 529), “the value which he attributes to such loves as motives to virtue and philosophy, (though) at variance with modern and Christian notions, is in accordance with Hellenic sentiment.” Nor does the Platonic Socrates, in the sequel, fail to take account of them. For some judicious observations on the general question of the Grk. attitude to paederastia, see Jowett, op. cit. pp. 584 ff.; Gomperz, Gk. Thinkers (E. Tr.) ii, pp. 380 ff.; for Eros in Gk. religion, see Miss J. E. Harrison, Prolegom. pp. 630 ff.; for Plato’s and Xenophon’s theories of Love, see I. Bruns, Vorträge etc., pp. 118 ff.; P. Crain, pp. 23 ff.
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The term is noteworthy, since it inevitably suggests that antithesis νόμος (φύσις) which was so widely debated among the sophists and thinkers of the close of the fifth century. Is the moral standard fixed by nature (φύσεως) or merely by convention (νόμος)? This was one form of the question; and closely connected with this was the other form: Is knowledge absolute or relative? Pausanias poses as a conventionalist, and a relativist, a champion of law as against nature (πάσα πράξεις αυτῇ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς οὐκε καλὴ οὔτε αἰσχρὰ); and this is of itself sufficient to show that, in Plato’s eyes, he is a specimen of the results of sophist teaching.

Nor is it only in his adoption of this principle of moral indifference, as we might call it, and in his capacity τὸν ἄπτω λόγον κρείττω πολείν, that Pausanias stands before us as a downright sophist; his argumentation also is chargeable with the sophistical vices of inconsistency and self-contradiction. For example, with what right, we may ask, does Pausanias condemn the νόμοι of other states than Athens regarding παιδεραστία, while laying down τὸ νόμον as the standard of morality? For such a distinction necessarily involves reference to another, superior, standard; whereas, by his own hypothesis, no such standard exists. Again, the section on the καλὴ ἀπάτη (181 ε. f.) stands out in curious contradiction with the section immediately preceding, in which fidelity and sincerity (τὸ βέβαιον) are put forward as the necessary conditions of a love that is fair (καλὸς) and irreproachable (οὐκ ἐπουείδιστος).

In literary style the speech of Pausanias displays, in a much higher degree than that of Phaedrus, the tricks and ornaments proper to the sophistical schools of rhetoric. Thus we find:

Paronomasia: ἐργα ἐργαζομένων 182 ε.; δουλεῖας δουλεύων 183 λ.; πράττειν τὴν πράξειν 181 λ., cp. 183 β.

Alliteration: ἑθέλοντες δουλεῖας δουλεύων οἷς σῦ δὲ δοῦλος οὐδεὶς (λ, δ, ο, ου).

Rhythmic correspondence of clauses and periods (εἰρυθμία, ἵσώκωλα): This is an important feature of Greek rhetoric, the invention of which is ascribed to Thrasymachus; and it is especially characteristic of the style of Isocrates. The following examples (as formulated by Hug)

1 So Jowett (Plato i. p. 529) writes: “(The speech of Pausanias) is at once hyperlogical in form and also extremely confused and pedantic.”
2 Cp. Ar. Rhet. iii. 9, 1409b 25 λέξεις κατεστραμμένη καὶ ὁμολα ταῖς τῶν ἄρχαίων ποιητῶν ἀντιστράφους.
3 A good example occurs in Helena 17:
   τοῦ μὲν ἐπίτοινον καὶ φιλοκυδίνον τὸν βίον κατέστησε
   τῆς δὲ περιβλεπτον καὶ περιμάχητον τὴν φύσιν ἐποίησε.
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will serve to indicate the extent to which Pausanias makes use of these artifices:

1. ὅσα γὰρ πράξεις ὤν ἔχει.
2. αὐτῇ ἐφ’ έαυτῆς,
3. οὕτε καλῆ οὕτ’ αἰσχρά.

4. οἷον δ’ νῦν ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν,
5. ἡ πίνειν ἡ λαμπάν ἡ διαλέγομαι,
6. οὔκ ἦστι τούτων αὐτὸ καλὸν οὐδέν,

7. ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ πράξει,
8. ὃς ἄν πραγματεύοις,
9. τοιούτων ἀπέβη.

10. καλὸς μὲν γὰρ πραγματεύομεν καὶ ὅρθως καλὸν γίγνεται,
11. μὴ ὅρθως δὲ αἰσχρόν,

12. οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἱπάν καὶ ὁ Ἑρώς οὐ πᾶς ἦστι καλὸς οὐδὲ ἀξίω

ἔγκυμαῖσεςθαι,
13. ἀλλὰ ὃ καλὸς προστέπων ἐράν. [180 ε ad fin.—181 λ.]

Here we have four περίσσοτε of which the first three are τρίκωλοι, the fourth τετράκωλος: in the three τρίκωλοι, the καλα of each are approximately equal; while in the τετράκωλος, long and short καλα alternate.

Other instances of strophic correspondence are 184 d—ε, 185 ά ff. (see Hug ad loc.).

3. Eryximachus, son of Akumenus, is like his father a physician and a member of the Asclepiad guild (186 ε); he is also a special friend of Phaedrus (177 ά). Alcibiades alludes to Akumenus as "the most temperate sire" of Eryximachus, and he is mentioned also by Xenophon as an authority on diet. The same "temperance" (σωφροσύνη) is a marked characteristic of Eryximachus in our dialogue: he is the champion of moderation in drinking (176 β ff., 214 β), and when, near the close, the revellers enter and the fun waxes fast and furious, Eryximachus, together with his comrade Phaedrus, is the first to make his escape (223 β). Another characteristic of the man is his pedantic manner. He is incapable of laying aside his professional solemnity even for a moment, and he seizes every possible occasion to air his medicinal lore, now with a lecture on μέθη (176 δ), presently with another on λύγξ (185 δ, ε).

Scientific pedantry is, similarly, the characteristic of Eryximachus's speech. He starts with a conception of Eros as a cosmic principle, from
the standpoint of natural philosophy. This conception he applies and develops with equal rigour in the spheres of medicine, music, astronomy and religion, so that definitions of a precisely parallel kind for each of these departments are evolved. The dogmatic manner appears also in his treatment of the dictum of Heraclitus (187 a), which corresponds to the treatment of Aeschylus by his friend Phaedrus. He resembles Phaedrus also in his fondness for displaying erudition: he knows his Empedocles and his Hippocrates, as well as the experts in musical theory.

The theory of the duality of Eros Eryximachus takes over from Pausanias, but he naturally finds a difficulty in applying this concept to other spheres, such as that of music, and in attempting to elude the difficulty he falls into the sophistical vices of ambiguity and inconsistency. E.g. in 187 ν the reference of δει χαρίζεσθαι is obscure; and, in the same context, the substitutions of ἡ Οὐρανία Μοίρα for 'Ἄφροδίτη Οὐρανία and of Πολυναία for 'Ἄφροδίτη Πάνθημος are arbitrary'.

As regards literary style there is little to notice in the speech, beyond its plainness and lack of ornament. The monotony of expression (seen, e.g., in the recurrence of such formulae as ἵστη δὴ 187 Β, ἵστη γὰρ 187 ζ, ἵστη δὲ 187 ι) marks it as the product of a pedantic, would-be scientific mind, in which literary taste is but slightly developed and the ruling interest is the schematization of physical doctrines.

4. Aristophanes. The greatest of Greek comic poets, the author of the Clouds, was a pronounced anti-Socratic. None the less, Plato

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1 Cf. Eurip. fr. 839 τὴν ‘Ἄφροδίτην οὐχ ὅρας ὅση θέος; | ἢν οὐδ’ ἄν εἴπως, οὐδὲ μετρήσαις ἄν | ὅση πέροκε κάνι’ ὅσων διέρχεται. | ...ἐραὶ μὲν ἐμβρον γα’,...ἐραὶ δ’, ὅση σεμανήσαι οὐρανὸς κτλ.

2 Pfeiderer (Sokr. u. Plato, pp. 551 ff.) broaches the theory that Eryx.'s speech is intended as a parody of (Pseudo-) Hippocr. πεπλεῖσθαι, and that the real author of that work was Eryx. himself. There are, certainly, a number of similarities, but hardly sufficient to prove the case. Obviously, it is a parody of the style of some one or more medical writers, but more than that cannot safely be said: some Hippocratean parallels in matters of detail will be found in the notes. See also my remarks on the next speech (Aristophanes'). Teuffel drew attention to the etymological significance of the name (ἐραίω-μαχος); this, however, cannot be an invention of Plato's, although it may partly account for the introduction of the λόγος incident.

3 The doctrine of Love as a harmony of opposites, which plays so large a part in Eryx.'s discourse, may be illustrated from Spenser ("Hymn to Love"):

"Ayre hated earth and water hated fyre,
Till Love relented their rebellious yre.
He then them tooke, and, tempering goodly well
Their contrary dislikes with loved meanes,
Did place them all in order," etc.
paints him here in no dark colours, but does justice to his mastery of language, his fertility of imagination, his surprising wit, his hearty joviality. In contrast to the puritanism of the pragmatical doctor, Aristophanes appears as a man of strength to mingle strong drink, who jokes about his "baptism" by liquor (176 v), and turns the scientific axioms of the "man of art" to ridicule (189 A). His rôle is, in fact, throughout that of a γελωτουσίως (189 A), and he supplies the comic business of the piece with admirable gusto. Yet the part he plays is by no means that of a vulgar buffoon: he is poet as well as jester,—a poet of the first magnitude, as is clearly indicated by the speech which Plato here puts in his mouth.

That speech is a masterpiece of grotesque fantasy worthy of Rabelais himself. The picture drawn of the globular four-legged men is intensely comic, and the serious manner in which the king of gods and men ponders the problem of their punishment shows a very pretty wit. Their sexual troubles, too, are expounded with characteristic frankness. And it is with the development of the sex-problem that we arrive at the heart of this comedy in miniature,—the definition of Eros as "the craving for wholeness" (τοῦ ὀλον ἐπιθυμία 192 e).

This thought, which is the final outcome of the speech, is not without depth and beauty. It suggests that in Love there is something deeper and more ultimate than merely a passion for sensual gratification; it implies that sexual intercourse is something less than an end in itself. But Aristophanes, while suggesting these more profound reflections, can provide no solid ground for their support; he bases them on the most portentous of comic absurdities. Here, as so often elsewhere in the genuine creations of the poet, we find it difficult to determine where παιδία ends and σπουδή begins. How far, we ask ourselves, are the suggestions of an idealistic attitude towards the problems of life seriously meant? Does the cloak of cynicism and buffoonery hide a sincere moralist? Or is it not rather the case that the mockery is the man, and the rest but a momentary

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1 Cp. Plut. Q. Conv. vii. 7. 710 c Πλάτων δὲ τὸν τ' Ἀριστοφάνους λόγον περὶ τοῦ ἔρωτος ὡς κωμόδιαν ἐμφασίζεις εἰς τὸ συμπόσιον.
2 Cp. Zeller (n. on 192 o ff. ἡλίον ἄλα τι, κτλ.) "Diese Stelle, in welcher der ernsthafte Grundgedanke unserer Stelle am Deutlichsten zu Tage kommt, gehört wohl zu dem Tiefsten, was von alten Schriftstellern über die Liebe gesagt ist."
3 See Jevons, Hist. of Gk. Lit. pp. 258 f. for some judicious criticisms of the view that "behind the grinning mask of comedy is the serious face of a great political teacher."
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disguise? Certainly, the view maintained by Rettig that the chief purpose of Aristophanes is to impugn παιδεραστία, and to preach up legitimate matrimony as the only true form of love and the sole road to happiness, is a view that is wholly untenable. And while we may acknowledge with Horn (Platonstud. p. 261) that the speech of Aristophanes marks a great advance upon the previous λόγοι, in so far as it recognizes the difficulty of the problem presented by the phenomena of Eros and looks below the surface for a solution,—yet how far we are intended to ascribe this sagacity on the part of the speaker to superior reasoning power rather than to a lucky inspiration (θεία μοίρα) is by no means clear.

In connexion with this question as to the design of the speech there is one point which seems to have been generally overlooked by the expositors,—the topical character, as we might term it, of its main substance. This appears, obviously enough, in the jesting reference (193 b) to the love-affairs of Pausanias and Agathon; and obvious enough too are the allusions to Eryximachus and his much-vaunted “art” in the mention made, both at the beginning (189 b) and at the end (193 d), of the healing power of Love, the good “physician.” But in addition to these topical allusions which sautent aux yeux, we are justified, I think, in regarding the great bulk of the discourse as being neither more nor less than a caricature of the physiological opinions held and taught by the medical profession of the day. The Hippocratean tract περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπον is sufficient evidence that there raged in medical circles a controversy concerning the unity or multiplicity of man’s nature: the author of the tract was himself an anti-unity man and assailed with equal vigour the views of all opponents, whether the unity they stood for was αἷμα or χολή or φλέμα—ἐν γάρ τι εἶναι φασιν, ὦτι ἐκαστος αὐτέων βιοῦται ὁνόμασα, καὶ τούτῳ ἐν ἕν μεταλλάσσετον τὴν ἴδεν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν. To this controversy Aristophanes, we may suppose, alludes when he speaks of man’s ἀρχαία φύσις, which was a unity until by the machinations of Zeus it became a duality. But with this theory of primeval unity of nature the poet combines a theory of sex-characteristics. And, here again, even more definitely, we can discover traces of allusion to current physiological doctrines. Aristophanes derives the different varieties of sex-characters from the bisection of the three primitive δία, viz. φιλανδροὶ women and φιλογύναικες men from the ἀνδρόγυνον, φιλογύναικες women (ἐπαριστρατ) from the original θῆλυ, and φιλανδροὶ men from the original ἄρρεν. Thus we see that Aristophanes analyses
existing sex-characters, classifies them under two heads for each sex, and explains them by reference to a three-fold original. If we turn now to Hippocrates περὶ διαίτης (cc. 28 f.) we find there also a theory of "the evolution of sex." Premising that the female principle is akin to water and the male to fire, the writer proceeds thus: "If the bodies secreted by both parents are male (ἄρσενα)...they become men (ἄνδρες) brilliant in soul and strong in body, unless damaged by after regimen (i.e. by lack of ξηρῶν καὶ θερμῶν σίτων, etc.). If, however, the body secreted by the male parent is male and that by the female, and the male element proves the stronger...then men are produced, less brilliant (λαμπροί), indeed, than the preceding class, yet justly deserving of the name of 'manly' (ἄνδρεῖων). And again, if the male parent secretes a female body and the female a male body, and the latter proves the stronger, the male element deteriorates and the men so produced are 'effeminates' (ἄνδρόγυνοι). Similarly with the generation of women. When both parents alike secrete female elements, the most feminine and comely women (θηλυκώτατα καὶ ευφυέστατα) are produced. If the woman secretes a female, the man a male body, and the former proves the stronger, the women so produced are bolder (θραυστέραι) but modest (κόσμια). While if, lastly, the female element prevails, when the female element comes from the male parent and the male element from the female, then the women so produced are more audacious (τολμηρότεραι) than the last class and are termed 'masculine' (ἄνδρεῖαι).

Here we find the sex-characters arranged under three heads for each sex, and explained by reference to four originals, two from each parent. Obviously, this theory is more complicated than the one which Aristophanes puts forward, but in its main lines it is very similar. According to both the best class of men is derived from a dual male element, and the best class of women from a dual female element (although the poet is less complimentary than the physician in his description of this class). The similarity between the two is less close in regard to the intermediate classes; for while Aristophanes derives from his ἄνδρόγυνον but one inferior class of men and one of women, Hippocrates derives from various combinations of his mixed (θηλυ + ἄρσεν) secretions two inferior classes of both sexes. Yet here, too, under the difference lies a consentience in principle, since both theorists derive all their inferior sex-characters from a mixed type.

We may imagine, then, that Aristophanes, having before his mind some such physiological theory as this, proceeded to adapt it to his purpose somehow as follows. Suppose we take the male element latent,
as the Hippocrates tell us, in each sex, combine them, and magnify them into a concrete personality, the result will be a Double-man. A similar imaginative treatment of the female elements will yield us a Double-wife. While, if—discarding the perplexing minutiae of the physiological combinations assumed by the doctors—we take a female element from one parent and blend it with a male element from the other, and magnify it according to our receipt, we shall thereby arrive at the Man-wife as our third primeval personality. Such a treatment of a serious scientific theory would have all the effect of a caricature; and it is natural to suppose that in choosing to treat the matter in this way Aristophanes intended to satirize the theories of generation and of sex-evolution which were argued so solemnly and so elaborately by the confrères of Eryximachus.

If in this regard the topical character of the speech be granted, one can discern an added point in the short preliminary conversation between Aristophanes and Eryximachus by which it is prefaced. The latter gives a warning (189 a—b) that he will be on the watch for any ludicrous statement that may be made; to which the former replies: "I am not afraid lest I should say what is ludicrous (γελοῖα) but rather what is absurd (καταγέλαστα)." In view of what follows, we may construe this to mean that Aristophanes regards as καταγέλαστα theories such as those of Eryximachus and his fellow-Asclepiads. Moreover, this view of the relation in which Aristophanes' speech stands to the treatises of the medical doctrinaires—of whom Eryximachus is a type—helps to throw light on the relative position of the speeches, and on the incident by which that position is secured and emphasized. For unless we can discover some leading line of connexion between the two which necessitates the priority of the medico's exposition, the motive for the alteration in the order of the speeches must remain obscure.

It may be added that the allusions in 189 ἐ (see notes ad loc.) to the evolutionary theories of Empedocles confirm the supposition that Aristophanes is directly aiming the shafts of his wit at current medical doctrines; the more so as Empedocles shares with Hippocrates the view that the male element is hot, the female cold, and that the offspring is produced by a combination of elements derived from both parents. Other references to Empedocles may be discerned in the mention of Hephaestus (192 ν) who, as personified Fire, is one of Empedocles' "four roots," and in the mention of Zeus (190 c), another of the "roots"; and the fact that these two deities play opposite
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parts, the one as bisector, the other as unifier, is in accordance with Empedoclean doctrine. Also the statement that the moon "partakes of both sun and earth" (190 b) is, in part at least, Empedoclean.

In point of style and diction, the speech of Aristophanes stands out as an admirable piece of simple Attic prose, free at once from the awkwardness and monotony which render the speeches of Phaedrus and Eryximachus tedious and from the over elaboration and artificial ornamentation which mar the discourses of Pausanias and Agathon. In spite of occasional poetic colouring—as, e.g., in the finely painted scene between Hephaestus and the lovers (192 ff.)—the speech as a whole remains on the level of pure, easy flowing, rhythmical prose, in which lucidity is combined with variety and vivacity of expression.

5. Agathon, the tragic poet, if born in 448 B.C., would be a little over thirty at the date of the Symposium (416). He was the παιδικά of Pausanias (193 b), and a man of remarkable beauty as well as of reputed effeminacy.1 He appears in the dialogue as not only a person of wealth, position and popularity, but a man of refinement, education and social tact. The banquet itself is given by him to a select company of his friends in honour of his recent victory in the tragic contest, and throughout the dialogue he is, formally at least, the central figure—both as host and as victor, and, what is more, as the embodiment of external κάλλος alike in his person (εἴδος) and in his speech (λόγοι). His graceful politeness to his guests never varies, even when Socrates sharply criticises his oration, or when Alcibiades transfers the wreath from his head to that of Socrates (213 ε); he himself shares in the admiration for Socrates, welcomes him most warmly and displays the

1 Ar. Thesm. 191–2 σο δ' εὐπρόσωπος, λεωκός, ἔξυρημένος,
γυναικόφωνος, ἀπαλός, εὐπρεπὴς ἑδεῖν.
ib. 200 ff.
καὶ μὴν σὸ γ', ὦ κατάπνγων, εὐφροσυκτὸς εἰ
οὐ τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς παθήμασιν, κτλ.
And Mnesilochus' comments on Agathon's speech and womanish appearance in 130 ff.
ὡς ἤδι τὸ μέλος, ὥς πότεριν Γενετυλίδες,
καὶ κηθυδροθάνει καὶ κατεγλωττισμένον, κτλ.
In estimating the value of Aristophanes' abuse of his contemporary—in the case of Agathon as in the case of Euripides—we must make due allowances for Ar.'s comic style. As Jevons well observes (Hist. of Gk. Lit. p. 274): "In polemics, as in other things, the standard of decency is a shifting one. Terms which one age would hesitate to apply to the most abandoned villain are in another century of such frequent use as practically to be meaningless....The charges of immorality which Ar. brings against Eur. and his plays are simply Ar.'s way of saying that on various points he totally disagrees with Eur." Probably the same holds good of his treatment of Agathon.
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utmost jubilation when Socrates promises to eulogize him (223 a). Finally, his consideration is shown in the social καρπερία with which he sticks to his post, drinking and talking, till all his guests, except Socrates, have either left or succumbed to drowsiness (223 d).

In his speech Agathon claims that he will improve on the method of his predecessors. In his attention to method he is probably taking a leaf out of the book of Gorgias, his rhetorical master and model. Besides the initial distinction between the nature and effects of Eros, another mark of formal method is his practice of recapitulation: at the close of each section of his discourse he summarises the results1. In his portrait of the nature of Eros—his youth, beauty, suppleness of form and delicacy of complexion—Agathon does little more than formulate the conventional traits of the god as depicted in poetry and art. His attempts to deduce these attributes are mere παιδί (197 e), pieces of sophistical word-play. Somewhat deeper goes his explanation of the working of Eros upon the soul, as well as the body; but the thought that Eros aims at the beautiful (197 b) is his most fruitful deliverance and the only one which Socrates, later on, takes up and develops2.

We may observe, further, how Agathon, like Phaedrus, indulges in mythological references, and how—like most of his predecessors (cp. 180 d, 185 e)—he makes a point of criticising and correcting the views of others (194 e, 195 e). Cp. Isocr. Busir. 222 b, 230 a.

In style and diction the speech of Agathon gives abundant evidence of the influence of the school of Gorgias, especially in the preface (194 e—195 a) and in the 2nd part (197 c—e). Thus we find repeated instances of:—


2 Jowett is somewhat flattering when he writes (Plato 1. p. 531): “The speech of Agathon is conceived in a higher strain (sc. than Aristophanes'), and receives the real if half-ironical approval of Socrates. It is the speech of the tragic poet and a sort of poem, like tragedy, moving among the gods of Olympus, and not among the elder or Orphic deities.... The speech may be compared with that speech of Socrates in the Phaedrus (230 a, n) in which he describes himself as talking dithyrambs.... The rhetoric of Agathon elevates the soul to 'sunlit heights'.” One suspects that “the approval of Socrates” is more ironical than real. Agathon's speech belongs to the class condemned by Alcibiamas, de Soph. 12 οἱ τοῖς δούλοις ἀκριβῶς ἐξειργασθεῖσθαι καὶ μᾶλλον πονηματικὴ ἡ λόγος ἐκδοκήσει: cp. id. 14 ἀνάγκη...τὰ μὲν ὑποκρίσει καὶ ῥαψωδία παραπλήσσει δοκεῖν εἶναι.
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Short parallel Kola with homoeoteleuton: e.g. 194 ε ἴγου δὲ ἐν |
βούλημα | πρώτον μὲν εἰπεῖν | ὀς χρή με εἰπεῖν | ἐπεὶτα εἰπεῖν: 197 ὁ
ἀλληλομάρτυς μὲν κενοὶ, οἰκείωτησ δὲ πληροὶ.

Homoeoteleuton and assonance: e.g. τών ἁγαθῶν ἐν ὁ θεὸς ἀντίσ
ἀιτίος (194 ε); τρόπος ὀρθὸς παντὸ...ἐπεὶ παντὸ...οἷς <ὁν> οὖν ἀιτίος
ὡς (195 λ); πάντων θεῶν εὐδαιμόνων ὄντων (195 λ).

These rhetorical artifices are especially pronounced in the concluding
section, as is indicated by the sarcastic comment of Socrates (198 β ἄ
ἐπὶ τελευτῆς, κτλ.); in fact, the whole of this section is, as Hug puts
it, a "förmliche Monodie." Another feature of A's style is his fondness
for quotation, especially from the poets (196 ε, 196 λ, 197 β), and his
tendency to break into verse himself—ἐπέρχεται δὲ μόι τι καὶ ἐμμετρον
εἰπεῖν (197 c). He has no clear idea of the limits of a prose style, as
distinguished from verse; and the verses he produces are marked by
the same Gorgianic features of assonance and alliteration. In fine, we
can hardly describe the general impression made on us by the style of
Agathon better than by adapting the Pauline phrase—"Though he
speak with the tongues of men and of angels, he is become as sounding
brass or a tinkling cymbal."

§ iv. Socrates and Diotima.

To Socrates it falls to deliver the last of the encomia on Eros. This
is no mere accident, but artistically contrived in order to indicate
the relative importance of his encomium as the climax of the series.
In form and content, as well as in extent, it holds the highest place,
although to its speaker is assigned the ἵσχατη κλίνη.

(A) The substance and form of Socrates' λόγοι.

(a) The encomium proper is preceded by a preliminary dialectical
discussion with Agathon, the object of which is to clear the ground of
some popular misconceptions of the nature of Eros. The notion of
Eros, it is shown, is equivalent to that of Desire (ἐρωτὸς = τὸ ἐπιθυμῶν)

1 Distinguish this from the more Isocratean style of the speech of Pausanias
with its more developed ἵσκα and εὐφθυμία of periods. Cp. Aristoph. frag. 300 καὶ
κατ' Ἀγάθων ἀντίθεσιν ἐπιθυμῶν, "shaved Agathon's shorn antithesis."

2 Horn summarises thus (Plato stud. p. 264): "Die ganze Rede mit ihrem
anspruchsvollen Eingang, ihrem nichtigen Inhalt, ihren wolkenden Phrasen und
Sophismen und insbesondere mit dem grossen Schlussefeuerwerke von Antithesen
und Assonanzen ist demnach nichts anderes als ein mit grosser Geschicklichkeit
tworfenes Musterstück der...gorgianisch-sophistischen Rhetorik." See also the
rhythmic analysis (of 195 n ff.) worked out by Blass, Rhythmen, pp. 76 ff.
—a quality, not a person. And the object of this Desire is the beautiful (τὸ καλὸν), as had been asserted by Agathon (201 A—B). That Socrates refuses to embark on an eulogistic description of Eros without this preliminary analysis of the meaning of the name serves, at the start, to differentiate his treatment of the theme from that of all the preceding speakers: it is, in fact, an object-lesson in method, an assertion of the Platonic principle that dialectic must form the basis of rhetoric, and that argument founded on untested assumptions is valueless.

(b) The speech proper begins with a mythological derivation of Eros, in which his conflicting attributes as a δαίμων—a being midway between gods and men—are accounted for by his parentage. Eros is at once poor, with the poverty of Desire which lacks its object, and rich, with the vigour with which Desire strives after its object. And in all its features the Eros of Socrates and Diotima stands in marked contrast to the Eros of conventional poetry and art, the divine Eros of Agathon.

Eros is defined as Desire and as Daemon; and, in the next place, its potency\(^1\) is shown to lie in the striving after the everlasting possession of happiness. But Eros implies also propagation in the sphere of beauty. It is the impulse towards immortality—the impulse displayed alike by animals and by men, the ground of parental love towards both physical and mental (φιλοτιμία) offspring.

But when we arrive at this point, the question suggests itself as to how, more precisely, these different determinations of Eros are related to one another. What is the link between Eros defined as “the desire for the abiding possession of the good” and Eros defined as “the desire for procreation in the beautiful”? The former conception involves a desire for abiding existence, in other words for immortality, inasmuch as the existence of the possessor is a necessary condition of possession; while the latter also involves a similar desire, inasmuch as procreation is the one means by which racial immortality can be secured. Thus the link between the two conceptions of Eros is to be found in the implicit notion common to both that Eros is the striving after immortality or self-perpetuation. But there is another point to be borne in mind in order to grasp clearly the connexion of the argument. The beautiful includes the good (τὰ γαθα καλὰ 201 c); so that the desire for the good is already, implicitly, a desire for the beautiful (and vice versa).

\(^1\) I.e. its generic notion (εἰρατοὶ, τὸ κεφάλαυν 205 b) as distinguished from the specific limitation (καλεῖωθα 205 c, 206 b) to sex-love. See W. Gilbert in Philologus LXVIII. 1, pp. 52 ff.
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Thus the main results of the argument so far are these: Eros is the striving after the lasting possession of the Good, and thereby after immortality; but immortality can be secured only through procreation (τόκος), and the act of procreation requires as its condition the presence of Beauty. We are, therefore, led on to an examination of the nature of Beauty, and it is shown that beauty is manifested in a variety of forms, physical, moral and mental—beauty of body, of soul, of arts and sciences, culminating in the arch-science and the Idea of absolute Beauty. Accordingly the Erastes must proceed in upward course \(^1\) from grade to grade of these various forms of beauty till he finally reaches the summit, the Idea. On the level of each grade, moreover, he is moved by the erotic impulse not merely to apprehend the καλόν presented and to appreciate it, but also to reproduce it in another: there are two moments in each such experience, that of "conception" (κόγνος) or inward apprehension, and that of "delivery" (τόκος) or outward reproduction.

The emphasis here laid on the notion of reproduction and delivery (τίκτευ, γενέα), as applied to the intellectual sphere, deserves special notice. The work of the intelligence, according to the Socratic method, is not carried on in solitary silence but requires the presence of a second mind, an interlocutor, an answerer of questions. For the correct method of testing hypotheses and searching out truth is the conversational method, "dialectic," in which mind cooperates with mind. The practical illustration of this is to be seen in Socrates himself, the pursuer of beautiful youths who delights in converse with them and, warmed by the stimulus of their beauty, λόγοι των αγαθών τίκτει οινες ποιήσοντοι βελτίως τούς νέους (210 c).

(e) As the conception of Eros as a striving after the Ideal pursued not in isolation but in spiritual fellowship (κοινωνία) constitutes the core of the Socratic exposition, so the form of that exposition is so contrived as to give appropriate expression to this central conception. It commences with a piece of dialectic—the conversation between Socrates and Agathon. Agathon is the embodiment of that καλός which here stimulates the ἐραστής in his search for truth: it is in Agathon's soul (ἐν καλῷ) that Socrates deposits the fruits of his pregnant mind. In much, too, of the exposition of Diotima the semblance, at least, of intellectual κοινωνία is retained, illustrating the speaker's principle of philosophic co-operation. Thus the speech as a whole may be regarded

\(^1\) It is interesting to observe how Emerson makes use of this Platonic "anabasis" when he writes:—"There is a climbing scale of culture...up to the ineffable mysteries of the intellect."
simply as a Platonic dialogue in miniature, which differs from the average dialogue mainly in the fact that the chief speaker and guiding spirit is not Socrates but another, and that other a woman. If asked for a reason why Socrates here is not the questioner but the answerer, a sufficient motive may be found in the desire to represent him as a man of social tact. Socrates begins by exposing the ignorance of Agathon: next he makes the amend honourable by explaining that he had formerly shared that ignorance, until instructed by Diotima.1

(B) Diotima and her philosophy.

(1) Diotima. Diotima is a fictitious personage. Plato, no doubt purposely, avoids putting his exposition of Eros into the mouth of any historical person: to do so would be to imply that the theory conveyed is not original but derived. It is only for purposes of literary art that Diotima here supplants the Platonic Socrates: she is presented, by a fiction, as his instructor, whereas in facts he merely gives utterance to his own thoughts. These thoughts, however, and this theory are, by means of this fiction, represented as partaking of the nature of divine revelation; since in Diotima of Mantinea we find a combination of two significant names. The description γνωτὶ Μαντινωτὶ inevitably implies the "mantic" art, which deals with the converse between men and gods of which τὸ δαιμόνιον, and therefore the Eros-daemon, is the mediating agent (202 ε); while the name Διοτίμα, "She that has honour from Zeus," suggests the possession of highest wisdom and authority. This is made clear by the rôle assigned to Zeus and his servants in the Phaedrus: ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμόνιν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς...πρῶτος παρεύρεται, κτλ. (246 β); οἱ μὲν δὴ οὖν Δίος διόν τινα ἔναι ἐγγούσιν τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐρωμένον· σκοποῦσιν οὖν εἰ φιλόσοφος τε καὶ ἡγεμονικὸς τὴν φύσιν καὶ...πᾶν τοιοῦτον ὅπως τοιοῦτος ἔσται, κτλ. (252 β ff.).

The characteristics of Zeus, namely guiding power (ἡγεμονία) and wisdom (σοφία), attach also to his ὀπαδός: consistently with this Diotima is σοφὴ (201 β), and "hegemonic" as pointing out the ὑποθή δόσι to her pupil, and guiding him along it in a masterful manner (210 Α ff., 211 Β ff.).2

1 Cp. Jowett (Plato 1, p. 527): "As at a banquet good manners would not allow him (Socr.) to win a victory either over his host or any of the guests, the superiority which he gains over Agathon is ingeniously represented as having been already gained over himself by her. The artifice has the further advantage of maintaining his accustomed profession of ignorance (cp. Menex. 236 fol.)."

2 Gomperz's suggestion (G. T. 11, p. 396) that "the chief object of this etherealized affection" which Plato had in mind when "in the teaching (of Diotima) he
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In the person of Diotima, "the wise woman," Plato offers us—in Mr Stewart's phrase—"a study in the prophetic temperament"; she represents, that is to say, the mystical element in Platonism, and her discourse is a blend of allegory, philosophy, and myth. As a whole it is philosophical: the allegory we find in the imaginative account of the parentage and nature of Eros, as son of Poros and Penia; the mythical element appears in the concluding portion, in so far as it "sets forth in impassioned imaginative language the Transcendental Idea of the Soul." And as in the allegory the setting is derived from current religious tradition, so in the myth the language is suggested by the enthusiastic cult of the Orphics. It may be well to examine somewhat more closely the doctrine of the prophetess on these various sides.

(2) Diotima's allegory. The first point to notice is the artistic motive for introducing an allegory. It is intended to balance at once the traditional derivations of the God Eros in the earlier speeches, and the grotesque myth of Aristophanes. Socrates can match his rivals in imagination and inventive fancy. It also serves the purpose of putting into a concrete picture those characteristic features of the love-impulse which are subsequently developed in an abstract form. And, thirdly, the concrete picture of Eros thus presented allows us to study more clearly the features in which Socrates, as described by Alcibiades, resembles Eros and embodies the ideal of the philosophic character.

In the allegory the qualities which characterise Eros are fancifully deduced from an origin which is related in the authoritative manner of an ancient theogony. The parents of Eros are Poros and Penia. Poros is clearly intended to be regarded as a God (203 ν θεός, οί τε ἀλλοι καὶ δ...Πόρος): he attends the celestial banquet and drinks nectar like the rest. The nature of Penia is less clearly stated: she cannot be a divine being according to the description of the divine nature as εὐδαιμων and possessing τάγαθα καὶ καλά given in the context preceding (202 c ff.); and the list of the qualities which she hands down to her son Eros shows that she is in all respects the very antithesis of Poros. We must conclude, therefore, that as Poros is the source of the divine side of the nature of Eros, so Penia is the source of the anti-divine side; and from the description of Eros as δαίμων, combined with the definition of τὸ δαίμονιν as μεταξὺ θεῶν τε καὶ θυμίων (202 e), we are justified
gave utterance to his own deepest feeling and most intimate experience" was Dion of Syracuse would supply, if admitted, a further significance to the name Diotima.

1 J. A. Stewart, The Myths of Plato, p. 428.
2 J. A. Stewart, loc. cit.
in identifying this anti-divine side with mortality, and in regarding ἡ Πενία as a personification of ἡ θεωτή φύσις. It is interesting here to notice that Penia had already been personified by Aristophanes in his Plutus, and personified as one member of an antithesis.

In the description of Poros, the father of Eros, it is significant that he is stated to be the son of Μῆτρα. The idea of Plenty (Πόρος) had already been personified by Alcman, whether or not the Scholiast ad loc. is correct in identifying that Poros with the Hesiodic Chaos. And the idea of Wisdom (Μῆτρα) also had played a part, as a personified being, in the speculations of the theogonists. For it seems, at least, probable that the Orphic theologians had already in Plato’s time evolved the equation Phanes = Ericapaeus = Metis, and that here as elsewhere in the language of Diotima there lie allusions to the doctrines of that school of mystics.

Of the incidental details of the allegory, such as “the garden of Zeus” where the intercourse between Penia and Poros took place and the intoxication of Poros which led up to that intercourse, the Neoplatonic commentators, as is their wont, have much to say. But we may more discreetly follow Zeller and Stallbaum in regarding such details as merely put in for purposes of literary effect, to fill up and round off the story. Poros could never have fallen a victim to the charms of Penia, since she had none; nor could Penia ever have hoped to win over Poros by persuasion or force, he being endowed with the strength and wisdom of a god. Obviously, therefore, the god must be tricked and his senses blinded—as in the case of the sleeping Samson or of the intoxicated Noah—that the woman might work her will upon him. Nor need we look for any mystical significance in ὅ τοι Διός κηπος. The celestial banquet would naturally be held in the halls of the King of the gods; that a king’s palace should have a park or garden attached is not extraordinary; nor is it more strange that one

1 So Plotinus is not far astray when he equates πενία with ὅλη, matter, potency (Enn. iii. p. 299 f.).

2 Cp. Plato’s Πόρος (Πενία with Ar.’s Πλοῦτος) (Πενία: also the description of πτωχεία as intermediate between πλοῦτος and πενία in Plut. 552 with the description of Eros as intermediate between πόρος and πενία in Symp. 203 b (οἵτινες ἀπορεῖ “Ερός οὕτε πλούτος”). Cp. also Plut. 80 ff. (Πλοῦτος...ἀνάχων βαδίζει) with Symp. 203 c (“Ερός αὐχμηρός). The date of the Plutus is probably 388 B.C.

Such pairs of opposites were common in earlier speculation. Cp. Spenser, “Hymn in Honour of Love”:

"When thy great mother Venus first thee bare,
Begot of Plentie and of Penurie."

3 Plato’s mention of a single parent of Poros is in accordance with the Orphic notion of Phanes-Metis as bisexed.

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of the banqueters, when overcome with the potent wine of the gods, should seek retirement in a secluded corner of the garden to sleep off the effects of his revels.

More important than these details is the statement that the celestial banquet was held in celebration of the birth of Aphrodite, so that the begetting of Eros synchronized with the birthday of that goddess. The narrative itself explains the reason of this synchronism: it is intended to account for the fact that Eros is the “attendant and minister” of Aphrodite. Plotinus identifies Aphrodite with “the soul,” or more definitely with “the soul of Zeus” (Zeus himself being ὁ νεός), but it seems clear from Plato’s language that she is rather the personification of beauty (Ἀφροδίτης καλῆς οὐτης 203 c).

As regards the list of opposite qualities which Eros derives from his parents, given in 203 c—ε, there are two points which should be especially observed. In the first place, all these qualities, as so derived, are to be regarded not as merely accidental but inborn (φύσει) and forming part of the essential nature of Eros. And secondly, each of these characteristics of Eros, both on the side of his wealth and on the side of his poverty, has its counterpart—as will be shown presently¹—in the characteristics of Socrates, the historical embodiment of Eros.

Lastly, we should notice the emphasis laid on the fluctuating character of Eros, whose existence is a continual ebb and flow, from plenitude to vacuity, from birth to death. By this is symbolised the experience of the ἀφλάκαλος and the ἀφλόσφος, who by a law of their nature are incapable of remaining satisfied for long with the temporal objects of their desire and are moved by a divine discontent to seek continually for new sources of gratification. This law of love, by which τὰ πορικόμενα νέοι οὔκ εἰκοκεῖ, is parallel to the law of mortal existence by which τὰ μὲν (ἀεὶ) γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπόλλυται (207 D ff.)—a law which controls not merely the physical life but also the mental life (ἐπιθυμίας, ἐπιστήματι, etc.)². Accordingly, the Eros-daemon is neither mortal nor immortal in nature (πέφυκεν 203 ν), neither wise nor foolish, but a combination of these opposites—σοφὸς-ἀμαθής and θυμὸς-ἀθάνατος—and it is in virtue of this combination that the most characteristic title of Eros is φιλόσφος (which implies also φιλ-αθανασία).

(3) Diotima’s Philosophy. The philosophic interest of the

¹ See § vi. 3.
² For an expansion in English of this thought see Spenser’s “Two Cantos of Mutabilitie” (F. Q. vii.).
remainder of Diotima’s discourse (from 204 λ to its end) lies mainly in the relations it affirms to exist between Eros and certain leading concepts, viz. the Good, Beauty and Immortality.

(a) The Problem of Immortality. Enough has been said already as to determination of these various concepts as expounded in the earlier part of the discourse (up to 209 ε). But the concluding section, in which “the final mysteries” (tά τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά) are set forth, calls for further investigation. We have already learnt that Eros is “the desire for procreation in the sphere of the beautiful with a view to achieving immortality”; and we have found also that, so far, all the efforts of Eros to achieve this end have been crowned with very imperfect success. Neither by way of the body, nor by way of the mind, can “the mortal nature” succeed, through procreation, in attaining anything better than a posthumous permanence and an immortality by proxy. We have to enquire, therefore, whether any better result can be reached when Eros pursues the ὀρθή ὀός under the guidance of the inspired παθαγμός. The process that goes on during this educational progress is similar in the main to what has been already described. Beauty is discovered under various forms, and the vision of beauty leads to procreation; and procreation is followed by a search for fresh beauty. But there are two new points to observe in the description of the process. First, the systematic method and regularity of procedure, by which it advances from the more material to the less material objects in graduated ascent. And secondly, the part played throughout this progress by the activity of the intellect (νοῦς), which discerns the one in the many and performs acts of identification (210 β) and generalisation (210 c). Thus, the whole process is, in a word, a system of intellectual training in the art of dialectic, in so far as it concerns τὸ καλὸν. And the end to which it leads is the vision of and converse with Ideal Beauty, followed by the procreation of veritable virtue. It is to be observed that this is expressly stated to be not only the final stage in the progress of Eros but the most perfect state attainable on earth by man (τὸ τέλος 211 β, ἐνταῦθα τοῦ βίου βιωτὸν ἀνθρώπω 211 δ, τεκόντω...ὑπάρχει θεοφιλά γενέωται 212 λ). But the question remains, does the attainment of this state convey also personal immortality? It must be granted that this question is answered by Plato, as Horn points out, somewhat ambiguously, “To the man who beholds the Beautiful and thereby is delivered of true ἁρετή it is given to become θεοφιλής and to become ἀδύνατος— to him εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων”: but in this last ἦ-clause there still lies
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a possible ground for doubt. We cannot gain full assurance on the point from this sentence taken by itself; we must supplement it either by other indications derived from other parts of Diotima's argument, or by statements made by Plato outside the Symposium. Now it may be taken as certain—from passages in the Phaedrus, Phaedo and Republic—that personal immortality was a doctrine held and taught by Plato. It is natural, therefore, to expect that this doctrine will be also taught in the Symposium; or, at least, that the teaching of the Symposium will not contravene this doctrine. And this is, I believe, the case, in spite of a certain oracular obscurity which veils the clearness of the teaching. When we recall the statement that the generic Eros, as inherent in the individual, aims at the “everlasting possession” of the good as its telos, and when we are told that the ἐρωτικὸς-φιλόσοφος at the end of his progress arrives at the “possession” (κτήμα) of that specific form of Good which is Beauty, and finds in it his telos, and when emphasis is laid on the everlastingness (ἀιών) of that possession, then it is reasonable to suppose that the ἀθανασία of the ἐρωτικὸς who has reached this goal and achieved this possession is implied. It is to be noticed, further, that the phrase here used is no longer μετέχει τοῦ ἀθανάτου nor ἀθαναστώτερος ἔστι but ἀθάνατος ἐγένετο. Nor does the language of the clause εἰπέρ τῷ ἄλλῳ necessarily convey any real doubt: “he, if any man” may be simply an equivalent for “he above all,” “he most certainly.” The point of this saving clause may rather be this. The complete philosopher achieves his vision of eternal Beauty by means of νοῦς (or αὐτή ἡ ψυχή), as the proper organ ὃ δρατῶν τὸ καλὸν (212 A): it is in virtue of the possession of that immortal object that he himself is immortalised: and accordingly immortality accrues to him not qua ἀνθρώπος so much as qua νοητικός or λογικός. In other words, while in so far as he is an ἀνθρώπος, a ζῷον, a δῖον compounded of two diverse

1 See F. Horn, Platonstud. pp. 276 ff. Horn also criticises the phrase ἀθάνατος γενέται: “die Unsterblichkeit im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes...kann nicht erworben werden. Der Mensch kann nur unsterblich sein oder es nicht sein, er kann aber nicht unsterblich werden.” But what Plato means by ἄθαν. γενέται is to regain the life of the soul in its divine purity—the result of right education, as a κάθαρος or μελέτη θανάτου. See J. Adam, R. T. G. pp. 383 ff.

It seems quite certain that Plato—whether or not in earnest with his various attempts to prove it—did believe in personal immortality, and would assent to the dictum of Sir Thos. Browne, “There is surely a piece of divinity in us, something that was before the elements, and owes no homage unto the sun.”

2 See my note ad loc. It is to be noticed that similar expressions are used in a similar context in Phaedr. 263 A (ἐφαντάμενοι τῇ θεῷ...καῦς δεν δυνατὸν ἰδεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχέιν): Tim. 90 b, c. Cp. θεῖον ὑπ' 209 ν, θείον καλὸν 211 ε, θεοφιλεῖ 212 λ. That the Idea (τάγαθαν) is οἰκεῖον to the Soul seems implied by 205 ε.
elements body and soul, the philosopher is not entirely ἄθανατος but still subject to the sway of sad mortality, yet in so far as he is a philosopher, a purely rational soul, grasping eternal objects, he is immortal. If we choose to press the meaning of the clauses in question, such would seem to be their most probable significance.\footnote{For this notion of immortality by "communion" or "participation" in the divine life as Platonic, see the passages cited in the last note, also Theaet. 176 λ. Cp. also the Orphic idea of the mystic as ἐνθέως, "God-possessed." This idea of supersession of personality by divinity ("not I but Christ that dwelleth in me") is a regular feature of all mystic religion.}

Another criticism of this passage suggested by Horn is this. If it be true that the philosopher, or ἐρωτικός, does at this final stage attain to immortality, this does not involve the truth of the doctrine of immortality in general, but rather implies that men as such are not immortal and that immortality is the exceptional endowment of a few. Here again we must recall the distinction between ἀθρούσος and pure ἐκχύσ and νοῦς. The soul as immortal is concerned with the objects of immortal life. In so far as it has drunk of the waters of Lethe and forgotten those objects, in so far as it is engrossed in the world of sense, it has practically lost its hold on immortality, and no longer possesses any guarantee of its own permanence. Although it may remain, in a latent way, in age-long identity, it cannot be self-consciously immortal when divorced from a perception of the eternally self-identical objects. If we may assume that Plato looked at the question from this point of view it becomes intelligible that he might refuse to predicate immortality of a soul that seems so entirely "of the earth, earthy" that the noetic element in it remains wholly in abeyance.

All that has been said, however, does not alter the fact that individual and personal immortality, in our ordinary sense, is nowhere directly proved nor even expressly stated in a clear and definite way in the Symposium. All that is clearly shown is the fact of posthumous survival and influence. That Plato regarded this athenasia of personal δύναμις as an athenasia of personal ὀνόμα, and identified "Fortwirken" with "Fortleben," has been suggested by Horn, as an explanation of the "ganz neue Begriff der Unsterblichkeit" which, as he contends, is propounded in this dialogue. But it is certainly a rash proceeding to
go thus to the *Sophist*—an evidently late dialogue—for an elucidation of the problem. A sufficient elucidation, as has been suggested, lies much nearer to hand, in the doctrine of the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*. It is merely perverse to attempt to isolate the doctrine of the *Symposium* from that of its natural fellows, or to assume that the teaching of Diotima is intended to be a complete exposition of the subject of immortality. "Plato," we do well to remember, "is not bound to say all he knows in every dialogue"; and if, in the *Symposium*, he treats the subject from the point of view of the facts and possibilities of our earthly life, this must not be taken to imply that he has forgotten or surrendered the other point of view in which the soul is naturally immortal and possesses pre-existence as well as after-existence.

*(b) The Problem of Beauty.* A further point of interest in the latter section of this discourse is the different value attached to τὸ καλὸν in the highest grade of love's progress as compared with the lower grades. In the latter it appeared as merely a means to τὸκος and thereby to ἀθανασία; whereas in the former it seems to constitute in itself the final end. Horn, who notices this apparent reversal of the relations between these two concepts, explains it as due to the fact that in the highest grade Eros is supplanted by Dialectic, or "the philosophic impulse," which alone gives cognition of the Idea. But if this be so, how are we to account for the use of the term τεκόντι in the concluding sentence, where the attainment of ἀθανασία is described as having for its pre-condition not merely τὸ ὑπάρχω but τὸ τεκέω? This is precisely parallel to the language elsewhere used of the action of Eros in the lower grades, and precludes the supposition that Eros ceases to be operant on the highest grade. The truth is rather that, in this final stage, the Eros that is operant is the Eros of pure νοῦς—enthusiastic and prolific intellection, "the passion of the reason." And the fact that τὸ καλὸν in this stage is no longer subordinated to ἀθανασία as means to end of desire is to be explained by the fact that this ultimate κάλλος being Ideal is ἄθανατον in itself, so that he who gains it thereby gains ἀθανασία.

That there are difficulties and obscurities of detail in this exposition of the concepts we have been considering may be freely admitted. But the line of doctrine, in its general trend, is clear enough, and quite in harmony with the main features of Platonic doctrine as expounded in other dialogues of the same (middle) period. Nor must the interpreter of the dialogue lose sight of the fact that he is dealing here not with the precise phrases of a professor of formal logic but with the
inspired utterances of a prophetess, not with the dialectic of a
*Parmenides* but with the hierophantic dogmata of the *Symposium.*

(c) *Eros as Philosophy.* The fact that Socrates himself is evidently
presented in the dialogue as at once the exemplar of Philosophy and
the living embodiment of Eros might be sufficient to indicate that the
most essential result of the Socratic discussion of Eros is to show its
ultimate identity with “the philosophic impulse.” Since, however,
this identification has been sometimes denied, it may be well to
indicate more particularly how far this leading idea as to the nature of
Eros influences the whole trend of the discussion. We notice, to begin
with, the stress laid on the midway condition of Eros, as son of Poros
and Penia, between wisdom and ignorance, in virtue of which he is
essentially a philosopher (φρονίσεως ἐπιθυμητής...φιλοσοφεῖ 203 d f f.). We
notice next how the children of the soul (λόγοι περὶ ἀρετῆς) are pro-
nounced superior in beauty to the children of the body (209 c), and
σοφία, we know, is one form of ἀρετῆ. Then, in the concluding section
(210 a f f.) we find it expressly stated that καλλος attaches to ἐπιστήμαι
(210 c), and that φιλοσοφία itself is the sphere in which the produc-
tion of καλὸι λόγοι is occasioned by the sight of τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ
καλοῦ. Thus it is clearly implied throughout the discussion that σοφία,
the highest division of ἀρετῆ (being the specific ἀρετῆ of νοσει), is the
highest and most essential form of τὸ ἀγαθόν for man; whence it follows
that, if Eros be defined as “the craving for the good,” this implies in
the first place the “craving for σοφία,” which is but another way of
stating “the philosophic impulse,” or in a word φιλοσοφία.

It must not be supposed, however, that in virtue of this identifica-
tion the love-impulse (Eros) is narrowed and devitalised. For φιλοσοφία
is not merely a matter of book-study, it is also a method of life and
a system of education. In reaching the ultimate goal, which is the
union of the finite with the infinite in the comprehension of the
Idea, the man who is driven by the spirit of Eros passes through all
the possible grades of experience in which Beauty plays a part; and
from social and intellectual intercourse and study of every kind he
enriches his soul. He does not begin and end with what is abstract
and spiritual—with pure intellection; nor does he begin and end with
the lust after sensual beauty: like the Eros-daemon who is his genius,
the true Erastes is οὐτε θηρίον οὐτε θεός, and his life is an anabasis
from the concrete and the particular beauties of sense to the larger and more
spiritual beauties of the mind.

Thus in its actual manifestation in life the Eros-impulse is far-
reaching. And, as already noticed, it is essentially propagative. The
philosopher is not only a student, he is also, by the necessity of his
nature, a teacher. This is a point of much importance in the eyes of
Plato, the Head of the Academy: philosophy must be cultivated in a
school of philosophy.

The significance of Eros, as thus conceived, has been finely expressed
by Jowett (Plato i. p. 532): "(Diotima) has taught him (Socr.) that
love is another aspect of philosophy. The same want in the human
soul which is satisfied in the vulgar by the procreation of children, may
become the highest aspiration of intellectual desire. As the Christian
might speak of hungering and thirsting after righteousness; or of
divine loves under the figure of human (cp. Eph. v. 32); as the
mediaeval saint might speak of the 'fruitio Dei'; as Dante saw all
things contained in his love of Beatrice, so Plato would have us absorb
all other loves and desires in the love of knowledge. Here is the
beginning of Neoplatonism, or rather, perhaps, a proof (of which there
are many) that the so-called mysticism of the East was not strange to
the Greek of the fifth century before Christ. The first tumult of the
affections was not wholly subdued; there were longings of a creature
'moving about in worlds not realised,' which no art could satisfy. To
most men reason and passion appear to be antagonistic both in idea
and fact. The union of the greatest comprehension of knowledge and
the burning intensity of love is a contradiction in nature, which may
have existed in a far-off primeval age in the mind of some Hebrew
prophet or other Eastern sage, but has now become an imagination
only. Yet this 'passion of the reason' is the theme of the Symposium
of Plato."

(d) Eros as Religion. We thus see how to "the prophetic tempera-
ment" passion becomes blended with reason, and cognition with
emotion. We have seen also how this passion of the intellect is
regarded as essentially expansive and propagative. We have next to
notice more particularly the point already suggested in the words
quoted from Jowett—how, namely, this blend of passion and reason is
accompanied by the further quality of religious emotion and awe. We
are already prepared for finding our theme pass definitely into the
atmosphere of religion not only by the fact that the instructress is
herself a religious person bearing a significant name, but also by the
semi-divine origin and by the mediatorial rôle ascribed to Eros. When
we come, then, to "the greater mysteries" we find the passion of the

1 See also J. Adam, Religious Teachers of Greece, pp. 396 f.
intellect passing into a still higher feeling of the kind described by the Psalmist as "thirst for God." This change of atmosphere results from the new vision of the goal of Eros, no longer identified with any earthly object but with the celestial and divine Idea (αὐρωπαλόν). Thus the pursuit of beauty becomes in the truest sense a religious exercise, the efforts spent on beauty become genuine devotions, and the honours paid to beauty veritable oblations. By thus carrying up with her to the highest region of spiritual emotion both erotic passion and intellectual aspiration, Diotima justifies her character as a prophetess of the most high Zeus; while at the same time we find, in this theological passage of the Socratic λόγοι, the doctrine necessary at once to balance and to correct the passages in the previous λόγοι which had magnified Eros as an object of religious worship, a great and beneficent deity.

This side of Diotima's philosophising, which brings into full light what we may call as we please either the erotic aspect of religion or the religious aspect of Eros, might be illustrated abundantly both from the writers of romantic love-poetry and from the religious mystics. To a few such illustrations from obvious English sources I here confine myself. Sir Thos. Browne is platonizing when he writes (Rel. Med.) "All that is truly amiable is of God, or as it were a divided piece of him that retains a reflex or shadow of himself." Very similar is the thought expressed by Emerson in the words, "Into every beautiful object there enters something immeasurable and divine"; and again, "all high beauty has a moral element in it." Emerson, too, supplies us with a description that might fitly be applied to the Socratic λόγοι of the Symposium, and indeed to Plato generally in his prophetic moods, when he defines "what is best in literature" to be "the affirming, prophesying, spermatic words of man-making poets." To Sir Thos. Browne we may turn again, if we desire an illustration of that mental phase, so vividly portrayed by Diotima, in which enjoyment of the things eternal is mingled with contempt of things temporal. "If any have been so happy"—so runs the twice-repeated sentence—"as truly to understand Christian annihilation, ecstasies, exolution, liquefaction, transformation, the kiss of the spouse, gustation of God, and ingestion into the divine shadow, they have already had an handsome anticipation of heaven; the glory of the world is surely over, and the earth in ashes with them" (Hydriotaphia, ad fin.). A similar phase of feeling is eloquently voiced by Spenser more than once in his "Hymns." Read, for instance, the concluding stanzas of the "Hymne
of Heavenly Love” which tell of the fruits of devotion to the “loving Lord”:

“Then shalt thou feel thy spirit so possesst,
   And ravisht with devouring great desire
Of his deare self...
That in no earthly thing thou shalt delight,
But in his sweet and amiable sight.

“Thenceforth all worlds desire will in thee dye,
   And all earthes glory, on which men do gaze,
Seeme durt and drosse in thy pure-sighted eye,
   Compar’d to that celestiall beauties blaze,...

“Then shall thy ravisht soule inspired bee
   With heavenly thoughts farre above humane skil,
And thy bright radiant eyes shall plainly see
   Th’ Idee of his pure glorie present still
Before thy face, that all thy spirits shall fill
   With sweete enragement of celestiall love,
Kindled through sight of those faire things above.”

From Plato, too, Spenser borrows the idea of the soul’s “anabasis” through lower grades of beauty to “the most faire, whereto they all do strive,” which he celebrates in his “Hymne of Heavenly Beautie.” A few lines of quotation must here suffice:

“Beginning then below, with th’ easie vew
   Of this base world, subject to fleshly eye,
From thence to mount aloft, by order dew,
To contemplation of th’ immortall sky....

“Thence gathering plumes of perfect speculation,
To impe the wings of thy high flying mynd,
Mount up aloft through heavenly contemplation,
From this darke world, whose damps the soule do byld,
And, like the native brood of Eagles kynd,
On that bright Sunne of Glorie fixe thine eyes,
Cleard from grosse mists of fraile infirmities.”

These few “modern instances” may be sufficient to indicate in brief how the doctrines of Plato, and of the Symposium in special, have permeated the mind of Europe.

The doctrine of love in its highest grades is delivered, as we have seen, by the prophetess in language savouring of “the mysteries,” language appropriate to express a mystical revelation.

On the mind of a sympathetic reader, sensitive to literary nuances, Plato produces something of the effect of the mystic φέγγος by his τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ and his ἐξαίφνης κατόψεται τι θαυμαστὸν κτλ. Such phrases stir and transport one as “in the Spirit on the Lord’s day” to heavenly places “which eye hath not seen nor ear heard”;
they awake in us emotions similar to those which the first reading of Homer evoked in Keats:

"Then felt I like some watche of the skies
When a new planet swims into his ken;
Or like stout Cortes when with eagle eyes
He stared at the Pacific...Silent, upon a peak in Darien."

§ v. Alcibiades and his Speech.

Alcibiades was about 34 years old at this time (416 B.C.), and at the height of his reputation1. The most brilliant party-leader in Athens, he was a man of great intellectual ability and of remarkable personal beauty, of which he was not a little vain. It was, ostensibly at least, because of his beauty that Socrates posed as his "erastes"; while Alcibiades, on his side, attempted to inflame the supposed passion of Socrates and displayed jealousy whenever his "erastes" showed a tendency to woo the favour of rival beauties such as Agathon. Other indications of Alcibiades' character and position which are given in the dialogue show him to us as a man of wealth, an important and popular figure in the smart society of his day, full of ambition for social and political distinction, and not a little influenced, even against his better judgment, by the force of public opinion and the on dit of his set. With extraordinary naïveté and frankness he exposes his own moral infirmity, and proves how applicable to his case is the confession of the Latin poet, "video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor." He is guiltless, as he says, of pudency, nor would ever have known the meaning of the word "shame" (ἀιτχύνη) had it not been for Socrates.

Yet, totally lacking in virtue though he be, the Alcibiades of the Symposium is a delightful, even an attractive and lovable person. Although actually a very son of Belial, we feel that potentially he is little short of a hero and a saint. And that because he possesses the capacity for both understanding and loving Socrates; and to love Socrates is to love the Ideal. Nominally it is Socrates who is the lover of Alcibiades, but as the story develops we see that the converse is more near the truth: Alcibiades is possessed with a consuming passion, an intense and persistent infatuation for Socrates. And in

1 "The character of Alcibiades, who is the same strange contrast of great powers and great vices which meets us in history, is drawn to the life" (Jowett, Plato i. p. 526).
the virtue of this "eros" we find something that more than outweighs
his many vices: it acts as the charity that "covers a multitude of sins."

The speech of Alcibiades, in spite of its resemblance in tone to a
satyrlic drama composed under the influence of the Wine-god, fulfils a
serious purpose—the purpose of vindicating the memory of Socrates
from slanderous aspersions and setting in the right light his relations
with Alcibiades. And as a means to this end, the general theme of
the dialogue, Eros, is cleverly taken up and employed, as will be shown
in a later section.

In regard to style and diction the following points may be noticed.
In the disposition and arrangement there is a certain amount of
confusion and incoherence. Alcibiades starts with a double parable,
but fails—as he confesses—to work out his comparisons with full
precision and with logical exactitude. This failure is only in keeping
with his rôle as a devotee of Dionysus.

Frequency of similes: 216 A ὄσσερ ἀπὸ τῶν Σειρήνων: 217 A τὸ τοῦ
δηχθέντος...πάθος: 218 B κεκοιμώνηκατε...βακχείας.

Elliptical expressions: 215 A, c; 216 B, d, e; 220 c, d; 221 d; 222 B.
Anacolutha: 217 e; 218 A.

§ vi. The Order and Connexion of the Speeches.

Disregarding the introductory and concluding scenes and looking
at the rest of the dialogue as a whole, we see that it falls most
naturally into three main divisions, three Acts as we might call them.
In the First Act are comprised all the first five discourses; the Second,
and central, Act contains the whole of the deliverances of Socrates;
the Third Act consists of Alcibiades' encomium of Socrates. We have
to consider, accordingly, how each of these Acts is related to the
others; and further, in regard to the first, we have to investigate the
relative significance of each of its five sub-divisions or scenes.

1. The first five speeches and their relative significance.

Plato's own opinion of the earlier speeches appears clearly enough
in the criticism which he puts in the mouth of Socrates (198 d ff.).

1 See Introd. § ii. (A) ad fin.; and Gomperz, G. T. II. pp. 394 ff.
2 See Introd. § vi. 3, where some details of the way in which Alcibiadic echoes the
language of the earlier speakers will be found.
3 Rettig and von Sybel make the First Act conclude with Arist.'s speech, and the
Second Act begin with Agathon's: but that this is a perverse arrangement is well
shown by F. Horn, Platonst. p. 254 (op. Zeller, Symp.).
Although that criticism is aimed primarily at the discourse of Agathon, it obviously applies, in the main, to the whole series of which his discourse formed the climax. Instead of endeavouring to ascertain and state the truth about the object of their encomia—such is the gist of Socrates’ criticism—the previous speakers had heaped up their praises regardless of their applicability to that object (198 ε ad initi.). What they considered was not facts but appearances (διπως ἐγκυμονάων δόξαι); consequently they described both the nature of Eros and the effects of his activity in such terms as to make him appear—in the eyes of the unsophisticated—supremely good and beautiful, drawing upon every possible source (198 ε—199 Α).

It thus seems clear that Plato intends us to regard all the first five speeches as on the same level, in so far as all alike possess the common defect of aiming at appearance only (δόξαι), not at reality (ἀληθεία), in virtue of which no one of them can claim to rank as a scientific contribution (ἐπιτήμημα) to the discussion.

The relative order of the first five speeches. The question as to the principle upon which the order and arrangement of these speeches depends is an interesting one and has given rise to some controversy.

(a) It has been suggested (e.g. by Rötscher) that the speeches are arranged in the order of ascending importance, beginning with that of Phaedrus, which is generally admitted to be the slightest and most superficial, and proceeding gradually upwards till the culminating point is reached in the speech of Agathon. This view, however, is untenable in the face of the obvious fact that Agathon’s speech is in no real sense the best or most important of the series; rather, from the point of view of Socrates, it is the worst. The fact that each speaker commences his oration by a critique of his predecessor might seem, at first sight, to lend some colour to the view that each was actually making some improvement, some advance; but this preliminary critique is plainly nothing more than a rhetorical trick of method.

(b) Steinhart would arrange the speeches in pairs, distinguishing each pair from the others according to the special spheres of the activity of Eros with which they deal. Phaedrus and Pausanias deal with the

2 Observe also how, in 193 ε, Eryx. characterizes the first four speeches as πολλα καὶ παντοδιαρά, “motley and heterogeneous.”
3 Similarly Deinhardt, Über Inhalt von Pl. Symp.
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ethical sphere; Eryximachus and Aristophanes with the physical; Agathon and Socrates with the higher spiritual sphere.

This scheme, however, is no less artificial, although it contains some elements of truth; and a sufficient ground for rejecting it lies in the fact that the speech of Socrates cannot be classed along with the other five.

(c) Hug's view is that the speeches are arranged from the aesthetic, rather than the logical, point of view, in groups of two each. The second speech in each of the groups is, he holds, richer in content than the first; and the groups themselves are arranged with a view to contrast and variety. But here again, little seems gained by the device of pair-grouping; and the development within the groups is obscure. Hug, however, is no doubt correct in recognizing that the arrangement of the speeches is governed mainly, if not entirely, by artistic considerations, and with a view to literary effect; and that an artistic effect depends largely upon the presence of variety and of contrast is beyond dispute.

(d) Any satisfactory explanation of the order in which the speeches are arranged must be based upon the internal indications supplied by the dialogue itself.

The first inference to be drawn from such indications is this: the speech of Socrates must be left to stand by itself, and cannot be grouped with any one of the first five speeches. This is made quite evident by the tone of the whole interlude (198 A—199 c) which divides Agathon's discourse from that of Socrates, and in special by the definite expression où γὰρ ἐτι ἐγκωμιάζω τὸῦτον τὸν τρόπον...ἄλλα τά

1 Cp. Jowett (Plato i. p. 527): “The speeches have been said to follow each other in pairs....But these and similar distinctions are not found in Plato; they are the points of view of his critics, and seem to impede rather than to assist us in understanding him.” This is sensibly observed; still, Jowett is inclined to dismiss the matter too lightly. I may add that, while from the artistic point of view it is absurd to class together the speeches of Arist. and Eryx., there is a certain connexion of thought between the two, in their common relation to physiological theories, and so far we may allow that Steinhart points in the right direction (see § iii. 4, above).

2 Cp. Jowett (Plato i. p. 526): “The successive speeches...contribute in various degrees to the final result; they are all designed to prepare the way for Socrates, who gathers up the threads anew, and skims the highest points of each of them. But they are not to be regarded as the stages of an idea, rising above one another to a climax. They are fanciful, partly facetious, performances....All of them are rhetorical and poetical rather than dialectical, but glimpses of truth appear in them.” This is well said.
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We are thus left with five speeches, not six; and this of itself might be enough to show that a division into pair-groups is not feasible. And when we further examine the internal indications, the arbitrary character of any such grouping becomes yet more obvious. For although the first two speeches possess a good deal in common, and were, apparently, confounded together by Xenophon, the method of grouping them in one pair tends to obscure the great difference between them in point of substance, style, and general ability of statement, and to obscure also the fact that a number of other discourses intervened between these two (μετὰ δὲ Φαίδρου ἄλλους τινας εἶναι 180 c). The express mention of this last fact is a land-mark not to be ignored.

Moreover, while this distinction is marked between the first speech and the second, there are internal indications which point to a special connexion between the third and the second. Eryximachus starts from the same assumption (the duality of Eros) as Pausanias; and, moreover, he expressly states that his speech is intended to supplement that of Pausanias (186 a ad init.). Furthermore, we find Aristophanes classing together these two (189 c).

As regards the fourth discourse (Aristophanes'), we are forbidden by similar internal indications to class it along with any of the preceding discourses. Although much of its point lies in its allusiveness to Eryximachus' theories, Aristophanes himself expressly emphasizes the difference between his speech and the others (189 c, 193 b); and indeed it is evident to the most cursory inspection. Nor is it possible, without reducing the group-system to the level of an unmeaning artifice, to pair the speech of Aristophanes with that of Agathon, which follows next in order. The only ground for such a grouping would be the purely fortuitous and external fact that both the speakers are professional poets: in style and substance the two speeches lie leagues apart, while not even an incidental connexion of any kind is hinted at in the text.

The reason for the position of the fifth discourse (Agathon's) is not hard to discover. Once the general plan of the dialogue, as consisting of three Acts, with the discourse of Socrates for the central Act, was fixed in the author's mind, it was inevitable, on artistic grounds, that Agathon's oration should be set in the closest juxtaposition with that of Socrates,—in other words, at the close of the first Act. This disposition is already pointed to in the introductory incident, where Agathon promises to engage in a match "concerning wisdom" with
Socrates (175 ε); and we have another indication of it at the very opening of the dialogue, where Glaucon in speaking of the banqueters mentions these three names only—Agathon, Socrates, Alcibiades (172 Α). If then, for the purpose of the dialogue as a whole, Agathon is the most important of the first five speakers, it is essential that his discourse should form the climax of the series, and stand side by side with that of Socrates his rival, to point the contrast.

This gives us one fixed point. Another fixed point is the first speech: once Phaedrus has been designated παρὰ τοῦ λόγου, the primary inventor of the theme1, the task of initiating the series can scarcely fall to other hands than his. Why the three intermediate discourses are placed in their present order is not so clear. Considerations of variety and contrast count for something, and it may be noticed that the principle of alternating longer and shorter speeches is observed2. Similarity in method of treatment counts for something too; and from this point of view we can see that the order Phaedrus—Pausanias—Eryximachus is more natural than the order Phaedrus—Eryximachus—Pausanias; since the middle speech of Pausanias has some points in common with both the others, whereas the speech of Eryximachus has practically nothing in common with that of Phaedrus. Granting, then, that on grounds at once of continuity and of variety of extent these three speeches may most artistically be set in their present order, and granting, further, that the proper place for Agathon’s speech is the last of the series, the only vacant place left for the speech of Aristophanes is the fourth. Although it is a speech sui generis, possessing nothing in common with that of Agathon, yet the mere fact of the juxtaposition of the two famous poets is aesthetically pleasing; while a delightful variation is secured by the interposition of a splendid grotesque which, alike in style and in substance, affords so signal a contrast both to the following and to the preceding speeches3. More-

1 That he is so designated may be due, as Crain thinks, to the desire to connect this dialogue with the Phaedrus.
2 The comparative lengths of the speeches, counted by pages of the Oxford text, are roughly these: Phaedrus 3 pp.; Paus. 6 1/2; Eryx. 8 1/2; Arist. 6; Agathon 4; Socr. (a) 3, (b) 14 1/2; Alc. 9 1/2. Thus, in round numbers, the total of the first five speeches comes to 23 pp., which very nearly balances the 24 pp. occupied by Socr. (b) and Alcib.
3 Jowett explains (Plato i. p. 530) that the transposition of the speeches of Arist. and Eryx. is made ‘partly to avoid monotony, partly for the sake of making Aristophanes the cause of wit in others,’ and also in order to bring the comic and tragic poet into juxtaposition, as if by accident.’ No doubt these considerations count for something, but, as I have already tried to show, there is another and a deeper reason for the transposition (see § iii. 4).
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over, as is elsewhere shown, Aristophanes handles his theme with special reference to the medical theorists of whom Eryximachus is a type.

The first five speakers are all actual historical personages, not mere lay figures. None the less, we must recognize the probability that Plato is not literally true, in all details, to historical facts but, choosing his characters with a view to scenic effect, adapts their personalities to suit the requirements of his literary purpose. That is to say, we probably ought to regard these persons less as individuals than as types, and their speeches less as characteristic utterances of the individual speakers than as the expressions of well-marked tendencies in current opinion. The view proposed by Sydenham, approved by Schleiermacher, and developed by Rückert, that under the disguise of the personages named other and more important persons were aimed at by Plato probably goes too far. It is true that some of the traits of Gorgias are reproduced in Agathon, and some of those of Isocrates in Pausanias; but where is the alter ego of Aristophanes to be found? Nor, in fact, was Plato at any time much concerned to attack individuals as such: the objects of his satire were rather the false tendencies and the tricks of style which belonged to certain sets and schools of rhetors and writers. And here in the Symposium his purpose seems to be to exhibit the general results of sophistic teaching in various contemporary circles at Athens; which purpose would be obscured were we to identify any of the characters of the dialogue with non-Attic personages.

The five intellectual types of which Plato here presents us with studied portraits are distinct, yet all the five are merely species of one and the same genus, inasmuch as all represent various phases of ungrounded opinion (δόξα), and inasmuch as all alike, in contrast to the philosopher Socrates, are men of unphilosophic mind.

2. The relation of the speech of Socrates to the first five speeches.

The speech of Socrates, as we have seen, stands in contrast not only to the speech of Agathon but also to the whole series of which

1 Rückert makes the following identifications: Phaedrus = Tisias; Pausanias = Protagoras or Xenophon; Eryximachus = Hippias; Aristophanes = Prodicus; Agathon = Gorgias. Jowett (Plato, p. 529) says of Pausanias: "his speech might have been composed by a pupil of Lysias or of Prodicus, although there is no hint given that Plato is specially referring to them." Sydenham supposed that Phaedrus stands for Lysias.

2 So Reel, Verhältnis, etc., p. 31: "Alle diese fünf Reden eine breite Basis, fast auf demselben Niveau stehend, bilden sollen für die später folgenden Reden des Sokrates und Alkibiades."
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Agathon's speech forms the climax and conclusion; since all of them alike are tainted with the same vice of sophistry. We have now to examine this contrast in detail.

(a) Socrates v. Phaedrus. Phaedrus had declared Eros to be μέγας θεός καὶ θαυμαστός (178 Α): Socrates, on the contrary, argues that Eros is no θεός but a δαίμων (202 c ff.). Phaedrus had relied for his proofs on ancient tradition (τεκμηρίων δὲ τούτου κτλ., 178 β; ὅμοιοτάτα, 178 c): Socrates bases his argument on dialectic, and on the conclusions of pure reason (Diotima being Reason personified). Phaedrus had ascribed the noble acts of Alcestis and Achilles to the working of sensual Eros (179 β ff.): Socrates ascribes the same acts to a more deeply seated desire—that for everlasting fame (ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς διανάτων κτλ., 208 Β)\(^1\):

(b) Socrates v. Pausanias. Pausanias had distinguished two kinds of Eros—Uranios and Pandemos (180 Β—Ε): Socrates, on the other hand, treats Eros as a unity which comprises in its single nature opposite qualities (202 Β, 203 c ff.); further, he shows that an apparent duality in the nature of Eros is to be explained as due to a confusion between Eros as genus (= Desire) and Eros in the specific sense of sex-passion (205 Β ff.).

Pausanias had argued that sensual Eros, of the higher kind, is a thing of value in social and political life as a source of ἀρετή and ἀνδρεία (182 Β—Ο, 184 Β—Ε, 185 Β)\(^2\): Socrates shows that the production of ἀρετῆς in the sphere of politics and law is due to an Eros which aims at begetting offspring of the soul for the purpose of securing an immortality of fame (209 Α ff., 209 Β)\(^3\). And Socrates shows further that the true Eros τὸ ἐν τοῖς εὐπτηδέμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμων καλῶν (210 Α) is not the τέλος. Lastly, the connexion between Eros (in the form of παύδεραστία) with φιλοσοφία which had been merely hinted at by Pausanias in 182 c, and superficially treated in 182 Β—Ε, is explained at length by Socrates.

\(^1\) This is the point noticed by Jowett (Plato i. p. 531): "From Phaedrus he (Socr.) takes the thought that love is stronger than death."

\(^2\) C. Jowett (Plato i. p. 531): "From Pausanias (Socr. takes the thought) that the true love is akin to intellect and political activity."

\(^3\) Gomperz (G. T. n. p. 396), ò propos of his view that Plato is thinking of his παύδεραστία in Symp., writes: "they were busy with projects of political and social regeneration, which the philosopher hoped he might one day realise by the aid of the prince. On this view there is point and pertinence in that otherwise irrelevant mention of legislative achievement among the fruits of the love-bond." The suggestion is interesting, but the relevance does not depend upon its being true: Plato, in any cause, taught politics.
(c) Socrates v. Eryximachus. Eryximachus, following Pausanias, had adopted the assumption of the duality of Eros: this Socrates denies (202 b).

Eryximachus had extended the sphere of influence of Eros so as to include the whole of nature (the objects of medicine, music, astronomy, religion): Socrates shows that the Eros-instinct affects animals as well as men (207 a)—as equally included under the head of θνητός (207 d)—and he ascribes to the Eros-daemon the mediation between gods and men and the control of the whole sphere of religion; but he confines his treatment in the main to the narrower subject of Eros proper as concerned with humanity.

(d) Socrates v. Aristophanes. Aristophanes had defined Eros as "the desire and pursuit of wholeness" (τῶν διών τῆς ἑπιθυμίας καὶ διάφερε ἐρωτόμενοι 192 b: cp. 192 b ὅταν...ἐντύχῃ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡμέρει): Socrates corrects this by showing that wholeness, or one's other half, is only sought when it is good (οὐτε ἡμίσεος εἶναι τὸν ἐρωτα οὔτε διὸν οὔ συν μή...ἀγαθόν ὅν 205 e). Both, however, agree in maintaining the negative position that Eros is not simply the desire for η τῶν ἀφροδισιῶν συννοσία (192 c).

(e) Socrates v. Agathon. The strictly dialectical part of Socrates' speech (199 c—201 c), which takes the form of a cross-questioning of Agathon, consists, in the main, of a hostile critique and refutation of his speech. But in some few particulars Socrates indicates his agreement with statements made by Agathon. We may, therefore, summarize thus:

(1) Points of Agreement: Socrates approves (199 c) of the rule of method laid down by Agathon (195 a) and of the distinction it implies (201 b ad fin.). Agathon stated the object of Eros to be the beautiful (197 b): Socrates adopts and develops this statement (201 a). Agathon ascribed αὐτόπελα to Eros (196 c—d): so does Socrates (203 d).

1 It is hardly correct to say with Jowett (Plato i. p. 531) that "from Eryximachus Socrates takes the thought that love is a universal phenomenon and the great power of nature": this statement requires limitation.

2 It may be observed, however, that while the Platonic Socrates is here simply in contradiction to Arist., the idea of a "fall" from a primeval state of perfection which underlies the myth of Arist. is very similar to the view put forth by Plato in the Phaedrus and elsewhere that the earthly life of the soul involves a "fall" from its pristine state of purity in a super-terrestrial sphere. And in both Eros is the impulse towards restoration: to achieve communion with the Idea is to regain τὸ ἀλέκκον, τὸ θάνατον, η ἄρχαλα φῶς (193 d).

3 Another "glimpse of truth" which appears in Α.'s speech is thus indicated by
(2) **Points of Difference**: Agathon’s Eros is κάλλιστος καὶ ἀριστός (197 c): Socrates makes out Eros to be οὐκε καλὸς οὐκε ἀγαθός (201 e). In particular Socrates denies that Eros is σοφός (203 e f.), or ἀπαλός (203 c), as Agathon (196 e f., 195 c, d) had affirmed. Agathon had assumed Eros to be θεός (194 e, et passim): this Socrates corrects (202 b ff., e).

Agathon, like the rest, in his lavish laudations had confused Eros with the object of love (τὸ ἐρωμένον, τὸ ἐραστῶν); whereas Socrates points out that Eros is to be identified rather with the subject (τὸ ἐρών, τὸ ἔπιθυμον, 204 c).

3. **The relation of Alcibiades’ speech to the rest.**

(a) The speech of Alcibiades is related to that of Socrates “as Praxis to Theory.” Its main purpose is to present to us a vivid portrait of Socrates as the perfect exemplar of Eros (ὁ τελέως ἐρωτικός); and thus to compel us to acknowledge that in the living Socrates we have before us both a complete φιλόσοφος—even as Eros is φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου (203 d)—and a δαιμόνιος ἄνήρ—even as Eros is a δαίμων. In addition to this main purpose, the speech serves the secondary purpose of vindicating the master against the charge of indulging in impure relations with his disciples (see § ii. a ad fin.).

But the language of Alcibiades echoes not only that of Socrates, in part, but also, in part, that of the earlier encomiasts of Eros. And this is due to the fact that Socrates—the Eros of Alcibiades—plays a double rôle; he is both ὁ ἐρωμένος and ὁ ἐρῶν. This ambiguity of the Socratic nature is already implied in the comparisons with satyrs and Sileni made by Alcibiades, which point to a character that is ἐραστὸς, however ἐνδείξις in outward appearance. We may therefore tabulate the more detailed points of inter-relation as follows:—

(a) **The Eros of the ἐραστὴς (as exhibiting ἐνδεία), Socrates’ encomium.**

203 ἐπίθυμον ἐστὶ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ...ἀπὶ τινας πλέκων μνημάτως.

203 ὁ φύσει ἐραστὴς ὄν περὶ τὸ καλὸν.

213 ὁ διειμηνίσχω ὅπως παρὰ τῷ καλῷ λατήσῃ...κατακέλῃ.

216 ὁ Σωκράτης ἐρωτικός διάκειται τῶν καλῶν.

Jowett (Plato i. p. 526): “When Agathon says that no man ‘can be wronged of his own free will,’ he is alluding playfully to a serious problem of Greek philosophy (cp. Arist. Nic. Ethics, v. 9); see Symp. 190 o ad iunil. But, so far as I see, no reference is made to this point by Socrates.

1 Hug, p. ixvii.
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203 τον ἀνυπόδητον καὶ δοικος, χαμαίσαντης
dei ὄν καὶ ἄστρωτος...ὑπαίθροις κοιμώ-
μενος. 220 τον ἀνυπόδητον...ἐπορεύετο.
203 τον φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητής. 220 τον ἑστήκει μέχρι ὧς ἐγένετο (with the
context).
203 τον δεικός γῆς καὶ φαρμακικός καὶ σο-
φιστής...πάραμος...διὰν εὐπορήθη. 215 τοῖς
κηλεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (κατέχει,
ἐκπλήττετει), κτλ. 223 τοὺς εὐποροὺς καὶ
πιθανῶς λόγων ήρευν.
209 εὐθὺς εὐπορεί λόγων περὶ ἀρετῆς.

