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THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE

WITH A COMMENTARY

BY THE LATE

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ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ
ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ

Β.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δήλον ἄρα ὅτι ὁ Ὄρασιμαχὸς τε καὶ διὰ ἄλλου σπουδή τέχνην ῥητορικῆν διδό, πρῶτον πάση ἀκρυβεῖα γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσῃ ψυχήν ἰδεῖν, πότερον ἐν καὶ δμοιον πέφυκεν ἡ κατὰ σῶματος μορφήν πολυειδῆς. τοῦτο γάρ φαμεν φύσιν εἶναι δεικνύασι. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δὲ γε, ὅτι τί ποιεῖν ἢ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν. ΦΑΙ. Τί μή; ΣΩ. Τρίτον δὲ δὴ διαταξάμενος τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη καὶ τὰ τοῦτον παθήματα, διέσιϊ τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων ἐκαστον ἐκάστων, καὶ διδάσκων οἷς οὖσα ὑ鲋' οἶων λόγων δι' ἦν αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ μὲν πείθεται, ἢ δὲ ἄπειθεί. ΦΑΙ. Κάλλιστα γοῦν ἄν, ὡς εὖκ, ἔχοι οὕτως. ΣΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν, ὥ φίλε, ἀλλὰ ἐνδεικνύμενον ἢ λεγόμενον τέχνη ποτὲ λεχθήσεται ἢ γραφήσεται οὕτε τί ἄλλο οὕτε τοῦτο.—ΠΛΑΤΟ, ΡΗΑΣΙΛΙΟΣ, p. 271.
In the following chapter we have a very brief account of the second kind of rhetorical proof, viz. the ethical, the ἡθος εν τῷ λέγοντι. The treatment of it is cursory; and we are referred backwards to the analysis of virtue moral and intellectual in Book I c. 9¹, for further details of the topics from which are to be derived the enthymemes whereby the speech and the speaker may be made to assume the required character of φρόνησις, ἀρετή and εὐνοία; and forwards to the chapter on φιλία and μνήσις (II 4), in the treatise on the πάθη, where the indications of these affections are enumerated, which will enable the speaker to convey (always by his speech) the good intentions and friendly feeling by which he is affected towards his audience. As supplementary and auxiliary to the direct logical arguments this indirect ethical mode of persuasion is indispensable to the success of the speech. People are hardly likely to be convinced by a speaker who sets them against him.

On the order of the subjects of the work in general, and the connexion of the contents of this Chapter, I refer as before to the Introduction [p. 245].

§ 1. ἐκ τίνων...ταύτ' ἐστίν] This is a confusion of two constructions: the grammar requires either ἐκ τίνων εἴρηται (or something similar), or else ἐξ ὧν ταύτ' ἐστί. The ποίαι in the second clause shows that the first of the two was the one predominant in the writer's mind, which is carelessly varied at the end.

δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις] These two are in fact the same. The current popular opinions are converted by the artist into premisses of rhetorical enthymemes. They are united again, c. 18 § 2, comp. Τοπικ. Α 10, 104 a 12, εἰσὶ δὲ προτάσεις διαλεκτικά καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις ἀμοια...καὶ ὅσαι δόξαι κατὰ τέχνας εἰσὶ τῶν εὐρημένας. And c. 14, ἑπιτ. τὰς μὲν προτάσεις ἐκλεκτέω...καὶ ὅσαι δόξαι κατὰ τέχνας εἰσίν.

¹ Now the sources from which we must derive our arguments in

¹ The connexion of this chapter with the subject of the Rhetorical ἡθος is marked at the opening of the chapter itself: συμβέβηκαν γὰρ ἄμα περὶ τούτων λέγοντας κάκεως δηλοῦν ἐξ ὧν ποιοὶ τινες ὑποληφθησάμεθα κατὰ τὸ ἡθος, ἤπερ ἦν δευτέρα πίστις: ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἄλλον ἀξιόπιστον δυνηθῆσαμε δοξεῖν πρὸς ἀρετήν.

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exhorting and dissuading, in panegyrical and censure, in accusation and defence, and the sort of opinions and premisses that are serviceable for (rhetorical) proof in them, are these: for these are the materials and sources of our enthymemes, specially, so to say, in each kind of speeches'; i.e. using a special treatment according to the kind of speech on which we are engaged. If the text is right here, ὡς περὶ ἐκαστόν εἰπεῖν ἢ ἓν μή μόνον πρὸς τὸν δίκην κρίσεως ἐστίν τὸν λόγον ὥς ἐποιεῖν—Bekker retains it unaltered, and Spengel accepts it in his last edition, though he formerly proposed ἐπισμεν—this must be the translation of it. ὡς εἰπεῖν 'so to speak', (ὡς ἐποιεῖν, ὡς τῷ ποδὶ τεκμηριωθαί, Plat. Phaedr. 230 B, et sim.).

§ 2. The commencement of this section is repeated and dwelt upon at the beginning of c. 18, where, after the parenthetical account of the πάθη and the six special ἡθο, a break occurs, the subsequent contents of the work are enumerated in their order, and the logical part of Rhetoric resumed.

On the extension of the signification of κρίνειν, κρίσις, κριτῆς, to include decisions or judgments of all kinds, moral, political, (as in deciding upon a course of policy to be pursued), literary, (criticism, in matters of taste, works of art, written compositions, and such like), as well as the ordinary application of it to the judicial decisions of the judges in a court of law, compare I 1. 7, p. 10, and Introd. p. 137, note 1.

ἀποδεικτικὸς] 'demonstrative', improperly applied to rhetorical proof. See note on I 1. 11, p. 19.

τὸν κριτήν κατασκευάζειν] (or the audience in general) Quint. V 12. 9, probationes quas paθητικὰς vocant, ducitas ex affectibus. There is a sort of ἐνδύμα in the application of κατασκευάζειν τον ποιόν τινα, and again to τὸν κριτήν. In both cases it means 'to establish' or 'constitute', but is applied in two slightly different senses; in the first it is to make himself out to be, to establish a certain character in and by the speech, and in the other to establish a certain feeling or disposition in the minds of the judges.

1 In his treatise on the Rhetoric in Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 39, note, he translates the passage thus: wie man jedes genus der reden für sich behandeln soll: understanding ὡς εἰπεῖν, if I do not mistake him, in the sense of ὡς δὲ εἰπεῖν (?) 'according as we have to speak', which seems to me to be hardly allowable. ὡς εἰπεῖν can, I think, in conformity with ordinary Greek usage, have no other sense than that which I have attributed to it. See, for illustrations of ὡς thus used with an infinitive, Matth. Gr. Gr. § 545.
§ 3. τολο γάρ διαφέρει πρὸς πίστιν κ.τ.λ.] Comp. I 2. 4, 5. Quint. IV 5. 6, interim refugienda non modo distinctio quaestionum est, sed omnino tractatio: affectibus perturbationis et ab intentione auserendus auditor. Non enim solum oratoris est docere, sed plus eloquentia circa movendum valet. This goes beyond Aristotle: Quintilian however is speaking rather of the πάθος, of the τῶν κρίτων ποιῶν τία κατασκευάζειν, than of the ἡθος. He sets the πάθος above the ἡθος in point of its importance and value to the orator as a means of persuasion; Aristotle, admitting this in forensic speaking, takes the opposite view in the deliberative kind; § 4. But compare I 2, 4, where a decided preference for the ἡθος is expressed.

For the assumption of a certain character by the speaker himself, and the supposition (of the audience) that he is disposed in a particular way (has certain feelings towards themselves), makes a great difference in respect of the persuasive effect of the speech, first and foremost in counselling or deliberation, and next in legal proceedings (ἡθος); and besides this, whether they (the audience) are themselves in some particular disposition (feeling, frame of mind) (towards him) (πάθος).


§ 4. το δὲ διακεισθαί πως τῶν ἄκροατῶν εἰς τὰς δίκας] Comp. I 2, 4, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄκροατῶν...γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδιδομέν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες...πρὸς δὲ καὶ μόνον πειρᾶσθαι φαμέν πραγματεύεσθαι τοὺς νῦν τεχνολογοῦντας, who wrote only for the use of pleaders in the courts of justice, 1 I. 9, 10.

οὐ γὰρ ταύτα φαινεται φιλοσοφικα καὶ μισοσοφικ, κ.τ.λ.] Cic. de Orat. II 42. 178, nihil est enim in dicendo maius quam ut faeuent oratori is qui audiet, utique ipse sic movetur ut impetui quodam animi et perturbatione magis quam indicio aut consilio regatur. Plura enim multo homines indicat odio aut amore aut cupiditate aut iracundia aut dolore aut laetitia aut spe

1 The reason of this is, that when a man has to recommend or dissuade a certain course of action, his character and the opinion entertained of it must give great weight to his advice; and it is not in the law-court, but in public life, in quelling the seditious riot, that Virgil’s vir pidenta gravis ac meritis (in the famous simile, Aen. I. 149) exhibits his ‘authority’: whereas in a court of justice, where facts are in question, the speaker’s assumed character has either no weight at all, or in a far less degree.
aut timore aut errore aut aliqua permotione mentis quam veritate aut praescripto aut iuris norma aliqua aut iudicii formula aut legibus. And on this importance of εὐνοια, that is, the conciliation of it in the audience by making your own good will apparent in the speech, compare Demosth. de Cor. § 277, p. 318, κάκεινον δὲ εὖ αὖθ', ὅτι τὴν ἐμὴν δεινότητα—ἐστω γὰρ καίτω έγώγ', ὅρο τῆς τῶν λεγόμενων δυνάμεως τοῦ ἀκούοντας τὸ πλείουν μέρος κυρίου ὕπνας; ὡς γὰρ ἀν ὑπεσὶ ἀποδέξητε καὶ πρὸς ἑκατὸν ἐξήρε εὐνοιας, οὔτως ὅ λέγειν ἐδοξε φρονεῖν κ.τ.λ. 

τὸ παράπαν ἑτέρα...τὸ μέγεθος ἑτέρα] (‘either altogether different’, different in kind; ‘or in magnitude and amount’, different in degree.) This clause (to τούναντιον) is explanatory of the effect of the πάθη upon the audience, (not of the ζῆσος,) as appears from the example chosen, φιλία and μῦσος being πάθη, II 4: and it belongs especially, though not exclusively—for in such cases as the public speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines it might be usefully, and in fact was, employed—to forensic practice; the result being in this case either complete acquittal from a charge (οὐκ ἀδικεῖν) or a lenient construction of it, and a mitigation of the penalty (ἡ μικρὰ ἀδικεῖν). The next (after τούναντιον) refers principally to the deliberative branch of Rhetoric, as is shewn by the future time—the time of the deliberative speaker is the future, I 3.2—τὸ ἐσόμενον, καὶ ἐνεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐσοθαί; and accordingly for the use of speakers in this branch the emotions appealed to must be different and adapted to a different purpose. The two which will be most serviceable to the public speaker are desire (ἐπιθυμία) and hope (ἐλπίς): those who are under the excitement of such feelings will be more likely to assent to the course of policy proposed, and so ensure the success of the speaker who recommends. It is singular however that neither of these is found in the list of πάθη which follows: ἐπιθυμία occurs amongst them in Eth. Nic. II 4; and hope may possibly be included under θάρσος, as the opposite of φόβος, in the analysis of τὸ θαρράλειον and θάρσος, Rhet. II 5.16, to the end. This is partially confirmed by II 5.16; after telling us that confidence is the opposite of fear, he adds ὅπως μετὰ φαντασίας ἡ ἐλπὶς τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἔγγιξ ἀντα, as if ‘the hope of near approaching safety’ were convertible with, or the ground of, confidence, and therefore a πάθος opposed to φόβος. In the same way εὐνοια, in the three ‘ethical’ virtues to be exhibited in the speech, is included in φιλία.

‘And to one who feels a desire for anything, or is in a sanguine frame of mind, the future result (announced by the speaker), if it be pleasant, appears to be both certain and good; whilst to any one who has no (such) feeling, or is in a bad humour, the contrary (is true, is the case)’. 

PHTORIKHΣ B Ι § 4.
The fern looks but ability implying corresponding audience character Thucyd. and other Politics depends; the will must be exact, and the authors, is must be represented as untruthful, to a statesman; 

§ 5. ἕστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετῆ καὶ εὖνοια] On Whately's comparison (Rhetoric, c. 2) of these three qualities as constituting the ethical character of the speech, with the character of Pericles, as drawn by himself, in Thuc. II 60, see Introd. p. 246, note i. The explanation of them, and the reason of their selection, are there given. φρόνησις is the intellectual virtue of 'practical wisdom', essential above all to a statesman; ἀρετῆ is moral virtue, of character and conduct; εὖνοια is required in the speaker himself (or rather in his speech) as part of the ἔθος, and in the audience as a πάθος. In the Politics VIII (v) 9, init. the correspondence is exact, and the three same qualities or virtues are selected as the special qualifications of the statesman: τριὰ δὲ τινα χρὴ ἐχειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀρξεῖν τὰς κυρίας ἀρχὰς, πρῶτον μὲν φιλίαν πρὸς τὴν καθεστῶσαν πολιτείαν (this is something rather different from the εὖνοια of the Rhetoric: but the ῥήσεως of Rhetoric and of Politics is different), ἑπαύεται δυνάμειν μεγιστὴν τῶν ἐργῶν τῆς ἀρχῆς (this is 'ability', corresponding to φρόνησις in Rhet. and the combination of knowledge and eloquence in Thucyd.), τρίτον δὲ ἀρετῆ καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἐκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ τῷ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. It seems not unlikely that Arist. may have borrowed this from Thuc., altering however and perhaps improving the classification and the expression, and adapting it to his immediate purpose in the Politics and the Rhetoric.