It will be noticed that in this list the passages which find
responsions in the language of Alcibiades are all drawn from
the discourse of Socrates. This is due to the fact that it is his discourse
alone, of the earlier encomia, which treats Ἔρως on the side of its
ἐὐθεία. The previous speakers had, as we have seen, regarded Ἔρως as
altogether lovely, i.e. as τὸ ἔρωμενον. Accordingly, it is to the next list
of parallels that we must look for the passages where Alcibiades echoes
their sentiments.

(3) Ἔρως-ἔρωμενον as κάλλιστος καὶ
ἀριστος in the earlier encomia.

(1) Courage.
178 ν (Phaedrus) στρατόπεδον ἐραστῶν
...μαχώμενοι γ’ ἀν νικήσ. κτλ. 220 ν ὅτι...φυγῇ ἀνεχώρει τὸ στρατόπεδον,
κτλ.
197 ν (Agathon) ἐν πάνῳ ἐν φήβῳ,
παραστάσες τε καὶ σωτὴρ ἀριστος.
203 ν (Socrates) ἄνδρεις ὄν καὶ ἔτης καὶ
σῶματος.

(2) Temperance.
196 ν (Agathon) ὁ "Ερως διαφερόντως...ἀν
σωφρονοί. 216 ν πόσης οἰεσθε γέμει...σωφροσύνης;

(3) Complete virtue.
196 ν περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφρο-
σύνης καὶ ἄνδρεας τοῦ θεοῦ εὑρήται,
περὶ δὲ σοφίας λείπεται. 219 ν ἀγάμενον...
σωφροσύνην καὶ ἄνδρεαν...
ἐλισ φόβους καὶ εἰς καρτερίαν.

(4) Admirableness.
180 ν (Phaedrus) οἷς θεοὶ...μᾶλλον ταυμά-
ζουσιν καὶ ἀγατω...διὰν ὁ ἔρωμενος
(e.g. Achilles) τὸν ἐραστήν ἀγατη, κτλ.
197 ν (Agathon) θεατὸς σοφοῖς, ἀγατός
θεοῖς.
210 ν (Socrates) καθήσεται τῷ ταυμαστῶν
τῆς φύσεως καλῶν.

(5) Inspiration of a sense of honour.
178 ν (Phaedrus) (ὁ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖ) τὴν
ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνην.

Socrates as the embodiment of "Ἐρως-
ἔρωμενον in Alcibiades' encomium.
(6) Indifference to personal beauty.

210 \( \text{Socrates} \) ἐνδε δὲ (τὸ κάλλος) καταφρονήσαντα, κτλ. (ap. 210 d, 211 e).

219 ὁ ἐμὸ...κατεφρονήσεν καὶ κατεγέλασεν τὴν ἐμῆς ἄρας.

(7) Fruitfulness.

210 \( \text{Socrates} \) τίκτειν λόγους...οὕτως ποιήσον δὲ καὶ τόις νέοις (ap. 210 d).

222 λογοποιούσα τὸν καλὸν λόγον καὶ πλείστα ἀρετῆς ἐν αὐτῶι ἔχοντας καὶ...τελευτησάντας...ἐπὶ πάν ὅσον προσφέρει εκποτήν τῷ μέλλωντι καλῷ κάμαθῳ ἔνεσθαι (ap. 218 d ὡς δὲ τι βέλτιστον γενέσθαι).

212 λόγια οὐκ εἶδομελές ἄρετής...ἀλλ' ἀληθής.

209 ἐντοπεῖ λόγων περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ σῶν χρῆ ἐμὲ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἄγαθον (ap. 185 ν πολλῶν ἐπιμέλειαν...πόδι ἄρετής).

210 ν καλῶς λόγους...τίκτη...ἐν φιλοσοφία ἀφθάρων.

218 ὁ δηχθεὶς ὅπδ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων.

(8) Range of Influence.

186 Ἐρυχιμαχός ἐπὶ πάν ὁ θεὸς τελει. (Eryximachus) ἐπὶ πάν ὁ θεὸς τελει.

222 λογοποιούσα τὸν καλὸν λόγον περὶ τοῦ πολέμου τελεύτης, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ πάν, κτλ.

210 ὁ Socrates ἐπὶ τὸ πολέμου περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ.

The foregoing lists contain, I believe, most if not all of the passages in which Alcibiades, describing Socrates, uses phrases which definitely echo the language or repeat the thought of the earlier encomiasts. When one considers the number of these “responsions” and the natural way in which they are introduced, one is struck at once both with the elaborate technique of Plato and, still more, with the higher art which so skilfully conceals that technique. For all its appearance of spontaneity, a careful analysis and comparison prove that the encomium by Alcibiades is a very carefully wrought piece of work in which every phrase has its significance, every turn of expression its bearing on the literary effect of the dialogue as a whole. Moreover, as we are now to see, the list of parallels already given by no means exhausts the “responsions” offered by Alcibiades.

(b) The speech of Alcibiades, although primarily concerned with Socrates, is also, in a secondary degree, concerned with Alcibiades himself. And Alcibiades, like Socrates, plays a double part: he is at once the πανδικόν of Socrates the ἐραστής, and the ἐραστής of Socrates the ἐρώμενος. In his rôle of ἐραστής Alcibiades exhibits a spirit very similar to that described in the earlier speeches, in which every display of erotic passion is regarded as excusable if not actually commendable. We may call attention to the following echoes:
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218 Παν ἐτόλμα δράν τε καὶ λέγειν.

219 Ε ἡπτόρων δὴ καταδεδουλώμενος.

218 δ ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὖθεν ἐκτὶ πρεσβύτερον τοῖς ὅλης ἤβηστί τούτω ἐμε γενέσθαι. τότε δὲ οὐκ ἦν μοι συλλήπτηρον οὖθεν κυρίωτερον εἶναι σοῦ. Ἔγὼ δὲ τοιοῦτον χάριν... δὲν μὴ χαριζόμενος διάχυσον τοὺς φρονίμους.

219 δ εἴπη...τις ἐστιν ἐμοὶ δύναμις δι' ἡς ἰν σώ γενοίς ἁμέλειν.

222 ν οὖσιν ἐξαιτατών ἦν ἐραυτῆς παιδικα...μὴ ἐξαιτάτωσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦτον.

217 ζ ὁσπέρ ἐραυτὴς παιδικοὶ ἐπιβούλευον...δ' αὖθις δ' ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι.

219 ο ἀντί, ἄφεις ὁσπέρ βέλη.

219 ι ὑπὸ τὸν τριβοῦν κατακλινεῖ τὸν τουτού, περιβάλλων τῷ χεῖρε...κατεκελμὴν τῷ κύκτῳ δὴν.

215 δ ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἔσμεν καὶ κατεχόμεθα.

219 σ ὁδὸν...εἶχον (ὕπως) ἀποστερηθείν τῇ τοῦτον εὐνοοῦσαι.

221 λ παρακελουσάμενοι τε αὐτοῖς βαρβάρειν, καὶ ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐκ ἀπολείψων αὐτῶ.

182 π (Pausanias) θαυμαστὰ ἐργά ἐργαζομένω...ποιεῖν οἶερόν οὐ ἐραυταί πρὸς τὰ παιδικά, κτλ.

184 ο (Paus.) ἐὰν τίς ἐθέλῃ τῶν θεραπειῶν ἴχνημένος δι' ἐκείνων ἁμέλεων ἐξασθαί... ἀυτή αὐτῇ ἐθελοδουλεῖα οὐκ ἀδύνατα.

184 π τότε δὴ...συμπίπτει τὸ καλὸν εἶναι παιδικὰ ἐραυτῇ χαρίστασαί.

185 η πάν τάτως γε καλὸν ἀρετῆς ἐνεκα χαρίστασα.

184 ν ῥ μὲν διώκομεν εἰς...ἀρετὴς συμβάλλεσθαι.

184 κ ο τούτῳ καὶ ἐξαπατηθήσαί οὖν ἀδύνατο.

185 β καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη.

203 δ (Socrates) ἐπιβουλὸς ἐστι (ὁ Ἑρωτ) τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ ἄγαθοῖς.

203 ν (Socr.) θυρευθής δειοῦς.

191 π (Aristoph.) χαλώσαι συγκατακελμένους καὶ συμπεπληγμένους τοῖς ἀνδράσι...οὐ γὰρ ὧν ἀναίσχυντα τούτο δρόσων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ θάρρους...ἀποβαλλοῦσι εἰς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἀνδρέας οἵ τοιοῦτοι.

192 β (Aristoph.) θαυμαστὰ ἐκπλήγγονται φίλα...καὶ ἔρωτι, οὐκ ἐθέλοντες...χαρίζεσθαι ἄλληλον συμμόρφων θρόνον.

179 η (Phaedrus) ἐγκαταλιπέων γε τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ μὴ βοηθήσαντι κινδυνεύοντι, οὐδές οὐσὶ κακὸς, κτλ.

Since in this list echoes are found of the only two earlier encomiasts who were not represented in the former lists (viz. Pausanias and Aristophanes), it will be seen that the speech of Alcibiades contains references, more or less frequent, to sentiments and sayings expressed by every one of the previous speakers. It is chiefly in his description of himself that Alcibiades echoes the language of the first five speakers, and in his description of Socrates that he echoes the language of Socrates. The general impression made on the mind of the reader who attends to the significance of the facts might be summed up briefly in the form of a proportion: as Alcibiades is to Socrates in point of practical excellence and truth, so are the first five speeches to the discourse of Socrates-Diotima in point of theoretical truth and excellence. But while this is, broadly speaking, true of the
inner nature (φύσις, ἡ ἔνδον) of Socrates as contrasted with that of Alcibiades, we must bear in mind that in his outward appearance (σχήμα) Socrates is “conformed to this world” and, posing as an erastes of a similar type to Alcibiades himself, serves to illustrate the theories and sentiments of the earlier speeches.

Lastly, attention may be drawn to one other parallel in Alcibiades’ discourse which appears to have passed unnoticed hitherto. It can scarcely be a mere coincidence that Alcibiades’ progress in erotics—in other words, “the temptation of saint” Socrates—is marked by a series of stages (συνουσία, συγγραμμασία, συνδιαπνεύ̣, 217 A ff.) until it reaches its climax in συγκέκριμα, and that a similar ἀνάστασις by gradual stages (210 A ff., 211 C ff.) up to the final communion with Ideal Beauty had been described as the characteristic method of the true erastes. It seems reasonable to suppose that the method of false love is designedly represented as thus in detail contrasting with, and as it were caricaturing, the method of true love: for thereby an added emphasis is laid upon the latter.

§ vii. THE DIALOGUE AS A WHOLE: ITS SCOPE AND DESIGN.

No small degree of attention has been paid by the expositors of our dialogue to the question regarding its main purport—“de universi operis consilio.” It is plausibly argued that there must be some one leading thought, some fundamental idea, which serves to knit together its various parts and to furnish it with that “unity” which should belong to it as an artistic whole. But wherein this leading idea consists has been matter of controversy. Some, like Stallbaum, are content to adopt the simplest and most obvious view that Eros is the central idea, and that the design of the whole is to establish a doctrine of Eros. Others, again, have supposed that Plato was mainly concerned to furnish his readers with another specimen of the right method of handling philosophical problems. But although either of these views, or both combined, might be thought to supply an adequate account of the design and scope of the dialogue if it had ended with the speech of Socrates, they are evidently inadequate when applied to the dialogue as it stands, with the addition of the Alcibiades scenes. In fact, this last part of the dialogue—the Third Act, as we have called it—might be construed as suggesting an entirely different motif,—namely, laudation of Socrates in general, or perhaps rather (as Wolf argued) a defence of Socrates against the more specific charge of unchastity.
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That this is one purpose of the dialogue is beyond dispute: many indications testify, as has been shown, that Plato intended here to offer an apologiam pro vita Socratis. Yet it would be a mistake to argue from this that the main design of the dialogue as a whole lies in this apologetic. Rather it is necessary to combine the leading idea of this last Act with those of the earlier Acts in such a way as to reduce them, as it were, to a common denominator. And when we do this, we find—as I agree with Rücker in believing—that the dominant factor common to all three Acts is nothing else than the personality of Socrates,—Socrates as the ideal both of philosophy and of love, Socrates as at once the type of temperance and the master of magic. Our study of the framework as well as of the speeches has shown us how both the figure of Socrates and his theory dominate the dialogue, and that to throw these into bolder relief constitutes the main value of all the other theories and figures. This point has been rightly emphasized by Rücker (p. 252): "utique ad Socratem animus advertitur; quasi sol in medio positus, quem omnes circummeant, cuius luce omnia collustrantur, viumque accipiant vitalem, Socrates ponitur, et Socrates quidem philosophus, sapiens, temperans. Quem iuxta multi plane evanescent, ceteri vix obscure comparent, ipse Agatho, splendidissimum licet sidus ex omnibus, ut coram sole luna pallescit."

It seems clear, therefore, that the explanation of the "Hauptzweck" of our dialogue which was given long ago by Schleiermacher is the right one—"propositum est Platoni in Convivio ut philosophum qualem in vita se exhiberet, viva imagine depingeret": it is in the portrait of the ideal Socrates that the main object of the dialogue is to be sought.

The theory of Teichmüller and Wilamowitz as to the occasion on which the dialogue was produced has no direct bearing on the question of design. They suppose that it was written specially for recital at a banquet in Plato's Academy; and, further, that it was intended to provide the friends and pupils of Plato with a model of what such a banquet ought to be. But it would be absurd to estimate the design of a work of literary art by the temporary purpose which it subserved; nor can we easily suppose that Plato's main interest lay in either imagining or recording gastronomic successes as such. Equally unproven, though more suggestive, is the idea of Gomperz that this dialogue περὶ ἔρωτος was inspired by an affection for Dion.
§ viii. The Date.

We must begin by drawing a distinction between (a) the date of the actual Banquet, (b) that of Apollodorus' narrative, and (c) that of the composition of the dialogue by Plato.

(a) That the date of the Banquet is B.C. 416 (Ob. 90. 4) is asserted by Athenaeus (v. 217 A): δ μὲν γὰρ (sc. 'Αγάθων) ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Εὐφήμου στεφανοῦται Ληναιός. It is true, as Sauppe and others have pointed out, that the description in 175 B (ἐν μάρτυρι...προσμυνών, cp. 223 B n.), would suit the Great Dionysia better than the Lenaea; but this discrepancy need not shake our confidence in the date assigned by Athenaeus. The year 416 agrees with the mention of Agathon as νίς (175 B), and of Alcibiades as at the height of his influence (216 B) before the ill-fated Sicilian expedition.

(b) The date of the prefatory scene may be approximately fixed from the following indications: (1) It was a considerable number of years after the actual Banquet (οὗ νεωστὶ 172 c, παῖδων δόντων ἡμῶν ἐτί 173 A); (2) several years (πολλὰ ἵτη 172 c) after Agathon's departure from Athens; (3) within three years of the commencement of Apollodorus' close association with Socrates (172 c); (4) before the death of Socrates (as shown by the pres. tense σνδιατίβω 172 c); (5) before the death of Agathon (as shown by the perf. ἐπὶδεδήμηκεν 172 c). It seems probable that Agathon left Athens about 408, at the latest, and resided till 399 at the court of Archelaus of Macedon. Hence any date before 399 will satisfy the two last data. And since the two first data demand a date as far removed as possible from the years 416 and 408, we can hardly go far wrong if we date the dramatic setting circ. 400 B.C.

(c) We come now to the more important question of the date of composition. The external evidence available is but slight. A posterior limit is afforded by two references in Aristotle (Pol. ii. 4. 1262b 12: de An. ii. 415a 26), a possible allusion by Aeschines (in Timarch. 345 B.C.), and a probable comic allusion by Alexis in his Phaedrus (ap. Athen. xiii. 562 A)—a work which probably cannot be dated before 370 at the earliest.

The internal evidence is more extensive but somewhat indefinite. It is commonly assumed that in 193 A (δυσκίσθημεν...Ἀκεδαμιονίων)

1 Fritzsch's view that Ar. Ran. 72 implies the previous death (i.e. ante 405) of A. is refuted by Retting, Symp. pp. 63 ff.
2 See e.g. Zeller, Plato (B.T.) p. 139 n.; Teichmüller, Litt. Fehd. ii. 262.
we have a definite reference to the άνωκοιμῶς of Mantinea in 385 B.C. But even if this be granted—as I think it must, in spite of the contradiction of Wilamowitz—it by no means follows that the dialogue must be dated 385–4. We find Isocrates (Panegyr. 126) mentioning the same event five years later. All that it affords us is a prior limit. Little weight can be given to Dümmler’s view that the previous death of Gorgias (circ. 380) is implied by the allusion to him in 198 c (Γοργίων κεφαλῆς κτλ.)¹. Nor can we lay much stress on the conclusions drawn (by Rückert and others) from the absence of reference to the re-establishment of Mantinea in 370, or to the exploits of the Theban "Sacred Band" at Leuctra (371), which (as Hug thinks) might naturally have been alluded to in 178 e.

The evidence of date afforded by "stylistic" observations is not of a convincing character. M. Lutoslawski, it is true, dogmatically asserts that the Symposium stands between the Cratylus and Phaedo in the "First Platonic Group"; but his arguments, when examined, prove to be of the most flimsy character. Beyond affording a confirmation of the general impression that our dialogue stands somewhere in the "middle" period, the labours of the stylometrists give us little assistance. If we choose to date it in 390 they cannot refute us, nor yet if we date it 10 or 15 years later. The question as to whether the Symposium preceded the Phaedrus or followed it is one of special interest in view of the number of points at which the two writings touch each other. The evidence on the whole seems in favour of the priority of the Phaedrus²; but, even if this be granted, little light is shed on the date of composition of the Symp., since that of the Phaedrus eludes precise determination.

Equally difficult is it to draw any certain conclusions from the relation in which our dialogue stands to the Symposium of Xenophon. That there are many points of connexion, many close parallels, between

¹ See Dümmler, Akademica, p. 40; and the refutation by Vahlen, op. Acad. i. 482 ff.

² So I hold with Schleierm., Zeller, I. Bruns, Hahn and others; against Lutosl., Gomperz and Raeder. It is monstrous to assert, as Lutosl. does, "that the date of the Phaedrus as written about 379 B.C. is now quite as well confirmed as the date of the Symp. about 385 B.C." I agree rather with the view which makes Phaedr. P.'s first publication after he opened his Academy, i.e. circ. 388-6 (a view recently supported in England by E. S. Thompson, Meno xiii ff., and Gifford, Euthyd. 20 ff.). The foll. are some of the parallels: Ph. 232 e = Symp. 181 e, 183 e; 234 a = 188 e; 234 b = 183 c; 250 c = 209 e; 251 d (240 d) = 215 e, 218 A; 251 A = 215 B, 222 A; 252 A = 189 d; 266 A = 180 e; 267 A (273 A) = 200 A; 272 A = 198 D; 278 A = 222 A; 276 e = 209 B; 278 e = 203 e; 279 e = 216 d, 215 e.
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the two works is obvious, but which of the two is prior in date is a problem which has called forth prolonged controversy. This is not the place to investigate the problem: I can only state my firm opinion that the Xenophontic Sympos. (whether genuine or not) is the later work. But attempts to fix its date are little better than guess-work: Roquette puts it circ. 380—76; Schanz, after 371; K. Lincke (Neue Jahrb. 1897), after 350.

It will be seen that the available evidence is not sufficient to justify us in dogmatizing about the precise date of composition of our dialogue. The most we can say is that circ. 383—5 seems on the whole the most probable period.

§ ix. The Text.

(1) Ancient authorities. The chief manuscripts which contain the text of the Symposium are:

B = codex Bodleianus (or Clarkianus or Oxoniensis); Bekker's A.
T = codex Venetus append. class. 4, cod. 1: Bekker's t ("omnium librorum secundae familiae fons" Schanz).

Among those who claim priority for Xenophon are Böckh, Ast, Delbrück, Bettig, Teichmüller, Hug, Dümmler, Pfleiderer; on the other side are C. F. Hermann, I. Bruns, Schenkl, Gomperz. Beside the broader resemblances set forth by Hug, the foll. refs. to echoes may be of interest:

Xen. Plat.
i. 1 = 178 A, 197 E
ii. 23 = 213 E, 214 A
ii. 26 (iv. 24) = 185 C, 198 C
iv. 14 = 183 A, 184 B, 179 A
" 15 = 178 E, 179 B, 182 C
" 16 = 178 E
" 17 = 181 E, 183 E
" 19 (v. 7) = 215 A (216 D, 221 D)
" 23 = 181 D
" 25 = 193 D
" 28 = 217 E
" 47—8 = 183 B
" 48 = 188 D
" 50 = 189 A, 197 E

Xen. Plat.
iv. 53 = 219 B
v. 1, 7 = 218 B (175 E)
viii. 1 = 218 B (187 N)
" 8 = 219 D
" 13 = 184 B
" 21 = 214 C
" 23 = 183 A (203 B), 172 C
" 24 = 217 E, 222 C
" 31 = 179 E
" 38 = 209 E
" 32 (iv. 16) = 178 E
" 34 = 182 B
" 35 = 179 A

The last three parallels are specially interesting, since Xen. ascribes to Pausan. some of the sentiments which Pl. gives to Phaedrus. Possibly (as Hug, Teichm. and others suppose) both writers are indebted to an actual apologia of the real Pausan., which Pl. is handling more freely, Xen. more exactly (cp. I. Bruns, Vorträge, p. 152).
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W = codex Vindobonensis 54, Suppl. phil. Gr. 7: Stallbaum's Vind. I.

To these we have now to add, as a new authority,

O.-P. = Oxyrhynchus Papyrus (no. 843 in Grenfell and Hunt's collection).

Since this last authority for the text was not forthcoming until after the publication of the latest critical text of the Symposium, I add the description of it given by the editors:

"The part covered is from 200 B [beginning with the word βου-λω[τo] after which 40 lines are lost, the next words being αυ ενδεια at the end of 200 η] to the end, comprised in 31 columns, of which four (xix—xxii) are missing entirely, while two others (i and xviii) are represented by small fragments; but the remainder is in a very fair state of preservation. The small and well-formed but somewhat heavy writing exemplifies a common type of book hand, and probably dates from about the year 200 A.D....The corrector's ink does not differ markedly in colour from that of the text, and in the case of minor insertions the two hands are at times difficult to distinguish. But as they are certainly not separated by any wide interval of time the question has no great practical importance. The text, as so often with papyri, is of an eclectic character, showing a decided affinity with no single MS. Compared with the three principal witnesses for the Symposium it agrees now with B against TW, now with the two latter as against the former, rarely with T against BW or with W against BT. Similarly in a passage cited by Stobaeus some agreements with his readings against the consensus of BTW are counterbalanced by a number of variations from Stobaeus' text. A few coincidences occur with variants peculiar to the inferior MS, the more noticeable being those with Vindob. 21 alone or in combination with Venet. 184 and Parisin. 1642 alone or with Vat. 229. Of the readings for which there is no other authority, including several variations in the order of the words, the majority, if unobjectionable, are unconvincing. The more valuable contributions, some of which are plainly superior to anything found in other MS, are: l. 92 [201 B] επι, l. 112 [202 A] the omission of καί (so Stallbaum), l. 239 [204 B] αυ εμή, where BTW have a meaningless δι, l. 368 [206 C] καλω as conjectured by Badham.

1 See crit. notes on 202 A, 203 A, 205 B, 206 B, 207 D, 211 C.
2 See crit. notes on 203 B, 211 D, 213 B, 219 E, 220 C (bis).
3 See crit. notes on 202 C—203 A.
4 See crit. notes on 201 A (ad fin.), 218 D, 220 A, 220 B, 223 C.
5 See crit. notes on 206 B (ad init.), 208 A, 223 C.
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for τῷ κ., l. 471 [208 B] μετέχει as restored by Stephanus (μετέχειν mss.), l. 517 [209 A] τεκευ̂ν confirming a conjecture of Hug (κανεύ mss.), l. 529 [209 B] επιθυμη as conjectured by Stephanus (ἐπιθυμεῖ mss.), l. 577 [210 A] καὶ σὺ omitted by mss., l. 699 [212 A] θεοφαλεῖ (ἡ BTW), l. 770 [213 B] καταθεν (?) (καθιζεῖν mss.), l. 898 [218 B] μοῦ (probably) with Vind. 21 (μοῦ BTW), l. 1142 [222 B] δαβαλει as conjectured by Hirschig (δαβαλη ΒΤΒ). On the other hand in many cases the papyrus once more proves the antiquity of readings which modern criticism rejects or suspects."

It may be added that the editors of the papyrus in citing W have made use of a new collation of that ms. by Prof. H. Schöne of Basel "which often supplements and sometimes corrects the report of Burnet." And in this edition I have followed the report of W in their apparatus, where available, while relying elsewhere upon that given by Burnet.

(2) Modern criticism. Much attention has been paid by Continental critics during the last century to the text of the Symposium, and for the most part they have proceeded on the assumption that the text is largely vitiated by interpolations. Even Schanz and Hug, who may be regarded as moderate and cautious critics in comparison with such extremists as Jahn and Badham, have gone to unnecessary lengths in their use of the obelus. Hug, while admitting that we must take into account the freedom and variety of Plato's style and that it is folly to rob a writer of his individuality by pruning away any and every expression which is in strict logic superfluous, and while admitting also that regard must be paid to the characteristic differences of the various speeches in our dialogue, which forbid our taking any one speech as the norm with which others should be squared,—yet maintains that in the speeches, and especially in those of Pausanias and Socrates, he can detect a number of unquestionable glosses. No doubt there are some cases in these speeches in which it is not unreasonable to suspect interpolation, but even Hug and Schanz have, I believe, greatly exaggerated the number of such cases; and I agree with the editor of the Oxford text in regarding the certain instances of corruption or interpolation as extremely few. Consequently, in the text here printed I have diverged but seldom from the ancient tradition, and such changes as I have made have been more often in the

1 E.g. O. Jahn, Hirschig, Badham, Cobet, Naber, Hartmann. On the other hand, sensible protests have been made by Teuffel and Vahlen; and Retzig's text is, if anything, ultra-conservative.
direction of verbal alteration than of omission. I have, however, recorded in the textual notes a selection of the proposed alterations, futile though I consider most of them to be.

§ x. Bibliography.

The main authorities which I have cited or consulted are:\footnote{Abbreviations used are—Bdhm. = Badham; Blt. = Burnet; Jn. = Jahn; J.-U. = Jahn-Usener; Sz. = Schanz; Verm. = Vermehren; Voeg. = Voegelin.}

i. Texts: Bekker (1826), the Zurich ed. (Baiter, Orelli and Winckelmann, 1839), C. F. Hermann (1851), O. Jahn (1864), Jahn-Usener (1875), C. Badham (1866), M. Schanz (1881), J. Burnet (1901).

Critical essays or notes by Bast (1794), Voegelin, Naber, Teuffel, M. Vermehren (1870), J. J. Hartmann (1898).


Other more general works consulted are: Teichmüller (Litt. Fehden, 1881), F. Horn (Platonstudien, 1893), W. Lutoslawski (Plato’s Logic, 1897), T. Gomperz (Greek Thinkers, E.T. ii. 1905), H. Raeder (Platons Philos. Entwicklung, 1905), J. Adam (Religious Teachers of Greece, 1908).


1 Abbreviations used are—Bdhm. = Badham; Blt. = Burnet; Jn. = Jahn; J.-U. = Jahn-Usener; Sz. = Schanz; Verm. = Vermehren; Voeg. = Voegelin.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΣΥΜΠΟΣΙΟΝ

[H ΠΕΡΙ ΑΓΑΘΟΥ· ΘΟΙΚΟΣ]

I. Δοκῶ μοι περὶ ὑπὶ πυνθάνεσθε ὅνικ ἀμελήτητος εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἐνγχαίνων πρώην εἰς ἀστυ οἰκοθεν ἄνιων Φαληρόθεν· τῶν ὑπὸ γνωρίμων τις ὀπισθὲν κατιδὼν μὲ παραθὸν ἐκάλεσε, καὶ παρὶν ἁμα τῇ κλησει, Ὄ Φαληρεύς, ἔφη, σύνος [Ἀπολλόδωρος], οὐ περιμενέεις; καὶ ἔπιστας περιμενεῖα. καὶ ὅσιο ς Ἐπολλόδωρος ἔφη, καὶ


172 A Δοκῶ μοι κτλ. The speaker, Apollodoros (see Introd. § II. A), is replying to certain unnamed ἑταῖροι who had been questioning him concerning the incidents and speeches which took place at Agathon's banquet. The plural πυνθάνεσθε (and οἷς, οἷς 173 C, δ ἐπὶ αὐτα) indicates that there were several ἑταῖροι present: the traditional heading of the dialogue, ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ, is due to the fact that all but one are κωφὰ πρὸσωπα.

οὖν ἀμελήτητος. μελέτη and μελετῶν are regular terms for the "conning over" of a speech or "part": cp. Phaedr. 228 B.

καὶ γὰρ ἐνγχαίνων. These words explain the preceding statement δοκῶ... οὖν ἀμελήτητος εἶναι, and serve to introduce not only the sentence immediately following but the whole of the succeeding passage down to 173 B where the initial statement is resumed by the words δοτέ...οὖν ἀμελήτητος ἔχω.

Φαληρόθεν. Phalerum, the old port of Athens, was about 20 stadia (2½ miles) distant from the city on the S.E.

καὶ παῖξαν...περιμενεῖς; Where does the joke come in?

(1) Ast, Hommel, Stallbaum and Jowett look for it in the word Φαληρεύς, which they take to be a play on φαλαρίς ("bald-headed," so Jowett) or φαλαρίς ("bald-coot") in allusion to the bald crown or the peculiar gait of Apollodorus. But what evidence is there to show that A. either was bald or walked like a coot?

(2) Another suggestion of Hommel's is to write (with the vulgate) ὅ Ἐπολλόδωρος and assume an etymological allusion to the opportuneness of the meeting (as "Apollo-given"). This also is far-fetched.

(3) Schüttz, followed by Wolf and Hug, finds the παθιά in the playfully
μὴν καὶ ἐνανγχός σε ἔξητον, θουλὸμενος διαπυθέσθαι τήν 'Αγά-
θωνος ξύνοντιαν καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
τῶν τότε ἑν τῷ συνδείπνῳ παραγενομένων, περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν
λόγων τίνες ἦσαν. ἄλλος γὰρ τίς μοι διηγεῖτο ἀκηκώς Φοῖνικος
τοῦ Φιλίππου, ἐφη δὲ καὶ σὲ εἰδέναι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οüδὲν εἶχε σαφῆς
λέγειν. σὺ οὖν μοι διήγησαι. δικαίωτας γὰρ ἐι τοὺς τοῦ ἐταίρου
λόγους ἀπαγγέλλειν. πρότερον δὲ μοι, ἡ δ' ὅς, εἰπὲ, σὺ αὐτὸς
C παρεγένου τῇ συνοισίᾳ ταύτη ἢ οὐ; κἂν γὼ εἶπον ὃτι Πάνταπασιν

172 B ἐν τῷ συνδείπνῳ secl. Baiter J.-U. συνδείπνῳ T: συνδείπνῳ W

official style of the address, in which the person is designated by the name of
his deme, this being the regular practice in legal and formal proceedings (cp.
Gorg. 495 § Καλλικλῆς ἐφη 'Αχαρνεῖς...Σωκράτης...ὁ Ἀλωπεκήθεν: Αγ. Ναυ.
134); but (as Stallb. objected) the order of the words in that case should be
rather δ ὁ δῆτος 'Α. ὁ Φαίρης. Hug also finds παιδία in the hendecasyllabic
rhythm (ὁ Φαλ. ὁ δῆτος 'Απ.). and the poetic combination δ ὁ δῆτος (Soph. O. C.
1627, A.)

(4) Rettig, reading ὁ Φαίρης, omits (with Badham) the proper name
Ἀπολλάδωρος as an adscript. This seems, on the whole, the best and simplest
solution. Glaucon, at a distance behind, feigns ignorance of the identity of
"the Phalerian," and shouts after Apollodorus "Ho there! you Phalerian,
halt," in a "stop thief!" tone. It is plausible to suppose also that a certain
contempt is conveyed in the description Φαίρης ("Wapping-ite"): port-
towns are often places of unsavoury repute: cp. Phaedr. 243 εἰν ναυτίας που
τεθραμμένον: Juv. Sat. viii. 174 "permixtum nautis et furibus ac fugitivis."

For the summons to halt cp. Ar. Plut. 440 oδης, τῷ δρότε; ὁ δειλότατον σὺ
θηρίων, ὅπερ περιμενεῖς; Thesm. 689 ποιεῖ σὺ θείες; oδης, oδης, σὺ μενεῖς;
also Ἐγ. 240, 1354. These passages support the future περιμενεῖς rather than
the present: "futurum est fortius imperantis; praesens modeste cohortantis
aut leniens postulantis" (Stallb.). For the future as a lively imperative cp.
175 A, 212 D.

172 B ἐν τῷ συνδείπνῳ. Similarly in Aristoph. Gerytades (frag. 204 εἰν
tοις συνδείπνοις ἐπιανόν Δαλίαν) συνδείπνοι is used for the more precise
συμπόσιοι: and a lost play of Sophocles bore the title 'Αχαιῶν σύλλογος ἢ
συνδείπνοι ἢ συνδείπνοι (see fragg. 146 ff., Dindf.).

tύμης ήσαν. For phrases of this kind, "satis libere subjecta orationi," see

Φοῖνικος τοῦ Φιλίππου. Nothing is known of this man. See Introd. § ii. A.
dικαίωτας γὰρ κτλ. τοῦ ἐταίρου is almost equivalent to ἐταίρου γε ὅντος,
giving the reason why Apollodorus is dikaiwotatos.

παρεγένου τῇ συνοισίᾳ. Cρ. Hom. Od. xvii. 173 καὶ σφίν παρεγένου ταῦτη:
and the exordium of the Phaedr (57 A) autōs, ὃς, παρεγένου Σωκράτει
... ή ἄλλον τοῦ ἥκουσας;

Παντάπασιν έκκει σοι κτλ. "It is quite evident that his narration was of
the vaguest kind." διαγείσθαι is here the infin. of διαγέετα. The emphatic repetition of οὐδὲν σαφὲς is a ground for suspecting that the reference is to a published account in which the facts were distorted.

172 Ο Πίθευν...Δ Γλαύκων: "What makes you think so, Glaucon?" There is an implicit negation in the question put thus: cp. Gorg. 471 D, Menex. 235 c. This Glaucon is perhaps the same as the father of Charmides (Charm. 154 a, etc.), but probably not the same as the Glaucon of the Republic, though Böckh and Munk would identify the two.

πολλῶν ἐτῶν κτλ. For the bearing of this passage on the dramatic date of this prologue, see Introd. § viii.

ἐπιμελές πεποίημαν...εἰδέναι. The nearest Platonic parallel for this construction is Ep. vii. 334 a πολλοῖς...ὑμνεῖν ταῦτα ἐπιμελές.

173 Α. περιτρέχων δὴ τύχωμι, i.e. with no fixed principle of conduct,—"like a wave of the sea, driven with the wind and tossed." Cp. Tim. 43 b ἀπάκτως δὴ τύχων προέλθει: Seneca de vita beata i. 2 "quamdiu quidem passim vagamur non ducem secuti...conteretur vita inter errores brevis," etc.

οἵμον τὶ ποιεῖν. For τὴν magnam quidq, cp. 219 c, Phaedr. 242 b, etc.

Πάθον ὑπὸν ἠμῶν ἤτω. Sc. Apollodorus and Glauc. Plato, too, born about 427 B.C., was a paie at the date of Agathon's victory (416 B.C.).

τῇ πρῶτῃ τραγῳδίᾳ. "Respicit Plato ad tetralogias" (Reynders).

τῇ ὑπερτερα. ἦ. For this (compendious) construction cp. Thuc. 1. 60 τεσσαράκοστ' ἡμέρᾳ υπερτερον...ἡ Ποιῆσα ἀπέστη (with Shilleto's note); Lys. xix. 22.

τὰ ἐπινικία ἠθέν. "Made a sacrificial feast in honour of his victory." On this occasion it was the author himself who provided the feast and offered the sacrifice. Sometimes however it was the Choregos (e.g. Ar. Aol. 886), and
πάλαι, ὃς ἔοικεν. οὗδέ τις σοι διηγεῖτο; ἢ ἀυτὸς Σωκράτης; Οὐ
μᾶ τόν Δία, ἂν δ' ἐγὼ, ἅλλ' ὅσπερ Φοίνικι. Ἀριστόδημος ἦν τις,
Κυδαθηριαίου, σμικρός, ἀνυπόδητος ἄει· παραγεγόνει δ' ἐν τῇ
συννυσίᾳ. Σωκράτους ἐρασθῇ ὄν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τῶν τότε, ὃς
ἔμοι δοκεῖ. οὐ μέντοι ἄλλα καὶ Σωκράτη γε ἔνα ἢδη ἀντιρήμην
ὤν ἐκείνον ἥκουσα, καὶ μοι ὃμιλοῦσε καθὰπερ ἐκείνος διηγεῖτο. Τί
οὖν, ἐφι, οὐ διηγήσας μοι; πάντως δὲ ἡ ὄδης ἢ εἰς ἄστυ ἐπιτιθεῖται
παρευμένοις καὶ λέγειν καὶ ἄκοινεν.

C Ὅστῳ δὲ οὕτως άμα τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ἐποιοῦμεθα, ὡστε,
ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐλπον, ὅνκ ἀμελετήτως ἔχω. εἰ οὖν δεῖ καὶ ὑμῖν
διηγησασθαι, τάντα χρῆ ποιεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἔγνωκε καὶ ἄλλως, ὅταν
μὲν τινὰς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λόγους/ ἢ αὐτὸς ποιῶμαι ἢ ἄλλων

173 A τὶ TW Β ἀλλοστεροι BT ἀνυπόδητος τ' Ast
παραγεγονεὶ BT καὶ om. T διηγηθῇ W: διηγή ἄν vulg. δὲ
om. al.: γε J.-U.: γαρ Susemihih C δεὶ: δοκεὶ Hirschig

sometimes the friends of the successful competitor (e.g. Xen. Symp. i. 4).
Similarly at Rome it was customary for the dux gregis to entertain his troupe
after a victory (see Plaut. Rud. 1417 ff).

173 B Ἀριστόδημος. See Intro. § II. A.

Κυδαθηριαίου. Schol. Κυδαθηριαίους δῆμος ἐν ἄστει τῆς Πανδιανίδος φυλῆς.
καλεῖται δὲ καὶ Κύδαθον. The poet Aristophanes also belonged to this deme.

ἀνυπόδητος. In this peculiarity A. imitated Socrates, see 174 A, 220 B,
Ar. Nub. 103 τοὺς ἀνυπόδητους λέγεις. | δὲν ὁ κακοδαίμων Σωκράτης καὶ
Χαριφῶν, ibid. 362. It is a peculiarity which would appeal to disciples
with a penchant for the simple life, such as those of the Cynic persuasion.

γρατής. “An admirer.” Cp. the application of ἐτάρας in 172 B supr.

ἐκεῖνοι...ἐκείνοι. Both pronouns refer to the same person, Aristodemus.
The statement here made is not without significance, see Intro. § II. A.

Τι οὖν...οὐ διηγήσω. “Haece interrogatio alacratem quandam animi et
aviditatem scendi indicat.” (Stallb.) Cp. Meno 92 a (with E. S. Thompson's
note, where a full list of the Platonic exx. is given).

πάντως δὲ κτλ. “For to be sure,” confirming the preceding clause with
a new argument. A good parallel is Laws i. 625 A πάντως δ' ἢ γε ἐκ Κνουσοῦ
όδης εἰς τοῦ Δίων ἄντρον καὶ λεγόν, ὧς ἄκοινες, ικανή.

173 C ὑπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐλπον. See 172 A ad init.

εἰ οὖν δὲ...χρῆ. The comma is better placed before ταύτα, with Usener
and Burnet, than after it, with Hug and earlier editors. A similar turn of
expression is Soph. Trach. 749 εἰ χρῆ μαθεῖν σε, πάντα δὴ φονεῖν χρεών.

αὐτὸς ποιῶμαι. Here Apollodorus seems to claim to be no mere disciple,
but himself an exponent of philosophy. So far as it goes this might indicate
that Apollodorus represents the real author, Plato. For A.'s delight in
philosophic λόγον, cp. what is said of Phaedrus in Phaedr. 228 B, where Soce.
too is called ὁ νοσῶν περὶ λόγων.
173 Ρρύχεσθαι υπερφυώς ός χαίρω. This may be explained as a mixture of two constructions, viz. (1) υπερφυώς ἐστιν ός χαίρω, (2) υπερφυώς χαίρω: it is found also in Gorg. 496 c, Phaedo 66 Α, Theaet. 155 c (but in all these places some, codd. and edd. omit οἰ).

χρηματιστικών. For this word in the masc., "money-makers," cp. Rep. 581 c ἡ γε χρηματιστικός πρὸς τὸ κερδαίνει τὴν του τιμάσθη ῥοῦνη ἡ τὴν του ματάσθαις οὐδενὸς δέξιαν φήσει εἶναι, εἰ μὴ εἰ τι αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιεῖ: also Phaedr. 248 Β. In Meno 78 c ἄγαθα...χρυσὸν λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτάσθαι) we have an expression of the sentiments of a χρηματιστικός. For Apollodorus' sentiment, cp. Isocr. c. Soph. 291 νὰ λέγοι μὲν ὄς οὐδὲν δέουσιν χρημάτων, ἀργυρίων καὶ χρυσίων τὸν πλούτον ἀποκαλύπτει (where the ref. is probably to Antisthenes): cp. also what Aelib. says of Socr., 216 E, 219 E. The gloss-hunting critics, strangely enough (as Vahlen remarks), have left the words ὑπατ' τοὺς ἐταίρους unscathed.

173 D ἀληθὴς ἔσεσθαι. ἔσεσθαι here is substituted for ἤγεσθαι, and the following οὐκ ὁμοία is in antithesis, not to the ὁμοία preceding, but to ἤγεσθαι. Apollodorus, conscious of his inferiority to Socrates, his ideal, is willing to admit that he is not as yet wholly ἐδαίμων.

ἀλλ' εὗ αἰθα. Sc. ἓτι κακοδαίμονες ἔστε. For this exposure of the true condition of "the children of this world" who are ἐδαίμονες in their own conceit, and despise others, one may cite Apoc. iii. 17 "Thou sayest, I am rich and increased with goods and have need of nothing; and knowest not that thou art wretched and miserable and poor and blind and naked."

'Αει ὁμοίος εἰ. "Semper tibi hac in re constas" (Stallb.): "you are quite incorrigible." So below we have 'αει τοιοῦτος εἰ. Cp. Charm. 170 Α ἀλλ' ἐγὼ κινδυνεύω 'αεί ὁμοίος εἰμι.

ἀτεχνῶς πάντας. This seems to be the sole instance in Plato of this combination "all without exception"; but cp. Rep. 432 Α ἀτατέχνεσθαι.

ἄθλιον. Here a synonym for κακοδαίμονας, the word used above. Cp. Meno 78 c τοὺς ἄθλιους οὐ κακοδαίμονας; ὁμοία ἤγογγε...τι γὰρ ἄθλος ἐστίν ἄθλιον εἶναι ἤ ἐπειθεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτάσθαι;

πλὴν Σωκράτους. "Save Socrates only": notice the emphasis on these words, repeated twice. We may discern, perhaps, in this an allusion, by way
of antithesis, to the κατηγορία Σωκράτους of the sophist Polycrates (see Introd. § II. a).

τὸ μανικός καλῶσθαι. There can be little doubt (pace Naber) that μανικός, not μαλάκως, is the true reading: it is supported by the words μαίνομαι καὶ παραπάλω in Apollodorus's reply. Stallbaum supposes an elision of some such phrase as δοκεῖς δὲ λαβέιν αἰτώλην before ἐν μὲν γὰρ κτλ., and (with Wolf) explains μανικός as referring to the vehemence and excess of Apollodorus both in praise and blame: cp. Polit. 307 b, and Apol. 21 a where Chaerophon (termed μανικός in Charm. 153 b) is described as σφοδρός ἐφ' ὑπὸ ἀρμήσεων. But the connexion of the sentence ἐν μὲν γὰρ κτλ. with the preceding clause is better brought out by Hug; he supplies (after αὐκ ἀιδα) "so ganz ohne Grund wirds wohl nicht sein," so that the line of thought is—"Though I do not know exactly why you got the nickname 'fanatic'—yet in your speeches at any rate you do something to justify the title." For a similar use of μὲν γὰρ cp. Polit. 264 c ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς κρήναις ταύτ' ἀν ἀφες εἶπε γήσημένως. For μανικός cp. also Meno 91 c where Anytus regards παρὰ σοφιστάς ἐλθεῖν as a sign of μανία: and Acts xxvi. 24 Μαύρη Παύλη· τὰ πολλά σε γράμματα εἰς μανίαν περιπέφει. "


173 Ε Ὡ φιλτάτη κτλ. Ironical—"Why, my very dear Sir, it is surely quite obvious that in holding this view about myself and others I display madness and eccentricity!"

παραπάλω. Α ἄσπας εἰρημένων in Plato. For the musical metaphor cp. Ophelia's "I see that sovereign and most noble reason, Like sweet bells jangled, out of tune and harsh."

Οὐκ ἀξίων... ἐρίζειν. "We mustn't quarrel." ἐρίζειν, though here used jocularly, is properly a strong term, cp. Prot. 337 b ἄρμασθησαν μὲν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μή: Rep. 464 a αὐκ ἐρίζειν, ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι (see Adam ad loc.).

μᾶλλον δ'. Instead of beginning at once with the speech of Phaedrus, Apollodorus proceeds to give an account of the preliminary incidents which led up to the λόγοι. For the significance of this, see Introd. § II. a.
II. "Εφη γάρ οἱ Σωκράτης ἐνυπέχειν λελουμένου τε καὶ τὰς 
βλαύτας ὑποδεδεμένου, ὃ ἐκεῖνος ὁλιγάκις ἔποιεί· καὶ ἐρέσθαι 
αὐτὸν ὅπου οὐδὲν καλὸς ἔγενεμένος. καὶ τὸν εἶπειν ὅτι Ἐπί 
δείπνου εἰς Ἀγάθωνος. χθές γὰρ αὐτὸν διέφυγον τοῖς ἐπινικίοις, 
φοβθεῖσι τὸν ὑξλον· ὁμολόγησα δ’ εἰς τήμερον παρέσεσθαι. ταύτα 
δὴ ἐκκαλλωσιάθην, ἕνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἰα. ἀλλὰ σὺ, ἡ δ’ ὅς, 
πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἑδέλου ἄν ἦναι ἀκλητος ἐπὶ δείπνου; κάνγο, B

174 A a: δ' Hertlein (ε) ἐρέσθας Voeg. Sz. τήμερον: τὴν 
σήμερον vulg. B ἑθέλην ἄν secl. Cobet Jn. ἄν ἦναι Steph.: ἄνεναι BT

εἴ ἄρχῃς ύμῖν ὡς ἐκεῖνος διηγεῖτο καὶ ἑγὼ πειράζομαι διηγή-
σασθαί.

The same formula occurs in Phaedo 59 c, Euthyd. 272 d, Epist. vii. 324 b.

174 A "Εφη γὰρ. Sc. Ἀριστόδημος. The whole narrative of the dialogue 
from this point on is dependent upon this initial ἐφη and therefore written in 
or. oblivia. oi (sibi)=Ἀριστοδήμῳ.

λελουμένων. For the practice of bathing and anointing before meals see 
Hom. Od. vi. 96—7; Xen. Symp. i. 7: Ar. Plut. 614 εἰσωχεῖσθαι...Λουσάμενος, 
λιπαρὸς χωρὸν ἐκ βαλανεῖον. The comic poets were fond of gibing at Socrates 
and philosophers in general as "unwashed," e.g. Ar. Av. 1554 ἄλοντος οἱ 
Aristotle, however, was a champion of the bath, Athen. 178 ε ἄφρεπες γὰρ 
ἥν, φημιν Ἀριστότελην (fr. 165), ἦκεν εἰς τὸ συμπόσιον σὺν ἰδρότι πολλῷ 
καὶ κοινορτῇ.

τὰς βλαύτας. Schol. βλαύτας: ὑποδήματα. oi δὲ βλαύτα, σανδάλα ἰχνα. 
For Socrates' habit of going barefoot, see 220 b ἴνα, Phaedr. 229 λ, Xen. 
Mem. i. 6. 2, and the note on ἰναπίδυτος, 173 b supra.

ταύτα δὲ ἐκκαλλωσιάθην. ταύτα is better taken (with Hug and Hommel) 
as accus. of "internal object" than (with Stallb.) as accus. of "remoter 
object," equiv. to διὰ ταύτα (cp. Prot. 310 ε). Elsewhere in Plato καλλω-
σιάθαι means to "plume oneself," "swagger," e.g. Rep. 605 d. Observe the 
word-play: "I have put on my finery, because he is such a fine man" 
(Jowett): cp. the proverb δύοσ δύοσ (195 b).

παρὰ καλὸν. Sc. Ἀγάθωνα—"to Agathon's (house)"; equiv. to eis Ἀγα-
θωνος above. For "the handsome Agathon," see Prot. 315 δ—ε (τὴν ἰδιαν 
pαν καλός), Ar. Thesm. 191 ff.

πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς κτλ. Cp. 176 b πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐφρώσθαι πίνειν; Prot 
352 b, Parm. 131 ε. Cobet's excision of ἑθέλειν ἄν is wanton: cp. (with Ast) 
Phaedo 62 ε τοῦτος φιλοσόφους ῥάδιος ἄν ἑθέλειν ἀποθητείκειν.

174 B ἀκλητος. The jester (γελωτοσωίς) who frequents feasts as an 
uninvited guest seems to have been a stock character in Epicharmus; and 
in Xen. Symp. Philippus is a person of this type. Araros the comic poet 
was, apparently, the first to dub them παράστοι. Cp. also Archil. 78. 3 οὐδὲ
The force of ἀρα is to indicate that the proverb, when amended, "still, after all" holds good. Two forms of the proverb are extant, viz. (1) αὐτόματον δ’ ἄγαθοι δεῖλαν ἐπὶ δαίτας ἱκαί (see Schol. ad Ἡ. I., Athen. iv. 27); and (2) αὐτόματον δ’ ἄγαθοι ἄγαθον ἐπὶ δαίτας ἱκαί. The latter form is vouched for by the poetα ἀπον. quoted by Athen. i. 8 λ (Bergk P. L. Q. p. 704), ἄγαθος πρὸς ἄγαθον ἄνδρα εἰπτισάμενος ἤκατον: Bacchyl. fr. 33 (22 Blass) αὐτόματον δ’ ἄγαθον δαίτας εὕρεχα, ἐς ὑπόρχουν ἐπηρέξανται δίκαιοι φῶτες (cp. Zenob. ν. 19 αὐτόματον δ’ ἄγαθοι ἄγαθον κτενί: οὔτος ὁ Βακχυλῆς ἐχρήσατο τῇ παροιμίᾳ, ὡς Ὁρακέων ἐπιφανής ἐπειπότησαντος ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν Κήνας τοῦ Τραχυῖον καὶ οὕτως εἰπτώτες): Cratinus fr. 111 (Mein.) οὖθ’ αὐθ’ ἧμεις, ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς | λάγω, αὐτόματος ἄγαθος ἱκαί | κομφών ἐπὶ δαίτα βεστών: also a number of post-Platonic passages cited by Hug, such as Plut. Q. Conv. vii. 6 ad fin. According to the Scholiast (1) is the original form, which was altered (μεταβάλλει) to (2) by Cratinus and Eupolis; and this is the view adopted by Stallbaum, Retigg and others. But Hug's elaborate investigation of the matter proves convincingly, I think, that the Scholiast is wrong and that the form with ἄγαθοι ἄγαθον was the original, of which the form with ἄγαθοι δεῖλαν is a parody by Eupolis (or Cratinus). This view, first suggested by Schleiermacher, is also supported by Bergk (ad Bacchyl. fr. 33): "Schol. Plat. Symp. 174 n a vero aberrat cum dicit a principio δεῖλαν ἐπὶ δαίτας φυσσε, quamquam fidem habuerunt cum alii tum Müller Dor. ii. 481: neque enim par fuit Herculem tam gravi opprobrio hospitem laedere. Eupolis primus, ut videtur, ludibundus δεῖλαν substituit. Locum difficilem Platonis, qui falsa criminatur Homerum corruptisse proverbium quod illo omnino non respetit, nemodum probabiliter expedivit. Alia varietas, quam nostri homines Commenti sunt, δεῖλαν δεῖλα, omni auctoritate destituta est." The main difficulty in the way of accepting this view lies in the words διαφθείρων μεταβάλλει. For even if (with most modern editors) we accept Lachmann's brilliant conjecture Ἀγαθούντι, the change thus involved is so slight that it could hardly be called a διαφθείρα, nor could the alteration involved in the Homeric account be spoken of as a
"'Αγάθων' ἐπὶ δαίτας ἱασιν αὐτόματοι ἀγαθοὶ." Ὁμηρος μὲν γὰρ κυνδυνεύει· οὗ μόνον διαφθείραι ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑβρίσαι εἰς ταύτην τὴν παρομοίαν· πωνήσας γὰρ τὸν 'Αγαμέμνονα διαφερόντως ἀγαθὸν γόργον τὰ τὸτε πολεμικά, τοῦ δὲ Μενέλαον "μαλθάκων αἰχμητὴν," δυσιάν ποιουμένον καὶ ἐστίντως τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἀκλητοῦ ἐποίησεν ἐλθόντα τοῦ Μενέλαος ἐπὶ τὴν θοίνην, χείρω δύντα ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ καὶ ἐστιῶντος om. Athen.

174 B Ἀγάθων Lachmann: ἀγαθὸν BT διαφερόντως + ἄνδρα + καὶ ἐστίωντος
double one (διαφθείραι καὶ ὑβρίσαι). The former objection, if it stood alone, might be obviated by the device of inserting μή before διαφθείρομεν: but in view of the passage as a whole this device is inadmissible. We seem forced to conclude that, whatever the original form of the proverb may have been (and as to this Hug's view is probably right), the form which Plato had here in mind was the form (1) given by Eupolis: and if Plato knew this form to be only a parody of the original (2), we must suppose further that the serious way in which he deals with it, as if it really were a "wise saw," is only a piece of his fun—a playful display of Socratic irony. (Cp. Teuffel, Rhein. Mus. xxix. pp. 141—2.)

'Αγάθων...ἀγαθοί. For the dative cp. Prot. 321 c ἀποροώντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔξχεται Πραμθείς. Similar exx. of paronomasia occur in 185 c, 198 c, Gorg. 513 b (ἄνθων and Demus, son of Pyrilampes), Rep. 614 b (ἄλκιμον, Alcinos): cp. Riddell Digest § 323. Teuffel (loc. cit.) prefers to retain ἀγαθῶν, partly because of the plur. δαῖρας, partly to avoid the elision of the iota; but neither of these objections is serious, and as to δαῖρας, the feast in question lasted at least two days, which might in itself suffice to justify the plural. Jowett's transl. implies that he retains ἀγαθῶν and supposes (1) to have been the original form of the proverb "demolished" by Socr. and Homer.

"Ομηρος μὲν γὰρ. The antithesis—ἡμεῖς δὲ μόνον διαφθειρομεν, or the like—is easily supplied from the context: for μὲν γὰρ, elliptical, cp. 176 c, and 173 d supra. The suggestion that Homer wilfully distorted a proverb which in his day was non-existent is, as Hug observes, obviously jocose.

ὑβρίσαι. The word may retain a flavour of its juridical sense—"liable to a criminal prosecution for assault and battery": and if so, διαφθείρα too may hint at the crime of "seduction." Homer is chargeable not only with seducing but with committing a criminal assault upon the virgin soundness of the proverb.

174 C μαλθακῶν αἰχμητῆν. "A craven spearman." Il. xvii. 587 σοὶ δὲ Μενέλαου ὑπετέρας, δὲ τὸ πάρος περ ἀμαλθακός αἰχμητῆς. μαλθακῶς, as a variant for μαλθακός, is used by P. also in 195 b, Phaedr. 239 c. Both forms, Menelao and Melelaos, are found in Attic prose; the latter, e.g., in Euthyd. 288 c. In Athenaeus v. 3, 188 b we have a criticism of this treatment of Menelaus.

ἀκλητον ἐποίησεν ἑδώντα. See Il. ii. 408 αὐτόματος δὲ οἱ ἥλιος βοῦν ἀγαθὸς Μενελαος: cp. Athen. v. 178 a. Thus the ὑβρις with which Homer is charged
άμελεινονος. ταύτ' ακούσας εἰπείν ἔφη Ἡσώς μέντοι κινδυνεύσω καὶ ἐγὼ οὖν ὃς σὺ λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καθ" Ομηρον φαίλοις οὐν ἐπὶ σοφοῦ ἄνδρος ἠνεάθεν θοινήν ἀκλήτος. ὅρα οὖν ἄγων μὲ τί ἀπο—

D λογίση, ὡς ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁμολογήσω ἀκλήτος ήκεν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ σοῦ κεκλημένος. "Σὺν τε δὺ," ἔφη, ἃ ἐρχόμενον πρὸ τοῦ βουλευ—

σόμεθα δ' τι ἔρωμεν. ἀλλὰ ἰώμεν.

Τοιοῦτ' ἄττα σφάς ἔφη διαλεξθέντας ἦνα. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη ἑαυτῷ πως προσέχοντα τὸν νῦν κατὰ τὴν οὖν πορεύεσθαι ὑπολειπόμενον, καὶ περιμένοντος οὐ κελεύειν προϊέναι εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. ἑπειδὴ δὲ γενέσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ οὐκίᾳ τῇ Ἀγάθωνος, ἀνεφωμενήν κατα-

Ε λαμβάνειν τὴν θύραν, καὶ τι ἔφη αὐτόθι γελοῖον παθεῖν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς παϊδὰ τινα ἔνδοθεν ἀπαντήσαντα ἄγειν οὐ κατεκίευτο οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ καταλαμβάνειν ἣδη μέλλοντας δειπνεῖν· εὐθὺς δ' οὖν

174 C ὁ ἄρα...τι Ὁμ.: ὁ ἄρα...τι B: ὁ ἄρα...τι T (τὰ W) ἀγαγὼν Creuzer

consists in making not an ἀγαθός but a μαθάκας (=δείλιος) come ἀκλήτος ἄγαθον ἐπὶ δαίμας.

τι ποθὸν ἄνδρος. σοφός, “accomplished,” was “a fashionable epithet of praise in Plato’s time, especially applied to poets” (see Rep. 331 E, 489 B, with Adam’s notes).

ὁ ὁ αὖν κτλ. This correction of the traditional ὁ ἄρα...τι is certain. Cp. 189 λ ὁ ἄρα τι ποιεῖσ: Phaedo 86 D ὁ ὁ αὐν...τι φήσομεν. For the dangers of violating etiquette on such occasions, see Aτ. Λν. 983 ff. αὐτὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκλήτος ἰῶν ἄνθρωπος ἀλαξῶν | λυτὴ δύστατα καὶ σπλαγχνευέντα ἐπίθυμη, | δὴ τὸ χρῆ τύπτειν αὐτὸν πλεινοὶ τὸ μεταξῆ.

174 D ὁ ὁ σον τε δῦν κτλ. See Π. ξ. 224 (Diomedes loq.) σον τε δῦν ἔρχομεν καὶ τα πρὸ τοῦ ἐνόησαν | δηπως κέρδος ἄφ. The same verses are quoted more exactly in Prot. 348 c: cp. also Arist. Pol. π. 1287b 13; Cic. ad fam. ῥ. 7. For exx. of how Plato “varii modis multis afferit aliena,” see Vahlen Op. Acad. I. pp. 476 ff.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ γενέσθαι. The infin. in place of the indic. is due to assimilation: cp. Rep. 614 u ἔφη δὲ, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ἐκῆναι τῷ θυμῷ, πορεύεσθαι: see Goodwin G. M. T. § 755.

174 Ε καὶ τα...γελοῖον παθεῖν. It was an awkward situation in smart society. Cp. Plut. Conv. 6 p. 628 ἔλαθε γὰρ κατὰ τὴν οὖν ὑπολειθεῖς ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ δὲ παρεισήλθεν, ἀπεχνῶς εἰς πυλαβίσουσα σώματος ἐξέσπισθε τὰ φῶς ἐχόντος.

οἷ (sibi) goes with ἀπαντήσαντα. Porson’s insertion (from Photius) of τῶν before ἔνδοθεν is no improvement: ἔνδοθεν is to be taken with ἀπαντήσαντα, and there is no indication that there were any ἔξωθεν παῖδες.
ός ἰδεῖν τὸν 'Αγάθωνα, Ὡ, φάναι, Ἀριστόδημε, εὶς καλὸν ἥκεις ὅπως 
συνδειπνήσῃς: εἰ δ' ἄλλον τινὸς ἕνεκα ἥλθες, εἰς αὐθείς ἀνα-
βαλοῦ, ὡς καὶ χθές ξητῶν σὲ ἐνα καλέσαμι, οὐχ οἷς τ' ἴδειν.
ἀλλὰ Σωκράτη ἡμῶν πῶς οὐκ ἄγεις; καὶ ἑγώ, ἐφη, μεταστρεφό-
μενος οὐδαμοῦ ὄρο Σωκράτη ἐπόμενος· ἐπένοιον οὖν ὦτι καὶ αὐτὸς 
μετὰ Σωκράτους ἥκειμ, κληθεὶς ὑπ' ἐκείνου δείρ' ἐπὶ δείπνου.
Καλῶς γ', ἐφη, ποιῶν σὺ· ἀλλὰ ποῦ ἔστιν οὖτος; 'Οπισθεν ἔμοι 175
ἀρτι εἰσήρει· ἀλλὰ θανάμαξω καὶ αὐτὸς ποῦ ἂν εἰη. Οὐ σκέψῃ,
ἐφη, παῖ, φάναι τὸν 'Αγάθωνα, καὶ εἰσάξεις Σωκράτη; σῦ δ', ἦ δ'
δς, 'Ἀριστόδημε, παρ' Ἕρωνίμαχον κατακλίνου.

III. Καὶ ἐ μὲν ἑφη ἀπονίξειν τὸν παίδα, ἵνα κατακέσιτο;
ἀλλού δὲ τινα τῶν παίδων ἥκειν ἀγγέλλων ὅτι Σωκράτης οὖτος 
ἀναχωρήσας εὖ τῷ τῶν γειτῶν προθύρῳ ἐστήκη καὶ οὐ καλοῦν-
τος οὐκ ἔθελε εἰσίναι. 'Ἤτοπον γ', ἐφη, λέγεις· οὕκοιν καλεῖς 
αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ ἀφῆσεις; καὶ δὲ ἐφη εἰπεῖν Μηδαμός, ἀλλ' ἐὰτε

174 Ε ὅ Τ: ὅ Γ συνδειπνήσεις Laur. xiv. 85, Bekk. Sz. τ' ἦ Τ:
τῇ Ε ἐνθὴν Τῷ οὐδαμῇ TW ἡκομι Τῆ: ἦκοι μὴ Β γ' Τ: ὅμ. Β
175 Α εἰσῆκεν Cobet ὅπου Hirschig τ μὲν Bast: τ Steph.: ἐμὲ BT
καὶ οὗ BT: κάμῳ W, Βτ.: καὶ σοῦ t καλεῖς Tmg. W: κάλει rec. h
αὐτὸν: αἴδης Herwerden ἀφῆγης Τ

εἰς καλὸν ἥκεις. "Soyez le bienvenu!" For the construction see Goodwin,
§ 317.

χθές ξητῶν σὲ κτλ. Hug regards this as a piece of polite mendacity on the
part of Agathon. Are we, then, to construe Alcibiades' statement, χθές μὲν
νῦν οἷς τὲ κτλ. (212 ε) as a similar exhibition of "Salonweltlichkeit"?

175 Α παρ' Ἔ. κατακλίνου. Usually each κλίνη held two, but in 175 c
it is said that Agathon had a couch to himself, while in 213 Α we find three
on the same couch.

ἀπονίξειν τὸν παιδα. The article indicates that a special slave was set
apart for this duty. For the custom of foot-washing see Plut. Phoc. 20;
Petron. Sat. 31; Ἐναγ. Luc. vii. 44; Ἀιών. xiii. 5. For the hand-washing
see Ar. frag. 427 φίρε, παῖ, ταχέως κατὰ χειρός ὤδος, | παράπεμπε τὸ χειρό-
μακτρον.

Σωκράτης οὖτος κτλ. The ἵπσισσιμα verba of the πᾶς are here repeated,
hence the use of οὖτος and of the def. article with προθύρῳ: in the corrections
proposed by Madvig and Herwerden this point is overlooked. For πρόθυρον,
"porch," i.e. the space between the house-door (ἀίλεια) and the street, see
Smith D. A. 1. 661b.

οὐκοῦν καλεῖς κτλ. καλεῖς is of course future, not pres. as Rückert wrongly
supposed. For the constr. see Goodwin G. M. T. § 299.
175 Β πάντως παρατίθετε. For the use of πάντως with imper., cp. Xen. Cyrop. viii. 3. 27 πάντως τοίνυν...δειξίων μοι: id. Οἰσιν. xii. 11, iii. 12. For παρατίθημι of “putting on the table,” cp. Her. 372 οἱ τραγήματα που παραθήσομεν αὐτῶς κτλ. Reynders adopts the reading πάντας, καὶ παρατίθετε.

έπειδαν...μὴ ἐφεστήκη. These words are difficult. They should naturally mean (as Stallb. puts it) “si quando nemo vobis est propositus”; and so Stallb. proposes to construe them, taking the clause as dependent on and limiting δὲ τι ἀν βούλησον. This, however, is, as Hug argues, almost certainly wrong. If we retain the text of the ms. we can only explain the phrase by assuming an ellipse—“serve up what dishes you like (as you usually do) whenever no one is in command.” So Zeller renders “tragt uns getrost auf, was ihr wollt, wie ihr es gewohnt seid, wenn man euch nicht unter Aufsicht nimmt,” etc.; and Rieckher (Πλευρ. Μυσ. xxxiii. p. 307) “Macht es wie ihr es immer macht, wenn man euch nicht beaufsichtigt (und das habe ich ja noch nie gethan), und setzt uns vor was ihr möget.” Most of the emendations offered (see crit. n.) are based on the assumption that the clause in question qualifies the leading clause (πάντως παρατίθετε): none of them are convincing, and the construction οὐ μὴ...ἐφεστήκη (the pres.-perf.) assumed by Schanz and Hug lacks support. If compelled to resort to conjecture, the best device might be to read εἰ γε μὴ γι γι επειδαν, cut out the μὴ after ψιλῶν, and change the mood of the verb to ἐφέστηκεν—following in part the suggestions of Usener. The ordinary text does not admit of Jowett’s rendering, “serve up whatever you please, for there is no one to give you orders; hitherto I have never left you to yourselves.” As regards the force of δ...ἐποίησα, L. Schmidt explains the clause to mean “nunquam autem rem ita ut nunc institui,” implying that the concession to the slaves was unusual: Teuffel, on the contrary, sees in it a piece of ostentation on the part of Agathon, boasting of his humanity. The former is clearly wrong.
eisíenai. tôn oún 'Agáthona pollákes kellein eis metapémphasathai
tójn Sókratí, ἐ de oúk éxan. ἱκεin oún autón oú polýn xronón,
ws eipōthei, diatréasa, ãlla málista sphaîs mesouîn deipnuûntas.
tójnn oún 'Agáthona—tûghánnev gar èsgathun katákeímenov mónon—
Deôr', èph fávai, Sókrates, pàr' èmè katákeisai, ìna kai toû D
sofoû aptómenos sou aptolaisow, δ sou prosèstè eîn toîs prothû-

175 C  ἐ δὲ BW: *** δὲ T (τὸν δὲ fuisse videtur): αὐτὸν δὲ vulg.: ἦ δὲ
proseftè T: προσεπτιν B

175 C pollákes kellein. This is an ex. of the pros. infin. representing
an impf. indic.: "He said, ἐδειπνούμενε, ὁ δὲ Σ. ὁπο לעבוד—ὁ οὖν 'Α. ἐκλεευνεν—
ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ ἔλων" (Goodwin G. M. T. § 119, where see parallels). The accus. ἐ,
of the speaker, is here used in preference to the more regular nomin. (αὐτός) in
order to balance the accus. τὸν 'Agáthona: cp. Gorg. 474 B ἐγὼ ὁμιαι καί ἐμὲ
kai σι...ήγεισθαι, and below 175 E.

ὁς εἰσδέθη. To be taken closely with ὁ π. χρ.: we should rather say
"contrary to his usual custom," the sense being "he arrived unusually soon
for him." For a striking instance of Socrates’ ἐθὸς see 220 c, where πολύν
xronón diētriphēn.

μάλιστα...δειπνούντας. For μάλιστα of approximate measurement, cp.
Parn. 127 B περὶ ἐτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα: Tim. 21 B, Críó 43 A.
Nowhere else in Plato is μεσαῖν joined with a participle, nor does L. and S.
supply any parallel.

ἐσχατον...móton. Agathon occupied the last κλίνη on the right: this was
the "lowest seat" at the table, and commonly taken, in politeness, by the
host. The seat of honour (πρωντή) was the left-hand place on the κλίνη
furthest to the left. Thus if four κλίναι are placed in a row, numbered
A—D, and each seating two persons, the person who occupies A¹ is termed
πρῶτος, and the occupant of D² ἐσχάτως: as thus

\[
\begin{array}{cccccccc}
A^1 & A^2 & B^1 & B^2 & C^1 & C^2 & D^1 & D^2 \\
\end{array}
\]

At this "Banquet" Phaedrus as occupying A¹ is described as πρῶτος in 177 D:
see also the discussion between Socrates and Alcibiades in 222 E. Cp. Theophr.
Char. 21 ὁ δὲ μικροφλότημος τοιοῦτος τις ὁλος σπουδάσαι ἐπὶ δειπνον κληθεὶ παρ'
autôn tôn kaléasanta deipnhsai: Stob. Flor. xiii. 36 Διανύσαο...ἀτμάζον αὐτόν...
katéklinen autôn en tê ἐσχάτη χώρα.

175 D τοῦ σοφοῦ...ἀπολαίεσα. τοῦ σοφοῦ is neut., being the antecedent of
δ, not in agreement with σου: "that I may enjoy the piece of wisdom which
occurred to you." The omission of ἀπτόμενος σου by B is probably accidental:
without the words (as Teuffel observes) Socr.’s remark (ἐὰν ἀπτ.) would be less
natural.
... δὴλαν γὰρ ὅτι εὗρες αὐτὰ καὶ ἔχεις· οὐ γὰρ ἀν προσπέστης. καὶ τὸν Ὀμπράτη καθίζεσθαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Β' ὁ ἔχων, φάναι, ὡς Ἀράδων, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἶν ὅσπια ὡστ' ἐκ τοῦ πληροστέρου εἰς τὸ κενώτερον ἤρει θεῖον, ἐὰν ἀντώμεθα ἀλλήλων, ὡστερ τὸ ἐν ταῖς κύλιξιν ὕδαρ τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἔριου ἤρει ἐκ τῆς πληροστέρας εἰς τὴν Ε' κενώτεραν. εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ὅσπια, πολλοὶ τιμῶμαι τὴν παρὰ σοι κατάκλυσιν· αἶμα γὰρ μὲ παρὰ σοῦ πολλῆς καὶ καλῆς σοφίας πληρωθήσεσθαι. ἤ μὲν γὰρ ἑκῆ φαύλη τις ἀν εἶν καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμος, ὡστερ ὃναρ ὦπα, ἢ δὲ ὅση λαμπράτε καὶ πολλὴν ἐπίδοσον ἐχοῦσα, ἢ γε παρὰ σοῦ νέου οὗτος οὔτω σφόδρα ἐξέλαμψε καὶ ἐκφαίνης ἐγένετο προφήτην ἐν μάρτυρι τῶν Ἐλλήνων πλέον ἢ τρισμυρίωσι. Τῷ βριστῆς εἰ, ἐφη, ὡς Ὀμπράτης, ὡς Ἀράδων. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ ὄλγου ὑπερον διαδικασόμεθα ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ


οὐ γὰρ ἀν προσπέστης. The protasis is suppressed: Stallbaum supplies ei μὴ εὗρες αὐτὰ: while Hug explains the phrase as a conflate of two thoughts, viz. (1) οὐκ ἀν ἀπέστης ei μὴ εὗρες, and (2) οὐ προσπέστης πρὶν εὖρεῖν.

ὡστερ τὸ...ὁπα κτλ. Editors from Rückert down generally accept the explanation of this passage offered by Geel. Two cups, one empty the other full, are placed in contact: a woollen thread, with one end inserted in the full cup, the other hanging into the empty cup, serves by the law of capillarity to convey the fluid from the one to the other.

175 Ε' φαίλη...καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμος. "Meagre" in quantity and "questionable" in quality, in antithesis to πολλὴ in quantity and καλὴ in quality.

πολλὴν ἐπίδοσον ἐχοῦσα. Hug supposes an astral allusion—"like a quickly-rising star." This, however, is not necessarily conveyed by the term ἐπίδοσις, for which cp. Theact. 146 ν ἑνοῦς εἰς πάν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει, and the intrans. use of ἐπιδοθήναι, Prot. 318 a, Theact. 150 b, etc.

οὗτο σφόδρα κτλ. Notice the ironical tone—exaggeration coupled with a purple patch of poetical diction: "shone out with such dazzling splendour before the eyes of three myriads of Greek spectators."

ὑβριστὴς εἰ. "What a scoffer you are!" Observe that ὑβρις is one of the main charges laid against Soer. by Alcibiades also (219 c, etc.); cp. Introd. § 11 b.

ταῦτα...διαδικασόμεθα. "We will formally plead our claims in regard to these heads." "Technically diadicasia denotes the proceedings in a contest for preference between two or moro rival parties either as to the possession
perὶ τῆς σοφίας, δικαστὴ χρώμενοι τῷ Διονύσῳ· νῦν δὲ πρὸς τὸ δεῖπνον πρωτὰ τρέπου.

IV. Μετὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, κατακλινέντος τοῦ Σωκράτους καὶ 176 δευτερνήσαντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, σπονδάς τὴν σφᾶς ποιήσασθαι καὶ δύοντας τὸν θεὸν καὶ τάλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα τρέπεσθαι πρὸς τὸν πότον· τῶν οὖν Παυσανίαν ἐφι λόγον τοιούτου τινὸς κατάρχειν. Εἶπεν, ἀνδρεῖς, φάναι, τίνα τρόπον ῥᾴστα πιέμεθα; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν λέγω ὡς ὅτι τῷ ὄντι πάνω χαλέπος ἔχω ὑπὸ τοῦ χθες πότον καὶ

175 E περὶ τῆς σοφίας del. Hirshig 176 A (δὲ) καὶ τῶν Rohde καὶ τάλλα: κατὰ Αστ.: καὶ...νομιζόμενα post ποιήσασθαι transp. Steinhart ἀνδρεῖς: ἀνδρεῖς Sauppe Sz. βρόστα BT: θείστα γρ. τ

of property or as to exemption from personal or pecuniary liabilities...The essential difference between διαδίκασις and the ordinary δίκαια is, that all claimants are similarly situated with respect to the subject of dispute, and no longer classified as plaintiffs and defendants” (Smith, D. A. l. 620). περὶ τῆς σοφίας, added loosely as an afterthought, serves to define ταῦτα: Teuffel, as against Jahn, rightly defends the words; and they serve to strike one of the keynotes of the dialogue.

δικαστὴ...τῷ Διονύσῳ. Dionysus is an appropriate choice since it was under his auspices that Agathon (πρῶτον) had engaged in an ἄγων and won a prize for poetic σοφία. There may also lie in the words (as Wolf and Rettig suppose) a jocular allusion to the σοφία which are arē bibendi, wherein also Agathon was δυνατῶτας (176 c). Compare also the pastoral pipe-contests of Theocritus, and Theognis 993 ff. eι...δέχον... | σοὶ τ’ εἴη καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίς πέρι δηρασάντων, | γνώσις χ’ δόσον δῶν κρίσανες ἡμᾶς. Cp. Introd. § II. B.

176 A σπονδάς...νομιζόμενα. Plato spares us the details of the ritual proper to such occasions. From other sources we may gather that it included (1) a libation of unmixed wine to ἄγαθος δαίμων (Ar. Eq. 105, etc.); (2) the clearing, or removal, of the tables (Xen. Symp. π. I.); (3) the fetching, by the παίδες, of a second supply of water for the hands (Ar. Vesp. 1217 etc.); (4) the distribution of wreaths among the guests (Theogn. 1001, Ar. Acharn. 1145); (5) the pouring out of three libations, viz. (a) to Zeus Olympios and the Olympic gods, (b) to the Heroes, and (c) to Zeus Soter (Schol. ad Philob. 66 π.; Aesch. Suppl. 27, etc.); (6) the singing of a Το Δεῦμ (ὁδεῖν τῶν θεῶν, πανανίζεων Xen. Symp. π. I., Alcman fr. 24 b, etc.): see Hug’s exhaustive note. Rückert wrongly makes τάλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα depend on ἢσανας: supply (as Reynders) ποιησάμενος. For καὶ τάλλα, cp. (with Vahlen) Euthyd. 294 c, Rep. 400 π.: for τὰ νομιζόμενα, quae moris sumps, cp. II. Alc. 151 b.


πᾶν χαλέπως ἔχω. The notion is “I was roughly handled in my bout with the wine-god yesterday”: cp. Theaet. 142 β χαλέπως ἔχει ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν.
δέομαι ἀναψυχής τινός, οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς—παρήστε

γὰρ χθές· σκοπεῖσθε οὖν, τίνι τρόπῳ ἂν ὡς βάστα πίνομεν. τὸν

οὖν Ἀριστοφάνη εἰπεῖν, Τοῦτο μέντοι εὖ λέγεις, ὁ Παυσανία, τὸ

παντὸς τρόπῳ παρασκευάσασθαι ραστώνην τινὰ τῆς πόσεως· καὶ

γὰρ αὐτὸς εἰμὶ τῶν χθές βεβαπτισμένων. ἀκούσαντα οὖν αὐτῶν

ἐφ' Ἕρωνιμαχὸν τὸν Ἀκουμένον Ἡ καλὸς, φάναι, λέγετε. καὶ

ἐτι ἐνδός δέομαι ὑμῶν ἀκούσαι, πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἔρροσθαι πίνειν

'Αγάθων. Ὡθοδωμός, φάναι, οὔδ' αὐτὸς ἔρροιμαι. Ἐρμαιον ἄν εἴη

C ἡμίν, ᾗ δ' ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐμοί τε καὶ Ἀριστοδήμῳ καὶ Πλάτωνι καὶ

τοῖσδε, εἰ ὑμεῖς οἴ τινας των ὀπλώντας πίνειν νῦν ἀπειρήκατε· ἤμεις μὲν

γὰρ ἄει ἀδύνατον. Σωκράτης δ' ἐξερχότα λόγον· ἱκανος γὰρ καὶ

ἀμφότερα, ὅστ' ἐξερχέσθαι αὐτὸς ὁπότερον ἂν ποιούμεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν

μοι δοκεῖ οὖνίς τῶν παρόντων προθύμως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πολὺν

πίνειν οἶνον, ἵσως ἄν ἐγὼ περὶ τοῦ μεθύσκεσθαι οἶνον ἐστὶ τάληθ

λέγων ἥττων ἄν εἴην ἂνήδης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο γε οἴμαι κατά:

D δὴλον ἠγοινότι ἐκ τῆς ἱατρικῆς, ὅτι χαλέπτων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ

μέθη ἐστί· καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς εὖκεν εἰναι πόρρω ἐθελήσαμεν ἄν πιεῖν

176 A παρῆσθε BTW: παρῆσθε in mg. rec. b Μ παρασκευάσασθαι TW:

παρασκευάζεσθαι B αὐτῶν T: αὐτῶν B Ἕρωνιμαχὸν T: τὸν Ἕρωνιμαχὸν B

ἀκουμένω W: ἀκουμένων BT καὶ: καί απ. Rohde ἐρρόσθαι seol. Cobet

πίνειν, Ἀγάθων τος Vahlen C ξαίρω Heindorf: ξαίρω BT ἂνήδης T: ἂνήδης B

176 B βεβαπτισμένων: "soaked," "drenched." Cp. Lucian Bacch. 7 καρπη

καὶ βεβαπτισμένως: and the use of βεβρεγμένος, Eubul. Inven. 5; μέθη βαριντ

βρέχεις Eur. El. 326: Sen. Ep. 83 mersus vino et madens; Hor. C. iv. 5. 39
dicimus...sicci...dicimus uvidi. A similar "baptism" is described in Envenos
2. 5—6, ei δὲ πολὺ πνευσέων (sc. ὁ βάρκας) ἀπέστραπα μὲν ἔρατος, | βαστῖτε
δ' ἕπνω γεῖτον τοῦ θανάτου: of which we find an echo in Clem. Alex. Paed.
π. ii. 272 (Stählin) ὑπὸ μέθης βαπτιζόμενος εἰς ἕπνοι. There may be an
underlying allusion to Eupolis' play Bapta (cp. Bergk P. L. G. p. 268).

394 b, 492 b. For Socrates as inconfivncible "with wine and wassail," see
Alcibades' description, 220 a.

περὶ τοῦ μεθύσκεσθαι. A favourite subject of discussion with moralists,
e.g. Theognis 473 ff., 500 ff.; Laws i. 677 d ff., Xen. Symp. ii.; and the treatise
περὶ μέθης of Antisthenes.

ἔρττον...ἀνήδης. "Less likely to bore you," sc. than if you were in the mood
for wine-bibbing. Compare (with Wolf) Hor. Sat. ii. 2 ff. quae virtus et
quantae, boni, sit vivere parvo...discite non inter lanceas mensasque nitentes.

176 D χαλέπτων...ἡ μέθη. Similarly in 180 b we have neut. adj. with
masc. subst. (θεοτερον...ἐρατις). For the sentiment cp. Ar. Vesp. 1253
κακόν τὸ πίνειν...κτλ.: Theogn. 211 οἶνον τοι πίνειν πολὺν κακόν: Xen.
οὔτε ἄλλῳ συμβουλεύσαιμι, ἄλλως τε καὶ κραπαλώντα στις τῆς προτεραιας. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἐφ' ὑπολαβόντα Φαιδρὸν τὸν Μυρινούσιον, ἔγγυς σοι εἰδὼλα πείθεσαι ἄλλως τε καὶ άττ’ ἀν περὶ ἰατρικῆς λέγης. νῦν δ’, ἀν εὖ βουλεύωνται, καὶ οἱ λοιποί. ταῦτα δὴ ἄκουσαντας συνχωρεῖν πάντας μὴ διὰ μέθης ποιήσασθαι Ε τήν εἴ τ’ παρόντι συννοιάζων, ἄλλ’ οὔτω πίνοντας πρὸς ἡδονήν.

V. Ἐπειδὴ τοῖνοι, φάναι τὸν Ερύξιμαχον, τούτο μὲν δέδοκαται, πίνειν δόσον ἀν ἐκαστὸς βουλητῇ, ἐπάναγκας δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι, τὸ μετὰ τούτο εἰσηγοῦμαί τήν μὲν ἄρτι εἰσελθοῦσαν αὐλητρίδα χάρειν εὖν, αὐλοῦσαν έαυτῇ ἓ ἀν βουλητῇ ταῖς γυναιξί ταῖς ένδον, ήμᾶς δὲ διὰ λόγων ἀλλήλοις συνείναι τὸ τήμερον καὶ

176 Ε  κραπαλώντα Τ: κραπαλώντα Β. κραπαλώντα Hirschig Φαιδρόν ἐν τῷ Κραπαλώντα. Ἐπειδὴ τοῖνοι, φάναι τὸν Ερύξιμαχον, τούτο μὲν δέδοκαται, πίνειν δόσον ἀν ἐκαστὸς βουλητῇ, ἐπάναγκας δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι, τὸ μετὰ τούτο εἰσηγοῦμαί τήν μὲν ἄρτι εἰσελθοῦσαν αὐλητρίδα χάρειν εὖν, αὐλοῦσαν έαυτῇ ἓ ἀν βουλητῇ ταῖς γυναιξί ταῖς ένδον, ήμᾶς δὲ διὰ λόγων ἀλλήλοις συνείναι τὸ τήμερον καὶ

Συνηρ. Π. 26 ἐν μὲν ἄθροί τοῦ ποτὸν ἐνεχώρειν, ταχὺ ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ αἱ γνώμαι σφαλοῦνται κτλ. For the pedantic reference to ἡ ἰατρική, cp. 186 λ. κραπαλώντα. Ἐπειδὴ τοῖνοι, φάναι τὸν Ερύξιμαχον, τούτο μὲν δέδοκαται, πίνειν δόσον ἀν ἐκαστὸς βουλητῇ, ἐπάναγκας δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι, τὸ μετὰ τούτο εἰσηγοῦμαί τήν μὲν ἄρτι εἰσελθοῦσαν αὐλητρίδα χάρειν εὖν, αὐλοῦσαν έαυτῇ ἓ ἀν βουλητῇ ταῖς γυναιξί ταῖς ένδον, ήμᾶς δὲ διὰ λόγων ἀλλήλοις συνείναι τὸ τήμερον καὶ

176 Ε  οὐτός...πρὸς ἡδονήν. οὐτός is frequently used thus in combination with adverbs (esp. ἀρχής, εἰκή, ἀργῶς, and the like; see Blaydes on Ar. Ἱσπ. 461) where it has "a diminishing power" (L. and S., e.g. 180 καὶ ἀθανάτω, Ἱσπ. 503 ὅ; cp. the force of sic in such phrases as "iacentes sic temero" (Hor. C. ii. xi. 14).

τοῦτο μὲν κτλ. The antithesis to the μὲν-clause lies, not in the clause ἐπάναγκες δὲ μ. εἰναί, but in τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο κτλ. Cr. Arist. Pol. 1278 τὸ ἐπεί δὲ ταῦτα διάφορα τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα σκέπτετο πάντων κτλ. ἐπάναγκες. Cr. Theogn. 472 πᾶν γάρ ἄναγκαίον χρῆμα ἀνηρίφο ἐφιν' τῷ πίνειν δ' ἐθέλοντο παρασταθῶν οἰνοχοεῖτο—where a similar relaxation of compulsory rules is advocated.


τῆς...αὐλητρίδας. It was the fashion at συννοια to provide pipers, dancers, jesters, jugglers et hoc genus omne to amuse the guests. Cp. Xen. Symp. ii. 1, Rep. 373 λ. κλίναι τε...καὶ ἑταίραι καὶ πέμπεσθαι (with Adam's note); Ar. Aol. 1090 ff.; also Protag. 347 c, d (see next page).

ταῖς ένδον. Sc. εἶν τῷ γυναικεῖο.
177 δι' οἷς λόγων, εἰ βούλεσθε, ἐθέλων ὑμῖν εἰσηγήσασθαι. Φάναι δὴ πάντας καὶ βούλεσθαι καὶ κελεύειν αὐτόν εἰσηγεῖσθαι. εἰπέν οὖν τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον ὅτι Ἡ μὲν μοι ἁρχὴ τοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν Εὐρυπίδου Μελανίππην. οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μύθος, ἀλλὰ Παιδρος τοῦδε, ὃν μέλλω λέγειν. Παιδρος γὰρ ἐκάστοτε πρὸς με ἀγανακτῶν λέγειν. Οὐ δεινὸν, φησὶν, ὁ Ἐρυξίμαχα, ἀλλοις μὲν τοις θεοῖς ὕμνους καὶ παιῶνας εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πεποιημένους, τῷ δὲ

177 A καὶ ἀντε βούλ. seel. Hermann Sz.: καὶ βούλεσθαι del. Voeg.

παίωνας W: παίωνας BT: παιῶνας βτ

δι' οἷς λόγων. For an appreciation of the συνουσία διὰ λόγων, cp. Theogn. 493 ff. ὡμεῖς δ' εἰ μυθεῖσθε παρὰ κριτὶς μένοιτε... | ἐς τὸ μέσον φονεύντες ὑμὸς ἐνι καὶ συνάσσασαι ἔτι; καὶ συνάσσασαι. ἐνδοὺς συμπνόουν γίνεται οὐκ ἄχρα. Simplic. in Ἑρωτ. 33. 6, p. 266 καλὸς ἔριτθαι ὅτι ἡ χαρίς λόγων τράπεζα φάνης οὐδέν διαφέρει which is probably a reminiscence of Protag. 347 c, δ καὶ γὰρ οὖν (sc. οἱ φαῦλοι καὶ ἁγοραῖοι), διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλων δι' ἑαυτῶν συνεῦθεν ἐν τῷ πόσῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς λαύους φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν λαύου ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας, τιμᾶς ποιούσα τὰς ἀληθρίδας κτλ. Cp. Phaedr. 276 D.

177 A Φάναι δὴ κτλ. It is tempting to excise (with Hermann, Teuffel and Hug) the first καὶ and to construe φάναι closely with βούλεσθαι, as balancing κελεύειν εἰσηγεῖσθαι, πάντας being the subject of both the leading infinitives, φάναι and κελεύειν: cp. 177 εἰσεφάσαν τε καὶ ἐκέλουν: Euthyd. 274 c ὅ τε οὖν Ἐρυξίμαχος συνείθεν...καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ ἐκέλουν...ἐπιδέιξασθαί κτλ. If the first καὶ be retained, it seems most natural to take κελεύειν as dependent on φάναι: Stallb., however, puts a comma after βούλεσθαι, as if making κελεύειν parallel to φάναι: and so too, apparently, Zeller.

κατὰ τὴν Μελανίππην. Euripides wrote two plays of this name, Μ. ἡ σοφή and Μ. δεσμώτης. The reference here is to the former (Frag. 488 Nanck), οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος ἀλλ' ἐμὺς μῆτρας πάρα, κτλ. Melanippe, a daughter of Aeolus, bore two sons to Poseidon; they were suckled by a cow, and brought to their grandfather Aeolus as βουγενή τέρατα: when he proposed to burn them, Melanippe appeared and tried to dissuade him, arguing ὅτι οὐδὲν τέρας ἐστίν. According to another account, M. was a daughter of Cheiron, seduced by Aeolus, and finally metamorphosed into a mare. Cp. Apol. 20 εὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τῶν λόγων, κτλ.: Hor. Sat. ii. ii. 2 nec meus hic sermo est sed quae praecepit Ofellus.

Οὐ δεινὸν κτλ. With this passage, cp. Isocr. x. 5—8, and x. 12 with its scornful reference to encomiasts of “humble-bees, salt-diets, and the like” (see Introd. § 11. 2 (ε)).

ἲμωνος καὶ παίωνας. Properly speaking ἱμωνοῖ are odes set for the lyre, παίωνες odes set for the flute and sung esp. in honour of Apollo. “The paean is a hymn (1) of supplication or propitiation during the pain or danger; (2) a thanksgiving after it is past” (see Smith, D. A. ii. 307 a.v.).
"Eρωτε, τηλικούτοι ὄντι καὶ τοσοῦτος θεφ, μηδε ἐνα πότοτε τοσοῦτον ἐκ τῶν γεγονότων ποιητῶν πεποιηκέναι μηδὲν ἐγκαμπὸν; εἰ δὲ βούλει αὖ σκέψασθαι τοὺς χρηστοὺς σοφιστάς, Ἡρακλέους μὲν καὶ ἄλλων ἐπαίνους καταλογάδην ξυγγράφειν, ἀσπερ ὁ βέλτιστος Πρόδικος· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἦτον καὶ ταυμαστόν, ἀλλ' ἐγωγέ ἢδη τινὶ ἐνέτυχον βιβλίῳ ἄνδρὸς σοφοῦ, ἐν οἷς ἐπαινοῦν ταυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὀφέλειαν, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα συχνὰ ἰδοὺς ἄν ἐγκεκαμασμένα· τὸ οὖν τοιοῦτον μὲν τέρα πολλήν σπουδὴν Γ σπουδάσθαι, "Ερωτα δὲ μηδένα ποιῶν ἄνθρωπων τετολμηκέναι εἰς ταυτην τὴν ἥμεραν ἄξιας ὑμηῆσαι· ἀλλ' οὕτως ἡμέληται τοσοῦτος θεος. ταῦτα δὴ μοι δοκεῖ εὖ λέγειν Φαιδρος. ἐγὼ οὖν ἐπιθυμῶ


tηλικούτω. "A god so venerable". Phaedrus holds Eros to be the most ancient of deities, see 178 B. The complaint was not entirely well-grounded, since before this date (416 B.C.) hymns to Eros of a eulogistic character had already been published by Sophocles (Antig. 781 ff.), and Euripides (Hippol. 525 ff.), and possibly others.

177 B εἰ δὲ βούλει. This phrase serves to introduce a fresh point, marking the transition from poets to "sophists"; cp. 209 D, 220 D (εἰ δὲ βούλεος), Lach. 188 c, etc.: but to add an infin., as here (σκέψασθαι), is unusual.

τοῖς χρηστοῖς σοφιστάς. "The worthy sophists"; considering that Phaedrus is the speaker, we must suppose that the adj. is seriously meant, not ironical.


ἀσπερ...Πρόδικος. This alludes to Prodicus's celebrated parable "The Choice of Heracles," for which see Xen. Mem. ii. i. 21 ff. For Prodicus of Ceos, see Zeller Presocr. Phil. vol. ii. pp. 416 ff., 473 (E. T.); Gomperz Gr. Thinkers (E. T.) i. pp. 425 ff.

ἦτον καὶ. For the unusual position of καὶ after the comparative, cp. Xen. Cyr. i. vii. 38 ταῦτα γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἔξαπατὰν δύνατα.

ἐνήσαν ἄλες. Logically, of course, the subject ought to be ἐπαυνοῖς, not ἄλες. The same μββλιοῦ is alluded to in Isocr. x. 12 τῶν...τοῦ βομβύλου καὶ τῶν ἄλας καὶ τὸ τοιαῦτα βουληθῆναι ἐπαυνεῖν: its authorship is now generally ascribed (as by Sauppe, Blass, Hug) to the rhetor Polycrates: see further Introd. § ii. b (e).

177 C τὸ οὖν...ὑμηῆσαι. The infin. may be explained (with Ast) as an ex. of the infin. "indignantias," cp. Ar. Nub. 819 τὸ Δία νομίζειν ὄντα τηλικοῦτοι.
177 C τουτόι Bdhm. καὶ χαρίσσαθα δελ. Hartmann  
D (περὶ)

"Ερωτος Hirschig καλλιστα W ἄρχειν: λέγειν Hirschig δὲ πρῶτον 
Φαῖδρον vulg.  
Ε ἀφροδίτη T ἡ om. T

ἐρανον εἰσενεγκείν. Συμβολή daret: cp. Laws 915 E, 927 c ὡς ἐρανον εἰσ-

ϕίροντα ἐκυρὶ — the only other instances of ἐρανος in Plato. For a defence 

of the text against Hartmann, who excises καὶ χαρίσσαθα, see Vahlen Op. Acad. 
π. 296. This passage is echoed in Aristid. Or. t. 1. p. 18.

177 D δοκεὶ γὰρ μοι. "My sentence is," an official formula: cf. Dem. i. 2, 

iv. 17. Hence the point of Socrates’ phrase ἐναντία ψηφιεῖται, four lines below.

λόγον...ἔπαινον. Cp. 214 b, Phaedr. 260 b συντείχει λόγον ἔπαινον κατὰ 

τὸν ὄνομα. 

ἐπὶ δὲξιὰ. “From left to right”: cp. Rep. 420 b (with Adam's note); 

Theaet. 175 e. Critias 2. 7 καὶ προσώπεις ἄργειν ἐπιδεξιὰ. 

κάλλιστον. Notice that, in Eryximachus’ view, the first requisite is 

κάλλος, and contrast the view of Socrates in 198 d e. 

πατήρ τοῦ λόγου. I.e. ἐστηγητός τοῦ λ, as Plutarch explains (Plat. Q. 

1000 b): the same phrase recurs in Phaedr. 257 b, cp. Theaet. 164 e δ ἀντήρ 

τοῦ μέθοδον: Lys. 214 a πατέρες τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἤγερμόνες.

τὰ ἐρωτικά. The objects or principles with which ἡ ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη (Phaedr. 

257 A) is concerned; cp. 186 c, 212 b, Lysis 204 b. This passage is alluded to 

by Themist. Or. xiii. p. 161, Max. Tyr. dis. xxiv. p. 288: for its significance 

here, see Introd. § 11. b.

οὕτα τοῦ...καλ. καὶ is used rather than οὕτε because Pausanias and Agathon 

formed "ein Liebespaar" (Hug).

177 E περὶ Διόνυσον καὶ Ἀφροδίτην. There are many points of mutual 

connexion between Eros, Dionysus and Aphrodite. Thus, Dionysus is the 

patron-god of the theatre, as shown by the phrases οἱ περὶ τὸν Δ. τεχνίται, 

"actors" (Arist. Probl. xxx. 10), and Διονυσοκόλακες, "stage-lackeys" (Arist. 

Rhet. iii. 1205 a 23); and on the comic stage erotic scenes were frequent. 

Moreover, Dionysus was sometimes represented (as by Praxilla of Sicyon, 

c. 450 b.c.) to be a son of Aphrodite; and in Aristoph. fr. incert. 490 (Df.) 

ἀῖναι is termed Ἀφροδίτης γίλα. For the traditional inter-connexion of 

"Wein, Weib und Gesang," we may also compare Solon 26 ἔργα δὲ Κυπρα-
γενούς νῦν μαί φίλα καὶ Διονύσου | καὶ Μαυσόν, ἦ τιθησ' ἀνθράσιν εὔφροσύνασ.
Echos of this phrase are to be found in Aristea. i. ep. 3, p. 11; Plut. amat. 750 A; Lucian Symp. p. 444.

ἡμῖν τοῖς ὑστάτοις. ὑστάτος here is equivalent to ἔσχατος as used in 175 c (where see note), i.e. placed on the extreme right.

ἄγαθος ἡμῖν.
"We shall be content," i.e. we shall not be called upon to speak: for the imper. ἐξάρκει c. dat. cp. 176 c, 192 b, 210 c.

τῷ ἄγαθῷ. "In Gottes Namen" (Wolf); cp. Phileb. 57 ν, Tim. 26 Ε.


178 Α. ἄξιομηνμόνευτον. We should expect rather the plural. We must suppose that the sentence is slightly confused, the original idea being to put ἄ δε μάλιστα ἐδοξᾷ μοι ἄξιομηνμόνευτα (ταύτα ἐρα), which was altered owing to the insertion, as an afterthought, of καὶ δὲ: then, instead of proceeding ἄν ἐδοξᾷ μοι ἄξιον τὸ μεμνησθαί (οὐ μεμνησθαί τοῦ λόγου), the word originally in mind was put down, but in the sing.: but it is tempting to restore either ἄξιομηνμόνευτ' εἶναι (supposing εἶναι to be corrupted from a compendium), or ἄξιον μηνμόευειν.

Prot. 343 Α (Ῥήματα βραχία ἄξιομηνμόνευτα) is the only other instance of the word in Plato: there may be an echo of the present passage in Xen. Symp. i. 1 ἄκοι δοκεῖ τὸν καλὸν κάγαθον ἄνθρωπόν ἔργα...ἄξιομημόνευτα εἶναι. For the significance of the statement here made by Apollod., see Introd. § II. B (g).

Πρώτων μὲν γὰρ κτλ. For the discourse of Phaedrus (178 A—180 b) see Introd. § I (analysis), § III. (1).

ἀστερ λέγα. "As has been stated": the present tense (186 Ε, 193 Α, etc.) is commoner than the past tense (εἶπον 173 c, 182 d, etc.) in this formula. The reference is to 177 D.

ἐνθεύσθω ποιεῖν. "Roughly at this point," hina fore: the combination recurs 199 c, Phaedr. 229 b, Euthyd. 275 b; so ἐνευθέν ποιεῖν Phaedr. 270 Α, Rep. 524 Α.
αὐθρώποις τε καὶ θεοῖς, πολλαχῇ μὲν καὶ ἀλλῇ, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύτατοι εἶναι τῶν θεῶν
Β τίμιου, ἦ δὲ θέσ. τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου· γονής γὰρ "Ερωτος οὐτ' εἶσ' ὠύτε λέγονται ὑπ' οὗδενος οὔτε ἤδιωτον οὔτε ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ' Ἡσιόδος
πρῶτον μὲν Χάος φησὶ γενέσθαι,

αὐτὰρ ἐπειτα

Γαὶ' εὐφύστερπος, πάντων έδος ἁσφαλές αἰεί,
ἡ' "Ερος.

178 A Ἀλλοι Στόβαεος πρεσβύτατοι BW, Στόβ.: πρεσβύτατοις Τ
tῶν θεῶν W: τῶν θεῶν BT
Β ἦ δὲ del. Βαστ: άείειδος Κρευζερ τεκμήριον δὲ· τούτου (*Ερωτος deleto) Νάβερ γοναὶ Στόβ., vulg. "Ερωτος:
Χάοςς cp. Βδίμ. "Ησιόδος (δὲ) Ηεινδόρφ γαί"...Ερος secl. Ηερμ.

κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν. "In respect of his origin."

ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύτατοι. For the doctrine of the antiquity of Ερος, cp. Χεν. Symp. viii. 1 τὸ μὲν χρῶνος Ἰσηλίκος τοῖς διεγενέσθαι θεοῖς..."Ερωτος: Αρ. Αν. 700
πρότερον δ' οὐκ ἦ γένος ἀθανάτων, πρὶν "Ερως συνείμειξεν ἰππάντα. Αγαθών, in 195 A, expressly contradicts Φαέδρος on this point. Βαστ excised ἦ δὲ on the ground that "in fine periie δι Platonicea non magis usurpatur quam
inquit Latinorum."

178 B τεκμήριον δὲ...gars. Cp. Critias 110 e, Απολ. 40 c: Χεν. Symp. iv. 17 τεκμήριον δὲ· θαλλοφόρους γάρ...ἐκλέγονται.

γονῆς...οὔτε λέγονται. This is a rash statement on the part of Φαέδρος; for Αλκαῖος (fr. 13 Bdgk.) makes Ερως son of Ζέφυρος and Ιρίς; Σεμινιδής
(fr. 43), son of Αρες and Αφροδίτη; Ευρίπιδης (Hippol. 534), son of Zeus;
Σαψφό (fr. 132), of Γη and Ουρανός; Ίβυκς (fr. 31), of Χαός; see also the
statements in 199 D, 203 ff. ινφρα. On the other hand ignorance or doubt as
to the parentage of Ερος is expressed in Χειν. ιδ. χιπ. 1, 2 οὐχ ἀρίτι τὸν
"Ερωτα μάνοις ἔτεχ''...ἀφτιν τοῦτο θεῶν ποικα τέκνων ἔγγειτα; Αἰτίν. Παλ. ν. 176.
7—9 πατρὸς δ' οὔκτε' ἑχαράζειν τόντο: οὔτε γὰρ Λάθήρο, [ο]ν Χάον φησὶ τεκέουν
tὸν θρασῖν, οὐ Πλαγός. For the usual Greek assumption that the poets are
religious teachers, cp. Αρ. Ραπ. 1054 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ παιδαρίων | ἓστι διδα-
σκαλος διατε φράζει, τοῖς ἴδιοις δὲ παιήται: and see Adam, R. T. G. pp. 9 ff.

ἰδιώτων. For this distinction between the prose-writer and the poet, cp. Phaedr. 258 D; Laws 890 A; Rep. 366 ε. The term ἰδιώτης may be taken as
a survival of the time when the poet alone had his work "published"—at
religious festivals, theatrical shows, κώμαι, etc.

"Ἡσιόδος κτλ. The reference is to Theog. 116 ff. ἤροι μὲν πρώτοιτα Χάος
γένετ', αὐτὰρ κτλ. Cp. Αρ. Αν. 693 ff. Χάος ἤν καὶ Νῦς κτλ. The order of the
text I have adopted, in the passage following, is that proposed by Σχάνζ,
except that he reads ὄμολογει (δὲ) φησὶ, while Burnet, accepting the trans-
position, prints σύμφησιν instead of ὄμολογει φησὶ. Ἡνγ and others eject the
clause φησὶ..."Ερωτα as a marginal prose paraphrase of the words of Ηεινίος;
since, as it stands in the traditional order, the clause is obviously tautologous:
but tautology is in itself no objection, but rather characteristic of Φιλ. 's style
'Hσιόδοφ δὲ καὶ 'Ακουσίλεως ὁμολογεῖ [φησὶ μετὰ τὸ Χάος δύο
toύτω γενέσθαι, Γῆν τε καὶ Ερωτα]. Παρμενίδης δὲ τὴν Γένεσιν
λέγει

πρότιστον μὲν Ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων.
οὖτω πολλαχόθεν ὁμολογεῖται ὁ Ἐρως ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύτατοις εἰναὶ. C

178 B 'Hσιόδοφ...ὁμολογεῖ (quae in BT post πάντων extant) transposui,
φησι om. Stob.: (δι) φησι Schanz Παρμενίδης...πάντων om. Stob.,
Heyne Wunder τὴν Γένεσιν λέγει secl. Jn.: τὴν γένεσιν secl. Rottig
C πρεσβύτατοι Stob.

(see Teuffel in Rhein. Mus. xxix. p. 133); and there is force in Hermann's
remark "agre intelligo quomodo alicius clarissimis poetae verbis (para-
phrasin) addendum existimaverit, molque verisimilior videtur Hesiodi
locum...postmodo adscriptum...irrepsisse." I bracket the clause as a gloss
on ὁμολογεῖ. The clause Παρμενίδης...πάντων is rightly defended by Hug,
against Voegelin and others, on the grounds that (1) οὖτω πολλαχόθεν in
the following sentence is more appropriate after three than after two instances,
and (2) Agathon in 195 ε, when alluding to Phaedrus’s speech, expressly
mentions Ἦσιόδος καὶ Παρμενίδης. The authority of Hesiod is similarly cited
by Plut. amat. 756 ε.

'Ακουσίλεως. Acusilaus of Argos, the "logographer," about B.C. 475 (?),
rote in the Ionic dialect several books of Genealogies, largely based
on Hesiod (see the fragg. in A. Kordt, De Acusilao, 1903). But the re-
puted work of A., extant in the time of Hadrian, was probably a forgery:
a collector of myths is not, properly speaking, a "logographer" at all (see
Jevons, Gk. Lit. p. 299). Cp. Clem. Alex. vi. ii. 26. 7 τὰ δὲ Ἦσιόδου μετήλ-
λαζαν εἰς πεζὼν λόγων καὶ ἄδια εξένεγκαν Εὐμηλός τε καὶ Ἀκουσίλαος οἱ
ἱστοριογράφοι. Hug, retaining the order of the mss., would explain the fact
that A. is put last as due to his being an ἰδιωτὴς, the others ποιηταὶ.

Παρμενίδης. See Parmen. frag. 132 (Karsten), R. and P. 101 Α; Arist.
Met. i. 4. 984b 25; Plut. amat. 756 ε. It is to be presumed that the famous
Eleate relegated this theogony to his "Way of Opinion." Cp. Spenser's
lines (H. to Love), "Or who alive can perfectly declare The wondrous cradle
of thine infancy... For ere this worlds still moving mightie masse Out of
great Chaos ugly prison crept... Love... Gan reare his head, by Clotho being
waked."

τὴν Γένεσιν...μητίσατο. Hermann and Hug follow Stallbaum in supplying
Γένεσις as the subject of μητίσατο: cp. Phaedo 94 δ οὖ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσέα
στόβος δὲ πλήξας κράδιν ἠνίπατε μύθῳ. For the personification of Γένεσις,
cp. Hom. II. xiv. 201 ἤκειαν τοι θέων γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν (cited by
Plato in Theaeet. 180 δ, Crat. 402 b). Plutarch (loc. cit.) differs by making
Ἀφροδίτη the subject of μητίσατο. It is, of course, possible that another
(suppressed) subject is intended; since we do not know what the context was
in the original.
πρεσβύτατος δὲ ὤν μεγάσταν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν αἰτίως ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχων ἤχος εἰπεῖν ὅ τι μεῖζόν ἔστιν ἄγαθον εὐθὺς νέω ὄντι ἡ ἐραστὶς χρηστὸς καὶ ἐραστὴ παιδικά. δὲ γὰρ χρη ἀνθρώπως ἠγείρεται παντὸς τοῦ βίου τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βιώσεσθαι, τούτῳ οὔτε συγγένεια οὐ̂ τε ἐμποιεῖν οὔτω καλῶς οὔτε τιμαλ ὀὔτε

D πλούτους οὔτε ἄλλο οὔθεν ὡς ἔρως. λέγω δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο; τὴν ἐπὶ μὲν τόις αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνην, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλῶς φιλοτιμίαν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦτων οὔτε πόλει οὔτε ἴδιότην μεγάλα καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἐξεργάζεσθαι. φημὶ τοῖνυν ἐγὼ ἀνδρα ὅστε ἔρα, εἶ τι αἰσχρὸν ποιῶν κατάδηλος γύνοιτο ἥ πάσχων ὑπὸ τοῦ δὲ ἀναν-

178 C πρεσβύτατος δὲ ὤν: πρὸς δὲ τοῦτο τῶν Bast (μέγαστός τε καὶ) μεγάσταν Bdhm. αἰτίως ἡμῖν Stob. (ἡ) παιδικά Hommel Jn. εὐγένεια Wyttenbach καλῶς (ὀὔτε κάλλος) vulg.: οὔτως οὔτε κάλλος Reyn. Jacobs

178 C πρεσβύτατος δὲ ὤν κτλ. The partic. gives the impression of a causal connexion—as if beneficence must be in direct proportion to antiquity!

μεγάσταν...αἰτίως. Cп. 197 ο infra; Ar. Plut. 469 ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων αἰτιῶν. eὐθὺς νέω ὄντι. "From his earliest youth": this properly applies only to the παιδικά. With παιδικά supply χρηστά. For a similar estimate of the value of φίλας, see Lys. 211 τ, Xen. Men. π. 4. 1 ff.

ἀνθρώπως...βίον. For ἡγέοισα c. dat. of person and gen. of thing, cp. Hom. Od. xxiii. 134 ἡμῖν ἡγεῖσω ὀρχηστῷ: Xen. Ogy. ππ. 7. 1 τοῦ χόρου ἡγήσατα Πέρσας. It would be easy, however, by inserting διὰ after the termin. -ας, to restore a favourite Platonic phrase διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου (cp. 203 π, Phil. 39 τ).


178 D αἰσχύνην...φιλοτιμίαν. Cп. Lys. xiv. 2, and 42 (in Alciib.) ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς καλῶς αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κακῶς φιλοτιμεῖσθαι, "taking glory for shame and shame for glory." Remembering that Phaedrus was a professed admirer of Lysias, we may, perhaps, recognize here a verbal echo. For a discussion of αἰσχύνη (not distinguished from αἴδως) see Arist. Eth. Nic. π. ix. 1128 b 10, and Rhet. π. ii. 1383 b 12.

οὔτε πάλιν οὔτε ἴδιότητι. Notice that in the subsequent treatment of these two heads the order is reversed (to secure rhetorical "Chiasmus").

εἶ τι αἰσχρὸν κτλ. Cп. Xen. Ogyg. xii. 20 ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τις ὄρθωτοι ἐν τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ὡς ἑαυτὸν ἐστὶ βελτίων καὶ οὔτε λείαν οὔτε ποιεὶ αἰσχρὰ οὐδε κακὰ, ἢν μὴ ἀφήνῃ ἐν τῇ ἐκείναι. Also 194 ο infra,

ἡ πάσχων κτλ. Cп. "It hath been said by them of old time, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." Ordinary Greek ethics approved of retaliation:

cp. Xen. Cyrop. viii. 7. 7; see Dobbs, Philos. and Popular Morals, etc. p. 39. For another incentive to courage, see Rep. 467 b.

178 E ταῦταν δὲ τούτο. "In exactly similar fashion," adverbial accus.: 8ο ταῦτα ταῦτα Μεσο 90 ε.

τῶν ἑραστῶν. The plural is due to the fact that it was usual for a number of ἑραστῶν to pay court to the same παίδεα (cp. Charm. 164 Α').

εἰ οὖν μηχανή των κτλ. Here Ph. passes on to his second head,—the benefits derived from Eros in civic and national life (πόλις, 178 δ supra). For the phrase cp. Laws 640 b εἰ δ' ἦν τις μηχανή κτλ.: Parm. 132 d, Phileb. 16 a.

στρατόπεδων ἑραστῶν. It is noteworthy that Xen. (Symp. viii. 32) puts a similar statement in the mouth of Pausanias—Παυσανίας γε...εἰρήκειν ὡς καὶ στρατευμά άλλομαστόν ἂν γενόστοι ἐκ παιδικῶν τε καὶ ἑραστῶν (cp. Introd. § viii. ad fin.). Cp. also Xen. Cyrop. vii. 1. 30 οὐκ ἦστιν ἵσχυστορέα φίλας ἦ δόν οἱ φίλοι συμμάχων ἰδρυματικὴν. This principle was exemplified in the famous ἵππος λόχος of the Thebans, organized by Gorgidas (or Epaminondas), which fought first at Leuctra, 371 B.C., see Athen. xiii. 561 ι, 602 a. A Roman analogy is afforded by Scipio's φίλοι πόλει. The parallel in Xenophon is of itself sufficient to refute Jahn's athetesis of ἥ στρατόπεδον.

οὐκ ἦστιν ὢντως ἄν κτλ. Hug, retaining ἥ before ἀπεχωμένων, would supply, with the participles, from the context "welche Gefühle allein durch den Eros in wirksamer Weise erregt werden." This, however, is exceedingly awkward; and his further remark that οὐκ ἄμενοι οἰκήσεων ἄν ἥ ἀπεχωμένων is equivalent to ἄριστ' ἄν οὐκ ἁπέχει does nothing to lessen the difficulty. By ejecting ἥ, as a very natural interpolation after the comparative by a copyist careless of the sense, we obtain the meaning required—"it would be impossible for them to secure a better constitution of their city, since thus they would abstain" etc.

λιπῶν τάξιν ὥσπερ ἀποβαλὼν. "The principal military offences at Athens were dealt with by one law. A citizen was liable to indictment, and, if convicted, to disfranchisement for (1) Failure to join the army—ἀστρατείας: (2) Cowardice in battle—δειλίας: (3) Desertion of his post—λιποσφαῖρον: (4) Desertion from the army—ὁπστρατεύομαι. Of these terms, λιπστρατεύομαι was that used in the widest sense, and might include any of the others" (Smith, D. A. i. 212c). Cp. Rep. 468 A, Laws 943 d ff., and the compounds ρήσασις (Laws 944 b, c; Ar. Vesp. 19), ἀσπιδαποθήκη (Vesp. 592). The conduct of the ideal ἔραστῆς on such an occasion is shown in 220 ε ἐνίφρα.

κινδυνεύοντι. For the sing. dat. referring to παιδικῶς, cp. Phaedr. 239 A, and 184 δ ἐνίφρα. After κινδυνεύοντι we should expect the sentence to conclude with ὡσπερ τολμᾶν ἢ or the like: the fact that a new ending is substituted may be regarded (with Ast) as due to the agitation (real or pretended) of the speaker "vom furore eroticis ergriffen."

ἐνθεον πρὸς ἀρετήν. For ἐνθέος, "god-inhabited," "inspired," cp. Ion 533 ε ἐνθέον ὁντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι: ibid. 534 B and below, 180 B. φύσει, denoting "natural" temper, is here opposed to this supervenient grace. For the thought cp. Spenser (H. to Love), "(The lover) dreads no danger, nor misfortune, feares...Thou cariest him to that which he hath eyde Through seas, through flames, through thousand swords and speares."

179 B "Ομήρου. See II. x. 485 τῷ δ’ ἐμπνευσε μένος γλαυκώπης Ἀθήνη: ib. xv. 262, Od. ix. 381. Cp. the (Lacedaemonian) term εἰςπνήλας for ἔραστῆς: also Xen. Symp. iv. 15.


οὐ μόνον ὅτι. This expression may be defended by Thuc. iv. 85. 3 καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὅτι αὐτῷ ἀνθίστασθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσ' ἢν ἑπίω, ἦσσον τις ἐμοὶ πρόσειον: Arist. Pol. vii. 11. 1331a 11 oὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέων (with Newman's note): Xen. Mem. ii. 9. 8. Jahn's oὐχ ὅτι would give, as Teuffel argues, the
Πελίου θυγάτηρ Ἀλκηστώς ἵκανήν μαρτυρίαν παρέχεται ύπερ τούτων τὸ λόγον εἰς τούς Ἐλλήνας, ἐθελήσασα μόνην ύπερ τοῦ αὐτῆς ἀνδρός ἀποθανεῖν, θνητον αὐτῷ πατρὸς τε καὶ μητρὸς. οὖς C ἐκείνη τοσοῦτον ὑπερβηλετο τῇ φιλίᾳ διὰ τοῦ ἔρωτα, ὅπερ ἀποδείξαι αὐτοῦς ἀλλητρίους θνητὸς τῷ νείποι καὶ νόματι μόνον προσήκοντας· καὶ τούτω ἐργασαμένη τὸ ἔργον οὕτω καλῶν ἐξοδεύν ἐργάσασθαι οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θεοῦ, ὅστε πολλὰ παλλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐργασαμένου εὐαριθμήτως δὴ τισιν ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοὶ, ἐξ "Αἰδον ἀνέκειν πάλιν τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνην ἀνέκειν ἀγαθόντες τῷ ἔργῳ οὕτω καὶ θεοὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦ ἔρωτα D χαὶ".


wrong sense "I do not say men do so, cela va sans dire." We may explain οὐ μόνον ὅτι as elliptical for οὐ μόνον (λέγω) ὅτι.

ἄνθρωπος...αἱ γυναῖκες. The addition of the article serves to signalize the second case as the more striking: cp. I. Alcib. 105 B ἐν "Ελληνικοὶ...ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις: Philod. 45 ε, ib. 64 c; Vahlen on Arist. Poet. iv. 1449α 1.

"Ἀλκηστώς. Besides Euripides, Phrynichus (438 B.C.) and later Antiphanes (354 B.C.) made Alcestis the theme of a tragedy: see also the Skolion by Praxilla in Bergk P. L. G. πρ. § 1293.

ὑπέρ τούτων τὸ λόγον. "In support of my argument."


179 C οὖς ἐκείνη κτλ. See Eur. Alc. 683 ff. where the appeal of Admetus is thus answered by his father Pheres: οὐ γὰρ πατρὸν τὸν ἑδεξίμην νῦν | παῖδον προβήχκειν πατέρας οὖθ' Ἐλληνικόν.

ἀλλητρίους. Admetus might have described his ἀλλητρίους προσήκοντας as "a little more than kin and less than kind."

εὐαριθμήτως. A grandiose synonym for ἀλήγος.

διόσκοι τοῦτο γέρας...ἀγαθόντες. Cp. Phaedr. 250 B ὁ γέρας παρὰ θεῶν ἐχοσιν ἀνθρώπως διδάσκαι, τάχ' ἄν δοὺς ἀγαθόντες. ἄγαμοι can take either the genitive (Rep. 426 d, etc.) or the accus. (Symp. 219 d, etc.). This passage is alluded to by Plut. amat. 762 A λέγοντες εἰς θεοὶ τοῖς ἑρωτικοῖς ἄνδον εἰς φῶς ὑπάρχειν.

οὕτω...παρασίν. Cp. Xen. Symp. viii. 28 ἀλλὰ καὶ θεοὶ καὶ ἡρωες τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φιλίαν περὶ πλείονος...ποιοῦνται.
179 D μιλιστα τιμῶσιν σεκ. Βαλίμ. φάντασμα TW τοιμῶν Ναβερ διαμηχανήσασθαι W, vulg. ζην έναι T ἐποίησαν έργον γενέσατο γυναικῶν Ναβερ Ε καὶ...ἀπέπεμψαν δαμνατ Ναβερ ἀποδανοῦτο τότε: ἀποδάνοιο B ἀποκτείνας δὲ τούτον οἴκαδ' ἔλθων γηραιὸς τελευτήσου, ἔτολμησεν

179 D Ὅρφεα. For the legend of Orpheus and his wife Eurydice, see Paus. ix. 30, Virg. Georg. iv. 454 ff., Ovid Met. i. 1 ff. Phaedrus modifies the usual story (1) by making Eurydice a φάσμα, and Orpheus consequently ἀρτέρας (cp. Stesichorus' treatment of the Helen-legend, followed also by Euripides in his Helena, and Phaedr. 243 B): (2) by making O.'s descent an act of μολακία rather than of τῶλμα (as Hermesianax 2. 7, Ov. Met. x. 13 ad Styga Tœnaeria est ausus descendere portas): (3) by representing O.'s death to be a penalty for this cowardice rather than for his irreverence to Dionysus (as Aeschylus Bassarai, etc.). For Orpheus and Orphism in general, see Miss J. Harrison Proleg. pp. 455 ff.

ἀτε ἂν κιθαροδός. As if the "soft Lydian airs" of the cithara conducted to effeminacy. For the cithara, as distinguished from the λύρα, see Rep. 399 D—E (with Adam's note). It is worth noticing that Spenser (Il. to Love) cites Orpheus as an instance of ἐνθεὸς τῶλμα—"Orpheus daring to provoke the yre Of damned fiends, to get his love retyre."

τοιγάρτοι διὰ ταῦτα. Cp. Isocr. vii. 52, Andoc. i. 108, Dem. xxiii. 203; an example of the rhetorical trick of amplitude. Phaedrus, as Hug observes, is blind to the obvious corollary that Eros sometimes fails to implant τῶλμα.


ὡς ἀποθανοῖτο. See Hom. Π. xviii. 96 ἀυτίκα γάρ τοι ἐπείτα μεθ' "Εκτορά πότμος ἔτοιμος: ibid. ix. 410 ff.; Ἀρ. 28 c, d.

οἴκαδ'...τελευτήσου. This clause is echoed, as Wolf observed, by Aeschines i. 145 ἐπιανδηλῶν οἴκαδ' γηραιὸς...ἀποθανεῖται.
179 Β) βοσθήσατίν W  
Πατρόκλων del. Naber  
180 Α) Αισχύλος...

"Ομηρος del. Valckenaer  
άλλα ἁρα W: ἄλλα ἁρα Τ: ἄλλα Β: ἄλλα' ἁρα Βτ.  
καὶ...ἀγένειος post polû transp. Petersen  
Β) ἑρασθήσατη...έστι secl. Bdhm.

βοσθήσατ.  
Cp. Arist. Rhet. 1. 3. 1359a 3 οίον 'Αχιλλέα ἐπαινοῦν ὅτι βοσθήσατ τῷ ἑταῖρῳ Πατρόκλῳ εἰδῶς ὅτι δει αὐτόν ἐπαθωμεν ἐξὸν ἔργῳ. Isocrates (in Panegyr. 53) lauds the Athenians for a similar nobility of conduct.

180 Α) ἐπαινοῦν.  
This and 208 Β are the only classical instances cited of this compound; nor does there seem to be another classical instance of ὑπεραγαθήναι.

Αισχύλος δὲ φιλαρεί. The reference is to Aesch. Myrmidons (fr. 135, 136 N.). Sophocles, too, wrote an 'Αχιλλέως 'Ερασταί: cp. also Xen. Symp. viii. 31. Achilles, like Asclepius and others, was worshipped in some places (e.g. Epirus) as a god, in others (e.g. Elis) as a hero.

άλλα ἁρα καὶ. "Ἀρα h. l. stare potest, valet: nimirum" (Wyttengbach): for ἁρα affirmative in a universal statement, cp. 177 Ε, Rep. 595 Α. To alter to ἀμα, as Burnet, is unnecessary.

καλλίων.  
For the beauty of Achilles, see II. Π. 673. Οv. Trist. Π. 411 refers to Sophocles' play—"nec nocet auctori mollem qui fecit Achillem": cp. Lucian dial. mort. 18. 1.

ἀγένειος. The hero is so represented in art; and the Schol. ad II. Π. 1. 131 applies to him the epithet γυνακοπρόσωπος. Similarly Apollo, in Callim. II. Π. 36 fr. φιλατε φαῖβου | θηλίας' οὖθ' ὁσον ἐπὶ χνίον ἥλαμά παρείς.

νεώτερος.  
See II. XI. 786 γενέθ μὲν ὑπέρτερος ἐστων 'Αχιλλέως | πρεβάτερος δὲ σὺ (sc. Πάτροκλος) ἑστα: and Schol. ad II. Π. xxiii. 94. For the relative ages of παιδικά and ἑρασθής, see 181 Β ff. infra; Xen. Anab. II. 6. 28 οὗτος δὲ (sc. Μῆνο) παιδικά ἐξη Θαρύπαν ἀγένειοι δὸν γενειώτα (mentioned as an enormity); Οv. Met. x. 83 ff.

μάλιστα μὲν...μάλλον μέντοι. This savours of a Hibernicism: cp. Gorg. 509 τοῖς μέγαντον τῶν κακῶν...καὶ ὦτι τούτοι μείζον.

180 Β) θαυμάζουσι.  

θεώτερον...ἐνθεος.  
Cp. 179 Α, 209 Β ad init.; Schol. ad Eur. Hippol. 144
τῆς Ἀλκήστιδος μᾶλλον ἐτίμησαν, εἰς' μακάρων νήσους ἀποστέμφανε.

Οὗτος δὴ ἐγγωγεῖ φημὶ Ἐρωτα θεῶν καὶ πρεσβύτατον καὶ τιμώτατον καὶ κυρίωτατον εἶναι εἰς ἀρετῆς καὶ εὐδαιμονίας κτῆσιν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ξώσι καὶ τελευτήσαιν.

C VIII. Φαίδρον μὲν τοιοῦτον 'τινὰ λόγον ἔφη εἰπεῖν, μετὰ δὲ Φαίδρον ἄλλους τινὰς εἶναι, ὅν οὐ πάνυ διεμμηνούνεν· οὖς παρεῖς τὸν Παυσανίου λόγον διασκεδάζετε. εἰπεῖν δ' αὐτὸν ὅτι Οὗ καλὸς μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Φαίδρε, προβέβλησθαι ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, τὸ ἀπλῶς οὐτὸς παρηγγέλθη ἐγκωμίαζεν Ἐρωτα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἶς ἦν ὁ Ἐρως, καλὸς ἂν εἴη, νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστων εἰς· μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνός D ὁ ὀρθότερον ἐστὶ πρότερον προρρηθῆναι ὁποῖον δὲ ἐπαίνειν. ἐγὼ οὖν πειράσομαι τοῦτο ἐπανορθώσασθαι, πρῶτον μὲν Ἐρωτα φράσαι δὲν δὲν ἐπαίνειν, ἐπείτα ἐπαίνεσαι ἀξίως τοῦ θεοῦ. πάντες γὰρ


ἐνθαν λέγονται οἱ ὑπὸ φάσματός τινος ὀφαρεβέντες τὸν νοῦν, καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ φασματοποιοῦ κατεχόμενοι καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐκείνω ποιοῦντες. See Rohde Psychol. II. 19 ff.

Οὗτος δὲ κτλ. In this epilogue καὶ πρεσβ. καὶ τιμ. summarise the first part of the speech; καὶ κυριωτέρον κτλ., the second part. Cp. Isocr. Hel. 218 ὁ κάλλους...μετέχειν ὁ σεμνότατον καὶ τιμώτατον καὶ θεώτατον τῶν ὅρων ἐστῖν.

180 C ἄλλους τινάς εἶναι. The construction here has been misunderstood: Hirschig proposed to write εἰπεῖν for εἶναι, while Hug bids us supply λέγοντας. Evidently both suppose that ἄλλοι τως mean persons, but it seems better to take them to be λόγοι and to construe μετὰ Φαίδρον as a compendium for μετὰ τῶν Φαίδρον λόγον. By this means we secure the word required, λόγουs, as the antecedent to ὅποιον: for διαμηνυονεύσων would be less naturally used of a person than of a speech (cp. 178 A πάντων...ἐμέμνητο). For the brachylogy, cp. Thuc. i. 71. 2 ἄρχαιοτερον ὕμων τὰ ὑπηρεσία τοις πρὸς αὐτῶν ἐστιν (with Shilleto's n.).

τῷ ἐγκωμίαζεν Ἐρωτα. This clause is best taken, with Stallb. and Hug, as nomin. in epexegetical apposition to προρρηθῆσαι ὁ λόγος. Equally improbable are Rückert's view that the clause is accus. ("quatenus sic simpliciter" etc.), and Hommel's that it is exclamatory.

ἀπόλοις οὖτως. Cp. 176 E.

νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ. We may assume the ellipse of οὐ καλὸς ἔχει after νῦν δὲ: cp. Theaet. 143 E, Apol. 38 E, etc.

προφητῆσαν. Hommel renders by "prior praefari," Hug by "edicere." In favour of Hommel's view cp. προφητήθη 198 E, τούτων προφητήντων Laws 823 D; Rep. 504 A.
ΣΥΜΠΟΣΙΟΝ


180 D οὐκ ἐστιν...'Αφροδίτης. Σρ. Hes. θεογ. 201 τῇ δ' "Ερως ᾠμάρτημα καὶ Ἰμερος ἐστετος καλὸς | γενομένῃ τὰ πρώτα θεῶν τ' εἰς φύλον ἴσην: Ὀρφ. Η. 55. Ο Οὐρανίῳ πολύμμε, φιλομεδίδις 'Αφροδίτη... (8) μήτερ ἐρωτῶν.

μᾶς οὖσης. Σρ. Χεν. συμπ. vili 9 εἰ μὲν οὖν μὰ ἐστιν 'Αφρ. ἡ δυτικ θ. τὰ θεά. Plato uses both theós (181 c, Rep. 327 L, etc.) and θεά (Rep. 388 A, 391 C, etc.) for "goddess," and θεά here serves to preclude confusion with "Ερως. For the notion of a dual Aphrodite cp. Xεν. l. c., Apuleius apol. 12, Plotin. ἑπλ. iii. 5. 293 b. For Aphrodite Urania, with a temple in Athens, see Hdt. i. 105, 131, etc.; Paus. i. 14. 6. See also Cic. N. D. iii. 23; Pind. fr. 87.

Πάνθημον. For the temple in honour of A. Pandemos, see Paus. i. 22. 3. It is doubtful whether the title originally attached to her as the common deity of the deme, or as the patroness of the ἐταιρία. But whatever its origin, the recognized use of the title at the close of the 5th century was to indicate Ἄνεως μετονύμχια.

180 Ε καὶ "Ερωτα κτλ. The notion of a duality, or plurality, in Eros is also hinted at in Ευριπ. fr. 550 ἐνὸς δ' "Ερωτος οὖν τοι μ' ἤδουν': οἱ μὲν κακῶν ἐρωτόν, οἱ δὲ τῶν καλῶν: fr. adesp. 151 διοῦσα πνεύματα πνεῖς "Ερως. Σρ. Pheadr. 266 A.

ἐπανει...θεώς. This is merely a formal saving clause, to avert possible Nemesis, and although it involves the speaker in something like self-contradiction, there is no good reason to suspect corruption in the text (if correction be required, the easiest would be ἐυφημεῖν, cp. Εριν. 992 δ εὐφημεῖν πάντας θεοὺς κτλ.). The laudation of base gods would sound less strange in ancient than in modern ears; and Eryximachus uses very similar language in 188 δ (cp. 196 A).

181 A αὐτὴ ἐφ' ἐαυτῆς κτλ. Gellius xvii. 20 ignores πραττομένη in his rendering ("Omne," inquit, "omnino factum sic sese habet: neque turpe est,
quantum in eo est, neque honestum, uelut est quas nunc facimus ipsi res, bibere cantare disserere. nihil namque horum ipsum ex se honestum est; quali cum fieret modo factum est, tale extitit," etc.): Proclus also (in Alcib. I. p. 218) omits it. It must certainly, I think, be ejected, since it only serves to confuse the argument; none of the alternatives proposed are at all probable; while Rettig's attempt to justify its retention by the device of setting a comma before it is merely absurd. For the language cp. Meno 88 c πάντα τά κατά τήν ψυχήν αυτά μέν καθ' αυτά ὠντε ὄφειμα ὠντε βλαβερά ἔστιν: Phaedr. 258 c, d. See also Eryx. 397 e; Arist. Pol. 1333 a 9, for the moral indifference of πράξεις καθ' αὐτάς.


181 B ἦν καὶ ἐρώσε. "In the actual objects of their passion": the full statement would be ἔρως τῶν σωμάτων ἐκείνων (sc. παιδῶν ἡ γυναικῶν) ὅν ἐρώτει μᾶλλον ἕν τῶν ψ.

το διαπράξεσθαι. A polite euphemism for the sexual act: cp. 182 c, Phaedr. 256 c; Lysias 1. 33.

ἐστι γὰρ...ἀρρένοι. Observe that the reasons are put in chiastic order.

181 C καὶ ἐστιν...Ἐρως. This clause is obviously open to suspicion as (1) anticipating the sense of ὅθεν δὴ κτλ., and (2) standing in partial contradiction to the later statement (181 d ad init.) ὅ γὰρ ἔρως παίδων.
PAIDWN ÉROΣ··] ἔπειτα πρεσβυτέρας, ὑβρεώς ἄμοιρον. Ὤθεν δὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρθρον τρέπονται οἱ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ἔρωτος ἑπταννοῦ, τὸ φύσει ἐρρημενέστερον καὶ νόμον μᾶλλον ἔχου ἅγαπῶντες. καὶ τις ἀν γνοι καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ παιδεραστίᾳ, τοὺς εἰλικρινῶς ὑπὸ τοῦτο τοῦ ἔρωτος ὁμομένους. οὐ γὰρ ἐρῶσι παῖδων, ἀλλ’ D ἐπειδὴ ἤδη ἀρχονταὶ νόμον ἱσχειν, τοῦτο δὲ πλησίον τῷ γενεάσκειν. "παρεσκευασμένοι γὰρ, οἶμαι, εἰσὶν οἱ ἐντεῦθεν ἀρχομένοι εἰράν ὡς τὸν βιον ἀπαντὰ ἐυνεσόμενοι καὶ κοινῇ συμβιωσόμενοι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐξαπατήσαμεν, ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ λαβώντες ὁς νέον, καταγελάσαμεν οἰκήσεσθαι ἐπ’ ἄλλων ἀποτρέχουστε. χρήν δὲ καὶ νόμων εἰμαί μὴ ἐραν παῖδων, ἵνα μὴ εἰς ἄδηλον πολλῇ ὀψουτῇ ἀνάλοικοτε, τὸ γὰρ τῶν παίδων τέλος ἄθηλον οἱ τελευτᾷ E


ἐπικαλ. "Driven by the spirit": the only other exx. of the word in Plato are Chr. 428 σ and Meno 99 D φαίμεν ἄν θείος τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθοσίαζειν, ἐπίτους ὄντας καὶ καταχρησάμενοι ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ (cp. 179 A π., 180 B π.).

181 D τοῦτο δὲ. Σ. τὸ νόμον ἵσχειν. This is in contradiction to the statements of Phaedrus, 178 c (εὐθὺς νέος ὄντε), 180 χ (εἰς ἀγένειον ἦν). For γενεάσκειν (rude only). For γενεάσκειν (rude only). For γενεάσκειν (rude only). For γενεάσκειν (rude only). For γενεάσκειν (rude only). For γενεάσκειν (rude only). For γενεάσκειν (rude only). For γενεάσκειν (rude only). For γενεάσκειν (rude only). For γενεάσκειν (rude only). For γενεάσκειν (rude only). For γενεάσκειν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γενεὰσκεῖν (rude only). For γεος αἰόρων. πάσα, as here used, is Theognis' μικρός παῖς, the παιδάριον of 210 τ. ἰνθρ. 181 Σ ἄθηλον οἱ τελευταῖ. Cp. Phaedr. 232 Σ τῶν μὲν ἐρωτῶν πολλοὶ πρότερον τοῦ σώματος ἔπειτα τοῦ τρόπου ἅγαπῶντες θ.: Theogn. 1075 μ. πρήγματος ἀπρήγματος χαλεπότατον ἐστὶ τελευτήν γινώσκων: ἄφρην γὰρ τέτατοι: Alcid. Odyss. 5 πάσα τε ἀπορία ἦν ποιεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τροφήσεως ἢ...τελευτή. A similar
sentiment occurs in the Clown's song in Twelfth-Night: "What's to come is still unsure...Youth's a stuff will not endure."

κακιάς καὶ ἀρετῆς. Possibly these genitives are to be construed (with Rückert) as dependent on the preceding adverb of: cp. Soph. O. T. 413 οὐ βλέπεις ἐν' εἰ κακόν (Madv. Gr. Syntax § 50 b). Hug, however, takes them to be governed by πέρι, comparing for the separation of prepos. from case Apol. 19 c, Soph. Aj. 793.

tοῦτων...ἐραστῶν. For οὗτος contemptuous cp. Apol. 17 b, Rep. 492 D οὗτοι εἰ παιδεύσαι τε καὶ σοφοσταί ("οὗτοι is the contemptuous isti" Adam).

tό τούτων. So. μὴ ἐράν παιδῶν (D ad fin.). For the db. accus. with -αναγκάζω, cp. Rep. 473 A τοῦτο μὴ ἀναγκάζε με: Phaedr. 242 B. Hommel, perversely, construes τό τούτων as an adverbial accus., "ganz in der Weise wie" etc.

τῶν ἑλευθέρων γυναικῶν. For the legal penalties (by a γραφή μοιχείας or ὑβρισμός or a δίκη βαλίων) for rape and adultery, see Lysias i. 86, 30, 49. One of the lesser penalties was that alluded to by Catullus xv. 18 f., Quem...Per-current raphanique mugosque.

182 Α. χαρίζομαι ἑραστῶν. χαρίζομαι, obsoqui, "to grant favours"—the converse of διαπράξεω— is a vox propriar in this connexion: cp. Schol. ad Phaedr. 228 ο τό χαριστέων ἐστιν...τό πρός ἀφροδίσιον ἐστιν συνοντάν ἐπιδιδόναι τινί. For the sentiment here disputed, see Xen. Symp. viii. 19 ff.; Mem. i. 2. 29; and the paradox in Phaedr. 233 e ἵσως προσήκει ὦ τοῖς σφόδρα δεσμένως χαρίζομαι. Aeschines i. 136 agrees with Pausanias.

τὴν ἄκαρπίαν. "Impropriety" or "tactlessness": for exx. of such ἄκαρπία, see 181 D, Phaedr. 231 D ff.

νόμος. νόμος here includes both "law" proper and "public sentiment," or "custom" ("die Anschauungen des Volkes," Hug) which are distinguished in Dem. de Cor. 114: cp. Thuc. vi. 18. 7: but in Thuc. vi. 16. 2 νόμος is "custom."
νοησαι, ράδιος, ἀπλῶς γὰρ ὡρισται. ὃ δ' ἐνθάδε [καὶ ἐν Δακεδα-μονί] ποικίλου. ἐν Ἡλείῳ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ, καὶ οὐ μὴ ἐν φοίλοι λέγειν, ἀπλῶς γεγομοδέθηται καλὸν τὸ χαριζεσθαι ἑρωταίς, καὶ οὐκ ἂν τις εἴτοι οὔτε νέος οὔτε παλαιὸς ὡς αἰσχρῶν, ἵνα, οἴμαι, μὴ πράγματ' ἔχωσι λόγων πειρώμενοι πείθειν τοὺς νέους, ἀτε' ἀδύνατοι λέγειν. τῆς δὲ Ἰωνίας καὶ ἄλλης. πολλαχοῦ αἰσχρῶν νεομίσται, οὕτω ὑπὸ βαρβάρως οἰκοῦν. τοὺς γὰρ βαρβάρους διὰ τὰς τυραννίδας/αἰσχρῶν τούτο γέ καὶ ἦ γε φιλοσοφία καὶ ἦ


182 A καὶ ἐν Δακεδαμονὶ. I follow Winckelmann and others (see crit. n.) in bracketing these words: possibly they should be transposed to a place in the next clause, either after γὰρ or after Βοιωτίᾳ (in suggesting this I find myself anticipated by an anonymous critic, ap. Teuffel, Rhein. Mus. xxix. p. 145). That Laconia was a hot-bed of pederasty might be inferred ὁ priorι from its military-oligarchical constitution, and is betokened by the verb λακω-νίζειν used as a synonym for παιδικοῖς χρήσθαι (Ar. frag. 323), and the adj. κυσολάκων for παιδραστῆς. It is certainly unlikely that a ποικίλος νόμος would be ascribed to the Laconians, and unlikely too that they would be classed apart from the μὴ σοφοὶ λέγειν. Moreover, in 182 D ff. it is ὁ ἐνθάδε (ὑμέτερος) νόμος which is treated as ποικίλος, and no mention is made there of a similar Laconian νόμος. For Laconian mores, Stallb. cites Xen. Rep. Lac. π. 13; Plut. Lac. Inst. p. 297 b; Aelian V. H. III. 10. 12. In Xen. Symp. VIII. 35 the Lacedaemonians are lauded—θεῶν γὰρ οὖ τὴν Ἀναίδειαν ἀλλὰ τὴν Λιδώ νομίζουσι (which ought, perhaps, to be construed as implying that they are slighted here).

182 B ἐν Ἡλείῳ κτλ. Ὁ περὶ Ἰωνίαν ἐνθάδε παῖδων (Laws VIII. 836) points to a similar state of things.

τῆς δὲ Ἰωνίας. The genitive is taken by Hug as dependent on πολλαχοῦ, by Stallb. as dependent on ὅσοι, "val potius ex demonstrativo ante ὅσοι intelligendo." Hug quotes Xen. Hell. IV. 4. 16 πολλαχοῦ καὶ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἐμβαλόντες:

ὅσοι...οἰκοῦν. The grammar is loose—"per synesen additur ὅσοι perinde ac si praecessisset 'apud Ionas autem et multos alios'" (Stallb.). The language is most appropriate to a time after the Peace of Antalcidas (387 B.C.), when the Greeks of Asia Minor were again reduced to subjection to the Great King (see Bury, Hist. Gr. p. 552); cp. Cratyl. 409 ὃ οὐ ὑπὸ τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκοῦντες: Laws 693 α.

τούτο γε καὶ κτλ. Strictly we should supply, with τοῦτο, τὸ χαριζεσθαι ἑρωταίς, but the notion latent is probably the more general one τὸ ἑρῶν (παιδῶν). The palaestrae (gymnasia) were recognized as the chief seats of
C φιλογνωστικὴν· οὕτω γὰρ, οἶμαι, συμφέρει τοῖς ἄρχουσι φρονώματα μεγάλα ἐγγίζεται τῶν ἄρχομένων, οὐδὲ φίλαις ἵσχυρας καὶ κοινοικιας, δὲ δὴ μᾶλλον ψυχῇ τά τε ἁλλὰ πάντα καὶ οὐκ ἔρως ἐμποτείνην. ἐργῇ δὲ τούτῳ ἐμαθον καὶ οἱ ἐννάδε τύμποτοι· οὐ γὰρ Ἀριστογείτωνος ἐρως καὶ ἡ Ἀρμοδίου φιλία βέβαιος ψυχεμένη κατέλυσεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἁρχήν. οὕτως οὖ μὲν αἰσχρῶν, ἀπέθη χαρί-


182 C φρονώματα...ἐγγίζεσθαι. For φρον. μεγάλα cp. 190 B. For ἐγγίζεσθαι cp. Xen. Emp. v. 6 ἀστ' εἶκεν ἢ έκισσα μὲν ὑμῖν...ἐγγίζεσθαι: and 184 λά ἑπ. The genitive τῶν ἄρχομένων, in place of the more natural dative, may be explained, with Stallb., as due to "a confusion of two constructions," the gen. being dependent on φρον. μεγ. and the dat. after the verb omitted. For the thought, cp. (with Jowett) Arist. Pol. v. 11. 15.

8 δὴ...ἐμποτείν. The neut. sing., which is acc. after ἐμποτείν, serves to grasp under one general head the preceding plurals. For this common use of φιλεῖ, solet, cp. 188 b ἑπ., Philob. 37 B. Hug, excising the καὶ after πάντα, construes τὰ ἁλλὰ πάντα as a second object, parallel to ἀ. But no change is needed: the phrase means "praeceter omnibus maxime amor," as Stallb. renders, op. the usage of ἁλλὸς τε καὶ τὰ τε ἁλλὰ καὶ in 220 λ, Apol. 36 λ, etc.

ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστογείτωνος κτλ. For the exploits of these tyrannicides, who slew the Pisistratids in 514 B.C., see Bury H. G. p. 205. Aristogeiton was the ἔραστής of Harmodius, and popular sentiment invested the pair, in later days, with a halo of glory as the patron-saints and martyrs of Love and Liberty. Cr. Skokia 9 (Bkg. P. L. G. iii. p. 646) ἐν μέγαν κλαδὶ τοῦ ἐβίου φορίων, ὁ δὲ προ Ἀρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτων, ὡς τὸν τύμπον κτανέτην, οἰκονόμους τ' Ἀθηναίων ἑπομενήν: Ar. Ach. ἑκκ. 890, Lys. 682. The exploit was also commemorated by Antenor's bronzes and a group by Critias and Nesiotes (reproduced in Bury H. G. p. 209).

ἐτέθη. As aor. pass. of τίθεσθαι, this is equiv. to ἐνομίσθη (cp. two ll. below). It is plain that θεμένων must here be taken to include both rulers and subjects. For πλεονεξία, "arrogant greed," as opposed to ἦ τοῦ ἱσον τιμή, see Rep. 359 C. For the theory implied in the following passage, that ἐρως and ἄνδρεα go together (as Phaedrus also had contended, 178 D ff.), cp. Bacon, Essay x. (Of Love): "I know not how, but Martials men are given to Love: I think it is but as they are given to Wine; for perils commonly ask to be paid in pleasures."
κατανόησαι ενθ. γ' ὑπὸ Bdhm. 

183 Α  'Ἐνθυμηθέντι γὰρ κτλ. The construction is grammatically incomplete: one would expect δοξεῖν ἀν, or the like, to govern the dative. It is not till we get to 183 οὖν κτλ. that we find the sense resumed. 

182 E ἐπικεφαλέων κτλ. "Quod attinet ad amasii capiendi conatum" (Stallb.). 

ἐξονελαν...ἐπαινεῖσθαι. Here, as often, the main idea is put in the participle. Again Jowett misleads, in rendering ὅ νόμος "the custom of mankind."

183 A πλὴν τοῦτο [φιλοσοφίας]. Φιλοσοφία is most probably corrupt: if retained, it would be better to construe it as genit. of object ("the reproaches levelled against philosophy") than as genit. of subject or origin (as Ast, Stallb., Kreyenbühl), for which we should expect rather φιλοσοφοῦν. The simplest and best remedy is, with Schleiermacher, to eject φιλοσοφία as a gloss on the misreading τοῦτο. For ὅνειδος, cp. Rep. 347 οὐ τὸ φιλότιμον τε και φιλόργυνον εἶναι ὅνειδος λέγεται. For καρποῦσθαι, in malam partem, cp. Rep. 579 c; Eur. Hipp. 1427 κ. πένθη. In their translations, Jowett follows Ast, but Zeller adopts Schl.'s excision.
τοιούτων ἀρχήν ἀρξαί ἢ τίν', ἀλλ' ἀλλὰν ἄλλῳν δύναμιν ἐθέλοι ποιεῖν ἀλλ' ἄλλῃν ἀλλὰν ἄλλῃν, ἐφθασει πρὸς τὰ πατικάδα, ἰκετείας τε καὶ ἀντιβολῆσεις ἐν ταῖς ἐκείνης ποιούμενοι, καὶ ὁρκοὺς ὁμώνυμοι, καὶ κοιμήσεις ἐπὶ ὑπόθερος, καὶ ἐθέλοντες δουλείας δουλεύειν οὐκ οὔτ' ἄν δύολοι οὕτως, ἐμπαίδευτο ἂν μὴ πράττειν οὗτο τὰ πράξει καὶ ὑπὸ φίλον καὶ ὑπὸ ἐχθρῶν, τῶν μὲν ὀνειδιζόντων κολακείας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας, τῶν δὲ νουθετοῦντος καὶ αἰσχυνομένων ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν: τῷ δ' ἐρώτητι πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντι χάρις ἔπεστι, καὶ δέδοται ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἄνευ ἀνείδος πράττειν, ὡς πάγκαλον τὰ πράγμα διαπραττομένου· ὃ δὲ δειμνότατον, ὅσοι γε λέγοντιν οἱ πολλοὶ, ὅτι καὶ ὁμώνυμοι τούτοις συγγραφέομεν παρὰ θεῶν ἐκβαίνειν τῶν ὅρκων—ἀφροδίσιον γὰρ ὁρκὸν


κομήσεις ἐπὶ θάρασι. Cn. 203 D; Ov. A. A. π. 238 frigidus et nuda saepe iacibus humo: Hor. C. iii. 10. 2 asperas | porrectum ante fores, etc. For the other love-symptoms also Xen. Cyrop. v. 1. 12.

183 B αἰσχυνομένων ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. For this construction cp. Euthyd. 305 a, Charm. 175 D. With the whole of this passage cp. Xen. Symp. iv. 15, viii. 12 ff.: Isocr. Hel. 219 B μόνου αὖαν (ἐκ τοὺς καλούς) διαπραττεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς οὐκ ἀρχαιολογῶμεν τρεπομένων, ἐκ λέοντος τοὺς ποιούμενοι ἂν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχαιολογήσασθαι καὶ ὑπεραπομειώσας τὸν ὅρκον τοῦτον διαπραττομένου καὶ κόλακας ἀπακαλοῦμεν τοὺς δὲ τὸ κάλλει λατρεύοντες φιλοκάλους καὶ φιλοσόφους εἶναι νομίζομεν (with which cp. also 184 C ὑπὲρ).

τῷ δ' ἐρωτεῖται...διαπραττομένου. For the gen. absolute after a dative, cp. Latis 839 B ἡμῖν τις παρασκατάτα ἀνήρ...λοιδορίσειν ἂν ὃς ἄνωτα...τιθέντων: Philoob. 44 C is a less certain case. For the sense of the passage, cp. Bacon, Essay x. (Of Love): "It is a strange thing to note the excess of this passion; and how it braves the nature and value of things; by this, that the speaking in a perpetual hyperbole is come in nothing but in Love."

ὡς γε λέγουσιν κτλ. These words qualify the following, not the preceding, clause; Pausanias himself censures perjury in 183 E. For ὡς γε, cp. Rep. 352 D, 432 B.

ἀφροδίσιον γὰρ ὁρκὸν κτλ. This proverbial expression is found in two forms—ἀφροδίσιον ὁρκὸς οὖ δίκαιος (Hesych.) and ἀφρ. ὁρκὸς οὖκ ἐμποίημι (Suid.). The Scholiast quotes Hesiod (fr. 5 G.) ἐκ τούτων ὁρκὸς ἐκθέναι ἀμείωτα (ἀπήμωνa G. Hermann) ἀνθρώπωσιν | νοσφίδιω τῶν πέρι Κυπρίδος. Cp. Soph. fr. 694 ὁρκὸς δὲ μοιχών εἰς τέφραν ἐγὼ γράφω: Callim. Erig. 27 (Anth. Pal. v. 5. 3) ἀλλὰ λέγονσιν ἀλθέα, τοὺς ἐν ἑρωταὶ ὁρκοὺς μὴ δύναιν οὔτως ἐσ

ἀδανάτων: Aristaeus. π. 20: Οv. A. A. 1. 633 Iuppiter ex alto peruria ridet amamentum: Tibull. i. 4. 21 ff. nec iurare time: Veneris peruria venti | irrita... ferunt, etc. As to the text, the parallels quoted lead us to expect a fuller expression. Hertz's ὄρκον (ἀρκον), adopted by Hug, is ingenious but rather weak in sense. I prefer to insert κύρων (abbreviated κῶ) after ὄρκον. For κύρως, "valid," cp. Laws 926 D: ἑρ. vi. 323 c, and see L. and S. s.v. p. 2: οὗ κύρως is equiv. to ἀκυρος, ἐννιάτος. To John's insertion (ἐμποίημον) Teuffel rightly objects that it smacks but little of the proverbial manner.

καὶ οἱ θεοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι. This seems to balance the statement made by Phaedrus, 179 c—d.

183 C τοῖς ἐρωμένοις. From this dative (governed by ἐπιστήσαντες), we must supply an acc. (τοῖς ἐρωμένοις) to act as subject to διαλέγεσθαι. For the general sense of the passage, cp. Phaedr. 255 Α ἐὰν...ὑπὸ ἐμφανητῶν ἦ των ἄλλων διαβεβλημένος ἦ, λεγόντων ὡς αἰσχρῶν ἑρωτεῖ πλησίων: ibid. 234 b.

καὶ...προστεταγμένα ἦ. Hug, after Jahn and others, condemns this clause on the grounds that (1) ἦ is wanting in B; (2) the change of number, from παιδαγωγὸς to παιδαγωγόφ, is awkward; (3) the clause contains nothing new. But there is point in the change from plur. to sing. as serving to individualize the parents' action; and the clause does add to the statement in the context the further idea that the paideugogi are appointed not only as a general safeguard, but with special instructions to ward off this particular danger. τοῖς ἑρασταίς.

183 D τὸ δη...ἡ. For this formula, introducing the solution of a problem, cp. 198 D; Theor. 166 Δ.

οὐχ ἀπλοῖον ἐστὶν. Stallbaum, ejecting οὐχ with Bas, renders ἀπλοῖον by
ελέγχθη οὕτε καλὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὕτε αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ καλὸς μὲν πραττόμενον καλὸν, αἰσχρός δὲ αἰσχρόν. αἰσχρός μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν πονηρῷ τε καὶ πονηρῶς χαρίζεσθαι, καλὸς δὲ χρηστῷ τε καὶ

Ε καλὸς. πονηρὸς δ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἑραστὴς ὁ πάνθημος, ὁ τοῦ σώματος μᾶλλον ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔρως· καὶ γὰρ οὕδε μόνιμος ἐστιν, ὃτε οὐ μονίμων ἔρων πράγματος. ἀμα γὰρ τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἀνθεί λήγοντι, οὕπερ ἡρα, "οἷκεται ἀποπτάμενος," τολλοῦς λόγους καὶ ὑποσχέσεις κατασχύνας· ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἱθους χρηστοῦ ὄντος ἑραστὴς διὰ βλάου μένει, ὃτε μονίμω συντακείς. τοῦτος δὲ βού-

183 D εἶναι del. Steph. Ast (οὐδὲν) οὕτε Bdhm. αἰσχρός μὲν: αἰσχρόν μὲν Steph. καλὸς de Par. 1810: καλὸν de BT καὶ καλὸς: καὶ χρηστῶς Sappe Sz. Ἐ ἔρων η τῆς ψυχῆς T ὅτε οὐ B: ὅτε οὐδὲ T

"verum simpliciter," citing Phaedo 62 Α, Phaedr. 244 Α, Protag. 331 Β. Retaining οὐχ, we cannot take the foll. accus. and infin. as the subject (with Wolf), but must supply τὸ χαρίζεσθαι (with Hug) from the context.

αἰσχρός μὲν...καλὸς δὲ. With each adverb, sc. χαρίζεσθαι: cp. Rep. 339 ν τὸ δὲ ὅρθω...τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅρθω... (sc. τιθέναι).

183 E τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἀνθεί λ. Youth "is like the flower of the field, so soon passeth it away, and it is gone." Cp. Minn. 2. 7 μίνιαθα δὲ γίγνεται ἡθος καρπᾶς: Theogn. 130δ παθείας πολυπαθῶν ἄνδος | ἀκρότερον σταθίων: Ségur’s refrain "Ah! le Temps fait passer l’Amour": Spenser (H. to Beauty) "For that same goodly hew of white and red, With which the cheeks are sprinkled, shall decay, And those sweetest rosy leaves, so fairly spread Upon the lips, shall fade and fall away" etc.: Rep. 601 Β οὐκοῦν εἰκεν τοῖς τῶν ὀραίων προσώπωσι... ὅταν αὕτα τὸ ἄνδος προλίηται: Χοφ. Συμπ. viii. 14 τὸ μὲν τῆς ἄδος ταχὺ δὴπον παρακμάξει, κτλ.: Τυρτ. 10. 28 ἄφρ' ἑρατής ἡθος ἄγλαν ἄνδος ἔξω: Minnecrm. 1. 4. So Emerson (On Beauty) "The radiance of the human form...is only a burst of beauty for a few years or a few months, at the perfection of youth, and in most rapidly declines. But we remain lovers of it, only transferring our interest to interior excellence."

αἰκεται ἀποπτάμενος. A reminiscence of Il. ii. 71. For the thought, cp. 181 Π υπὴρα: Χοφ. Συμπ. ι. cx. ἀπολείποντος δὲ τοῦτου (sc. τοῦ τῆς ἄδος ἄνδους), ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν φιλίαν συναιμαραίονεσθαι. Cp. also Phaedr. 232 Ε, 234 Α.


τοῦτοι δὲ. With the text as it stands in the mss., τοῦτοι refers to the ἑρασταί only, who are divided into two classes, the good (τοῖς μὲν) and the bad (τοῖς δὲ). But in the next clause τοῖς μὲν refers to the ἑρασταί en bloc, and τοῖς δὲ to the ἑραμενοῖ. This is extremely awkward; and it is a further objection to the clause that the statement it contains is premature, and would fit in better below (184 δ—ε). I therefore follow Voegelin and Hug in obelizing. For the language, cp. Theogn. 1299 ff. δ' παί, μέχρι τίνος μὲ προφεύξεις; διὰ σε διώκων | διξήμ'...ἀλλ' ἐπίμεινοι, ἐμοὶ δὲ δίδου χώριν.
λεται ὁ ἡμέτερος νόμος εὗ καὶ καλῶς βασανίζειν [, καὶ τοῖς μὲν 184 χαρίσασθαι, τοῖς δὲ διαφεύγειν]. διὰ ταύτα ὅπως τοῖς μὲν διώκειν παρακελεύεται, τοῖς δὲ φεύγειν, ἀχωνοθετών καὶ βασανίζων ποτέ ποτέ ἐστιν ὁ ἐρών καὶ ποτέρων ὁ ἐρώμενος. ὅτι ό θ υπὸ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἀλήσκεσθαι ταχὺ αἰσχρόν νευό-
μισται, ἵνα χρόνος εγγένεται, δὴ δὴ δοκεῖ τὰ πολλὰ καλῶς βασα-
nίζειν, ἐπειτα τὸ ὕπο χρημάτων καὶ ὑπὸ πολιτικῶν δυνάμεων ἀλώναι αἰσχρόν, εἰα τὸ κακῶς πάσχουν πτήξῃ καὶ μὴ καρτηρήσῃ, Β ἀν τ' εὐφροσύνεις εἰς χρήματα ἢ εἰς διαπράξεις πολιτικάς μὴ καταφρονήσῃ. οὐδὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ τούτων οὔτε βέβαιον οὔτε μόνον εἶναι, χωρὶς τοῦ μηδὲ πεφυκέναι ἀπ' αὐτῶν γενναίαν φιλίαν. μία δὴ λείπεται τῷ ὑμετέρῳ νόμῳ ὁδὸς, εἰ μὲνελεί καλῶς χαριεῖσθαι ἐραστῇ παιδικά. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν νόμως, ὄσπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐρασταῖς ἃν δουλεύειν ἐθέλοντα ἡμινοῦ δουλείαν παιδικοῖς μὴ κολακεῖαι εἶναι C

184 A καὶ...διαφεύγειν secl. Bdhm. Sz. διαφεύγειν Hirschig διὰ...
δὴ BT: δὴ καὶ W ὑπὸ...αἰτίας del. Baiter τὸ (ἡ) Hirschig καὶ ὕπο:
ἡ ὕπὸ Hirschig B αἰσχρῶν del. Hirschig ὀπτευργετούμενος Τ εἰς
χρ...πολιτικάς secl. Hirschig J-U. Hug Sz. μόνον: νόμων Wolf ἐστὶ:
ἐθέλουτα vel ἐθέλουτα Stob. Sz.: ἐθέλουταν Bast: ἐθέλουταν Bdhm.

184 A ὡνα χρόνος κτλ. For the touchstone of time, cp. Simon. fr. 175
οὐχ ἐστίν μείζων βάσανος χρόνων οὐδὲν ἐργον | δκ καὶ ὑπὸ στέρνων ἀνδρός
Ηηρ. 1051 μηνυτῆς χρῶν. On the signific. of βάσανος, see Vahlen Op. Acad.
π. v. 7 ff.: cp. Gorg. 486 d, Rep. 413 e; Clem. Al. Strom. i. 291 d.

τὸ ὑπὸ χρημάτων...ἄλωνα. Op. 185 δ πλοῦτον ἑνεκα χαρισαμένου: 216 δ
μέλει αὐτῷ οὐδὲν...εἴ τις πλούσιος: Ar. Plut. 153 ff. καὶ τοῖς γε παῖδα...δρᾶν...
τάργυριον χάριν. As against the deletion of the second αἰσχρῶν by Hirschig,
see the parallels collected by Vahlen Op. Acad. ii. 359. For πολιτ. δυνάμεων,
cp. Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 35; this may be a hit at Alcibiades, cp. 216 b.

184 B ἐλθειν...πολιτικάς. The reasons for which Hug, after Hirschig
and others, rejects these words—as (1) superfluous for the sense, and (2)
spoiling the responsion of the clauses εὰν τε καρτηρήσῃ and ἀν τε...καταφρο-
nήσῃ—are not convincing. This is the only ex. of διάπραξε, αἰτία, cited by
L. and S.

ἐστὶ γὰρ κτλ. Hug, objecting to the "ganz unerträgliche Anakoluthie,"
follows Vermehren in excising the clause ἐστὶ...νόμος, as a gloss on the
following ἐνομίστα, and writing ὃς γὰρ for ὃσπερ. This is too rash.
For the sense, cp. 183 π and the passage from Iseer. Hel. 219 β there quoted.

ἡν...ἐνα. For simple ἦν (ἐστὶ) with accus. and infin. cp. Phaedo 72 b
ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τῷ ὑπὶ...τὰς τῶν τεὐθεωτών ψυχάς ἐνα. For ἐθέλων as adj. ("volun-
μηδὲ ἑπονεἰδιστον, οὔτω δὴ καὶ ἀλλὰ μία μόνον δουλεῖα ἑκοῦσιος λείπεται οὐκ ἑπονεἰδιστον· αὕτη δὲ ἔστιν ἣ περὶ τῆν ἀρετήν.