διαψευδοταὶ 'the speakers' make mistakes, or false statements', whether intentionally or unintentionally; πεψευδοταὶ can bear either sense. In the Nic. Eth. where it occurs several times, VI 3, 1139 b 18, ib. c. 6, 1140 b 4, c. 13, 1144 a 35, IX 3, 1165 b 8, and in the ordinary usage of other authors, it appears to be always 'to be deceived', implying an unintentional error, accordingly here also the mistakes and false statements must be represented as unintentional, so far as the word is concerned; though the alternative διὰ μοιχηρίαν—the second case, when ἀρετῆ is lacking—shews that it is also possible to make them intentionally and with intent to deceive. The fact is that here again is a sort of ζεῦγμα, and διαψευδοταὶ (as interpreted by the ordinary usage of it) will only apply properly to the first of the three cases; in the other two it requires some modification. The concluding observation, διάστερ ἐνδείχεται...γινώσκοντας, 'it is possible to do this with one's eyes open', looks as if it was meant to supply this.
κούντα λέγουσιν, ἡ φρόνιμοι μὲν καὶ ἑπιεικεῖς εἰσὶν ἀλλ' οὐκ εὖνοι, διόπερ ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα συμβούλευέν γιγνώσκοντας. καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν. ἀνάγκη ἀρα τὸν ἄπαντα δοκοῦντα ταῦτ' ἔχειν εἶναι 7 τοῖς ἀκρομένοις πιστοῖ. οὔθεν μὲν τοῖνυν φρόνιμοι καὶ ἱπουδαίοι φανεῖν ἀν, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἄρετας διηρημένων Ληπτέων· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ κἂν ἔτερον τις κἂν ἐαυτὸν κατασκευάσειε τοιοῦτον· περὶ δὲ ἐννοίας 8 καὶ φιλίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον γόν· ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ πάθη δι' ὁσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρονσι πρὸς

§ 6. διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγουσιν] i.e. from corrupt motives do not state their real opinions. Whately's parallel from Thucydides, above referred to, though not precisely corresponding to the three virtues of the speech here described, is yet sufficiently close to serve as a commentary on this passage of Aristotle; and as pouring, in terse and vigorous language, the character of an upright and independent statesman, such as were rare at Athens, it is sufficiently striking in itself, to deserve quotation on its own account. καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιοῦτο ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε, says Pericles, ὃς οὐδενὸς οὐκαμα ἧσονον εἶναι γνώναι τε τὰ διόντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύται ταῦτα φιλοσόφας Aristotle's ἐννοια] τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείστων. (This illustrates the μοχθηρία, the malus animus, of the other, which consists in suppressing your convictions or making false statements from corrupt or interested motives.) δ' τε γὰρ γνώναι καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἵνα καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη· δ' τ' ἐχων ἀμφότερα, τῇ δὲ πάλιν δύσνους, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως τι οἰκεῖος φρίζοι πρόσοντος δὲ καὶ τοῦτε, χρήματι δὲ νικωμένου, τὰ ἐξίπαντα τοιοῦτον ἐνδὲ ἀν παλοῦτα, Thuc. II 60.


εκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] κατασκευάζει here again has the same double sense and application as before, § 2. It is to make oneself out, make to appear, in the speech; and to put others in such and such a frame of mind. Both of these can be done, he says, by the use of the same topics, namely those of I 9. The topics there applied to panegyric under the epideictic branch, can be here transferred to the representation of the speaker's own character in and by his speech.

§ 8. τὰ πάθη] Of the various senses and applications of πάθος, and also of its special signification in Aristotle's ethical system, an account is given in the Introduction, p. 133 seq.; together with a comparison of the two lists here and in the Nic. Ethics. These two it will be seen differ materially. I have further referred (p. 246, note I, on the summary of this chapter) to Mr Bain's work On the Emotions and the Will for a complete and scientific explanation of the actual facts of those which are also included in Aristotle's lists, either here or in the Nic. Eth., viz. anger, resentment, righteous indignation, terror and confidence or courage, love and hatred.
What is here said of them, that they are characterised, as parts of our moral nature, by being always attended by pleasure and pain—one or both, as anger—is found likewise in Eth. N. II 4, sub init. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργήν φόβον διάρος (so written here; more correctly διάρος, II 5. 16), φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μίσος πόθον ἐλεον, δόλος οἰς ἑπταὶ ἡδονῆς ή λυπῆς. In Eth. Eudem. II 2, 1220 β 12, it is said of them, λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἰδῶν ἐπιθυμίαν, (this is of course not intended for a complete list: αἰδῶν and ἐπιθυμία come from the Nic. Eth., the former from the end of Book IV., where it appears with νεόμεσις as an appendage to the list of virtues; it is found likewise in the Rhet. II 6, under the name αἰσχύνη. ἐπιθυμία is absent in the Rhetoric), δόλος οἰς ἑπταὶ ὡς ἑτὶ τὸ πολύ (this is a modification of Aristotle’s statement) ἡ αἰσθητικὴ (this also is an addition) ἡδονῆς ἡ λυπῆς καὶ αὐτά. In Magn. Mor. A 7, 8, there is a summary account, borrowed directly from Aristotle, of the three elementary divisions of man’s moral nature, πάθη δυνάμεις ἐξεῖς. Of the first we find, πάθη μὲν οὖν ἑκεῖν ὀργήν φόβος μίσος πόθον ἐλεον, τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἰς ἑκατοκολούθειν λυπῆς καὶ ἡδονῆς, 1186 a 12, which is afterwards thus modified, c. 8, 1186 a 34, τὰ δὲ πάθη ἑκεῖν λυπᾶται εἰσὶν ἡ ἡδονᾶς, ἡ οὖν ἑκεῖν λυπῆς ἡ ἡδονῆς. These πάθη proper are therefore distinguished from other πάθη, feelings or affections of like nature, such as the appetites, hunger and thirst (which are also attended by pleasure and pain), not by pleasure and pain in general, as seems to be implied in the above statements, but by the particular kinds of pleasures and pains that severally accompany them; bodily in the one case, mental and moral in the other. So that the appetites belong to the body or material, the ‘emotions’, as they are now called, to the mind and the moral, immaterial, part of man; and feeling (the general term) and emotion (the special term) are thus distinguished: all emotions are feelings, all feelings are not emotions.

μεταβαλλόντες διαφέρουσι (differ by change) ‘are brought over to a different state of mind or feeling’. πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις ‘in respect of their decisions’, of all kinds; but especially judicial decisions and those of national assemblies on questions of policy or expediency.

§ 9. For rhetorical purposes we must divide the examination of each πάθος into three parts; the nature of them, what the disposition is in one who feels the emotion; the ordinary objects, against whom the emotion is directed (as the ordinary objects of anger); and the ordinary conditions, the occasions and circumstances which give rise to them. Without the knowledge of all three in each case, it is impossible to excite in the mind of anyone the feeling or emotion required.
§ 1. Ἔστω δή ὁργῇ ὀρέξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαίνονται.

This definition of anger occurs likewise in the Topics, Θ 156 a 30, ἡ ὀργῇ ὀρέξις εἶναι τιμωρίας διὰ φανομένην ὀλγωρίαν, as an average specimen of a dialectical definition; whence no doubt it was imported into the Rhetoric. Another definition similar to this is again spoken of as popular and dialectical, and opposed to a true physical definition, de Anima 1, 403 a 29, διαφέρουσα δὲ ἀν ὀρίσαντο φυσικὰς τε καὶ διαλεκτικὰς ἑκάστων αὐτῶν, ὅποιον ὀργῇ τῇ ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀρέξιν ἀντιλυπῆσεως ἢ τι τουοῖτον, ὁ δὲ ἐξείς τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν ἀιματὸ καὶ θηρέον; the latter is the ‘appropriate’ form of definition. And Plutarch, de Virt. Mor. p. 442 b, speaks of ὀρέξις ἀντιλυπῆσεως in terms which seem to imply that Aristotle had himself employed as his own definition. This, says Seneca, de Ira, 13. 3, very nearly corresponded with his own, (euphēdias iniuiiae uliscendae 1 2. 4) ait enim (Arist.) iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi; which appears to be a translation of ὀρέξις ἀντιλυπῆσεως. A passage of the Eth. Nic. vii 7, 1149 a 30, will illustrate some points of the definition of the Rhetoric. ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτίτα...ὁμα τρός τῇ τιμωρίᾳ, ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἡ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι θρία ἡ ὀλγωρία ἐκάλλωσεν, ὁ δὲ ὀσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τουοῖτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπάνει ὃς εὐθὺς ἡ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, εἰνάν μονον εἰπῃ ὅτι ἄδυν ὁ λόγος ἡ ἡ αἰσθήσεις, ὁμά πρὸς τῇ ἀπόλασιν. Here two elements of anger are distinguished. And the pain lies in the struggle which the θυμὸς undergoes, whilst the pleasure is caused by the satisfaction of the ἐπιθυμία, the appetite or desire of satisfaction or compensation for the injury inflicted, which is the object of the τιμωρία. Victorius quotes the Stoic definition of anger, τιμωρίας ἐπιθυμία τοῦ δοκόντος ἡδίκηκενει οὗ προσηκόντως, which is derived probably from this of Aristotle.
μένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν

ἔρεξις as a general term denotes a class of ὑπερεξις, instinctive and impulsive faculties of the soul or immaterial part, intellectual as well as moral, the ultimate origin of all action in the human subject. Sir W. Hamilton, Lect. on Metaph. 1 p. 185, laments the want of any corresponding word in modern psychology; and proposes to supply it by the term "conative" faculties. The ὑπερεξις, so far as it is described at all, is noticed in de Anima II 3, sub init., and afterwards more at length in III 9 and 10; compare also Eth. N. vi 2. The first of these passages enumerates the ascending stages or forms of life which characterise and distinguish the ascending orders of plants and animals. The first, τὸ ὑπερεττικόν, the life or principle of growth and nutrition, is the lowest form, and is characteristic of plants, which have no other. The second stage in the development of life is τὸ ἀνθρητικόν, with which τὸ ὑπερεττικόν, the ultimate origin of motion in the living animal, is inseparably connected; (sensation implies impulse) both of them being instinctive and both constituting animal as distinguished from plant. But the lowest animals have no power of motion; consequently the next stage in the upward course is τὸ κυνητικὸν, local motion, or locomotion in space, κατὰ τόπον. The last, which is peculiar to humanity, is τὸ διανοητικόν, the intellectual element, divided into νοῦς and διάνοια. The ὑπερεττικόν is here divided, 414 b 2, into three classes of faculties, ἐπιθυμία (the appetites, or sensual desires), θυμὸς (the passions, anger, love, hatred, and all the more violent and impetuous emotions, the angry passions especially—the word is as old as Homer, a relic of antiquity, and as a psychological term very vague and indistinct), and lastly βούλησις, which seems here to include 'will' as well as 'wish'. The will is more directly implied, though never disengaged and distinctly expressed, in the πραϊτερεις, the moral faculty of deliberate purpose: this consists of an intellectual, and also of an impulsive element, the spontaneous origin of moral action which is the office of the intellectual part to direct aright; the πραϊτερεις accordingly is ὑπερεξις βουλευτική, Eth. N. vi 2, 1139 a 24, or again, ὑπερεττικός νοῦς ἢ ὑπερεξις διανοητική, ib. b 4. These two elements in combination, (the πραϊτερεις), are the ἀρχὴ πρᾶξεως, ib. a 32, of which the ὑπερεξις (and so de Anima III 9. 2, 3, ἐν δὲ τὸ κυνήν, τὸ ὑπερεττικὸν,) is the

1 This reference of ἐπιθυμία to the class of ὑπερεξις indicates, as Plutarch, de Virt. Mor. c. 3 (ap. Heitz, Verlor. Schrift. Arist. p. 171), has pointed out, a change in the Aristotelian psychology, from the Platonic tripartite division of the human nature, intellectual and moral, which he originally held—ὡς δηλοὶ ἐστὶν ἕξ ὤν ἔγραψεν, i.e. in the lost dialogue περὶ διακοινωνίας, according to Heitz: the θυμοειδεῖς and ἐπιθυμητικοὶ are actually distinguished, Topic. B 7, 113 a 36—b 3, and Δ 5, 125 a 8—13, where we have the three, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν, τὸ θυμοειδὲς, τὸ λογισμικὸν (in both passages τὸ θυμοειδές is assigned as the seat of ὑπήρχο), and the division is certainly implied in Polit. iv (vii) 7, 1327 b 36, seq., where the author is criticising the Republic to the views expressed in the de Anima, in which the Platonic division is criticised, condemned, and rejected. Plutarch, l. c., p. 442 b, after the statement above quoted, continues, ὡστὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν θυμοειδὲς τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν προσένεμεν, ὡς ἐπιθυμίαν τινὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὑπατα καὶ ὑπεξις ἀντιλυ-
πῇσεως.
original moving agent: and this, though not expressly so called, is in fact the will. In de Anima III cc. 9, 10, are repeated the statements of II 3, with the addition of further details. Of the three component elements of ὄρεξις, the second, θυμός, is omitted: and the five stages of life of the former passage still remaining five, the intellectual is now divided into two, τὸ νοητικόν, and τὸ βουλευτικόν (the speculative and practical reason), and the κινητικόν κατὰ τόπον has disappeared. How this division of the ῥυχή, soul or life, is to be reconciled with that of the Ethics II 4, into πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις, Aristotle has not told us, and no one I believe has yet discovered. Of the three sets of ὄρεξις above mentioned ὀργή must belong to the θυμός.