XI. Νενόμισται γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν, εἶν τις θέλη τινὰ μεροπρεπέων ἠγούμενος δὴ ἐκείνον ἀμείνων ἔστεσθαι ἢ κατὰ σοφίαν τινὰ ἢ κατὰ ἄλλο ὀτιόν μέρος ἀρετῆς, αὕτη ἢ ἡ ἐθελοδουλεία οὐκ ἀισχρὰ εἶναι οὐδὲ κολακεία. δει δὴ τῷ νόμῳ τούτῳ ἐν ὑμῖν ταύτῳ, D τὸν τε περὶ τὴν παιδεστάταν καὶ τὸν περὶ τὴν ϕιλοσοφίαν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν, εἰ μέλλεις ψυχήναν καλῶν γενέσθαι-τὸ ἑραστῇ παιδικὰ χαράσθαναι. ὅταν γὰρ εἰς τῶ οὖν ἔλθωσιν ἐραστῆς τε καὶ παιδικὰ, νόμον ἔχουν ἐκάπτερος, ὁ μὲν χαρισμένοις παιδικοῖς ὑπηρετῶν ὁτιόν δικαίως ἢ ὑπηρετεῖν, ὁ δὲ τῷ ποιοῦντι αὐτὸν σοφὸν τε καὶ ἄγαθον δικαίως αὐτῷ ἅπαν ὑποψειρῆν <ὑποψειρῆν>,


tarily") in prose, cp. Xen. Anab. vi. 2. 6; Lys. xix. 6: in poetry the use is common, e.g. Soph. O. T. 649.

184 C οὔτω δὴ κτλ. In this clause the method of action permissible to παιδικά is presented as parallel to that permissible to ἔρως ταί. That there is some corruption in the text is indicated by the divergence of the mss. in regard to the words after ἀλλὰ: but of the many emendations suggested (see criv. n.) none is convincing. Perhaps the safest plan is to bracket μόνω...ἐκούσιος, as an adscript meant to suggest a subject for λείπει, and to supply ὅδε as subject from the preceding context.

σοφίαν...μέρος ἀρετῆς. Cpl. Protag. 329 E, Rep. 427 E (with Adam's n.): "the nearest approach to the doctrine before Plato is in Xen. Mem. iii. 9. 1—5." How many μέρος ἀρετῆς are assumed here by Pausanias is, of course, left indefinite. (See also 196 B n.)

184 D οὗτον γὰρ κτλ. Notice the balance and rhythm of the clauses in this sentence—(a') οὗτον...ἐκάπτερος, (b') ὁ μὲν...ὑπηρετῶν, (b') ὁ δὲ...ὑποψειρῆν, (c') ὁ μὲν...εὐμαθεσθαὶ, (a') ὁ δὲ...κτισθαὶ, (a') τότε δή...ἐνταῦθα, (a') ἔμπνευτε...οὐδαμοῦ.

ὑπηρετεῖν...ὑποψειρῆν. Both words are used in an erotic sense. So ψειρῆν is used in τῷ venera, Amphis 'ταλ. That ψειρῆν (ὑποψειρῆν) is the best restoration is shown by Vahlen Op. Acad. 1. 499 ff.: cp. 193 C.
καὶ ὁ μὲν δυνάμενος εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν ἔμμαθει, ὁ δὲ δεόμενος εἰς παίδευσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν κτάσθαι, Ε ὑπὸ τοῦτον ἔμμαθειν εἰς ταύτῳ τῶν νόμων μοναχοῦ ἑιπείζει καὶ ἐμπιπτεῖ τὸ καλὸν ἐναντία τοῖς προκαταλεσθαῖς, ἀλλοθεὶ δὲ σάμαδοι. ἐπὶ τοῦτῷ καὶ ἐξαπατηθῆναι οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι καὶ ἐξαπατωμένῳ αἰσχύνῃ φέρει καὶ μὴ. εἰ γὰρ τις ἀρετῇ ὡς πλούσιος πλούσιν ἕνεκα χαρισώμενος ἐξαισέπεται. 185 τηθεία καὶ μὴ λάβει χρήματα, ἀνασφαλέστως τοῦ ἐραστοῦ πένητος, οὐδὲν ἤττου αἰσχρόν· δοκεὶ γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος τὸ γε αὐτοῦ ἐπιδείξει, ὅτι ἕνεκα χρημάτων ὁποῖοι ἄν ὁροῦν ὑπηρετοῦν, τοῦτο δὲ οὐ καλῶν. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λόγον κἂν εἰ τις ὡς ἀγαθῷ χαρισώμενος καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς ἀμείβων ἐσόμενος διὰ τὴν φιλίαν ἐραστοῦ ἐξαπατηθεὶς,


184 Ε εἰς παίδευσιν...κτάσθαι. If the text is right we must suppose that κτάσθαι is here equiv. to ὁταν κτάσθαι, appended to the main verb ἔμμαθεσθαί which is to be supplied with εἰς παίδευσιν κτλ. (so Vahlen). Of the corrections suggested (see crit. n.) Schanz's is the neatest, but spoils the sense-balance with ἔμμαθεσθαί. The corruption is, perhaps, to be sought elsewhere: the expression τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν is open to suspicion, since σοφία as here used after ἄλλην stands as a generic subst., whereas σοφία has just been termed (184 c) μέρος ἀρετῆς: moreover, we should expect that σοφία should itself constitute the κτήμα of the recipient, just as φρόνησις is itself the contribution of ὁ ἔμμαθεσθαί. On these grounds, 1 venture to suggest that another fem. subst., such as διδαχήν, may have fallen out after ἄλλην (ἐκπαίδευσιν for εἰς π. is just possible).

ἐπὶ τούτῳ. "In this case," i.e. in the quest for ἀρετή, in contrast to "the other cases" where lucre or position is coveted (184 Λ).

εἰ γὰρ τις κτλ. Observe the effort after rhythm, with strophe and anti-strophe. For the thought, see 184 Α and cp. Isoc. Hel. 219 κ τῶν ἐχόντων τὸ κάλλος τοὺς μὲν μαυρισμένας...ἀτυμάζομεν.


διὰ τὴν φιλίαν ἐραστοῦ. This phrase also is rejected by Hug (followed by Hirschel) on the grounds that (1) “an der correspondierenden Stelle nichts steht,” (2) we should expect rather διὰ τῶν ἐραστῶν τοῦ ἐραστοῦ (cp. 182 ο). The latter objection falls if, with Rückert, we take ἐραστοῦ as object gen. ("suam caritatem erga amatorum"). φιλία ἐραστοῦ here is, I take it, equiv. to the compound φιλεραστία (213 δ, cp. 192 β).
Β ἀναφανέντος ἐκείνου κακοῦ καὶ οὐ κεκτημένου ἀρετῆς, ὡς καλῇ ἡ ἀπάτη. δοκεῖ γὰρ αὖ καὶ ὡς τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν δεδηλωκέναι, ὅτι ἀρετῆς γ' ἔνεκα καὶ τοῦ βελτίων γενέσθαι πάν ἂν παντὶ προσθηθῇ, τοῦτο δὲ αὐτῶν πάντων κάλλιστον. οὕτω πάντως γε καλὸν ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα χαρίσθησιν.

Οὗτος ἔστω ὁ τῆς οὐρανίας θεοῦ ἔρως καὶ οὐράνιος καὶ πολλὸν ἄξιος καὶ πόλει καὶ ἰδιώτας, πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀναγεννησεις καὶ ποιείσθαι πρὸς ἀρετῆς τὸν τε ἔρωτα αὐτὸν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν ἐρωμένου. οἱ δὲ ἐτερον πάντες τῆς ἑτέρας, τῆς πανδήμου. ταύτα σοι, ἐφη, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα, ὁ Φαίδρης, περὶ Ἐρωτος συμβάλλομαι.

Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου, διδάσκουσι γὰρ μὲ ἵσα λέγειν οὕτως οἱ σοφοί, ἐφη ὁ Ἀριστόδημος δεῖν μὲν Ἀριστοφάνη λέγειν, τοιχεῖν δὲ αὐτῷ τινὰ ἢ ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς ἢ ὑπὸ τινὸς ἀλλού λύγγα


185 Β καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη. Sc. τῷ ἐξαιπασμένῳ.

dokei gar aiv kal oitos. This corresponds to dokei gar o toutous ktl. in 185 Α.

185 Σ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα. For the sense subito a. ex tempore, cp. Crat. 399 b, Critias 107 e. On extempor, as opposed to premeditated orations, see Alcidamas de Soph. 3 εἰπεῖν ἐκ τοῦ παραντίκα κτλ.

συμβάλλομαι. "This is my contribution," with allusion to the literary ἔρων mentioned in 177 c.

ὑπα λέγειν. This alludes to the ἵσα σχῆμα (including sound-echoes etc., as well as "isokolia") of the rhetorical τεχνίται (see Spengel, rhet. Gr. π. pp. 436—7). We may render (after Jowett): "When Pausanias had come to a pause—a pretty piece of 'isology' I have been taught by the professors—" etc. The title οἱ σοφοὶ is variously applied in Plato to the Orphics (Rep. 583 b), to poets (Rep. 489 b); and, as here, to linguistic craftsmen. For σοφία as applied to etymological 'puns,' cp. Crat. 396 c, d, and the use of σοφίζεσθαι (in connexion with the etymology of οὐράνιος) in Rep. 509 d (see Adam's π. ad loc.). For a rhetorical repetition of the same word (παῦω), see Gorg. Ηel. 2 τὴν μὲν κακὰς ἀκούσας παῦσαι τῆς αἰτίας, τοὺς δὲ μεμφα-μένους...παῦσαι τῆς ἀραβίας.

λέγγα. The Scholiast has a long note here: τὸ τοῦ λυγμοῦ σύμπτωμα ἐπιγίνεται τῷ οὐσμαχῷ διὰ πλήρωσιν ἢ κένωσιν ἡ ψυξίν, ἐνίατε δὲ καὶ διὰ δηξιῶν δριμεὺν ὑγρῶν καὶ φαρμακευδῶν ταῖς παύσεσι...ἀταν δὲ ὑπὸ πληρώσεως λυγμὸς γένησα, ἐμπότα τοῦτας ἴμμα καὶ τῶν ἅκρων τρίψιν καὶ πνεύματος καταχή. The hiccough of Aristophanes is part of the comic relief in the piece (see Introd. § π. 6). For πλησμονή, as a cause of disorder, cp. 186 c n., Hippocr. de diaet. π. 72 ff.
Éπιπεπτωκύιαν καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε εἰναὶ λέγειν, ἀλλ' εἰπεῖν αὐτοῦ—
ἐν τῇ κάτω γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸν ἑατόν Ἐρυξίμαχον κατακείμεθα—Ω Δ
Ἐρυξίμαχε, δίκαιος εἰ ἡ παύσαι με τῆς λυγγῆς ἢ λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ,
ἐως ἣν ἐγὼ παύσωμαι. καὶ τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον εἰπεῖν Ἀλλὰ ποιήσωμαι
ἀμφότερα ταύτα: ἥγῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔρωτεν τῷ σῷ μέρει, σὺ δὲ ἐπείδην
παύσῃ, ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ. ἐν δὲ ἀν ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐὰν μὲν σοι ἐθέλη
ἀπνευστὶ ἐξεντι πολὺν χρόνον παύσεις ἡ λύγη· εἰ δὲ μη, ὑδεί
ἀνακογχυλασόν. εἰ δὲ ἀρα πάνω ἱσχυρά ἐστιν, ἀπαλαβών τῷ ἔ
τοιούτῳ ὦρ κυνήσαι ἄν τὴν ρίνα, πτάρε· καὶ ἐδὲ τοῦτο ποιήσης
ἀπεξ ἀ δις, καὶ εἰ πάνω ἱσχυρά ἐστι, παύσεται. Οὐκ ἂν φθαίνου
λέγων, φάναι τὸν Ἀριστοφάνι: ἐγὼ δὲ ταῦτα ποιήσω.

XII. Εἰπεῖν δὴ τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, Δοκεὶ τοῖνυν μοι ἀναγκαῖον
einai, ἔπειδη Πανανίας ὀρμήσας ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον καλῶς οὐχ ἰκανῶς 186
ὑπετέλεσαι, δεῖν ἔμε πειράσθαι τέλος ἐπιθέως τῷ λόγῳ. τὸ μὲν
γὰρ διπλῶν εἰναι τὸν Ἐρωτα δοκεὶ μοι καλῶς διελέσατι· ὅτι δὲ

185 C λέγειν om. W D ἐν τῇ κάτω: εὐγενεῖτω Steph. τὸν ἑατόν T:
τὸν ἑατὸν B (οὐ) πολὺν Sauppe παύσασθαι Stob. Σ ἀναλαβῶν:
λαβῶν Stob. οὐ: ὅτω Cobet κυνήσας Wytenbach: κυνήσας Luzac:
κυνήσας BT, Stob. Athen. πταρὰν Stob. φάναι B: εἰπεῖν TW
ἀναγκαῖον εἰναι del. Sa. οὐκ ἰκανῶς: οὐχί καλῶς olim Sz. 186 A δεῖν
om. Method. Sz.: δεῖν ἐμε del. Hirschig

ἐν τῇ κάτω αὐτοῦ. Sc. κλίνη—referring to what might jocosely be termed
the clinical position of the worthy doctor. Cp. n. on ἔσχατου κατακείμενον,
175 c.

ἐὰν μὲν σοι κτλ. We have here a case of “aposiopesis” or suppressed
apodosis; cp. Protag. 311 D; Hom. II. 1. 135 ff.: see Goodwin G. M. T. § 482.
ἀνακογχυλασόν. Schol. ἀνακογχυλάζει· τὸ κλάεσαι τὴν φάρυγγα, τὸ λέγον
III. 75 ff. γίνεται δὲ καὶ τοίαδε πλησιμονε: ἐς τὴν ὑπεραίην τὸν σίτον ἐμυρο-
γάνεται κτλ.

185 E πταρί. Cp. Hippocr. Αρθ. VI. 13 ύπο λυγμοῦ ἐξομιν ἐπταροὶ

Οὐκ ἂν φθαῖνος λέγων. A familiar idiom: “the sooner you speak the better”
(see Goodwin G. M. T. § 894): more rarely of 1st person, 214 E infra.

οὐχ ἰκανῶς. Schanz’s οὐχί καλῶς is ingenious but needless: for a similar
variety in antithesis Vahlen cites Theat. 187 εἰρεῖττον γὰρ ποιν σμικρὸν
ev ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἰκανῶς περάναι. For δεῖν redundant cp. A. Ι. 144 D, 146 B,
Rep. 535 A, Laws 731 D, E: Schanz in nov. comm. p. 83 regards both ἀναγκαῖον
eιναι and δεῖν ἐμε as interpolations by copyists who failed to see the force of
dokè = aertum videtur; but in his text he excises only δεῖν: against this, see
Teuffel, Rh. Mus. xxix. p. 140.
...
αὐτὸς τοῖς σώμασι τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ἐκάστου τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἵναινοις καλὸν χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δεί, καὶ τούτῳ ἐστὶν ὥ ὄνομα τὸ ἰατρικὸν, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς καὶ νοσώδεσιν αἰσχρῶν τε καὶ δεὶ ἄχρηστείν, εἰ μέλλει τις τεχνικὸς εἶναι. ἡστι γὰρ ἰατρική, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἶπεν, ἐπιστήμη τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἑρωτικῶν πρὸς πλησιμονὴν καὶ κένωσιν, καὶ ὁ διαγνωσκόν ἐν τούτοις τοῦ καλὸν τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν ἔρωτα, οὕτος ἐστὶν ὁ ἰατρικῶτατος, καὶ ὁ μεταβάλλειν D ποιῶν, ὥστε ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔρωτος τοῦ έτερου κτάσθαι, καὶ οἷς μὴ ἴσως εἶσαι, ἐπιστήμης εὐποιῆσαι καὶ ἐνότα ἐξελείν, ἀγαθὸς ἀν εἶ δημιουργός. δεὶ γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἐχθριστα


186 C ἡστι γὰρ ἰατρική κτλ. Ὁp. (with Poschenrieder) Hippocr. de flat. i. p. 570 Κ. πάλιν αὐτ ὁ πλησιμονὴν ἵπταν κένωσιν· κένωσιν δὲ πλησιμονὴ...τὰ ἐναντία ἄνευτον ἐστὶν ἑματα. ἰατρικὴ γὰρ ἐστὶ προσέθεσι καὶ ἀφάρεσις, ἀφάρεσις μὲν τῶν ὑπέρβαλλοντων, προσέθεσι δὲ τῶν ἐλλιπόντων· ὁ δὲ κάλλιστα τούτο ποιῶν ἄριστος ἤηρώς. Also Philob. 32 A, 35 A for "repletion" and "duplication" in connexion with bodily φύσις: and Tim. 82 A γῆς πυρὸς ὦδας τε καὶ ἀέρος...ἡ παρὰ φύσιν πλεονεξία καὶ ἐνδεία...στάσεις καὶ νόσους παρέχει.

ὁ διαγνωσκόν κτλ. In this passage there is a distinction implied between pure and applied ἰατρική, between medicine as a science (ἐπιστήμη) and as an art (τέχνη). διαγνωσκό is here used almost in the technical sense of making a medical diagnosis (cf. Hippocr. de nat. hom. 9 τὴν διάγνωσιν...ποιέσθαι): possibly earlier "Asclepiads" than Hippocrates may have earmarked διάγνωσις as a medical term. Cf. the distinction between κατὰ γνώμην and κατὰ χειρουργῶν in Hippocr. de morbis i. 6.

186 D ὁ μεταβάλλειν ποιῶν κτλ. Cr. Hippocr. de morbo sacro, p. 396 L. ὅστις δὲ ἐπιστάσατο ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολήν καὶ δύναται ύγρόν καὶ ξηρον ποιεῖν καὶ βέρον καὶ ψυχρὸν ὑπὸ διάθεσι τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν, οὕτω καὶ ταύτην τὴν νοῦσον ὡς ἄν: id. de nat. hom. 9 τὴν βεβαιείνην χρὴ ποιείσθαι...τῇ τῶν διατημάτων μεταβολῇ κτλ. In later Greek δημιουργός becomes the νοικ προφίλλα for a medical "practitioner," as δημοσιοεύς for "to practise": similarly χειροτέχνη, Hippocr. peri παθῶν 1.

ἀφτε...κτάσθαι. Supply as subject τὰ σώματα. Schanz would excise these words; but though they present a rather awkward case of brachylogy, they are otherwise unobjectionable. Herwerden's proposal (see not. n.), though supplying the right sense, is needless; while Lehrs is obviously blundering when he construes ἐνότα as neut. plural, "und wieder auch das Vorhandene fortzubringen." Hommel gives the meaning rightly, "und die einwohnende (Neigung), die nicht einwohnen darf, heraus zu treiben."

δεὶ γὰρ δὴ. "For he must, as a matter of fact"—an appeal to recognized
The axioms of "the Art." Hippocrates based his medical theory on the assumption of two pairs of opposite and primary qualities, ψυχρός/θερμός, and ἐχθρός/ἐγρήγορος. By the permutations and combinations of these he sought to account for all varieties of physical health and disease: see e.g. Hippocr. de morb. i. 2; de affect. i. Cp. Lys. 215 ε: Theo. Smyrn. Math. p. 15 Bull. on the same three pairs are mentioned, with δέξιον/ἀμβλύς as a fourth, as exx. of the law of ἐπιθυμία τῶν ἑναστῶν. Moreover, it is obvious that the question of savours is of special importance in medical science: cp. Theaet. 166 ε τῷ... ἀπευθεῖσθαι πικρά φαινέται ἢ ἐσθίει καὶ ἐστὶ: Hippocr. peri διαίτησι. 56 τὰ γλυκᾶ... καὶ τὰ πικρά... θερμαίνειν πέφυκε, καὶ ὅσα ξηρά ἐστι καὶ ὅσα ἐνεργή: id. de nat. hom. 2, 6: and the connexion between πικράτεις and χολή brought out in Tim. 83 a ff. Further, as Hommel observed, πάντα τὰ τουτεύτων, after only two exx. is unusual.

186 Ε ὁ ἡμέτερος πρόγονος Ἰ. Asclepius in Homer is not more than Ἰππότῳ ἀμφότερος: in Pindar (Pyth. iii.) and later poets he is the son of Apollo and Coronis. The earliest seats of his worship seem to have been Thessaly and Boeotia, and his cult, as a "chthonic" and "mantic" deity, may have its roots in a primitive ophiolatry (see Rohde, Psyche i. 141 ff.). Cp. Orph. Fr. 272 διὰ καὶ οἱ θεολόγοι τῆς μεν εἰς Ἀσκληπίων ἀνάφεροντο ὑγείαν τῆς ἑαυτῆς πίσαι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν κτλ. i. 47, addressed to Α. As Ιππότῳ πάντων, Ἀσκληπιί, διέσπυρα παίνων κτλ. The Asclepiadae were a recognized medical guild, with hereditary traditions; their most famous schools were at Cos and Chidias, for which see the account in Gomperz G. T. (E. tr.) vol. i. pp. 275 ff.: cp. Phaedr. 270 c (with Thompson's note).

οὗτος οἱ ποιηταὶ. The "deictic" oὐδέ points to the presence of Aristophanes and Agathon.

187 Α. ἔμφροντική. The curative value of physical training is said to have been emphasized especially by Iecos of Tarentum and Herodicus of Selymbria, both 5th century experts in dieting. For the latter as an advocate of walking exercise see Phaedr. 227 d (with Schol. ad loc.)
παντί κατάδηλος τῷ καὶ σμικρῶν προσέχων τὸν νοῦν ὃτι κατὰ 
taυτὰ έχει τούτοις, ὀστέρ ἴως καὶ Ἡράκλειτος βούλεται λέγειν,
ἐπει τοῖς τε βήμασιν οὐ καλῶς λέγει. τὸ ἐν γὰρ φησὶν "διαφερό-
μενον αὐτῷ-αὐτῷ ξυμφέρεσθαι, ὀστέρ ἀρμονίαν τόξου τε καὶ 
λύρας." ἐστὶ δὲ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρμονίαν φάναι διαφέρεσθαι ἢ ἐκ 
diαφερομένων ἐτί εἶναι. ἀλλ' ἴως τὸ δὲ ἐβούλετο λέγειν, ὃτι ἐκ 
diαφερομένων πρὸτερον τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, ἐπέται ὁστερον Β

187 A ἐχοντε νοῦν Hirschig ταυτά T: ταυτά B ἐν: ἐν vel 
πάν Ast τόξου...λύρας: τοῦ ὀξέος τε καὶ βαρέος Best Gladisch 
λύρας: νεύρα Bergk

406 Δ: for the former, as an example of abstinence, see Laws 889 B. That 
Plato himself recognizes the connexion between ἱστρική and γυμνοστική is 
shown by such passages as Gorg. 452 a ff., 464 b ff., Soph. 238 a, Polit. 295 c.

καὶ γεωργία. The appositeness of γεωργία is not so evident as that of 
γυμνοστική, but the use of the word here is defended by 186 a (τοῖς εἰν τῇ γῇ 
φυμένου) and by other exx. of a similar collocation, such as Lach. 198 B, Laws 
889 D (cp. also Protag. 334 A f.). The art which deals with φυτά is regarded 
as analogous to that which deals with ξώσα, involving a similar command of 
the permutations and combinations, the attractions and repulsions (τὰ ἐφω-
τικὰ), of the fundamental qualities.

τὸ ἐν γὰρ φησὶ κτλ. The words of Heraclitus (Fr. 45) are given in Hippol. 
refut. haer. IX. 9 thus: οὐ ξύνισιν ὡς διαφερόμενον ἑωτῷ ὠμολογεῖ: παλιν-
τροπος ἀρμονίη ὁκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης: cp. Plut. de Is. 45 παλιντροπος 
γὰρ ἀρμονίη κόσμου ὁκωσπερ λύρης καὶ τόξου καθ' Ἡράκλειτος: Soph. 242 B. 
Probably, as Burnet holds, the original word used by H. was παλιντροπος, not 
pαλιντροπος, and ἀρμονίη combines the original sense of "structure" with 
the musical sense "octave," the point of the simile being (see Campbell, 
Theaet. p. 244) "as the arrow leaves the string the hands are pulling opposite 
ways to each other, and to the different parts of the bow (cf. Plato, Rep. 
4. 439); and the sweet note of the lyre is due to a similar tension and retention. 
The secret of the universe is the same." That is to say, the world, both as a 
whole and in its parts, is maintained by the equilibrium resultant from 
opposite tensions. For more detailed discussion of the theory see Burnet, 
The τόξου H. had in mind is probably, as Bernays suggested, the Scythian bow- 
the φορμίκη ἄχροδος of Arist. Rhet. III. 1412 b 35 (see the woodcut in Smith, 
D. A. s.v. "archus").

ἀλλ' ἴωσι κτλ. Eryximachus argues that H.'s dictum is defensible only if 
we understand the opposites to be not co-existent: the discordant cannot be 
simultaneously concordant, though it may be capable of becoming so in 
lapse of time (πρῶτερον...ὑπότερον). For τὸ ὀξὲ καὶ βαρὺ as matter for ἀρμονία 
cp. Heraclit. Fr. 43 (R. and P. § 27) οὐ γὰρ ἐν εἶναι ἀρμονίαν μὴ ὄντα ὀξέος 
καὶ βαρέος, οὐδὲ τὰ ξώα ἄνευ βηλέως καὶ ἄρρενος, ἐναντίων ἄντων: Soph. 253 A; 
Phileb. 17 c, 26 b; Laws 665 b.
όμολογησάντων γέγονεν ὑπὸ τῆς μουσικῆς τέχνης. οὐ γὰρ δὴ που ἐκ διαφερομένων γε ἐν τού ὀξέοι καὶ βαρέοι ἀρμονία ἀν εἴη. ἡ γὰρ ἀρμονία συμφωνία ἐστὶ, συμφωνία δὲ ὀμολογία τις. ὀμολογίαν δὲ ἐκ διαφερομένων, ἐστὶν ἀν διαφέρονται, ἄδυνατον εἶναι. διαφερόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ὀμολογεῖν ἄδυνατον <δυνατον> ἀρμόσαι,

C ὀστερ γε καὶ ὁ ῥυθμός ἐκ τοῦ ταχεός καὶ βραδέος ἐκ διενεχειμένων πρότερον, ὀστερον δὲ ὀμολογήσαντων γέγονεν. τὴν δὲ ὀμολογίαν πᾶσι τούτοις, ὀστερ εἰκεὶ η ἱερακαὶ, ἑνταῦθα ἡ μουσικὴ ἐντιθέσιν, ἔρωται καὶ ὀμόνοιαν ἀλλήλων ἐμποιήσασα. καὶ ἐστὶν αὐτὶ μουσική περὶ ἀρμονίαν καὶ ρυθμίου ἐρωτικῶν ἐπιστήμης. καὶ ἐν μὲν γε αὐτῇ τῇ συντάσει ἀρμονίας τε καὶ ρυθμοῦ οὐδὲν χαλετῶν τὰ


187 B ὀμολογησάντων κτλ. Cp. Theo. Smyrn. math. p. 15 καὶ οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ δὲ, οἷς παλλολ νῆται Πλάτων, τὴν μουσικὴν φασὶν ἐναντιών συμφωνιαν καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἔνσων καὶ τῶν δίχα φρονούσων συμφρόνησιν, οὐ γὰρ ῥυθμίων μόνον καὶ μέλους συντακτικῆς, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς παντὸς συντίματος. τέλος γὰρ αὐτὴ τὸ ἔνοον τε καὶ συναρμάζειν. For the Pythagorean ἀρμονία see Philolaus, fr. 4. 3 (R. and P. § 56) τα δὲ ἀνόμων...ἀνάγκα τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀρμονίᾳ συγκεκλείσθαι κτλ. The same notion of a cosmic ἀρμονία or ὀμολογία appears in Orph. fr. 139 τὴν Ἀφροδίτην...τάξιν καὶ ἀρμονίαν καὶ κοινωνίαν πάσα τοῖς ἐγκοσμοίοις...ἀδημοιρόχως φιλίας ἐστίν αὐτίος τοῖς δημιουργήσασι καὶ ὀμολογίας.

συμφωνία. Cp. Ξεν. 405 δ περὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ὑδή ἀρμονίαν, ἥ δὲ συμφωνία καλεῖται: Rep. 430 Β, 398 δ, ε with Adam's notes: "in its musical application συμφωνία is used both of consonance in the octave or double octave and also of other musical intervals": "ἀρμονία 'reconciles' δέξι and βαρύ by a proper arrangement of notes of higher and lower pitch. In the wider sense, therefore, any ὀμολογία of δέξι and βαρύ is a ἀρμονία, but in practice the word was used specifically of certain scales or modes."

διαφερόμενον δὲ αὖ κτλ. With the ms. text the sequence of thought is disjointed and obscure; αὖ seems out of place, and the next clause (ἀστερ γε καὶ κτλ.) seems to imply that the possibility rather than the impossibility of harmonizing opposites is stated in the present clause (cf. Susemihl, Philol. Anz. vii. 412). Hence, rather than alter αὖ with Schanz, I prefer to read διαφερόμενον δὲ αὖ καὶ μὴ ὀμολογεῖν δύνατον (or δύνατον) ἀρμόσαι: this gives a proper antithesis to the clause preceding.

187 C ἀρμόνιαν. It is possible that this word may contain an allusion to Antiphon's work peri ἀρμονίας, for which see Dünnler, Akad. p. 79.

αὐτῇ τῇ συντάσσα ἀρμονίας. "In the constitution of harmony peri se": εν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀρμονία might have sufficed, but the addition of συντάσσαi serves to emphasize the fact that ἀρμονία is a synthesis—ὅμολογία—of a plurality of

elements: cp. Laws 812 C τῶν ἄρμονίων συστάσεις: Erinp. 991 B ἄρμονίας σύστασις ἀπασαν. For ῥυθμός, see Adam's note on Rep. 398 D: "The elements of music are ῥυθμός and ἄρμονία. The former 'reconciles' ταχύ and βραδύ by arranging a proper sequence of short and long notes and syllables": also Laws 665 A τῇ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως τάξιν ῥυθμός δυνα ἐν, τῇ δὲ αὖ τῆς φωνῆς... ἄρμονία, κτλ., Phileb. 17 D (with my note).

Eryxímacus analyses Music into Theory (αὐτὴ ἡ σύστασις) and Practice (καταθρήσκεια ῥ.), the latter being further subdivided into μελοστοία and παυδεία. 187 D παυδεία ἐκλήθη. For "education" as "the right use of melody and verse," compare what Plato has to say about the psychological effects of music and its place in education in Rep. II., III., Laws II., VIII. Of course παυδεία in the ordinary sense includes also gymnastic; cp. Rep. II. 376 ε, Laws 659 D: in dancing to music (ἁρματική Laws 816 Α) we have a combination of both. It is worth noticing that in the Pythagorean quadriōnum μουσική had a place beside ἀρματική, γνωμετρία and σφαιρική or ἀστρονομία; see Adam's Republic vol. II. pp. 163 ff.

πάλιν... ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. Pausanias was the author of the λόγος, cp. 186 B συντριπτότης.

187 E Πολυμνίας. "The Muse of the sublime hymn" here replaces Aphrodite, being selected out of the Nine probably, as Ast supposes, because the first part of her name is congruous with the character of Aphr. πάρθενος. προσφέρει... κατακόρυφα... ἐκποίησις. Supply as subject the indef. τος. καθ' ὃ ὅσον παρείκει. "So far as possible." Cp. Rep. 374 E, Laws 734 B.
188 XIII. Ἡ τῶν ὀρῶν τοῦ ἐναυτοῦ σύστασις μεστή ἐστιν ἄμφοτέρων τούτων, καὶ ἐπειδὰν μὲν πρὸς ἀλληλα τοῦ κοσμίου τύχη ἐρώτος ἐν νῶν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τά τε βέρμα καὶ τα ψυχρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ ὕγρα, καὶ ἄρμονίαν καὶ κράσιν λάβῃ σώ- φρονα, ἢκει ἑρέντα ἐνετηρία χεῖ καὶ ὑγείας ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις ἱώσις τε καὶ φυτοῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἠδίκησεν· ὅταν δὲ ὁ μετὰ τῆς ύβρεως "Ερως ἐγκρατέστερος περί τὰς τοῦ ἐναυτοῦ ὀρας ἐγένηται, διέθετεν τε πολλὰ καὶ ἠδίκησεν. οἳ τε γὰρ λοιμοὶ φλούσι γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀλλ᾽ ἀνόμοια πολλὰ νοσή- ματα καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς· καὶ γὰρ πάχαιναι καὶ χέλαξαι καὶ ἐρυνήσαί ἐκ πλευεξίας καὶ ἀκοσμίας περί ἀλληλα τῶν τοιούτων γίγνεται ἑρωτικῶς, ὅν ἐπιστήμη περι ἀστρον τε


188 A ἡ τῶν ὀρῶν...σύστασις. For the influence of the seasons on health see Hippocr. de nat. hom. 7 ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἐναυτὸς μετέχει μὲν τὰς πάντων καὶ τῶν θερμῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχρῶν καὶ τῶν ἕρων καὶ τῶν ὑγρῶν κτλ.: cp. Philoc. 26 B. ὅ νῦν δὴ...ἔλεγον. See above, 186 D. οὐθέν ἠδίκησεν κτλ. For these aorists, following presents, see Goodwin G. M. T. § 155.

188 B ἀνόμοια...νοσήματα. "Divers diseases": the adj. is similarly used in Arist. Poet. 24. 1459b 30 ἐπεισοδίων ἀνομοίων ἐπεισοδίων, "relieving the story with varying episodes" (Bntcher): cp. id. Ἡ. Ἀν. τυ. 1. 523b 12: Hippocr. de nat. 3 δικέει μὲν οὖν τὰ νοσήματα οὐθέν ἀλλήλους ἐσκίνει διὰ τὴν ἀλλοίωτης καὶ ἀνομοίωτης τῶν τότων.

πάχαι...καὶ ἐρυνῆσαι. Timaeus defines thus: ἐρυνῆσαι μιλτάδθης δρόσος- πάχης δὲ δρόσος χιονῶθης. Roman religion had a goddess Robigo. Ruhnken (ad Tim. p. 122) cites Orph. de lapr. 15, v. 91 καὶ αἰθήριν ἐρυνῆσαι, | ἢτε κατορ- πανόθεν παταμῆν ποτὶ καρπῶν ἐρυνῆσαι, | ἀμφὶ περὶ σταχυσθεῖσι πειραμάχουσα κάθθαι.

tὸν τοιούτων γίγνεται κτλ. There are two difficulties in this passage:
(1) the singular verb after the plural subjects is harsh; to explain it we must assume a mental unification of the subjects, of which similar but easier instances occur in Rep. 363 A, 618 D, Laws 925 E. We might evade this difficulty by removing the colon at φυτοῖς, marking καὶ γὰρ...,ἐρυνῆσαι as parenthetic, and thus construing ἀλλα...νοσήματα as the direct subject of γίγνεται. (2) We should naturally expect τοιούτων to have the same reference
53

Here as τῶν τουτῶν has above (viz. to the combinations of elements in which the bad Eros predominates), whereas it seemingly stands in agreement with ἑρωτικῶν: this being so, what does ἑρωτικῶν precisely mean? For it cannot well retain, in this connexion, its proper meaning as genitive of τὰ ἑρωτικά "the laws of affinity" (186 c, 187 c). Ought we, then, to put a stop after γίνεσθαι and begin a new sentence with ἑρωτικῶν οὖν ἐπιστήμη κτλ.?

ἀστρονομία. The term as here used includes what we should rather call "meteorology"; cp. Rep. 527 δ τρίτων θώμων ἀστρονομίαν...τὸ γὰρ περὶ ὅρας εὐασθητέρως ἐχει καὶ μηνῶν καὶ ἑναυτῶν...ναυτιλίᾳ προσήκει. For "astronomy" as a regular part of the school curriculum see n. on παίδεια 187 δ, and cp. Theaet. 145 c, d; Protag. 318 κ.

ἡ περὶ θεοῦ...κοινωνία. Simpler would have been ἡ θεῶ...κοινωνία, but, as Hug remarks, "Eryximachus liebt das unbestimmte περὶ c. accus."


[περὶ] τὸν ἔτερον. Perhaps an original πη was mistaken for a compendium of περὶ: for the combination ἀλλὰ πη, cp. Theaet. 191 β ἀλλὰ πη δυνάτων.

α δὲ...ιατρεῖαν. The infinitives may be taken as epeexgetic of α (so Stallb., Zeller), or α may be construed separately as accus. of respect ("qua in causas" Ast; "in welcher Beziehung" Hommel). There is no need to eject or emend τοὺς ἔρωτας: the phrase used 4 li. above, περὶ ἔρωτας φυλακῆν τε καὶ ἱασών, supports ἔρωτας here.
Οὔτω πολλὴν καὶ μεγάλην, μάλλον δὲ πάσαν δύναμιν ἔχει ἐξουλλίθιδον μὲν ὁ πᾶς Ἐρως, ὁ δὲ περὶ τὰ γὰρ μετὰ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀποτελοῦμενος καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς, οὕτως τὴν μεγαλῆν δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ πάσαν ἡμῖν εὐδαιμονίαν παρασκευάζει καὶ ἀλλήλοις δυναμένους ὁμιλεῖν καὶ φίλους εἶναι Ε καὶ τοῖς κρείττοσι πρὸς θεοῖς. ἤκος μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐγώ τοῦ Ἐρωτα ἐπαινῶν πολλὰ παραλείπω, οὐ μέντοι ἐκώς γε. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τι ἐξελίσσειν, σοῦ ἔργον, ἢ ἀριστοφανεῖς, ἀναπληρώσας· ἢ εἰ πώς ἀλλὰς ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐγκωμίαξεν τὸν θεόν, ἐγκωμίαξε, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῆς λυγγῆς πέταυσαί.

189 Ἐκδεξάμενον οὖν ἐφεις εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη ὅτι Καὶ μάλ᾽ ἐπαύσατο, οὐ μέντοι πρὶν γε τὸν πταρμὸν προσεγχώθηναι αὐτῷ, ὅστε μὲ θαυμάζειν εἰ τὸ κόσμιον τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμεῖ τοιούτων ψόφων καὶ γαργαλισμῶν, οἷον καὶ ὁ πταρμός ἑστι· πάντων γὰρ εὐθὺς ἐπαύσατο, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ τὸν πταρμὸν προσήνεγκα. καὶ τὸν


188 D Οὔτω πολλὴν. The German translators mostly take οὔτω as qualifying the adjj, "so vielfach und gross" (Zeller, Schleierm.), but Hommel is probably right in taking οὔτω by itself ("hoc modo," "itaque") comparing οὔτω πολλαχόθεν 178 c. Cp. Hippocr. de flat. 3 oútos (sc. ὁ ἐγώ) ὁ μέγατος ἐν ταῖς πάσιν τῶν πάντων δυνάμεις ἐστίν. ἀξιόν δὲ αὐτῷ δεικνύουσα τὴν δύναμιν.

καὶ...παρὰ θεοῖς. Hug condemns these words, as implying a slur on the righteousness of the gods. But the phrase is merely a stock formula, like our "heaven and earth," not intended to bear rigid analysis; cp. 186 b, 187 ε καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωποις καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς.

καὶ ἀλλήλοις...θεοῖς. For the accus. δυναμένους after ἡμῖν cp. 176 d. The καὶ after εἶναι is rendered "auch" by Hug, as if ἡμῖν governed ἀλλήλοις and φίλους εἶναι the other datives, but Zeller's rendering, which makes both the infinitives govern both sets of datives, seems more natural.

188 E καὶ ἐγὼ, i.e. "I as well as Pausanias": see 185 ε ad fin.

ἐπειδή καὶ. καὶ implies a suppressed reason—"since (it is your turn) and you are cured of your cough.”

189 A τὸν πταρμὸν. This was one of the remedies prescribed by Eryx. in 185 ε, hence the def. article. προσφέρειν is a vox propria for medical "applications," cp. 187 ε, Phædr. 208 Α; Hippocr. de flat. 1 ὁίς τ᾽ ἐν προσφέρειν τὰ ἐξωφέροντα τῷ σώματι: ὑπ. de affect. 1 ὡς δὲ τοὺς χειροτέχνας εἰκὸς ἐπισταθήσαι καὶ προσφέρειν καὶ διαχειρίζειν κτλ.

τὸ κόσμιον. This is in ridicule of the theory of medicine stated in 186 c ff and of the use of the term κόσμιος in 187 ν, 188 c.
'Ερυξίμαχος, Ἡγαθέ, φάναι, ['Αριστοφάνες,] ὥρα τι ποιεῖν. γελοιοτοπεῖς μέλλων λέγειν, καὶ φύλακά με τοῦ λόγου ἀναγκάζεις γόγγεσθαι τοῦ σεατοῦ, ἕαν τι γελοῖν εἴπης, ἐξὸν σοι ἐν εἰρήνῃ B λέγειν. καὶ τοῦ 'Ερυξίμαχου γελάσαστα εἰπὲν Εὐδ léγεις, ὁ 'Ερυξίμαχος, καὶ μοι ἐστώ ἄρρητα τὰ εἰρημένα. ἀλλὰ μὴ με φύλαττε, ὥσ ἐγὼ φοβοῦμαί περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ῥηθήσεσθαι, οὐ τι μὴ γελοία εἴπω,—τοῦτο μὲν γάρ ἂν κέρδος εἰη καὶ τὴς ἡμετέρας μούσης ἐπιχώριον,—ἀλλὰ μὴ καταγέλαστα. Βαλὼν γε, φάναι, ὁ 'Αριστοφάνης, οἱ εἰκεφύσεσθαι; ἀλλὰ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν καὶ οὕτω λέγει ὡς δοσῶν λόγον· ἵσως μέντοι, ἂν δοξή μοι, ἄφθισσω σε.

XIV. Καὶ μὴν, ὁ 'Ερυξίμαχος εἰπεῖν τὸν 'Αριστοφάνην, ἀλλὰ γε τῇ ἐν νῷ ἔχω λέγειν, ἢ ἦ σὺ τε καὶ Παυσανίας εἰπέτενιν. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκοῦσιν ὁρθῶς παρατάσσας τῇ τοῦ ἐρωτος δύναμιν ὑπέρ ἴσθησαι, ἐπεὶ αἰσθανομένοι γε μέγιστον ἂν αὐτοῦ ἱερὰ κατα-

189 A ἄγαθε φάναι T: ἄγαθε φάναι ἄγαθε B 'Αριστοφάνες del. Sauppe 
Hug B ὁ om. vulg. μὴ γε Bdhm. ῥηθήσεσθαι T: ῥηθήσεσθαι 
(sed ἐτ extra versum) B: ἐδὴ ῥηθήσεσθαι Rettig: fort. ἐτ ὅ. 
C eἰπετον 
Blass ὁ ὅμρωσοι Bekk.: ὁ ὅμρωσοι ΒΤ: ὁ ὅμρωσοι W, vulg.

['Αριστοφάνες]. I follow Sauppe and Hug in regarding the proper name as a gloss on ἄγαθε: as a rule, ἄγαθε stands alone.

189 B οὐ τι...εἰςω. In γελοία Arist. applies the term used by Eryx. in a different sense, distinguishing between γελοία, ridicula, and καταγέλαστα, deridenda; whereas Eryx. had meant by γελοῖον what A. calls καταγέλαστον, cp. 199 d, 221 ε.

τῆς ἡμετέρας μοῦσης. This may allude (as Rettig thinks) to Eryximachus's Οὐρανία μοῦσα καὶ Πολυμία, and to his phrase ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ (187 δ, ε).

Βαλὼν γε κτλ. "So you think you are going to get off scot-free!" Suidas s.v. βαλὼν explains by πρὸς τοὺς κακοὺς τὸ δρᾶσταντας καὶ ποίμενας ἐκφεύγειν. Cp. Rep. 344 d ὅνεν ἐμβαλὼν λόγου ἐν νῷ ἐκεῖς ἀπείκονι: Phædo 91 c; Plut. ὑμ. 518 B ὅλλ' ὅνεν τι βαλὼν, εἰπεν, ἀπηλάγη, καλὼν εἰχε περιμένα τὸ βέλος ἐγκέιμενον.

189 C Καὶ μὴν κτλ. This clause has reference to what Eryx. had said, not in 189 b, but in 188 ε (ἐ τι πως ἄλλος ἐν νῷ ἐκεῖς κτλ.)—"Yea verily, it is my intention to act as you suggested."

παντάπασας...οἐκ. "To have completely failed to discern." For δύναμις (καὶ φύσις) as a rhetorical category, cp. Isocr. Hel. 218 δ ράδου δὲ γνώναι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ κτλ.

ἐτεί αὐθ. γε κτλ. For εἴπε...γε cp. Rep. 352 c. The following infinitives (with ἄν) are governed by δοκοῦσιν, repeated in thought from the main clause. For the sense, cp. Isocr. Hel. 221 ε Ϝκ...δύναμένην, ἀναθήματι καὶ θυσίαι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλαις προσόδοις θαίκεσθαι καὶ τῷ πάντως αὐτῆς χρῆ.
σκευίας αἱ καὶ βωμοῖς, καὶ θυσίας ἀν πτείεις μεγίστας, οὐχ ὀστερον 
νῦν τοῦτων οὐδὲν γίγνεται περὶ αὐτῶν, δεόν πάπτων μᾶλλον 
ὅτι γέγραφαι. Ἔστι γὰρ θεὸς φιλαθρωπότατος, ἐπικουρός τε ὑπὸ τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἰατρός τούτων, ὡς ιαθέντων μεγίστη εὐδαιμονία ἄν 
τῷ ἀνθρωπείᾳ γένει εἰη. ἔγὼ οὖν πεπράσμαι ύμῖν εἰσηγήσασθαι 
τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ἐπεστε. δεὶ 
δὲ πρῶτον ύμᾶς μαθεῖν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσιν καὶ τὰ παθήματα 
αὐτῆς. ἢ γὰρ πάλαι ἡμῶν φύσις οὐχ ἀυτὴ ἢ ἤπερ νῦν, ἀλλὰ 
ἀλλοίᾳ. πρώτων μὲν γὰρ τρία ἤν τὰ γένη τὰ τῶν ἄνθρωπων, οὐχ 
Ε ὀστερον νῦν δύο ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρίτον προσῆν κοινὸν ὑν 
ἀμφότερον τούτων, οὐ νῦν δῶμα λουτόν, αὐτὸ δὲ ἤφαινοταὶ 
ἀνδρόγυνον γὰρ ἐν τῷ τέτε μὲν καὶ εἶδος καὶ δῶμα εἰς ἀμφότερον

189 Ε καὶ βωμοῖς del. Blass πωδίσθαι Hirschig

D εἰδαμονία ἀν
BTW: ἀν εὐδαιμονία vulg.  εἰσηγήσασθαι post αὐτῷ trs. Blass ἐπεστείλα T 
δεὶ δὴ Blass παλαιὰ Blass αὐτῇ T, Stob.: ἢ αὐτῇ Euseb., Blass ἀλλὰ ἄλλα Euseb. 
πρῶτα W τὰ τῶν BT: τῶν W, Euseb, Stob. Ε δύο 
om. Stob. ἀλλὰ καί: ἀλλὰ Stob. Eusebi codd. aliquot 

οὐχ ὀστερον. "Whereas": cp. 179 ε.
189 D ἰατροῦ. This term recalls the doctor’s speech, esp. 186 b ff., 
188 c ff.; cp. Phaedr. 252 a.

εἰσηγήσασθαι. The force of this word is lost if we render it "narrate," 
"relate" with L. and S.: it means "to initiate into": cp. 176 e, Xen. Mem. 
ii. 7. 10. For the next clause cp. Menex. 240 δ ἡμερῶν καὶ διδάσκαλοι τοῖς 
άλλοις γενόμενοι.

φύσιν...παθήματα. This is the order of A.’s exposition—περὶ φύσεως 
180 d—190 c, περὶ παθήματος 190 c—193 a. For various views of physiologists as to the φύσις ἀνθρώπων, see Hippocrates' tract with this title, 
where the theory that man ἐν τι εἶναι (αἷμα, χολή, φλέγμα, etc.) is combated. 
Aristotle’s exposition is intended, no doubt, as a caricature of the medics 
of his age (see Introd. § iii. 4).

189 Ε ἀνδρόγυνον κτλ. Stuidas ἀνδρόγυνος: ὁ τὰ ἀνδρῶν παιῶν καὶ τὰ 
γυναικῶν πάσχων. Rückert wrongly renders εἶδος by “genus”: it means 
“form” (as Stalb.). εἶδος καὶ δῶμα are taken by Rückert and Hug as 
nomin., by Stalb, as accus. of respect, the construction being ἐν γὰρ (sc. τῶν 
γενών) ὡς τῷ ἀνδρόγυνον: the latter way seems the better. Rettig proposes 
to insert τῷ before ἐν, which would give the same sense. If εἶδος καὶ δῶμα 
are construed as accus., it is better to take them closely with ἀνδρόγυνον.
than with ε ἀμφοτ. κτλ. (as Stallb.). For ἀνδρόγυνος, see also Hippocr. de diet. 28.

For the description cp. Emped. 257 ff. (St.) πολλὰ μὲν ἀμφίπρόσωπα καί ἀμφίστερων φύσεως | ...μεμεγέμενα τῇ μὲν ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν | τῇ δὲ γυνακοφύῃ στείρωσις ἑσπερίδα γεως: Lucr. v. 837 ff. portenta...androgynum, interutrasque nec utrum, utrimque remotum: Ov. Met. iv. 378 nec femina dici | nec puer ut possint; neutrumque et utrumque videntur: Livy xxvii. 11. 4. Theophrastus (Char. 16) mentions Hermaphroditus-statues; and the Orphic conception of Eros-Phanes may also be compared.

νῦν δὲ κτλ. "But now the name exists solely as a term of reproach": cp. the use in Latin of seminuir, Virg. A. iv. 215 ille Paris cum seminivro comitatu: Livy xxxiii. 28. 7.

δὸν ἦν κτλ. Cp. Emped. 265 (St.) οὐλοφυεὺς μὲν πρὸ τοῦ τύπου χωνοὺς ἐξανεμέλεων. δὸν is predicate and not merely (as Ast, Schleiern.) a qualifying adj. with τὸ εἴδος. Certainly, as Rettig notes, Zeller's "ganz rund" is impossible. Rabelais (t. 8) has a reference to this passage—"ung corps humain ayant deux testes, l'une virée vers l'autre, quatre bras, quatre pieds, et deux culs; tel que dict Platon, in Symposium, avoir esté l'humaine nature à son commencement mystiq"—in his description of Gargantua's equipment.

190 A κεφαλὴν δ' εἰς κτλ. "Quis non Iani mincerit?" (Hommel). The notion of a similar double-fronted, androgynous being is found in the Talmud, and Euseb. pr. Evang. xii. 12 quotes our passage as a plagiariam from Moses.

οἱ κυβιστῶντες. Schol. κυβιστήρ ὁ ὀρχιστής, καὶ κυβισταῖν τὸ ὀρχισθαι. Cp. II. xvi. 750, and the evolutions of the "tumbler" Hippocrites described in Hdt. vi. 129: also Xen. Symp. ii. 11, vii. 3. The καὶ before εἰς ὀρθῶν reads awkwardly; if retained, we must render it "actually" (adeo, Wolf), but possibly οὐσι ἢ σι καὶ may have been the original. Rettig quotes Cic. .. Fin. v. 35 si aut manibus ingrediatur quis aut non ante sed retro fugere, plane se ipse et hominem σαν οἷον hominem naturam odisse (videtur).
\[\text{φερόμενοι κυβιστώσι κύκλῳ, ὅκτῳ τότε οὖσι τοὺς μέλεσιν ἀπερει-
δόμενοι ταχὺ ἐφέροντο κύκλῳ. ἦν δὲ διὰ πατὰ τριά-τα-γένη καὶ
Β τοιαύτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἄρρεν ἦν τοῦ ἱλίου τὴν ἄρχην ἐκογοῦν, τὸ δὲ
θῆλυ τῆς γῆς, τὸ δὲ ἀμφοτέρῳ μετέχον τῆς σελήνης, ὅτι καὶ ἡ
σελήνη ἀμφοτέρων μετέχει. \(\text{περιφέρῃ} \) δὲ ἦν καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ ἡ
πορεία αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ τοῖς γινομένων ὀμοῖς ἔπαιναι. \(\text{ἡν} \) ὅλην τὴν ἀρχήν
δεινά καὶ τὴν ρώμην, καὶ τὰ φρονήματα-μεγάλα ἔχον, ἐπεχεί-
ρησαν δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ ὄ λέγει ὁ Ὀμήρος περὶ Ἔφιάλτου τε καὶ
"Ὅτων, περὶ ἐκείνους λέγεται, τὸ εἰς τὸν ὀὐρανὸν ἀνάβασιν ἐπιτίχε-
C ρεῖν ποιεῖν, ὡς ἐπιθησομένους τοῖς θεοῖς.

ΧV. 'Ὁ οὖν Ζεὺς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι θεοὶ ἐβουλεύοντο ὅ τι χρή
αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι, καὶ ἡπόρουν οὔτε γὰρ ὅποιος ἀποκτείναειν εἶχον

190 Α κυβιστῶσι κύκλῳ del. Sauppe Bdhm Sz. τότε ὅκτῳ T, Stob.
ἀπερειδέμενοι T: ἀπε ἐδεμεναι B: ἀπερειδέμενοι ej. Steph. Β ἀμφοτέρον T
ὁτ...μετέχει del. Jn. μετέχειν Stob., Blass (καὶ) περιφέρῃ Blass ἃ ὁμ.
Stob. αὐτῶν del. Blass τε καὶ BT: καὶ W C ὥσ...θεοὶ post Ὁτῶν
transp. Steinhart ὁ γὰρ Stobaei A

190 Β ὁτί τὸ μὲν ἄρρεν κτλ. Aristophanes too cau pose as an erudite
physicist. His astronomical lore may come partly from Parmenides, partly
from the Pythagoreans. Op. Arist. de gen. an. 1. 2 ἄρρεν γὰρ λέγομεν ξύφον
τὸ εἰς ἄλλα γενόντα, θῆλυ δὲ τὸ εἰς αὐτὸ· διὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὁλῷ τὴν τῆς γῆς φύσιν ὃς
θῆλυ καὶ μητέρα νομίζοντο, οὐρανὸν δὲ καὶ ἤλιον...ώς γεννάτοι καὶ πατέρας
προσαγορεύοντο. For the moon as bisexed, cp. Orph. Ἡμν. ix. 4 (θῆλυ τε
καὶ ἄρσην); Macrobi. i. 8 Philochorus affirmat Venerem esse lunam et ei
sacrificium facere viros cum veste muliebri, milieres cum virili, quod eadem
et mas aestimetur et femina. Procl. in Tim. p. 326 c (οὕτω δὴ καὶ σελήνηκα
ψυχὴν εἰς ἀνδρὸς κατέναι φῶς, καὶ τὴν Μοναδίαν φασί, καὶ ἀπολλωνικὴν
(ἡλικὴν Ιακίν) εἰς γυνακίς, καθάπερ ἴσροισι τὴν Σεβάλλαν) shows that
opinion on the matter was not uniform: see also Plutarch, Is. et Os. ii.
366 c, 371 ff.

ὁτί...μετέχει. Vogelin and others rightly defend this clause against athe-
tizers like Jahn: it adds to the impression of "komische Gelehrsamkeit."

περιφέρῃ. "Globular" rather than "circular" ("kreisformig," Ast,
Schleierm.). For πορεία, ἰποσσος, cp. Tim. 45 α, Polit. 266 b.

τὰ φρονήματα μεγάλα ἔχον. They were "high minded" and had "proud
looks"; they did not "refrain their soul and keep it low": "μεγάλα φρονήματα
dicuntur habere qui contra dominos conspirant, op. 182 c" (Hommel).

δ λέγει ὁ Ὀμήρος. See Od. xi. 305 ff., Il. v. 385 ff. We may compare also
Ps. ii. 2, "The kings of the earth set themselves...against the Lord"; and
the Babel tradition (Gen. xi. 4 ff.; cp. Orig. e. Cols. iv. p. 515 A ff).

190 Κ ὁτί γὰρ...ἔχον. This obviously implies, as Hug remarks, moral
rather than physical impossibility—the inexperience of killing the goose that
lays the golden egg. Supply ἡφάνιοναν with κερα ταντες.
καὶ ἀστερὶ τοὺς γήγαντας κεραυνώσαντες τὸ γένος ἄφανταν—αἱ
tιμώλ γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἱερὰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἱππαίζοντες
οὐθ' ὅπως ἔφεν ἀσέλγανεν. μόνης δὴ ὁ Ζεὺς ἄφθονος λέγει ὅτι
Δοκώ μοι, ἐφι, ἔχειν μηχανήν, ὡς ἄν εἰδί τε ἀνθρώποι καὶ
ποιούσιν τῆς ἀκολογίας ἀσθένεστεροι—γενόμενοι. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν
αὐτοῖς, ἐφι, διατέμον δέχα ἐκατον, καὶ ἀμα μὲν ἀσθένεστεροι
ἐκατον, ἀμα δὲ χρησιμώτεροι μὲν διὰ τὸ πλεῖον τῶν ἀριθμῶν
γεγονέναι· καὶ βαδιούσατα ὅρθοι ἐπὶ δυοῖν σκέλοι. εάν δὲ ἐτὶ
dοκώσων ἀσέλγανεν καὶ μὴ ἥθελον ἡσυχαῖν ἁγεῖν, πάλιν αὖ,
ἐφι, τεμώ δέχα, ὡς ἐφι ἐνός πορεύονται σκέλοις ἀσκαλοῖστες.
tαύτα εἰπὼν ἔστεμεν τους ἀνθρώπους δίχα, ἀστερὶ οἱ τὰ δὰ τέμ-

190 § γὰρ (ἀν) Ἀστ. (τὰ) ιερὰ Stob., J.-U. μόλις δὲ Stob. εἰν τε:
iώνται Stob. ἀνθρώπῳ Vog.: ἀνθρώπῳ BT ἀσθένεστεροι γενόμενοι socl.
Kreyenbuhl Sz. D δ' ετί Stob., vulg.: δ' τι BT ἥθελον Baiter Bt.:
θέλων B, Stob.: έθλως Τ. αὐχαλοῖστες Stob. ἰα Timaeus Pollux:

ἡφαίστεα. For the impf. without ἂν, cp. (with Stallb.) Rep. 450 δ, Euthyd.
304 δ; Ar. Nub. 1212.

μόνης...ἀνθρώποι. Notice the comic touch: the omniscient Zeus has to
cudgel his brains over the business!

ὡς ἄν εὖ. For this construction after a present, cp. Xen. Cyrop. τ. 2. 5
(Goodwin G. M. T. § 349, cp. § 351).

ἀσθένεστεροι γενόμενοι. Although these words are superfluous, a little legal
verbosity may be excused in a comedian’s Zeus.

190 D χρησιμώτεροι. “More lucrative.” Zeus, with a sharp eye to “the
loaves and fishes,” contrives to kill two birds with one stone. The propagation
of piety by making fissures in men is an idea that tickles, and the discovery
of the benefits—from the Olympian point of view—which result from schisms
of this sort is nόμα γελοιότατον. This passage is alluded to by Musonius ap.

ἐὰν δὲ ἐτι κτλ. The ingenious Deity has still “a rod in pickle”: the
process of bisection may be repeated ad lib. until the wicked are left literally
with not a leg to stand on.

ἀσκαλοῖστες. Schol. ἀσκαλοῖστες κυρίως μὲν τὸ ἐτι τοὺς ἀσκόν ἄλλησθαι
ἄλημμένους, ἐφ' οὔς ἐπῆδον γελοιαῖν ἐνεκά τινες δὲ καὶ ἐτι τῶν συμπεφυκός
toις σκέλεσιν ἄλλομεν. ἥδε δὲ τιθέει καὶ ἐτι τοῦ ἄλλησθαι τὸ νεώρα (τὸν
eterangan σφ. Bekl.) τῶν ποδῶν ἀνέχοντα, ἢ ἄν νῦν ἐτὶ σκέλος ἄνεις βαϊνοντα.
ἐτσι δὲ καὶ τὸ χαλαίνειν. Ἡσυχ. ἀσκαλοῖστες· ἐφ' εὖς ποδὸς ἐφαλλόμενοι.
in pratis unctos salnere utres. See also Smith D. Α. s.v. “ascoliaismus.”

ἀστερὶ οἱ τὰ δα κτλ. For δα (see crit. n.) cp. Pollux vii. 79 ἂν δὲ τρωγάλα
kάρα μυρίδες μέσπιλα, καὶ δα καλεῖται: Tim. (Phot., Suid.) δα· ἀκροδρών
Ε νοντες καὶ μέλλοντες ταριχεύειν [, ἢ ὁσπερ οἶτι τὰ χωταῖς θριεῖν]. ὅντινα δὲ τέμοι, τὸν Ἀπόλλων έκέλευε τὸ τε πρόσωπον μεταστρέφειν καὶ τὸ τοῦ αὐχένος-ήμιον πρὸς τὴν τομήν, ῥᾳ θεώμενος τὴν αὐτοῦ τμῆσιν κοσμιώτερον εἰπὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τὰλλα ἱάσθαι ἐκέλευεν. ὥ δὲ τὸ τε πρόσωπον μετεστρέφει, καὶ συνέλευξιν πανταχόθεν τὸ δέρμα ἐπὶ τὴν γάστερα νῦν καλουμένην, ὁσπερ τὰ σύντομα βαλλάντια, ἐν ὁμόται πωπόν ἀπέδει κατὰ μέσην τὴν γαστέρα, δὲ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν καλούσι. καὶ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ρυτίδας.


εἰδὸς μήλους μυκροὶ ἐμφερεῖς. It is the "sorb-apple" or "service-berry," Lat. sorbus; for the mode of preserving these cp. Varro de re rust. i. 59 (putant manere) sorba quidam dissecta et in sole macerata, ut pira, et sorba per se ubicunque sint posita, in arido facile manere: and for ταριχέων in this sense of "drying," cp. Phot. (Suid.) ταριχεύειν...σημαίνειν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐρμαίνειν.

The clause ἢ ὁσπερ...ταῖς θριεῖν is condemned by most edd. It is an objection to the phrase that, as Retting notes, we ought naturally to supply with it not only the appropriate τέμνοντες but also the inappropriate μέλλοντες ταριχεύειν: this objection however is not insuperable, and if necessary τέμνοντες might be transposed. It is argued on the other hand by Hommel and Vogelin that a second simile is really required, the sorb-slicing describing only the mode of operation, whereas the egg-slicing adds the idea of ease and facility. That ὁσπερ δριεί διαρέειν was a proverbial saying is shown by Plut. amat. 24, p. 770 B οἴδα τοὺς σπαδικοὺς ἐρωτας (eis) ἀβεβαιότητα πᾶλλα λέγονται καὶ σκὼπτοντις λέγοντες ὁσπερ ἄν τιχὶ διαρείεσθαι τὴν φιλὶν. Rückert supposes "ovorum per crines dissectionem ludi genus fuisse; fortasse ex ovorum dissectione per crines facta conviviae futura praedicere solebant": Zeller writes "vielleicht ein Gesellschafts- oder Liebesspiel, das darin bestanden haben könnte, dass zwei Tischgenossen sich in die zwei Hälften eines hertgesottenen Eies theilten, nachdem es mit einem dem Einen von ihnen ausgezogenen Haarc zerschnitten war, also ein griechisches Vielliehen."

It is, perhaps, possible that it had some connexion with (Orphic) magic and divination by χορκοπτία. For the process of bisection, cp. Phaedr. 265 e.

190 Ε τὴν αὐτῶ τιμῆσιν. Here τιμῆσις denotes, of course, the result rather than the process: Naber's πρόμηνον, umbilicun, is ingenious but needless.

τὰλλα ἱάςθαι. Apollo, as ἀκίσως and ἱητήρ, very properly plays the part of surgeon's assistant.

τὰ σύντομα βαλλάντια. "Round pouches with strings to draw": see Smith D. A. i. 565.


τὸν καλάποδα. "The (cobbler's) last": Lat. forma (Hor. Sāt. ii. 3. 106), οἱ tenepellēlia. Suidas (s.v. κάλα) κάλον γάρ τὸ ξύλον: ἐξ οὗ καὶ καλόσως, ὁ ξύλος ποὺς.

μυμειον...πάδον. The residue of the wrinkles was intended to serve as a memorial "of man's first disobedience...and all our woe." This repeats the idea already expressed in 190 ε συρα (Ἰάνα Βίωμενος κτλ.).

ἡ φύσις. Creuzer renders this by "nos homines," disapproving of Ficinus' "natura" and Schleierm.'s "forma": but φύσις is no mere periphrasis but connotes original nature or form.

ποδοῖν ἐκαστὸν κτλ. To attempt to restore the Bodleian reading ξυνείαν, as several of the later critics do, involves too much alteration; thus Hug writes τῷ αὐτοῦ ξυνείαν, Usener ἐπόθουν...τῷ αὐτοῦ ξυνείαν. Notice the "constructio ad sensum," ποδοῖν...περιβάλλοντες...ἀπέθυμακον. There is an echo of this passage in Philo de op. mund. 53 p. 36 M.

τῆς ἀλλῆς ἁργίας. "General inactivity," implying that the λμῶς itself was due to ἁργία. Cp. Rep. 554 a, c (with Adam ad loc.).

191 B εἰτε ἄνδρος. Abbreviated for εἰτε ἄνδρος τοῦ ἁλοῦ ἐντύχοι ἡμίσει. Notice that the third possibility (εἰτ' ἄνδρογινου) is omitted.

191 C ὀσπερ οἱ τέττυνοι. This is not merely a piece of natural history;
it contains also an allusion to the cicada as the symbol of Athenian autochthony: cp. Polit. 271 A τὸ μὲν εἰς ἄλληλων οὐκ ἐν ἔν τις φύσει γεννώμενον, τὸ δὲ δὴ γγενέσω εἶναι ποτὲ γένος λειχθὲν κτλ.: Thuc. i. 6, Ar. Eq. 1331. For the mode of propagation of cicadas, cp. Ael. H. A. ii. 22 ταῖς ἀφόις ὁ πηλὸς γενεσίς ἐστι. δὲ ἄλληλοι δὲ οὐ τίκτουσιν οὐδὲ ἐπιγίνονται κτλ.: the female lays her eggs in the sand, where the young are hatched out by the sun's heat. Cp. also Plut. amat. 767 c.

στύτω...πρόσθεν. Hommel explains στύτω by hac ratione, qua dixi; Rückert by uti unus posita sunt, which seems preferable. στύτων (sc. τὰ αἰδώλα) by itself reads rather awkwardly; but, as Vögelin points out, a glossator would certainly have added the missing words. It is, perhaps, just possible that τὰ αἰδώλα fell out before καὶ διὰ, owing to similarity of letters; but the insertion of ταῖρ' is a simpler change.

γένοιτο τὸ γένος, i.e. τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, cp. 190 D τὸ γένος...ἀνθρώπων. There is no reason to tamper with the text: the present tense secures the notion of continuance without need of supplements such as Rückert's στύν or ἔτη. (A neater change would be τείνωσα.)

ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα. In contrast to their former ἐργα (191 B). Cp. Hesiod's title ἐργα καὶ ἡμέρα. Βίος is here practically equiv. to ἡ τοῦ βίου κατασκευή (Laws 842 c); and the phrase means "husbandry and other means of subsistence."

ἐπι τῇ οὖν. Here at last we come to the point of the whole tale—the function and value of Eros.

ἐκ τότου. "From such early times," tam longo ex tempore: the only other ex. in Plato is Laws 642 B, but the phrase is common in Hdt., e.g. v. 88, vi. 84.

191 D συναγωγέως. "A unifier," in the sense of "restorer." This subst. is unique in Plato, and rare elsewhere; cp. the use of συναγωγός, Prot. 322 c, Tim. 31 c.
XVI. "Εκαστός οὖν ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου ζύμβολον, ἀτε
τετμημένοις ὦσπερ αἱ ψυτταί, εὖ ἐνὸς δύο. ζητεὶ δὴ ἄει τὸ αὐτὸν
ἐκαστὸς ζύμβολον. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῦ κοινὸς ὁμόμο
εἰσιν, δὴ τότε ἀνδρόγυνον ἐκαλεῖτο, φιλογυναικῆς τ' εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ
πολλοὶ τῶν μοιχῶν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γένους γεγοναί, καὶ ὅσαν αὐτῷ
γυναίκες φίλανθρωποὶ τε καὶ μοιχεύτριαι [ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γένους
γίγνονται]. ὅσαν δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν γυναικὸς τμῆμα εἰσιν, οὐ
παννυ αὐτὰ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τοῦ νοῦν προσέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς
γυναίκας τετραμμέναι εἰσὶ, καὶ αἱ ἐταιρίστριαι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ

191 D οὖν: γοῦν cf. Usener ἐκαστὸς TW: ἐκαστὸν B, Stob. τμῆμας
Stob. Ε φιλογυναικῆς Stob. ἐκ...γίγνονται del. Bdhm. Sz.
γυναικῶν W καὶ αἱ...γίγνονται del. Voeg. αἱ om. Stob.

ἀνθρώπου ζύμβολον. "But the indenture of a man" (Jowett): σύμβολον
here is the tessera hospitalis; the host presents his departing guest with one
half of a broken die (ἀιστράγαλος), retaining the other half himself (see Smith
D. A. s.v. "hospitium"). Cp. the use of the word by Empedocles, in his theory
of reproduction stated in Arist. de gen. an. i. 18. 772 b 10 'Εμπεδοκλῆς...φησὶ
ἐν τῷ ὄρθροι καὶ ἐν τῷ βῇλε ὕπον σύμβολον εἶναι, δηλοὶ δ' ἀπειθεῖτερον ἀπείπαι—
"ad quod decreatum philosophi respetit fortasse Aristophanes" (Stallb.).

αἱ ψυτταί. Lat. thrombi, a kind of flat-fish (perhaps plaice or turbot):
Schol. ἤχύθιον τι τῶν πλατείας ἡ ψυττα, ἵκ δῶν δερμάτων συγκείσαθαι τὴν ἴδιαν
δοκοὺν, τὶν τινι σανδίλων καλοῦσιν κτλ.: "genus piscium, quod oculos et nares
in altera tantum parte capitis habet" (Stallb.). Cp. Ar. Lys. 115 (where the
Schol. curiously defines ψ. as ὄρθροι τετραμμένοι κατὰ τὸ μέσον, ὡς αἱ σφήκες),
Athen. viii. p. 329.

φιλογυναικῆς. Cp. Cic. Tusc. iv. 11. 25 similiterque ceteri morbi...ut
mulierositas, ut ita appellum eam, quae Graece φιλογυνία dicitur, etc. The
sing. is φιλογύνης (see L. and S.).

191 Ε φίλανθρωποί. The word here has the bad sense noted in Hermog.
der id. iii. p. 324 W. τὴν γάρ ἀκαλασίαν βούλεται νῦν δὴπον σημαίνει καὶ τὸ
μοιχεύεσθαι. Somewhat different is the force in Soph. fr. 1006 N. (Hermog.
Rhet. iii. p. 324) καὶ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς δὲ φίλανθρωπον ποιν τὴν ἀταλάντην εἰπε διὰ τὸ
ἀσπαξεσθαι σὺν ἀνδρῶν εἰναι: and Eur. Androm. 229; while in Ep. Titus ii. 4
φίλανθρωπία is a virtue.

ἐκ τούτου...γίγνονται. I follow Badham and Hug in rejecting these words
as an adscript derived from the context (a view already suggested by
Hommel). Badham writes, "si altero praedicato opus esse credidisset Plato,
quod aegro adducar ut credam, aliquid pulcriter orationem variasset quam
γεγονάσιν ἐν ψυτταῖς mutando." The three-fold repetition sounds clumsy.

γυναικὸς τμῆμα, i.e. a section of the γυνὴ ἄλη ("Doppelweib") of 191 b.
Similarly below ἄρπεν τμῆμα refers to the ἄνδρα ἄλος ("Doppelmann"). With
the theory of sex-characters here expounded, cp. Hippocr. de diaet. i. 28 ff.

Alex. Paed. iii. 21, p. 264 P. γυναῖκες ἀνδρίζονται παρὰ φύσιν γαμοῦμεναι τε
καὶ γαμαύσαι γυναίκες: and Ep. Rom. i. 28.
γένοις οὕτως. ὅσοι δὲ ἄρρενοι τμημά εἰσι, τὰ ἄρρενα διώκουσι, καὶ τέως μὲν ἄν παῖδες ὦσιν, ἄν τεμάχια ὄντα τοῦ ἄρρενος,

192 φιλοῦσι τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ χαίρουσι συγκατακελμένοι καὶ συμπεπλεγμένοι τοῖς ἄνδράσι, καὶ εἰσιν οὗτοι βέλτιστοι τῶν παῖδων καὶ μειρακίων, ἢτο ἄνδρεύτατοι ὄντες φύσει. φασὶ δὲ δὴ τινες αὐτοὺς αὐτοκράτορι εἶναι, ψευδώνοις. οὐ γὰρ ἕντο ἀνισχύνθης τοῦτο δρῶσιν ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ θάρρους καὶ ἄνδρειας καὶ ἄρρενοτίας, τὸ ὁμοιὸν αὐτοῖς ἀσταθὲς. μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον καὶ γὰρ τελευθέντες μόνον ἀποβαίνουσι εἰς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἄνδρες οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἔστειλαν B δὲ ἄνδρωθασι, παιδεραστοῦσι καὶ πρὸς γάμους καὶ παιδοποιίας οὗ προσέχουσι τῶν νῦν φύσει, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἀναγκαζόμενοι.


ἀναγκαζόμενοι. An example of this is Alcibiades: see his own account in 217 D ff.

192 A ἄνδρεύτατοι. An allusion, as Hommel remarks, to the ambiguity of the word ἄνδρειας. Cp. Hippocr. de diät. 1. 28 ἡν μὲν οὖν ἐς ἄρρενα τὰ σώματα ἀπεκρίθην ψυχὰς τῇ ὕσυχῃ γίνονται οὗτοι ἄνδρεια λαμπροὶ τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἴσχυροι.

φασὶ...τινες. Cp. what Pausanias says in 182 A (ἀστε τινάς τομάν λέγειν κτλ.).

ἀρρενοπλασία. Etym. M. s.v. ἄρρενοπλασίας: ὁ ἄρρενος πρόσωπων ἐχων, κατὰ συνεκδοχὴν. ἤγουν ὁ ἄνδρεια καὶ ἴσχυρός καὶ δυνάμεος ἐχθρὸν ἀντιπαθητήν. The subst. is ἐπ. λεγ., but the adj. occurs in Laws 802 ε to δὴ μεγαλαπρεπὲς αὐν καὶ τὸ τὴν πρὸς ἄνδρειαν μέτον ἄρρενοπλασία φατέαν εἶναι. Rettig regards all these apparently encomiastic terms as ironical.


ἄνδρες is predicative: "Such as these, and they alone, turn out men (i.e. manly, capable) in public affairs": Ficinus wrongly renders "cum adoleverint, soli ad civilem administrationem conversi, viri praestantes evadunt": and Schleierm. also goes wrong. For the connexion between the paederastic temper and politics, cp. 182 c, Ar. Nub. 1093, Eq. 333 ff, etc.

ἀνδρωθώσι. This verb is not found elsewhere in Plato: cp. Hdt. 1. 123, Eur. H. F. 42.

192 B φύσει...ἀναγκαζόμενοι. Hug, on quite insufficient grounds, expunges these words. It is true that there was, so far as is known, no law at Athens to enforce matrimony, though there was such a law at Sparta, according to Stob. (Serm. 65 p. 410) and Pollux (viii. 40), by which citizens were liable to a
All' ἐξαρκεί αὐτοῖς μετ' ἀλλήλων καταζήν ἀγάμους. πάντως μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιούτος παιδεραστῆς τε καὶ φιλεραστῆς γίγνεται, ἀεὶ τὸ ξυνηγενὲς ἀσπαζόμενος. ὅταν μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἐκέινῳ ἐντύχῃ τῷ αὐτοῦ ἡμῖνει καὶ ὁ παιδεραστὴς καὶ ἄλλος πάς, τότε καὶ θαυμαστὰ ἐκπλήττονται φιλὰ τε καὶ οἰκεῖοτητι καὶ ἔρωτι, οὐκ ἔθελοντες, ὡς ἐκς εἰπεῖν, χωρίζεσθαι ἀλλήλων οὐδὲ σμικρὸν χρόνον. καὶ οἱ διατελοῦντες μετ' ἀλλήλων διὰ βίου οὐτοῦ εἰσώ, οὐ οὖδ' ἀν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν ὦ τε βούλωνται σφίατα παρ' ἀλλήλων γίγνεσθαι. οὔδεν γὰρ ἄν δόξει τούτ' εἶναι ἡ τῶν ἱφροδισιῶν συνουσία, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτον ἔνεκα ἐτέρος ἐτέρῳ χαιρεῖ ξυνὸν ὦτος ἐπὶ μεγάλης σπουδῆς: ἀλλ' ἄλλα τί βουλεύεσθαι ἐκατέρους ἡ ψυχή δήλη ἔστιν, οὐ δύναται D


γραφῆ ὁγάμου (οἱ ὁγαμοῦ). But, as Hommel notes, νόμος covers not only law but custom; and it appears that “certain disabilities attached, at Athens, to the state of celibacy; those who entered public life, as βάπτοες or στρώχγγοι, were required παιδοποιοῦσιν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους (Deinarch. c. Demosth. p. 99 § 72)”: see Smith D. A. 1. 43 a. And it is to be noticed that it is precisely public men who are spoken of in the text. The antithesis φύσει (νόμος derives from the Sophists (Hippias v. Protagoras), see my Philebus μ. xxviii n., Adam R. T. G. pp. 279 ff., Gomperz G. T. 1. pp. 401 ff.

φιλεραστῆς. This applies to the ἐρώμενος; cp. the use of φιλεραστία in 213 D. Those who are παιδερασται in manhood were φιλερασται in boyhood (φιλούσι τοὺς ἀνδρας 191 x), so that the words here suggest that π. τε καὶ φιλεραστῆς may denote “virum qui neque alios vituperet amatores pueros, et ipse pueros amat.” The point is also missed by Rückert’s “amicorum amator,” and Wolf’s “sodalium amator.”

αὐτῷ...ημίσει. This refers to 191 δ, ἦγει δὴ ἄεὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἐξώβολον.

ἄλλος πάς. This is a short way of referring comprehensively to the segments of the other διὰ, viz. the androgynous and the “Doppelweib” (191 δ, ε). ἔκτυπωσα ἐκτυπωτα κτλ. Cp. 211 D.

192 C ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν. This qualifies the negatives in the clause, like paene diicerin: “Barely consenting to be sundered for even a moment.”

καὶ οἱ διατελοῦντες κτλ. “It is these who continue in fellowship their life long, although they could not so much as say what gain they expect from one another.” Schleierm. misses the force of ὦτοι by making it direct antecedent to οἱ (“diezen sind es welche” etc.). For the thought of this passage, cp. 181 d, 183 e, Phaedr. 254 a ff., 255 B ff.

τούτου ἔνεκα, ἢ. ὑπ. τῶν ἄφρ. συνουσίας ἔνεκα.

B. P.
192 D θέλω Β Ε συμφυσήσαί BTW: συμφύσωσα b t, vulg. ζήτε ὡς T: ζητήσασες Β ἀλλο ὡς TW τοῦτο δ: τοῦ στι Bdhm. τοῦτο γὰρ Ficinus Bast: τοῦτον ἄρ' Wolf 193 Δ διωκίσθημεν: διεσχίσθημεν Cornarius ὑπὸ: ἀπὸ Hommel

192 D καὶ ε...ἐροτό. The apodosis to this duplicated protasis is to be found in ἵσυμεν ὁτι κτλ. (192 ε). For Hephaestus and his tools, see Od. viii. 266 ff., esp. 274 εν ὤ̣ ἐθερ' ἀκμοθήτῳ μέγαν ἄκμονα, κόπτε τε δεσμοῖν | ἀφράκτους ἀλύτους ἄφρ' ἐμπεδον ὀσθὶ μένων. He would also have his bellows (φῦσαι), tongs (πῦργαρα), and hammer (σφήρα, βαστήρ): see Il. xviii. 372 ff., 474 ff.

192 E συντῆξαί. Cr. 183 ε, Tlm. 43 A πυκνοὶ γόμφοι ξυντήκοντες: Eur. fr. 964 πᾶσα γὰρ ἐγαθὴ γυνῇ, ἣ τιν ἄνδρι σωτῆτης, σωφρονεῖν ἐπισταταί. For τῆκεν of the effects of love, cp. Theocr. id. i. 66; Xen. Symp. viii. 3.

συμφυσήσαί. Stalb., Hommel and Jowett retain the vulgar, συμφύσα, but the other lection gives a better sense—"to weld together," confiarre: cp. Il. xviii. 470. There is a ref. to this passage in Arist. Pol. ii. 4. 1282b 11 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἑρώτικοις λόγοις ἵσυμεν λέγοντα τῷ Ἀραστάφανῷ ὡς τῶν ἐρωτῶν διὰ τὸ σφάδα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμοῦσαν συμφύσα καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων ἀμφοτέρους ἐνα (Newman here reads συμφύσαι), but the word συμφύσα is probably due to a reminiscence of 191 α. For the sense, cp. Orgâ. Fr. 139 παράγαγεν...τὸν Ἐρωτα, ἐνοπλοῖν δυτὰ τῶν ὄνομ. τοῦ ὄνομον...αὐτοὶ. This definition sums up the description of Eros given in 191 ν ἀπì ἀρχή.