[μετὰ λύπης] all the πάθη being attended by pleasure or pain; or sometimes both, as ὀργή. Note on c. 1. 8.

ἥπαλωμενή and ἥπαλωμένη] are both emphatic; not merely ‘apparent’ and unreal, but ‘manifest, conspicuous, evident’. ἥπαλωμένη τιμωρία, ‘a punishment of which the effect can be perceived’, (comp. II 3. 16, and note; II 4. 31, αὐθεσθαί γὰρ κ.τ.λ.) and διὰ ἥπαλωμένην ὀλγορίαν, ‘due to a manifest slight’; a slight which is so manifest that it cannot escape observation; and therefore because it has been noticed by everybody, requires the more exemplary punishment in the way of compensation. It is because anger is an impulse towards this punishment or vengeance that can be seen, and accompanied with pain until this impulse is quieted by satisfaction, that we are told in I 11. 9, ‘that no one is angry with one who appears to be beyond the reach of his vengeance, or with those who are very far superior to him in power’.


ὀλγορίαν] ‘slight esteem or regard’, ‘slight’. The cause of anger is stated so nearly in the same terms in Rhet. ad Alex. 34 (35). 11, ὀργήν δὲ (ἐμποιησμοῖν). εἶναι ἐπιδεικνυόμενον παρὰ τὸ προσήκον ὀλγορίζουνος ἤ Ἠδοκυκλεώνους, ἢ τῶν φιλῶν ἐκεῖνων, ἢ αὐτοῦ ἢ ἢ διὰ κηδομένους τυγχάνονσιν αὐτοῖς, that one might almost suppose that the two explanations are derived from some common source, perhaps a definition of anger current in the earlier treatises on Rhetoric, Thrasymachus’ ἔλεοι (Rhet. III 1. 7, Plat. Phaedr. 267 c), and the like.

A valuable commentary on this explanation of the cause of anger, the coincidence between the two being manifestly accidental, is to be found in Prof. Bain’s work on The Emotions and the Will, p. 166, ch. ix. § 3, on the ‘irascible emotion’. “These two facts both pertain,” he says, “to the nature of true anger, the discomposure of mind from the circumstance of
another man's intention in working evil against us, and the cure of this
discomposure by the submission or suffering of the agent." I will only add
one remark upon this interesting subject; that when Aristotle assigns ἀλη-
γορία, the contempt and indifference to our feelings and sense of personal
dignity implied in the notion of 'slight', as the main cause of the emotion
of anger, he is thinking only of the angry passion as excited against a fellow
man. Yet we are angry with a dog that bites, or a cat that scratches us1,
and here there cannot in all cases be any sense of undeserved contempt
or indifference to provoke the angry feeling; though perhaps sometimes
it may be increased by such an act of aggression, if the animal happen to
be a pet or favourite, in which case we may extend (by analogy) human
feelings to the brute, comparing him unconsciously with a 'friend' who has
injured us, and forgetting the intellectual and moral differences of the
two, which aggravate the offence in the human subject. Seneca denies
the capacity of anger to all but man: de Ira, I 3.4, dicendum est feras
ira carere et omnia praeter hominem.

τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν ('him' i.e. αὐτὸν, 'himself') ἡ τῶν αὐτοῦ] This phrase,
which is unusually elliptical—even for Aristotle—must it seems be thus
filled up and explained. τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν means τῶν ἀδικηθέντων or simply
πραξεθεντων εἰς αὐτόν, 'offences or acts committed against oneself', and
ὁληγορίαν τῶν is, 'slight or contemptuous indifference of, i.e. shewn in,
evidenced by, offences &c.': in supplying the ellipse in the other part
of the phrase, ἡ τῶν αὐτοῦ, we are guided by a similar expression, c. 8 § 7,
ὑμβεβηκότα ἡ αὐτῷ (so the MSS here) ἡ τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἡ ἐπίτια γεννήθαι ἡ
αὐτῷ ἡ τῶν αὐτοῦ; in both of them the indef. pronoun is omitted, ἡ των
τῶν αὐτοῦ in c. 2.1, and τωι in the two other places.

τοῦ ὀληγορείν μὴ προσήκοντος, the last term of the definition, adds to
1 On the manner in which anger vents itself upon all sorts of objects indi-
criminately, see Plut. de cohibenda ira, p. 455 D, θυμῷ δ' ἀδικον αὐξόν οὐδ' ἀνέπτυ-
χείρον ἄλλ' ὠργίσμεθα καὶ πολεμοῖς καὶ φίλοις καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γονέσι, καὶ θεοῖς
η ∆Ιά, καὶ θρίως, καὶ ἀφίξοις σκέψει, which is further illustrated by some
examples.
2 This appears likewise in the Stoic definition quoted above. I believe it has
not hitherto been noticed that the four terms usually employed in Greek to express
the notion of duty or obligation may be distinguished as implying four different
sources of obligation, and represent appeals to four different principles by which
our actions are guided. The four are προσήκει, δει, χοι, πρέπει. The first, το
προσήκον, expresses a natural connexion or relationship, and hence a law of nature,
the prescriptions of φύσις; as οἱ προσήκοντες are our natural relations. This,
therefore, is the form of obligation that nature imposes upon us, or natural pro-
priety. The second, δει, is of course connected with δειν, 'to bind', and δεσμοι,
and denotes the 'binding nature of an ob-ligation', which is equally suggested by
the Lat. obligatio. το δειν is therefore the moral bond, the binding engagement,
by which we are bound to do what is right. The third, χοι, το χρείων, appeals to
the principle of utility or expediency, χρεσθαι, χρέλα, by which human conduct
is directed as a principle of action, and accordingly expresses the obligation of a
man's duty to himself, and the necessary regard for his own interest which the
law of self-preservation requires. Besides these, we have πρέπει, το πρέπον;
decorum, quod deeo, Cic. de Off. 1. 27, quod aptum est in omni vita; the befitting,
the offence at the slight which provokes anger the consciousness or feeling that the slight is something which is not our due: by a slight the sense of personal dignity is offended: we know that we do not deserve it, and are the more enraged. This is a necessary qualification—a συμβεβηκός καθ αυτό, and therefore added to the definition—because there may be cases in which an insult or injury arouses no angry feeling, when the person insulted is very far inferior in rank and condition to the offender or of a very abject and submissive temper, or if the power of the aggressor is so great and imposing, that the injured person is terrified and daunted instead of angry, II 3.10. So at least Aristotle: but I am more inclined to agree with Seneca on this point, who to a supposed objection to his definition, cupiditatis ulciscendi, replies thus, de Ira, I 3.2, Primum diximus cupiditatem esse poena: exigenda, non facultatem: concupiscunt autem homines et quae non possunt. Deinde nemo tam humilis est, qui poenam vel summi hominis sperare non possit: ad nocendum potentes sumus. And anger is apt to be blind and unreasonable. This is an answer to 1 11.9, already referred to.

The definition therefore of anger in full, is as follows: ‘an impulsive desire, accompanied by pain (and also pleasure, as is afterwards added), of vengeance (punishment of, and compensation for, an offence) visible or evident (in its result), due to a manifest (and unmistakeable) slight (consisting, or shewn) in (insults, indignities, wrongs) directed against ourselves, or (any) of our friends, when (we feel that) the slight is undeserved’; or literally, ‘is not naturally and properly belonging to us’, not our due, in consideration of our rank and importance or of our personal merits and qualifications.

Bacon’s Essay, Of Anger, has one point at least in common with Aristotle’s delineation of it. “The causes and motives of anger are chiefly three. First to be too sensible of hurt; for no man is angry that feels not himself hurt... The next is, the apprehension and construction of the injury offered to be, in the circumstances thereof, full of contempt: for contempt is that which puteth an edge upon anger, as much or more than the hurt itself.” “For raising and appeasing anger in another; it is done chiefly by choosing of times, when men are forwardest and worst disposed, to incense them. Again, by gathering all that you can find out to aggravate the contempt.”

§ 2. Anger is directed against the individual, not the genus or species (comp. c. 3.16): that is, it is excited by a definite, concrete, single individual, and by a distinct provocation, not by a mere mental abstraction, or a whole class of objects. This is one of the characteristics which distinguish it from μίσος or ἐχθρα; infra c. 4, καὶ ἡ μὲν ὀργή δει περὶ τὰ καθ’ the becoming; which represents the general notion of fitness or propriety: that principle of ὁρμωλα or κοσμιότης (and the κόσμος), of harmony and adaptation, which Dr Clarke selected as the basis of all morality, and styled ‘the fitness of things’. Our English words ought and duty, expressive of moral obligation in general, are both of them borrowed from the notion of ‘a debt,’ which is ‘owed’ in the one case, and ‘due’ from us in the other, to our neighbour; comp. ὁφέλεια, ὤφελον. “Owe no man any thing, but to love one another.”
τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν τινι, οἶνον Κλέωνι ἄλλ’ οὐκ ἀνθρώπω, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τιμά τι πεποίηκεν ἡ ἡμελ- λεν, καὶ πάση ὀργῇ ἔπεσθαί τινα ἱδονήν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι. ἦδυ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἴεσθαι τεῦξεσθαι ὑπὸ ἐφείται, οὐδέις δὲ τῶν φανομένων ἀδυ- νατῶν ἐφείται αὐτῶ, ὁ ὃ ὀργιζόμενος ἐφείται δυνατῶν αὐτῶ.

Again, it is provoked by any injury (or insult) committed or intended, he pēsoiēke tis he ἡμελλεν, either against ourselves, or any of our relations, friends, dependants, anyone in whose welfare we are interested.

‘Thirdly, (as we gather from the terms of the definition, ὄρεξες τιμω- ρίας) every angry emotion is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, that, namely (τὴν Bekk. τῆς A), which arises from the hope of vengeance upon, or of punishing (both are included in τιμωρία), (the person who has offended us).’ First of all revenge is in itself pleasant: καὶ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι ἦδυ’ οὖ γὰρ τὸ μὴ τυχάνειν λυπᾶτο τὸ τυχάνειν ἦδυ’ οἱ δ’ ὀργιζόμενοι λυποῦνται ἀνυπερβλήτως μὴ τιμωρούμενοι, ἐλπίζοντες δὲ χαίρουσιν. Comp. Eth. Nic. iv 11, 1126 a 2, ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἱδονὴν ἀνί τῆς λύπης ἐμπο- ούσα. τούτῳ δὲ μὴ γενομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν. ‘For it is pleasant to think that we shall attain to the object of our desire’, (the pleasure of hope or anticipation, i 11. 6, 7,) ‘and no one ever aims at what is evidently impossible for himself (to attain), and the angry man’s desire always aims at what he (believes to be) possible for himself’. He always supposes that he shall obtain the object of his desire, the punishment of the offender, and therefore even in his anger he feels pleasure in the prospective satisfaction. The first of the two following lines of Homer, II. Σ 109, has been already quoted in illustration of the same topic, the pleasure of anger in the prospect of revenge, i 11. 9. In the passage quoted above from Seneca, de Ira, 1 3. 2, what is here said, οὐδέις τῶν φανομένων ἀδυνατῶν ἐφείται αὐτῶ, may seem at first sight to be contradicted. The two statements are however different: Seneca says that a man may wish for what is quite beyond his reach; Aristotle says that he never aims at it, never uses any exertion to attain to that which he knows to be
...which is equally true. No one ever deliberates about things which are not under his own control. (For a list of such things see Eth. Nic. III 5, sub init.)

But this anticipation of the future is not the only source of the pleasure which we feel in an angry mood: 'it as accompanied by yet another pleasure, the present pleasure of dwelling in the mind on the prospective vengeance: it is the fancy that then arises (presents itself) that produces the pleasure in us, just like that of dreams'. On the pleasures of the fantasia, and the fantasia itself, see again 1 11. 6, 7, and the notes there.

Schrader refers to an excellent illustration of this pleasure of dwelling on the prospect of vengeance, in Terent. Adelph. III 2. 12, seq. beginning, me miserum, vix sum compos animi, ita ardeo iracundia. 1

§ 3. ἐπεὶ δὲ] has either no apodosis at all—which is highly probable in itself, and seems to be Bekker's view, who retains the full stop at ὑπολαμβάνωνεν: or else we may suppose with Vater that the apodosis is τρία δὲ ἐστὶν...; in which case δὲ may be added to the examples of the apodotic δὲ in note on I 1. 11, or omitted with MSS Q, Yb, Zb. According to Vater's view the connexion will be, that whereas δλιγωρία is an expression of contempt for somebody or something supposed to be worthless, whether it be so or not in reality, there are accordingly three kinds of δλιγωρία each expressing contempt, but in three different forms, or modes of manifestation. To the three kinds of δλιγωρία here distinguished ἀνα-

1 See also 'on the pleasure of irascible emotion,' Bain, Emotions and Will, c. ix. § 4. Mr Bain acknowledges, though he regards it as anomalous, the painful fact that pleasure at the sight of suffering inflicted, especially under circumstances of violent excitement when the passions are already inflamed, as at the sack of a captured town, is in reality a phenomenon of human nature. Other examples of this are the notoriously cruel habits of children in their treatment of animals, and in their ordinary sports; the pleasure found in gladiatorial combats, bull fights, bear baiting, cock and quail fights, and all the other cruel exhibitions which have amused the most civilized as well as barbarous spectators. He traces this to three sources, of which the principal is the love of power. I will venture to add three more possible elements of the emotion, which may contribute, without superseding the others, to the production of it. First, the sense of contrast between the suffering which we are witnessing in another and our own present immunity: this is the principle implied in Lucretius' Suave mari magni, and is illustrated in 1 11. 8, of this work. Secondly, it may be partly traced to curiosity—the pleasure of learning, as Aristotle calls it—and the stimulus of surprise or wonder which we feel at any exciting spectacle; another source of pleasure mentioned by Aristotle in the same chapter. And thirdly, perhaps, a distorted and perverted sympathy (this is an ordinary source of pleasure), which gives us an independent interest in the sufferings of any creature whose feelings, and consequent liability to suffering, we share—that is, of all animated beings; with inanimate objects there can be no sympathy.
περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαινόμενον· καὶ γὰρ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τάγαθα ἄξια οἰόμεθα σπουδῆς εἶναι, καὶ τὰ συντείνοντα πρὸς αὐτὰ· ὅσα δὲ μηδέν τι ἡ μικρόν, οὐδενὸς ἄξια υπολαμβάνομεν. τρία δ’ ἐστὶν εἰδὴ ὀλυγωρίας, καταφρόνησις τε καὶ ἐπηρεασμὸς καὶ ύβρις· ὁ τε γὰρ καταφρονῶν ὀλυγωρεῖ (ὅσα γὰρ οἴνονται μηδενὸς ἄξια, τούτων καταφρονοῦσιν, τῶν δὲ καταφρονον-σχυνία is added in c. 6 § 2. In Dem. de F. L. § 228 it follows ἀναιδεία as its ordinary companion (compare Shilleto’s note).

ἐνέργεια δοξήν] represents the opinion, hitherto dormant or latent, as roused into active exercise as a realised capacity, a δίνωμε become an ἐνέργεια. The mere opinion of the worthlessness of so and so, has now become developed into ὀλυγωρία, and assumed the form of an active or actual expression of the contempt by the outward token of 'slight regard'.

ὅλγωρία therefore shews 'indifference', as to something that we do not care for at all, or regard as something so contemptible, so devoid of all positive character, that it is not worth forming an opinion about: what is positively good or bad is always worthy of 'earnest attention', or 'serious anxiety.' On σπουδή 'earnest', as opposed to παιδία 'sport' (Plat. Phaedr. 276 D, compared with E, Rep. X 602 B, alibi), and on σπουδαίος 'serious', 'earnest', 'of solid worth or value', opposed to φαύλος 'light', 'trifling', 'frivorous', 'unsubstantial', 'worthless', and hence morally 'good' and 'bad', see note on i 5. 8.

καὶ τὰ συντείνοντα] 'as well as everything that has that tendency'; viz. to good and bad. 'There are three kinds of slight, or contemptuous indifference, contempt, spite and wanton outrage'. First, 'contempt involves ὀλυγωρία; because people despise men and things that they regard as worthless, and ὀλυγωρία, slight esteem, contemptuous indifference, is directed to the same objects', whence it appears that they have a common element, and that καταφρόνησις is ὀλυγωρία τε, a kind of slight.

§ 4. A second kind of ὀλυγωρία is ἐπηρεασμός, spiteful opposition to, wanton interference with, the plans and wishes (ταῖς βουλήσει) of others, in order to thwart them, where you gain no advantage to yourself by doing so; where the motive is the mere malicious pleasure of disconcerting some one, and thereby shewing your power over them: which is the root of the wanton love of mischief inherent in human nature: comp. § 6. 'This is an inclination to thwart or interfere with the wishes of another, not for any advantage that you expect to derive from it yourself, but merely for the mischievous satisfaction of depriving him of it. The slight regard therefore is shewn in the wantonness of the offence; for it is plain that there is no intention (lit. supposition) of injury in a slight—that would imply fear, not merely indifference—nor of doing him any service, none at least worth speaking of (ὀλυγωρία excludes the notion of good as well as bad, it is mere indifference; § 3, καὶ γὰρ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τάγαθα ἄξια οἰόμεθα σπουδῆς εἶναι κτ.λ.); for this (doing him service) would imply care for him, solicitude for his welfare, and that again
friendship," il. 'for (in that case) he would have shewn that he cared for him, and therefore (so that ὅστε, it would follow) that he was his friend'. The argument of ἐπεί οὖν—φίλος εἶναι is this. The wantonness of the mischief which is the effect of ἐπηρεασμὸς, (spiteful interference with your neighbour's inclinations,) shews that ὀλιγωρία enters into it in this, that it must proceed from a contumacious indifference as to the person and character of the victim; for the very wantonness of the act, that it is done for mere amusement, and without any prospect of advantage, shews the slight regard that the perpetrator has for the sufferer; that he neither fears him as he must have done if he wished to hurt or injure him by thwarting his schemes, nor esteems and respects him as a friend, as would necessarily be the case if he intended to interfere with and oppose his plans and inclinations for the other's benefit: and therefore the indifference that he does manifest must be indicative of contempt.

[ἐπηρεασμὸς] appears to be almost a ἀπαξ λεγόμενον; only two examples are given in Steph. Lex., one from Diodorus and the other from Pollux—no great authorities. [It is also found ἐνθέα c. 4 § 30.] The usual form of it in the ordinary language is ἐπηρεία, which occurs in much the same sense; as also ἐπηρεαζέων frequently in Demosthenes, and less frequently elsewhere, as in Xenophon and the Comic Poets. Thucyd. I 26 is a good instance as a commentary upon Aristotle's text, and illustrative of his interpretation: of the Corcyreans, during their war with the Corinthians, it is said that after the surrender of their colony Epidamnus to the Corinthians, they took this to heart, and despatched a force of 25 ships, to demand amongst other things the restitution of the Epidamnian exiles; and this they did κατ' ἐπηρείαν, 'they bade them out of mere spite and wantonness' without any prospect of benefit to themselves, merely for the purpose of annoying the others. Comp. ἐπηρεαζέων, Dem. c. Mid. p. 519, of Midias vexatious annoyance, ἐπηρεία ib. p. 522 ult. where it is distinguished from ὕβρις, the wanton outrage on the sacred person of the choragus. See also de Cor. p. 229, lines 8, 14 in both of which it is applied to spiteful, wantonly offensive language; whereas in Aristotle it is ἐμποδισμὸς ταῖς βουλήσεωι, and in Plut. Reip. Ger. Praec. p. 816 c, it is applied to acts of this character, ἃ πράξεων ἐχούσαις φιλοτομίαν ἐπηρεάζουν; as in Ar. Pol. ΠΙΙ 16, 1287 a 38, πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπηρείαν καὶ χάριν εἰσόασι πράττειν; which also marks the 'wantonness' characteristic of it by the addition of πρὸς χάριν. In Plut. Coriol. 334 D, οὐκ ἐπὶ κέρδεσιν ἄλλα δι' ὕβρις καὶ περιφρόνησιν τοῖς πένθοις ἐπηρεάζων, which marks the wanton character of the acts of oppression. These passages from Plutarch with some others from the same author are to be found in Wyttenbach's note on Plutarch, p. 135 D. He renders it vexantes, infestantes, per invidiam et contumeliam. The only other instance that I will refer to, occurs in Herod. VI 9, where the word seems at first sight to bear a different meaning, 'threatening': τάδε ὁμ λέγετε ἐπηρεάζοντες τά περ σφέας κατέξει, (and so Schweighäuser's Lexicon 'munitari'). But by comparing the word as here used with its use and explanation in other authors, we see that the sense of the threat is only
§ 5. υβρις] which corresponds with the preceding in some points, while it differs in others, is 'an injury or annoyance inflicted, involving disgrace to the sufferer; for no benefit that is expected to accrue to the aggressor except the mere fact of its having been done, in other words the pleasure of doing it: for retaliation is not wanton outrage but vengeance or punishment'. This is the locus classicus for the explanation of υβρις, so important in the Orators and the Athenian law. See note on 1 12. 26, where it is examined from this point of view. The outraged personal dignity, the wounded honour, which gives its special sting to an act of υβρις, and distinguishes it from a mere assault, aικία, is noted in the text by the phrase ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνη ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχοντι, and the rest of the definition describes the 'wantonness' of the aggression, which υβρις has in common with ἐπηρεασμός, and in which the ὀλιγορία is shewn. Compare I 13. 10, where the two same characteristics of υβρις reappear; οὐ γὰρ ἐὰν ἐπιτάξη πάντως υβρισεν, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἔνεκα τοῦ, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμᾶσαι ἐκείνον ἢ αὐτὸς ἠσθήμα. υβρις therefore is wanton outrage, an insult or injury which disgraces and humiliates its victim, and is prompted by no motive but the mere momentary gratification of humiliating another and therein indulging the love and the sense of power. Some illustrations of acts of υβρις are to be found in Polit. VIII (v), 10, 1311 a 33. Personal outrage, ἐπί τὸ σῶμα, is one of the causes of conspiracy and revolution. τῆς δ' υβρεως οὐσίας πολυμερούς, ἐκατὸν αὐτῶν ἀτιμήσας γίνεται τῆς ὀργῆς τῶν δ' ὀργιζομένων σχέδιον οἱ πλείστοι τιμωρίας χάριν ἐπιτιθένται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπεροχή, οἷον κ.τ.λ. and then follows a number of examples. It is plain however from a comparison of this with what immediately follows in the Rhet. § 6, where υβρις is traced to the love of ὑπεροχή, that the υβρις here spoken of is confined to insults or outrages of a particular kind, offered to the person, εἰς τὸ σῶμα.

AR. II.
§ 6. 'The cause or source of the pleasure which men feel in wanton outrages is that they think that by the illtreatment of (by doing mischief to) others they are shewing in an unusual degree their superiority over them'. μάλλον 'more than they otherwise would'. Superiority, or excess in merit and good qualities, is a mark of virtue, I 9. 39, ἡ δ’ ὑπερ- σχή τῶν καλῶν. ...ἡ ὑπερσχή δοκεῖ μηνείν ἀρετήν; and a source of pleasure, I 11. 14, τὸ μικρόν ἦδυ...φαντασία γὰρ ὑπερσχής γίγνεται, οὐ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ ἡμεια ἡ μάλλον, and the corollaries of this, § 15. τὸ ἀρχεῖν ἡδίατω, ib. § 27. On the 'emotion of power' and its ramifications, the various modes in which it exhibits itself, see Mr Bain's excellent chapter (VIII), Emotions and Will, p. 145 seq. and the quotation from Dugald Stewart in the note at the commencement [chap.x. p.192, ed. 1875].

διὸ οἱ νέοι ὑβρισταί] Comp. II 12. 15, καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὑβρίσ καὶ οὐ κακουργοῦσι. This character and tendency of youth is also expressed in one of the two opposite senses of the derivatives νεανίας, νεανιεύσεσθαι, νεανικός. The two last convey, in different contexts, the two sides of the youthful character, and the good and bad qualities by which it is specially distinguished. On the one hand, they represent the gallant, spirited, vigorous, impetuous, nature of youth (ἐν καὶ γενναιοῖς, ἀτε νέος ὡς, Plat. Soph. 239 B), on the other the petulosity, wantonness, insolence, which sometimes characterises it—proterus, ferox, superbus, Ast. Lex. Plat. s. v. νεανικός. Both senses are abundantly illustrated in Plato. I will only quote Soph. 239 D, τί τις τὸ νεανία (this audacious, impertinent, younger) πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτόμενον ἀποκρινεῖται. See Heindorf ad loc. who refers to Eur. Suppl. 580, Arist. Vesp. 1333, and interprets the word 'de homine feroci insolentiente'; and νεανιεύσεσθαι, as exemplified in Lysias' speech (Phaedr. 235 λ), which 'ran riot', 'passed all bounds of moderation' in the endeavour to shew, &c.; and (according to Callicles, Gorg. 482 C) in that of Socrates, who had been talking like a mob- orator, 'running riot, luxuriating in language full of exaggeration, extravagance.' So that 'to play the youth, act like a young man', sometimes means rash and arrogant, wanton, insolent, overbearing, extravagant, licentious conduct. The examples of both these words in Demosthenes display a leaning towards the more favourable view of the youthful character. —Plat. Euthyd. 273 A, ὑβριστής δὲ διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι (Gaisford).