193 Δ διωκίσθημεν κτλ. This is apparently a reference—in spite of the audacious anachronism (cp. Introd. § viii.), to the διακισμός of Mantinea in
καθάπερ 'Αρκάδες ὑπὸ Δακεδαιμονίων. φόβος οὖν ἔστω, ἐὰν μὴ κόσμωι ὡμέν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ὅπως μὴ καὶ αὕθες διασχισθησόμεθα, καὶ περίμεν ἑχοντες ὡσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς στήλαις καταγραφὴν ἐκτετυπωμένοι, διαστησίμοις κατὰ τὰς ρίζας, γεγονότες ὡσπερ λίσται. ἄλλα τούτων ἔνεκα πάντων ἀνδρὰ χρῆ ἄμαντα παρακελεύεσθαι εὐσεβεῖν περὶ θεοὺς, ἢν τὰ μὲν ἐκφύγωμεν, τῶν δὲ Β τύχωμεν, ὡς ὁ Ἔρως ἡμῖν ἡγεμόνι καὶ στρατηγός. ὃ μηδεῖς ἐναντία πραττέτω—πράττει δ᾽ ἐναντία, ὅστις θεοῖς ἀπεχθάνεται—φίλοι γὰρ γενόμενοι καὶ διαλλαγέντες τῷ θεῷ ἐξευρήσομεν τε καὶ ἐνθευσόμεθα τοὺς παιδικοὺς τοῖς ἡμετέρους αὐτῶν, ὁ τῶν μὲν ὀλύντως ποιοῦν. καὶ μὴ μοι ὑπολαμβῆν Ἐρυξίμαχος, κωμιδῶν τὸν λόγον, ὃς Πανσανίαν καὶ Ἀγάθωνα λέγω ὅσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ οὕτως τούτων τυγχάνουσιν ὑπέτει καὶ εἰσὶν ἀμφότεροι τὴν φύσιν ἄφρενες: λέγω C


385 b.c., for which see Xen. Hell. v. 2. 1 ff. ἐκ δὲ τούτων καθηρέθη μὲν τὸ τέιχος, διώκεισθαι δὲ ἡ Μαντινεία τετραχρὴ καθάπερ τὸ ἄρχαίον φίλουν (i.e. κατὰ κόμας): Isoc. Pan. 67 λ: Arist. Pol. π. 2, § 3.

καταγραφὴν. Many editors divide the word κατά γραφὴν. Probably whichever reading we adopt the meaning is the same, “in profile,” the figures being bas-reliefs (orusta). Cp. Pln. xxxv. 34 hic catagaphra invent, hoc est obliquas imagines.

ὡσπερ λίσται. These are διαστησιμοῖοι ἀστράγαλοι (Schol. ad loc., Suidas), like the σύμβολον of 191 δ : cp. Ar. Ran. 826, Schol. ad Eur. Med. 610.

193 Β ὡς ὁ Ἔρως. The Bodleian’s ὡς, though doubtful, is possible. Perhaps the variants arose from an original ὅσον or ἐν ὅ.

πράττει...ἀπεχθάνεται. This may contain an allusion, as Usener suggests, to some familiar verse such as, e.g., πράττει δ᾽ ἐναντὶ δὲ θεοῖς ἀπήχθετο.

μὴ μοι ὑπολάβῃ. This is one of three cases in Plato of “μὴ with the (independent) subjunctive implying apprehension coupled with the desire to avert the object of fear,”—the other cases being Euthyd. 272 c, Laws 861 e (see Goodwin G. M. T. § 264).

κωμιδῶν τὸν λόγον. “Ridiculing my discourse,” cp. 189 b : so ἐπίκωμοι, Αριστ. 31 d. Ας Hug observes, A. is really κωμιδῶν himself when, in comic contrast to the picture drawn of Agathon in Thesm. 31 ff., he here suggests that he is τὴν φύσιν ἄφρην.

193 C ἀμφότεροι...ἄφρενες. “H. e. ἄφρενος ἑνὸς” Stallb. As Wolf (like Stallb.) says, ἄφρενες τὴν φύσιν means “mares origine, γεγονότα ταὐτόνημα τοῦ ἄφρηνος,” and implies further, as Rettig notes, “mares natura, geborene Päderasten.”

5—2
Oùtos, ἐφή, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, ὦ ἔμοι λόγοι ἐστὶν περὶ Ὑρωτος, ἄλλοις ἢ ὦ σός. ἀσπέρ οὖν ἐδείξας σου, μὴ κωμιδήσῃς αὐτόν. Ἐ να καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀκούσαμεν τῇ ἐκαστῷ ἐρει, μάλλον δὲ τῇ ἐκάτερος. Ἀγάθων γὰρ καὶ Σωκράτης λοιποὶ.


ἀπελθὼν. "Returning," "being restored to": so, perhaps, ἀπήμεν πρὸς τὸ ὄστῳ Rep. 327 B; cp. πάλιν ἀπίναι Phaedr. 227 E, etc. Hence Mehler's ἐπανελθὼν is superfluous.

ὑμνούντες...ὑμνοῦμεν. Cp. 184 ὑπηρετῶν ὑποτίμων δικαίως ὑπηρετεῖν κτλ.; and Agathon's echo of the word (ἐφιμούντα) in 197 E.

193 D εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον. Cp. Charm. 163 D ὦτι τὰ οἰκεῖα τε καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἁγαθὰ καλοῖς: Rep. 586 E. Possibly there is an intentional echo in the word of διωκίσθημεν, as used in 193 A.

ὑπίδας μ. παρέχεται. Cp. 179 B μαρτυριάν παρέχεται: Xen. Symp. iv. 25. For the aor. infin. (without ἄν) after a verb of "hoping," cp. Phaedo 67 B (Goodwin G. M. T. § 136). Notice the rhetorical care with which this peroration echoes (ἰασάμενος...ἐνδιάμονα) the exordium (ἰατρός...ἐνδιάμονα, 189 D); also, in εὐσέβειαν we have an echo of εὐσέβειαν, 193 A ad fin.: and the emphasis on ἱασάμενος (with Ἐρυξίμαχε in the next line) should not be missed.

ἀλλοτρος ὦ ὦ σός. This serves to emphasize, by repetition, the statement made by A. in 189 C (ἄλλη γε πη...λέγειν κτλ.).

ἀσπέρ οὖν ἐδείξας σου. See 189 B, 193 B.

193 Ε τῇ ἐκάτερος. A. corrects himself with a precision worthy of Prodicus, the comparative form being more proper than the superlative (ἐκαστος) in speaking of two only. Observe that Aristodemus (the narrator) should have spoken next after Ἑρυξ., but is here ignored: to have represented him as a chief speaker "wäre auch nicht recht passend gewesen" (Zeller).
XVII. 'Aλλα πείσομαι σοι, ἐπὶ φάναι τον Ἕρυξίμαχον. καὶ γὰρ μοι ὁ λόγος ἥδεως ἐρρήθη. καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνυήθην Σωκράτει τε καὶ Ἀγάθωνι δεινοῖς οὐσὶ περὶ τὰ ἑρωτικά, πάνυ ἄν ἐφοβοῦμην μὴ ἀπορησοὺν λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ εἰρήθησαι. νῦν δὲ ὅμως θαρρῶ. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτην εἰπεῖν Κάλως γὰρ αὐτὸς ἤγανίσατι, 194 ὁ Ἕρυξίμαχος: εἰ δὲ γένοιο οὐ νῦν ἐγώ εἰμι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἱσώς οὐ ἔσομαι, ἐπεὶ διὰν καὶ Ἀγάθων εἴπη εὖ, καὶ μάλ' ἂν φοβοῦ ὡς καὶ ἐν


καὶ γὰρ...ἀρρήθην. “Indeed I was quite pleased with your discourse”: hence, Eryximachus could “lct off” Aristophanes (cp. 189 c ἵσως...ἀφθήσω σε). Whatever the esoteric meaning of A.’s discourse may have been, Eryx. apparently regards it simply as a piece of pleasantry—“er hat sich also offenbar nicht verstanden, sondern hat sich blos an die lustige Aussenseite derselben gehalten” (Rettig).

ei μὴ ἐνυήθην κτλ. For this construction with ἐνυήθη, cp. Prot. 348 β ἵνα τοῦτο μην ταῦτα εὐνειδῶμεν (with Adam’s note); Phaedo 92 d, Apol. 34 b.

πάνυ δὲ ἐφοβοῦμην. For the imperf. here (in an unfulfilled condition) as a primary tense, cp. Theaet. 143 b (Goodwin G. M. T. § 172).

194 A Καλώς...ἡγάνισα. This implies that the various encomiasts are engaged in a rhetorical contest (ἀγών): “your display in the competition was a fine one.”


ἐπειδὰν κτλ. Notice the elaborate courtesy, not devoid of irony, with which S. treats Agathon, who evidently is a man with a taste for flattery. Since the combination εὖ καὶ μάλα is open to suspicion, the regular forms being either εὖ μᾶλα (Gorg. 496 c, etc.) or καὶ μᾶλα (Phaedr. 205 a, etc.), I adopt the punctuation suggested by Vahlen. Other critics have proposed to eject either the καὶ or the εὖ: it would be equally easy to alter εὖ to σῦ, or transpose to καὶ εὖ. The text, punctuated after εἰπη, has been construed (1) as “plenius dictum pro εὖ μᾶλα” (Stallb.), the καὶ connecting μᾶλα with εὖ (Hommel), or (2) as εὖ μᾶλα with καὶ, corresponding to the following καὶ, interjected (so Ast.); but neither of these explanations is tenable. In favour of construing εὖ with εἰπη may be cited εὖ ἐροῦντος three ll. below and εὖ ἐρεῖ 198 λ.: for the order, cp. Rep. 613 b δὸν δὲν δὲν ἔδωσαι εὖ: Laws 805 b, 913 b (see Vahlen Op. Acad. i. 494 ff.): add Thuc. i. 71. 7 πρὸς τάδε οὐκουλεύσεπε εὖ, καὶ κτλ.

194 B ἀκρίβαντα B ἐπεδείξασθαι T θορυβήσεσθαι TW σὺ δὴ ποῦ οὐ τοῦ σ. Steph.
οὔτω θεάτρων μεστῶν ἦγει, ὡστε καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι νόον ἔχοντες ὁλίγοι ἐμφρόνεσ πολλῶν ἀφρόνων φοβερότεροι; Οὐ μενταν καλῶς Σ ποιοίην, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ὁ 'Αγάθων, περὶ σοῦ τι ἐγὼ ἀγροκοὸν δοξάζων· ἀλλ' εἴδο, ὅτι εἰ τισὶν ἐντύχοις οὐς ἡγαίο σοφοῖς, μᾶλλον ἄν αὐτῶν φροντίζοις ἢ τῶν πολλῶν· ἀλλὰ μη ὡς ὁνύ ὁποῖον ἤμεις ὥμεις—ἤμεις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐκεῖ παρῆκε καὶ ἤμεν τῶν πολλῶν· εἰ δὲ ἄλλοις ἐντύχοις σοφοῖς, τάξ' ἄν αἰσχύνοις αὐτοῖς, εἰ τι ἵσως ὁφειο ισχρὸν ὑν ποιεῖν· ἢ τῶς λέγεις; ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι. Τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς οὐκ ἄν αἰσχύνοιο, εἰ τι οἷοι αἰσχρὸν δ ποιεῖν; καὶ τὸν Φαίδρον ἐφὶ ὑπολαβόντα εἰπεῖν Ὡ φίλε Ὁμήρων, ἐδὲ ἀποκρίνῃ Σωκράτει, οὐδὲν ἐτι διώξει αὐτῷ ὁμηριν τῶν ἐνθάδε ὁμιδὸν γίγνεσθαι, ἐὰν μόνον ἐχῆ πρὸ τι διαλέγηται, ἂλλος τε καὶ καλφ. ἐγὼ δὲ ἰδέως μὲν ἀκούω Σωκράτους διαλεγομένουν, ἀναγκαίοις δὲ μοι ἐπιμεληθήσαν τοῦ ἐγκομίου τῷ Ἐρωτι καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι


οὔτω θεάτρων μεστῶν. This means “theatri applausu inflatum esse” (Stallb.); rather than “stage-struck,” cp. Themist. 26. 311 b; Synes. de provid. 105 b θεατρω και ἀγοράς ἀπληπτος.

194 C πολλῶν ἀφρόνων. As Wolf observes, “ein feines Compliment für das Parterre in Athen.” But such a lofty contempt for the bourgeois of the pit and gallery is quite in keeping with A.’s position as the artistic aristocrat. If Aristophanes flatters his public on their σοφία (as in Ran. 1109 ff.), it is obvious that he does so with his tongue in his cheek. Cp. Laws 659 Δ, οὕτω γὰρ παρὰ θεάτρων δεῖ τὸν γε ᾿Αληθῆ κρίνῃ κρίνει μανήαντα.

περὶ σοῦ τι ἐγὼ. “Nota vim pronominum... de te, vire tanto tamque insigni, ego, homo villis” (Hommel). For ἀγροικος, cp. 218 b, Laws 880 Δ Theaet. 174 δ 'αγροικὸν δε καὶ ἀπαίδευτον...γίγνεσθαι.

μὴ οὐχ...οἷοι. For Platonic exx. of μή or μὴ οὗ in “cautions assertions or negations,” see Goodwin G. M. T. § 265.

ἄλλοις...σοφοῖς. Not “other wise men” but “others who are wise” (sc. unlike us).

ἵσως. This word is probably genuine. Possibly, however, it should be transferred to a place before, or after, τάξ' ἄν (for the combination ἵσως τάξ' ἄν, cp. Tim. 38 b, Laws 676 c, etc.; Schanz nov. comm. p. 14). The ἄν after αἰσχρὸν is sufficiently confirmed by Rep. 425 c, Phaedo 77 a (see Vahlen, Op. Acad. i. 496 f. on the whole passage).

194 D οὔθεν ετι διώξεστη γίγνεσθαι. For Socrates as φιλόσοφος, see Apol. 38 Δ, Phaedo 61 ε; and for his “cramp-fish” style of dialectic, Laches 187.

ἄλλως τε καὶ καλφ. For Socrates as φιλοκαλος, cp. 213 c, 216 D: it is a mark of the ἔρωτικος.
par' évos ékástou ὑμῶν τὸν λόγον· ἀποδοὺς ὅν ἐκάτερος τῷ θεῷ
Ε ὁ ὅτας ἰδὴ διαλέγεσθω. Ἀλλὰ καλὸς λέγεις, ὁ Φαιδρε, φάναι τὸν
'Αγάθωνα, καὶ οὐδὲν με κωλύει λέγειν· Σωκράτει γάρ καὶ αὐθίς
ἐσται πολλάκις διαλέγεσθαι.

XVIII. Ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ βούλομαι πρῶτον μὲν εἶπεῖν ὡς χρῆ μὲ
eiπεῖν, ἑπείτα εἰπεῖν. Δοκοῦσι γάρ μοι πάντες οἱ πρόσθεν εἰρήκότες
οἱ τῶν θεῶν ἐγκαμμάζεις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εὖδαιμονίζειν τῶν
ἀγαθῶν ὅν ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς αἴτιος· ὅποιος δὲ τις αὐτὸν ὅν ταῦτα
195 ἐδώρησατο, οὐδεὶς εἰρήκην. εἷς δὲ τρόπος ὅρθος παντὸς ἐπαύλου
περὶ παντὸς, λόγῳ διελθεῖν οἶος ὅν <οἶον> αἴτιος ὃν τυγχάνει
περὶ οὐ ὁ λόγος ἦ. οὕτω δὴ τὸν Ἑρωτα καὶ ἡμᾶς δικαίων
ἐπαινέσαι πρῶτον αὐτῶν οἷον ἐστίν, ἑπείτα τὰς δόσεις.

Φημὶ οὖν ἐγὼ πάντων θεῶν εὐδαιμονίων ὧντων Ἑρωτα, εἰ δέμιος
καὶ ἀνεμέστατον εἰπεῖν, εὐδαιμονεστάτον εἶναι αὐτῶν, κάλλιστον

194 Ὅς BT: ἕ vulg. ἑπανείν, ἑπειτ' ἑπανείν Hirschig 195 Α. ὅρθος
ομ. Τ παντὸς om. Bdhm. οἷος ὅν <οἶον> scripsi: οἷος οἶον Sz. Bt.:
οἶς οἶον ex emend. Τ: οἷος ὅν BT: οἷος ὅν vulg., J.-U.: οἷος ὅν οἰραι:
οἷος ὅν (ὁξων) Voege.οἷος Bdhm. αἴτιος: αὐτὸς Bdhm.

ἀποδοὺς οὖν. Cp. Polit. 267 Α. καλὸς καὶ καθαπερεὶ χρῶς ἀπεδωκᾶς μοι τὸν
λόγον: Rep. 612 B, c; 220 D ἱνθα. 194 Ε πρῶτον μὲν...ἐπείτα εἰπεῖν. Stallbaum, though reading ὅς, punctuates
like Hommel (who keeps the vulgate ἕ) after the first as well as after the
second εἰπεῖν, as if the meaning were “to speak in the way in which I ought
to speak,” which is nonsense. The first εἰπεῖν (=δηλοῖν) is different in force
from the other two (=λόγον πιαίσθαι), the sense being “first to state the
proper method I am to adopt in my oration, and secondly to deliver it.”
Agathos has imbued a “worship of machinery”—the machinery of method—
from the fashionable schools of rhetoric.

Δοκοῦσι γὰρ μοι. Agathon, like the rest (cp. 180 Α, 185 Β), adopts the
favourite rhetorical device of criticizing the manner or thought of previous
speakers: cp. Isocr. Busír. 222 Β, 230 Α; Hel. 210 Β φραί μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμων...
τυγχάνει δὲ ἀπολογίαν εἰρήκως κτλ.: Panegyr. 41 Β ff., 44 c.

195 Α. οἷος ὅν (ὁξων). This doubling of relatives is a favourite trick of poets
and rhetors; cp. Soph. Aj. 923 οἷος ὅν ὅν ὅν ἔχειν (“mighty and mightily
fallen”), ib. 557, Trach. 906, 1045; Eur. Alc. 144; Gorg. Palam. 22 ὅν ὅν οἷος
ὁ λοιπός: ib. Hel. 11 ὅν ὅν ὅν ὅν καὶ ἑπείται καὶ πείσσουμε.

ἐλ θέμις καὶ ἀνεμέστην. For excess in laudation as liable to provoke
νέμεσις, see n. on φαρμάττειν, 194 Α. For the thought (here and at the end of
A.’s speech) cp. Spenser, H. to Love, “Then would I sing of thine immortall
praise...And thy triumphant name then would I raise Bove all the gods, thee
ously honoring, My guide, my God, my victor, and my king.”
195 B. ο Φαϊδρ. Phaedrus is specially addressed because it is his thesis (ἐν τοίς πρεσβύτατος ὁ 'Ερως 178 a, c) which is here challenged.

μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον. This serves to echo, and reply to, Phaedrus's τεκμήριον ἐν τούτων 178 b (cp. 192 a). For the attributes youth and beauty, cp. Callim. H. ii. 36 καὶ μὲν δὲι καλὸς καὶ δὲι νέος (of Phoebus).

φιγονον φυγή. A poetical mode of giving emphasis. "φυγή φεύγει νω-

quam sic legitur ut simplex φεύγει de victis militibus, sed per translationem, fugientium modo, h. e. omni contentione aliquid defugere atque abhorrere" (Lobeck Parall. ii. p. 524). Prose exx. are Epin. 974 b, Epist. viii. 354 c ; Lucian adv. indoct. 16.

ταχὺ ἐν...προσέρχεται. Bast, "motus ὄρησι sententiae," condemned these words; but the presence of sophistical word-play is no reason for suspicion in A.'s speech. A. argues that Age, in spite of its "lean shrunken shanks," is nimble, only too nimble indeed in its pursuit of men: therefore, ἐὰν fortiori, the god who can elude its swift pursuit must be still more nimble. For the agility of Eros, cp. Orph. H. 58. 1, 2 (κυκλήσκων ἔρωτα...ἐθρομον ὀρμή).

ἐντὸς πολλοῦ. Cp. Thuc. ii. 77 ἐντὸς γὰρ πολλοῦ χωρίου τῆς πόλεως υἱὸν ἕν πελάσας. For the sense (abhorrence of age), cp. Anaecr. 14. 5 ἡ ἒ (νήσι...τὴν μὲν ἐρήν κύρην, ἀνεκταρημέφεται κτλ.

τε καὶ ἐστιν. Hug adopts Sauppe's addition (νίσος), but this spoils the ring of the clause and it is best to leave it to be mentally supplied: for the ellipse, cp. 213 c γελοῖος ἐστι τε καὶ βούλεται. For μετὰ...σύνεστι, cp. Lawus 639 c ; Plut. de Is. et Os. 352 ἀπάρτι καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς ὅντα καὶ συνόντα.

ὑμών ὡς. The original of this is Hom. Od. xvii. 218 ὡς δὲ τὸν ὄμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τῶν ὄμοιον. Cp. 186 b supra, Lysis 214 a, Rep. 339 a ; Aristaen. Ep. i. 10 : and for a Latin equivalent, Cic. de Senect. 3. 7 pares cum paribus, votore proverbio, facillime congregantur: so Anglicé, "birds of a feather flock together." Similar in sense is ἥλις ἥλικα τέρπει (Arist. Rhet. i. 11. 25).

Φαϊδρ. The reference is to 178 b. Spenser (H. to Love) combines these opposite views,—"And yet a chyld, renewing still thy yeares, And yet the eldest of the heavenly Peares."

Κρόνου καὶ Ἰαπετοῦ ἀρχαίωτερός. A proverbial expression to denote the
C φημὶ νεώτατον αὐτὸν εἶναι θεῶν καὶ ἀεὶ νέων, τὰ δὲ παλαιὰ πράγματα περὶ θεῶν, ἡ Ἡσίοδος καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγουσιν, Ἀνάγκη καὶ οὐκ ἂρτῳ ἡγεῖναι, εἰ ἐκεῖνοι ἀλῆθῆ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄστομι πρὸς ὀδὺς δειμοὶ ἀλλήλων ἐγέροντο καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ βιαία, εἰ ἂρτῳ ἂν αὐτῶς ἦν, ἄλλα φιλία καὶ εἰρήνη, διότι πῦν, ἕξος ἂρτῳ ἂν θεῶν βασιλεύει. νέος μὲν οὖν ἔστι, πρὸς δὲ τῷ D νέῳ ἀπαλός· ποιητοῦ δὲ ἐστίν ἐνδειχθείς ὁδὸς ἢ "Ομήρος πρὸς τὸ ἐπιδείξατε θεῶν ἀπαλότητα. "Ομήρος γὰρ Ἀτην θεῶν τὰ φήσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀπαλὴν—τοὺς γούν πόδας αὐτῆς ἀπαλοῦς εἶναι—λέγον

195 C νεώτατον τῇ Stob. πράγματα T, Stob.: γράμματα B παρ-


μενίδης T: Παρμενίδης B: Επιμενίδης Ast ἐπὶ ἐκεῖνο ὑμ. Stob. λέγουσιν


Stob. ἐγέροντο Stob. D οἱς πέρ ἄν ὅ "Ομήρος Stob. τοὺς...εἶναι


"ne plus ultra" of antiquity: cp. Moeris p. 200 Ἱαπτέρως· ἀντὶ τοῦ γέρων· καὶ Τίθονος καὶ Κρόνος· ἐπὶ τῶν γερῶντων: Lucian dial. deor. 2. 1; Ar. Nub. 398, Plut. 581. Cronus and Iapetus were both Titans, sons of Uranus and Ge (Hes. Th. 507), and imprisoned together in Tartarus (Il. viii. 479). Iapetus was father of Prometheus, and grandfather of Deucalion, the Greek "Adam": hence "older than Iapetus" might be rendered "ante-preadamite."

195 C ἡ Ἡσιοδος καὶ Π. λέγουσιν. These were the authorities adduced by Phaedrus (178 b). Hesiod relates such παλαιὰ πράγματα in Theog. 176 ff., 746 ff.; but no such accounts by Parmenides are extant. Accordingly, it has been supposed (e.g. by Schleierm.) that A. is mistaken, and Ast proposed to read Ἐπιμενίδης: but cp. Macrobi. somn. Scip. i. 2 Parmenides quoque et Heraclitus de dis fabulati sunt. If P. did relate such matters in the poem of which portions remain, clearly (as Stallb. observed) it could only have been in Pt. II. ("The Way of Opinion"). Cp. Ritter and Pr. § 101 "Generati sunt deinceps (i.e. post Amorem) ceteri dei, de quibus more antiquorum poetae om. πράγματα narravit, v. Plat. Symp. 195 c, Cic. D. Nat. i. 11"; Zeller, Presocr. p. 596 (E. Tr.); Krische Forsch. p. 111 f. For Ἀνάγκη in the cosmogonists, cp. Parmen. 84 K., κρατῇ γὰρ Ἀνάγκη | πείρατος ἐν δεσ-


μοῖσιν ἐχει, τὸ μὲν ἀμφὶς ἔγραψε: ἢδ. 138 ὅς μὲν ἄγωνος ἐπέθεσεν Ἀνάγκη: Emped. 369 ἐστιν Ἀνάγκης χρήμα κτλ.

ἐλεγον. Rettig and Stallb. rightly explain the imperf. as due to the reference to Phaedrus's mention of Η. and P. (178 b).

ὕκτομαι οὖν διηρμ. Cp. Euthyphro 5 b ff., Rep. 377 b where such tales of divine immorality are criticized.


"Ομήρος γὰρ. See Il. xiv. 92—3. Schol. πίλνατα· προσπελάζει, προσέγ-


γίζει.

τοὺς γούν...εἶναι. As Hug observes, the occurrence of καὶ τοσὶ καὶ πάντῃ below is sufficient to establish the soundness of these words.
tēs mēνt' ἀπαλοὶ πόδες· οὐ γαρ ἐπ' οὐδεσιν πάλιναί τι, ἀλλ' ἔρα ἣ γε κατ' ἀνδρῶν κράτα τα βαίνειν.
καλὸν οὖν δοκεὶ μοι τεκμηρίῳ τὴν ἀπαλότητα ἀροφαίλειν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπὶ σκληροῦ βαίνει, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μαλακοῦ. τῷ αὐτῷ δὴ καὶ ἰμέεις χρησωμέθα τεκμηρίῳ περὶ Ἔρωτα ὅτι ἀπαλός. οὐ γαρ ἐπὶ τῆς Ε βαίνει οὔδ' ἐπὶ κρανίων, ἀ ἐς τοις μαλακώτατοι τῶν οὐ καὶ βαίνει καὶ οἰκεί. ἐν γαρ ἰδεῖ καὶ ψυχαις θεόν καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὴν οἶκησιν ἔδραται, καὶ οὐκ αὖ ἐξῆς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ἀλλα ἂντι ἂν σκληροῦ ἡδον ἔχουσῃ ἐντύχῃ, ἀπέρχεται, ἡ δ' ἂν μαλακον, οἰκείεται. ἀπτόμενον οὖν αἰει καὶ ποτε καὶ πάντῃ ἐν μαλακώτατοι τῶν μαλακώτατος, ἀπαλότατον ἀνάγηκε εἶναι. νεώτατος μὲν δὴ ἐστι καὶ ἀπαλότατος, πρὸς δὲ 196 τοῦτοι ὕγρος τὸ εἴδος. οὐ γαρ ἂν οἷος τ' ἴν πάντῃ περιπτύονσεθαι.


195 E ἰδεις καὶ ψυχαις. "In the tempers and souls": here ἰδεις seems to be co-ordinate with ψυχή, but below ((heap ἐχόοισιν, sc. ψυχή) subordinate, i.e. A. uses the word loosely with more attention to sound than sense: cp. Λυγ. 222 λ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἂν κατὰ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἱδον ἂν τράπετον ἃ εἴδος: 183 περια, 207 εἰνθα. Notice also the material way in which ἰδον and ψυχαί are here conceived: cp. Moschus i. 17 ἐπὶ σπαλάροις δὲ καθήκε: and the figure in such a phrase as "the iron entered into his soul."
καὶ ποιῆ καὶ πάντη. "With feet and with form entire," "nicht wie Ate blos mit Füßen" (Wolf): πάντη, like ἅε, is A.'s own extension of the Homeric statement.
ἐν μαλακώτατοι τῶν μ. The genitive is governed by ἀπτόμενον, and ἐν μαλακώτατος is parallel to ἐν τοῖς (πρεσβύτατον) 178 λ: "the most soft of softest things."

ὑγρός τὸ εἴδος. υγρός, here opposed to σκληρός, is often used "de rebus lubricis, lentis, flexibilibus, mollibus" (Stallb.): cp. Theoc. 162 β τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ υγρότερῳ δοτί (opp. to σκληρῷ δοτί) προσπαλαίνειν: Pind. Pyth. i. 17 (11) ὃ δὲ (αἰεῖς) κνώσαντον ύγρὸν νότου αἰωρεῖ: Callistr. descript. 3 (of a bronce of Eros) ὑγρὸς μὲν ἕν ἄμαρχοι μαλακότητος. Another sense of υγρός, in erotic terminology, is "melting," "languishing," e.g. Anth. Plan. 306 ἐπὶ δμαμασῶν ύγρὰ δεδορκὸν: Anaxag. xxviii. 21: and in hymn. Hom. xviii. 33 υγρός is an epithet of πόδα. "Supple of form" is the best rendering here. Arist. G. D. i. 7. 3 applies υγρότης (τοῦ σώματος) to serpents.—περιπτύονσεθαι is ἰπ. λεγ. in Plato, and mainly used in poetry.
συμμέτρον...ιδέας. "Acute vidit Astius σύμμετρον referendum esse ad peripτύςσεσθαι. Amor enim, quia potest πάντη peripτύςσεσθαι, recte σύμμετρον vocatur. Itaque ne hic quidem audien dus est Orellius qui σύμ-
μετρον legendum putabant." (Stallb., so too Rückert and Hommel). Rettig
takes σύμμετρον to be merely a synonym for ύγρός, supposing that the proof
of the statement ύγρός τά είδος, which was first stated negatively, is here
being stated positively—"num hängt συμμετρία mit der εὐσχημοσύνη zusammen
the other hand Hug, supposing that συμμετρία is introduced as a new attribute
distinct from ύγρός, follows Jahn in ejecting the words καὶ ύγρός. Rettig's
view, adopted also by Teuffel, seems the most reasonable: A., with sophistical
looseness, smuggles in the extra term σύμμετρον beside ύγρός in order to
secure the applicability of εὐσχημοσύνη. By συμμετρία, properly used, is
meant the perfect proportion of the parts in relation to one another which
results in a harmonious whole: see my Philo. p. 176. For εὐσχημοσύνη, cp.
Rep. 400 c ff.

οὗδὲ διὰ πάσης ψυχῆς καὶ εἰσίδων τὸ πρῶτον λαυθάνειν καὶ ἐξιῶν; εἰ
σκληρὸς ἡ. συμμέτρον δὲ καὶ ύγράς ιδέας μέγα τεκμήριον ἡ εὐσχη-
μοσύνη, ὃ δὴ διαφερόντως ἐκ πάντων ὁμολογουμένως ἕρως ἔχει·
ἀσχημοσύνη γὰρ καὶ ἔρωτι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀεὶ πόλεμος. χρόνος δὲ
κάλλος ἢ κατ' ἀνθή διάιτα τοῦ θεοῦ σημαίνεται ἀναπερ σάρκα καὶ

196 A καὶ (ante εἰσίδων) om. W καὶ ύγρᾶς secl. In. Sz.: καὶ τρυφέρας
Verm.: καὶ ἀβράς Sehwald iδέας: ὀφθαλμὺς Stob. ἢ κατ': ἢ καὶ τὰ Stob.

καὶ πάντων. Cp. Theaet. 171 B ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα...ἀμφιβολήσεται, "on all
hands, then...we find it disputed" (so Campbell ad loc., who observes that
"this use of ἐξ has been needlessly disputed by Heindorf and others"). Ficinus
seems to connect ἐκ π. with διαφ., which is possible but less probable.

χρόνος δὲ καλλὸς κτλ. Possibly we have here a reminiscence of some
passage in poetry: χρῶς...ἀνθή admits, as Hug observes, of being scanned
as a "catalectic pentamody" (like Eur. Phoen. 294). In the repeated mention
in these lines of ἄνθος and its compounds, we may discern an allusion to
Agathon's tragedy 'Ανθέως. Cp. Plato 32 (I. L. G. π. 311) αὐτός δ' (sc. ἐρώς)
ἐν καλύκεσιν μεῖδον πεπεθημένον ὑπνοι | εἴδεν μειδίων: Αλέκαν 38 μάργον δ'
"Ερώς οἰα παῖς πάλαις...ἀκρ' ἐπ' ἀνθῆ καβαίνω...τὸ κυνηρίασε: Simon. fr. 47
ὁμιλεῖ δ' ἀνθέσιν, (ὁτε) μέλισσα ξανθῶν μελ κηρομένα: Ερός, like Titania, loves
"a bank where the wild thyme blows" (εὐώδης τόπως), and might echo the
song "where the bee sucks, there suck I," etc. For the negative thought
ἀναπερ...οὐκ ἐνίζει, cp. Philo de meretr. merc. π. 204 ἐξώροις γενομέναις ("when
past the flower of their age," sc. ταῖς ἔταιραις) oudeis ἐτὶ πρόσεσιν, ἀπομορφα-
thείας διαπε τινῶν ἄνθων τῆς ἀκρής. For εὐώδης τόπως, cp. Phaedr. 230 B.
The description of Eros lying soft in Soph. Antig. 781 ff. is somewhat similar,
XIX. Περὶ μὲν οὖν κάλλους τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ταύτ’ ἰκανά καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ λείπεται, περὶ δὲ ἄρετῆς Ἕρωτος μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέων, τὸ μὲν μέγιστον ὁτι Ἕρως οὔτ’ ἄδικει οὔτ’ ἄδικεται οὔθ’ ὑπὸ θεοῦ οὔτε θεόν, οὔθ’ ὑπ’ ἄνθρωπον οὔτε ἄνθρωπον. οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὸς βία πάσχει, εἴ τι πάσχει. βία γὰρ Ἕρωτος οὐχ ἀπετειαί οὔτε ποιῶν ποιεῖ· πάς γὰρ ἐκὼν Ἕρωτι πᾶν ὑπηρετεῖ, ἀ δ’ ἄν ἔκων ἕκοντες ὁμολογήσης, φασίν “οἱ πόλεως βασιλῆς νόμοι” δίκαια εἶναι. πρὸς


(*Ἑρως) δὲ ἐν μαλακίᾳ παρειαὶς | νεανίδος ἐνυψίεις: cp. Hor. O. IV. 13. 6 ff. (Amor) virentis...pulcris excubat in genias. Also the echo of our passage in Aristaeum. Ep. II. 1.

196 B Περὶ μὲν οὖν...περὶ δὲ κτλ. Cp. Isocr. Pan. 47 ὁ Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου...ταύτ’ εἰσίν ξάμεν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χρόνου κτλ.: Phaedr. 246 λ. περὶ δὲ ἄρετῆς. In drawing out this part of his theme Agathon follows the customary four-fold division of ἄρετη into δικασίαν, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σοφία. Adam (on Rep. 427 ε) writes “There is no evidence to shew that these four virtues and no others were regarded as the essential elements of a perfect character before Plato.” Yet it certainly seems probable that these four were commonly recognized as leading ἄρετα at an earlier date (see the rest of the evidence cited by Adam), and a peculiarly Platonic tenet would hardly be put into the mouth of Agathon. Cp. Protag. 329 c ff.; and for a similar use made of this classification in oncomastic oratory, see Isocr. Hel. 31 ff., Niccol. 31 ff., 36 ff. (cp. n. 184 c).

οὔτ’ ἄδικει οὔτ’ ἄδικεται. The maxima “love your enemies, do good to them which despitefully treat you” formed no part of current Greek ethics: cp. Mened. 71 ε αὕτη ἕστιν ἄνδρός ἄρετη...τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὰ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ’ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς: Crito 49 B: Xen. Mem. II. 3. 14; and other passages cited by Adam on Rep. 331 ε. See also Dobbs, Philos. etc. pp. 39, 127, 243. Notice the chiasmus ἄδικει...ἀδικεῖται...ὑπ’ θεοῦ...θεῶν.

βία πάσχα. These words form one notion and are put as a substitute for ἄδικεται, just as ποιεῖ (εἰς βία) below is a substitute for ἄδικει. Cp. Polit. 280 ο τὰς βία πράξεις. There may be a ref. here to the ἔρωτος ἀνάγκαι of Gorgias Hel. 19.

πάς γὰρ κτλ. With but slight modification this would form an iambic trimeter. Cp. Gorgias ap. Philol. 58 η τοῦ ποιεῖν πολὺ διαφέρει ποιῶν τεχνῶν...πάντα γὰρ ὑφ’ αὕτη δολα δι’ ἐκόντων ἅλλ’ οὐ διὰ βίας, of which our passage may be a reminiscence.

196 σ’ α’ ἄν κτλ. The argument is that where mutual consent obtains, since βία is absent, there can be no ἄδικα. For a different view of δικασίαν see Arist. Eth. Β. v. 9. 1136 β 32 ff. ἤπεραν γὰρ τὸ νομικόν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κτλ.: Crito 52 ε: Xen. Symp. VII. 20.

οἱ πόλεως...νόμοι. Apparently a quotation from Alcidamas, a rhetor of the
δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ σωφροσύνῃ πλείστης μετέχει. εἶναι γὰρ ὑμο-
λογεῖται σωφροσύνῃ τῷ κρατεῖν ἥδων καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν, "Ερωτος δὲ
μηδεμίαν ἥδοναν κρείττων εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἦττους, κρατοῦν· ἀν ὑπὸ
"Ερωτος, ὁ δὲ κρατοῦν, κρατῶν δὲ ἴδιων καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ὁ "Ερως
diaferontos d̓ an sωφρονοῦ. καὶ μὴν εἰς γε ἄνδρειαν "Ερωτι "οὖν
D "Аρης ἀνθίσταται." οὐ γὰρ ἔχει "Ερωτα "Αρης, ἀλλὰ "Ερως "Αρης,
'Αφροδίτης, ὡς λόγος· κρείττων δὲ ὁ ἢχων τοῦ ἑξαμένου· τοῦ δὲ
ἄνδρειστάτου τῶν ἄλλων κρατῶν πάντων ἀν ἄνδρειστάτος εὖν.
περὶ μὲν δὲν δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἄνδρειας τοῦ θεοῦ
eίρηται, περὶ δὲ σοφίας λειπέσται· δὸν οὐν δυνατόν, πειρατέως μὴ
ἐλλείπειν. καὶ πρῶτον μέν, ἐν αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην

196 c πλείστων Cobet κρατεὶ Stob., Naber: κρατοῖς Bdhm. σωφρονοῦ
ἐν' αὖ T: αὖ B: ἐν' οὖν Stob.

school of Gorgias: see Arist. Rhet. iii. 1406a 18 ff. διὸ τὰ 'Αλκιδάμαντος νεφρά
φαντατ· οὐ γὰρ ἢδοματ χρήται ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδίσματο τοὺς ἐπιθύμους, οὗτος πυκνοῖς
καὶ μείζονι καὶ ἐπίδηλοις, οὖν...οὐχί νόμοις ἀλλὰ τῶν πύκνων βασιλείς νόμους
(see Cope ad loc.). Two extant works are ascribed to Alcidamas, viz. an
Odyssey and a de Sophistis: the latter is probably genuine and "seems to
justify Aristotle's strictures on his want of taste in the use of epithets" (Cope
π. 328.

eἶναι γὰρ...σωφροσύνην. This definition of "temperance" is common to
both scientific and popular morals. Cp. Rep. 369 ν σωφροσύνης...αὐτῶν
(εἰναί) ἄρχοντας τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἔδοξας ἡδονῶν ("tem-
perance, soberness and chastity"); ib. 430 ε, Phaedo 68 c: Antiphon fr. 6
σωφροσύνην δ' ἄνδρος...οὗτος τοῦ θυμοῦ τὰς παραχρήμα ἡδονᾶς ἐμφάσεων
κρατεῖν τε καὶ νικᾶν ἡδυνὴν αὐτὸς ἕαυτον. See Dobbs op. cit. pp. 149 ff.;

"Ερωτος δὲ κτλ. The argument is vitiated both by the ambiguity in the
use of Eros (as affection and as person) and by the ambiguity in κρατεὶ
ἡδονῶν, which in the minor premiss is equivalent to ἔστιν ἡ κρατίστη ἡδονή.
For similar fallacies, see Euthyd. 276 d ff.; Arist. soph. el. 165b 32 ff. For ἐρως
as a master-passion, cp. Rep. 572 ε ff. Agathon here again echoes Gorgias
(Hel. 6 πέφυκε γὰρ οὐ τὸ κρείσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἱσονος κωλυσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἱσον
ὑπὸ τὸ κρείσσον ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἀγεσθαι κτλ.).

οὖθεν "Ἀρης ἀνθίσταται. This comes from Soph. (Thyestes) fr. 235 N. πρὸς
τὴν ἀνάγκην οὖθεν "Ἀρης ἀνθίσταται. Cp. Anacreontea 27 A, 13 ἀλαβὲν βελέμνον
(sc. Ἕρως) Ἀρης.

196 d ὁς λόγος. See Hom. Od. viii. 266 ff., already alluded to in 192 d.

πάντων ἂν...ἐλι. Another illegitimate conclusion. By means of a tacit
substitution of the notion ἄνδρεια for κρατεῖ, it is assumed that ὁ κρατῶν
tοῦ ἄνδρείου must be ἄνδρειατερος.
196 Ε ὡσπερ Ἐρυξίμαχος. Στὴν αὐτὸν, ποιήτης ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς οὐτως Ε ὠστε καὶ ἄλλων ποιησαί, πᾶς γὰρ ποιήτης γίγνεται, "καὶ ἄμονος ἢ τὸ πρῖν," οὐ ἐν "Ερως ἄψηται. ὦ δὴ πρέπει ἡμᾶς μαρτυρῆς κρῆσασθαι, ὅτι ποιητής ὁ "Ερως ἀγαθὸς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ πᾶσαν ποιήσειν τὴν κατὰ μουσικὴν· ἀ γὰρ τῇ μιᾷ ἡμὶ ἐχει ἡ μῃ οἴδεν, οὕτως ἀν ἐτέρῳ δοῖν οὕτω ἄλλων διδάξει. καὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν γε τῶν ζώων ποιήσειν 197 πάντων τίς εναντίωσε τιμὴ οὐκ ἢ. Ὁ ἐρωτος εἶναι σοφιάν, ἢ γίγνεται τε καὶ φύεται πάντα τὰ ζώα; ἄλλα τὴν τῶν τεχνῶν δημιουργίαν οὐκ ἴσως, ὅτι οὐ δὲν ὁ θεὸς οὐτος διδασκάλος γένηται, ἐννοίμοις καὶ φανὸς ἀπέβη, οὗ δὲν ἢ ὁ Ερως μὴ ἐφάγηται, σκοτεινὸς; τοξικήν γε μὴν καὶ ἱατρικὴν καὶ μαντικὴν Ἀπόλλων άνευρεν ἐπιθυμίας καὶ


196 Ε ὡσπερ Ἐρυξίμαχος. See 186 B.

πᾶς γὰρ καλ. An allusion to Eurip. (Sthemeneos) fr. 663 N. ποιητὴν δ' ἁρα "Ερως διδάσκει, καὶ ἄμονος ἢ τὸ πρῖν. This last phrase had a vogue: cp. Ar. Vesp. 1074; Menander Com. 4, p. 146; Plut. amat. 17. 762 B, Symp. i. 622 c; Longin, de subl. 39. 2 (quoted with other passages by Nauck). For the ditties of a love-sick swain, cp. Lysia 204 D. See also Arist. t. i. Or. iv. p. 30.

πᾶσαν...μουσικὴν. With A's bisection of ποιήσεις cp. the analysis of the notion by Socrates, 206 B infra.

196 Α καὶ μὲν δὴ...γε. Porro etiam, quin etiam. (See Madv. Gr. Synt. § 236.)

"Ερωτος...σοφιάν. σοφιάν is here predicate (against Rückert) and stands for σοφιας ἔργον. For Eros as "poetic" in this sense, cp. Spenser (H. to Love), "But if thou were indeed, as men thee call, The worlds great Parent."

τὴν...δημιουργίαν. This branch of ποιήσεις is really a distinct kind from the other two, as not involving invention or creation. For " demiurgic acts," see Phileb. 56 D ff., and for ἱατρικὴ as an example Phileb. 56 A; cp. 186 C, D supra. Cp. Isocr. Hel. 219 B (where H. is eulogized as the cause τεχνῶν καὶ φιλοσοφῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀφελείων).


Ἀπόλλων άνευρεν. For Apollo as the inventor of τοξική, see Hom. H. ii. 827; of μαντική, H. i. 72; of ἱατρική, 190 E ff. supra. See also h. Hom. Apollo. 131 ff.; and for μαντική in connexion with the cult of A., Rohde Psyche ii. pp. 56 ff.
B ἔρωτος ἦγεμονέυσαντος, ὡστε καὶ οὕτος ἔρωτος ἄν εἰ ἡ μαθητής, καὶ Μοῦσαι μουσικῆς καὶ 'Ἡφαίστους χαλκείας καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ ιστοργίας καὶ Ζεὺς "κυβερνάν θεὼν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων." ὅθεν δὴ καὶ κατασκευάσθη τῶν θεῶν τὰ πράγματα ἔρωτος ἦγεμονέυσεν, δήλον ὃτι κάλλους· αἰσχεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἔπει ἔρωτοι πρὸ τοῦ δὲ, ἀστερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶπον, πολλά καὶ δεινὰ θεοῖς ἐγένετο, ὡς λέγεται, διὰ τὴν τῆς Ἀπάγους βασιλείαν ἐπείδη δ᾿ ὁ θεὸς οὕτος ἔφυ, ἐκ τοῦ ἐράν τῶν καλῶν πάντ᾽ ἀγαθὰ γέγονε καὶ θεοὶς καὶ ἀνθρώποις.

C Οὕτως ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Παῦλο, ἔρως πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἀκαλλιστος καὶ ἀρίστος μετὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄλλων τοιούτων αὕτως εἶναι.


197 B ἔρωτος..."Ερωτος. Here, as elsewhere in these λόγοι, there is a play on the double sense of the word as (1) a mental affection (i.e. ἐπιθυμία), and (2) a personal agent.

καὶ Μοῦσαι μουσικῆς. Supply (as Stallb. and Hug) "Ερωτος ἄν εἰν μαθητής. Less probable is the explanation of Ast and Rückert who, regarding ὡστε... μαθητής as parenthetic, supply ἀνέφων with Μοῦσαι (and the other nominatives) and take μουσικῆς (and the other genitives) as dependent on ἐπιθυμία... ἦγεμονέυσαν mentally repeated. For the double genitive of person and thing, cp. Hesp. 599 6 τις μαθήτας εἰς τιμής καθέντες.


Ζεὺς κυβερνάν. The sudden change of construction from genitive to bare infin., together with the unusual genit. after κυβερνάν, are best explained by assuming (with Usener) that we have here another of Agathon's poetical tags. For Zeus as world-pilot, see Il. ii. 205, ix. 98: cp. Parmen. fr. 128 M. δαίμων, ἡ πάντα κυβερνά: and below, 197 6 ad ἑπτ. κυβέρνησις is applied to Ἐρως (cp. 186 E).

καταγενέσθη κτλ. This sentence is quoted later on (201 a) by Socrates. ἓν πράγματα echoes the παλαιὰ πράγματα of 195 c. κάλλος is object. gen. after ἔρωτος.

ἀἰσχεῖ γὰρ κτλ. This repeats the assertion of 196 a—b. Rettig reads αἰσχεῖ... ἰτείν, arguing that ἰτείν, not ἰν, is required by the ref. in 201 a: but αἰσχεῖ ἰτείν as an equiv. for αἰσχοὺς ἰτείν would be a strange use. The restoration ἰν is certain as such things can be.

ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐπιστον. See 195 a. Notice that here as there A. refuses to make himself responsible for the ascription of violence to the gods, as shown by the saving clause ὡς λέγεται.

ἐπέρχεται δὲ μοι τι καὶ ξύμετρον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὖν ὅστις ἐστὶν ὁ ποιῶν εἰρήνην μὲν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, πελάγει δὲ γαλήνην νημεῖαν, ἀνέμους κοίτην ὑπνον τ' ἐνι κῆδει.

οὖν ὅστις ἡμᾶς ἀλλοτριώτητος μὲν κενοί, οἰκείοτητος δὲ πληροῖ, τὰς Δ τοιάσθε ἐξυνόδους μετ' ἀλλήλων πάσας τιθέεις ἔωσταί,


ἐπέρχεται δὲ μοι κτλ. Here Agathon breaks out into verse of his own, whereas hitherto he had contented himself with quoting from others (196 c, e). Observe the alliterative effect, dear to the school of Gorgias, of the play with ρ and ν, γ and λ, in the former, and of ν and μ in the latter of the two verses.

νημεῖαν...κῆδει. Both the punctuation and reading of this verse are doubtful. Rückert, Stallb., and the Zurich edd. print commas after γαλήνην and ἀνέμους, Hug and Burnet only after ἀνέμους, Hommel after γαλήνην and κοίτην. It would appear, however, from the Homeric passage (Od. ν. 391 = Ξπ. 168, ἀνέμοι μὲν ἐπαύσατο ἠδὲ γαλήνη | ἐπλετο νημεία), of which this is obviously an echo, that no stop should be placed after γαλήνην, but rather after νημεῖαν or ἀνέμους; while the compound word ἀνέμοκοιτα, applied to a sect (γένος) in Corinth who claimed to be able τοὺς ἀνέμους κομίζειν (see Hesych. and Suid. s.v.; also Welcker Kl. Schr. 3. 63; Rohde Psych. π. 88, and 202 ν. c.), makes it probable that ἀνέμους κοίτην are meant to go closely together. Further, although as Zeller argues it is appropriate enough in general to describe Love as “is qui non sequoris solum sed etiam humani pectoris turbas sedat” (cp. Ιλ. xxiv. 128 ff., Catull. 68. 1—8), still the reversion to human κηδῶς after mentioning waves and winds is a little curious, and it is tempting to adopt Hommel’s conjecture ἐνι κῆτει which, if κῆτος can bear the sense of “sea-depths” (see L. and S. s.vv. κηδός, μεγακήδης) would furnish a more satisfactory disposition of ideas—“peace on land and on sea, repose in heaven above and in the depths below.” Or, if we assumed that an original νεικη (= νείκει) was corrupted by haplography to ἐνι κη, a fair sense would be obtained. If the ordinary text be kept, we may notice (with Vögelin) how the force of the prepos. in ἐν ἀνθρ̄..., ἐνι κῆδει varies “in the style of the Sophists.” In Theaet. 153 c we have a similar combination, νημεῖαι τε καὶ γαλήναι, the only other Platonic ex. of νημεία being Phaedo 77 ε. γαλήνως as an adj. occurs in Αξ. 370 D.

197 D ἀλλοτριώτητος κτλ. For Eros as the peace-maker, cp. Isocr. Ηελ. 221 B εὑρίσκομεν τοὺς "Ελλήνας δὲ αὐτὴν ὄμοσσάστας καὶ κοινὴν στράτευμα... πνευμάτων.

τὰς τοιάσθε ἐξυνόδους. “Haec deictikōs dicta sunt: quale est hoc convivium nostrum” (Stallb.).

B. P.

6
ἐν χοροῖς, ἐν θυσίαις γυνῳμένοις ἡγεμών· πραότητα μὲν πορίζων, ἀγριότητα δ᾽ ἐξορίζων· φιλόδωροι εὐμενεῖς, ἀδώροι δυσμενεῖς· ἐλεος ἁγανός· θειός σοφοῖς, ἁγαστὸς θεοῖς· ζηλωτὸς ἄμοιροις, κτητὸς εὐμέρειοι· τρυφῆς, ἀβρότητος, χλιδῆς, χαρίτων, ἴμερον, πόθου πατήρ· ἐπιμελής ἁγαθῶν, ἀμελής κακῶν· ἐν πόνῳ, ἐν φαβῷ.


ἐν θυσίαις. For θ. Stob. has εὐμενεῖς, which looks like a gloss on some word other than θυσίαις. I am inclined to suspect that θιάσου should be restored; the word would fit in well between χοροίς and ἡγεμών, “in festive bands.” The corruption might be due to the loss of the termination, after which θιάσου was mistaken for θυσίαις. Cp. Xen. Symp. viii. 1 πάντες ἐπέμεν τοῖς θεοῖς τούτοις διασώται.

ἁγανός. The ἁγαθός of the mss. cannot stand, and Stobaeus’s ἁγαθός (adopted by most ed. since Wolf) is open to objection both as spoiling the symmetry and because of the occurrence of ἁγαθῶν just below. We want a more exquisite word, and Usener’s ἁγανός is more appropriate in sense than such possible alternatives as ἁγανώς or ἁγλάς. For Agathon’s antitheses, cp. Clem. Al. Strom. v. 614 D; Athen. v. 11.

τρυφῆς...χλιδῆς. Moeris: χλιδῆς ἀρτικοί, τρυφῆς ἔλληνες. Hence Hug omits τρυφῆς as a gloss on χλιδῆς, and (to preserve symmetry) omits πόθου also.

ἐν πόνῳ κτλ. These words have given rise to much discussion and many emendations (see crit. n.). Two main lines of interpretation are possible: either (1) we may suppose that maritime allusions are to be sought in these words to match those in κυβερνήτης κτλ.; or (2) we may suppose the latter set of words to be used in a merely metaphorical sense. Badham adopts line (1); so too Schütz regards the whole figure as borrowed “e re nautica. Nautis enim saepe timor naufragii, desiderium terrae, labor in difficultate navigandi, aerumna nauseantibus...accidere solet”; and he takes the following four subst. (κυβερνήτης κτλ.) as referring in order to these four conditions. And, adopting this line, I myself formerly proposed to read (for ἐν πόθῳ, ἐν λόγῳ) ἐν πόνῳ, ἐν ῥάθῳ. The 2nd line of explanation is adopted (a) by those who attempt to defend the vulgate, and (b) by some who have recourse to emendation. Thus (a) Stallb. commends Λατ’s view that λόγος can stand here because Agathon’s speech is full of “merus verborum lusus”; while Hommel takes the words ἐν πόνῳ etc. as “e re amatoria depronta,” expressing the affections of the lover while seeking the society of his beloved, and connects (in the reverse order) λόγῳ with κυβερν., πόθῳ with ἐπιθ., φάβῳ with παραστ., and πόνῳ with σωτηρ. On the other hand, (b) Rettig—while altering the second pair to ἐν μάθῳ, ἐν λόγῳ—also disregards the maritime metaphor and
εν πότω, εν λόγῳ κυβερνήτης, ἐπιβάτης, παραστάτης τε καὶ σωτήρ Ε ἄριστος, ξυμπάντων τοις θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώπων κόσμως, ὄργανον καλ-
λιστος καὶ ἄριστος, ὦ χρή ἔπεισαι πάντα ἄνδρα ἐφύμνωντα


understands the passage “überhaupt von Kriegsgefahren und dem in solchen geleisteten Beistand,” comparing the allusions to such matters by Phaedrus (179 Λ) and Alcibiades (220 δ. ff.). Here Retting is, I believe, partly on the right track; since the clue to the sense (and reading) here is to be looked for in Alcibiades’ eulogy of Socrates. We find πόνῳ echoed there (219 ε τούς πόνους...περὶπήν), and φόβῳ also (220 ε φυγῇ ἄνεχόρει, 221 Α ἐν φόβῳ) and εν λόγῳ may be defended by the allusions to Socrates’ λόγοι (215 ο. ff., 221 θ. ff.). Thus the only doubtful phrase is εν πόθῳ, which has no parallel in Alcibiades’ speech, and is also objectionable here because of the proximity of πόνου.

In place of it I propose εν πότῳ (cp. Philo. 48 Λ), of which we find an echo (in sense if not in sound) in 220 Α ἐν τ’ α’ ταὶς εἰσχίαις...καὶ πάνω...πάντας ἐκρατεί. For maritime terms in connexion with λόγος, cp. Lach. 194 ε ἀνδρός φίλως χειμαζόμενος εν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσι βοηθῶν: Parm. 137 Α διανείσας...τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς λόγοις: Phaedr. 264 Α; Philo. 29 Β. So both λόγος and πότος in Dionys. Chalc. 4. 1 ff. ὑμοὶς οἰνοχοίς...τούνθε...εἰρεῖσθαι γλώσσης ὑποπέμψειαν...παῦε ἐπὶ συμπαυσίαν: ἐξειδίκτησι τοῦ λόγου | Φιλάκος Μουσών ἐρέται ἐπὶ σέλαμα πέμπει: τ. 5. 1 ff. καὶ τινες οἴνων ἄγοντες ἐν εἰρείσθῃ Διανύσαν, | συμπαυσίον ναύαται καὶ κυλικὸν ἐρέται | (μάρεναται) περὶ τούτῳ. Cp. also Cic. Tusc. iv. 5. 9 quaeerebam utrum pandem erat orationis statim, an eam...dialectico remis propellerem. For παραστάτης, of Eros, cp. ἀ παρ’ ἐκατόφθαλμων in later Stoic literature (Rohde Psyche p. 316): Epict. diss. i. 14. 12; Menander (ap. Mein. Com. iv. 238) ἀπέτυχα διαμόν οὐκ ἀναβραστάθημεν καὶ εἰς τὸ γενομένου μυσταγαγωγὸς τοῦ βλου. For Socrates as σωτήρ, see 220 ο. ff.: the term is regularly applied to a ἱρος, e.g. Soph. O. C. 460 (Οδύς); Thuc. v. 11. 2 (Brasidas); Eur. Her. 1032 (Eurystheus): Pind. fr. 132 has the same combination, σωτήρ ἄριστος: cp. Spenser, “(Love) the most kind preserver Of living wights.” εν πόνῳ might be a reminiscence of Pind. Nem. x. 78 παῦρο...εν πόνῳ πιστοι: or used, HomERICALLY, of “the toil of war” (= εν μαγις, cp. 220 Β). For κυβερνήτης used metonymously, cp. 197 Β (n. on κυβερνῶν); so Emerson, “Beauty is the pilot of the young soul” επιβάτης, in the present context, must mean “a marine,” classarius miles, and hence, by metonymy, “a comrade” in general.—The general sense of the passage is this: “in the contest both of war and peace the best guide and warden, comrade and rescuer is Eros.” Cp. also Procl. in I Alc. p. 40.


ἡμιμῶν...ἐφύμνωντα. The image is that of Eros as coryphæus leading a
καλῶς, φθινὸς μετέχοντα ἦν ἄδει θέλγων πάντων θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων νόμα.

Οὔτος, ἔφη, ὁ παρ' ἐμοῦ λόγος, ὁ Φαῖδρος, τῷ θεῷ ἀγαλείον, τὰ μὲν παίδιας, τὰ δὲ σπουδὴς μετρίας, καθ' ὅσον ἐγὼ δύναμαι, μετέχων.

Εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀριστόδημος ἀναθορυβήσας τοὺς παρόντας, ὡς πρεπόντως τοῦ νεωνίκου εἰρηκότος καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ θεῷ. τὸν οὖν Σακράτης εἰπεῖν βλέψαντα εἰς τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, Ἄρα σοι δοκῶ, φάναι, ὦ ταῖ Ἀκουμενοῦ, ἰδεῖς πάλαι δέος δεδείναι, ἀλλ' οὐ μαντικῶς ἢ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Ἀγάθων θαμμαστῶς ἔροι, ἐγώ δ' ἀπορήσουμι; Τὸ μὲν ἔτερον, φάναι τοῦ Ἐρυξίμαχον, μαντικῶς μοι δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι, ὅτι Ἀγαθών εὖ ἐρεί· τὸ δὲ σε ἀπορήσειν, οὐκ ὀμιαί.

καλῶς BT: καλῆς Stob.: καλὼς kalv vulg.: καλῶς τῆς Ast.: καλῶς καὶ τῆς Orelli Teuffel: καὶ Mdg. Sz. δὲ (και) Method. 198 A. πρεπόντως b t: πρεπόντος BTW ἀρα B ἀραὶ Cobet Jn. δοκεῖς μοι T

procession of singers, and singing ("a song of my beloved") himself (φθινὸς ἦν ἄδει). Notice how Agathon repeats the phrase θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων (op. 197 B). For ὑγιέων, cp. Spenser (H. to Lose) "Thou art his god, thou art his mighty guide." καλὴς is omitted in Ficinus' transl.

νόμα. Here used, poetically, as equivalent to νοῦς: cp. Pind. Pyth. vii. 29; Theogn. 435; Emped. 329 St., αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώπως περικάρδιων ἐστι νόμα. τῷ θεῷ ἀγαλείον. "Let it be presented as a votive-offering (ἀνάθημα) to the God (σα. Eros)."

παιδίας...σπουδῆς. Possibly an echo of Gorg. Hel. ad fin. Ἔλενθης μὲν ἑγκώμιο, ἐμὸν δὲ πάγιον. For the antithesis, ep. 216 e; Laws 647 ν; Phædr. 30 e; Ar. Ran. 389.

μετρίας. "H.e. κοσμίας" (Stallb.), with, perhaps, a latent play on the other sense of μέτρων, in allusion to the rhythmical style of A.'s oration; ep. 187 ν, 206 c, Phædr. 267 A εἰ μέτρῳ λέγειν.


ὦ ταῖ Ἀκουμενοῦ. Observe the mock-solemnity of this mode of address: ep. 172 λ, 214 ν. Socrates addresses Eryx. with allusion to his language in 193 ν (εἴ μη ξυπηρήθη κτλ.).

ἀδέως...δεδείναι. Schol. ἀδέως δεδ. ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ μὴ ἄξια φόβου δεδιάνων. ἄμοιον ποτόν καὶ τῷ ψυφοδέος ἀνθρωποῖς (Phædr. 257 ν). Observe how Socr. here, in caricature of Agathon's style (e.g. 197 ν), combines in one phrase the figura etymologica and the figura ozymoron: cp. Eur. I. T. 216 νύμφων δύναμι- φων: ib. 566 χάριν ἄχραν: id. Hel. 690 γάμων ἄγαμον.

ὦ νῦν δὲ ἐλεγον. The reference is to 194 λ.
198 B

Kaivōs, ὥ μακάριε, εἴπειν τὸν Σωκράτη, οὐ μέλλω ἀπορεῖν B καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλος ὀστισοῦν, μέλλουν λέξειν μετὰ καλὸν οὕτω καὶ παντοδαπὸν λόγον ῥηθέντα; καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐχ ὁμοίως μὲν ἑαυμαστά· τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥήματων τίς οὐκ ἄν εξεπλάγη ἀκούον; ἔπει ἤγγει ἐνθυμοῦμενοι ὅτι αὐτὸς οὐχ ὁλὸς τ’ ἐσομαι οὖ δέ ἔγγυς τούτων οὐδὲν καλὸν εἴπειν, ἦτ’ αἰσχὺν οὐκ ἐποδρᾶς ψίχομην, εἰ τ’ ἐξίουν. καὶ γάρ με C Γοργίου ὁ λόγος ἀνεμίμησεν, ὅστε ἀτεχνῶς τὸ τοῦ Ὄμήρου
198 B καὶ παντοδαπὸν οὕτω TW μὲν om. Vind. 21, vulg. Sz.: (μὲν, θαυμαστὰ δὲ· Bdhm.) ἀκούον om. W

198 B οὐ μέλλω κτλ. Notice the change of tense in ἀπορεῖν...λέξειν: Plato uses pres., fut., and aor. infinitives after μέλλω, of which the last is the rarest construction. For the sense, cp. Soph. 231 B.

παντοδαπὸν λόγον. There is irony in the epithet. Socr. implies that he regards it as a motley λόγος, “a thing of shreds and patches.” Cp. 193 B, and 198 E (πάντα λόγον κυστίτες κτλ.).

οὐχ ὁμοίως μὲν θαυμαστά. The antithesis must be mentally supplied: “the earlier parts were not equally marvellous (although they were marvellous).” Stallb. explains differently, “τὰ μὲν ἄλλα accipi potest absolute pro et quod cetera quidem attinet; quo facto non inepte pergitur sic: οὐχ ὁμοίως μὲν θαυμαστά, particula μὲν denuo iterata.” But the former explanation (adopted by Rettig and Hug, after Zeller) is the simpler and better.

tὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς κτλ. τὸ is accus. of respect, going closely with ἐπὶ τελευτῆς, not with τοῦ κάλλους (as Rückerl): “quod autem exitum erationis tuae attinet” (Stallb., and so Hommel). τοῦ κάλλους is governed by εξε-πλάγη, as gen. of causative object (cp. Madv. Gr. Synt. § 61 b). ἄκαμνων, “as he heard.”

tῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥήματων. Cp. 199 B ἄν&oacute;ματι δὲ καὶ θέσει ῥήματων. Properly, ὄνομα and ῥῆμα are distinguished as, in logic, the subject and predicate and, in grammar, the noun and verb respectively. But commonly ὄνομα is used of any single word, and ῥῆμα of a clause, or proposition (e.g. Protag. 341 b); cp. Apol. 17 B; Craigl. 399 A, 431 B. Both here and below, as Athenaeus observes (v. 187 C), Πλάτων χλεύαζε τε τὰ ἱσόκωλα τὰ Ἀγάθονος καὶ τὰ ἀντίδετα. Cp. the criticism of the Sophistic style in Alcid. de Soph. 12 οἱ τοῖς ἀνόμασιν ἀκριβὸς ἐξειρημένοι καὶ κάλλος ποιήσαν ἡ λόγοι ἐσοφάτε καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτόματον καὶ πλέον ἀλήθειας ἀποβεβηληκότες: Isocr. c. Soph. 294 D τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι πρεπόντως ὅλων τὸν λόγον κατασκίλαι καὶ τοῖς ἄνωθες εὐρύθ-μως καὶ μανσικῶς εἶπεν.


ἀλγοὺ. Ἡ. ἀλγοῦ δεῖν. Cp. Thes. 180 D; Euthyd. 279 D.


τὸ τοῦ Ὅμήρου. See Od. xi. 632 ἐμε δὲ χλορόν δεος ἐρει | μὴ μοι γοργεῖν
κεφαλὴν δεινοῖο πελάροι | ἡ 'Αἴδεω πέμψειν ἄγανη Περσεφόνεια. Miss Harrison (Proleg. p. 191) renders γοργεῖν by "grizzly," with the note "Homer does not commit himself to a definite Gorgon": his Gorgoneion is "an underworld bogey, an ἀποτρόπαιον." That "the Gorgon was regarded as a sort of incarnate evil eye" (ibid. p. 196) appears from Athen. v. 64. 221 κτείνει τὸν ὑπ’ αὐτῆς θεωρήτω, οὗ τῷ πνεύματι ἄλλα τῇ γνωμήν ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀμαθῶν φύσεως φορά καὶ νεκρῶν ποιεῖ. Rohde (Psyche II. 407) points out that "Hekate selbst wird angerufen als Ποργό καὶ Μορμό καὶ Μήν καὶ πολύμορφη: hymn bei Hippol. ref. haer. 4. 35 p. 73 Mill"; and that Ποργό appears to be a shorter form for Ποργύρα ('Ἀχέροντος γυνήν, Apollod.). For the pun on Gorgias-Gorgon, cp. that on ἄγαθον (174 b n.). As against Dümmel's inference that Gorgias' previous death is here implied, see Vahlen op. Acad. I. 452 ff.

ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. Cp. 201 λ, Ποργ. 457 δ, Theaet. 169 β. To eject these words with Hug, or to substitute πελάροι with Badham, would (as Voegelin and Rettig contend) destroy the antithesis ἐν τῷ λ. | ἐπὶ τὸν ἔμον λ. and spoil the "Gorgianische Wortspiel." Further, the phrase serves as a parallel to the Homeric ἡ 'Αἴδεω. Observe, as a feature of the parody, the different sense in which Σοκρ. uses δεινὸς: also, how the sentence as a whole forms a playful retort to Agathon's remark in 194 λ (φαρμάτειν βούλει με κτλ.). For the adverbal use of τελευτῶν, cp. Phaedr. 228 b, c; Gorg. 457 δ. (See also Vahlen, l.c. for a discussion and defence of the text.)

τότε...ἤνικα. The τότε goes with ὅν which is imperf. partic.: the ref. is to 177 δ.

198 D ἦγὼ μὲν κτλ. The μὲν here is answered by the δὲ in τῷ δὲ ἄρα below. For ἀβελτρια, cp. Theaet. 174 c, Phil. 48 c (see my note ad loc.).

τούτῳ μὲν ὑπάρχειν. "That this (viz. the statement of the facts) should be the ground-work": there is no need to insert, with Bast, πρῶτον or μέγιστον after τούτο. For this sense of ὑπάρχειν, cp. Menex. 237 β. For the thought, cp. Emerson "Veracity first of all and forever. Rien de beau que le vrai."

ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων. Rettig's comment on this is "mit Beziehung auf das collective in τούτῳ gedachte τάληθα." This is misleading, since τούτῳ means


198 e]  

ΣΥΜΠΟΣΙΟΝ

87

eν έρων, ός είδως τὴν αλήθειαν [τού ἐπαινεῖν ὤτιον].

τὸ δὲ ἄρα,

ὡς ἐσοκεῖται, οὐ τοῦτο ἢν τὸ καλῶς ἐπαινεῖν ὄτιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅσ μέγιστα ἐ

ανατίθεναι τῷ πράγματι καὶ ὡς καλλιστα, εάν τῇ οὔτως ἔχοντα

εἶν τῇ μη· εἰ δὲ Ἴσευθη, οὔδεν ἀρ' ἢ πράγμα. προορρήθη γὰρ, ὡς

ἐσοκεῖν, διὸς ἐκαστὸς ἡμῶν τοῦ Ἑρωτά ἐγκομιάζειν δόξη, οὐχ

ὅπως ἐγκομιάζεσται. 

dia ταῦτα δὴ, οἴμαι, πάντα λόγων κινοῦντες

198 D τοῦ...ἀριστέρων αἴλειφ τοῦ Νάπλιον Μαστ. ἐ δόξη

Steph.: δέξετο ΒΤ

τὸ τάληθη λέγειν, a singular notion, and αὐτὰ ταῦτα here represents simply τάληθη. In the Socratic theory of rhetoric here stated we have the following order of treatment proposed: (1) τὸ τάληθη λέγειν, (2) ἡ τῶν καλλιστῶν ἐκλαγή, (3) ἡ ἐντρήσης δίσ. But it is implied that the 2nd and 3rd of these—artistic selection and arrangement—are valueless, except in so far as they are based on the 1st requisite: in other words, matter is more important than form. 

Cp. Procl. in Tim. p. 27 al γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐθεῖς εἰσφῆται παῖσῶν προέκουσαν, ὡς καὶ ὃ ἐν τῷ Συμμοσίῳ ἑκράτης παραδίδοσιν.

ὡς εἰδός τὴν αλήθειαν. I follow Badham and Hug in bracketing the next words (τοῦ ἐπαινεῖν ὤτιον) as an erroneous gloss on ἀλήθειαν, with which we must supply περὶ τοῦ ἔρωτος, as required by δεινὸς τὰ ἐρωτικὰ above and the passage there alluded to (175 D). 

Cp. Phaedr. 259 ἐ ἀρὸν οὐκ ὑπάρχειν δεὶ τοὺς εἴς ἄδικα καὶ καλῶς ῥήησαμένοις τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος διάνοιαν εἰδώλ οὖν ἐν ἔρειν περὶ μελῆ. Rettig defends the traditional text, asking “is denn ἡ αλήθεια τοῦ ἐπαινεῖν ὤτιον hier nicht identisch mit ἡ αλήθεια περὶ ἔρωτος?“ To this the answer is “no!”: for if the tradition be kept we must take τὴν 

αλήθειαν as equivalent to τὴν 

ἀληθή (or rather ὧρθην) μέθοδον, which is a very unlikely equation, especially so soon after τάληθη in another sense: Stallb.'s rendering may serve to indicate the difficulty involved,—“utpoter veram tenens laudationis cujuslibet naturam et rationem:“ Jowett's “thinking I knew the nature of true praise” shirks the difficulty.

τὸ δὲ ἄρα. For τὸ δὲ, “but in reality,” cp. Meno 97 c (with Thompson's note), Apol. 23 λ (with Stallb.'s note).

198 E οὖ τοῦτο, ἢδ. οὐ τὸ τάληθη λέγειν.

tὸ...ἀνατίθεναι. Perhaps an allusion to the term used by Agathon, ἀνα-

tέκισθων 197 e. For Socrates' criticism, cp. Phaedr. 272 λ, Menex. 234 ο οὐ

τῶν καλῶς ἐπαινοῦντι, ὅστε καὶ τὰ προσάντα καὶ τὰ μὴ περὶ ἕκαστον λέγοντε,

καλλιστὰ πως τοῖς ὄνομασι ποικίλουσι γοητεύουσιν ἡμῶν τὰς φυχάς: Isocr. 

Herm. 222 β δεὶ τοὺς μὲν εὐλογεῖν τινας βουλομένους πλεῖοι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἄγαθων προσόν μερισματικοῖς (which sentiment is, perhaps, referred to here).

προορρήθη. Cp. 180 D. The reference is to 177 D.

ἐγκομιάζειν δόξη. The emphasis is on δόξη, implying the regular Platonic antithesis δόξα ἢ ἀλήθεια. Cp. Simon. 76 τὸ δοκεῖν καὶ τὰ ἀλάθειαν βιαῖα (cited in Rep. 365 c).


199 A. ὡς ἂν φαίνεταί. φαίνεται here, as δοξεί above, is emphatic. A comparison with 195 A shows that Socr. is alluding especially to Agathon’s oration. οὐ γὰρ δὴ που κτλ. Cp. Gorg. 459 A οὐ γὰρ δὴ πον ἐν γε τοῖς εἰδοῖς τού ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται: and for οὐ γὰρ πον... 200 B, Euthyph. 13 A.

καὶ καλῶς γ᾽ κτλ. Earlier editors generally print a full stop after εἰδοῖς. Socr. here sarcastically endorses the approval with which Agathon’s ἔπαινοι had been received (ὡς πρεσβύτατος εἰρήκοτος κτλ., 198 A).

ἡ γλῶσσα οὖν κτλ. Euripides’ line (ἡ γλῶσσ’ ὀμαχ’; ἥ δὲ φρήν ἀνώμοτος Ηππολ. 612) soon became a familiar quotation: see Ar. Thesm. 275, Haem. 101, 1471; Thaeet. 154 D; Cíc. de offic. iii. 29. 108 iuravi lingua, mentem iiuratum gero.

χαίρετα δή. “I say good-bye to it”: cp. Laws 636 D τὸ...τοῦ μύθου χαίρετα: id. 886 D. Retting suggests that here the formula may be intended as another echo of Euripides: cp. Med. 1044 οὐκ ἄν δυναῖνεν χαίρετα βουλεύματα | τὰ πρόσθεν: Ηππολ. 113.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν κτλ. “I withdraw my offer to eulogize.” ἐγκυμοσύνων must here be a “present for future” (see Madv. Gr. Synt. § 110. 3), since Socr. has not yet begun the eulogy.

199 B καὶ ἱμαντοῖν, οὐ πρὸς κτλ. “In my own fashion, not entering into competition with your orations.” For κατὰ c. acc. in this sense, cp. Aprod. 17 B οὐ κατὰ τούτοις εἶναι ρήτωρ (“not after their pattern”): Gorg. 505 D.

γλώσσα ὁμοίως. This resumes the notion in καταγκλαίαστος ἂν, 198 C.

ἡ Φαῖδρ. Socrates, like Agathon (197 B), politely appeals to Ph. as the πατήρ λόγων: cp. 194 D.


ὄνομασι δὲ κτλ. See 198 B π. Of ὡς οὐ Φιλ cites no instance; the
199 Ἀνάθεμα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κελεύειν λέγειν, ὅπερ αὐτὸς οἴοντο δεῖν εἰπεῖν, ταὐτῇ. Ἐτὶ τοίνυν, φάναι, ὁ Φαίδρε, πάρεσ μοι Ἀγάθωνα σμίκρο ἀττα ἐρέσθαι, ἢν ἀνομολογησάμενος παρ’ αὐτῷ οὔτως ἤδη λέγω. Ἀλλὰ παρίσημα, φάναι τὸν Φαίδρον, ἦν ἄλλ’ ἐρώτα. μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸν Σωκράτη ἐφη εὐθέντε ποθὲν ἀρξάσθαι.

XXI. Ἔτι μὴν, ὁ φίλε Ἀγάθων, καλῶς μοι ἐδοξάζει καθηγηγῶν αὐτὸς τοῦ λόγου, λέγων ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν δὲν αὐτὸν ἐπιδεῖξαι ὁποῖος τίς ἐστιν ὁ Ἔρως, ὑστερον δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ. ταὐτῇ τῇ ἄρχῃ πάνυ ἄγαμαι. ἣν οὖν μοι περὶ Ἐρωτος, ἐπεὶ δὴ καὶ τάλλα καλῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς δεῖλθε οἷς ἐστι, καὶ τὸς εἰπεῖ. Δ’ ἐπέτερον ἐστὶν τοιοῦτος οἷς εἶναι τινὸς ὁ Ἔρως ἔρως, ἢ οὐδενός; ἔρωτῶ δ’ οὐκ εἰ μητρὸς τινὸς ἢ πατρὸς ἐστὶ—γελοίον γὰρ ἄν εἰτ ἡ τὸ ἔρως ἔρως ἔρως ἔρως ἔρως ἔρως ἔρως ἔρως ἔρως ἔρως ἔρως ἔρως.

199 C ἄλλ’ ἐρώτα Αγαθώνι tribuit B, Naber D οὗς τ’ TW ἔρως ἔρως ἔρως B: ἔρως T

The force of δὴ is to heighten the notion of indefiniteness which lies in ὁποία (so Hug).

ἔτι τοίνυν κτλ. ἔτι goes with ἐρέσθαι. Socrates appeals thus to Ph. because Ph. had previously (194 D, ε) debarred him from catechizing Λ.

ἀνομολογησάμενος κτλ. Cf. 200 E, Gorg. 489 A. For οὕτως ἤδη, cp. 194 D. For εὐθενῶς ποθὲν, 178 A.

199 C καθηγήσασθαι. The ref. is to Λ.’s exordium, 195 A.

ἐν οὐν. αγαθόν; cp. Gorg. 452 D, Rep. 376 D.

199 D τινὸς... ἢ οὐδενός. These are objective genitives to be construed with the second ἔρως: “Is Love love for some object or for none?” For the use of the indef. in such phrases, cp. Phileb. 35 B ὅ γ’ ἐπιθυμῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ.

οὐκ εἰ μητρὸς τινὸς κτλ. These words have been variously interpreted:
(1) Lehrs and Prantl construe the genitives as subjective (“love felt by a mother”); (2) Ast as objective (“love for a mother”); (3) Rückert, followed by Hommel and Hug, takes them to be genu. of origin; so too Zeller renders “ich meine damit aber nicht, ob er eine Mutter oder einen Vater hat.” Of these, (1) seems the least probable in point of sense, and with subjective genitives τινὸς would be superfluous. It is a serious objection (as Hug admits) to (3) that it compels us to regard the “absurdity” (γελοίον) of the question as lying in its form rather than its substance. That the “absurdity” lies in the substance of the statement is shown, e.g., by Lys. 221 A ὧ γελοίον τὸ ἔφωτημα, δ’ τι ποτ’ ἐσται τότε ἢ μὴ ἐσται; τίς γὰρ οἶδεν; (cp. Phaedr. 274 C). But if so, recourse must be had to textual alteration: we must strike out either the second ἔρωσ, with Sommer, or the whole block of words εἰ Ἔρως... πατρός, as Hug (followed by Jowett) suggests. This, however, is a hazardous alternative. On the whole, then, the explanation (2) put forward by Ast seems the most probable. Construing, “I do not ask whether Eros has for its object a father or a mother, since to ask whether Eros is eros for a parent.
were an absurd question," the point will be taken to lie in the fact that ἐρως, as properly denoting sexual passion, cannot naturally have for its object a parent. The same interpretation might be kept if we struck out—as perhaps we ought—the words μητρὸς ἡ πατρός, and construed "the question would be absurd if (or granting that) Eros is (really) ἐρως (i.e. sex-love)."

αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα ἠρώτων. Rettig approves Stallbaum’s explanation, "h. c. πατέρα, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὀπερ ἐστὶν ut mox loquitur. Vult autem cogitari de patris notione, qualem mente informatum habemus." But the use of the neuter in apposition to the masc. is sufficient to indicate that "cogitari de patris notione"; and it is most natural to regard αὐτὸ τοῦτο as implying a reference to the previous use of "this very word, πατέρα."

ἐπεσ ἄν. "You would at once reply." (See Goodwin G. M. T. § 414, Thompson on Μένο 72 Β.)

ἡ μήτηρ ὁμοίως. Sc. ἐστίν νίεος γε ἡ θυγατρός μήτηρ.

199 Ε Εἰ γὰρ ἐρομνη. For apodosis we may supply τι ἄν φαίης; or the like: cp. 204 D, Ἰπτ. 311 ε.

αὐτὸ τοῦθ᾽ ὀπερ ἐστὶν. "Notionally," "in its abstract significance."