οἱ πλουσιοί] II 16. 1, τὸ δὲ πλούτῳ ἄ ἔπεται ἐδὴ ἐπισολὴς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν ἄπασιν ὑβρισταὶ γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, and the reason of this. And again § 4, like the νέοι, ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν οὐ κακουργοῦσι αὐτὰ τὰ μὲν ὑβριστικά τὰ δὲ ἀκρατευτικά. In applying the doctrine of the 'mean' to the various orders of population, with the view of determining the best form of government, Aristotle makes the following remark, Polit. vi (iv) 11, 1295 ὄ 6, all excess and defect is injurious; ὑπέρκαλον δὲ ἡ ὑπερήφανος ἡ ὑπερενγειή ἡ ὑπερπλούσιον, ἡ τάναντι τοῦτοι, ὑπέρπτωκον ἡ ὑπερασθενή καὶ σφόδρα ἄτιμον, ἔχει τὸ λόγον ἄκολουθεν, γίγνεται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑβρισταὶ καὶ μεγαλοπλούσιοι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοίγοι καὶ μικροπλόνηροι λίαν τῶν δ’ ἀδικημά-
ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ  Β 2  §§ 6, 7.

υβρισταί: υπερέχειν γὰρ οίονται υβρίζοντες. υβρεως δὲ ἀτμία, οὐ δ᾽ ἀτμιασθ' ὀλιγωρεῖ τὸ γὰρ μηδενὸς ἀξίων οὐδεμίαν ἔχει τιμήν, οὔτ᾽ ἄγαθον οὔτε κακοῦ. διὸ λέγει ὁργιζόμενος ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἠτίμησεν ἐλών γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπούρας καὶ ὃς εἶ τιν ἀτίμητον μετανάστην, 7 ὃς διὰ ταῦτα ὁργιζόμενος. προσήκειν δ᾽ οίονται πο-
tων τὰ μὲν γίγνεται δὲ υβριν τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν: where we have again the same distinction of crimes as in the two passages of the Rhetoric already quoted, 11.12.15, and 16.4; and a third time 13.14, where the opposite —eis kakourgian, οὐκ εἰς υβριν—is said of old men. Crimes are hereby divided into two classes, crimes on a great and on a petty scale; high-minded crimes of violence and audacity, outrages which imply a sense of power and superiority in those who commit them; and sneaking, underhand crimes, of fraud and low villany, which are the crimes which the poor and mean are especially inclined to.

υπερέχειν γὰρ οίονται υβρίζοντες] This, as we have already seen, is a general tendency of human nature: but besides this general inclination, there is in the case of the young a special desire and a special inclination to assert their superiority to others, which is shewn in the love of victory, or getting the better of an opponent in the mimic combats and contests of their games; and also in their love of honour or spirit of ambition; υπεροχῆς γὰρ ἐπίθυμη ἡ νέωτης, ἡ δὲ νίκη υπεροχῆ τις, 11.12.6.

'Again, υβρις is a mark of disrespect, inflicts disgrace or indignity, and this again is a mark of slight esteem; and this feeling of disrespect, and the disgrace and dishonour to the sufferer that accompany it, shew that the object of them is considered of no worth or value, because he has no honour (but the contrary), which is as much as to say that he is of no value (τιμή having the double sense), worth nothing either for good or for evil', and therefore is the object of the contemptuous indifference which is the sting of ὀλγωρία.

This disgrace and indignity is then illustrated by two lines of Homer II. 11. A 356, repeated in I 11x) 367, and I (IX) 648 (644), in which the angry Achilles expresses his indignation at the slight put upon him by Agamemnon, 'who had taken and kept for himself (αὐτὸς ἐξει) the present (gift of honour, one of the μέρη τιμῆς; see note on γέρα, I 5.9, p. 85) of which he had deprived him'; and had treated him 'like some despised alien or vagabond'. μετανάστης, comp. II. 11 (XVI) 59, where the line is repeated, properly a 'settler in a foreign land', like the μέτοικος at Athens, a despised class without civil rights, and therefore ἀτίμητος; Ar. Pol. III 5, 1278 a 36, ὁσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησεν "ωσεὶ τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην": ὁσπερ μέτοικος γὰρ ἐστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων. And Herod. VII 161, where the Athenians boast that they are μονοὶ οὐ μετανάσται Ἐλλήνων.

§ 7. 'Now men think they have a natural claim' (προσήκεια, note on 1. 1 p. 11, μὴ προσήκοντο) 'to especial respect and consideration (πολυνορείαθαι)
This is illustrated by more two lines of Homer, II. B 196, ʽgreat is the wrath of divine-bred kingsʼ (ʽin Homeri II. B 196, singulare Διστρεφέων βασιλέως legitur. Sed cum haec sententia in proverbium abiisset, universae pronuntiandum erat plurali numeroʼ Vater); and, II. A 82, ʽYet it may be that even hereafter he keeps a grudgeʼ—here the endurance of the wrath indicates its original violence and the magnitude of the slight that provoked it (ἄλλα γε καί, the vulg., is retained by Bekker. MSS A, Yb, Zb have τε, as also Mr Paley’s text).—άγανακτούσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ʽFor the lasting vexation (this is in explanation of the μετόπισθεν κότον of the last quotation) is owing to their superiorityʼ.

§ 8. ʽAnother aggravation of anger and the sense of slight arises, when the insult or injury proceeds from those from whom, as he conceives, kind and courteous treatment is due; such are those who are indebted to him for benefits past or present, bestowed either by himself or on his account (such as are due to him) or by one of his friends, or those to whom he wishes well (wishes to benefit) or ever did (wish well)ʼ. For the antecedent to ψφ’ δὲν, and the supplement of the context, we may
9. 

Phanerôn oûn èk tou'ton ἵδη πῶς τ' ἐχοντες ὀργίζονται αὐτοὶ καὶ τίσι καὶ διὰ ποία. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ, ὅταν λυπώνται· ἐφετέρον γὰρ τίνος ὁ λυπούμενος· εάν τε ὄντων κατ' εὐθυρίαν ὀτιοῦν ἀντικρούσθη τίς, οἶον τῷ understand (as I have done) ὀργίζονται μᾶλλον from what has preceded, or possibly ἀγανακτοῦν from the immediately preceding clause: otherwise repeat ὀτιοῦν πολυνορείσθαι from the beginning of § 7.

§ 9. 'From what has been said it is by this time clear (we may now infer from the preceding statements) what the angry disposition or state of mind is, what sort of persons it is directed against or provoked by, and (what sort of things it is due to) what sort of offences or acts provoke it'.

'As to the first, we are angry when we are vexed or annoyed; because one who is vexed is always aiming at, eagerly bent on, something; if then he be directly crossed or thwarted (ἐὰν ἀντικρούσῃ τίς) in anything whatsoever,—a thirsty man, for example, in his effort to drink,—or not (i.e. if he be crossed, not directly, but indirectly), the act in either case appears to be just the same (the act in its effect or in the intention is the same; the act itself is not the same); or again if any one offers any opposition, or refuses to help, or troubles, bothers, throws obstacles in the way of, a man in this state of mind (i.e. in a state of eager desire, and 'aiming at something', ἐφετέρον τίνος), with all these he is angry'.

κατ' εὐθυρίαν] is 'in a straight line', -ορεῖν, -ορος (this must be a mere termination in this word, as in θεωρός, τιμωρός, συνάμωρος, and the Latin -or-us and -os-us, plagosus, generousus, animosus, belliosus; ὃρα, as in Ἀνωφός, can form no part of the derivation). The phrase, which is equivalent to εἰς εὐθείας or κατ' εὐθείαν (γραμμήν), occurs elsewhere, in Plat. Rep. iv 436 E, τὴν εὐθυρίαν (in a straight line, or straight) is opposed to ἀποκλίνειν, and κατὰ τὸ περιφερές κύκλον. Ar. Metaph. A. 2, init. 'in a straight line', (see Bonitz ad loc.), de part. Anim. II 8. 7, τὴν δὲ σχῆσιν ἔχει τῆς σαρκὸς οὐ κατ' εὐθυρίαν ἀλλὰ κατὰ κύκλους διαρρεῖν (Vict.). Ib. c. 10. 16, ἀκούει γὰρ οὗ μόνῳ κατ' εὐθυρίαν ἀλλὰ παντάθεν, ἡ δ' ὄψις εἰς τὸ ἐμπροσθεν, ὁρὰ γὰρ κατ' εὐθυρίαν (directly forwards, in a straight line) (Gaisford), Probl. xi 58, εὐθυρεῖν, Eth. Eudem. vii 10, 1243 δ 15, τοῖς μέτο κατ' εὐθυρίαν (φίλοις), of indirect friendships, where the two friends are not of the same kind, but associated from different motives; Fritzsche, note ad loc. (who refers also to Tim. Locr. p. 94 b, τὸ μέτο κατ' εὐθυρίαν νοείσθαι ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, and to this passage of the Rhetoric). Add Arist. de part. Anim. IV 9. 6, ἡ εὐθυρία τῶν ἐντοπιδῶν, and de Anima a 3, 406 δ 31, τὴν εὐθυρίαν εἰς κύκλον κατέκαμψεν. peri ἕννυεῶν c. 2. 5, κατ' εὐθυρίαν ἑ συμβαίνει τὴν ὄψιν ὀραν.

ἀντικρούσιν, 'to strike or knock against', 'to come into collision with', hence metaphorically, to interfere with, interpose an obstacle, to hinder or thwart a man's designs or efforts. The word is not common: it occurs in Dem. de Cor. § 198, and ἀντικρούσις (a check, sudden stoppage), Rhet. III
v. 9. 6. In the neuter sense in which it is here employed it follows the analogy of συγκρούειν, προσκρούειν, and hundreds of other transitive verbs which by the suppression of the reflexive pronoun pass from active to neuter—a process common, I should suppose, to most languages, and certainly found in our own.

ἐνοχλεῖν, ‘to mob’ (δύχοις), only once in Plato: but frequent in Demosth., Xenoph., Aristoph.; applied to troublesome and vexatious annoyances and vexatious conduct in general; ‘to trouble, annoy, bother’.

§ 10. ‘And therefore in sickness, in poverty (and distress), in love, thirst, or any appetite and desire in general, which is unsatisfied’ (in the satisfaction of which they are unsuccessful μὴ κατορθοῦντες ἐν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ), ‘men are irascible and easily excited to passion (provoked) especially against those who shew a contemptuous indifference to their present condition (who wantonly obstruct them in the efforts they are making to obtain the immediate object of their wishes, or in the gratification of this particular appetite or desire of which they are under the influence at the moment) as a sick man against those who slight and thwart him in his efforts to cure his disease’, οἱον κάμνων ὀργίλος ἐστι τοῖς (ἄλγωροσιν αὐτοῦ) πρὸς τὴν νόσον—(πρὸς, ‘in respect of’, ‘those who direct their obstruction and annoyance to’ his disease, i.e. to interference with the progress of his cure: and the same explanation may be applied to the remaining cases)—‘a poor man when his poverty (and efforts to relieve it) is at stake, and a man in a battle against those who interfere with his fighting (or if a general, with his manoeuvres and warlike operations), or if in love, with the affairs of his love, and so on for all the rest: for in each case the way is ready prepared beforehand for the anger of the individual by the existing affection (passion, or state of feeling).’

ὀργίλος, ‘irascible’. ἐστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀργῆν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλειψις καὶ μεσότης...τῶν δ’ ἀκρῶν ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἐστώ, ἢ δὲ κακὰ ὀργιλότης, Eth. N. 11 7, 1108 a 40, IV 11, 1125 b 29, and 1126 a 13, οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλου ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται καὶ οἳ οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον η δεῖ, παντοῦνται δὲ ταχέως’ ὁ καὶ βελτιστὸν ἔχουσιν κ.τ.λ.

II ékástant oúgyn úpò toû úpárχontos παύθους. ἐτι δ’ ἐάν τάναντία τύχη προσδεχόμενος. Λυπεῖ γαρ μᾶλ-
λον τὸ πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, ὡςπερ καὶ τέρπει τὸ πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, ἐάν γένηται ὁ βουλεταί. διὸ καὶ ὃραι καὶ χρόνοι καὶ διαβέσεις καὶ ἡλικίαι ἐκ τούτων φα-
νεραί, ποιῶσε εὐκίνητου πρὸς ὀργήν καὶ ποῦ καὶ πότε, p. 8.

23 (and elsewhere), ‘to advance’ by clearing away (κόπτειν), before an advancing army, wood and other obstacles to its progress, presents the same metaphor in a somewhat different form.

§ 11. Disappointed expectation is also provocative of anger: ‘if a man happen to have expected the contrary (to that which does actually occur); for the pain of disappointment is increased in proportion to its unexpectedness, just as the joy in the opposite case is increased by an unexpected success. And so, by applying these principles to the different seasons, times, dispositions, and ages (in which anger chiefly manifests itself), it will be easy to see what sorts of them (the two last named) are easily moved to anger, and in what places and at what times, and also that the more they are under these circumstances (in these conditions) the more easily they are moved’. That is, the nearer they are to the critical moment in the times and seasons and to the central point or acme in the age of life, and the more they are under the influence of the particular dispositions which prompt the angry feeling—the higher the degree in each case—the greater will be the proneness to anger.

Schrader supplies a very apt illustration of the ὅραι from Theoc. Id. I 15: ‘ut cibi et somni horae; caprarius ap. Theocr. Οḏ βέμις, ὃ πομὺ, ὁ ἑσπαρμβρίνων, οὐ βέμις ἅμμιν Συρίσδεν’ τὸν Πάνα δεδοῖκαρες: ἦ γὰρ ἀπ’ ἄγγας Τανίκα κεκμακός ἀμπανταίος ἐντὶ ἐν πικρός, Καὶ οἱ ὃ ἐδριμέα χολή ποτι ποῦν κιδήσαται.’ Of the three ἡλικίαι, II 12. 2, Seneca, on the contrary, de Ira I 13, ult., iracundissimi infantes senesque et aegri sunt, et invalidum omne naturae querulum est (Schrader). veōs is the one which is most liable to anger, Ib. § 5, com. 9. As regards times and seasons, one man might be more inclined to be angry in hot, and another in cold, weather—though perhaps this should rather be referred to the διαβέσεις or bodily temperaments; constitution, or habit of body or mind, comes under the denomination of διαβέσεις—the διάβεσις or ‘passing temporary disposition’ being apparently not here distinguished (as it ought to be, Categ. 8, p. 8 b 27, comp. 11 a 22) from the confirmed, settled, permanent, ἔξις or ‘state’. On the διαβέσεις Schrader notes, ‘Affectiones animi corporisve: ut morbus, maeror, pudor, metus. Sen. de Ira II 19, vinum incendit iram, quia anget calorem. III 10, vetus dictum est, a lasso rixam quaeri (fatigue). Acque autem et ab esuriente et a silicente, et ab omni homine quem aliqua res urit: nam uti ulceara ad levem tactum, deinde etiam ad suspicionem tactus, condoleascent (this describes a state of irritation or inflammation); ita animus affectus minimis offenditur. Adeo ut quosdam salutatio, epistola, oratio, et interrogatio in lietum evocent’. Every situation or condition of pain, discomfort, malaise, constraint, &c. makes a man irritable.
§ 12. So far of the subjects of anger; next of its objects.

First, anger is provoked by ridicule (contempt expressed in laughter), mockery, jeering; all of which imply ὑβρίς, a wanton unprovoked attack upon a man’s feelings and personal dignity.

χλευάζειν, probably connected with χέλος or χέλος (χελύς) ‘the lip’ (so Valck.), ‘to shoot out the lips’ in mockery and derision. Compare the analogous ἐρεσχελείν which may possibly be ἐρέσσειν χέλος expressing the same action. χλευάζειν, χλευασμός and χλευασία, appear frequently in Demosth. and occasionally in other authors: in Rhet. II 3. 9 we find χλευαστής. In Top. Z 6, 144 a 5, we have καθάπερ οἱ τῶν προπηλακισμῶν ὑβριν μετὰ χλευασίας ὀριζόμενοι ή γὰρ χλευασία ὑβρις τις, ὡστ’ οὐ διαφορὰ ἀλλ’ εἰδος ἡ χλευασία. χλευασία therefore is a ‘kind’ of ὑβρις, which exactly corresponds with the view of it taken here.

σκόττειν, is not easily distinguished from the preceding, except by the greater frequency of its occurrence. It expresses an ill-natured joke, sneering, taunting, gibing at, another, for the purpose of bringing him into ridicule. This is the ‘scornful jest’, which, as Pope says, is ‘most bitter’. σκόμμα or σκώμης is therefore opposed to εὐτραπελία, the easy well-bred pleasantry which distinguishes the conversation and composure of the accomplished gentleman. The ill-natured intention implied in σκόττειν appears incidentally in the phrase λυπεῖν τῶν σκωπτόμενον, which indicates that it is always attended with pain to the object of it, Eth. N. IV 14, 1128 a 7: and again this its ordinary character appears Ib. line 25, seq. πότερον οὖν τῶν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὁμιτέον τῷ λέγειν ἀ πρέπει ελευθερία, ἡ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τῶν ἁκοίματα καὶ τέρπειν; (neither of which evidently belonged to the ordinary character and operation of the σκόμμα), and again, line 30, τὸ γὰρ σκόμμα λοιδόρημα τι ἐστίν. I suppose that the difference between this and χλευασμός must be something of this kind: χλευάζειν ‘mockery’ may be conveyed by the gesture or tone of voice or the manner as well as by the actual words, and is therefore the more general expression of contempt as conveyed by language or manner: in σκόμμα the contempt is conveyed or embodied in a joke or taunting phrase. It occurs, as might be expected, constantly in Aristophanes, who dealt more largely in the commodity itself than most other writers. An examination of the passages where it is used by this author will help to confirm what I have said of the ill-natured use of it; for instance, Pac. 740, ἐς τὰ ῥάκια σκώπτοντας ἀεὶ καὶ τῶν φθειρῶν πολεμοῦντας, Nub. 540, οὖν ἐσχωπτε τοὺς φαλακροὺς, and so of the rest.

A second aspect of persons who are special objects of angry feeling, are those who inflict such injuries as bear upon them the marks of wanton outrage. These must be such as are neither in retaliation (for an injury already inflicted on the aggressor) nor beneficial to those who inflict them;
for when this is the case' (by this time, now at length; note on ἥδη, I 1.7) 'then (and not till then) they are thought to be due to a wanton, malicious, unprovoked, intention to offend'—ὑβρις, the worst of the three kinds of ὀλγώρια by which anger is provoked; §§ 3, 5.

§ 13. A third are 'those who revile and express contempt for things in which the aggrieved parties are themselves most interested (or, to which they are earnestly devoted, or in which they most desire to distinguish themselves, or in which they most value themselves; the last of the four referring to such things as ἴδεα, personal beauty, the second example); as those who are eager and ambitious of distinction in the pursuit of philosophy are especially indignant at any slight, any slur cast upon their favourite study; or those who value themselves upon their personal appearance, if that be called in question; and similarly in all other cases'. This topic expresses the specially angry feeling that is called forth by any ridicule or contempt directed against a man's profession, his studies, his order, any class or society to which he belongs, and is carried even to the extent of a national feeling: any reflexion, in short, upon what he is particularly interested in and attached to or values himself upon, any association with which he is bound up, and on whose credit his own credit and importance in some measure depend. "Je me suis souvent désespé, en mon enfance," says Montaigne (du Pédantisme, Livre I Ch. 24), "de veoir en comedies italiennes tousjours un Pedante pour badin, et le surnom de Magister n'avoir gueres plus honorable signification parmy nous: car leur estant donné en gouvernement, que pouvois-je moins faire que d'estre jaloux de leur reputation?"


§ 14. 'But this angry feeling is much aggravated, if he suspect that this, whatever it may be, on which he prides himself, does not really belong to him, either not at all or in no great force (ἐκχειρόν), or that if it does, at all events other people don't think so (lit. it does not appear so,

1 The following is Buhle's note on ἴδεα, 'Cogitantum est de ideis Platonicis'! and this is quoted by Gaisford without a remark.
μὴ ἵσχυρὸς, η μὴ δοκεῖν ἐπειδή ἂν γὰρ σφόδρα οἴων- P. 1379 ταυ ὑπάρχειν [ἐν τούτοις] ἐν οἷς σκωπτοῦνται, οὐ φρον- 15 τίζουσιν. καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μᾶλλον ἡ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις: οἴνονται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον πάσχειν εὖ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν 16 ἡ μὴ. καὶ τοῖς εἰδισμένοις τιμῶν ἡ φροντίζειν, εάν 1 ἐν τοῦτοις οὐκ ἐνεινείται.

μὴ δοκεῖν: for whenever people have a strong conviction that they really possess the assumed advantage' (supply, ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς ἐφ ο φιλοτιμοῦνται from the last §, or ὁ οἴνονται ἔχειν, or ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς, from οἴων ὑπάρχειν) 'in those particular things (studies, personal qualities, accomplishments, rank and position, before enumerated) at which the taunt is levelled', (ἐν οἷς 'in which', represents the sphere, or circumstances, the 'locality' as it were of the joke in which it resides), 'they care nothing about it'. A very acute observation. F. A. Wolf has a note upon ἐν τούτοις, for which he proposes to substitute ἐναὐτοῖς or αὐτοῖς. He insists upon connecting σφόδρα ὑπάρχειν, and pronounces that to be bad Greek or unintelligible. σφόδρα οἴνονται, if it required any justification, would be sufficiently defended by Phaedo 73 Α, σφόδρα μέμνημαι. I think that the translation above given shews that the vulg. is correct, and there is no manuscript authority for any alteration. σφόδρα and ἵσχυρὸς (above) are used here in the same sense, 'in a high degree'. Wolf's conjecture is supported by Brandis' Anonymus, in Schneidewin's Philologus IV 1 p. 46.


§ 15. ‘Again anger is more readily excited against those who are dear to us, than against those who are not; because we think we are naturally entitled to expect from them kind treatment rather than the reverse’ (ἡ μὴ εὗ). Comp. Polit. IV (VII) 7, 1328 a 1, σημεῖον δὲ πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ο θυμὸς Αἱρεται μᾶλλον ἡ πρὸς τοὺς άγνώστας, άλλογρεῖσθαι νομισάς. διό καὶ 'Ἀρχαλοχος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle adduces this as a proof that (in the Platonic psychological division) the seat of φιλία, love, is the θυμὸς or τὸ θυμοειδές, the passionate element of the human composition, in which all the noble, generous impulses, zeal, enthusiasm, righteous indignation, resentment, courage, and with them anger, reside. Aristotle is here criticising Plato's scheme, while he recognises its general validity, who assigns (Tim.) φιλία to the belly, with the other ἐπιθυμίαι. A few lines further on the author adds, τοῦτο δὲ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις πάσχουσιν, ὅπερ εἰρήται πρῶτον, ἂν ἀδικείσθαι νομισάσαι καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει κατὰ λόγον παρ’ οἷς γὰρ οἰκεῖσθαι δεῖν τὴν εὐεργείαν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, πρὸς τὸ βλάβει καὶ ταύτης ἀποστερεῖσθαι νομίζοντων, ὅθεν εἰρήται 'χαλεποὶ γὰρ πόλεμοι ἀδελφοῖς', (this line is more correctly given by Plutarch, de Frat. Amor. 480 d, χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν, ὥς Εὐρυπίδης εἰρήκει, Dind. Eur. Fr. Inc. 57: it is in fact a paronimias verse, the proper vehicle for 'proverbs'), καὶ "οἱ τοῖς περὶ στέρζαντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ περὶ μισοῦνσιν.”

§ 16. ‘And similarly against those that have been accustomed to pay
ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Β 2 §§ 16—18.

πάλιν μὴ οὗτως ὀμιλῶσιν καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦτων οἶον—
17 ται καταφρονεῖσθαι ταῦτα γὰρ ἂν ποιεῖν. καὶ τοῖς
μὴ ἀντιποιοῦσιν εὖ, μηδὲ τὴν ἴσην ἀνταποδιδόσιν, καὶ τοῖς
tάναντία ποιοῦσιν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν ἤττους ὤσιν·
kαταφρονεῖν γὰρ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι φαίνονται, καὶ οἱ
18 μὲν ὡς ἥττονων οἱ δ' ὡς παρ' ἥττονων. καὶ τοῖς ἐν
μηδενὶ λόγῳ οὕσιν, ἄν τι ὀλιγωρῶσι, μάλλον ὑπό-
respect and attention to them, if they afterwards cease (to associate or
live with them on the same terms) to treat them in the same way: for
from such, this seems to imply contempt, otherwise (if their feeling
therefore had not changed) they would have gone on doing as they
used to do'.

καταφρονεῖσθαι] passive, see Appendix B, on I 12. 22 [at the end of
Vol. 1].

§ 17. τὴν ἴσην] sc. μοιρὰν, Bos, Ellipt. pp. 306—7, cites many instances
of the omission of this subst. with various words, as numerals, δικάτη,
tρικαστή (Dem. c. Lept. § 32), ἡμίσεια. Analogous to τὴν ἴσην here, we
have ἐπ' ἴσης, ἐπὶ ἴσα, ἐκ ἴσης, ἐκ τῆς ἴσης, τὴν ὀμοίην (Herod. IX 78), ἐπὶ τῇ
ὄμοια, ἐκ τῆς ὀμοίας. With πεπρωμίσθη, it is a still more frequent ellipse.
With this word μοίρα is sometimes expressed; as it is likewise in Hom.
II. 1 (IX) 318, ἴση μοίρα μένοντι καὶ εἴ μᾶλα τις πολεμίζοι. At the same time in
§ 23, we have τοῖς χάριν μὴ ἀποδιδοῦσιν; and Bos himself in a subsequent
article on χάρις (p. 523) refers to this, Herod. VI 21, οὐκ ἀπεδοῦσαν τὴν
ὄμοιην Συβαρίτας; to which Schäfer adds, IV 119, τὴν ὀμοίην µήν ἀποδι-
dοοὐσί. However μοίρα is just as natural a supplement as the other, and
the more numerous analogies, by shewing that the ellipse of it was more
usual than that of χάριν, are in favour of the former explanation.