200 Α. Τοῦτο μὲν...folios. Rettig, Rückert and Lehrs put a comma before μεμηνύεις, rendering "hoc igitur apud animum serva (sc. alicujus esse) atque cuius sit, memento." Hommel and Hug, on the other hand, follow Ast and Schleierm. in removing the comma, explaining ἕτοι (sc. Ἐρως ἐρως ἐστίν) as epekegetic of τοῦτο, and construing φύλαξ μεμηνύεις closely together: thus Schleierm. renders "Dieses nun, habe Socrates gesagt, halte noch bei dir fast in Gedanken, wovon sie (er) Liebe ist." On this latter view—which is certainly preferable—we must suppose Socrates to be alluding to the definition of the object of love (viz. κάλλος) previously given by Agathon (in 197 Β), while debarring him from restating it at this point in the discussion.
οὐ ἔστιν ἔρως, ἐπιθυμεῖ αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε, φάναι. Πότερον ἐξων αὐτὸ ὦ ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἔρρα, εἰτα ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρρα, ἢ οὐκ ἐξων; Οὐκ ἐξων, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς γε, φάναι. Σκόπει δὴ, εἰτεῦν τὸν Ἀφακράτη, ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκότος εἰ ἀνάγκης οὕτως, τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐ ἐνδεές ἔστιν, ἢ μὴ ἐπιθυμεῖν, εάν μὴ ἐνδεές ἡ; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ θαυμαστῶς δοκεῖ, ὡς Ἀγάθων, ὃς ἀνάγκη εἴναι· σοὶ δὲ πῶς; Β Κάμοι, φάναι, δοκεῖ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἃρ′ οὖν βούλοιτ' ἀν τὶς μέγας ὄν μέγας εἶναι, ἢ ἰσχυρὸς ὄν ἰσχυρός; Ἄδυνατον ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦ ἐνδέης ἀν εἰ̂ τούτῳ ὁ γε ὁν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ὁν βούλοιτο ἰσχυρός εἴναι, φάναι τὸν Ἀφακράτη, καὶ ταχὺς ὄν ταχύς, καὶ ὑγιῆς ὃν ὑγιῆς— ἵσως γὰρ ἂν τὰ ταῦτα οἰηθεῖν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τους ὄντας τε τοιούτους καὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα τοιούτων ἀπερ ἔχονται καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν ὑπερ, ἵν' οὖν μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν, τούτου ἔνεκα λέγω· τούτως γὰρ, ὡς Ἀγάθων, εἰ ἐννοεῖς, ἔχεω μὲν ἐκαστα τούτων ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀνάγκη ἢ ἔχουσαι, εάν τε βούλωμαι εάν τε μὴ, καὶ τούτῳ γε δὴ

200  Β ὁμολογημένων W: ὁμολογημένων vulg. εἰ δ' ἄρα Stallb. γὰρ καὶ BT: γὰρ W ταύτι T ὃ ἐκαστὸν vulg.

ἐπιθυμεῖ αὐτοῦ. For αὐτοῦ resuming ἐκεῖνον, cp. 196 Α, Soph. O. T. 248. Observe that the entire argument here is based on the identification of ἔρος with ἐπιθυμία (see 205 δ): cp. the use of ἔραν in Theogn. 256 πρῆγμα δ' τερπνοάτον, τοῦ τε ἔρα, τὸ τυχεῖν. Cp., for the question here discussed, Lys. 221 d f.

ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκότος. Cp. Phaedr. 267 Α, 269 δ; see Blass, Att. Bereds. Ι 78. ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐ εἰνδεές ἵστιν. Cp. Lysis 221 δ τὸ γε ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὐ ἂν εἰνδεές ἡ, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ: Εὔβους. 405 Β αἰ δ' ἐπιθυμία πάσαι ὄλλεν ἔτερον ἢ ἐνδεές τινον: Oesc. 496 δ. A similar theory is implied in Phileb. 35 Α ὁ κενούμενος... ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει· κενούμενος γὰρ ἔρα πληροζεῖ (which also illustrates the use of ἔραν and ἐπιθυμεῖν as synonyms). Cp. also Isocr. Hel. 219 Α (quoted below, on 200 c).

200  Β ἁμαρταστῶ...δ. For ὃς thus separated from its adverb, cp. Phaedo 95 Α, 99 δ, Theaet. 157 δ. Thus Bast's suspicions as to the soundness of the text were unfounded.

Εἰ γὰρ καὶ κτλ. In this sentence we have an ex. of anacoluthon: after the protasis the sentence is interrupted by a parenthesis (ἴσως...λέγω), then the protasis is resumed in an altered form (ἀλλ' ὅταν τις κτλ.), which leads up finally to the apodosis in the form εἴπαμεν ἃν αὐτῷ κτλ. The main purpose of the whole paragraph is to guard against a possible misunderstanding as to the nature of βουλήσις and ἐπιθυμία which might arise from carelessness in analyzing the sense of popular phraseology.

ταῦτα οἰηθεῖν, ταῦτα and πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα are accusatives of "remoter object" with ἀπεθεῖ, "with regard to these and all similar cases."
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ  

ποτ τις ἄν ἐπιθυμήσειν; ἂλλ' ὅταν τις λέγῃ ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑγιαίνων βούλομαι καὶ ὑγιαίνων, καὶ πλούτων βούλομαι καὶ πλούτων, καὶ ἐπιθυμῶ ἀυτῶν τοῦτον ἢ ἔχω, ἐπιτειμέν ἀν αὐτῷ ὁτί σύ, ὑ ἀνδροπε, 

D πλούτων κεκτημένοι καὶ ὑγιαίνων καὶ ἰαχόν βούλει καὶ εἰς τὸν ἐπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα κεκτηθοῦν, ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ γε νῦν παρόντε, εἴτε βούλει εἴτε μή, ἔχεις; σκόπει οὖν, ὅταν τοῦτο λέγῃς, ὅτι ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν παρόντων, εἴ ἄλλο τι λέγεις ἥ τόδε, ὅτι βούλομαι τά νῦν παρόντα καὶ εἰς τὸν ἐπειτα χρόνον παρεῖναι. ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῖ ἂν; 

Συμφάναι ἐφὴ τὸν Ἁγάθωνα. εἰπεῖν δὴ τὸν Ἀριστα. Οὐκοῦν τούτο γ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνον ἔραν, ὃ οὔτω ἐτοιμὸν αὐτῷ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἐπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σφόδρωτα καὶ "<ἄλλον παρόντα; Πάνω γε, φάναι. Καὶ οὗτος ἁρα καὶ ἄλλος πᾶς ὁ ἐπιθυμῶν τοῦ μὴ ἐτοιμῷ ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τοῦ μὴ παρόντος, καὶ μὴ ἔχει

200 C καὶ πλούτων Β: πλούτων Τ  


E ὁ ἄλλος T

200 C βούλομαι...καὶ ἐπιθυμῶ. The point here emphasized is that βούλησις and ἐπιθυμία, when their sense is investigated, are found to apply only to the future (εἰς τὸν ἐπειτα χρόνον), not to the present (ἐν τῷ παρώντι). For investigation shows that “I wish for what I have” is really an abbreviated phrase for “I wish to continue having in the future what I now at present have” (βούλομαι τὰ νῦν παρόντα παρεῖναι). For the force of βούλησις, cp. Isoc. Ηel. 219 Δ τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων, ἄν ἄν ἐν χρείᾳ γενώμεθα, τυχεῖν μόνον βούλομεθα... τῶν δὲ καλῶν ἐρῶσ ἦμών ἐγγίζεται, τούτων μείζων τοῦ βούλησθα ῥώμην ἔχων, ὁσφυρτερ καὶ τὸ πράγμα κρείττον εστίν (with which cp. also 205 Δ ἐμφόρτα).

200 D ἄλλο τι ὁμολογεῖ ἂν: For the interrogative ἄλλο τι, ἄλλο τι ἢ, see Meis 82 c (with Thompson's note); Prot. 363 c (with Adam's note).

Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο γ' ἐστὶν κτλ. The main construction is rightly explained by Stallb.: "τὸ εἰς τὸν ἐπείτα χρ. κτλ. relativo pronomini per epexegesis ad- 

duntur, nec assentior Rückerto interpunctionem post αὐτῷ ἔστιν inferenti": 

tὸ is in the nominative, where we should rather expect τὸ in apposition to ἔκείνου, owing to assimilation to ἄ. For the reading of the last words in the sentence, see crit. n. Rettig reads μη παρόντα "in hypothetisch-causealem Sinne." More attractive is Usener's excision of the words μοι παρόντα, adopted by Hug. The objection to καὶ, printed by Burnet, is that it fails to supply an explanation of B's μοι: hence I prefer to read καὶ αἱ, supposing that an abbreviated καὶ blending with αἱ might account for both variants.

200 E Καὶ οὗτος κτλ. οὗτος represents the typical τις and ἄνθρωπος of 

200 c; and ἄλλος πᾶς serves to generalise, cp. 192 b.
καὶ δ’ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτὸς καὶ οὐ ἐνδεχὴς ἔστι, τοιαύτ’ ἀτα ἔστιν δὲν ἢ ἐπιθυμία τε καὶ δ’ ἔρως ἔστιν; Πάνυ γ’, εἰπεῖν. "Īθι δὲ, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀναμολογησόμεθα τὰ ἐιρήμενα. ἀλλὰ τι ἔστιν ὁ "Ερως πρῶτον μὲν τινῶν, ἐπειτὰ τούτων δὲν ἂν ἐνδεια παρῆ αὐτῷ; Ναὶ, φάναι. Εἰτὶ δὴ τούτως ἀναμιμήσθητε τίνων ἐφησθα ἐν τῷ 201 λόγῳ εἶναι τὸν "Ερωτάντα· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἐγὼ σε ἀναμνήσω. οἶμαι γάρ σε ούτωσι ποιεῖν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοῖς θεοῖσι κατεσκευάσθη τὰ πράγματα δὲ ἔρωτα καλῶν. αἰσχρῶν γὰρ οὐκ εἰὴ ἔρως. οὐχ οὕτωσι πως ἔλεγες; Ἐπιτον γὰρ, φάναι τὸν 'Αγαθώνα. Καὶ ἐπιεικῶς γ’ ἔλεγες, ο’ ἐταίρε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τι ὁ "Ερως κάλλος ἂν εἰὴ ἔρως, αἰσχοὺς δ’ οὐ; Ωμολογεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ὀμολογήται, οὐ ἐνδεχὴς ἔστι καὶ μὴ ἔχει, τούτων ἔραν; Ναὶ, B εἰπεῖν. 'Ἐνδεχὴς ἄρ’ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔχει ὁ "Ερως κάλλος. 'Ἀνάγκη, φάναι. Τί δὲ; τὰ ἐνδεεῖς κάλλους καὶ μηδὲν μηκητήμενον κάλλος ἄρα λέγεις οὐ καλῶν εἶναι; Οὐ δήτα. "Ετι οὖν ὀμολογεῖς "Ερωτα καλόν εἶναι, εἰ τούτα οὕτως ἔχει; καὶ τὸν 'Αγαθώνα εἰπεῖν Κιν- δυνεῦω, ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐδὲν εἰδεναί αὐτὸ τότε ἔτον. Καὶ μὴν καλὸς.

ἐνδεια παρῇ. This sounds like a jocular contradiction in terms: in Eros there is a plentiful lack.

201 B ἔφησα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. See 197 B: cp. Isocr. Ἱσολ. 219 A τῶν δὲ καλῶν ἔρως ἤμων ἐγγύνεται.

ἐπιεικὸς γ’ ἔλεγες. For ἐπιεικός, probh, recta, cp. Rep. 431 e, Laws 635 A. I have ventured to read ἔλεγες for the traditional λέγεις. In the present context λέγεις seems objectionable because of its ambiguity, since “You say well” would more naturally be taken to refer to A.’s reply (ἐπον γάρ) than to his previous statement. This objection is not touched by Rettig’s defence of the tense: “auoch das Präsenst is ganz an seinem Platze. Da Agathon bestätigt, dass er sich so geäusset habe, wie Sokrates angebe, so gilt seine obige Auusserung auch jetzt.”

201 B οὐ...καὶ μὴ ἔχει. “Sic dictum est ut δ’ apud έχει repentendum est” (Stalb.).


Κινδυνεῦω...ἐπον. εἰδέναι is past, not present, in sense.
Καὶ μὴν...ἐποῖε. Not “recte dixisti” (Ficinus), but “praeclarae dixisti”
What Soc. alludes to is not A.'s forgoing reply, but his oration (cp. 198 b, 199 c); and the point of his remark is to suggest that formal beauty of diction does not necessarily involve the more essential beauty of \( \alpha \lambda \theta e \).

For the coincidence of these two concepts, cp. Prot. 360 b, Hipp. Maj. 297 b, c, Philob. 64 b ff. It might be near the truth to say that \( \tau \delta \ \alpha \gamma \alpha \theta \) is neither less nor more than \( \tau \delta \ \alpha \gamma \alpha \theta \) in its external aspect, “goodness” as apprehended by the aesthetic faculty, or goodness qua attractive and soul-stirring. See also Plotin. de polor. p. 46; Procl. in I Alc. p. 329.

\[ \text{Εγώ...σαλ...σαύ.} \] The personal pronouns are, by position and repetition, emphatic. Agathon means to imply that he yields not so much to the force of argument as to the wordplay of Socrates’ invincible dialectic: cp. 216 b \( \text{ένθρα}: \) Xen. Symp. v 8.

\[ \text{Καλ οι...άσω.} \] "You I will now release": this is said with reference to the phrase used in 199 b \( \text{έτ...πάρεσ} \) μοι \( \text{'Αγάθωνα κτλ.} \)

\[ \text{Μαντινικὴς Διοτίμας} \] Probably both these names are meant to be etymologically significant: the resemblance of the adj. to \( \mu \alpha \nu \tau \iota \kappa \iota \) is patent (in fact some mss. give \( \mu \alpha \nu \tau \iota \kappa \iota \) and Ficin. \( \text{futidica muliere} \)), while as illustrating the onon of \( \Delta i o t \iota \mu a \) one might cite Soph. fr. 226 N. σοφὸς γὰρ οὐδές πλὴν ὅν ἄν τιμῇ θεὸς. See further Introdc. § iv. c. Hug quotes an imitative passage from Dio. Chrys. i. p. 59 R. \( \text{μῦθον...δι} \) ἐγὼ ποτε \( \text{\\eta ϰουσα γυναικὸς Ηλείας} \) \( \text{'Αρκεδλᾶς ὑπὲρ 'Ηρακλῆους διηγουμένης.} \) See also Max. Tyr. diss. xxiv. 4, p. 588; Clem. Al. Strom. vi. p. 631 b.

\[ \text{πρὸ τοῦ λαμβὼν κτλ.} \] For the Great Plague at Athens in 430 B.C. see Thuc. ii. 47, Bury H. G. p. 407. That the plague had been rife elsewhere for some time previously is implied by Thuc. l. c. For similar instances of the averting or postponing of impending evils by divine or prophetic agency, see Hdt. i. 91 τὰ ἑα γὰρ \( \text{ἐπανεβάλετο} \) (sc. \( \text{οἱ Λοξίης} \)) \( \text{τὴν Σοφίδων Ἀλωσιν}: \)
201 E] ΣΥΜΠΟΣΙΟΝ 95

ἐρωτικὰ ἐδίδαξεν,—ἀν οὖν ἐκεῖνη ἐλεγεῖ λόγον, πειράσομαι ύμίν
dιελθεῖν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἐμοί καὶ Ἀγάθωνι, αὐτός ἐπ᾿ ἐμαυτῶι,
ὅπως ἄν δύναμαι. δει δὴ, ὃ Ἀγάθων, ὀστὲρ σὺ διηγῆσω,
dιελθεῖν αὐτὸν πρῶτον, τίς ἐστιν ὁ Ἐρως καὶ ποιός τις, ἐπειτα τὰ Ἐ
ἐργα αὐτοῦ. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι βάστον εἶναι οὕτω διελθεῖν, ὡς ποτὲ μὲ
η ἣ ἐνη ἀνακρίνουσα διήει. σχεδὸν γάρ τι καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἔστερα τοιαύτα ἐλεγον ὀλάπερ ὑν πρὸς ἐμὲ Ἀγάθων, ὡς εἶν ὁ Ἐρως
μέγας θεός, εἰ ἤ δὲ τῶν καλῶν ἣλεγχε δὴ μὲ τούτοις τοὺς λόγους
οἴσπερ ἐγὼ τοῦτον, ὡς οὔτε καλὸς εἰν κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον οὔτε
ἀγαθὸς. καὶ ἐγὼ, Πῶς λέγεις, ἐφην, ὡς Διοίτιμα; αἰσχρὸς ἄρα

201 D λόγον εκείνην ἐλεγον Ο.-Ρ. ἐπ᾿ Κοισ. corr. Paris 1642 Ο.-Ρ., Bast:
dη ὀ Απ ΑΒΤΕΙΤΟΒ Ο.-Ρ.: δειλῆ δη Β διηγῆσω ΒΤ Ο.-Ρ.: δὴ ήγήσω Σχ.
Βτ.: καθηγήσω Ηϊρίς: ὑπηγήσω Σαύππε: διηγῆσοι Υσαυεν: ήγήσω οἶλ
Herm. Ε ποίος: οστος Ο.-Ρ. ποτ᾿ ἐμὲ vulg. γάρ: δὲ Ο.-Ρ. εφη
λέγεις Ο.-Ρ. αἰσχρὸς[v] Ο.-Ρ.

Athen. xiii. 602 b : Euseb. praep. evang. v. 35, p. 233 b, c : cp. Virg. Æn.
vii. 313 ff., viii. 398 ff. (where “decem annos” is the interval named). A
specially interesting parallel, as mentioning the same 10 years’ interval, is
Laus. 642 v ἀκήσας ὡς Ἠπειρμενῆς γέγονεν ἀνήρ θεός...ἀλθῶν δὲ πρὸ τῶν
Περσικῶν δέκα έτει πρότερον παρ’ ἐμᾶς...δυσίας τε ἐθυσάτο τινα...καὶ δὴ καὶ
φοβουμένων τὸν Περσικὸν Ἀθηναίων στόλον εἶπεν διά δεκά μὲν ἐτῶν οἷς
ἐξουσιων κτλ.

αὐτός ἐπ’ ἐμαυτοῦ. Ρίκερτ alone retains the lection ἐπ’ ἐμαυτοῦ. Cp.
I Alc. 114 b εὶ μὲν βούλει ἐρωτῶν με, ὀστὲρ ἐγὼ σε, εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ
λόγῳ διεξέλθη: Soph. 217 c.

ὡσπερ σὺ διηγῆσω. I think the traditional text, supported also by the
Papyrus, may stand, taking διηγῆσω to imply—with veiled contempt—a
lengthy or meticulous disquisition. Schanz’s δὴ ήγήσω is open to a double
objection, (1) the repeated δὴ is unpleasing, and (2) ἡγήσω is a feeble word to
apply to Agathon’s dogmatic exposition (in 195 A) of the rules of method.
Sauppe’s ὑπηγήσω is appropriate enough (cp. Gorg. 455 D, Κρ. 392 D), but
does not explain the corruption.

201 B διελθεῖν αὐτὸν κτλ. Here Socrates cites almost verbatim
the language used by Agathon in 195 A λόγῳ διελθεῖν...δῖσεις. Observe however
the significant addition by Socr. of the words τίς ἐστιν : he requires a state-
ment of the essential notion (τίς ἐστι) as well as of the attributes (ποίος τίς).

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καλῶν. The genitive is not masc. nor one of origin (= ἐκ τῶν
καλῶν) as Wolf thought, but as Stallb. rightly notes “καλῶν pendet ex “Ερως,
quod etiam hic positum est ut p. 196 D" : cp. 201 A, 204 D, for similar genn.
of the object.

αἰσχρὸς ἄρα κτλ. Socrates represents himself (ironically) as unversed in
the rules of logic, and habitually confusing contradictory with contrary
notions (οὔ καλὸς with αἰσχρὸς): for the distinction, cp. Soph. 257 b, 257 d ff.;
Euthyd. 283 b, 285 a ff., Cratyl. 429 b ff.

202 Α. Ἡ καὶ ἐν μῇ κτλ. "Ν. ε. ἐν τι μῇ σοφῶν. Nam τι e superiore δ τι facile intelligas" (Stallb.).

Τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν κτλ. This distinction between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη is much insisted on by Plato; see esp. Rep. 477 ff.; Meno 99 Α: cp. Isocor. Hel. 209 Α. For τὸ ἐπίστημον λόγῳ δούναι as the distinctive mark of ἐπιστήμη, cp. Meno 98 Α; but this definition is criticised unfavourably in Thetiat. 201 ο. ff. (see Zeller, Plato, pp. 171 ff.). I bracket καί before ἐνεμ: if retained, we must render with Rückert (and Hug) "aufl. ohne Rechenschaft geben zu können." For this "intensive" use of καί, see Thompson on Meno 71 B. Rettig defends the Bodleian ὀρθοδοξίαν thus "ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν ginge auf Einzelnes und Thatstäubliche, nicht auf den Begriff als solchen und die geistige Eigenschaft" : but this distinction is imaginary, and there is no other evidence, in Plato or elsewhere, for the existence of this compound, Aristotle's word (E. N. vii. 8. 4) being ὀρθοδοξία. Possibly we should write καί (ἢ) αὖ, cp. Rep. 413 Α. μεταξὺ φρονήσεως κτλ. Ср. Rep. 477 Α μεταξύ τι...ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης: ιβ. 478 δ.

202 Β Μὴ τοῖν τῶν ἀνάγκασε. "I. q. μὴ ἀναγκαίον νόμιζε, v. Heindorf ad Euthyd. (sic) p. 432 c" (Stallb.). For this use to denote logical compulsion, cp. also Cratyl. 432 Ε μὴ ἀνάγκασε πάντ’ ἐχειν τὰ γράμματα...ἀλλ' ἐκ κτλ.: Parmen. 133 ο.

Τῶν μὴ εἰδώτων. Sc. παρὰ: cp. Crat. 408 δ, Soph. 243 δ, etc. A similar distinction had been drawn twice by Socr. himself, see 194 B ff., 199 Α.
омолογοίτω μέγας θεὸς εἶναι παρὰ τούτων, οἷς φασίν αὐτῶν οὐδὲ θεὸν εἶναι; Τίνες οὕτως; ἢν δ' εἴγον. Εἰς μὲν, ἐφη, σὺ, μία δ' εἴγον: κάγῳ εἶπον, Πῶς τοῦτο, ἐφην, λέγεις; καὶ ἢ, ὅδιος, ἐφη. λέγει γάρ μοι, οὐ πάντας θεοὺς φής εὐδαίμονας εἶναι καὶ καλοὺς; ή δεδομέναις ἂν τινα μὴ φάναι καλὸν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα θεὸν εἶναι; Μᾶ Δί' οὐκ ἐγγον', ἐφην. Εὐδαίμονας δὲ δὴ λέγεις οὐ τούς τάγαθα καὶ τὰ καλὰ κεκτημένους; Πάνω γε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν Ἠρωτά γε ὁμολογήκας δι' ἐνδεικτικῶν τῶν ἁγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν δ' τούτων ἄν εὐδης ἐστιν. Ὢμολογήκας γάρ. Πῶς δὲν οὖν θεὸς εἶναι γ' γε τοὺς καλοὺς καὶ ἁγαθοὺς ἄμοιρος; Οὐδαμοῦ, ὡς γ' ἐνικεν. Ὄρασ αὖν, ἐφην, ὅτι καὶ σοὶ Ἠρωτα οὐ θεὸν νομίζεις; XXIII. Τί οὖν ἄν, ἐφην, εἶναι τοῦ Ἠρωτοῦ; θυντός; Ἦκιστά γε.


We might avoid this tautology (for which cp. 177 λ) by reading κἀγὼ εἶπον...ἐφην. Μᾶς we avoid this tautology (for which cp. 177 λ) by reading κἀγὼ εἶπον...ἐφην. Μᾶς we avoid this tautology (for which cp. 177 λ) by reading κἀγὼ εἶπον...ἐφην. Μᾶς we avoid this tautology (for which cp. 177 λ) by reading κἀγὼ εἶπον...ἐφην.
'Αλλα τι μήν; "Ωσπερ τὰ πρότερα ἔφην, μεταξὺ θυντοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου. Τί οὖν, ὁ Διοτίμα; Δαίμων μέγας, ὁ Σώκρατες· καὶ Ε γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαίμονον μεταξὺ ἐστὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ θυντοῦ. Τίνα, ἢν ἤγα ν' ἐγὼ, δύναμιν ἔχων; 'Ερμηνεύων καὶ διαπορμέουν θεοὶ τὰ παρ’ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν μὲν τὰς δεξιότεις καὶ θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἀρμοδίας [τῶν θυσίων], ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ἢν ἀμφιτέρων ἀμπληροῖ, ὡστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἕυστεδεσθαί.


"Ωσπερ τὰ πρότερα. Viz. the exx. of a mean between extremes given in 202 A, B.


202 Ε Ἐρμηνεύων κτλ. For the term ἐρμηνεύων to describe the mediating office of δαίμονες, cp. Erp. 985 η ἐρμηνεύονται (δαίμονας) πρὸς ἄλλους τε καὶ τῶν...θεοὶ πάντες τε καὶ πάντα. Ημμολ λίθικας οἱ τὰς ἐρμηνεύον μεταξὺ τὰς μεταξὺ ἀνθράπων (as "eiusdem atque 'Ερμής radieis") and διαπορμεύων with θεοὶ τὰ παρὰ ἀνθρώπων (the office of the πορθεῖα, Charon, being "anima e terra ad sedes deorum transverse")]. This is probably right; but in any case it is a mistake to regard the two words as synonymous, as do L. and S. (s. v. διαπορμέων, "to translate from one tongue into another, to interpret").

ἀμοβνὰς [τῶν θυσίων]. ἀμοβνὰ as a "return-present" (in transactions between gods and men) is used in Hom. Od. I. 318 καὶ δ' ἄξιον ἔσται ἀμοβνὰ (οἱ τὰ δώραν): ἦν III. 56 ἄλλους δίδων χαρίσσαν ἀμοβνὰν...ἀγαλματίς ἐκατόμβης: cp. Eur. Or. 467 οἷον...ἀπ' ἀμοβνὰς οὐ καλᾶς. Pollux (VI. 187) when quoting our passage ignores τῶν θυσίων. Cp. also Procl. in Alci. I. p. 46, 63: Plut. de Is. et Os. 26, p. 361 B δτε Πλάτων ἐρμηνευτικὸν τὸ τουτοῦ ἀνυμαίξε γένους καὶ διακοινών ἐν μέσῳ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, εὐχάρ τιν ἐκεὶ καὶ διέσεις...ἀναπέμενον...καὶ ἐκεῖνον δὲ μαντεία δεύορ καὶ δόσεις ἐγάθων ἔφεροντας: Apuleius de dēo Socr. φις ἡ Ῥασείς δαίμονας nuncupant, inter homines caelicosque vectores hinc precum in deorum, qui ultro eitro portant hinc petitiones inde suppetias, eeu quidam utrisque interpretetes et saltutigeri. per hos cosedem, ut Plato in symposi simul, cuntacta denunintata et magorum varia miracula omnesque praesagorum species reguntur: see also Plut. de or. def. 415 A; Philo Jud. de somn. p. 586 D (δαίμονας) τὰ πάντα ἐπικελεύεις ταῖς ἐγκών, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐγκών χρείαι τῷ πατρὶ διαγγέλλουν.

ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ὡς. This calls for no alteration (such as is suggested by
203 A] ΣΥΜΠΟΣΙΟΝ  

διὰ τοῦτον καὶ ἡ μαντικὴ πᾶσα χωρεῖ καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν τέχνη τῶν 
τε περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς τελετὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιφάνειας καὶ τὴν 
203 μαγγανείαν πᾶσαν καὶ γοητείαν. Θεοὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπων οὐ μίγνυται, 
ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτον πᾶσα ἐστιν ἡ ὁμιλία καὶ ἡ διάλεκτος θεοὶ πρὸς 
ἀνθρώποις < καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς ἀνθρώποις>, καὶ ἐγγύγγοροι καὶ 

203 Ε ἱερὸν Stob. 203 A τὰς τελετὰς B Stob. O.-P., J.-U.: τελετὰς 
TW, Bt. καὶ τὰς ἐπιφάνειας...γοητείας secl. Hug καὶ τὴν...γοητείας secl. Voege. 
ἀνθρώποις (καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς ἀνθρώποις) Wolf Usener Sz.: ἄ. (καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς 

Vermehren): with συμπληροὶ se. ἀμφιφέρουσ. The μέσον serves as the δειμός 
by which the extremes (here θυητοὶ and ἀδάνατοι) are united into an organic 

203 A τὰς τελετὰς. "Ritual": cp. Rep. 365 λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδική-
μίτων...ἄς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦντων: Phaedr. 244 E (with Thompson's note): 
Laws 738 σοφίας τελετάς συμμετόχως. That καθαρμοὶ (and τελεται) included περιθεώ-
σεις, λουτρά, περιπράσινως appears from Cratyl. 405 λ. Rohde (Psyche Π. 70 n. 3) 
points out that "these μάντεις entscheiden in allem Wesentlichen den Zaubern 
und Medicinmännern der Naturvölker. Wahrsager, Arzt, Zauberer, sind hier 
noch eine Person." E.g. Apis in Aesch. Suppl. 260 ff.; cp. Eur. Heracl. 401, 
Phoen. 1255 ff., and the part played by Empedocles. In Hippocr. de morb. 
snr. p. 591 the μάντες and καθαρμοί are witch-doctors, claiming control of 
the elements, as rain-makers, etc. (καθαρμοὺς προσφέροντε καὶ ἐπαύδος... 
περικαθαρίσω καὶ μαγεῖον τε καὶ θέους σελήνη τε καθαρισθεί καὶ ήλιον ἰκανεί 
καὶ χειμώνα καὶ εἴδιπνο ποιήσει κτλ.): cp. 197 c n.

τὴν μαγγανείαν πᾶσαν. Geel's correction μαγγανείαν is perhaps slightly 
preferable, on the ground of Platonic usage, to Badham's μαγείαν. Cp. 
Laws 908 δ ἐὰν μάντεις τε κατασκέυάζονται πολλοὶ καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν τὴν 
μαγγανείαν κεκινημένοι: id. 933 δ ἄλλη δε (φαρμακεία) ἡ μαγγανείας τε τοις 
καὶ ἐπιφάνεις καὶ καταδίδος λεγομένας πείδει κτλ. (cp. 933 c): Gorg. 484 λ τὰ 
ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπιφάνεις: also [Dem.] xcv. 79 λαβὼν τὰ 
φάρμακα καὶ τὰς ἐπιφάνεις...μαγγανείς καὶ φενακιζει. Hug objects to γοητείαν, 
as elsewhere used by Plato in a bad sense. There is, however, no need to 
suppose that any of these terms are intended here to convey more than a 
neutral sense; and to represent ἡ Μαντική as a disbeliever in any of the 
arts of divination or wizardry would be less artistic than pedantic. Moreover, 
the language used here is supported by the echo it finds in the description of 
Eros below (203 δ ἄδ γίς καὶ φαρμακεύς καὶ σοφιστή). Rep. 
364 B, c shows Plato's own low opinion of current μαντική, but Socrates was 
probably more credulous, see Xen. Mem. t. 1. 9, 4. 15.

θεοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώποις κτλ. Since the participles can neither be construed 
with θεοὶ, because of the sense, nor with ἀνθρώποις, because of the case, it is 
necessary to supply some such supplement as that adopted in the text. 
Rettig accepts Stallbaum's explanation of the traditional text: "Quum enim
καθεύδοντοι καὶ ὁ μὲν περί τὰ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς διαμόνιος ἀνήρ, ὁ δὲ ἀλλὸ τῷ σοφῷ ἄν ἢ περὶ τέχνας ἢ περὶ χειρουργίαις, τινὰς βάλανυσος. οὕτω δὴ οἱ δαίμονες πολλοὶ τε καὶ παντὸδαπώ εἴσων, εἰς δὲ τούτων ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ Ἑρως.

Πατρὸς δὲ, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τίνος ἐστὶ καὶ μητρός; Ὑμνήμοραν μὲν, Β ἐφ' ὅταν διηνήγησαθαι ὁμοὶ δὲς σοι ἐρώτ. ὅτε γὰρ ἐγένετο Ἡ Ἀφροδίτη, εἰστὶν τοι οἱ θεοὶ, ἢ τὲ ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Μητέρος υἱὸς Πόρος. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐδείπνησαν, προσανείπθησαν οἷον δὴ εὐσχίας-ουσης ἀφίκετο Ἡ Πενία, καὶ ἦν περὶ τὰς θύρας. ὁ οὖν Πόρος μεθύσεις


dicatur ὁμιλεῖν τινι et διαλέγεσθαι τινι, etiam ὁμιλεῖ καὶ διϊλεκτος τινι rocte dici potuit. Et quum anteac...perspicuitatis causa usus esset praepositione πρὸς addito casu accusativo, nunc ad legitimam constructionem revertens, neglecta grammatica diligentia, dativum post accusativum rocte inferri potuit." But at this rate one might justify anything in the way of distorted grammar! Hug marks a lacuna after ἄνθρωποι. For the ref. to divine communications in sleep ("the visions of the head upon the bod"), cp. Pind. fr. 131. 3 ff.; Rep. 571 d ff. (with Adam's note); Rohde, Psyche i. 6 ff.

διαμόνιος ἀνήρ. Compare the etymological definition (διαμόνη = διαμονή) in Cratyl. 398 c. For Socrates as an example of the διαμόνιος ἀνήρ, see 219 b.

περὶ τέχνας...βάλανυσος. Cp. Theaet. 176 c, Laws 644 a.; Arist. Rhot. i. 9. 1367a 31 (ἐλευθέρου σημείου) τὸ μηδὲν ἐγραψαθαι βάλανυσον τέχνην. The question as to why manual labour is held in contempt is asked in Rep. 590 c, and answered in Rep. 495 d (see Adam's notes ad loc.).

οἱ δαίμονες. Other Platonic passages mentioning these intermediary beings are Rep. 392 α, 427 b, 617 d (with Adam's note), Laws 713 b, 717 b. For later developments see esp. Plutarch (de defect. orac., de Is. et Os., de daemon. Socr., etc.). Cp. Rohde, Psyche i. 153.

Πατρὸς δὲ...τίνος κτλ. These are genitives of origin. Here we have it tacitly assumed that Phaedrus's statement (178 b), that Eros is unbegotten, is untrue.

203 B Πόρος. We find in Alcam. fr. 16 (with the Schol. ὁτι τὸν Πόρον ἔφηκε τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ ὑπὸ τὰ τῶν Ὑσιάδου μεμιθεμένῳ Χάι] one for the personification of Πόρος. Πενία is personified by Aristophanes in the Plutus, passim. For Μήτης, see Hes. Thoag. 886 Ζεὺς δὲ θεῶν βασιλέως πρῶτων ἀλοχον θέτο Μήτης, | αὐτίκα θεῶν τε ἴδιαν ἰδέ θητῶν ἀνθρώπων: (μήτης is, in Epic, the especial attribute of Zeus, as μητίτα): Μήτης was also an Orphic alias of
Eros. For nectar as the primeval substitute for wine, cp. Hom. II. v. 341, etc., also Phaedr. 247 έ τούς ἑπτάνως...νέκταρ ἑπόσως. The celestial δείπνον was, it appears, followed by a συμπόσιον. Spenser, H. to Love, speaks of the god as "Begot of Plentie and of Penury." See further Introd. § IV. c. 2.

εἰς τὸν τοῦ Δίως κύπον. Cp. Soph. fr. (Ion) 297 N. εν Διός κύπους δρουθέντα μόνον ἐνδαιμονείς ἁλβος. It is interesting to notice that Origen (Contra Cels. iv. 39) identifies the "garden of Zeus" with Paradise, Poros with Adam, Penia with the Serpent. With the intoxication and its results we might compare the O. T. stories of Noah and his sons and of Lot and his daughters. For the neo-Platonic interpretation of the myth, see Plotinus Enn. iii. 5. 2, 292 f., 298 f.: cp. also Introd. § IV. c. 2. A similar Orphic legend is mentioned by Porphyry de antr. nymph. 16 (Orphica p. 180) παρὰ δὲ τῷ 'Ὀρφεί ὁ Κρόνος μέλει ὑπὸ Δίως ἐνδρέεσθαι: πληθεῖς γὰρ μέλησε μεθύνε καὶ σκοτώσας ὡς ὑπὸ οἴνου καὶ ὑπνοί, ὡς παρὰ Πλάτωνος ὁ Πόρος τοῦ νέκταρος πληθεῖς, οὗτο γὰρ οἶνος ᾦ. Another classical example is the trick played by Lady Macbeth on Duncan's "spongy officers" ("his two chamberlains Will I with wine and wassail so convince" etc.).

βεβαρμένος. A later form for the Ἐρικ βεβαρμῆς (Od. iii. 139): cp. Theocr. xvii. 61 βεβαρμένα ἄδινεσσιν.

παιδὸν ποιῆσασθαι ἐκ κτλ. So Andoc. iv. 22 νῦν ἐξ αὐτῆς πεποίηται: and παιδὸς ποιεῖθαι in Crito 45 δ, Laws 674 b, 783 d, as equiv. to the epd. παιδοπαιδία (Rep. 449 b, Laws 784 λ, β, ε). These parallels are sufficient to defend the text (see crit. n.), without resorting to Retig's absurd notion that παιδὸς π. is "vercundior" than the opd.


ταρτῆς ᾧν περὶ τὸ κάλα. Cp. 204 b, 206 e. For the thought, cp. Sir T. Browne (Rel. Med.) "I am naturally amorous of all that is beautiful."
ολον οι πολλοι οιονται. This popular opinion had been esp. voiced by Agathon, 195 οιοι; and he had used the term σκληρος in 195, 196. The properties of Eros are, as observed by Max. Tyr. diss. xxiv. 4. p. 461, ετεχως σαι εις αυτον Σακρατην ένυκαπτων εν Διονυσιοις οι καμφοι: cp. Themist. or. 13. p. 161 d ff.

203 D αγχηρος. This is evidently intended as the contrary of Agathon's epithet υρης, 196. Cp. Ar. Plut. 80 ff. (Πλαοντος) αθλιος διακειμενος...ανχηροι βαδιες; and the echoes in Plat. de fort. p. 98 d, in amat. 759 ο.

ανυποθητος...αστρωτος. These, too, are characteristics of the Socratic (and Cynic) way of life. For ανυποθητος, see 173 b, 220 b; for χαματετης και αστρωτος the account given by Alcibiades in 220 b, c. Compare also the description of the Σελλοι ("fakirs") in Il. xvi. 234 ff. Σελλοι, ανυποτοδες, χαματετης κτλ. (see Welcker Kl. Schr. 3. 90 ff.; Rohde, Psyche 1. 122).

της θερας κτλ. For the θεραλία of έραται, see 183 Α, Anthol. v 5; and for this phrase as applicable to Socrates, 175 Α, 220 c, Ar. Nub. 160 ff. So too Penia was described in 203 b as (οδα) περί τας θερας. υπαιθρος and σύνοικος are words of a poetical flavour: cp. Xen. Symp. viii. 24 ο αεί σύνοικος μοι έρως.

της. "Energetic" ("go-ahead"): Schol. έπης...πιστής, πιστήμων, ως ενταθα. λαμβανεται δε και επί του ιμανοι και θρασιων. The Scholiast's ως ενταθα is clearly wrong, and that Plato connected the word with ιναι is shown by Protag. 349 ε πέτραν τους ανδρειαν θαραλακους λεγεις θ' άλλο τι; και ινας γ', έφη, έφη α οι πολλοι φαινομαι ιναι. Cp. Prot. 359 ο: Callinus t. 9—10 άλλα τε ινας ένω | ένοχος απασχολος κτλ. Here, however, the special sense of intellectual progress (μεθοδος, άνοδος) may be implied, cp. 210 ο (μετη, λόντα, ιναι), and my note on άνδρειαν 212 b (also 205 ο).

φρονήσως ἐπιθυμητῇ καὶ πάρμος, φιλοσόφων διὰ παινός τοῦ βίου, δεινὸς γώγι καὶ φαρμακεύς καὶ σοφιστὴς· καὶ ὤντε ὡς ἀθάνατος πέρικεν ὤντε ὡς θυτός, ἀλλὰ τοτε μὲν τῆς αὐτῆς ὅμερας Εὐθάλει καὶ ζῆ, ὅταν εὐπορήσῃς, τοτε ὑποθνήσκει, πάλιν ὁ ἀναβιώσκεται διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποριζομένου ἀεὶ ὑπεκρεῖ· ὥστε ὤντε ἀπορεῖ Ἔρως ποτὲ ὤντε πλούτε, σοφίας τε αὐ καὶ αμαθείας ἐν μέσῳ εστίν. ἦχει γὰρ ὀηδα. θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ ὦνδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφός γενέσθαι——ἔστι γὰρ——οὐδ' εἰ τις ἄλλος σοφός, 204 οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ. οὐδ' αὐ ὀι ἀμαθεῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ὦνδ' ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.


πάρμος. As son of Πάρος. Agathon, too, had described Ερῶς as (προσήγα) πορεύον, 197 d.

δεινὸς γώγις κτλ. For γώγις, see 203 a n. and for Socrates as wizard or charmer, 215 c ff., Meno 80 a ff., Xen. Mem. iii. 11. 17—18. For σοφιστής, ομ. 177 b, 208 c; Rep. 596 b; Xen. Cyrop. vi. 1. 41 νῦν τοῦτο πεφιλοσόφηκα μετὰ τοῦ ἄδικον σοφιστοῦ τοῦ Ἔρωτος: Maxim. Tyr. xxiv. 9 (= Sappho fr. 125) τὸν Ἔρως Σωκράτης σοφιστὴν λέγει, Σαπφώ μυθοπλάκων. The esoteric meaning of these epithets is thus explained by Hermias in Plat. Phaedr. p. 97: (εἰς τὸν Ἔρωτα) φιλόσοφον μὲν ὡς τὸ λογικὸν ἡμῶν διεγείροντα ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ· γώγια ὡς τῶν θυμῶν καταστέλλοντα· φαρμακεύς (δὲ) ὡς τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κυλοῦσαι· σοφιστὴν δὲ ὡς τὴν φύσιν ἀπαγόρευται καὶ διελέτσοντα—this however must be taken "with a grain of salt." C. also Procl. in Cratyl. p. 94, 158 ὅτι ὁδεῖ τὸν Ἐρωτάν τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐπὶ σεμφ' τάττει πράγματι: τὸν γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάστῳ τὰ ἄλλα δυνάμενον ἐνστρέφειν οὕτως καλεί, οἷον τὸν Δία (Μίν. 319 c), τὸν Ἀδην (Cratyl. 403 E), τὸν Ἐρῶς.


ὅταν εὐπορήσῃ. These words are condemned, on no sufficient grounds, by Hug and others as "sehr prosaische und abschwächend."

ἀλ' ὑπεκρεῖ. "Die geistigen Güter werden uns zu Theil nur insofern wir sie erwerben" (Rettig). The cpd. ὑπεκρεῖν is ἡπ. λεγ. in Plato, but cp. Euthyd. 291 b αἱ δ' ἐπιστήμαι ἀλ' ὑπεκρέφγον.

οὔτε ἀπορεῖ...οὔτε πλουτεῖ. ἀπορία is a quality of the mother of Ερῶς (δὲ τὴν αὐτής ἀποριάν 203 b), as πλοῦτος of the father. On the other hand πενία is described as a mean between πλοῦτος and πτωχεία in Ar. Plat. 552.

204 Α. ἐστὶ γάρ. Sc. σοφός: cp. Simon. 5. 10 θείω ἄν μόνος τοὺτ' ἔχω γέρας (sc. ἐσθλὸν ἐμφανει). For the midway position of the φιλόσοφος, cp. Phaedr. 278 b, Lysis 218 A; Plotin. Enn. vi. 7. 35 ff.
σοφοὶ γενέσθαι: αὐτὸ γὰρ τούτο ἐστὶ χαλεπῶν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν μηδὲ φρονίμων δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἰκανον· οὐκέν ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ μὴ οἴομενος ἑνδεῖ εἶναι οὐ ἄν μὴ οἴηται ἐπιδείκθαι.

Τίνες οὖν, ἐφην έγώ, ὁ Διοτίμα, οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες, εἰ μὴ Β οἱ σοφοὶ μὴτε οἱ ἀμαθεῖς; Δῆλον δὴ, ἐφη, τοῦτο γε ἢ ὁ ἄγαθος καὶ παιδι, ὅτι οἱ μεταξύ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, δὲν αὐτῷ καὶ Ἕρως. ἐστὶ γὰρ δὴ τῶν καλλίστων ἡ σοφία, Ἕρως δὲ ἐστὶν ἐρως περὶ τὸ καλὸν, ἄστε ἀναγκαῖον Ἕρωτα φιλόσοφον εἶναι, φιλόσοφον δὲ ὄντα μεταξύ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθοῦς. αἰτία δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τούτων ἡ γένεσις· πατρὸς μὲν γὰρ σοφὸν ἐστὶ καὶ εὐπόρου, μητρὸς δὲ οὐ σοφῆς καὶ ἀπόρου. ἦ μὲν οὖν φύσις τῶν δαίμονος, ὁ φίλε Σώκρατε, αὕτη·

C δοὺ δὲ σὺ φήμης Ἕρωτα εἶναι, βαθμιαστὸν οὐδὲν ἐπάθει. φήμης δὲ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεὶ τεκμαίρουμεν ἔξ ὀν οὐ λέγεις, τὸ ἔρωμενον Ἕρωτα εἶναι, οὐ τὸ ἔρως. διὰ ταῦτα σοι, ὀμαί, πάγκαλος ἐφαίνετο ὁ Ἕρως. καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐραστὴν τὸ τὸ ὄντι καλὸν καὶ ἀβδὸν καὶ τέλειον καὶ μακαριστὸν· τὸ δὲ γε ἔρως ἀλλην...ιδέαν τοιαύτην ἔχον, οἰαν ἔγω δηλθοῦν.


αὐτῶ γὰρ τοῦτό κτλ. "Precisely herein is ignorance a grievous thing, (viz.) that.\" etc. If, with Stallb., we take αὐτῶ τοῦτο as adverbial accus. of respect, with τὸ μὴ...ἰκανὸν as an epexegetical supplement, no emendation is required. For the neuter χαλεπῶν in appos. to ἀμαθία, cp. 176 δ, Phileb. 12 c.

204 Β Δῆλον δὴ...καὶ παιδ. Cr. Euthyd. 279 δ τοῦτο δὲ κἂν παῖς γνοίη: ἢδ. 301 b, Lys. 205 c (Schanz nov. comm. p. 72). Observe how sharply Diotima snubs Socrates, ἀσπερ οἱ τελειοι σοφασταῖ (208 c). For my cf. ἢν εἰς, cp. 203 λ.

φιλόσοφον εἶναι. Cr. Procl. in Tim. 52 δύο τούτοις θεοὺς οἱ Πλάτων φιλοσόφους ἐκάλεσε, τὸν τὲ Ἕρωτα καὶ τὸν Ἀθηνᾶν (Tim. 24 b)...ἂν γὰρ ὁ δημιουργὸς "καὶ Μήτης πρῶτος γενέστωρ καὶ Ἕρως πολυτερπής" (Omph. Theog. fr. 8. 11), καὶ ὡς μὲν Μήτης τίκτει τὸν Ἁθηνᾶν, ὡς δὲ "Ἐρως ἀπογεγενθὰν ἥ τορικὴν σειράν.

204 Θ ἀβδῶν. Agathon (here alluded to) had used the subst. ἀβράτης (197 b), besides the epithets ἀτολάς and ἀγός (195 c ff.).

μακαριστόν. The only other Platonic exx. are Rep. 465 δ, Phaedr. 256 c. Cp. the use of μακαρίζω in 216 Β infra.
XXIV. Kal ἐγὼ ἐπιτοι, Ἠδὲ δή, ὧν ἡ ἐξέγεις· τοιοῦτος ὁν ὁ Ἐρώς τίνα χρείαν ἔχει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους; Τοῦτο δή μετὰ ταύτ', ἐφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειράσομαι σὲ διδάξας. ἔστι μὲν δ' ἐγὼ ἐπιτοι τοιοῦτος καὶ οὔτω γεγονός ὁ Ἐρώς, ἕστι δὲ τῶν καλῶν, ὡς ἐν φήμ. εἰ δὲ τις ἦμᾶς ἔρωτι τί τῶν καλῶν ἐστιν ὁ Ἐρώς, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Διονύσια; ὅδε δὲ σαφέστερον ἐρωτεύω τῶν τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρα τε καὶ ἔστι επιτοι ὧτι Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ. Ἀλλ' εἰτε ποθεύει, ἐφη, ἢ ἀπάρκρισις ἐρωτησεῖν τοιάνδε· τί ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο ω ἡν οὐκ ἔχειν τὰ καλά; Οὐ πάντων ἐφης ἐτί ἐξειν ἐγὼ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐρωτήσεις προχειροφω ἀποκρίνασθαι. Ἀλλ', ἐφη, ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ τις μεταβαλὼν δ άντι τῶν καλῶν τῷ ἁγαθῷ χρώματω πτωθών τοίον· φερε, οὐ Σώκρατες, ὥρα· τί ἐρωτός τῶν ἀγαθῶν τί ἐρα; Γενέσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῷ. Καὶ τί


τίνα χρείαν κτλ. Here begins the second section of Socrates-Diotima's exposition. For χρεία, "utility,"—equiv. here to the δύσις of 195 a, the ἔργα of 199 c—cp. Gorg. 480 a, etc.

Τοῦτο δὴ μετὰ ταύτ' κτλ. "Εβενσον 180 d, 186 a, 189 d, 194 e. Also wohl parodisch und spöttisch" (Rettig).

204 D ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν καλῶν. This is object. genitive: cp. 201 b, 206 e. As Rettig notes, Diotima herself affects περὶ τῶν καλῶν in preference to τῶν καλῶν (after ἔρως etc.), and this may be used as an argument against Jahn-Usener's σύμφησις.

εἰ δὲ τις κτλ. For the omission of the apodosis, cp. 199 e εἰ γὰρ ἐραίμην κτλ. 

σαφέστερον ἐρω. The preceding query had been ambiguously worded, since τῶν καλῶν might be taken either as a partitive gen. dependent on τί, or as an object. gen. with Ἐρώς (τί being adverbial accus.): that the latter was the construction intended is now shown by the revised statement of the query—ὁ ἐρωτ. ἐτί ἐρα; I am inclined to suspect that we should read ἔρα (see 204 e n.) for ἔρω (ἔρα mss.)

ἐτι ποθεύ. If we read εἰκοδομεῖ we must ascribe to the proposition its full force, "craves further"; the other exx. of the cpd. in Plato are Prot. 329 a τῶν' ἐστιν δ' ἐτι εἰκοδομέω: Laws 855 e. The former of these supports Rückert's εἰτε εἰκοδομεῖ.

Οὐ πάντων...ἐτί. For οὐ πάντων, cp. Meno 71 c (with Thompson's note).

204 E μεταβαλὼν. Here the participle "adverbii partes agit," cp. Gorg. 480 e, Philob. 51 a. For the ellipse, cp. 204 d, 199 e.

φέρε, ὦ Σ., ἐρα. Most editors bracket the mss.' εφ' Stalib., after
οῖσται ἐκεῖνος ὃ ἄν γένηται τάγαθα; Τούτῳ εὐπορώτερόν, ἂν δὲ ἐγὼ,
205 ἔχω ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι εὐδαιμῶν ἦσται. Κτήσεις γὰρ, ἐφι, ἄγαθῶν
οἱ εὐδαιμονεῖσκένυδαιμονες, καὶ οὐκέτι προσεῖτε ἐρέσθαι, ὡς τὶ δὲ
βουλεῖται εὐδαιμον ὦ καὶ βουλόμενος, ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἑχειν
ἡ ἀπόκρισις. Ἀλήθη λέγεις, ἐποτὶ ἐγὼ. Ταύτην δὲ τὴν βουλήσθων,
καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον ἄνθρωπον ὠμίλε, εἶναι πάντων ἀνθρώ-
πον, καὶ πάντας τάγαθα βουλεῦθαι αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἂν, ἡ τῶς
λέγεις; Οὔτως, ἂν δ' ἐγὼ; κοινῷ εἶναι πάντων. Τι δὴ ὁν,
Β ἐφη, ὃ Σώκρατεσ, οὔ πάντας ἐραν φαμέν, εἰπέρ γε πάντες τῶν
αὐτῶν ἐρόσι καὶ ἂν, ἀλλὰ τινὰς φαμέν εράν, τούς δ' οὖν; Θαυμάζω,
ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ αὐτὸς. 'Αλλὰ μὴ θαύμαζε, ἐφη; ἀφελῶντες γὰρ ἄρα
τοῦ ἔρωτος τὶ εἰδὸς ὄνομαξομεν, τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιτιθεντες Ὠνόμα,
ἐρωτα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀλλαξα καταχρομεθα ὡμός ποιος; "Ωσπερ τι; ἡ
δ' ἐγὼ. "Ωσπερ τὸδε. οὐσ' ὑπὸ τοῖς σπάνοις ἐστὶ το πολὺ; ἥ γὰρ τοι' ἐκ

Winckelmann, retains it with the punctuation ἐρό σ' ἐρων τῶν ἄγαθων; τι
ἐρός;—a mode of expression which is “velamentius quam ut aptum videri
possit huic loco” (Rettig). Rückert defends the Aldine reading ἐρῶ as a
permissible superfluity “in familiaris sermone.” I suspect that here, as above,
we should read ὅρα: cp. ὅρα τι ποιεῖς 189 λ; Rep. 596 c; Crat. 385 c φίρε...εἰπέ.
205 A ἦν τι. Sc. γένηται: for this colloquial use see Goodwin G. M. T.
§ 331.

τέλος...χαίν. Because it is recognized that εὐδαιμονία constitutes in itself
the ethical τέλος or “summum bonum”: cp. Clit. 410 E ἐμπόδιον τοῦ πρὸς
τέλος ἀρετίς ἀλήθεια εὐδαιμονία γενέσθαι: Arist. E. N. i. 7. 1097 33 ἄλλως δὴ
τέλειον τὰ καθ' αὐτὸ αἵρετον δεί...ποιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ.
Cp. also 210 E πρὸς τέλος ἀδικὰ ἰόν κτλ.

πάντας...ἀδικ. Here ἂν goes with βούλευσθαι, not with αὐτοῖσ εἶναι (as in
206 λ ἵνα).

Τι δὴ ἄν κτλ. Diotima here points out an apparent contradiction between
the previous conclusion (κοινῷ πάντων) and common opinion, due to the
ambiguity of the term ἔρως (ἔραν) which is used both in a generic and in a
specific sense.

205 B "Ωσπερ τι; “For example—?"

πάντας. The selection of this term as an ex. of varying connotation is
partly, no doubt, due to the fact that it was one of the matters specially
emphasized by Agathon, 197 λ. For πολὺ, multiplex, cp. Polit. 282 λ.

η γὰρ τοῦ κτλ. For the definition, cp. Soph. 219 B, 265 B πατηκῆν...πάσαν
ἐραν ἰόν δύμαν, ἡ τις δ' αὐτία γίνεται τοῖς μὴ πρώτερον ὄσιν ὑστέρον
γίνεσθαι: also Philob. 26 δ; Xen. Mem. ii. 2. 3; Procl. inst. theol. p. 74.
205 C ἡ δ′ Ἡ Bekker: η δ Η O.-P.: ἡ δ BTW οὐ om. W ἐχουσιν
TW O.-P., Sa.: ἔχουσιν B, Bt.: ἔχουσιν Sauppe μόροιν BT O.-P.: μόνον
pr. W γὰρ τούτῳ: γ. ταύται O.-P. εφι[ν] λέγεις O.-P. D πᾶσα...εὐδαι-
μονεῖν del. Edhm.

205 C οἱ...ἐργασίαι. Cp. Θοργ. 450 c τῶν μὲν (τεχνῶν) ἑργασία τὸ πολύ ἕστι.
The word denotes manufacturing processes: cp. τ. o. p. περὶ τέχνας κτλ., 203 λ.
For ὑπὸ c. dat., a construction rare in Attic prose, cp. Φίλων. 58 λ.: Ἡππ.
Μελ. 295 δ τὰ τε ὑπὸ τῆς μονοσχῆ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας (ὅργανα): Ἱερ.
511 λ. Cp. Aristotle’s use of ὑπὸ c. acc. to denote the subordination of arts,
Ε. Ν. 1. 1. 1094 a 10 ff. ὅσα δ′ εἰσὶ τῶν ταὐτῶν ὑπὸ μίαν τινα ὅνωμα κτλ.
ἐν μόροιν. Equivalent to ἐν εἴδος (205 b): for this logical use of the term
cp. Θοργ. 464 b, Λαύρα 460 b. For ἀφορίζω, cp. Σοφ. 257 c, 268 d τῆς ποιήσεως
ἀφορμαίῳ ἐν λόγω...μόροιν.
τὸ περὶ...τὰ μέτρα. Cp. 187 d, 196 e.

205 D τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον κτλ. Opinions are divided as to the construction
of τὸ κεφάλαιον: it may be construed (1) as nominative and subject, “the
generic concept (σα. τοῦ ἐρωτός) is”—so Hommel, Vermehren, Hug, Prantl,
comparing Θοργ. 463 λ καλὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ (σα. τῆς ῥητορικῆς) τὸ κεφάλαιον καλακεύων:
or (2) as adverbial accus. (of respect), “in its generic aspect,” cp. Φίλων. 48 c
ἐστι δὴ ποιησία μὲν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον: Euthyphr. 8 e. The latter is certainly
the more natural mode of construing here, since no genitive (αὑτοῦ) is added.
But other difficulties remain: what is the subject of ἐστι, if τὸ κεφάλαιον is
adverbial? Should we (a) construe with Finicinus (followed by Stallb., Lehrs,
Zeller, Jowett and others) “nam summatis quidem omnem bonorum felicita-
tisque appetitio maximus et insidiat armor est cuique”? Or (b) should we
rather, with Stallb. and Prantl, supply ὁ ἐρωτός as the subject of ἐστι
and construe πᾶσα ἡ...εὐδαιμονεῖν as the predicate? To my mind the latter is
the more natural method. Next arises the question, how are we to deal
with the last part of the sentence, ὁ μέγιστος...παρτί? If with most edd.
(except Rückert, Stallb. and Rettig) we regard δολερός as corrupt, the best
plan is to excise the whole clause with Hug (and Stallb.), since none of the
corrections of δολερός hitherto proposed (see crit. n.) are at all convincing.
The chief objection to δολερός is, not so much the meaning of the word
itself (which may be defended by 203 d), as rather (to quote Stallb.) “con-
junctio superlativi μέγιστος cum δολερός positivo.” But even this objection
205 D δ...δόλερος secl. Usener: ά...παντί secl. Stallb. (1827) Hugi μέγαστα: ἀμφιττικός Creuzer δόλερος: δόλερωτας Stallb. (1852): δειμνώτας

is not, I think, insuperable; for if we construe παντί closely with δόλερος as “all-ensnaring,” we get a superlative idea which balances μέγαστα, while in sense it is supported by 203 B, D and Sappho’s ἀλοκήρος Ἀφροδίτα. If, adopting this explanation, we retain the traditional text, it seems best to regard the clause ὀ μέγαστα...παντί as an appositional quotation and to construe, with Prantl, “nämlich jene grösste und für jeden verfängliche Liebe.” Hommel is singular in taking τοῦ εὐθαμονείν (sc. ἡ ἐπιθυμία), as well as τὸ κεφάλαιον, as subject (“und das Streben nach dem höchsten Gute, d. i. nach Glückseligkeit, ist die grösste Liebe”).

έρωτα...έραστα. This sequence is irregular. Usually with ὄνομα ἔχειν the name is in the nominative, in apposition with the subject, e.g. Laws 556 C διαστηματία ὄνομα...ἔχοντες (so here ἐρασταί): but the accus. is also possible (in appos. with ὄνομα), as in Plut. Arist. 2. But the combination of the two constructions is certainly awkward, and the words may well be, as Schanz supposes, a gloss.

Καὶ λέγεια kτλ. An allusion to Aristophanes’ speech, esp. 192 B, E ff.: cp. 212 C. For οὖθ’ ὀλον, below, cp. 192 B.

205 Ε ἐπὶ αὐτῶν γε κτλ. Ορ. Χειρ. Μεμ. 1. 2. 54 ἔλεγε δ’ ὅτι καὶ ζων ἐκαστὸς έναυς, ὁ πάνων μίλητα φίλε, τοῦ σώματος δ’ τι πάν ἄχρειον ἤ καὶ ἀνωφελές αὐτός τε ἀφαιρεῖ καὶ ἀλλὰ παρέχει. αὐτοὶ τε γε αὐτῶν ὄνομας τε καὶ τρίχας καὶ τύλους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι κτλ.: Ἑν. Ματθ. 5. 30 καὶ εἰ ἡ δεξιὰ σου χεῖρ σκανδαλίζει σε, ἐκκοφοι αὐτῆς κτλ.
τὰ ἐαυτῶν πονηρὰ εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἐαυτῶν, οἷμαι, ἐκαστοῦ ἀστά-
ζονται, εἰ μὴ εἰ τις τὸ μὲν ἄγαθον οἰκεῖον καλεῖ καὶ ἐαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ
κακὸν ἀλλότριον· ὡς οὐδὲν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὐ ἔρωσιν ἄνθρωποι 206
ἡ τοῦ ἄγαθον. ἦ σοὶ δοκοῦσιν; Μᾶ Δί οὐκ ἐμοίηγε, ἦν δ᾿ ἐγώ.
"Ἀρ᾽ οὖν, ἢ δ᾽ ἦν, οὕτως ἀπλοῦν ἑστὶ λέγειν, ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ ἔρωσιν; Ναὶ, ἑφην. Τι δὲ; οὐ προσθετέον, ἑφη, ὅτι καὶ
εἶναι τὸ ἄγαθον αὐτῶν ἔρωσιν; Προσθετέον. "Ἀρ᾽ οὖν, ἑφη, καὶ οὐ
μόνον εἰναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι; Καὶ τοῦτο προσθετέον. "Εστιν
ἀρα ἐξιληθήδην, ἑφη, ὃ ἔρως τοῦ τὸ ἄγαθον αὐτῷ εἶναι ἀεὶ. Ἄλη-
θέστατα, ἑφην ἐγώ, λέγεις.

XXV. "Οτε δὴ τούτου ὁ ἔρως ἐστὶν ἀεὶ, ἢ δ᾽ ἦν, τῶν τίνα B
τρόπους διωκόντων αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν τίνι πράξει ἢ σπουδὴ καὶ ἡ σύντασις
ἔρως ἄν καλοῖτο; τί τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅν τὸ ἔργον; ἑξείς εἰσεῖν; Οὔ

205 Ε καλεὶ W: καλὴ BT 206 A ἄνθρωποι Bekk. Sz. Bt.: ἄνθρωποι
ἡ σοὶ...ἀγαθοῦ om. O.-P.1 ἢ δ᾽ ἦ Bekker: ἢ[δ]ιη O.-P. corr.: ἢδὴ BT ὅτι
ἄνθρωποι ἔσπαρρο Ἰν. τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ BW O.-P. corr.: τάγαθῳ T, BT. προσθε-
ἡδη BT: η δ η O.-P. τῶν T b O.-P.: τὸν B αὐτὸν ἦ σύντασις B O.-P.:
σύντασις ΤΩ

ei μὴ el. See Goodwin G. M. T. § 4764.

οἰκεῖστον (with Adam’s note): Charm. 163 c, D ἐμανθανον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι τὰ
οἰκεῖα τε καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἁγαθὰ καλοῖσις: Arist. E. N. x. 7.

206 A. ἢ τοῦ ἄγαθου. For the assumption that τάγαθον is the final end
of desire, cp. Phileb. 20 B ff., Gorg. 467 D ff., etc. The statement here is
referred to by Proclus in Alcib. I. p. 129.

ἀπλοῦν. Equivalent to ἀνευ προσθετῶς ἄληθες: cp. 183 D; Phaedo 244 A
ei μὲν γὰρ ἢν ἀπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακῶν εἶναι κτλ. ("true without qualification,
Thompson); Prot. 331 c.

206 B ὁ ἔρως ἐστὶν ἀεὶ. Most edd. follow Bekker in ejecting ἀεὶ: Rottig,
however, rightly keeps it with the note "ἀεὶ=die gegebene Definition gilt
überall und für alle Falle"; cp. 206 Α, B.

αὐτὸ. Sc. τὸ τάγαθῳ αὐτῶς εἶναι ἀεὶ.

ἡ σύντασις. Cp. 203 D ("Ερως ἐστι) σύντασιν: Phileb. 46 D σύντασιν ἁγρίαν
ποιεῖ (with my note): Euthyd. 288 D. For the limitation of the notion of Eros
here (ἐν καλοῖτο), cp. that in 205 A ff. (καλοῖται, c, D).

τυγχάνει δν. Not "what does it happen to be," but "what in reality is it":
see Verrall on Eur. Med. 608: cp. Phaedo 65 D—Ε.

Οὐ μεντάν κτλ. For the suppressed protasis (sc. ei τοῦτο εἶχον εἰπέαν), cp.
175 D.
εφοίτων παρᾶ σε. φοιτᾶν is the regular word for “attending” lectures or a school, see Prot. 326 c eis διδασκάλων...φοιτᾶν: Rep. 328 d δεύμα παρ’ ἦμισ φοίτα: Phaedo 59 B.

τόκος ἐν καλῷ. The act of procreation appears to be called almost indiscriminately (1) τόκος, as here, (2) γέννησις (206 c, e, 209 B), (3) γέννησις καὶ τόκος (206 e), (4) in passive aspect γέννησις (206 d, 207 d). Similarly with the verbs: we find τίκτειν (206 c, 210 c, etc.), γεννᾶν (206 d, 207 a, etc.), τίκτειν καὶ γεννᾶν (206 d, 209 B, c).

Μαντείας...μανθαίνω. Notice the play on the stem-sound. Rettig, citing Eur. Hippol. 237 (τάδε μαντείας ἄξια πολλῆς), writes “Witzspiel mit Anklang an Eur. und Anspielung auf Diotima’s Heimath und Beruf”: the latter allusion is likely enough, but the “Anklang an Eur.” is very problematical; had it been specially intended we should have had ἄξια or πολλῆς echoed as well.

206 C κυνός. κύνης, “pregnancy,” is properly the condition intermediate between conception (σύλληψις) and delivery (τόκος). Cp. Achill. Tat. 1. 10 καὶ νεανίσκος ἑρωτος πρωτοκήμων οὐ δεῖται διδασκαλίας πρὸς τῶν τοκετών. For the language and thought of this whole passage, cp. Theaet. 150 ff., Phaedr. 251 a ff., Tim. 91 a : also Max. Tyr. dis. xvi. 4, p. 179 κυνός δὲ πᾶσαι μὲν γυναι φύσει, αὐλόνοις δὲ θει, τίκτουσι δὲ λόγῳ κτλ.: Clem. Al. Strom. v. 552 B: Themist. or. xxxii. p. 355 D.

ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ γ. I adopt Badham’s correction τῇ for τῷ since the change involved is very slight and ἐν τῷ ἡλικίᾳ is unexampled in Plato: cp. Gorg. 484 C ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ: Rep. 461 B; Phaedr. 209 B infra; 255 A; Meno 89 B. Plato also uses ἐν ἡλικίᾳ, e.g. Rep. 461 B: Charm. 154 A: Laws 924 E.

τίκτειν δὲ...καλῷ. There is much to be said for Rettig’s view that this sentence (as well as the next) is a gloss. As he argues, the words “gehören also ihrem Inhalte nach nicht an die Stelle, an welcher sie stehen, sondern sie müssten nach dem Satze ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο κτλ. folgen. An dieser Stelle collidieren sie aber mit den gleichbedeutenden Worten τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀναμμάστῳ...ἀριστον,
für deren Glosse ich sie ansehe. Worauf sollten auch die Worte ἐστι δέ... πράγμα gehen, wenn ihnen die Worte τίκτειν δέ...καλὸς unmittelbar vorangingen?" It is just possible, however, to retain the clause as a kind of parenthetical addendum to the preceding sentence, which forestalls, somewhat confusingly, the sentences τὰ δ᾽...ἄρμποτον. The omission of the article before καλὸς, confirmed by the Papyrūs, is certainly an improvement. For the thought, cp. Plotin. Ἐπι. Π. v. p. 157 b.

[ἡ γὰρ...τόκος ἐστὶν.] Most edd. (except Hommel and Stallb.) agree in excising this clause as a meaningless intrusion. Hommel and Stallb. explain the words as intended to introduce the first part of the exposition of τόκος, viz. τόκος κατὰ σῶμα: and Stallb. renders "nam (ἡ γὰρ=nemlich) vīrī et mulieris coitus, est ille nihil aliud nisi τόκος." Susemilh's comment is "die Zeugung werde als die wahrhafte Aufhebung der Geschlechtsdifferenz bezeichnet." But, as Rettig shows, none of these attempts to justify the clause are satisfactory. Perhaps it is a gloss on ἡλικία.

ἐστὶ δὲ τούτο κτλ. Ὅψ. Λαώς 773 Ε, 721 σ γαμεῖν δὲ...διανοηθέντα ὡς ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος φύει τινὶ μετελθεῖν ἄθανασίας· οὐ καὶ πέφυκεν ἐπιθυμίαιν ἴσχειν πᾶσαν πάσαν κτλ.: Cicero Tusq. 1. 35 quid procreatī liberorum, quid propagatio nominis...significant, nisi nos futura etiam cogitare?: Clem. Al. Strom. II. p. 421 c ἐπισκευάσας τὴν ἄθανασίαν τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν (sc. διὰ τοῦ γάμου), καὶ οἰνοὶ διαμουρθῶς πασὶ παῖδον μεταλαμπαδευμένην.

ἐν τῷ ἄναρμόστῳ. For the connexion of Eros with ἄρμα, see 187 a ff.; for harmony of the body, cp. Rep. 591 d; and of the soul, Rep. 430 ε ff., Phaedo 85 ε ff.

206 D Μοῖρα...Εἰλείθυα. Ὅψ. Pind. Ol. vi. 41 τὰ μὲν ὁ Χρυσοκόμας πραγματίν τ᾽ Ἐλείθυαν παρέστασεν τε Μοῖρας: ὑδ. Ἕρ. vi. 1 Ἐλείθυαν πάρθενον Μοῖραν βαθυφρόνων. Μοῖρα ("the Dispenser") is a birth-goddess also in Hom. II. xxiv. 209 τῶν ὁς ποθὲ Μοῖρα κραταῖ [γυνομένῳ ἐπένησε λίγη]. For Eileithyia, see also II. xii. 270, Hes. Theog. 922; and it is noteworthy that Olen made out Eros to be the son of Eileithyia (see Paus. ix. 27). Libanius (οὐ. ν. τ. i. p. 231 R.) identifies Eil. with Artemis.

ἡ Καλλονῆ. Usener was no doubt right in taking καλλονῆ here as a proper name, in spite of Rettig's objection that "deren Existenz nachzuweisen ihm aber nicht gelungen ist"; for such a personification, in this context, requires no precedent. "Beauty acts the part of our Lady of Travail at the birth." Possibly we ought to insert ἐπὶ after ἐστιν(ν) or read ἐπὶ in place of ἐστὶ.
ótaν μὲν καλὸν προστελάζη τὸ κύον, ἱλεών τε γῆγνεται καὶ εὐφραίνομεν διαχεῖται καὶ τίκτει τε καὶ γεννᾷ: óταν δὲ αἰσχρῷ, σκυθρωπὸν τε καὶ λυπούμενον συσπειρᾶται καὶ ὀποτρέπεται καὶ ἀνειλλεῖται καὶ ὣν γεννᾷ, ἀλλὰ ἰσχῦν τὸ κύμα χαλεπῶς φέρει.


ἰλεὼν. Cp. 197 D.

dιαχεῖται. This word may signify both physical and emotional effects: for the former cp. Lavis 775 ὑπὸ μέθης: for the latter, Suidas (Hesych.) διαχεῖται—χαίρει, διαχεῖται, and the Psalmist’s “I am poured out like water.”

συσπειρᾶται κτλ. Schol. συσπειρᾶται· συσπειρᾶται. Suid. κυών δὲ ἀνέλλειθαν τὸ ἀπαξίων. They are realistic terms to express averseion, derived perhaps from the action of a snail in drawing in its horns and rolling itself into a ball. Cp. Plotin. Επ. I. vi. 2. 51 ἢ ψυχὴ...πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχρῶν προσβαλοῦσα ἀνέλλειται καὶ ἀρνεῖται καὶ ἀνανεύει ἔτι τοῦ οὗ συμφωνοῦσα καὶ ἀλλοτριωμένη. Usener and Hug may be right in bracketing καὶ ὀποτρέπεται, on which Hug comments “Zwischen dem der Gleichnissprache angehörenden συσπειρᾶται und ἀνειλλεῖται ist das matte, prosaische ὀποτρέπεται unpassend”; but the extra word helps to add emphasis, if nothing more, and Plotinus too uses three verbs. In ἀνειλλεῖται Rettig sees an “Anspielung auf ἀνειλλεῖθα” (cp. Eur. Ion 453). Cp. Plut. de s. u. n. p. 562 λ.

σαργαρῶντι. For σαργαρῶν, lacte turbere, cp. Rep. 460 c: in Phaedr. 256 λ (σαργαρῶν δὲ καὶ ἀπορῶν περιβάλλει τῶν ἐρατῆν καὶ φιλεῖ) σαργαρῶν = Venere tumens. The Scholiast here has σαργαρῶντι· ὀρμῶντι, ὀργῶντι, ταραττομένῳ, ἢ ἀνθοῦντι. λαμβάνεται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μαστῶν πεπληρωμένων γάλακτος. Here the realism of the language and the juxtaposition of κυώντι compels us to construe “great with child” (as L. and S.) or “with swelling bosom”—not merely “bursting with desire” or excitement. Cp. σφριγῶ as used in Ar. Lysistr. 80.

περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλης ὅδινος ἀπολύειν τὸν ἔχοντα. ἔστι Ε
γὰρ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐφη, οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ὅ ἔρως, ὡς σὺ οἶει. Ἀλλὰ τί
μὴν; Τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ. Εἰσε; ἢν δὲ ἔγοι.
Pάντω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, τί δὴ οὖν τῆς γεννήσεως; ὅτι ἀπειγομένοις ἐστι
καὶ ἀδιάβατον ὅς ἰδντῷ ἢ γέννησε. ἀβανασίας δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπὶ-207
θυμεῖν μετὰ ἄγαθοῦ ἐκ τῶν ἰμιλογημένων, εἴπερ τοῦ ἄγαθον
εαυτῷ εἶναι δὲ ἔρως ἐστὶν. ἀπαγκαίον δὴ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου
καὶ τῆς ἀβανασίας τὸν ἔρωτα εἶναι.

XXVI. Ταῦτα τε οὖν πάντα ἐδίδασκε με, ὅποτε περὶ τῶν

206 ὅ ὅδινος ἀπολύειν. This is the office of Καλλοῦν as Ἐἰλείδινα: cp.
Thes. 151 έ ταύτην...τὴν ὅδινα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀπολύειν ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη (ἐσ.
ἡ μαχητικὴ) δύναται; Bep. 490 θ ζ παντίσασι καὶ μαγεῖς τῷ ἄνω ὄντι,
γέννησαν νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν...καὶ οὕτω λέγοις ὅδινας: Max. Τυρ.
ἀξια. xvi. 4, p. 179 λέγοις Μακεδόνοις πυχήν κυώντων καὶ ὅδινων μεστῆν.

τὸν ἔχοντα. "Sc. ταύτην τὴν ὅδινα" (Wolf): but Hommel and Stallb.
supply αὐτό, i.e. τὸ καλὸν. Cp. Ιναεδ. 252 έ τὸν τὸ καλὸν ἔχοντα ἱατρὸν
ἐυρίκη μόνον τῶν μεγάτων πάνω,—which settles the question.

τ.γεννήσεως; τί, answered by ὅτι, means "why" or "wherein" rather
than "what" (as in 204 D), and the genitive, like those preceding, is objective.
Supply έστιν δ ἔρως.

ἀπειγομένοις. This is practically a re-assertion of the statement in 206 C (θεδὼν
τὸ πράγμα κτλ.). Cp. Λαος 773 θ ὧς χρή τῆς ἀπειγομένης φύσεως ἀντίχεσθαι τῷ
παῖς παῖδων καταλείποντα κτλ.

207 έ ἐπέρ τοῦ ἄγαθον κτλ. Against Bekker, Dindorf, Ast, Stallb.1 who
adopted τοῦ τάγαθον Rückert wrote: "etiam vulg. proba est. Construe: ἐπέρ
τοῦ ἄγαθου ἔρως ἐστὶν, quibus ἐξηγητικῶς addita sunt verba ἰατρὸ εἶναι ἐστὶν.
In quibus supplendum est subj. ὁ ἔρως." To this Stallb.2 and Retzig assent,
comparing Pind. Ol. iii. 33 τῶν νῦν γυνῶν ἰμερών ἔχον...; μια: Thuc. v.
15. 1 ἐπίθεμα τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς κοµίσασι (where Poppo cites for
the exexegetic infin. Crītō 52 C, Xen. Κυρ. v. 231). None other the less, the mss.'
text seems—if not "sineullo sensu" as Wolf put it—at least very awkward
Greek. The obvious allusion to the former definition, ὁ ἔρως ἐστὶ τοῦ τὸ
ἄγαθον αὐτῷ εἶναι ἐστὶ (206 A ad fin.), supports Bekker's reading here as the
right one: but if we read τοῦ τάγαθον here consistency requires that we also
read μετὰ τάγαθοῦ in the preceding line, an easy change but supported by no
authority. Hence I content myself with the minimum of alteration, viz.
ἄγαθον for ἄγαθον.
èρωτικῶν λόγων πως τινός, καὶ ποτὲ ἦρμην Ῥίοις, ὃ Σώκρατες, αἴτιον εἶναι τούτων τοῦ ἐρωτος καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει ὡς δεινῶς διατίθεται πάντα τὰ θηρία, ἐπειδὰν γεννᾶν ἐπιθυμήσῃ, καὶ
Β τὰ σεξὰ καὶ τὰ πτηνά, νοσοῦντά τε πάντα καὶ ἐρωτικῶς διατίθέμενα, πρόων μὲν περὶ τὸ ξυμμαχήμα τὸν ἄλλον, ἐπειδὰν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τοῦ γεννομένου, καὶ ἔτομα ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τούτων καὶ διαμάχεσθαι τὰ ἀδεξενότατα τὰς ἱσχυροτάτους καὶ ὑπέραπτηθέσεις, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰς λύμφα παρατεῖνόμενα ἄστ' ἐκείνα ἐκτρέφειν, καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ποιούντα; τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους, ἔφθ', οὖντ' ἂν τις ἐκ λογισμοῦ ταῦτα ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ θηρία τῆς αἵτια μνήμων ἐρωτικῶς

καὶ ἀνέθεσθαι; ἡξίωσι λέγειν; καὶ ἐγὼ αὖ ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐκ εἶδειν' ἢ δ' ἐπει, Διανοεὶ οὖν δεινῶς ποτὲ γεννῆσθαι τάς ἐρωτικά, ἐὰν ταῦτα μην ἐννοήσῃ; Ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτά τοι, ὁ Διοτίμα, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ εἴπον, παρὰ σὲ ἤμως, γνωσίς ὅτι διδασκάλων δέομαι. ἀλλὰ μοι λέγε


ὡς δεινῶς διατίθεται. “In welchem gewaltsamem Zustande sich die Thiere befinden” (Schlei.). The phrase is echoed by Alcibiades in 215 ε, cp. 207 b, 208 c. For διαθεσις see Phileb. 11 d, with my note.


καὶ διαμάχεσθαι κτλ. This is a correction of Phaedrus’s statement (179 b ff.): cp. 220 b ff. For the fact, cp. Aelian H. A. 1, 18, π. 40: Λάβων 814 b μήδ’ ὀστέρ οἴνοιδας περὶ τέκνων μαχαιρίνας...ἐθέλειν ἀποθησάσιεν κτλ.


τὸ αἵτια κτλ. For αἰτία with the (anarthrous) infinit., cp. Phaedo 97 a αἰτία...γενέσθαι. For the foregoing description of the phenomena connected with reproduction in the animal-world, cp. (with Retting) Od. xvi. 216 ff.; Λάβων 814 b; Arist. Hist. An. viii. 1; Cic. de fin. iii. 19. 62.

207 C Διανοεῖς. “Do you fancy—?”: cp. Λάβων 755 b μηκέτι...τὴν τηλικαύτην ἄρχην ὡς ἄρξον διανοηθήνω. Notice the tone of indignant scorn in which Diotima speaks, cp. 204 b.


ὑπὲρ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον. See 206 b.
καὶ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν περὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά.
Εἰ ταῦταν, ἐφι, πιστεύεις ἐκείνου εἶναι φύσει τῶν ἔρωτα, οὐ πολλάκις ὁμολογήκαμεν, μὴ θαύμαζε. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείνον ὁ λόγος ἡ θυνητὴ φύσις ξητεῖ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀεὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀδάνατος. δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ μᾶνον, τῇ γενέσει, ὅτι ἀεὶ καταλείπει ἐτέρων νέον ἀντὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ὃ ἐν ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἰδίων ὧν


οὐ πολλάκις ὁμ. οὗ means ἀδανασίας: πολλάκις refers not only to 206 B f. but also to other conversations such as are implied in 207 λ (ἐδίδασκε μὲ ὀπτές κτλ.).

207 D ἐνταῦθα. “Here,” i.e. in the case of τὰ θηρία, as distinguished from that of humans.

τῶν αὐτῶν...λόγοιν. Ἀνδ. accus.; cp. 178 Ε.

κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν. This implies (cp. 208 λ ad ἕν., B) that only partial immortality, at the best, can attach to ἡ θυνητὴ φύσις.

ἀεὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀδάνατος. I retain the reading of B rejected by recent edd. (see crit. n.): ἀεὶ goes with the preceding words, cp. Rep. 618 ε τὸν βελτίων ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ἀεὶ πανταχοῦ αἰρεθάναι: and 206 λ, B supra. If, with Burnet, we adopt the reading of Τ, we must suppose εἶναι to be doing double duty, “both to exist (εἶναι) always and to be (εἶναι) immortal.” For the desire of this mortal “to put on immortality,” cp. Eur. fr. 809 θαλάσσων βηροὶ...οὐτως ἐρως βρότους ἐγκεκατοβίον: Browne Hydriot. c. 5 “Restless inquietude for the diuturnity of our memories unto present considerations seems a vanity almost out of date, and superannuated piece of folly.”

δύναται κτλ. This introduces the explanation of the saving phrase κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν. ταύτῃ is adverbial (equiv. to ταύτῃ τῷ μηχάνῃ in 208 Β ad init.), and τῇ γενέσει, if genuine, is an epeexegetic supplement. Possibly we should excise τῇ γενέσει, with Vermehren; or else alter to τῇ γεννήσει. But the use of τῇ γενέσει above (206 B) in the sense of “the process of generation,” combined with the emphasis, by repetition of its moods and tenses, laid on γίγνεσθαι in the sequel (207 D—208 Α), may make us hesitate to adopt any change; cp. also the passage quoted in the next note.

ἀεὶ καταλέπτω κτλ. Cr. Λαвлς 721 ε γένος οὐν ἀνθρώπων...τοῦτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἀδάνατον ὅν, τῷ παῖς παῖδον καταλείπόμενον ταύτῃ καὶ ἐν ὃν ἀεὶ γενέσει τῆς ἀθανασίας μετειληφθέναι: ἰβ. 773 Ε (cited above). On this “conceit” of “a fruitful issue wherein, as in the truest chronicle, they seem to outlive themselves,” Sir T. Browne (Rel. Med. § 41) observes “This counterfeit subsisting in our progenies seems to me a mere fallacy” etc.

ἐπεὶ καὶ κτλ. We should expect this first clause to be followed by something like οὐκ ἦστι τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλα νέον ἀεὶ γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπόλλυσεν ὁ οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ, but, affected by the parenthetic clause ὅταν...γένητο, the
sentence follows a different course. Cp. the cases of anacoluthon in 177 B, 182 d.

νόει...τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύτηρα. For the omission of τὰ μὲν, cp. Theaet. 181 d, Protag. 330 α, Rep. 451 d. I think it not unlikely that for ἀλλὰ we should read ἄμα: the processes of growth and decay are synchronous. For the substance of this passage cp. Heraclitus fr. 41 διέ ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἄν ἐμβαίνῃς: (Heraclitus ap.) Plut. de El Delph. c. 18 ὁ χθές (ἀνθρώπος) εἰς τὸν σήμερον τέθηκεν, ὁ δὲ σήμερον εἰς τὸν αύριον ἀποθηκεύεται. μὲν δ’ οὐδὲς, οὐδ’ ἄστιν εἰς, ἀλλὰ γεγονότα ἐπιλογὶ περὶ ἐν φάντασμα: Max. Tyr. διά. xli. 4 μεταβολὴν ὅρμας σωμάτων καὶ γενέσεως ἰδὰναγίαν, ὅδ’ ἀνω καὶ κάτω καὶ τῶν Ηράκλειτον κτλ.: Plut. cons. ad Apoll. 10: Cratyl. 439 d ff.: see also Rohde, Psyche II. 148.

The influence of “the flowing philosophers” is noticeable also in Epicharm. fr. 40. 12 ff. (Lorenz)—

δὲ νῦν ὅρη
καὶ τὸς ἀνθρώπονν: ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐξεῖτ᾿, ὁ δὲ γὰρ μᾶς φθίνει.
ἐν μεταλλαγῇ δὲ πάντες ἐντὶ πάντα τῶν χρόνων.
ὁ δὲ μεταλλάσσει κατὰ φύσιν κατάστασιν ἐν τούτῳ μένει,
ἄπερον εἶ δὴ καὶ τὸν δὴ ἄφθονος παρεξεργασιμοῖς.
καὶ τὸ δὴ καὶ ὅλος ἄλλοι καὶ νῦν ἄλλοι τελεόμενες,
καθὼς ἄλλοι κατάστασιν ἄλλως κατοντὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀλλόν.

Cp. Spenser F. Q. vii. 7. 19 And men themselves do change continually, | From youth to eld from wealth to poverty...Ne doe their bodies only fit and fly, | But ecke their minds (which they immortall call) | Still change and vary thoughts, as new occasions fall.”

208 A ai ἐπιστήμαι. The word is used here in the popular sense—
“notitiae rerum in sensus cadentium” (Ritckert); cp. Rep. 476 d ff.

μελέταν. See note on ἀμελέτητος 172 A supra.
τάν, ὡς ἔξοιχας ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· λήθη γάρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος, μελέτη δὲ πάλιν καὶνή ἐμποιοῦσα ἀντί τῆς ἀπιούσῃς [μνήμης] σφάζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὡστε τὴν αὐτήν δοκεῖν εἶναι. τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ πάν τὸ θυντὸν σφάζεται, οὐ τῷ παντάπασι τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ εἶναι ὡστερ τὸ θείον, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸ ἀπόν καὶ παλαιόμενον ἔτερον νέον Β ἐγκαταλείπειν οἷον αὐτὸ ἤν. ταὐτή τῇ μηχανῇ, ὥς Σώκρατες, ἔφη, θυντὸν ἀθανασίας μετέχει, καὶ σῶμα καὶ τάλα πάντα· ἀδύνατον δὲ ἀλήθ. μὴ ὁνθαμάζει εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποβλάστημα φύσει πᾶν τιμᾶ· ἀθανασίας γὰρ χάριν παντὶ αὐτῇ ὡς σπουδὴ καὶ ο ἐρως ἐπεται.


λήθη γὰρ κτλ. Cp. Πραεδ. 75 ὁ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν...ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολὴν; Phileb. 33 κ ἐνι τῷ λήθη μνήμης ἔξοδος: Μένος 81 c; Laws 732 c. For the πνεύμα Ἁβαθῆς (Μνησούνης) in Ἰακόπος, see Pind. fr. 130; Kohde, Psyche ii. 209. 3901. [μνήμην]. This word is either interpolated or corrupted (pace Rottig who attempts to defend it by citing Philob. 34 β): ἀποπνοίας must refer to the same subst. as ἐξούσῃς above, viz. τῆς ἐπιστήμης, while καὶνή must qualify the same subst. as ἀπιούσῃς. For later ref. to this doctrine, see Philo Jud. de nom. nat. p. 1060; Nemes. de nat. hom. 13, p. 166.

208 Β ἀλλὰ τῷ...οἷον αὐτῷ ἤν. This view is reproduced by Aristotle, de an. ii. 4. 415a 26 ff. φυσικῶτατον γάρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζωσι...τὸ ποιήσαι ἔτερον οἷον αὐτῷ...καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσαι...ἐπεί ὁν κοινωνεῖν ἀδύνατε τοῦ αὐτῷ...καὶ τοῦ θείου τῇ συνεχείᾳ· κοινωνεῖ ταυτῇ...καὶ διαμένει οὐκ αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἀλλ' αὐτῷ, δριμψί μὲν οὐχ ἐν, εἶδε δ' ἐν: cp. id. Pol. i. 1252a 26 ff.; de gen. an. ii. 735a 17 ff.


ἀδύνατον δὲ ἀλήθ. Stallb. retaining the traditional ἀδύνατον, comments: "haec addita videntur et oppositionis gratia et propter verba extrema καὶ τάλα πάντα: quae ne falso intelligerentur, sane cavendum fuit"—which, as Hommel points out, is unsatisfactory. Against ἀδύνατον Rückert absurdly objects that Plato would have written ἀληθ. δὲ ἀδύνατον.

πάντες ἐπεται. Since ἐπεσθαι is more naturally used of attendance on a divinity (cp. 197 e, Phaedr. 248 a etc.) perhaps ἐπεστη ought to be read (cp. 183 b crit. nat.). ἡ σπουδὴ serves to recall 206 b.
XXVII. Kai ἐγὼ ἀκούσας τὸν λόγον ἑθαύμασά τε καὶ εἴπον Ἔλεν, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὡ σοφωτάτη Διοτίμα, ταῦτα ως ἁλθός σύντος 


Εἶλεν. “Really!”: “In irissione verti potest so?” (Ast). This is a somewhat rare use; cp. Rep. 350 εἴω δε σοι, ὀσπερ ταῖς γραῖσιν ταῖς τοῖς μίδους λεγούσαι, “εἶλεν” ἐρώθ.: ib. 424 ε.; Euthyd. 290 ε. For the doubled “verbum dicendi” (ἰπτὸν...πρ), cp. 177 λ., 202 ε.

208 C ὀσπερ οἱ τέλειοι σοφισταί. We might render “in true professorial style.” The reference may be partly (as Wolf and Hommel suggest) to the fact that the sophist, as contrasted with the Socratic, method was that of didactic monologue (ὅπως κατατεύνοιτο τοῦ λόγου Προτ. 329 λ)—the lecture rather than the conversation. Thus in the sequel (208 c—212 λ) Diotima develops her own doctrine without the aid of further question-and-answer. Stallb., however, explains the phrase as intended to ridicule the pretended omniscience of the sophists; Rettig sees in it an indication that what follows is meant, in part, as a parody of the earlier speeches; and by Ast and Schleierm. it is taken to refer only to the dogmatic tone of εἰ ὑμι. For τέλεος σοφιστής, cp. Stat. 403 ε (applied to Hades); σοφιστής applied to Eros, 208 δ; οἱ χρηστοὶ σοφισταί, 177 β; οἱ σοφοὶ, 185 ε. It is possible also that in τέλεος there may be a hint at the mystery-element in D.’s speech (cp. 210 λ and πρὸς τέλος 210 ε).

εἰ ἐθέλει κτλ. For φιλοσοφία, cp. 178 δ. The thought here recalls Milton’s “Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise,” etc.

θαυμάζως δὲν κτλ. Stallb., defending περὶ, says “αἰδ ἐννοεῖ facillime e superioribus intelligitur aucta.” But we may justly complain here, as Badham does at Phileb. 49 α., of “the dunce who inserted περὶ.”

καὶ κλέος...καταθέσθαι. “Ex poeta aliquo petita esse ipse verborum numerus declarat” (Stallb.): but it is just as probable that Diotima herself is the authoress—rivalling Agathon. Cp. Tyrt. 12. 31—2 οὗτο σὺ κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἀπάλλυται οὐδ᾽ ἰδων’ αὐτόν | ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ γῆς περ ἐὼν γίγνεται ἄθανατος: Theogn. 245—6 οὐδ᾽ τῶν οὐδ᾽ θανῶν ἀπολείς κλέος, ἀλλὰ μελήσεις ἃ ἀθτῶν ἀνθρώπους αἰτὶ ἐχὼν δόμα: Simon. 99. 1 ἀσβεστον κλέος...θέντες. For the thought, see also Cic. Tuscul. i. p. 303; Cat. Mai. 22. 3.
καὶ ἕπεραποθυήσκεν. ἔτει ὀιεὶ σὺ, ἐφη, Ἀλκηστὶν ὑπὲρ Ἀδμήτου ἀποθανεῖν ἂν, ἢ Ἀχιλλέα Πατρόκλῳ ἐπαποθανεῖν, ἢ προαποθανεῖν τὸν ὑμέτερον Κόδρον ὑπὲρ τῆς βασιλείας τῶν παίδων, μὴ οἰδομένους "ἀδάνατον μνήμην ἁρετῆς πέρι" ἐαυτῶν ἔσεθαι, ἢν νῦν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν; πολλοὶ γε δεῖ, ἐφη, ἅλλ', οἶμαι, ὑπὲρ ἁρετῆς ἀδανάτου καὶ τοιαύτης δόξης εὐκλεόσις πάντες πάντα ποιοῦσιν, δόσῳ ἄν ἀμελ-
hope for immortality, or any patent from oblivion, in preservation below the moone." Also Soph. Philoct. 1422 ἐκ τῶν πῶνων τῶν εὐκλείων θεών.

208 Ε οί μὲν οὖν ἐγκύμονες. Here first the two kinds of pregnancy, bodily and mental,—mentioned together in 206 b, c—are definitely separated.

πρῶς τάς γ. μ. τρέποντα. Cp. 181 c, 191 e.

ἀθανασίαν κτλ. Hug points out that by a few slight alterations this can be turned into an elegiac couplet:—

ἀθανάσατον μνήμην κεδαμονίαν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς
eἰς τὸν ἑπετα χρόναν πάντα παριζόμενα.

Hommel had already printed εἰς...χρόνον as a half-verse.

209 Α οί τε κατὰ τήν ψυχήν. So. ἐγκύμονες δύνες. In this anacoluthic period Retting sees a parody of Phaedrus's style with its "langathmigen, anakolutischen und regellosen Perioden."

καὶ κυήσαι καὶ τεκεῖν. Hug's conjecture, τεκεῖν for κυήν, is fortunate in finding confirmation in the Papyrus. If κυήν be read, what is the point of the distinction of tenses? Schleierm. renders by "erzeugen und erzeugen zu wollen"; Schulthess, "zeugen und empfangen"; Retting explains that "κυήν geht auf den dauernuden, κυήσαι auf den vollendeteten Process"; Stallb. "et concepisse (quae est actio semel...perfecta) et conceptum tenere.

But there is certainly not much point here in making any such fine-spun distinction, unless it be to imply that Diotima is playing the part of a σοφιστής!

φρόνησιν...ἀρετήν. "Moral wisdom and virtue in general": the phrase is an echo of that in 184 d. For φρόνησις, cp. Rep. 427 e (with Adam's note); Meno 88 b (with Thompson's note).

οἱ ποιηταὶ. That the poets were ethical teachers and the stage a pulpit—just as Homer was the Greek Bible—was an axiom in the Hellenic world. See the appeal to the authority of poets in the Protagoras (and Adam's note on 338 e); Ar. Ran. 1099 (Eurip. loquitur) βελτίων τε ποιούμεν τοὺς ἀνθρώ

πονοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεισι: Λύσιος 214 ἄ οὐντι γὰρ (sc. οἱ ποιηταὶ) ἥμιν ὀσπερ πατέρες τῆς σοφίας έστι καὶ ἤγερμονες. The fact that most kinds of poetry were produced in connexion with, and under the sanction of, religion, had no doubt something to do with this estimate of it. See further Adam R. T. G. pp. 9 ff.

σημειογράφω...εἰρητικὸν. An allusion to 197 τ. σημειογράφω...ἀνέφερον.


σωφροσύνη τη καὶ δικαιοσύνη. Cp. Παρ. 62 a οἱ τῶν δημοτικῶν τε καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐπιτετηδευκές, ἢ δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, εὖ ἐνως τε καὶ μελτέτης γεγονόντων ἓνει φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ: Μενο 73 A. For these virtues in the Republic, see Adam on 432 a, 434 c. Here they combine to form a description of “ordinary civil virtue.”

209 B τῶνων αὐτὰ κτλ. Here the main statement is resumed. With Stephens (followed by Ast, Rückert and Hug) I read ἐπιθυμῆ, whereas Burnet prints ἐπιθυμεῖ, ζητεῖ δὴ κτλ., with commas after ψυχὴν and ἡλικίας. Stallb. takes καὶ as intensive rather than connective, and renders θείος ἢν “quippe divinna.” Burnet adopts Parmentier’s θέος, but there seems little point in emphasizing the celibacy of the youth. If alteration be required, the best would be ἐνθεός, for which cp. 179 a, 180 b. But in Μενο 99 c ff. θείος, in much the same sense as ἐνθεός, is applied to the very classes here mentioned—ὅρθως ἢν καλοῦμεν θείους τε, οὗ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησμοφόρος καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικὸς ἔσπαστος καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς...φαίμεν ἢν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθούσατες κτλ. (see Thompson ad loc.): hence the word may well be sound here also. For τῆς ἡλικίας (and θείος) cp. 206 c.


φότερον, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν ἀνθρωπον εὐθὺς εὐπορεῖ λόγων περὶ C ἀφετῆς καὶ [peri] οἷον χρῆ εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀ ἐπιτη-
δεύειν, καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖ παθεύειν. ἀπτόμενος γάρ, οὐμα, τοῦ καλὸν
καὶ ὠμλῶν αὐτῷ, ὁ πάλαι ἐκεῖν, τίκτει καὶ γεννᾷ, καὶ παρὼν καὶ ἀπὸν μεμιμηνόν, καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν συνεκτρέφει κοινῷ μετ’ ἐκεῖνον,
ὡς τολὺ μείζω κοινωνίαν [τῆς τῶν παίδων] πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ
tοιοῦτοι ἐσχοῦνται καὶ φιλίαν βεβαιοτέραν, ἀνε καλλιῶν καὶ ἀθανωτέρων παίδων κεκαιονηκότες. καὶ πᾶς ἀν δὲ ξαίται εαυτῷ
D τοιοῦτον παῖδας μᾶλλον γεγονέναι ἢ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους, καὶ εἰς
"Ομηρον ἀποβλέψασ καὶ <eis> Ἡσίοδον καὶ τοὺς ἀλλους ποιητάς
tὸς ἀγαθὸν ζηλοῖν οἶα ἐκογνὸν ἐαυτῶν καταλείποντος, ἢ ἐκεῖνοι

ἀπὸν καὶ παρὼν T καὶ (ante τὸ) om. Vind. 21, Bast τῖς...παίδων
seclusi τῶν παιδῶν: ἄλλων παιδῶν Hug: θυτῶν παιδῶν Schritz: τῶν
πολλῶν Rohde: τῶν παιδογόνων Bast: fort. τῶν (γήινων) παιδῶν
καλλίων ἄν B παιδῶν secl. Creuzer J.-U. D εἰς Ἡσίοδον O.-P.: Ἡσίοδον libri,

209 C καὶ [peri] οἷον κτλ. peri is retained by Hommel and Stallb. who
renders "quale sit in quo tractando versari debet is qui boni viri nomen et
dignitatem obtinere velit," taking oἷον as neut., and by Rettig who regards
the "redundance and tautology" of the words as due to the "sophistical
character" of the passage.

τὸν καλὸν. This is masc., not neuter, as the context shows.
καὶ παρὼν καὶ ἀπὸν. A rhetorical formula; cp. Soph. Antig. 1109 οἱ τ’
ὄντες οἱ τ’ ἄπνοτες: id. El. 305: Crat. 420 λ., Laws 635 λ. As Hommel
observes, μεμιμηνός (sc. αὐτῷ) can in strictness apply only to ἀπὸν.

τῆς τῶν παιδῶν. Hugprint τῶν * * * παιδῶν with the note (after Vermehren)
"es scheint ein Epitheton wie φύσει o. ähnl. ausgefallen zu sein." Stallb.
explains ἡ κοινωνία τῶν παιδῶν to mean "conjectio ex liberorum procreatione
oriunda." The simplest remedy is to bracket the words τῆς τῶν παιδῶν (see
krit. n.).

ἀθανατοτέρων. For this Hibernian comparison cp. Phaedo 99 c.
209 D ξηλῶν οἷα κτλ. Ι.κ. ζηλῶν αὐτοῦς ὅτι τοιαῦτα κτλ., "With envy for
the noble offspring they leave." For οἶας = ὅτι τοιοῦτος, cp. Xen. Cyr. vii. 3. 13
(Madv. Gr. S. § 198 R. 3). Rückert punctuates after Ἡσίοδον, Hommel after
ἀποβλέψας, and it is evident from Rettig’s note,—"Homer kann man nur
bewundern, mit andern Dichtern ist es eher möglich zu wetteifern,"—that
he too mistakes the construction: we must supply αὐτοῦ (as Stallb.) with
ζηλῶν and construe all the accusatives as depending on εἰς: cp. I. Alc. 120 λ,
122 B, c. This passage is quoted by Proclus ad Pl. Rep. p. 393.

αὖτα τοιαῦτα. Rettig says "sc. ἄδανατα"; but the words imply κλεῖος as well as ἄθανασία.

εἰ δὲ βούλει. See on 177 D. This is a brachylogy for εἰ δὲ βούλει, ζηλῶν Δυκοῦργον οἷος παῖδας κτλ.

παῖδας κατελίπτετο. For the middle, cp. Laws 721 c, Rep. 594 c.

σωτήρας τῆς Δ. "Dadurch, dass sie den revolutionären Bewegungen ein Ende machten" (Rettig). Agathon had already applied σωτήρ to Eros (197 v). For Plato's philo-Laconism, see Zeller's Plato (E. T.) p. 484. For the mythical lawgiver "Lycurgus" (vulgarly dated at 885 B.C.), see Bury H. Gr. p. 135. The statement that his laws were the salvation "practically" of Hellas may be taken to refer to the part played by the Spartans during the Persian invasions, cp. Pind. Pyth. I. 77 ff. See also the parallel passage in Xen. Symp. viii. 38—9.

τίμιος δὲ κτλ. For this emphatic position of the adj., cp. Laws 730 D τίμιος μὲν δὴ καὶ ὁ μηδὲν ἄδικῶν.

209 Ε ἄλλοι ἄλλως πολλαχοῖ. An echo of 182 B: cp. Prot. 326 D. This passage is alluded to by Clem. Al. Strom. I. p. 130. 38 ἐν τῷ συμποσίῳ ἐπαυνὸν Πλάτων τοὺς βαρβάρους κτλ.

πολλὰ...ἔργα. Another rhetorical "tag," as is shown by the parallel in Menex. 239A πολλὰ...καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἀπεφήναντο εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώποις: cp. Phaedrus's expressions in 179 B, c.


τερά πολλὰ. For the shrine of Lycurgus, see Hdt. I. 66, Plut. Lyc. 31. The language echoes Aristophanes' μέγας' ἐν αὐτοῦ τερά κατασκευάζει (189 c); and it is cited by Clem. Al. Strom. I. p. 300 P.

Ταύτα...κἀν σὺ μυθένης. Here Diotima passes on to the final section of her discourse on erotics (see 210 D ἄν). Hug and P. Crain (following C. F. Hermann and Schwelger) suppose that κἀν σὺ μ. indicates that what follows is something beyond the ken of the historical Socrates, whose view...
210 σὺ μνηθεῖς· τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά, δὲν ἔνεκα καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, εἵνεκα τὰς ὀρθῶς μετίηριν, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἶος τ' ἄν εἶναι. ἔρω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ἐγὼ καὶ προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω· πειρῶ δὲ <καὶ σὺ> ἐπεσθαί.


they regard as correctly represented in Xen. Symp. viii. 97 ff. But although we may admit (with Thompson, Meno p. 158) that "we often find Plato making his ideal Socrates criticise the views the real Socrates held," we are not hereby justified in assuming such criticism on every possible occasion. And, in the case before us, another and more probable explanation of the words lies to hand. Socrates throughout—with his usual irony—depicts himself as a mere tiro in the hands of the Mantinean mistress; but he is still, in spite of his mock-modesty, the ideal philosopher of Alcibiades' encomium. As it was a part of his irony that he had already (201 ε) put himself on the level of Agathon and the rest of the unphilosophic, so the contemptuous ἀν σὺ here serves to keep up the same ironical fiction,—i.e. it applies neither to the ideal nor to the real (historical) Socrates, but to the hypothetical Socrates—the disguise assumed by the ideal Socrates when he played the part of pupil (cp. Rettig's note, and F. Horn Platonstud. p. 248). The attitude of Socr. may be illustrated by the words of S. Paul (1 Cor. iv. 6) ταῦτα δὲ, ἀδελφοί, μετεσχημάτισα εἰς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ Ἀπολλώ δὲ ύμᾶς, ἱκα ἐν ύμῖν μάθητε κτλ. For μνηθεῖς, see next note.

210 A τὰ δὲ...ἐποπτικά. Cp. Phaedr. 250 ε εὐδαίμονα φάσματα μυώμενοι τε καὶ ἐποπτεύοντες: ῥ. 249 ε τελιοὺς δεί τελετᾶ τελούμενος. On the former passage Thompson comments, "μυώμενοι and ἐποπτεύοντες are not to be distinguished here, except in so far as the latter word defines the sense of the former. Properly speaking μῦσις is the generic term for the entire process, including the ἐποπτεία, or state of the epopt or adept, who after due previous lustrations and the like is admitted into the adytum to behold the αὐτοπτικὰ ἀγάλματα (Tambil. Myst. ii. 10. 53): "the distinction between the two words (μῦσις and ἐποπτεία), as if they implied, the one an earlier, the other a more advanced stage of imitation, was a later refinement." According to Theo Smyrnaeus (Math. p. 18) there were five grades of initiation, viz. καθαρμᾶς, ἢ τῆς τελετῆς παράδοσις, ἐποπτεία, αὐτοπτεία καὶ στεμμάτων ἐπίθεσις, ἢ θεοφιλῆς καὶ θεός συνδιατησ εὐδαίμονια. For the language and rites used in the mysteries, see also Plut. de Is. c. 78: id. Demetr. 26: Clem. Al. Strom. v. p. 689; Rohde Psyche ii. 284; and the designs from a cinerary urn reproduced in Harrison, Proleg. p. 547.

ἀν ἔνεκα. "The final cause": cp. 210 ε, Charm. 165 λ.

ταῦτα. Repeating ταῦτα...τὰ ἐρωτικὰ: see the recapitulation in 211 ε.

οἶδ' ἄν εἶναί τι. So. μνηθεῖται: this, as Thompson observes, shows that μῦσις includes ἐποπτεία. Notice the emphasis laid, here at the start and throughout, on educational method, τὸ ὀρθῶς μετείην.


πειρῶ δὲ (καὶ σὺ) ἐπεσθαί. I have added καὶ σὺ from the Papyrus; it serves
to lay an appropriate stress on the personal effort required on the part of the disciple, the incapacity of whose “natural man” is so persistently emphasized.

δεί γὰρ κτλ. The sentence runs on without a full stop till we reach the close of 210 B: Rettig sees in this straggling style a parody of the style of Pausanias. The passage following was a favourite with the neo-Platonists; see the ref. in Alcineus isag. 5; Plut. quaest. Plat. 3. 2. 1002 ε.; Thomist. or. 13, p. 168 c; Plotin. Enn. 1. 6. 1, p. 50; Procl. in Alcib. 1. p. 330.

οἱ ἡγομένοι. The educational “conductor” is represented as a μυσταγωγός.
So we have ἂγγελος 210 C, παθαγωγιζή 210 E, ἄγεσθαι 211 C.

εὐς αὐτῶν σώματος. If we retain σώματος—and emphasis requires its retention,—it is difficult to justify the Bodleian αὐτῶν: and αὐτῶν, which has the support of the Papyrus, although rather otiose, is preferable to such substitutes as Hommel’s αὗ τῶν (σωμάτων) or Vermehren’s αὗ τῶν, since αὗ is hardly in place here. Voegelin’s objection to αὐτῶν, endorsed by Rettig, that it should involve the repetition of δεῖ, does not strike one as fatal; and I follow Ruckert and Stallb. in adopting it.

210 B τὸ ἐπὶ...σώματι. Cp. 186 A.

tὸ ἐπὶ eidei καλὸν. This has been interpreted in three ways: (1) “das in der Idee Schöne”(Schleierm.), “das Schöne der Gesammtgattung”(Schulthess); so too Zeller and F. Horn; (2) “quod in specie (opp. to ‘summo genere’) pulchrum est” (Stallb., after Wytttenbach), so too Hommel; (3) “das in der Gestalt Schöne” (Ruge), “pulcritudo quae in forma est atque sensibus perciputur” (Ruckert). The last of these is undoubtedly right, and has the support also of Vermehren, Rettig and Hug; for εἴδος of physical “form” or “outward appearance,” cp. 196 A, 215 B.

μὴ ὅδε...ήγοισθαι. See Goodwin G. M. T. § 817.

ἐνσώσαντα καταστήναι. Sc. αὐτῶν δεῖ, resuming the oblique construction.

tὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο. “Idem est quod τοῦτο τὸ σφόδρα ἐραῦ vel τῶν σφοδρῶν τοῦτον ἔρωτα” (Stallb.). We have had a description of this σφοδρότης already, in 183 A ff.
210 C καὶ Ἑρμ. Βδ.μ. Βτ.: καὶ ἔαν ΒΤ Ο.-Π.: καὶ δν Β.: καὶ Αστ Σζ.

οὕστε καὶ ἔαν κτλ. The uncontracted form καὶ εἶναι is very rare in Plato, see Schanz nov. comm. p. 95. For υδής, cp. 183 ε.  
210 C [καὶ ζητεῖν]. Ast rightly condemned these words as “ineptum glossema.” To excise καὶ only (as Badham) is unsatisfactory, since as Hug justly observes τίκτεων ζητεῖν λόγους “ist unerträglich matt.” Stallb. attempts to justify the words thus: “Diotima hoc dicit, talem amatorem non modo ipsum parere quasi et se procreare, sed etiam aliunde quaerere et investigare ciusmodi sermones, qui iuniores reddant meliores”; so too Rettig. But this is futile.  
ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηθισμασί. “In Morals” (Stewart): cp. Latēs 793 δ ὡς νόμαι 
ὁ ἔδη τις ὡς ἐπιτηθισμασί καλεῖ: Ἱπ. 444 ε.: Gorg. 474 ε.

καὶ τὸ...ἄναι. This clause is subordinate to, rather than coordinate with, the preceding καὶ clause (like the ὡς δν clause in δ ἐντρα),—a juxtaposition which sounds awkward. Hence it is tempting either to excise this clause with Hug, or with Ast to read ἀναγκασθείς for ἀναγκασθῇ, and delete the second καὶ. Against Hug’s method it may be urged that the words are wanted to correspond to ἐνὶ... συμκράν ἡγεσάμενον in 210 β. above, and to emphasize the “littleness’ of corporeal beauty even when taken in the mass. For this belittling of things of the earth, cp. Theaet. 173 ε ἢ δὲ διάνοα, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγεσίματα συμκρά καὶ αὐθήν, ἀτμίσασθα...φέρεται κτλ. Observe how πάν... ἔγγενε here balances (πάν) κάλλος... ἀθέλφαν in 210 β. 

ἀγαγὼν. The construction is still dependent upon δὲ, but the subject to be supplied (via. τῶν ἡγεσιμένων) is changed.  
210 D μὴ κατεῖ τῷ παρ’ ἐνὶ κτλ. τῷ, οὖ καλῷ, is governed by δουλεύων, and the phrase contains a clear reference to the language of Pausanias in 183 Λ ff. ὡστερ οἰκήτης, “like a lackey,” is of course contemptuous, as in Theaet. 172 δ κενοφοβοῦσιν...ὡς οἰκήται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι. For ἀγαγὼν, “contented with,” cp. Menex. 240 c. If we retain the mss.’ τῷ παρ’ ἐνὶ the construction is
awkward, as Stallb. admits—"quod olim accusativum defendendum susceptimus, videtur nunc interpretatio loci quam proposuimus, quamvis Rückerto et Hommelio probata, nimis contorta nec satis simplex esse." I am inclined to suspect the phrase ἡ ἀνθρώπου τινός. Schirilzt proposed to excise ἡ ἀνθρώπου: I suggest παίδαριον κάλλος [ἡ] ἄνω τινός, "of some witless urchin," and suppose a reference to what Pausanias said in 181.1 ἐρώσι...ός ἀν δύνωνται ἀνστοτάτων: 181.2 οὗ γὰρ ἐρώσι παιδῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ήδη ἀρχωντα νοῦν ἑσχειν (cp. next n.).

κάλλος...συμκρολόγος. Cp. 181 b, where those who follow Aphrodite Pandemos (loving women and boys) are described as οἱ φαίλοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος. πέλαγος of itself connotes vastness; cp. Rep. 453 b εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον (ἀν τις ἐμπέσῃ): I 338 Α. φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων. The phrase is alluded to in Clem. Al. prorept. 69 Α; Plut. quaest. Plat. 1001 b; Themist. or. xii. p. 177 c.

θεωροῦν. This should be taken closely (supplying ἀντί) with what precedes, not with πολλοῖς...λόγοις (as Ast's Dict. s.v. implies). The parable suggests that the spectator, having reached the hill-top, turns himself about and gazes, wonder-struck, at the mighty ocean of beauty which lies spread before him, till the spectacle quickens his soul and moves it to deliver itself of many deep-lying thoughts.

καλότε...μεγαλοπρεπεῖς. Cp. Menax. 247 b: ib. 234 c; Rep. 503 c νεανίκω τε καὶ μ. τὰς διανοιὰς; ib. 486 Α, 496 Α γενν. διανοήματα τε καὶ δόξας. Cp. for the sense Plotin. de puls. 8 c (Cr.).

ἀφθόνοι. ἀφθόνοι is used alike of fruits (Polit. 272 Α) and of soils (Soph. 222 Α), thus meaning both "abundant" and "bountiful"—"unstinted" and "unstinting."


ἐπιστήμην μίαν. This unitary science—ἐπιστήμη in the strict Platonic sense, called also (211 c) μάθημα—is dialectic; cp. Phaedr. 247 ν ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστιν οὖν ὁ ὅ ποτα ἐπιστήμην ὑπάρχων. See parallels in Plotin. de puls. 2 Α (Cr.); Procl. in I. Alc. p. 246.

210 Ε πειρά αὐτῷ μικρακ. Here again, as at 210 Α (πειρά αὐτῷ ἐπεσθαυ κτλ.), a climax in the exposition is marked.
XXIX. "Os γὰρ ἂν μέχρι ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὰ ἑρωτικὰ παιδα-
γωγηθῆ, θεόμενος ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὅρθως τὰ καλά, πρὸς τέλος ἦδη
ἴων τῶν ἑρωτικῶν ἐξαίφνης κατόψεται τι θαυμαστῶν. τῇ φύσιν
καλῶν, τούτῳ ἑκείνῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗ δὴ ἐνεκέν καὶ οἱ ἔμπροσθέν
211 πάντες πόνοι ᾧσαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀεὶ ὅν καὶ οὗτε γυγνόμενον οὐτε
ἀπολλύμενον, οὗτε αὐξάνομενον οὐτε φθίνον, ἐπείτα οὐ τῇ μὲν
καλῶν, τῇ δὲ αἰσχρῶν, οὐδὲ τοτὲ μὲν, τοτὲ δὲ οὖ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ
καλῶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρῶν, οὐδ' ἐνθα μὲν καλῶν, ἐνθα δὲ αἰσχρῶν
211 A ῥοδε δὲ Ο.-Π.

ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὅρθως. "In correct and orderly succession"; see 211 B ad fin.
tούτῳ γὰρ δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ὅρθως...ἰέναι κτλ., and 210 A where the right order of
procedure (πρῶτον...ἐπείτα, etc.) is specially emphasized.

πρὸς τέλος ἦδη ἴων. "πρὸς τέλος ἴέναι dicebantur ii, qui superatis gradibus
tandum ad spectanda arcana admittebantur" (Hommel). Cp. the use of τέλεα
in 210 A, τέλεων 204 C, τέλος 205 A.

ἐξαίφνης. "On a sudden": this suggests the final stage in the mystery-
rites, when out of darkness there blazed forth suddenly the mystical φέγγος,
and ἐν αὐτῇ καθαρά the φῶςματα (Phaedr. 250 c) or ἐρα ὑποτικά—consisting
probably of images of Demeter, Iacchus and Persephone, and other sacred
emblems—were displayed to the awe-struck worshipper (μακαιρία δής τε καὶ
vii. 341 c ἐξαίφνης, οἷον ἀπὸ πρῶτον πρόδησαντος ἐξαφθεῖν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενό-
μενον (sc. the highest μάθημα). See further Rohde, Psyche ii. 284.

κατόψεται. Cp. 210 D supra, and Phaedr. 247 D (καθαρὰ μὲν αἰτήν δικαιο-
σώνην κτλ.), which suggest that καθαρὰν was a vox proprio for viewing ritual
displays.

θαυμαστῶν...καλῶν. Similarly Phaedr. 250 B κάλλος δὲ τῶν ἤν ἰδεῖν λαμπρῶν.
For θαυμαστῶν cp. 219 B: it often connotes the supernatural, e.g. Rep. 398 A
προσκυνοῦμεν ἀν αὐτῶν ὡς ἱερὸν καὶ θ., καὶ ἦδον.

οὗ δὲ ἐνεκέν κτλ. "The goal to which all our efforts have been directed":
cp. 210 A; Phaedr. 248 B αὐτ' ἐνεκ' ἡ πολλ' σπουδή κτλ. See the parallel in
Plotin. de pulcr. 42 c, d (Cr.).

211 A πρῶτον μὲν...ἐπείτα...οὐδ' αὖ κτλ. The Ideal object is distinguished
by three leading characteristics, viz. (1) eternity and immutability; (2) absolu-
teness, or freedom from relativity; (3) self-existence. Compare the accounts
of Ideal being given in Phaedo 78 c ff., Phaedr. 247 c ff., Cratyl. 386 d, 439 c ff.,
description has, necessarily, to be conveyed by means of negative propositions,
i.e. by way of contrast with phenomenal objects. See also the parallels in
Plotin. Enn. v. viii. 546 c, vi. vii. 727 c.

τῇ μὲν...τῇ δὲ. "In part...in part": so Theaet. 158 B, Polit. 274 E, Laws
635 D.

πρὸς μὲν τὸ...τὸ. This donotes varying "relation," as in the Aristotelian
τὸ πρὸς τί.
...aiσχρόν. Retigg defends this clause, quoting Wolf's note, "τιοι (geht) auf alle vier (vorher genannten) Ideen, Theile, Zeit, Verhältniss, Ort." Teuffel argues that "ausser Platon selbst hätte nicht leicht Jemand einen Anlass gehabt einen Beisatz zu machen." None the less, I believe we have here another "ineptum glossema."

future ισχρόν. SC. το ἑωτευόν. future ισχρέοισθαι often connotes illusive semblance; cp. Phaedo 110 D, Rep. 572 B.

οὐδὲ τις λόγος. It is difficult to be sure of the sense in which λόγος is used here. (1) It is most natural to refer it, and ἐπιστήμη following, to the λόγοι and ἐπιστήμαι of 210 c, and to render by "discourse," "argument" (with Gomperz, Stewart and Zeller). This rendering has in its favour the fact that this is the usual sense of λόγος (λόγοι) throughout this dialogue. (2) Or λόγος may mean "concept"; so Retigg, who comments: "Die Ideen sind nicht bloss Begriffe, sie sind vielmehr Existzenen, χηρισταλ, wie Aristoteles sich ausdrückt, und Bedingungen des Seins und Werdens der Dinge der Sinnenwelt." Cp. Phaedr. 245 e, Laws 895 e, Phaedo 78 c, in which places (to quote Thompson) "λόγος is equivalent to ἄρος or ἰδροισ, of which οὕσιa is the objective counterpart." This more technical sense is, perhaps, less probable in the present context; but, after all, the difference between the two renderings is not of vital importance. The essence of the statement, in either case, is that the Idea is not dependent upon either corporeal or mental realization, i.e. that it is not subjective, as a quality or product of body or mind, but an objective, self-conditioned entity. A third possible sense of λόγος is "ratio," or mathematical relation. Perhaps "formula" would best render the word here.

οὐδὲ τὸν ὄν. τὸν is probably used in a local sense: cp. Arist. Phys. iii. 4. 203a 7 Πλάτων δὲ ἔξω μὲν οὐδὲν εἶναι σῶμα, οὐδὲ τὰς ἑιδάς, διὰ τὸ μὴ τὸν εἶναι αὐτός. But though the Ideas are extra-spatial, it is Platonic (as Aristotle implies, δὲ Δν. iii. 4. 429a 27) to say τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόσον ἑάνω.

211 B μονοειδής. Cp. Phaedo 78 D μ. οὐ αὐτό καθ' αὐτό: ἵνα 80 B μονοειδεὶ καὶ ἀδιαλλατ.: Theat. 205 D: Tim. 59 b: Rep. 612 A ἐπί τοινυείδες ἐπὶ μονοει- δής (ἦ ἄληθες φύσις). Stewart renders "of one Form," but the full force may be rather "specifically unique," implying that it is the sole member of its class.

μεταφέσσαι. For the doctrine of "participation," see esp. Phaedo 100 c ff., Parmen. 130 B ff.

tοιοῦτον, ὁλον. Equiv. to τοιοῦτον ὅστε (see Madv. Gr. S. § 166 c).

B. P.


tοῦ τέλους. This combines the senses “goal” and “sacred symbol”: cf. 210 Α; Soph. fr. 753 N. ὡς τρίς ὑδίαι | κεῖνοι βροτῶν, οἱ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τῆλη | μέλλων ἔσται ἄδειον.

tοῦτο γὰρ δὴ κτλ. Here commences a recapitulation of “the Ascent of Love” as described in 210 Α—211 Β; cp. Rep. vi., vii. for both language and thought.


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211 C (ίνα) καὶ scripsi: καὶ libri: ἵνα Usener: καὶ Bdhm.: καὶ γνφ...καλὸν
αἱ post μόνον καὶ transp. Ast θεᾶσθαι μόνον TW: θεᾶσθαι μόνον B: μόνον θεᾶσθαι O.-P. Ε ἄμερτον post ὑπηκ., ἄλλ' transp. Liebhold ἀλλὰ δὲ ανάπλεων σαρκῶν τε αὐθρωπίων καὶ χρωμάτων

are uncertain. I follow Usener in changing τελευτήσῃ to the infinitive and in inserting ἵνα after μάθημα (retaining, however, καί before γνφ which he needlessly deletes). The objection to Schanz's ὤς (for καί) ἀπὸ τῶν μ. is that ὥς, in the final use, occurs but once elsewhere in Plato, according to Weber's statistics (see Goodwin, G. M. T. p. 398), being very rare in all good prose-writers except Xenophon. Another possible expedient would be to read γνωνα in place of γνφ. ἐστ' ἄν is a non-Platonic form.

τελευτήσῃ...τελευτῶν. The repetition serves to emphasize the finality of the Idea.

αὐτὸ...δ ἐστίν. For this formula to express ideality, cp. Phaedo 74 B, 75 B οὐς ἐπεισφρογεμέθη τούτο ἡ ἐστὶ: Theaeet. 146 E.


οὐ κατὰ χρυσον κτλ. Similar is Proverbs viii. 11 "Wisdom is better than rubies; and all the things that may be desired are not to be compared to it." That Socr. held this view is shown in 216 D, Ε. For κατὰ c. acc., of comparison, cp. Gorg. 512 B, Rep. 466 B.

ἐξωνότες...μῆτε πίνειν. Cp. 191 Α ff.; also Sappho 2, Archil. 103, Soph. fr. 161 N. (ἐμάκαρειον πάδος): Rel. Med. "There are wonders in true affection—when I am from him I am dead till I be with him," etc.

τι δήτα...οἰόμεθα. Sc. γενέσθαι αὐτῷ, or the like.


μὴ ανάπλεων. Tim. ανάπλεων· αναπεπλησμένος· χρήσται δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ μερο-λυσμένου: cp. Phaedo 83 D and the use of the verb in Phaedo 67 A μηδὲ
καὶ ἀλλὰς πολλὰς φλυαρίας ὑπηρείς, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν
dύνατο μονοειδῆς κατιδεῖν; ἢ ὅτε, ἐφή, φαύλον βίον γίγνεσθαι
212 ἐκείσε βλέποντος ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐκείνον ὃ δέι θεωμένων καὶ
ξυνόντος αὐτῷ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνθυμη, ἐφη, ὧτι ἐνταῦθα αὐτῷ μοναχοῦ
γενήσεται, ὁδότης ὃ ὅπατο τὸ καλὸν, τίκτειν οὐκ εἰδώλα ἁρε-
τῆς, ἀτε οὐκ εἰδώλων ἐφαπτομένῳ, ἀλλ’ ἀληθή, ἀτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
ἐφαπτομένῳ τέκοντε δὲ ἁρετῆν ἀληθῆ καὶ θρεψαμένῳ ὑπάρχει

211 Β ὑπηρείς del. Bdhm. ἀλλ’...κατιδεῖν del. Bdhm. ἐφη om. T
212 A ὃ δὲι Ast: ὃ δὲι B: ὃ δὲι T: δη Schleierm.: δὲi Rohde Sz.
ἐφαπτομένῳ del. Voeg.

ἀναπιπλάμεθα τῆς τοῦτον (sc. τοῦ σώματος) φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ’
αὐτοῦ. Also Rep. 516 ε, Theaet. 196 ε. This passage is cited by Plotin. Enn.
1. vi. 7, p. 56.
χρωμάτων. For the Idea as ἄχρωματος οὖσα, see Phaedr. 247 c.

φλυαρίας ὑπηρείς. "Lumber of mortality": cp. Phaedo 66 c ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ
ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φιλοῦν καὶ εἰδῶλων παντοδαιμόν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίπτουν ἡμῖς
πολλῆς (sc. τὸ σώμα); Soph. 490 c.; Rep. 581 d.

φαύλον βίον. For the sense, cp. Soph. fr. 753 Ν., Eur. fr. 965 D. ἀλέξος ὅτις
...ἀδανάτου καθαρών φύσεως | κάσμον ἢγήρω κτλ.

212 Α ἰκάνον ὃ δὲι. "With the proper organ," sc. τὸ νῦ; cp. Phaedr.
247 ε ἢ γὰρ...ἀναφῆς οὖσα, δυναμον οὖσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτη μόνον θεωτὶ νῦ κτλ.:
Phaedo 65 ε; Rep. 490 β αὐτοῦ δ ἐστιν ἐκάστον τῆς φύσεως ἄφασθαι δ’ προσήκει
ψυχῆς ἐφαπτομένη τοῦτοι; ὁδόν: ἦν. 532 λ πρὶν ἀν αὐτὸ δ’ ἐστὶν ἄγαθον αὐτῆ
νοῆσαι λάβῃ. For the organ of intellectual vision (τὸ ἄργανον δ’ καταμαθάνει
ἐκάστος...οὐκ εἰ δύμα), see Rep. 518 c; cp. S. Matth. vi. 22 ff. So Browne
Hydriot. "Let intellectual tubes give thee a glance of things which visive
organs reach not": cp. Plotin. de pulcr. 60 b (Cr.).

οὐκ εἰδώλα...ἀλλ’ ἀληθῆ. Rettig writes, "εἰδώλαν ist hier nicht Trugbild,
sondern Abbild. εἰδώλα ἁρετῆς sind...Tugenden zweiten Grades. Vgl. Pol. vii.
516 λ, 534 c, x. 596 λ, 598 ν,...Commentar zu unserer Stelle ist Symp.
206 d." On the other hand, cp. Theaet. 150 λ εἰδώλα τύχειν, with 150 c πυτέρων εἰδώλων
καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἢ διάνοια ἢ γόνων τε καὶ ἀληθῆς. Evidently here
the point of εἰδώλα lies in the inferiority rather than the similarity of
the objects when compared with ὄντως ὄντα. But it is scarcely probable that: an
allusion is intended, as Zeller suggests, to the myth of Ixion "der seine
frevelnden Wünsche zu Here erhob, aber statt ihrer ein Wolkenbild umarmte
und mit ihm die Centauren erzeugte."

proposed to omit the second ἐφαπτομένῳ, but Plato never omits the participle
with ἄτε. For parallels, see Phaedo 67 b, Rep. 534 c; Plotin. de pulcr.
46 ε (Cr.).

θρεψαμένῳ. Cp. 209 c.


212 C *πίθευρε* 

212 D καλέτε. "Invite him in."; cp. 174 D, E, 175 B.
πίνομεν ἀλλὰ ἀναπαυόμεθα ἢδη. καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὑστερον Ἀλκιβιάδου τὴν φωνὴν ἀκούειν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ σφόδρα μεθύοντος καὶ μέγα βοῶντος, ἐρωτῶντος ὅπων Ἀγάθων καὶ κελεύοντος ἢγειν παρ’ Ἀγάθωνα. ἢγειν οὖν αὐτῶν παρὰ σφάς τὴν τε αὐλητρίδα ύπολαβοῦσαν καὶ ἄλλους τιών τῶν ἀκολούθων, καὶ ἐπιστῆναι ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἐστεφανωμένου αὐτῶν κυπτοῦ τέ των στεφάνων δασκεί καὶ ἱών, Ε καὶ ταυνίας ἤχοντα ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς πάνυ πολλάς, καὶ εἰπεῖν: "Ἀνδρέ, χαλρετε· μεθύοντα ἀνδρὰ πάνυ σφόδρα δέξασθε συμπότην,


ἀναπαυόμεθα ἢδη. "We are retiring already," rather than "the drinking is over" (Jowett): cp. Prot. 310 ε ἐπειδὴ...δεδεινηκότες ἤμεν καὶ μέμλημεν ἀναπαύομεθα κτλ. The statement here would be a social fiction (see 174 D n.).

σφόδρα μεθύοντος κτλ. Hommel and Hartman may be right in regarding ἐρωτῶντος as a gloss: for βοῶν followed directly by a question the former quotes Asclepi. Epigr. xiii. 5 τῇ δὲ τοσοῦτ' ἐβήγασα βεβέρεγμένοι· ἄχρι τίνος, Ζεῦ;

ἀγείν οὖν. Evidently the subject of this infin. is not Agathon's παίδες, as implied in Schlicrm. 's transl., but Alcib.'s own attendants.

ὑπολαβοῦσαν. For ὑπολαβέω in this physical sense, "casurum sustentare," cp. Rep. 453 D (the only other ex. in Plato), and Hdt. i. 24 of the dolphin "supporting" by "getting under" Arion (L. and S.'s "take by the hand" is probably wrong).

ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας. "Intelligne foris ipsius domus, in qua convivae erant, sive τὴν μετάυλος θύραν" (Stallb.).

212 Ε αὐτῶν...Ἰων. "More Graecorum abundat aὐτῶν propter oppositionem taeniarum quas gestabant in capite" (Wolf). Violets were specially in fashion at Athens, as implied in the epithet λοστέφανοι (Pind. fr. 46). Other favourite materials for wreaths were myrtle and roses: cp. Stesich. 29 πολλά δὲ μύρσιν φύλλα | καὶ βοξίνοις στεφάνοις ίων τε κοράνθιδας οὐλας.

ταυνίας. Cp. Thuc. iv. 121 δημοσία μὲν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἀνέδησαν...ιδίᾳ δὲ ἐταυνίων κτλ.: Pind. Pyth. iv. 240; Hor. Carm. iv. 11. 2. See Holden on Plut. Timol. p. 266: "ταυνία, taenia, lemniscus, a sort of fillet or riband, given as a reward of honour, either by itself, or more commonly as a decoration to be fastened upon other prizes, such as crowns, wreaths, which were considered more honourable when accompanied with a lemniscus than when they were simply given by themselves. Originally it was made of linden-bark or of wool, but afterwards of gold and silver tinsel (Plin. N. H. 21. 4)."

μεθύοντα...πάνυ σφόδρα. The peculiar order—"a drunken fellow right royally (drunk)"—seems intended to indicate that the speaker is, or feigns to be, considerably mixed.
Greek portion:

For ingenious, i.e. aludhmev; engav gav tov, xinei, rhes evn oux olav t' ogenotmynot akfesvav, vyn de

kow ev t' kefalhe' ekouv tas tainias, ona av tov eme' kefalhe's tivn tiv sofotaton kai kalursos kefalhe' tiv

et' eivov oivtowv anadhe's. avra kateyelasevde mou avs melhontos; engav de, kan

213 meies gela'te, omovs ev oiv' avl alin' fegov. alla moi legete

avtadev, evp' rhotos eivov miv; sumplesqe eiv oiv;

Pantasev ouv anadorevtheia kai kolevnein eiseinva kai kata-
klinevtheia, kai tiv 'Agathovna kalhein avtov. kai tov lione anagmenon

upto ton anavropov, kai peramvomevno ama tiv tainias ouv anada-
then, evpiprosevov tivn othrelmvov ekovolta ouv katidein tivn

Swakrathe', alla kathizevtheia para tiv 'Agathovna en mev Swakrapous te kai

212 B evpev B: evpev TW O.-P. : evtheov TW O.-P.: eivtheov B

exhev O.-P.: oiv t' T O.-P.: oiv t' B evp...taiaviv del. Naber

et' ev oiv oivtowv BT: kefalhe' add. W: post anadh'ow transp. ej. Steph., post aera Ast:

seel. Wolf J.-U. Bt.: anepov (vel eiv aneipov) oivtowv Winckelmann: oiv eivov

ovt. Usener: eiv eivio ovtr. Bergk: eiv eti oiv t' 2, ovtr. temptabam kate-
gelousithu W

213 A kellevnei T: kellevei B

Latin and English portions:

χθες. I.e. at the main celebration of Agathon's victory, cp. 174 a.

et' ev oivtowv. Since Wolf most add. agree in obelizing these words as

a (misplaced) gloss on the following clause. Hommel's conj. is ingenious,

though far-fetched—etan et'ov (addressed to his attendants) "dixi iam saepius,
mitti me velle liberum a vestris manibus." I have proposed etan eti oiv t' 2,
oivtowv anadh', "if I am still capable of doing so," in jesting allusion to his

own incapable condition; or perhaps the original had neaniskou. The scenic

effectiveness of oivtowv, used deictikas, I should be lost to use. Jowett's "as

I may be allowed to call him" cannot be got out of the Greek.

213 A authevon. Statim, illidio (Stallb.); cp. Thuc. vi. 21. 2.

et' rhotos. "On the terms stated" (cp. Laws 850 A), i.e. as a sumptosis.

This is made clear by the following clause, sumptisishe 3 oiv; which repeats

the condition already stated in 212 B (mevontan...dezevthe sumptopav):

Ruekert, as

Stallb. observes, is wrong in saying "at nullam (conditionem) dixit adhuc."

That Alcibiades meant his "conditions" to be taken seriously is shown by

the sequel, 213 B ff.

anadorevtheia. Cp. 198 A. For kalhein, see 212 D ad init.

upo tov anavropov. Including, we may suppose, the aulthrop, see 212 D.

epiprosve...Swakrathe. "Und da er sie vor sich vor die Augen hielt, bemerkte

er Sokrates nicht" (Zeller). Ficinus, followed by Wolf and Schleierm., wrongly

renders "Socratem, licet e conspectua adstantem, non vidit"; so too Hommel

writes "ante oculos habuit et vidit Socratem, sed eum non agnovit." For

epiprosvev ekhein, cp. Critias 108 c.

par' tiv 'Agathovna. I.e. on the etxathet klinh: for the disposition of the

company see 175 c.
\[\text{ekelouv: para xwrisai gar ton Sokrathe ws ekeloun kateidein. B para kakebezomenon de auton aspa exes} \]
\[\text{te ton 'Aga} \theta \text{wana kal anadein. eitein ouw ton 'Aga} \theta \text{wina 'Tpolwete, pai} \delta \text{es, 'Alkebida} \delta \text{nu,} \]
\[\text{ina ek trito} \nu \text{katanketai. Panyu ge, eitein ton 'Alkebida} \nu \text{ allad tis meiv ode trito} \nu \text{symptonis; kal ama metaatrephomenon} \]
\[\text{auton oran ton Sokrathe, idonta de anasthetai kal eitein 'O 'Hrapkeis, touti ti hew; Sokrathe soudos; ellonxwv au me entaitha} \]
\[\text{katekeiso, osper eidosis ekafinhs anaafainesthai} \text{otou eno} \varphi \text{men G } \]
\[\text{hkesta se esexwthai. kal vyn ti heves; kai ti au entaitha kate-} \]
\[\text{klinhs, kai ou para 'Aristofanei oude eix tis allys gleiois esti} \]

\[\text{ode trito} \nu \text{W O.-P., Sz. Bt.: ode trito} \nu \text{B, J.-U.: trito} \nu \text{ode T} \]
\[\text{orany T O.-P.: oray B touti ti Hew TW O.-P.: touti eitein B Wmg. Sokrathe} \]
\[\text{del.ilder enlochm B C eidos vulg. kai ou Herm. Sz. Bt.: ws ou B:} \]
\[\text{piws ou Hug oude B: outhe T} \]

\[\text{213 B para xwrisai. "Locum dedisse": cp. Prot. 336 B.} \]
\[\text{os ekeloun kateidein. The adoption of this reading from the Papyrus obviates} \]
\[\text{the necessity of bracketing the words (see crit. n.). Adam on Rep. 365 d} \]
\[\text{writes "os for atome...is a curious archais, tolerably frequent in Xenophon...} \]
\[\text{but almost unexampled in Plato," citing as instances Prot. 330 n, Phaedo} \]
\[\text{108 e, II. Alc. 141 b, and our passage: Goodwin, however (G. M. T. § 609),} \]
\[\text{recognizes only one instance of os=atome c. infin. in Plato (viz. Rep. l.c.)} \]
\[\text{Certainly this is no fit context for the introduction of a "curious archaism."} \]

\[\text{'Ypoletes. "Calceos solvite": see Smith D. A. i. 393 b. The opposite} \]
\[\text{process is upodein (174 a).} \]
\[\text{ek trito} \nu \text{. Cp. Gorg. 500 a, Tim. 54 a; Eur. Or. 1178.} \]
\[\text{touli ti wu; "Mirandi formula, qua utuntur, quibus aliquid subito et} \]
\[\text{praeter expectationem accidit" (Stallb.). The idiom is common in Aristophanes, e.g. Vesp.} \]
\[\text{183, 1509, Ran. 39, etc. The words } \Sigma \text{. soudos are, as} \]
\[\text{Rettig observes, "nicht Ausruf, sondern an sich selbst gerichtete Frage des} \]
\[\text{Alicbiades."} \]
\[\text{ellonxwv. Cp. Prot. 309 a apyv kynneisiwv tou peri} \theta \text{tyn 'Alkebida} \delta \text{nu oran;} \]
\[\text{I. Alc. 104 c. See also the description of Eros in 203 d (epi} \beta \text{oulous kyl).} \]
\[\text{213 C ekafinhs anaafaiwthai. Cp. 210 b; Theatet. 162 c ei ekafinhs ouwos} \]
\[\text{anafainhsei kyl.} \]
\[\text{kai ou para kyl. I adopt Hermann's kai for the os of the ms. Stallb.} \]
\[\text{explains os by "quippe, nam, ut mox in verbis os epai...gfyovov". Hommel,} \]
\[\text{putting a question-mark after bowletai, renders "warum setzest du dich grade} \]
\[\text{dahin, als zum Beispiel nicht neben A." etc. but, if os be kept, it would be} \]
\[\text{best to mark a question after kateklinais.} \]

\[\text{geleios bowletai. With bowletai, supply geleios eivai. For Aristoph. as} \]
\[\text{geleios, cp. 189 b. The sense is, as Rettig puts it, "Was hast du geleios und} \]
213 C boiëtei (êna) Bdhm. 

213 C prosofleôsai. This may have been the vox propria for a lover's glance, cp. Ar. Plut. 1014 (quoted below).

According to Goodwin, G. M. T. § 32, the present tense often refers to the future, to express likelihood, intention, or danger.

For erotic scheming, cp. 203 D ff.

In animated language, according to Rückert, "birds of a feather should flock together." The key is the illogical but "regular with deixis, prosofke, and the like, in the preceding clause" (Adam on Prot. 323 α).

For erotic scheming, the use of "but that," is "regular with deixis, prosofke, and the like, in the preceding clause." (Adam on Prot. 323 α).

This is a ἀπ. εἰρ. in Plato: cp. Ar. Plut. 1014 ff. ἀπ. ἀπεφεύγειν μὲ τις, ἐτύπταμεν διὰ ταῦθα δὲν τὴν ἡμέραν. (Agrimovus ο νεανίσκος ἢ). The use of "but that," is "regular with deixis, prosofke, and the like, in the preceding clause." (Adam on Prot. 323 α).

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αὐτοῦ πίνακα φράζει. This and 214 D infra are the only exx. in Plato of ἀπεχεθαί in the sense continere (manum): elsewhere it occurs mainly in poetry (Od. xxi. 316, etc.).


"equivalent to ἀντέρως (Phaedr. 255 b): cp. 192 B.

ἀρραβω. Horresco, a strong word for "quaking with fear."

Διαλλαγή. Alcibiad catches up Socrates' word διάλλαξαν and negatives it with a "What hast thou to do with peace?" "But," he proceeds, "I'll have
σομαι νῦν δὲ μοι, 'Αγάθων, φάναι, μετάδος τῶν ταινιῶν, ἵνα ἀναδῆσω καὶ τὴν τούτου ταυτητί τὴν θαμαστήν κεφαλήν, καὶ μὴ ἔμιμπφται ἵνα σε μὲν ἀνέδησα, αὐτὸν δὲ νικώντα ἐν λόγοις πάντας ἀνθρώπους, οὐ μόνον πρὸς ὑμῖν ἀλλ' ἀδεῖ, ἔστειτα οὐκ ἀνέδησα. καὶ ἀμφοῖ ἀλβούτα τῶν ταινιῶν ἀναδεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ κατακλίνεσθαι.

XXXI. Ἐπειδή δὲ κατεκλίνη, εἰπεῖν: Ἐσέν δὴ, ἄνδρεσι δοκείτε ἡγάρ μοι νῆσεν: οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον οὐν ὑμῖν, ἄλλα ποτέον: ὁμολόγηται ἡγάρ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν. ἀρχοντα οὖν αἰροῦμαι τῆς πόσεως, ἑως ἅν ὑμείς ἰκανῶς πίητε, ἐμαυτόν. ἄλλα φερέτω, 'Αγάθων, εἰ τι ἔστιν ἕκτωμα μέγα. μάλλον δὲ οὐδὲν δεί, ἄλλα φέρε, παί, φάναι,
214 τὸν ψυκτήρα ἐκεῖνον, ἰδόντα αὐτὸν πλέων ἢ ὀκτὼ κοτύλας χωρίστων. τοῦτον ἐμπλησάμενον πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸν ἐκπείειν, ἐπείτα τῷ Σωκράτει κελεύειν ἐγχευειν καὶ ἀμα εἰπεῖν. Πρὸς μὲν Σωκράτη, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, τὸ σόφισμα μοι ὄνειν· ὁπόσον γὰρ ἀν κελεύθης, τοσοῦτον ἐκπιέων ὄνειν μᾶλλον μὴ ποτε μεθυσθή. τὸν μὲν οὖν Σωκράτη ἐγχέαστος τοῦ παιδός πίνειν: τὸν δ᾽ Ἐρυξίμαχον Πώς οὖν, φάναι, ὃ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ποιοῦμεν; οὔτως οὖτε τι λέγομεν ἐπὶ τῇ κύλικῃ Β οὔτε τι ἄδομεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπεχνῶ ὡσπερ οἱ διψώντες πιόμεθα; τὸν οὖν


"214 Α. τὸν ψυκτήρα. "Yonder wine-cooler." Suid. ψυκτήρα: κάδδων ἡ ποτήριον μέγα, ἀπὸ τοῦ βάττων ψύχθηνα ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ κρασί: Poll. vi. 99 ὃ δὲ ψυκτήρ πολυβρυλός, ὃν καὶ δίνου ἐκάλω, ἐν ὃ ἢν ὁ Αρκάτας· οἱ πολλοί δὲ ἀκρατοφόροι αὐτῶν καλούσιν. οὐ μὴ ἔχει πυρήμαν ἀλλ᾽ ἀστραγαλίσκουσιν. Other names for it were πρόχωμα (Moeris, Schol. Ag. Υεσι. 617) and κάλαδος (Hesych. s.v.): for details see Smith D. A. s.v. Psyster; cp. Xen. Mem. ii. i. 30 ἵνα δὲ ἡδεσ πίης, ταῦτα θύμων χώνα περιέβουντος ἐτείς: Xen. Symp. ii. 23 ff.

ὄκτω κοτύλας. Ἡ κοτύλη or ἡ μίνα (=6 κύβοι) was '48 of a pint, so that 8 κοτύλαι are nearly equal to 2 quarts. For a ψυκτήρ this seems to have been a small size, since Athenaeus (v. 199) mentions ψυκτήρεσ holding 18 to 54 gallons. Alcib. was not alone in his taste for an ἐκτόμωμα μέγα: cp. Anacr. 32 τρίκυαδον κελεθήν ἐχουσα: Alcaeus 41. 2 καὶ δ᾽ ἀεὶρε κυλήνας μεγάλας: Xen. Symp. l.c. ὃ παῖς ἐγχείωμα μοι τὴν μεγάλην φαίλην: Gouffé (Le Verre) "Nous devons aux petits gens Laisser les petits verres."


ἐγχείω. Cp. Soph. fr. 149 δ φορείτε, μασσάτε τίς, ἐγχείω βαδόν κρήτηρα: Alcaeus 31. 4 ἐγχείω κέρνας ἕνα καὶ δύο κτλ.: Theogn. 487 σὐ δ᾽ ἐγχείω τούτῳ μάστιν | κοτύλαις αὐτί· τοινέκα τοι μεθείς. Notice that Alcib. adopts the order ἐπὶ δεξία, see 175 e.


ουνε...μεθυσθή. See Goodwin G. M. T. § 295. For Socrates' invincible head for wine, see also 176 c, 220 b, 223 c.

Πάς οὖν...ποιοῦμεν. The present indic. differs from the subjunctive, "quod dicitur de eo quod revera iam fit, neque adhuc suscipiendum est" (Stallb.): contrast ἀλλὰ τι ποιοῦμεν (deliberative) just below. For the indignant οὖτω cp. Hom. Il. ii. 158 οὖτω δὴ οἰκιάω...φειδοῦσαι.

214 B οὔτε τι ξίδωμεν. This lection is preferable to B.'s οὔτ' ἐπάδομεν which is accepted by most later editors. Eryx. would not propose to "chant spells," the only sense in which the compound word is used by Plato. For the idea of trolling a catch over one's cups, cp. Gouffé (Couplets) "On boit
'Αλκιβιάδην εἰπεῖν Ὄ Ερυξίμαχε, βέλτιστε βελτίστου πατρὸς καὶ σωφρονεστάτου, χαῖρε. Καὶ γὰρ σὺ, φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον ἀλλὰ τι ποιῶμεν; ὁ τι δὰν σὺ κελεύῃς. δεῖ γὰρ σου πείθεσθαι.

ιπτός γὰρ ἀνήρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἄλλων.

ἐπίπτατε οὖν ὁ τι βούλει. "Ἀκοῦσον δή, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον. ἠμῖν πρὶν σὲ εἰσελθεῖν ἔδοξε χρῆναι ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ἔκαστον ἐν μέρει λόγον περὶ Ἕρωτος εἰπεῖν ὡς δύναιτο κάλλιστον, καὶ ἐγκωμίασαι. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πάντες ἡμεῖς εἰρήκαμεν: σὺ δ᾿ ἐπείδη οὐκ εἰρήκας καὶ ἐκπέπτωκας, δίκαιος εἰ εἰπεῖν, εἰπὼν δ᾿ ἐπιτάξαι σωκράτει ὁ τί ἄν βούλῃ, καὶ τούτον τῷ ἐπὶ δεξιὰ καὶ οὗτος οὖν ἄλλους. 'Αλλά, φάναι, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, τὸν 'Αλκιβιάδην, καλὸς μὲν λέγεις, μεθύνοντα δὲ ἄνδρα παρὰ νηφώντων λόγους παραβάλλειν μὴ οὖν εἰς ἵσον ἕ.

214 Β Ἐρυξίμαχε del. Naber ὅπως αὐτόν Βλ.: δ᾿ ὅπως Β, Ἰ.Β. πιθέσαι Bdhm. ιπτός Τ, Σκ. Βτ.: ιπτός Β Κ ὅπως αὐτόν Sauppe (τοῦ) νηφώντων vel νηφώντας cf. Steph. λόγους (λόγων) Bast

chez eux, on boit beaucoup Êt de bourgogne et de champagne; Mais rien ne vaut un petit coup Qu’un petit couplet accompagne."

For λόγοι επικλίκεια, cp. Athen. 2 λ; Lucian Timon, c. 55.

"Ὡ Ἐρυξίμαχε κτλ. Alcibiades—as if to show how ready he is ἀδειν τι—replies with an iambic trimeter—"A noble sire’s most noble, sober son!"
The superlatives are not without irony, cp. 177 B, Xen. Mem. iii. 13. 2.

χαῖρε. “All hail!” Alcibiades pretends not to have noticed the doctor before.

ιπτός γὰρ...ἄλλων. From ΙΙ. ΧΙ. 514: "Surely one learned leech is a match for an army of laymen." Pope's rendering—"the wise physician skilled our wounds to heal"—hardly deserves the name, although Jowett paid it the compliment of borrowing it.


ἐδοξε κτλ. See 177 D.

214 Κ ὅπως δύναιτο κάλλιστον. Cp. Thuc. VII. 21 νὰ ὅπως δύναιται πλείστας πληροῖες (Madv. Gr. S. § 96): there is no need to insert ἄν, as Sauppe suggested.

καὶ ἐκπέπτωκας. "But have finished your draught."

μεθύνοντα...παραβάλλειν. "μεθύνοντα negligentius dictum est pro λόγον ἄνδρα μεθύσας" (Wolf). For the brachylogy cp. 180 C μετὰ δὲ φαῦδρον κτλ. (see note ad loc.); 217 D ἐν τῇ ἐχομένῃ ἐμοῦ κλίνῃ. With παραβάλλειν we must supply as subject τω (with Retzig) rather than το, i.e. Ἐρυξίμαχον (with Wolf). Of conjectures Bast's is the most plausible. Cp. Theogn. 627 αἰσχρῷ τοι μεθύνατα παρ' ἄνδρας νηφός μείναι.

For a stricture on ἔπαινον μεθύνατος, see Phaedr. 240 E.
D καὶ ἀμα, ὃ μακάρις, πείθει τι σε Σωκράτης ἃν ἄρτι εἶπεν; ἡ οἴοθα ὅτι τουνάντιον ἐστὶ πᾶν ἢ ἢ ἐξεγεῖ; οὔτος γὰρ, εῶν τινα ἐγὼ ἐπαινέσω τοῦτον παρόντος ἢ θεῖον ἢ ἀνθρωπόν ἄλλον ἢ τοῦτον, οὐκ ἄφεξείται μοι τὸ χείρε. Οὐκ εὐφημήσεις; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. Μά τὸν Ποσειδῶ, εἰπέω τῶν Ἀλκιβιάδην, μηδὲν λέγει πρὸς ταῦτα, ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδ' ἄν ἐνα ἄλλον ἐπαινέσαιμι σοῦ παρόντος. 'Ἀλλ' οὔτω πολεῖ, φάναι τὸν Ἐρυξίμαχον, εἰ βούλειι. Σωκράτη ἐπαίνεσον.

Ε Πῶς λέγεις; εἰπεῖν τῶν Ἀλκιβιάδην· δοκεὶ χρῆναι, ὁ Ἐρυξίμαχε; ἐπιθῶμαι τῷ ἄνδρι καὶ τιμωρήσωμαι ύμῶν ἐναντίον; Οὔτως, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, τί εὖ νῦ ἔχεσι; ἐτὶ τὰ γελοιοτέρα με ἐπαινέσει; ἢ τί ποιήσεις; Τάλθηθ ἐρῶ. ἀλλ' θραύσαι εἰ παρίσης. 'Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, φάναι, τά γε ἄληθῆ παρίσημι καὶ κελεύον λέγειν. Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμεν, εἰπέω τῶν Ἀλκιβιάδην. καὶ μέντοι οὖτωι ποίησον. ἐὰν τί μη ἁληθῆς λέγον, μεταξὺ ἐπιλαβοῦ, ἢν βούλῃ, καὶ εἰπεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο ψεύδομαι.

214 D ὃ οὖσ' J.-U.  Ε τιμωρήσωμαι W επαινέσει Bekk. Sz.: επαινέσει BTW: επαινέσει Be. παριεῖς Schanz

214 D ὃ μακάρις. "Gutmuthig-ironisch" (Rettig): cp. 219 Α.
πείθει. εἶπεν; "Η. ε. πείθει σε τί τουνάντιον ἢ Σ. ἄρτι εἶπεν...h. ε. noli quidquam eorum credere quae modo dixit S." (Stallb.). Α. is alluding to 213 c—d (ἀπ' ἐκεῖνον γὰρ τοῦ χρόνου κτλ.).
οὐκ ἄφεξει κτλ. "Satis lepide isdem fere verbis hic utitur Alcib. quae Socr. 1. l. exhibuit" (Hommel); Α. is turning the tables on S.
Μά τὸν Ποσειδῶ. This form of oath is rare in Plato, see Schanz nov. comm. Plat. p. 23. The main reason why Α. chooses Poseidon to swear by is, no doubt, because Α. was the special deity of the ancient aristocracy of Athens (see R. A. Neile's ed. of Ar. Knights, p. 83); but Α. may also be punning on πότις, as if Ποσειδῶν meant "drink-giver," and invoking a "deus madidus" as appropriate to his own "madid" condition. Cp. Euthyd. 301 Ε, 303 Α.

214 Ε τιμωρήσωμαι. This echoes the τιμωρήσωμαι of 213 d.
Οὕτος. "Ho, there!" Cp. 172 Α.
ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιοτέρα. "To make fun of me": cp. Phileb. 40 c (ἥδονα) μεμι-μημέναι ταῖς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιοτέρα ("caricatures"); so ἐπὶ τά αἰσχύνα Polít. 293 Β, 297 Α.
επαινέσει. Plato always uses the middle form of the future, with the doubtful exception of Laws 719 Ε (where Burnet, after Bekker, corrects ἐπαινέσοι to ἐπαινέσαι), see Veitch Gk. Verbs s.v.
οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμεν. So. τάλθηθι λέγων: iamiam dicam. Cp. 185 Ε, Phaedo 100 Σ, Euthyd. 272 Β (in all which places the participle is expressed).
καὶ...ποίησον. Hommel rashly proposes to read ποίησων for ποίησον and remove the stop after the word. For καὶ μέντοι, see Madv. Gr. S. § 254.
έκων γάρ εἶναι οὐδὲν ψεῦσμαί. ἐὰν μέντοι ἀναμμηνησκόμενοι 215 ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν λέγω, μηδὲν θαυμάσῃς· οὐ γάρ τι ράδιον τὴν σὴν ἀτοπίαν ὁδ' ἔχουσιν εὐπόρως καὶ ἐφεξῆς καταριθμῆσαι.

XXXII. Σωκράτης δ' ἐγὼ ἐπαινεῖν, ὥς ἄνδρες, οὗτος ἐπιχειρήσω, δι' εἰκόνων. οὗτος μὲν οὗν ἵσως οὐσεῖται ἔπτ' τὰ γελοιότερα, ἑσται δ' ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ἄλθους ἔνεκα, οὐ τοῦ γελοίου. φημὶ γάρ δὴ ὁμοίο-τατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῖς σιληνοῖς τούτοις τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἐρμογυλφείοις

215 A τι: τοι vulg. Hirschig ἐρμογυλφεῖας Τ

215 A ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν. “In a wrong order,” or “in promiscuous fashion”: cp. IL ii. 75, Aesch. Ag. 92, etc. Alcib. forestalls criticism by this apology for the “mixed” style of his reminiscences, on the ground of what he calls his “present condition” (ὁδ' ἔχουσι·μεθύνων, οραπλα λαβοράτιον).

οὐ γάρ τι ράδιον. For οὔτι, handquaquam, cp. 189 B.

αὐτοῖς. Csp. Gorg. 494 D; 221 C infra. That Socrates is an “out-of-the-way” character, a walking conundrum, is, in fact, the main theme of Alc.'s speech: it is a mistake to limit this αὐτοῖς to the contradiction between his outer and inner man, as Susemihl does.

οὗτως...δι' εἰκόνων. For οὗτως with an epexegetical phrase, cp. 193 C, Laws 633 D, Rep. 551 C οὗτοι...ἀπὸ τιμημάτων. For εἰκόνως, “similes,” see Ar. Rhet. III. 4, where they are described as a kind of μεταφορά ("A simile is a metaphor writ large, with the details filled in," Cope ad loc.). εἰκοσία ("conundrums") were also “a fashionable amusement at Greek social gatherings” (Thompson on Meno 80 C), see for exx. Ar. Vesp. 1308 ff., Av. 804 ff.: cp. Rep. 487 E, Phaedo 87 B; Xen. Symp. vi. 8 ff.

ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα. Sc. οὗτως ποιήσων, or the like: cp. 214 E.

τοῖς σιληνοῖς κτλ. These were statuettes representing a Silenus playing a flute or pipe; the interiors were hollow and served as caskets to hold little figures of gods wrought in gold or other precious materials. But the precise fashion of their construction and how they opened (διὰ διαχείρισθε) is by no means clear. (1) Hug thinks they were made with a double door (δυκλίδες): similarly Stallb. and Hemmel (“in contrariis Silenorum lateribus duobus due foramina erant, quae epistemio quodam claudi poterant”). (2) Schultess supposes that one section telescoped into the other (“Schiebt man sie ausseinander, so erblickt man inwendig Gotterbilder”). (3) Panofka, with Schleiermacher, supposes that the top came off like a lid. (4) Lastly, Rettig “denkt an ein Auseinandernahmen in zwei Hälften,” though exactly how this differs from (3) he does not clearly explain. But—as Rettig himself observes—“mag es verschiedene Arten solche Gehäuse gegeben haben,” and in the absence of further evidence it would be rash to decide which of the possible patterns is here intended: the language (διὰ διαχείρισθε) rather favours the idea that the figures split into two, either horizontally or vertically—possibly, also, with a hinge. Cp. Synes. Ep. 153, p. 292 B διστερ ἐπιδοῦν Ἀθήνησιν οἱ δημοσίηι Ἀφροδίτην καὶ Χάρινας καὶ ταῦτα κάλλη θεῶν ἀνάμεισι σιλήνων καὶ στάζουν ἀμπισάχων: Maximus comm. in Dion. Areop. de div. nom. c. ix. t. ii. p. 201 f. (ed. Cord.) ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οἷα τινὰς ἀνδριάντας
B καθημένοις, οὖς τινας ἐργάζονται οἱ δημιουργοὶ σύριγγας ἢ αὐλοῦς ἔχοντας, οἱ διχάδε διοικθέντες φαίνονται ἐνδοθεῖν ἀγάλματα ἔχοντες θεῶν. καὶ φημὶ αὖ ἐοικέναι αὐτῶν τῷ σατύρῳ τῷ Μαρσύᾳ. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ γε εἴδος ὁμοίος εἶ τοῦτοι, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὖ ὑπὸ <ἀν> αὐτὸς ὁ πον ἀμφισβητηθείσαι· ὅς δὲ καὶ τάλλα ἐοικά, μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκοῦε. ὑβριστὴς εἶ; ὡς οὖ, ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ ὁμολογήσῃ, μάρτυρας παρέξομαι. ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐλητής; τολύ γε θαυμασιώτερος ἐκείνου.

Σ ὁ μὲν γε δὲ ὅργανον ἐκήλει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ στάματος δυνάμει, καὶ έτει νυνι δὲ ἄν τὰ ἐκείνου αὐλῆ; ἢ γὰρ Ὁλυμπός ἡΰλει,


215 B ἀγάλματα...θεῶν. Ср. 222 λ, Phaedr. 251 λ.

φημὶ αὖ κτλ. This second comparison arises out of the first, since the Satyr is himself akin to the Sileni: on the connexion between the two (as both originally horse-demons) see Harrison, Proleg. p. 388. Schol.: Μαρσύας δὲ αὐλητής, Ὁλυμπός νιός, δὲ...ἡρισεν Ἀπόλλωνι περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ ἡττήθη, καὶ ποιήν δέδωκε τὸ δέρμα δαρείσ, κτλ.

τὸ γε εἴδος. For the Satyr-like ugliness of Socr., ср. Schol. ad Ar. Nub. 223 εἰλέγετα δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὴν ὅφιν ζειλήνυ παρεμφαίνειν· σμός τε γὰρ καὶ φαλακρός ἤν: Theaet. 143 b προσέωκε δὲ σοὶ τὴν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἕξω τῶν ἀμαθῶν: ib. 209 b, Meno 80 a f.; Xen. Symp. iv. 19, v. 7.—δῆπον (ἀν) ἀμφισβ. (ср. Meno 72 c) is another possible order of words.

ὑβριστής εἰ. "You are a mocker" or "a bully" (Jowett): so too Agathon had said, in 175 e. For the present Alcib. forbears to enlarge on this Satyr-like quality, but he resumes the subject in 216 c ff., see esp. 219 c, 222 λ. Observe also that Alcib. is here turning the tables on Socr., who had brought practically the same charge against A. in 213 c, d. Schleierm.'s rendering, "Bist du übermuthig, oder nicht?", is based on a wrong punctuation.

οὐκ αὐλητής. I.e. (as Schol. B puts it) ἐν ἥθει. ἐκείνου, sc. Μαρσύων.

215 C Ὁλυμπός. For Ὁλυμπός ὁ Φρύξ ἀσ τὰ παδίκα of Marsyas, ср. Minos 318 b; Paus. x. 30; also Laws 677 d, 790 d ff.; Arist. Pol. v. 5. 1340 a 8 ff.; Clem. Al. Strom. i. p. 307 c.

For κατεχεσθαί of "possession" (by supernal or infernal powers), ср. Meno 99 b, Phaedr. 244 e; Ion 533 e ff. (Rohde Psycho ii. pp. 11, 18 ff., 48, 88). The orgiastic flute-music (having a cathartic effect parallel to that of tragedy) provided, as Aristotle explains, a kind of homoeopathic remedy for the fit of εὐδονισμῶν.
M. λέγω που, τοῦ διδάξαντος. Τὰ οὖν ἐκείνου εἰτὶ τὰ ἀγαθὸς αὐλητής αὐλὴ ἐὰν τα φαύλη ἀὐλητρίς, μόνα κατεξέσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δηλοὶ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν τα καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους. διὰ τὸ θία εἶναι. 
οὗ δ' ἐκείνου τοσοῦτον μόνον διάφερες, ὅτι ἂνεν ὀργάνων ψυλοῖς λόγους ταύτων τοῦτο ποιεῖς. ἥμεις γοῦν ὅταν μὲν τοῦ ἄλλου ἀκού—

215 Ο που, τοῦ scripsi: τοῦτο BT, Bt.: τοῦ τούτων Voeg.: τοῦ Badm. Sz.: τοῦτο Sommer: αὐτοῦ Liebhold 

M. λέγω που, τοῦ 8. I venture on this slight innovation: otherwise it were best, with Badm, to cut down the τοῦτον to τοῦ.