καὶ τοῖς τάναντι—παρ' ἥττονων] 'And against those that do things con-
trary to our interests, if they are our inferiors' (from inferiors opposition was
not to be expected, from equals or superiors it might be; therefore in
the former case it is more provoking); 'for from all such, opposition seems
to imply contempt; either because (in opposing us) they seem to regard
us as inferiors' (quīs enim contra potentiōres sponte contendit praēlia-
turque, Victorius; with ὡς ἥττονων repeat καταφρονεῖν φαίνειται); 'or else
as if (these benefits had proceeded) from inferiors' (and therefore need
not be repaid; either not at all, or not in full). These belong to the
class described in the preceding topic, 'those who do not repay a benefit
at all, or inadequately'; from which the ellipse in ὡς παρ' ἥττονων must
therefore be filled up; by this non-repayment or inadequate repayment of
the benefits received they shew their contempt.

Those who fail to repay benefits received, altogether or in part, seem
to express contempt for their benefactors as inferiors; for they would not
neglect such a manifest duty, or do what they know must give offence,
unless they thought that it was not worth while to keep on good terms
with them. So Victorius. With παρ' ἥττονων, εὔφεργεύουμενοι, or εὐ ποιοῦ-
μενοι, is to be understood.

§ 18. 'The angry feeling is aggravated against those who are of no
account, no repute at all, if they are guilty of any slight, any contemptuous indifference, to us and our pretensions. This topic goes a step beyond the preceding. In that the offenders were only relatively contemptible, inferior to ourselves. Here they are absolutely contemptible and worthless, of no repute at all in any one's estimation— for anger is assumed to be (referring to the definition, § 1) provoked by the slight against those who have no natural claim (to treat us in this way): the natural duty of inferiors is not to slight (their betters).

On προσθήκειν, and the several kinds of obligation from which the terms expressive of 'duty' are derived, δεί, χρή, πρέπει, προσθήκει, see on μὴ προσθήκονται, II 2. 1, note 2 on p. 11.

§ 19. τοῖς φίλοις] Comp. § 15, and note. 'We are angry with friends if they don't speak of us, and treat us, well, and still more if they do the contrary; and if, when we are in want of anything, they don't perceive it (don't find it out before we tell them of it)—this manifests their indifference to us and our wants, which is a kind of contempt, and the sting of ὀλγωρία— as Antiphon's Plexippus was (angry with, ὀργίζεται) with his (τῷ) Meleager: for this want of perception (or attention) is a token of slight; because, when we do care for any one, (things of this kind) don't escape us'. ἄν γὰρ προντιζωμεν (ταῦτα) οὐ λανθάνει. This is expressed in the abstract neuter of all things; meaning of course persons. There were two poets named Antiphon: one a writer of the New Comedy, (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. I 489, ποιητής καὶ κυνής κωμῳδίας Ἀντιφῶν Ἀθηναίος, Böckh, Corp. Inscr. I p. 767): and the other, a tragic writer, mentioned by Athenaeus as τραγῳδοποιός, together with his character, Plexippus, xv 673 f. This second Antiphon is again referred to, Rhet. II 6. 27, Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ποιητής, and his play Meleager, Iib. 23. 20, where two lines are quoted from it. Besides Antiphon's play, there were several others with the same title, and on the same subject, the Calydonian boar-hunt and its tragic consequences, by poets comic as well as tragic, Sophocles, Euripides, Sosiphanes, (Wagner, Trag. Gr. Fragm. III 179,) Antiphanes, and Philetaerus, Mein, u. s., I 315, 349. (The Meleager of Antiphanes is doubtful, the names of Antiphon and Antiphanes being often interchanged, Mein.) See also Wagner, Trag. Gr. Fragm. III 113.

Victorius notes on this allusion: 'Plexippus was brother of Althea, Meleager's mother, and with his brother Toxeus was put to death by Meleager, because they expressed indignation at his bestowing the prize, the boarskin, which he had received for the destruction of the Calydonian boar, upon his mistress Atalanta. Perhaps it was this very circumstance that Antiphon indicated: he may have represented Plexippus as expressing his vexation at Meleager's insensibility to his want, to his great anxiety, namely, to possess the boarskin, which his nephew (Meleager) had,
regardless of the claims of consanguinity, bestowed nevertheless on Atalanta. (I have altered the second sentence for the sake of clearness.)

The story of Meleager and the Caledonian boarhunt, is told by Ovid, Metamorph. viii. The offence of the Thespiadace, Toxeus and Plexippus, and their death by the hand of their nephew, are described in 428—444: from which Victorius apparently derived his account.

§ 20. ‘We are angry also with those that rejoice at our misfortunes or in general maintain a cheerful demeanour in the midst of our distresses: for this is a mark either of downright enmity or of contemptuous indifference’. ὅλως, without any special indications of joy, yet maintain a most provoking air of serenity and indifference whilst they cheerfully contemplate our vexations and annoyances—everyone who has ever had experience of this (and who has not?) knows well how provoking it is.

‘And with those who don’t care (who exhibit no solicitude, or sympathy; comp. infra § 21, οἱ γὰρ φίλοι συναγάγουσι) when they give us pain; and this is why we are angry with the messengers of evil tidings’ (ingenious solution). Or the explanation might be, that the first surprise and annoyance at the unwelcome intelligence associates the bearer with his news. That messengers of unwelcome news are liable to a rough reception from those to whom they communicate them, is noticed also by Aesch., Pers. 255, ὁμοί κακῶν μὲν πρῶτον ἀγγέλλειν κακά, Soph. Antig. 277, στίρυγιοι γὰρ ὅπειροι ἄγγελον κακῶν ἐπῶν.

Shakespeare, Henry IV. Pt. II. Act i, sc. 1. 100, Yet the first bringer of unwelcome news hath but a losing office. Antony and Cleop. II 5, Though it be honest it is never good to bring bad news. Macbeth, v 5, Liar and slave—(to the messenger, who comes to announce the moving of Birnam wood).

§ 21. ‘And with such as stand quietly, calmly, listening to an account of (πεπιλ), or looking on at (any painful exhibition of) our faults and weaknesses (τὰ φαύλα), (without offering either help or sympathy); this looks like either contemptuous indifference, or actual enmity: because friends sympathise with us (feel pain as we do ourselves), (and these do not); and every one feels pain at the spectacle, the contemplation, when he witnesses the exposure, of his own infirmities’—the friend, being ἐτέρεις αὐτὸς or ἄλλος αὐτὸς, ‘a second self’ (Eth. Nic. ix several times repeated), must regard the exposure of his friend’s weaknesses just as he would of his own.
§ 22. 'And further, with those who shew slight to us before (in respect of) five different kinds of persons; (1) to those whom we are ambitious of rivalling 1 (in the race for distinction; φιλοσειείσαι expresses the ambitious views, and πρὸς ὁς the competition, comp. c. 4.24, 6.15, 10.5, &c.); (2) πρὸς τοὺς to whom we respect and admire; (3) those by whom we wish to be respected and admired; (4) those of whom we stand in awe; (5) ή τοῖς οἰκείοις who, or autōn as Ar. writes it,) or, (we are angry with those who slight us) when in the company of (εἰς) those who hold us in awe. In the society of any of these, a slight offered is provocative of a greater degree of anger (than it would be elsewhere).

αισχύνεσθαι, with the accus. of the person, means to 'be ashamed in a man's presence, or before him; to be afraid to look one in the face, from reverence; to stand in awe of him'. Soph. Phil. 1382, ὀν κατασχύνει θεοῖς; τὸν προστρόπαιον τὸν ἰκέτην; The accusative is the local accus., an extension of the cognate accus., the person, whose presence causes the shame or awe, being represented as the seat of it, as when we say οἰκείοις τὴν κεφαλήν. Matth., Gr. Gr. 441, has given a few examples of this use of αἰσχύνεσθαι and aἰδείσθαι—four from Eur. Ion, 353, 379, 952, and 1093, αἰσχύνομαι τὸν πολύομον θεόν, and one from Xen. de Rep. Lac. II 11. Add Hom. II. Λ 23, αἰδείσθαι θ' ἱερὰ, Z (VI) 442, αἰδεύομαι ῼθρας καὶ ῼθραδικά ἐλκευτέλπους: so αἰδείσθαι ἱκέτην, as Hom. Ι. Χ (XXII) 124. Aesch. Agam.362, (Dind.), Διὰ τοῦ ἤμων μέγαν αἰδοῦμαι. Aristoph. Thesm. 848, 903, Eccles. 381, Plut. 1077. Plat. Theaet. 183 E, μῖλεοιν... ἅπτων αἰσχύνομαι. Symp. 216 B, 218 D, Protag. 312 A, οὐκ ἄν αἰσχύνοι σαντὸν; Rep. Ι.ΙV 562 E, αἰσχύνεσθαι τοὺς γονέας, k.t.l. Comp. Lat. pudere, supplicare, aliquem alicuius, Cic. Ep. ad Fam. ΙΧ 1 sed quod cernum me suppudedeat. Orator 155 'Patris mei, meum factum (i.e. meorum factorum) pudet.'

§ 23. 'And those whose slight is offered to such objects as it would be a disgrace to us not to help and protect, such as parents, children, wives, rulers and governors 1, such as have a natural claim upon our help and protection. 'And those that have failed to make a due return (for a benefit received); for in this case the slight (neglect, contemptuous indifference to moral obligation) is a violation of the natural

1 Θέ phrase has been otherwise understood, 'those whom they are anxious to stand well with'. But to say nothing of its not properly representing the Greek, this interpretation leaves no difference between this first class and the third.
§ 24. παρὰ τὸ προσήκον γὰρ ἡ ὀλυγωρία. καὶ τοῖς εἰρωνευομένοις πρὸς σπουδάζοντας καταφρονητικῶν
γὰρ ἡ εἰρωνεία. καὶ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων εὐποιητικῶς,
ἐὰν μὴ καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ γὰρ τούτο καταφρονητικῶν,
τὸ μὴ ἄξιον ὅν πάντας καὶ αὐτῶν. ποιητικῶς δὲ ὁργῆς καὶ ἡ λήθη, οίνον καὶ ἡ τῶν ὁνομάτων οὕτως ὦσα περὶ μικρόν ὀλυγωρίας γὰρ δοκεῖ καὶ ἡ λήθη σημείον εἶναι δὲ ἀμέλειαν μὲν γὰρ ἡ λήθη γίγνεται,
ἡ δὲ ἀμέλεια ὀλυγωρία ἐστίν.

§ 25. οἷς μὲν οὖν ὁργίζοντα καὶ ὧς ἔχοντες καὶ διὰ ποία, ἀμα εἰρηταὶ δὴλον δὲ ὅτι δέοι ἂν κατασκευά-
claim, duty, or obligation. The nature or fitness of things requires (under this theory, which is that of justice, the lex talionis) such a compensation, or the repayment of the favour.

§ 24. ‘And those (are provoking) who use irony to (πρὸς, in reply to, or conversation with) us when we are in serious earnest (whether merely talking, or engaged in some serious pursuit: either of these is provoked by untimely levity; which is construed as a kind of contempt, for irony is expressive of contempt1). This characteristic or construction of irony is not noticed in the analysis of it in Eth. Nic. IV 13, 1127 b 22 seq. In IV 8, 1124 b 30, it appears as a trait in the character of the μεγαλόπυχος, and is part of the contemptuous bearing (1124 b 5 ὃ δὲ μεγαλόπυχος δικαιω καταφρονεῖ) to the vulgar which is suitable to his dignity, εἰρωνεία δὲ πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν. On irony and its uses in Rhetoric, besides the passage from the Ethics already quoted, see Rhet. ad Alexandrum 22. 1, Cic. de Orat. II 67. 269 seq., III 53. 203, Quint. VIII 6. 54, IX 2. 44 seq. Socrates was probably one of those whose constant use of εἰρωνεία was construed as contempt, and contributed to his unpopularity.

§ 25. ‘And (again we feel ourselves slighted) by those who are naturally or habitually disposed to acts of kindness, if they don’t extend their kindness to ourselves: for this has the air of contempt, to consider us (αὐτῶν is ‘an individual’ opposed to πᾶντας) unworthy to be treated in the same way as every one else’.

§ 26. ‘Forgetfulness too is provocative of anger, even, for instance, forgetting your friend’s name, though it be (shewn) in such a mere trifl: for even forgetfulness (trifle though it be, καὶ) is construed as a sign of contempt: because this oblivion is due to neglect, and neglect is slight’. Falconbridge, in King John, Act I, sc. I 187, And if his name be George, I’ll call him Peter; For new-made honour doth forget men’s names.

§ 27. ‘So the objects, dispositions, and provocatives of anger have been all treated together’. On the grammar of οἷς... εἰρηταί, see note, II 9. 11 (at the end).

The following sentence is a note upon the mode of applying the foregoing analysis to the conduct and management of the speech, for the
benefit of the student of Rhetoric: how, namely, to excite and direct this passion in conformity with the interests of the speaker, and it is plain that what is required is, to bring the audience by the speech into such a state of mind as men are in, when they are irascible (so that their anger may be brought to bear upon the opponent); and to represent the adversary as liable to the imputation of such feelings and acts as provoke men to anger, and of such character or disposition as men are angry with. 

CHAPTER III.