δηλοὶ...δεομένους. Cρ. the imitative passage in Μίνως 318 Β καὶ μίνα κινεῖ καὶ ἐκφάνει τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ἐν χρείᾳ ὃντας. 

215 D ὅταν μὲν κτλ. Observe the antitheses σοῦ ἄλλου—τῶν σῶν λόγων ἃ ἄλλους λόγους—πάνυ φαύλος...λέγων ἃ πάνυ ἄγαθος ῥήτορος. 

ἡ...ἄλλου λέγουσι. A case in point is the Symposium itself, where Socrates' λόγοι are reported at second-hand.

ἴδι τα γυνῆ κτλ. "No sex or age is impervious to the impression"—in antithesis to the preceding universal negative ὅντα. For ἑκπληκτικος as a love-symptom, cρ. Charm. 154 c.

κομιδῆ...μεθάνων. Schol. κομιδή· ὑσδοῦναμεὶ...πο σφόδρα καὶ τελέως. Cρ. 212 ε.

ἐτόν ὄμορφα ἄν. "I would have stated on my oath," i.e. I would not merely have described the facts, as I am about to do, but would have called Heaven to witness ἀρχαῖος (cρ. 183 a). Hommel supposes that Alcib. "rom silentio praeterire apud se constituit"; but this is confused by the context. For a ref. to this passage, see Procl. in Ι. Αι. p. 89.

215 Ε τῶν κορυβαντῶντων. Τίμ. κορυβαντίαν· παρεμμαίνεσθαι καὶ ἐνθυ- 

ΣΥΜΠΟΣΙΟΝ

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10
ékχειται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τούτων· ὀρῶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους παμ-
πόλλους τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχοντας. Περικλέος δὲ ἀκούὼν καὶ ἄλλων
ἀγαθῶν ῥητόρων εἰ μὲν ἡγοῦμην λέγειν, τοιοῦτον δ' οὐδὲν ἔπασχον,
οὐδ' ἤτεθορυθτό μου ἢ ψυχή οὐδ' ἡγανάκτει ὡς ἄνδραποδωδῶς
dιακειμένου· ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ Μαρσύου πολλάκις δὴ οὗτω
216 διετέθη, ὡστε μοι δόξας μὴ βιωτόν εἶναι ἔχοτε ὡς ἐχὼ. καὶ
taῦτα, Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔρεις ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. καὶ ἐτι γε νῦν ξύνοιο
ἐμαυτῷ ὅτι εἰ ἐθελομιν παρέχειν τὰ ὀπτα, οὐκ ἂν καρτερῆσαιμαι
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἄν πάσχομι. ἀναγκάζει γάρ με ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι
πολλοῦ ἐνδής ὅν αὐτός ἐτι ἐμαντοῦ μὲν ἀμελῶ, τὰ δ' Ἀθηναῖων

215 Ε ὑπὸ...τοῦτου secl. Voeg. Hug
toῦ τοῦτον TV: τοῦτου B: τοῦτου
secl. J.-U. ταῦτα (ταῦτα) π. Naber
216 Α Σώκρατες B, J.-U.: ἂ Σ. T.
Jn. Bt. (cf. 217 B) ταὐτά: ταῦτα BT ἔτι T: τι B

δικοῦσιν ἀκούων: Ion 533 ε, 536 c. Among the symptoms of κορυβαντισμὸς
were the hearing of faery flute-notes, visions, hypnotic dreams, dance-motions
etc. (see Rohde Psyche ii. 47 ff.): cp. also Plut. adv. Colot. 1123 δ.

ἢ τε καρδία πηθή. Cp. Ion 535 c, Phaedr. 251 c; Sappho 2. 5 τοῦ μαῦν |
kαρδιάν ἐν άτθέσιν ἐπιτάσσειν: Ar. Nub. 1393 νῦνα γε τῶν νεωτέρων τὰς καρδίας |
pηθὸν ὅτι λέξει.

ὑπὸ τῶν λ. τ. τοῦτο. Rettig seems right in arguing that a Glossator would
be unlikely to write thus; and repetitions of this kind are characteristic of
Alc.'s speech (cp. 221 d).

Περικλέος δὲ ἀκούων. For the oratorical powers of Pericles, cp. Phaedr.
269 ε, Meno 94 λ, Menev. 235 ε; Thuc. ii. 65; Ar. Achar. 530 ff.; Cic. Brut. xi.
44, de or. iii. 34; and esp. Eupolis Δῆμοι (fr. 6. 34) κράτιστος οὗτος (sc. Περικλῆς)
έγενεν ἀνθρώπων λέγειν | ...πειθώ τίς ἐπεκάθεσεν ἐπὶ τοῖς χείλεσιν | οὕτως ἐκῆλε,
καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητῶν τὸ κέντρον ἐγκύκλιετε τοῖς ἀκροαμένων. Comparing
with our passage,—taken in conjunction with 213 δ (νικῶντα ἐν λόγοις πάντας
ἀνθρώπους), 215 B (ἐκῆλε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους), 218 A (πληγεῖς τε καὶ δηθεῖς ὑπὸ
tῶν λόγων), 221 c (οἷος ὁ Περικλῆς κτλ.),—it seems probable that Plato has
this passage of Eupolis in mind, and represents Alcib. as confuting Eupolis—
as a return for the railley he had suffered at the hands of E, in his Βασταί:
cp. the story told in Cic. Att. vi. 1 that Alcib. got Eupolis drowned.

ἡν ἡ ψυχή. For this position of the genitive of the pronoun, which gives
it nearly the force of an ethnic dat., cp. Rep. 518 c, Phaedo 117 β (cp. Vahlen
op. Acad. i. 440 ff.).

ἄνδραποδῶδως δ. Cp. Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 39: 210 δ ὁσπερ ἀκέτης...
δουλεύον.

216 Α μὴ βιωτόν. This echoes, by way of contrast, 211 δ ἑνταῦθα...

βιωτόν.


οὐκ...ἀληθῆ. Notice these repeated protestations of veracity: cp. 214 ε,
215 B (and see Introd. § 11. λ).

οὐκ ἂν καρτερῆσαμι. Contrast with this the καρπεία of Socr., 219 δ, 220 λ.
βια...φέφυγον. "Invitus mihiique ipsi vim inferens au fugio." (Rückert). Hommel wrongly takes βια with επισχέμενος. βιων, the conjecture of Abresch, based on Hesych. (βιων τα άτα επιφραττον) makes the order awkward and produces tautology. επισχέμενος τα άτα is the opposite of the foregoing παρέχειν τα άτα: cp. Plut. Romp. 55; Hor. Er. ii. 2. 105 obturem patulas impune legentibus aures; Acts vii. 57 συνίσχον τα άτα αντόνα: Ps. lvi. 4, 5 (A.V.) "they are like the deaf adder that stoppeth her ear; which will not hearken to the voice of charmers, charming never so wisely." For the Σειρήνης, cp. Iom. Od. xii. 39 ff., and see Harrison Proleg. pp. 197 ff.

αυτού...παρά τούτῳ. αυτού is not really "redundant" (as Ast)—"sitting still here beside him," i.e. "müsig und entfernt von Staatsgeschaften" etc. (Rettig); cp. Ar. Ran. 1490 ff.; Apol. 31 0 ff.

καταγγέλλω. Perhaps a double entendre—A. implying that S.'s moralizings ("rumores senum securiorum") would soon make an old man of him. 216 B ὅσυκ...ἐνίβαιναι. This is a specimen of the naive candour which characterizes Aleib. throughout. For Aleib.'s self-assurance, cp. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 47.

ζητημένως...πολλάν. "Me honori, quo me ornet populi multitudo, succumbere" (Stallb.). Cp. Rep. 359 α.: Xen. Cyrop. iii. 2. 12 ἦδεσθαι τῇ ἵπτῳ πάντων τιμή: Thuc. i. 130. 1. For the thought, cp. Rep. 491 0 ff.

δραπετεύω. "I take to my heels," like a runaway slave (δραπετέω, Meno 97 ε).

τὰ ωμολογημένα. I.e. the conclusions as to his own ὑπεύθεια forced upon him by S.; cp. 216 Α ἀναγκάζει...ομολογεῖν.


οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι χρήσωμαι. Since Aleib. is here generalizing, the (dubitative) subj. seems preferable to the more definite fut., as Hommel argues against Stallb.

Aleib. is in the position of a "Dipsychus," "halting between two opinions."
XXXIII. Καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν ὅτι τῶν ἀυλημάτων καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλοι τολλοὶ τουταίτης πεπονθαίνω ὑπὸ τρόθε τοῖς σατύροις. ἄλλα δὲ ἐμὸι ἀκούσατε ὡς ἁμικὸς τὸ ἐστὶν ὅσ ἂν ἡκασὰ αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ὃς βουλισίαν ἔχει. εὖ γὰρ ἵστε ὅτι οὐδὲς ὑμᾶς τούτον γεγνώσκει.

D ἄλλα ἐγὼ δηλῶμαι, ἐπειπέρ ἁρμῆμαι, ὀρᾷ τὰ ὅτι Σωκράτης ἐρωτικός διάκειται τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἱ περὶ τούτων ἑστι καὶ ἐκτελησκείται, καὶ αὖ ἀνγοῦει πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα

216 C ἡκασὰ Fischer: εἰκασὰ libri D καὶ αὔ...οἶδεν secl. Jr. Bdhm. Sz. αὐ B; om. TW ἀννοεὶ πάντα (καὶ...οἶδεν deletis) Bast οἶδεν. ὡς distinguish Bt. ὡς: πῶς Ast: ἦ Usener


οἷς ἐγὼ ἡκασὰ αὐτοῦ. Sz. τοῖς σιληνοῖς. ἡκασὰ recalls the ῥε ἐκάνων of 215 λ. οὔδες...γεγνωσκε. Plato may mean by this, as Hug suggests, that the majority of the admirers and followers of Socr. possessed a very dim insight into the sources of his real greatness—ἄλλ' ἐγὼ (Plato, behind the mask of Alcib.) δηλῶσω.

216 D ἐρωτικὸς διάκειται κτλ. For Socrates as (professing to be) subject to intense erotic emotion, see the vivid description in Charm. 155 c ff. ἐγὼ ἄρα ἡμᾶς, καὶ ἔτι πράσθεν θραυσὶς ἐξεκόπτο...καὶ ἐφελέγομη καὶ οὐκέτ' ἐν ἑμαυτῷ ὣν κτλ.

καὶ αὔ...οἶδεν. Most of the later critics (including Voeg., Teuffel, Hug) agree in ejecting this clause. Rettig, who defends it, writes: "die Worte gehen auf den vermeintlichen Stumpfsinn des S., wie er so häufig mit roher Sinnlichkeit verbunden ist...Die Worte εἰρωνευόμενος...διατελεῖ den obigen καὶ αὐ...οἶδεν gegensätzlich gegenüberstanden...Da nicht blos die Silene ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται κτλ., so würde ohne unsere Worte die folgende Frage ως το σχῆμα...οὗ σιληνοῖδες; kaum motivirt sein." But (as generally interpreted) the clause seems hardly pertinent to the main argument, which is the contrast between the outward appearance of eroticism and the inner σφρασύνη of Socr.: the clause εἰρωνευόμενος κτλ. does nothing to strengthen the case for the reference to γνώσις here; while there is no reason to suppose that professions of ignorance were specially characteristic of Sileni (in spite of the story of Midas and Silenus in Plut. ad Ap. de consol. 115 c (Σειλ.) οὐδὲν ἐθέλει εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ σωπᾶν ἄρρητως). If retained as it stands the clause is best taken closely with the previous words, as expressing an erotic symptom. [Possibly, however, for πάντα we should read πάντας and for οὐδέν, οὐδὲν, taking the words as masc. (sc. τοὺς καλοὺς).] This implies of course that οὐδέν bears the sense "agnoscit" (and ἀνγοῦει the opposite), for which cp. Eur. H. F. 1105 ff. ἐκ ταὶ τεθηκασα...τίς...δύσυνεον δοτις τὴν ἡμῖν ἱστατα; σαφώς γὰρ οὐδέν οἶδα τῶν εἰωθῶν: ἦδ. El. 767 ἐκ τοῦ δείματος δυσγνωσίαν | εἶχον προσώ- που νῦν δὲ γεγνώσκω σε δή. (Cp. for this sense, Vahlen op. Ac. II. 63 f.) ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ. "Which is the rôle he affects." For this use of σχῆμα
of an acted part, cp. I. Alc. 135 d, Rep. 576 a: similarly σχηματικώς, simuló, Phaedr. 255 a ώριξ ὑπὸ σχηματιζόμενον τοῦ ἔρωτος, ἀλλ' ἄλλους τοῦ πεπονθότος. This is preferable to rendering by "forma et habitus," as Stallb. The punctuation of the passage has been disputed: "vulgo enim legebatur καὶ οὔδεν οἴδειν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὖ σειλήνωδες σφόδρα γε, quod Stephanus ita corrigebat ut pro οὐ σειληνώδες scriberet ὄν σειλ'" (Stallb.): Stallb., Rückert, Badham, Schanz and Hug follow Bekk. and Schleierm. in putting a comma after οἴδεν and a full stop after αὐτοῦ (so too Hommel, but proposing οἴδε for οἴδεν): Rettig follows Bernhardy in putting the full stop after τοῦτο, with a comma at οἴδεν: Burnett puts a full stop at οἴδεν, and no further stop before σειλήνωδες: Ast proposed πῶς for ὡς. Bast, reading πάντη for πάντα and ejecting καὶ οὔδεν οἴδεν, construed ὡς...σφόδρα γε as dependent on ἄγνοια: and Stephens's οἴδε involves a similar construction.

περιβλήθη. "Has donned" as it were a "cloak" of dissimulation: cp. Xen. Oec. 11. 6 εἰς δὲ τὸ σῶν σχῆμα δι' ἄντι ἔρωτι: Pha. cix. 18 "he clothed himself with cursing like as with his garment."


πλοῦτος...τιμὴ ἡμῶν. Stallb. renders "aut praetera honore aliquo ornatus," distinguishing τιμὴ from κάλλος and πλοῦτος; whereas Rücker states that "τιμὴ dicta est h. l. de re, quae honorem habet efficitque τιμή, ita ut κάλλος et πλοῦτος etiam τιμὴ esse possint." Rettig supports Stallb., but probably the other two διάδημα are also classed in A.'s mind as τίμα. Cp. 178 c, 216 b: Pind. fr. inc. 25.

τῶν...μακραίμοιν. Sc. τιμῶν.

καὶ ημῶς οὔδειν εἰμι. "h. e. atque nos, qui talia magni faciamus nullo in numero habendos ccnset." (Stallb.). This,—or Rücker's "nos ipsos qui puleri, qui divites sumini,—seems to bring out rightly the point of the personal reference; in spite of Rettig, who writes "vollig fremd ist der Platonischen Stelle der Zusatz, welchen Stallb. hier macht." For this use of οὐδὲν (=οὐδενὸς ἄξιον) cp. 219 a, 220 a. The attitude here ascribed to Socr. is very like that ascribed to his admirer Apollodorus in 173 c, d.
λέγω ύμίν.—εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ καὶ παῖς ὁ πάντα τὸν βιον πρὸς
τὸν τεθρόσους ἀπετελεί. σπουδάσαντος δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀκουμένος
οὖν οἶδα εἰ τις εἰρωκεῖ τὰ ἐντὸς ἀγάλματα· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἤδη ποτ' 217 ἑδόν, καὶ μοι ἐδοξέων οὔτω θειά καὶ χρυσά εἶναι καὶ πάγκαλα καὶ
θαυμαστά, ἠστεροὶ ποιητῶν εἶναι εἰς ἑμέραν. ὁ τε κελεύει ἵκοράτης,
ηγουμένος δὲ αὐτὸν ἐστημόδενναι ἐπὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ὥρᾳ. ἐρμαινὴν ἡγη-
σάμην εἶναι καὶ εὐτυχίαμα ἐμὸν θαυμαστόν, ὥστε πάροικον μοι
καὶ ἐν παρεκκλήσει. ἐπω, (χαίρισαμένος) ἵκοράτης πάντι ἄκοιμαι διαπέρ οὐτὸς ἤδεις· ἐφόρονυν
γάρ δὴ ἐπὶ τῇ ὥρᾳ θαυμασίου· δου. ταῦτα οὖν διανοηθεῖς, πρὸ τοῦ

216 E λέγω ύμίν BT: λέγων μὲν οὖς Ηερμ.: ηγουμένος Βδιμ.: ἵνα λέγω
ὑμῖν Sz.: ἀλλ' ἐρώτων οὖς Usener: del. Voeg.: fort. transp. post ἀλλὰ ἱρα
ἐμβραχύ Cobet Sz. BT.: ἐν βραχύ BT ἀ τι (ἀν) Σαύρης θν. αὐτὸς: αὐτὸς
Βδιμ. δὴ B: ηδὴ ΤΒ: ἐτι cf. Wolf

λέγω ύμῖν. There is no objection, at least in A.'s speech, to this kind of
parenthetic interjection (cp. εἰσθε, d supra); cp. Ἀρο. 30 a, Θυκυ. vi. 37. 2,
Εὐρ. Μεδ. 226. Similarly in Gorg. 464 c, 526 c "asserverandi causa orator ad
ca quae maxime attendi vult addit illa φημι, λέγω" (see Vahlen op. Acad. i.
479). I am, however, inclined to suspect that the words are misplaced, and
originally stood after ἀλλὰ, three lines lower down; if so, we should read ἀλλὰ—
λέγω ύμῖν—ἢ ἵνα κτλ., or perhaps ἀλλὰ ἂ λέγω ύμῖν ἐγὼ: this would serve to echo
the ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἀδίστη ὁ ἐν ἐμώ. Cp. also 222 B ἀ δὴ καὶ σοὶ λέγω.

337 A αὕτη ἐκείνη ἡ εἰσθανία εἰρωνεῖα ἵκοράτους.
τὰ ἐντὸς ἀγάλματα. See 215 A πο.: ἀγάλμα, ὡς ἐφ' ὑπ τίς ἄγαλματα, can fitly
be applied to spiritual as well as material treasures; cp. the use of ἵστον in Eur.
Helm. 1002. This passage is cited in Procl. in Alc. i. p. 89; Clem. Alex. Strom.
vii. 5, p. 846 P.; cp. Cic. de Legg. i. 22 "ingeniumque in se suum sicut
simulacrum aliquid dedicatum putabit."

217 A χρυσά. "Nur ein poetischer mit κάλος synonymer Ausdruck" (Rettig);
no doubt the material ἀγάλματα referred to were of gold or gilt,
cp. Κτίτικες 116 D χρυσά...ἀγάλματα ἐντρήσθησαν. For the metaphor, use, cp. Ἰππ.
Μαί. 301 λ, Phaedr. 235 ε φιλτατος εἰ καὶ ὅς ἀλήθως χρυσῶς: Gorg. 486 D
χρυσήν ἤχων...τεν ψυχήν: and Shaksper's "Golden lads and lasses."

ἐμβραχύ. "In short," used to qualify a universal statement expressed by
a relative such as ἅτις: cp. Gorg. 457 A (with Heindorf ad loc.), Ἰππ.
Min. 365 D; Ar. Vesp. 1120.

ἐπιποτούκαται ἐπὶ κτλ. Observe how this contrasts with the παίζεων of 216 E:
A., we are to infer, had not as yet (at the date of the incident following) learnt the
"irony" of Socr. With the attitude of Alcib. here cp. what Pausanias says in
184 a ff.

ὥρα. ἰδρα ἴδωθος etatis is nearly equiv. τὸ ἁῦνος (183 E, 210 c): cp. 219 c,
Phaedr. 234 A, I. Alc. 131 Π τα...σά λήγει ἰδρας, σά δ' ἰδρεῖ ἁῦνος.

ἐφράζων κτλ. For Alc.'s vanity, cp. I. Alc. 104 A.
217 Α. μόνος secl. Hirschig J.-U. Hug  
B (δ) Ἀκρατες Sz.  δ' οὖν:  
Hommel Hirschig: fort. δὲ καὶ συνεγγυματίζον περαιών  
Sz. Sauppe Sz. Hug  
C ἔνταθα (γε) Naber ἀνετέων: ἀνεταίον O.-P.  ἢδον ἐπὶ τὸ πρ.  
Wytenbach  

217 Β. τάληθ...ψευδομα.  
Cp. 216Α, 214Ε for similar protestations.  
Observe the effectiveness of this pause in the narration, and of the challenge to contradiction, as marking an approaching climax: cp. Phaedo 85 d.  


ἀν...ἀχτερ. If ἀν is right we must take it to denote repeated action, "solebat identidem discedere" (Stallb.): cp. Apol. 22 Β (Madv. Gr. Σ.  
§ 117 b, R. 3; L. and S. s.v. ἀν δ).  

συνημερεύατον. The only other ex. in Plato is Phaedr. 240 Α παιδικός...ἐραστίς...ἐλιτ τὸ συνημερεύατον πάντων ἀδηστάτων.  

ἐλα&μά&σε&μα. For this practice, cp. 182 Α, Menex. 236 d, Rep. 452 Α ff.; and Xen. Symp. 11. 16 Α Π., where Socr. treats of public and private gymnastics.  

217 Α. οὐδέν...πλέον ἢν. "Nihil enim proficiebam" (Stallb.): cp. 222 Α.  

ἐπε&δη&θ ο&κ. Rettig supposes an allusion to Eur. Hipp. 390 Α: ἐπε&δη&θ τοι&σ&δ&α&κ&μ&ν Κύπρων | κρατή&σ&α&ν, κατ&θαν&έ&ν ἐ&δ&α&ξ&εί μοι. For other ref. to  

Eurip., see 177 Α, 189 Α, 196 Ε.  

ἰστέων...πράγμα.  
Reynolds is alone in approving of Wytenbach's "restoration," ιτέον ἢδον ἐπί τὸ πράγμα: for, as Rücker argues, this must imply either  
that Α. had as yet made no "conamen alliciendi S.,” which is untrue, or that  
he had not as yet begun his narration, which is equally untrue. The sense of  
the text is "I must get to the bottom of the matter without more ado,”  
im. discover the real ground of Socrates' indifference.  
Cp. Apol. 20 Α τὸ σῶν  
τί ἔστι πράγμα;  

προκαλο&μα&ι δὴ κτλ.  
Here comes the third and most desperate expedient,
in which Alcib. reverses their respective rôles and acts towards Socr. no longer as παίδικα but as ἐραστής (cp. 213 c, 222 b, and see Introd. § vi. 3). For three as a climacteric number cp. Phil. 66 d, Euthyd. 277 c, Rep. 472 a. For ζητοῦντας, cp. 203 b, 203 d.

217 D dē ... νυκτῶν. "Usque ad multam noctem" (Stallb.). For this force of dē, cp. dē διά τοῦ βίου Phaedo 75 b, etc.; so with πόρρω, Gorg. 486 a τοὺς πόρρω δὲ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας. For the plural νύκτες, "night-watches," cp. 223 c, Prot. 310 c πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν: Phaed. 50 d.

ἐν τῇ ... κλίνῃ. ἐμοῦ is short for τῆς ἐμῆς (or ἑμοῦ) κλίνης: cp. the similar brachylogy in 214 c: Hom. Od. vi. 308.


217 E μέχρι ... δεύρῳ. So Laws 514 D τῆς ... δυνάμεως τὸ μέχρι δεύρῳ ἡμῶν εἰρήσθω.

καὶ πρὸς ὀντινοῦν λέγειν. This reminds one of Diotima's language in 209 e ff. (ταύτα μὲν οὖν κτλ.).

τὸ λεγόμενον κτλ. Photius explains thus: οἶνος ἄνευ παίδων δύο παρομία: ή μὲν οἶνος καὶ ἀλληθεία, ή δὲ οἶνος καὶ παιδίς ἀληθείας. For the first of these, cp. Alcaeus fr. 57 b, Theocr. Id. xxix. 1. We might render "In wine and wean is candour seen." Cp. Schol. ad h. l.; Athen. p. 37 εἰλάχιστος δὲ φησιν ὅτι οἱ πίνουσαι οὐ μόνον ἑαυτῶς ἐμφανίζοντο αἰτίνες εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκατόν ἀνακαλύπτουσι, παρρησίαν ἀνέχουσι. θεῖαν "οἶνος καὶ ἀλήθεια" λέγεται: Alcaeus fr. 53 οἶνος γὰρ ἄνθρωπος διάστροφος: Hor. Sat. 1. 4. 89 condita cum vera ex aperit praecordia Liber. Similar sayings about the effects of wine are Ar. Plut. 1048 μεθύον διέστησεν βλέπει: Theogn. 479 ff. οἶνος ... κούφων ἔθηκε νόον. The explanations of H. Müller ("Trunkene sagten die Wahrheit, mochten Diener zugeben sein oder nicht") and of Hommel ("si proverbio illo vinum, quod neque praeentiam neque absentiam servorum curat (alluding to the ἄκολουθος of 217 a), non esset veridicum") are clearly wrong. Cp. Xen. Symp. viii. 24.
αφαίρεσαι. “To keep dark”: notice the play ἀφαίρεσαι...φαίνεται, which Lehrs represents by “eine helle That des S. ins Dunkle zu setzen.” φαίνεται after the imper. ἦν is one of Alc.'s anacolutha.

ὑπερήφανον. The adj. here, though prima facie eulogistic, evidently contains (as Rückert notes) “grata quaedam ambiguitas,” as alluding to the ὁδός of Soc., cp. the use of ὑπερήφανα to denote “superbia cum contentione coniuncta” (Ast) in 219 c. for the good sense of the word, cp. Phaedo 96 A, Gorg. 511 D.

tὸ τοῦ δηχθέντος κτλ. For this proverbial case, cp. Aristides or. 15, i. p. 234 ὁσπέρ τὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ἔχθινης φασὶ πληγέντα μὴ ἑθέλειν ἑτέρῳ λέγειν ἄλλ' ἦ δόσις πεπείραται: id. or. 49, ii. p. 305: Xen. Symp. iv. 28 ὁσπέρ ὑπὸ θηρίων τινὰς δεδηγμένος...ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὁσπέρ κυνήμα τι εἴδοκεν ἔχειν: id. Mem. i. 3. 12 ff. ἐνίσχυσι γὰρ τὰ τὰ φαλάγγα κατὰ τὸ δήγμα...ὡςτε μαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν. This last passage refers to the “bite of love,” for which cp. Soph. fr. 721 ἐρωτας δήγμα: Socrates (Bergk P. L. G. ii. p. 288) πόθος δηχθείς. Rückert is no doubt right in holding that there is allusion here “ad certam fabellam, nobis licet ignotam.” Cp. also Aesch. Cho. 996.

218 A πάν...λέγειν. “Alii de remediiis totoque curationis genere (haec) verba intelligunt, alii de motibus, gestibus furibundis, dictisque quae doloris magnitudo elicuerit, sanis hominibus nil nisi risum moturis” (Rückert). The former of these views is adopted by Stallb. and Rettig (who takes the phrase to refer to the superstitious use of charms, amulets, etc.), the latter by Hommel. The phrase recalls 182 ε δωματά ἔργα...γόλιμῷ ποιεῖν: 208 ὁ πάντα ποιοῦσιν: cp. Rep. 576 A. It seems best here to interpret it broadly of the results of the δήγμα, whether or not directly aiming at a cure: i.e. as covering both the senses indicated above.

τὸ ἀλγεινότατον. “In my most sensitive part.”

τῇ καρδίᾳ. Schol. B, ὅτι τῇ καρδίᾳ (καρδίαν τῆν Ηερμ.) ψυχῆν καλεῖ. This implies—as Usener inferred—that the words ἦ ψυχῆν were absent from the Scholiast's text: none the less, in view of the context, I think it rash to expunge the words, and content myself with obelizing γάρ. For ἦ ὅτι κτλ., cp. 212 c.
δηχθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων, οἱ ἔχονται ἑχιδνὴς ἄγριότερον, νέου ψυχῆς μὴ ἁφώνος ὅταν λάβωνται, καὶ ποιοῦσι δραίν τε καὶ λέγειν ὁτιον — καὶ ὅρον αὐ τὸν Φαῖδρος, 'Αγάθωνας, Ἐρυθ-Β μάχους, Παυσανίας, 'Αριστοδήμους τε καὶ 'Αριστοφάνας. Σωκράτης δὲ αὐτῶν τὶ δεὶ λέγειν, καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι; πάντες γὰρ κεκοιμονυκατε τῆς φιλοσοφοῦ μανίας, τε καὶ βασικεῖς. διὸ πάντες ἀκούσανθε συγγνωσάθη γὰρ τοῦ τέτο πράξθει καὶ τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις οἱ δὲ οἰκεῖαι, καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος ἔστι βεβηλὸς τε καὶ ἄγριοις, πῦλας παμμεγάλας τοῖς ὁσίων επίθεσθαι.

ΣΣΣ. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὖν, ὅ άνδρες, ὃ τοὺς λύχνους ἀπεσβήκει C καὶ οὶ παίδες ἔξω ἦσαν, ἐδοξὴ μοι χρῆναι μηδὲν ποικίλλειν πρὸς αὐτῶν, ἢλλ' ἑλευθέρως εἰπεῖν αὐ μοι ἐδόκει. καὶ εἶπον κινήσας


υπὸ τῶν...λόγων. Cρ. 210 ν λόγους...ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἁφώνῳ. Ποι πληγεῖς, cp. Euthyd. 303 Α διότι πληγεῖ σύν τοῦ λόγου ἁφώνος ἐκείνην: Epist. vii. 347 D. νέου ψυχῆς. Rost, removing the comma before νέου, connected ν. ψυχῆς with ἔχονται, wrongly: for ἔχεισαν without a genitive, cp. Gorg. 494 B.

Observe the word-play ἔχονται ἐχ-άφωνη.

μὴ ἁφώνος. Cρ. 209 β ψυχῆ...ὑφωνεί.

Φαῖδρος κτλ. For a similar (generalizing) use of the plural of proper names, cp. Menex. 245 D, Ar. Ran. 1040 ff., Av. 558 f.

218 B συγγνώσασθαι. This echoes the συγνώσασθαι of 218 A εὑρεια.

οἱ δὲ οἰκεῖαι. This echoes Diotima's ἀστροτερίατι, 210 D ad init. : cp. Ar. Ach. 242, Ran. 41 for the nomin. of address.


πῦλας...τοῖς ὁσίων. Cρ. Theogn. 421 πολλὸς ἀνθρώπων γλώσσῃ θύρα οὐκ ἐπικεῖται ἀρμάδια.


ἐμοῦ...ἀξιός. Whether ἐμοῦ goes closely with ἐραστὴς or with ἀξιός is open to doubt: Jowett renders “the only one who is worthy of me,” whereas Rettig writes “ἀξίως absolutum—würdig, beachtenswerten.”

ἀκνεῖν κτλ. “To be shy of mentioning (your love) to me”: cp. I. Ael. 103 Μ οἶμαι σε σαμαῖς ὅτι πρῶτοι ἐραστῆς σου γενόμενοι...τοσούτως ἐτῶν οὔτε προσεῖπον.

τῆς οὐσίας...τῶν φιλῶν. Cp. 183 ἤ ἡ χρήματα...ὑπὸ φιλῶν. For ἡ τῶν φιλῶν = ἡ τῆς τῶν φιλῶν, cp. the brachylogy in 217 D (ἐμοῦ).

218 D προσβάτερον. Poll. ii. 12 καὶ προσβαθεῖν τὸ τιμᾶν παρὰ Πλάτωνι καὶ τὸ “οὐδὲν ἐστι προσβάτερον” ἀπὶ τοῦ “οὐδὲν τιμῶσθαι”; 186 b, 188 c suprag. συλλήπτορα. For the ἐραστὴς as an aid to ἄρετή, see 185 A; cp. Socrates’ description of Eros as συνεργός, 212 b. μοι was taken by Stallb. with συλλήπτορα, by Rückert with ἑιναι, but it is better to say with Hommel that, as an ethic dat., “ad totum verborum complexum referatur.”


οὗ φαίλος. “Kein Dummkopf” (Hug); cp. 174 c, 175 e. Soer. means that if Alcib. proposes to make such a profitable bargain, bartering his own cheap κάλλος for the rare κάλλος of Soer., he evidently is a “cute” man of
Ε tvxh'vnei ónta ò légeis perì èmou, kal tois èst' èn èmou dýnamis, di' ès òv sù gévous améinw. amh'xovn toî kállous órfh's èn èn èmou kai tîs pàra soi évmorfiás pámpolu didafh'v. éi dé kathorón autò koinósasthav te moi épixeireis kai alláξasathai kállous autì kállous. ouk ólîgo mou plenveketeiv diavnoi, all' autì dòghs

219 alh'xvnon kallwv ktaußathai épixeireis kai to ònti "xýsea xalkeiwn" diameîbësathai neveis. all', ò makarîre, amewon skópetai, mh se laan-thânvo uidêon àvn. hé to tîs diavnoias òphs arxetai òxi blêtein otaîn hé tów ômmáton tîs ákmh's lîghve épixeirev. sù de toûtov èti tórrw. káwv akoussas. Tâ mén par' èmou. èphf, taît' èstîn. òwn ouidêon allwos ërphpai hé às diavnobmei. sù de autòs ou'to boulwvnon ó tî soi te arîstovn kai èmou ëhevi. 'All', èphf, toûtov ge eî légeis.

B èn gar toî étînûnti xýno boulwvmoi prîxiomewn ó òn fainnetai neîv perî te toûtov kai perî tów allwv arîstovn.

218 Ε toî BTW O.-P.: tî al., Bekk.: te vulg. té mou BT O.-P.: mou W


218 Ε amh'xovn ktl. Supply from the context, with Stallb., "nam hoc ita si sit." Rückert, after Schleierm., wrongly connects this clause with the preceding, "qua fiat, ut tu melior evadas, atque exinde immemso in me pulcritudinem cernas"; while Honmel makes it depend upon ètipèr. Cp. Rep. 509 b, 608 d.; Charm. 155 d.


ántl dòghs alh'xvnon k. "Real for sham beauties": alh'xevnon kallwv = alh'xwv kallw. Cp. Phil. 36 c ff; and for the antithesis, cp. 198 ε, 212 λ supra.

219 Α xýsea xalkeiwn. A "familiar quotation" from Il. vi. 235—6 (Γλαύkos) òs pròs Tudeidîn Dívomîda teûxeî amevn | xûsea xalkeiwn, ékatôm-betaî evnebaîovn. Later ref. to the proverb are frequent, e.g. Plut. adv. Stoic. 1063 ε; Clem. Alex. Cohort. ad Gent. 71 c. Cp. Winter's Tale I. 2 "take eggs for money." In xûsea there is an obvious allusion to the ãgdâmai xûsaî of 216 ε.

ἡ toî...δûphs. For this idea of the inverse development of vision, cp. Laws 715 d, Il. Alc. 150 d. Rettig thinks that in this passage there may lie a ref. to Phaedr. 253 d ff, and an indication that the views there put forward are crude and the book itself "eine jugendliche Schrift."

219 Β èn gar toî ktl. Thus Socr. practically defers the consideration of the matter to "the Greek Kalends." Rettig calls attention to the catalectic hexameter in èn gar...boulwvmoi, which gives a touch of jocular liveliness.
ἔγω μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τε καὶ εἰπὼν, καὶ ἀφεῖς ὠσπέρ βῆλη, τετρωσθαί αὐτὸν ὄμην· καὶ ἀναστας γε, οὐδὲ ἐπιτρέψας τοῦτῳ εἰπεῖν οὔδεν ἔστι, ἀμβηγός τὸ ἵματίον τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ τούτον—καὶ γὰρ ἦν χειμῶν—ὑπὸ τὸν τρίβωνα κατακλυσμένος τὸν τουτοῦ, περιβάλλειν τὸ χείρῳ τούτῳ τὸ δαιμονίῳ ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ θαυμαστῶς, С κατεκείμην τὴν νύκτα διήν. καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦτα αὐ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐρείς ὦτε ψεύδομαι. Ποιησάντως δὲ δὴ ταῦτα ἐμόν οὗτος τοσοῦτον περιε-γένετό τε καὶ καταφρόσυκε καὶ καταγέλασε τῆς ἐμῆς ὀρας καὶ ὑβρισε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνω <ὁ> γε ὄμην τί εἶναι, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ—


ἀφεῖς ὠσπέρ βῆλη. Sc. τοὺς λόγους. For this image applied to “winged words,” cp. the use of βαλόν 189 b; Phileb. 23 b βῆλη ἔχειν ἔτερα τῶν ἐμ-προσθέσεων λόγων: Theax. 180 A; Pind. Ol. Ι. 112.


τρίβωνα. Cp. Prot. 335 b; Ar. Ach. 184, etc. The vogue of the “philosopher’s cloak” (pallium) seems to date from Socrates: cp. Plut. de disc. ad. 56 c. For the incident, see also Lysins in Acliib. xiv. 25 (Teichmüller Lit. Φ. II. 267 ff.); Theocr. Id. xvi. 19; cp. Theogn. 1063 ff. ἐν δ᾽ ἦβη πάρα μὲν ἔφοβον ὄρα πτυχα τῆς ἐβαθμίας | ἱπερτάν ύρων ἐξ τρόπον ἰμενον. Notice the stylistic effect produced both by the row of successive participles, mostly asyndetic (“der Sturmlauf ist vergeblich” Retting); and by the repetition of the pronoun (τοῦφ, -τον, -τοῦ, -τῷ, -τῷ, ὄντος). “For Sans haec illustrat Soph. Trach. 944. Respexit Alciphron i. 38” (Wyttenb.).


tosou'vov. “Dictum est δεικτικῶς et per quandam exclamationem ut significet: mirum quantum me vicit” (Stallb.): Rückert and Hommel, on the other hand, suppose that “sequi dehebat ὁστε” so as to give the sense “ut non alter ab eo surrexerim,” etc. (Rückert), or ὁστε καὶ καταφρόνησα κτλ. (Hommel). Rückert’s view, which explains the change of construction as due to the intervening parenthesis, seems the most probable.

περιεγένετό κτλ. Alcib. is fond of piling up synonyms by way of emphasis; cp. 207 A, 219 D, 221 e.

ὑβρις. ὑβρις is a vox propria in erotic literature for the “spretae iniuria formae”; cp. Anthol. Pal. v. 213 οὐκ αὐτῷ τῶν ἀπάλαυστρων ὑβρις.

Anacreon fr. 129 ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ἀπαθαλοὶ (Ἀνακρέων ἄπελε τοῖς Ἔρωσιν... ἐπειδήπερ ἔόρα τὸν ἐφήβον ὀλίγον αὐτοῦ φροντίζοντα...εἰ μὴ αὐτῷ τετρώσκομεν
diakastai γὰρ ἐστε τῆς Σωκράτους ὑπερηφανίας. εὖ γὰρ ἵστε μὰ θεοὺς, μὰ θεᾶς, οὐδὲν περιττότερον καταδεδικθήκως ἀνέστην μετὰ D Σωκράτους, ἦ ἐι μετὰ πατρὸς καθήδουν ἦ ἀδελφοῦ πρεσβυτέρου.

XXXV. Τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο τίνα οἰεσθὲ με διάνοιαν ἔχειν, ἡγοῦμενον μὲν ἡττόμασθαι, ἀγάμενον δὲ τὴν τοῦτον φύσιν τε καὶ σοφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν, ἐντευκτηκότα ἀνθρώπῳ τοιούτῳ οὕφ έγὼ οὐκ

219 D ἦ εἰ Β Ὀ.Π.: ἦ TW

αὐτικα τὸν ἐφιππον κτλ.). Cp. Spenser’s, “Thou hast enfronset her disdaineful brest,” and “Whilst thou tyrant Love doest laugh and scorne At their complaints, making their paime thy play, Why lest they lie languishing like thral stars forlorne” (cp. kataθεδουλωμένος 219 B ἐνθνα).

καὶ περὶ τέκνων ὑς κτλ. So I have ventured to write on the strength of the evidence of the Papyrus.

Rettig keeps the Bedleian κέινο, as tolerable “in hac Alcibiadis oratione singulare amantis,” and refers to Pepp. ad Thuc. viii. 86, Lév. ad Phryn. p. 7, and other authorities: but to bolster up the double anomaly “vain is the strength of man”: if κέινο be retained we must assume delusion (κέινο).

τὶ εἶναι. “Magni quid esse” (Rückert): cp. Gorg. 472 a: it is the opposite of αὐδένειν εἶναι, 216 B, 219 A.

δικαστηλ. Alcib. appeals to the audience to try the case, the notion of a lawsuit (γραφη ὑβρισεως) having been suggested by the word ὑβρισεως. We have already had, in this speech, terms suggestive of legal proceedings, viz. 214 D τιμωρησωμει ωμων ἐναντιον: 215 B μάρτυρας παρεξεμα: and δικαστῆς itself was already used by Agathon in 175 B.

μὰ θεοῦ, μὰ θεᾶς. Such an invocation of the whole pantheon is unusual, but cp. Tim. 27 c.

αὐδέν περιττότερον. Haud aliter, cp. Isocr. iii. 43.


219 D τίνα...διάνοιαν. A.’s feelings were a blend of chagrin and veneration: cp. the perplexity described in 216 C; Theogn. 1091 ff. ἀργαλέοις μοι θυμός ἐξει περὶ σῆς φιλότητος: ὧντε γὰρ ἐχθαρεῖν ὤντε φιλεῖν δύναμαι, κτλ.


ἀγάμενον. This is an echo, both of Phaedrus’ language in 179 C, 180 A, and of ἀγαστής applied to Eros (197 D). Observe the assonance ἡγούμενον...ἀγάμενον. Cp. Xen. Symp. viii. 8.

τὴν τοῦτον φύσιν κτλ. Hemmel renders “des Mannes ganzem Wesen besonders seiner Besonnenheit und Charakterfestigkeit” etc.; Rettig explains φύσις as “die geistige Naturanlage des S., seine theoretische und spekulative Begabung, ingenium, σοφία (vgl. Theae. 144 A).” The former seems the more natural interpretation; φύσις may be intended also as an echo of Aristophanes’ use of the word (189 D etc.).
αν φιμη ποτε ἐντυχεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς καρτερίαν; ὡστε οὐθ' ὅπως ὁμοίως ἐλχον καὶ ἀποστερθεῖν τής τοῦτον συνονο- σίας, οὐθ' ὅτι προσαγαγούμεν αὐτὸν ἤπτορον. εὐ γὰρ ἢδη ὁτί ἔ χρήμασι ἀργὸν μᾶλλον ἀτρατος ἢν παυταχῇ ἢ σκίδηρο ὁ Ἁλας, ὥ τε φιμη αὐτὸν μόνῳ ἀλώσεσθαι, διεσεφείγει με. ἢπτορον δὴ, καταδεδουλωμένος τε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἁνθρώπου ὡς οὐδές ὑπ' οὐδενὸς ἀλλον περιή. ταῦτα τε γὰρ μοι ἀπαντά προσφεύγειν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα στρατεία ἢμῖν εἰς Ποτίδαιαν ἐγένετο κοινῆ καὶ συνεσιτοίμων ἐκεῖ. πρώτον μὲν οὖν τοῖς πόνοις οὐ μόνον ἐμοῦ περιῆ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀλλών ἀπάντων· ὅπτ' ἀναγκασθείμην ἀπολείψθηνες ποι,


οὐθ':...ἐχειν. Of moral impossibility, as in 190 ε, Πλ. Πρ. 214 λ.

219 Ε ἀτρατος. "Invulnerable on all sides": cp. τετράποσθα 219 β. For the incorruptibility of Soce, shown by his sending back Alcib.'s presents, see Stob. Flor. xvii. 17, Ael. x. i. 29.

σκιδήρο ὁ Ἁλας. For the impregnable seven-fold shield of Ajax, see Pind. Isthm. v. 45; Soph. Aj. 576; Welcker Kl. Schr. π. p. 267.

ὁ τε φμν. Sc. τῇ ἄρα (cp. 219 ε): the antecedent, κατὰ τοῦτο (διατεφ.), has to be supplied.

καταδεδουλωμένοις. Cp. Euthyd. 303 c. Above, 215 ε, we had ἀνδραποδῶδος διακείμενον.


στρατεία...κοινῇ. Potidæa revolted from Athens in 435 b.C. and after 5 years of war was reduced in 430 (see Bury's Hist. Gr. pp. 392—3); Soce.'s part in the campaign is alluded to also in Apol. 28 ε, Charm. 153 λ, o: cp. Plut. adv. Colot. p. 1117 ε.

συνεσιτοίμων. "We were mess-mates" (σύσσιτοι). This implies personal friendship rather than proximity of origin; for Soce. and Alcib. belonged to different φυλαὶ and to different τάξεις.

τοῖς πόνοις. Cp. 198 ε (Ερωτ) ἐν πόνῳ...ἀμιστος.

ἀπολείψθηνες. "Cut off," "a commutat intercippi et prohibiti" (Stallb.): cp. Hdt. π. 115. 2; Thuc. vi. 22; Gorg. 522 λ.
220 οία δή ἐπὶ στρατεύας, ἀσπίδης, οὐδὲν ἦσαν οἱ ἄλλοι πρὸς τὸ καρτερεῖν. ἐν τ' αὖ ταῖς εὐσχίαις μόνος ἀπολαύεις οἷς τ' ἤν τ' τ' ἀλλὰ καὶ πίνειν οὐκ ἔθελων, ὅποτε ἀναγκασθεῖν, πάντας ἐκράτει, καὶ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν θαυμαστῶνταν, Σωκράτη μεθύουσα οὐδείς τῶποτε ἐώρακεν ἀνθρώπων. τούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ αὐτίκα ὁ ἔλεγχος ἔσεθαι. πρὸς δὲ αὖ τὰς τοῦ χειμῶνος καρτερήσεις—δεινοὶ γὰρ αὐτὸθε χειμῶνες—θαυμάσει εἰργάζετο τὰ τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ ποτὲ ὄντος Β πάγου οὖν δεινοτάτου, καὶ πάντων ἡ οὐκ ἐξιότων ἐνδοθεν ἡ εἰ τις εξίοι ημιφεισμένοι τε θαυμαστα δὴ ὅσα καὶ ὑποδεδεμένοι καὶ ἐνειλιγμένοι τοὺς πόδας εἰς πίλους καὶ ἄρνακίδας, οὔτος δ' ἐν


220 Α. οία δή κτλ. Sc. φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, or the like; cp. Rep. 467Β οία δῇ εἰ πολέμω φιλεῖ (sc. γίγνεσθαι); Euthyd. 272Δ. οὐδὲν ἦσαν...πρὸς κτλ. Cp. 195Δ οία ήν...πρὸς κτλ., and 216Ε οὐδὲν εἶναι.

εὐωχλας. Cp. Law. 666Β ἐν τοῖς συσσίτιοις εὐωχλέετα: 203Β ψυρα. τὰ τ' ἄλλα κτλ. The construction is loose; we may either explain it (with Stallb.) as a brachylogy for τά τ' ἄλλα καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο οτι...ἐκράτει, or say (with Wolf) that ἐκράτει is carelessly put for κράτων. Hug construes πίνειν closely with ἀναγκασθεῖν, marking οὐκ ἔθελαν as a parenthesis; but it is simpler to regard πίνειν as a kind of accus. of respect ("at drinking") with ἐκράτει. For the ἀνάγκη of the "symposiarch's" ruling cp. 176Α, 223Β.

ἐώρακεν. The plpf. ἐώρακε (in spite of Rettig, etc.) is inconsistent with πάντοτε. For Socr.'s invincibility in carousals, see 176C, 214Α, 223C; and cp. Theogn. 491 ἀνίκητος δὲ τοῖς οὔτοις | δὲ πολλάς πίνουν μὴ τι μάταιον ἔρει.

αὐτίκα...ἐσεθαί. Ἰ.ε. we shall have proof, before the night is over, of Socr.'s καρτερεία in this regard.


θαυμάσια εἰργάζετο. An echo of 182Ε and 213Δ.


... ιμάτιον μεν τοιούτων ολοντερ καὶ πρότερον εἰώθει φορείν, ἀνυπόδητος δὲ διὰ τῶν κρυστάλλου ῥάων ἐπορευότα τη ὦι ἀλλοι ύποδεδεμένου. οἱ δὲ στρατιώται ὑπέβλητον αὐτῶν ὡς καταφρονοῦντα σφῶν.

XXXVI. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἂν γαρ ταῦτα.

οἶον δ' αὖ τὸδ' ἐρεῖξαι καὶ ἐτήλη καρτέρος ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖ ποτὲ ἐπὶ στρατιάς, ἄξιον ἀκούσαι. ξυνυνήσας γὰρ αὐτόθι, ἐσθενὲ τι εἰστήκης σκοπῶν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ οὐ προνάχρει αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἄνει ἄλλα εἰστήκης ζητῶν. καὶ ἢδη ἦν μεσημβρία, καὶ ἀνθρώποι ὑσθάνοντο, καὶ θαυμάζοντες ἄλλοι άλλῳ ἔλεγον ὅτι Σωκράτης ἐξ ἐόθινοι φραντίζων τι ἐστήκη. τελευτώτες δὲ τινὲς τῶν Ἰώων,


ιμάτιον...φορεῖν. Cp. 230 a n.; Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 1. 2 καὶ Ἰώων ἡμιφεισας οὐ μόνον φαίλον ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ θέρους τε καὶ χειμῶνας, ἀνυπόδητος δὲ καὶ ἀχίτων διαστέλεις. For ἀνυπόδητος, see also 174 a, 203 d.

ὑπέβλητον. “Looked askance (suspiciously) at him,” i.e. “quippe quem ipsos despicere opinarentur” (Stallb.). Cp. Eryx. 396 ιποβλέψας...ἀστερ τα ὀδικούμενα: Κρίτο 53 ιποβλέψαται σὲ διαπροεῖ ἡγοῦμενοι τῶν νόμων.

220 C Καὶ ταῦτα...ταῦτα. For this formula of transition, dismissing the subject, cp. Laws 676 a.

οἶον δ' αὖ...ἀνήρ. From Hom. Od. iv. 242, with the slight alteration οἶον δ' αὖ for ἄλλ' οἶον: there it is spoken by Helen in describing Odysseus.

ξυνυνήσας. Rettig holds that the following section is an illustration of the “spekulative Begabung (φύσις 219 d) of Socr.; but it describes, primarily, another phase of his καρπηία. For S.'s habit of thought-immersion, cp. 174 ε ff., Goll. N. A. ii. 1; similarly, in Indian gymnosophists, Plin. H. N. vii. 22. The similar incident in 174 ε ff. is there construed by Agathon as a symptom of σοφία (see 175 c—d).

'Ἰώων. Rückert comments “Iones illo tempore sub Atheniensium ditione erant, unaque militabant”; but most recent editors suspect corruption after Mehler (ad Xen. Symp. p. 75) “Neque fuere eorum in ordinibus, neque Platonis haec sunt verba.” To Mehler's restoration, τῶν νεῶν, Rettig objects that “den Athenern gleichviel ob jung oder alt diese Weise des Sokrates kaum auffallend war, da man ihn genugsam kannte”; while in favour of his own conj. Παίδων, he cites Thuc. i. 59, 61, etc. But I agree with Usener (Rhein. Mus. lxxx. p. 372) that 'Ἰώων may well be genuine.

B. P.
D ἐπειδὴ ἑστῆρα ἦν, δεπηύσαντες—καὶ γὰρ θέρος τότε γ' ἦν—χαμεύνια ἐξενεγκάμενοι ἁμα μὲν ἐν τῷ φύσει καθήδουν, ἀμα δὲ ἐφύλαττον αὐτὸν εἰ καὶ τὴν νύκτα ἑστήκει. ὁ δὲ εἰστήκει μέχρι ἐως ἐγένετο καὶ ἥλιος ἀνέσχεν· ἐπειτα ὁχετ' ἀπίων προσευξάμενος τῷ ἥλιῳ.

Εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε ἐν ταῖς μάχαις· τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ δικαίων γε αὐτῷ ἀποδόναι· ὅτε γὰρ ἡ μάχη ἦν, ἔξ ἦς ἐμοὶ καὶ τάριστεία ἔδοσαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ, οὔδεις ἀλλος ἐμὲ ἔσωσεν ἀνθρώπων ἢ οὔτος, τετρω-Ε μένοι οὐκ ἔθελον ἀπολυπεῖν, ἄλλα συνδιέσωσε καὶ τὰ ὑπλα καὶ αὐτόν ἐμε. καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν, ὁ Σόκρατες, καὶ τότε ἐκέλευον σοὶ διδόναι τάριστεία τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, καὶ τούτῳ γέ μοι ούτε μέμψῃ

220 D προσευξάμενοι δἐ ἐν ταῖς· καὶ εν ταῖς Ο.-Ρ. οὐκ ἔθελον τετρώμενον Τ Ἔ Σωκρατῆν Ο.-Ρ.

220 D χαμεύνια. ταπεινα κλινίδα (Schol.); τά ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς στρωννυμένα (Tim.): cp. (Eros) χαμαιπτής, 203 δ: Ηιρποναξ ὑν ἐν σταθμῷ τε καὶ χαμεύνιος γυμνόν.

προσευξάμενος τῷ ἥλιῳ. Ἑσίοδος (Op. 339) prescribes prayer at sunrise and sunset; cp. Laws 887 ε, 906 δ; Soph. Ο. Κ. 477 ; Αρ. Πλ. 771 καὶ προσκυνῶ γε πρῶτα μὲν τὸν ἥλιον. The suggestion here may be that the Sun-god (Φαοδός, the revealer, “the light of the world”) brings mental illumination, and that Socr.'s εὐχή was in part a thanksgiving therefor. As a parallel to Socr., we may refer to “the devotion of Orpheus to Helios” as pointed out in Harrison Proleg. p. 462. Moreover, Socr. regarded Apollo as his special patron-god, see Apol. 39 D ff., Phaedo 85 B, Tim. 40 λ (Adam, R. T. G. pp. 325, 434 ff.); and the sun is the symbol of ideal Good, see Rep. 530 λ, Phileb. 28 η. For the content of a Socratic prayer, see Phaedr. 279 B—C; Xen. Mem. 1. 3. 2 ηὐχετα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀπλῶς τἀγαθὰ διδόναι. Of prayers to Helios we have exx. in Soph. Aj. 815 ff.; id. fr. 772 Ἡλίους οἰκτείρει με | ὑν σοφοί λέγουσι γεννηθῆνθεν θεων | καὶ πατέρα πάντων.

Εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε. Σα ἀκούσαί σοι ἢν, ὢν οἶκος; cp. 177 Β. Αλκιβ. here passes on to treat of the ἀνδρεία of Socr.

ἀποδόναι. “Tanquam dobitum persolvere” (Stallb.).

ἡ μάχη. “Illa pugna (omnibus nota)” (Rückert); i.e. the fight (in 432 B.C.) which preceded the blockade of Potidaea, cp. 219 Ε ν., Thuc. Ι. 66 ff., ii. 2.

ἔσωσεν. With this, and συνδιέσωσεν below, cp. Eros as σωτήρ ἄριστος, 197 Ε.

220 Ε οὐκ ἔθελον ἀπολυπεῖν. This passage echoes the language of Phaedrus in 179 Α: ἐγκαταλπείν γε τὰ παιδικά κτλ., and ὑπλα ἀποβαλλόν. To rescue a man’s arms was to save him from the disgrace attaching to ἀπλῶν ἀποβαλλή.

οὔτε μέμψῃ. Here for the fifth time Alcib. challenges Socr. to contradict him (cf. 219 Β): for μέμφομαι, cp. 213 Ε.
άδωμα. "Social standing": "erat genus Alemaonida...ipse Pericles in tutela erat." (Rückert). Cp. I. Ahe. 104 v; Thuc. ii. 37, v. 43, etc.

ἡ σαντόν. We should expect μᾶλλον ἡ αὖτα, but the accus. is put in order to balance ἐπει, "propter oppositionis gravitatem" (Stallb.). For the omission of μᾶλλον after words "denoting a wish or choice," see Madv. Gr. S. § 93 c.

221 Α. ἀπὸ Δήλου. For this famous battle in Boeotia (424 B.C.), when the Athenians under Hippocrates were routed by the Thebans under Pagondas, see Thuc. iv. 76 ff., Bury's Hist. Gr. pp. 442—3.


κάλλιον ἡθισάμην. "I got a finer view of": cp. Rep. 467 ή ἐπ' ἐπιτω... κάλλιστα τις θεάσυναι... καὶ ἀσφαλέστατα κτλ.

ἐν φόβῳ. Cp. 197 v.

ἐμφρων. "Cool," "collected"; cp. Ion 535 ἐπίτεσω ἐμφρῷν εἰ, ἡ ἐξω σαντον γίγνει; Laws 791 ἡ ἀντί μανικών... ἐξεις ἐμφρανας ἐχειν.

221 Β τὸ σὸν ὅς τοῦτο. An accus. absol., like τὸ λεγόμενον: "ut tuo illo utar" (Stallb.). Cp. Soph. 233 b, Euthyd. 284 c (with Schanz, nov. comm. pp. 76 f.). The ref. is to Ar. Nub. 362 ὅτι βρεθήθη τῇ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς καὶ τόφθαλμῳ παραβάλλεις. The Clouds was not produced until the year after the battle of Delium, viz. 423 B.C.

βρεθήμενος. "Stalking like a pelican" (Jowett): Schol. ad Nub. 362 βρεθήμενος ἀποστερῶν σαντόν ἐν τῷ σχήματι καὶ ταυρηδόν ὄρφη: καταπάζεις καὶ ἰσπεροπτικός βαδίζεις: cp. Schol. ad Pax 45, ad Lysist. 887. "Nimirum ductum est verbum a βρεθήθος, quod significat aven aquaticam, frequentor ad paludes commorantem altisque pedibus inciduntem" (Stallb.).

τόφθαλμῳ παραβάλλων. "H. e. torvo vultu oculos in obliquum vertens"
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

221 Β περισκοπῶν Ἀστ Ἐκκ. καὶ τῶν φίλους καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, δῆλος ἀν παντὶ καὶ πάνυ πόρρωθεν, ὅτι εἰ τις ἀφεται τοῦτον τὸν ἀνδρός, μᾶλα ἐρρομένως ἀμυνείται. διὸ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ἀπήκα εἰς καὶ ὦ; τος καὶ ὁ ἔταίροςι· σχεδὸν γάρ τὶ τῶν ὦ; διακειμένων ἐν τῷ ἔν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐδὲ ἀπτονται, ἀλλὰ τοὺς προτροπάδην φεύγοντας διώκουσι.

Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἄν τις καὶ ἄλλα Ἑχοὶ Σωκράτη ἐπανέσαι καὶ θαυμάσσαι· ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων τάχ’ ἄν τις καὶ περὶ ἄλλου τοιαῦτα εἰπον, τὸ δὲ μηδεὶν ἀνθρώπων ὄμοιον εἶναι, μῆτε τῶν παλαιῶν μῆτε τῶν νῦν ὑστων, τοῦτο ἄξιον παντὸς θαύματος. οἷος γὰρ Ἀχίλλεως ἐγένετο, ἀπεικόσει εἶναι τις καὶ Βρασίδαν καὶ

(Stallb.). Rettig objects that this rendering is inconsistent with ἄρμα φιλος, and explains by “oculis prope admotis intueri, also scharf ansehen,” cp. Phaedo 103 α, Rep. 531 α. Ast gives “oculus in aliud immutum habere intentos”: Reydners, τὸ θέλμα ἄνω καὶ κάτω κινεῖν: Jowett, “rolling his eyes.”

ἴρμα παρασκοπῶν. This verb is ἀπ. εἰρ. in Plato, and perhaps conveys a literary allusion: Rückert explains it to mean “oculis quasi comitari, observare, ut omnes motus lento oculorum motu notare videarv.”

δῆλος...πόρρωθεν. “Similiter Apollodorus, qui Socratis incessum imitatus est, τῶν οὖν...πόρρωθεν ἐκδηλοῖς κτλ.” (Hommel).

ὁ ἔταίρος. So Jahn, after Aristides t. π. p. 72: the more definite term is preferable, as Rettig argues against Teuffel. For confusion of the two words in the codd., cp. 183 c (crit. π.), and see Schanz, nov. comm. p. 59.

221 Β προτροπάδην. “In headlong rout”—an Epic (Ἰ. xvi. 304) word, ἀπ. εἰρ. in Plato. For the sense, cp. Tyrt. 11. 11—13 οἱ μὲν γὰρ τολμῶσι...παύσεσθαι θύνῃνοι κτλ.: Seneca, Ἐρ. 94 audentes fortuna iuvat (see Bergk, ad Simon. fr. 227): Ἰ. v. 531 f. αἰδομένων δ’ ἀνδρῶν πλέονς οὐδὲ ἡ πείθαι τει εὐθραυστεῖν | φεύγωνταν δ’ οὖρ’ δὴ κλέος δρυνται οὖτε τὸς ἀλήτη: id. x. 561 ff.

Πολλὰ...καὶ ἄλλα κτλ. Cp. 195 β, 201 δ. Hirschig’s θαυμάσαι gives us (as Rettig argues) “einen matten Gedanken.”

θαυμάσαι. “Of wonder” (the subjective feeling), cp. Phil. 36 ν, Laws 967 α: elsewhere in Plato θαυμά means “quod mirum est.”

οἷος γὰρ κτλ. For Achilles, see Ὥδ. iv. 267 ff.; and cp. 179 ε f.

Βρασίδαν. For this famous Spartan leader, who fell fighting at Amphipolis in 422 B.C., see Thuc. Π. 25, 85 ff., v. 6; Bury, Hist. Gr. pp. 445 ff.
Περικλῆς. See 215 ε. n., Gorg. 515 c ff., 519 λ.

Νέστορα καὶ Ἀντήνωρα. Comparable to Pericles on the ground of eloquence (cp. 215 ε, Pericles as ἀγάθος ῥήτωρ). For Nestor, see Hom. Il. 1. 247 ff.; for Antenor, Il. vii. 347 ff.; Hor. Ep. 1. 2. 9.

221 Δ τὴν ἀποτάμαν. “Originalität” (Wolf): see 215 λ. n.

αὐθωτοὶς μὲν κτλ. See 215 λ, β, 216 ε.

221 Ε παγγέλοιοι. Cp. 189 ε, 215 α.; the context shows that -γέλωι here is nearly equiv. to καταγέλαστοι. Of Socr., as of S. Paul, it was said that “his speech was contemptible.”

όνοματα καὶ ρήματα. See 198 π. n.

ἐξεθεν περαιμπέχονται. Cp. 216 β ἐξεθεν περαιβιβληται.

σταύρον [ἀν] τινά. Stallb. vainly argues in a long note “ἀν tenendum et per ellipsis verbi (i.e. οὔτα) explicandum esse.”

ὑδροτοῦ. Cp. 215 β, 175 ε. In δορᾶν, the satyr’s “hide,” there is an allusion, no doubt, to the flaying of Marsyas by Apollo.

κανθηλίους λέγει καὶ χαλκέας τινὰς καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ βυρσοδέφας, καὶ ἂν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν, ὥστε ἀπειρὸς καὶ αὖθτος ἀνθρώπος πᾶς ἂν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσειν.

222 διαγγελμένοις δὲ ἴδιον αὖ τις καὶ ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος πρῶτον μὲν νοῦν ἐχοντας ἐνδον μόνους εὑρίσκει τῶν λόγων, ἑπείτα θεωτάτους καὶ πλείοτ' ἀγαλματ' ἀρτές ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐχοντας καὶ ἐπὶ πλείαστον τείνοντας, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὅσον προσηκεὶ σκοπεῖν τῷ μέλλοντι καλὸ κάγαθω ἔσεσθαι.

Ταῦτ' εἴτεν, ὃ ἄνδρες, ἡ ἑγὼ Σωκράτης ἐπαινῶ· καὶ αὖ ἀ μέμφομαι συμμέλειας ὑμῖν εἰπὼν ἃ με ὑβρισθεῖ, καὶ μέντοι οὐκ ἔμε ἐν μόνον ταῦτα πεποίηκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Χαρμίδην τὸν Γλαύκωνος καὶ Ἐυθύδημον τὸν Διοκλέειος καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ πολλοῦς, οὗς οὖν ἔξαπατὼν ὡς ἑραστής παιδικὰ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς καθίσταται ἀντι


222 Α ἴδιον αὖ τις. "ἄν cum participio cohaeret hoc sensu, εὖ τις θῇ... si quis forte viderit" (Rückert); Stallb., too, defends ἄν, citing Rep. 589 Β, Phaedo 61 ο, Euthyd. 287 ο; the objection of Rückert and Rettig, that αὐτὸς ought to stand after διαγγελμένος rather than after ἴδιον, is not fatal.

μόνους...τῶν λόγων. For the contrast implied, cp. Homer's ὁδὸς πέπνυται, ταὶ δὲ σκιαί δισσοσυν (Meno 100 Α). A similar ascription of life to λόγοι is to be found in Phaedr. 276 Α.

θεωτάτους κτλ. Οp. 216 Ν—Ε. The whole of this account of Socrates' λόγοι is virtually an encomium of his σοφία.

tείνοντας...ἐπὶ πᾶν. Οp. 188 Β ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει: Rep. 581 Β. For echoes of phrases in the previous speeches here, and throughout Alcib.'s speech, see Introd. § vi (3).

ἄ μέμφομαι κτλ. "Verba ita connectenda sunt: καὶ συμμέλειας αὖ ἄ μέμφομαι εἰπὼν ὑμῖν ἃ με ὑβρισθεῖ" (Stallb.). Stephens erroneously put a comma, Wolf a full stop, after αὖ μέμφομαι. Rückert, agreeing with Stallb., put a comma after συμμέλειας, and Hommel added another after αὖ. Jowett's transl.,—"I have added my blame of him for his ill-treatment of me"—seems to imply a different view of the construction. The points alluded to are those mentioned in 217 Β ff., 219 Σ.

222 Β Χαρμίδην. For Charmides, Plato's arunculus, see Charm. 154, 157; Xen. Mem. iii. 7, Symp. iii. 9 etc.

Εὐθύδημον. This Euthydemus, son of Diocles (see Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 40), is not to be confounded with his namesake the sophist, who appears in the dialogue Euthyd.

παιδικὰ...ἄντ' ἱραστοῦ. "The object rather than the subject of love." This may fairly be construed, with Rettig, as an indication that Socr., the
embodiment of the ideal κάλλος, is exalted above Eros (cp. 201 A): contrast 180 B θειότερον ἐραστής παιδικόν. For the reversal of the rôles of Alc. and Socr., cp. I. Alc. 135 ὁ κυνδυνεύσαμεν μεταβαλεῖν τὸ σχῆμα, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὲν σὸν ἔγω, τὸ δὲ τοῦμον. οὐ γὰρ ἔστεν ὅπως οὐ παιδαγωγήσω σε κτλ. Cp. also Xen. Symp. viii. 3; and see Introdc. § vi. 3.


222 C παρηκτά. "Naivetät" (Wolf); see A.'s excuses for it in 217 ε.

Νήπιοι μοι δοκεῖς. Echoing the phrase previously used by Alcib. (δοκεῖ ὁ γὰρ μοι νήπιο 213 ε), Socr. jocously derides his repeated plea of intoxication 212 ε, 214 c, etc.), saying in effect: "It's seber you are, not drunk; otherwise you could never have exagotigated so deep a scheme."

κομψός. Of a "pretty" trick; cp. Theouet. 202 δ, Soph. 236 δ.

κύκλος περιβαλλόμενος. See Ast ad Phaedr. 272 δ "imago desumta est ab amictu, quem rhetores, priusquam perorarent, componere solebant: V. Quintil. xi. 3. 116": Cic. de or. iii. 39. 138 se circumvestit dictis. For κύκλος cp. Ar. Rht. i. 9. 33 (with Cope's note), iii. 14. 10, and Virgil's "per ambages" (G. ii. 45).

ἐπὶ τελευτής. I.e. as if it were an after-thought only: cp. 198 B, Phaedr. 267 δ.
D ἐνεκα εἰρηκὼς, τοῦ ἐμὲ καὶ Ἀγάθωνα διαβάλλειν, οἵμενος δεῖν ἐμὲ μὲν σοῦ ἑρᾶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἄλλου, Ἀγάθωνα δὲ ὕπτο σοῦ ἐράσθαι καὶ μηδ' υφ' ἐνὸς ἄλλου. ἀλλ' οὖν ἔλαβες, ἀλλὰ τὸ σατυρικὸν σοὺ δράμα τούτο καὶ σιλήμεικών κατάδηλον ἐγένετο. ἀλλ', ὥ φιλε Ἀγάθων, μηδέν πλέον αὐτῷ γένηται, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζου ὅπως ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μηδεὶς διαβάλει. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα ἐπείν, Καὶ μήν, Ε ὁ Σωκράτης, κωνδυνεύεις ἀληθή λέγειν. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ καὶ ὅς κατεκλίνη ἐν μέσῳ ἔμου τε καὶ σοῦ, ἵνα χωρίς ἡμᾶς διαλαβῇ. οὖν οὖν πλέον αὐτῷ ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ παρὰ σὲ ἑλθὼν κατακλινή- σομαι. Πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, δεύορ ὑποκάτω ἐμοῦ κατά-

222 D διαβάλει Hirschig Cobet Sz. Bt.: διαβάλει O.-P.: διαβάλη BTW

222 D ημὶ...διαβάλειν. "To set us at variance": cp. 222 d, Rep. 498 c. οἴσμενος δεῖν κτλ. I.e. thinking that you must at once monopolise Socr. as your ἔραστής and Agathon as your πιαδίκη. For δείν, cp. 222 b. ἀλλ' οὖν ἔλαβες κτλ. For the conversational carelessness of the repeated ἀλλ', cp. 175 b (four times).

τὸ σατυρικὸν σοὺ δράμα κτλ. A playful allusion to the εἰκώνες employed by Alcib. in his encomium (see 215 b). For "satyr-drama" see Smith, D. A. p. 860 b: "The satyr-drama was so-called because the Chorus consisted of satyrs attendant on Dionysus...it was aptly described as παίζοντα τραγῳδία": Jevons, Hist. Gk. Lit. p. 186.

μηδὲν πλέον κτλ. An echo of the language of Alcib. in 217 c.

222 Ε χωρίς διαλαβῇ. "Dictum hoc eleganter cum amphibolia quadam, ut ot de spatio possit cogitari et de animorum disjunctione" (Stallb.): cp. Phil. 55 d.

ὑποκάτω ἐμοὶ. The original order of the places on this (ἐσχάτη) κλίνη was (1) Agathon, Socrates (see 175 c—d): then Alcibiades on his entrance had seated himself in the middle (213 b ad init.), thus making the order (2) Agathon, Alcib., Socr.: now Socrates invites Agathon to shift his position so as to change the order to (3) Alcib., Socr., Agathon: presently, in the sentence following, Alcibiades suggests that, instead of this, Agathon should take the middle place (ἐν μέσῳ ἡμῶν), which would result in the order (4) Alcib., Agathon, Socrates. But the adoption of this last order is, as Socr. hastens to point out, impossible, inasmuch as it would cause serious dislocation in the series of λόγων which are bound to proceed in order from left to right (see 214 c), each speaker taking for his theme his next neighbour on the right. If the order (4) were adopted, it would be the duty of the next speaker, Agathon, to eulogize Socrates, a task already performed by Alcib. himself; whereas by adopting the order (3), the next speech would fall to Socr., and he would have for his theme Agathon, an arrangement unobjectionable in itself and well-pleasing to Socr. (πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ αὐτῶν ἐγκωμίσαι, 223 α) as well as to Agathon (ἰοῦ ἤν κτλ., 223 θ).
κλίνου. *Ω Zeus, εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, οἶα αὖ πᾶσχω ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. οἴεται μου δεῖν πανταχὺ περεῖναι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τι ᾠλο, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐν μέσῳ ἡμῶν ἐὰν Ἀγάθωνα κατακείσται. Ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. οὔ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἐπηνέσας, δεῖ δ' ἐμὲ αὖ τὸν ἐπὶ δεξί' ἐπαινεῖν. ἐδ' οὖν ὑπὸ σοι κατακλινῇ Ἀγάθων—οὐ δὴ που ἐμὲ πάλιν ἐπαινεῖσται, πρὶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖσθαι; ἀλλ' ἐσαν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς τῷ 223 μειρακιί ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐπαινεῖσθαι καὶ γὰρ πάνω ἐπιθυμῶ αὐτὸν ἐγκωμίσαι. 'Ἰοῦ λοῦ, φανά τὸν Ἀγάθωνα, Ἀλκιβιάδη, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτως ἂν ἐνβάδε μείναιμι, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον μεταναστήσομαι, ἵνα ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἐπαινεθῶ. Ταῦτα ἐκεῖνα, φάναι τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, τὰ εἰσθότα: Σωκράτους παράντος τῶν καλῶν μεταλαβεῖν ἀδύνατον ἄλλω, καὶ νῦν ὡς εὐπόρως καὶ πιθανὸν λόγον ἦρεν, ὥστε παρ' ἐαυτῷ τούτῳ κατακείσται.


οĩα αὖ πᾶσχω. "How I am fooled" (Jowett). This echoes 215 δ οὐ δὴ τῆς πανᾶθα κτλ.: cp. 184 δ κακῶς πᾶσχων (sc. ὁ ἐρώμενος).

ὑπὸ σολ. ὦ ὑπὸ τῶν (οὐ ὑποκάτω τῶν) is equiv. to ὦ ἐπὶ δεξία (cp. 175 ο. ο.).

οὐ δὴ ποὺ κτλ. If we retain the ms. reading, this clause is best printed as interrogative (so Bt. and Lehrs)—taking the place of a regular apodosis, such as δεῖσθαι αὐτόν ἐμὲ πᾶλιν ἐπαινεῖν. Against Badh.,—who wrote "monstru vero simile est, πρὶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖθαι,"—Rettig attempts to defend the text thus: "Statt der Worte: 'er wird eher wollen von mir gelobt werden, als mich loben,' setze man: es wird nicht verlangt werden können, dass er mich lobe, bevor ich vielmehr ihn gelobt habe"; καὶ ὦ δῆσου ἐπαινεῖσαι is equiv. to οὐ δῆσου ἐπαινεῖν εὐθεῖα. This, however, is awkward; and some corruption must, I believe, be assumed: if so, the changes I have proposed seem the most plausible.

223 Α ιοῦ ιοῦ. For a distinction between ιοῦ, as a cry of joy, and ιοῦ, of pain, see Schol. on Ar. Nub. 1170. Here it denotes jubilation, not commiseration as Hommel suggests ("Wehe, weho, armer Alkibiades" etc.).


eὐπόρῳς. This echoes phrases in the description of Eros, son of Πόρος, see 203 δ (πόρόμος), 203 ε (εὐπορήσῃ), 204 δ (πατρός...εὐπόρου). Similarly πιθανὸν suggests the plausible tongue of the γῆς and σοφίστης of 203 δ.

πιθανὸν λόγον ἦρεν. For this "inventiveness of plausible argument" as belonging to the art of the sophistical rhetor, cp. Gorg. 457 Α ff., Phaedr. 269 δ.
XXXIX. Τὸν μὲν ὦν Ἀγάθωνα ὅς κατακεισμένον παρὰ τῷ 
Σωκράτει ἀνίστασθαι· ἐξαίφνης δὲ κωμαστὰς ἥκειν παμπόλλοις 
ἐπὶ τὰς όθρας, καὶ ἐπιτυχόντας ἀνεφμέναις ἐξίόντως τινὸς εἰς τὸ 
ἀντικρυς πορεύεσθαι παρὰ σφάς καὶ κατακλίνεσθαι, καὶ θορύβου 
μεστὰ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν κόσμῳ οἶδεν, ἀναγκάζεσθαι 
πείνειν παμπόλλοιν οἶνον. τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἔρυξίμαχον καὶ τὸν Φαίδρον 
καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἠφη ὁ Ἀριστόδημος οἶχεσθαι ἀπιόντας, ἐδὲ 
τὴν πολύν λαβεῖν, καὶ καταδραθεὶν πάνυ πολύ, ἄτε μακρὰν τῶν νυκτῶν 
οὐσῶν, ἐξεγράφη δὲ πρὸς ἡμέραν ἤδη ἀλεκτρύνων ἄδοντων, 
ἐξεγρόμενος δὲ ἰδεῖν τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους καθεύδουτας καὶ ὀλχομένους, 
Ἀγάθωνα δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνη καὶ Σωκράτη ἔτι μόνους ἐγγραφεῖν 
καὶ πείνειν ἐκ φίλης μεγάλης ἐπὶ δεξιά. τὸν οὖν Σωκράτην αὐτὸς

223 B ἐξαίφνης δὲ κτλ. Cp. the "sudden" tumultuous entrance of 
Alcibiades (212 ο καὶ ἐξαίφνης κτλ.). The incursion here is devised in order 
to save the situation. For the sake of artistic effect, the series of λόγωι 
must now stop: the climax having been reached in the encomium of Socr. 
by Alcib., to add a eulogy of any lesser personage would be bathos. 

ἐξίόντως τινὸς κτλ. Hommel comments: "imaginem proponit comissorium 
contra nitente eo, qui iam exiturus erat, aditum vi expugnantium." But, as 
Rettig remarks, there is no hint in the text of ἀυτός or of ἄντικρυς. The words 
ἐξίόντως τινὸς are merely put in to explain how it is that they found 
the doors open. ἐς τὸ ἀντίκρυς is connected by Hommel and Stallb., with ἐξίόντως, 
but by Rückert, Ast and Stallb., with πορεύεσθαι: the former view is 
preferable.

*Ερυξίμαχον. Eryx. and Phaedrus are represented throughout in "hunting 
in couples"; and it is characteristic of the former, as an authority on health, 
and of the latter, as a valetudinarian, that they should be the first to escape 
from the scene of ἀθρόμασι and παμπόλλοις οἶνοι: cp. 176 B ff., 214 A ff.

223 C μακρὰν τῶν νυκτῶν. This indication of date would suit either the 
Lenaea in January or the Great Dionysia in March, though rather favouring 
the former (cp. Introdt. § VIII a).

ἀλεκτρύνων ἄδοντων. Cp. Thesm. 164 ὁ ἀλεκτρύνων ἀγνοοὺς δίκτυ...ἀδειον. 
The hour of cock-crow was, theoretically, the 3rd watch (12—3 a.m.): cp. Ev. 
Ma. xiii. 35. Jowett's "he was awakened by a crowing of cocks" misses ἤδη, 
which goes with ἄδοντων.

καὶ ὀλχομένους. We should expect ἤ instead of ὀ: but (as Rückert 
oberves) οῖ μὲν ἄλλοι fall into two subdivisions,—those absent in spirit 
(καθεύδου), and those absent in body (ἐξάφνης).

Ἐγρηγορεῖν κτλ. Cp. Athen. v. 192 ὁ Σωκράτης...ἐγγρηγορε...καὶ πῖνει ἐξ 
ἀργυροῦ φρέατος· καλῶς γὰρ ταύτα μεγάλα ποθήμα ποτήρια αὐτῶς ὅνως ὄνομασε κτλ.
223 D και κομφωδοποιόν Vind. 21, vulg. Sz. Bt.: κομφωδοποιόν BTW O.-P.

τα μὲν ἀλλα κτλ. This is artistic selection disguised under the cloak of imperfect recollection, cp. 178 Α, 180 c.

223 D τὸ μέντοι κεφάλαιον. "The gist of it was...": cp. 205 δ ad init. τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄνδρος κτλ. Cp. Ion 534 β τέχνη ποιοῦντες. Here both τέχνη and ἐπίστασθαι are emphatic, with no distinction between them implied. The point of Socrates' argument is that the scientific poet must be master of the art of poetry in its universal, generic aspect, and therefore of both its included species, tragedy and comedy. This thought, if developed, might be shown to mean that full knowledge both of λόγοι and of φύσις, and of the effects of the one on the other, is requisite to form a master-poet. Which is equivalent to saying that, just as the ideal State requires the philosopher-king, so ideal Art is impossible without the φιλόσοφος-ποιητής. The thesis here maintained by Socrates finds in the supreme instance of Shakespeare both illustration and confirmation: "The Merry Wives" came from the same hand as "Othello" and "Lear."

The statement in Schol. ad Ar. Ran. 214 and Philostr. (vit. soph. 1 ν, p. 439) that Agathon wrote comedies as well as tragedies is probably due to a blunder: see Bentley, opusc. phil. p. 613.

οὐ σφόδρα ἐπομένους. "Erant enim vino languidi. Ad ἐπομένους intelligenti potest τοὺς λεγομένους Euthyphr. p. 12 Α οὐχ ἐπορεύοιτο τοὺς λεγομένους" (Stallb.)


<ξ>. I.e. Aristodenus, the narrator: for his practice (εἰσθεί) of dogging the footsteps of the Master, cp. 173 Β, 174 Β (ἐπού).

Δίκειον. This was a gymnasion, sacred to Apollo Lyceus, situated in the eastern suburbs of Athens, though the exact site—whether s.e. or n. of the
hydrate διατρίβειν, καὶ οὕτω διατρίψαντα εἰς ἑσπέραν οἶκοι ἀναπαύεσθαι.

Cynosarges—is uncertain. The Lyceum is mentioned also in the beginning of the Lysis and of the Euthyphro; cp. Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 10, Paus. 1. 19. 4. “Ibi Socr. versabatur propterea quod sophistae in eo scholas habebant, quorum inscitiam solebat convincere, et quod plurimos illic adolescentes nanciscabantur, quibus cum sermones instituere posset” (Stallb.).
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