Analysis of πράσης, patience; the opposite of ὀργή, as it is here stated. In the Nic. Eth. IV 11, init. the statement is different. πράσης is there the mean state, or virtue, lying between ὀργίλως irascibility, the excess of angry emotion, and ἀρρησία want of spirit, insensibility (to provocation or wrong), the defect; τό δὲ προπλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τῶν οἰκείων περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες. ὀργή is the basis of the whole, the πάθος in general, the natural emotion in respect of provocation, capable of modification so as to assume three different forms: its three ἔξεις are περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν, c. 12 init. πράσης then, here, as a πάθος—in the Ethics it is a ἔξει or virtue—is this instinctive affection, feeling, emotion, in a mild, calm, subdued state (opposed to ὀργή an emotion in a state of excitement); placidity of temper. As a virtue (in the Ethics) it is as described by Grant (Eth. Nic. Plan of book, IV p. 150, first ed.) ‘the virtue of the regulation (or control) of the temper’. In the de Anima, I 1, 403 a 16, it is still only a πάθος, together with ὄνεια, φόβος, ἔλεος, τάρας, χαρά, φιλία, and μῦχος. Again πράσης, the feeling, stands in the same relation to πράσης, the quieting, calming, lowering process of the excited, angry emotion, as ὀργή does to ὀργίζεσθαι, (and would to ὀργίσει if the word were in existence). And lastly, as ὀργή is a κίνησις (setting in motion in the way of stirring up and exciting) de Anima, I 1, 403 a 26, τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησις τις τοῦ τοιοῦτο σώματος ἡ μέρους κ.τ.λ., so πράσης is a κατάστασις, a process of settling down, and ἡμέρισις, a passing to a state of rest—ἡρεμία the regular opposite of κινεσθαι. The fifth book of the Physics is on these two opposites, κίνησις and ἡμέρισις; see especially ch. 6. ‘And whereas growing angry is opposite to growing calm, and anger to calmness, (and we rhetoricians are bound to be equally acquainted with both sides of every question), we must now proceed to ascertain the several
καὶ πρὸς τίνας πρᾶσιν ἔχουσι καὶ διὰ τίνων πραύνον-2 ται ἐστὶν δὴ πράσσως κατάστασις καὶ ἡρέμησις ὀρ-3 γῆς. εἰ οὖν ὀργίζονται τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσιν, ὀλιγωρία δὲ ἐστὶν ἐκούσιον, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν τούτων ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἀκούσιως ποιοῦσιν ἢ φαινομένοις τοιοῦτος
4 πρᾶοι εἰσίν. καὶ τοῖς τάναντια ὧν ἐποίησαν βουλο-
μένοις. καὶ ὅσοι καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰς αὐτοὺς τοιοῦτοι· οὐ-
5 δὲις γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ δοκεῖ ὀλιγωρεῖν. καὶ τοῖς ὁμο-
λογοῦσι καὶ μεταμελομένοις ὡς γὰρ ἔχουσε δίκην τὸ
λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς πεπουμένοις παῦνται τῆς ὀργῆς.
σημεῖον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν οἰκετῶν κολάσεως· τοὺς μὲν p. 60.
γὰρ ἀντιλέγοντας καὶ ἀρνομένους μᾶλλον κολάζο-
dispositions of calmness (in the subject), the states of mind (in the objects)
which are regarded with calmness (sang-froid), and the means of bringing
them into this state'.

§ 2. ἐστω] See note on 1 5, 3, 6.2, &c. 1 Let it be assumed then (as sufficient
for our purpose) that the process or growth of this even and indifferent
state of mind is a subsiding or settling down, and a process tending to
rest (a quieting process) of the motion (i.e. excitement, ferment, ebullition)
of anger.' "In V. Nat. Ausc. [φυσικής ἀκροάτες, E p. 230 a 4.] (32, ἢ γὰρ
εἰς αὐτὸ κίνησις ἐν ᾧ ἐστηκεν, ἡρέμησις μᾶλλον ἐστιν) valet Aristoteli ἡρέμησις,
via progressusque ad quietem". Victorius.

§ 3. 'If then anger is roused by slight, and slight is voluntary (i.e.
intentional), it plainly follows that to those who do none of these things
(the various kinds of ὀλιγωρία enumerated in this last chapter) or do it
unintentionally, or have that appearance (though they may in reality
have intended a slight), men are calm (quiet, placable, take no offence)'.

§ 4. 'And to those who offer a slight without intending it (with
the contrary intention). And to those whose feelings or dispositions and
conduct' (both included in τοιοῦτοι) 'are alike to themselves and to the
others (lit. who behave in the same way towards themselves); for
no one is ever supposed to slight himself'.

§ 5. 'And to those who offer a slight, and then repent of it; for, accept-
ing as a sort of satisfaction the pain felt at what has been done, their
anger ceases. A sign of this is what happens in the punishment of slaves;
for those that answer, or contradict us, and deny the fault, we punis-
more severely, whilst we cease to be angry with those that admit the
justice of their punishment'.

μεταμελομένοις] ἀκούσιων δὲ τὸ ἐπιλυσων καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ...τοῦ δὴ δὲ
So that repentance is a sign that the act was unintentional, and from
ignorance of the probable effect.

ἀντιλέγοντας] Arist. Ran. 1072, λαλιαν καὶ στομολιαν ἢ ἐξεκένωσεν τάς
τε παλαίστρας, καὶ τοὺς παράλους ἀνέπεισεν ἀνταγωνεῖν τοῖς ἄρχονσιν.

AR. 11.
πρὸς τῶν ὁμολογοῦντας] Schrader refers in illustration to Terent. Andr. III 5. 15, Pamph. annon dixi esse hoc futurum? Dav. dixti. Pamph. quin meritus's? Dav. crucem....Pamph. (who is mollified by the admission) hei mihi, cum non habeo spatium ut de te sumam supplicium, ut volo. Jul. Cæsar, IV 3, 116, Brut. When I spoke that, I was ill-tempered too. Cass. Do you confess so much? Give me your hand. ‘The cause of this (of the heavier punishment of those that aggravate their offence by denying it), is that to deny evident facts is effrontery’ (ἀναισχυντια is a want of respect for the opinions and feelings of others), ‘and effrontery implies slight regard and contempt—at all events we feel no respect for’ (αἰσχύνεσθαι τινα, note on II 2. 22) ‘those whom we greatly despise’. This is an argument in support of the assertion that ἀναισχυντια implies ὀλυγωρία and καταφρόνησις. ἀναισχυντια is ‘disrespect’; now as experience shows that we do treat with disrespect those whom we very much despise, it follows from this that disrespect, effrontery, impudence, must carry with it, as its outward expression, the feeling of contempt. Comp. c. 6 § 2, ἢ δ' ἀναισχυντια ὀλυγωρία τις.

ἀναισχυντια τὸ τὰ φανερὰ ἁρπείσθαι] The sausage- (or black-pudding-) monger in the Knights (296) is a perfect model of this kind of effrontery. Cleon, who is represented as not overburdened with modesty, candidly admits his thefts, ὁμολογῷ κλέπτειν σὺ δ' οὐχί. The other lays his hands upon something under the very eyes of the bystanders, and then swears that he never touched it: νῦ τὸν Ἐρμῆν τὸν ἄγοραίν, κατηρκᾶ γε βλεπόντων.

§ 6. What follows, though put forward as an independent topic, may also be regarded as the explanation of the second member of the alternative, the mitigation of the penalty consequent upon the admission of the offender.

‘And to those who humble themselves before us, and do not answer or contradict us; for in doing so they seem to admit their inferiority, and (conscious) inferiority implies fear, (not contemptuous indifference), and no one in that state of mind is ever guilty of a slight’. (Fear and anger cannot coexist, § 10.) ‘That our anger does cease towards those who humble themselves before us, is shewn also by the habit which dogs have of not biting those that sit down (when they attack them)’. This fact in the natural history of dogs is attested not only by Homer—Od. § 26 ἐξαιτίης δ' Ὁδυσσα ἰδον κἀκε ἐκλαμάμωροι' οἱ μὲν κεκληγόντες ἐπέδραμον, αὐτάρ Ὅδυσσεύς ἦτο κερδοσύνη, σκήπτρον δὲ οἱ ἐκπεσε χειρος—but also by the experience of modern travellers in Albania [see esp. Mure’s Tour in Greece
7 ἴργη, καὶ οἱ κύνες δηλοῦσιν οὐ δικιόντες τοὺς καθ-7 ἵκωντας. καὶ τοῖς σπουδάζουσι πρὸς τοὺς σπουδά-7 ἵκωντας· δοκεῖ γὰρ σπουδάζεσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ καταφρο-8 νεῖσθαι. καὶ τοῖς μείζω κεχαρισμένοις. καὶ τοῖς9 δεομένοις καὶ παρατουμένοις· ταπεινότεροι γὰρ. καὶ10 τοῖς μὴ υβρισταῖς μηδὲ χλενασταῖς μηδ' ὀλγυφοῖς, ή11 εἰς μηδένα ή μὴ εἰς χρηστοὺς μηδ' εἰς τοιοῦτοις οὐ10 περ αὐτοὶ. ὅλωσ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων δεὶ σκοπεῖν τὰ12 πράγματικα. καὶ οὐς φοβοῦνται ή αἰσχύνονται· ἐως

1 93—100 or De Quincey's review XIII 301—9]. I myself heard of it there. In illustration of καθιζοντας, sitting as a suppliant posture, Victorius cites Soph. Ocd. R. init. τίνας ποθ' ἐδρας τάδε κ.τ.λ. Arist. Plut. 352, ὁρῶ τιν13 ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος κοβεδούμενον, ἵκετριαν ἵχωνα. Demosth. de Cor. § 107 οὐκ εὖν Μυστίκη ἐκάθευστο (took sanctuary at the altar of Artemis in Munychia).  

§ 7. 'And to those who are serious with the serious' (earnest in anything—the opposite of those who joke παίζουσι, or use irony, when you are disposed to be serious, which makes you angry; c. 2 § 24); 'because then you consider yourself to be treated seriously' (which implies respect, that you are worthy of serious consideration), 'and not with contempt (as in the other case, in which people seem to 'make a joke' of you). 

σπουδάζεσθαι καὶ καταφρονεῖσθαι] On this formation of the passive, see Append. B on 1 12. 22 (at the end of the notes to Book 1).

§ 8. 'And to those who have done us more kindness and service (than they have received from us)'. The explanation of this is not given because it is too clear to require one. It is that this superiority in conferring favours constitutes a debt and an obligation on the part of the inferior in this social commerce, whose account is on the debit side in the books of the other; who is therefore obliged to him, and disinclined to resent any real or supposed offence: the gratitude overpowers the sense of slight.

'And those who beg for anything and deprecate our wrath or resentment'—both of these are confessions of inferiority, we acknowledge that we are in want of something, a deficiency which they can supply, and this shews superiority—'for they are humbler' (than they would otherwise be, if they didn't want anything).

§ 9. 'And those who are not given to wanton outrage, or to mockery, or slight'—the opposite dispositions and conduct being of all the most provocative of anger, C. 2 §§ 3, 5, 12—'either such as never indulge them against any one, or never against the good and worthy, or never against those who are like ourselves'.

§ 10. 'And as a general rule, the things (words or deeds) that are productive (in our intercourse with others) of a calm temper' (a quiet, indifferent, unexcited state of feeling; πραφτης is purely negative; I believe, strictly speaking, that it is no true πάθος at all, and is better represented as a virtue or mean state in the Ethics) 'may be ascertained from their
The presence of those that we are afraid of, or stand in awe of, makes us calm: for as long as we are in this state of mind we cannot feel anger; because fear and anger cannot coexist in the mind.

§ II. 'At offences committed under the influence of passion we either feel no anger at all, or in a less degree; because in this case the offence appears not to be due to slight; for no one when angry with another can feel indifferent about him and his proceedings; because a contemptuous and indifferent state of mind, or slight, implies the absence of pain, whereas anger is always accompanied by it.' ὑγγ γ' ὑρεξις μετὰ λύπης, defn. II 2.1. "Eodem argumento Eth. Nic. III (4, III β 17) distinxit προαίρεσιν a cupiditate: καὶ ἦ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδεσ καὶ ἐπιλυπήν, ἢ δὲ προαιρέσις οὔτε λυπηροὶ οὐθ' ἡδεσ". Victorius.

τοις δὲ ὑγγ γ' ποιήσασιν] As here the influence of passion mitigates the offensiveness of an act, and the amount of provocation caused by it, so in Eth. Nic. v. το, 1135 β 19, ὅταν εἰδως μὲν ἡ προβολεύσας δὲ, ἀδίκημα, οἶν οὖσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἀλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαία ἡ φυσικά, συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, it diminishes its criminality. The supposition is, that a man who kills another, for instance, in a fit of passion, is blinded by it, deprived thereby of the knowledge of the particular circumstances of the case, which is necessary to constitute guilt, Eth. N. III 2, and the want of which exempts in some degree from responsibility; there is no malice prepense which makes the complete crime. The question of the degree in which acts of this kind can be properly called involuntary is briefly discussed in c. 3 of the same book.

§ 12. 'Again, an offence from one who stands in awe of us', does not provoke us to anger, because we know or guess that from one who
ραοι εισιν, οιον εν παιδια, εν γελωτι, εν εορτη, εν 
ευημερια, εν κατορθωσει, εν πληρωσει, δολος εν αλυ-
παν και ηδονη μη υβριστικη και εν ελπιδι ετεικει.

13 οτι κεχροικοτες και μη υπογνιοι τη οργη οντες· πανει
habitually regards us with awe or reverence the offence is unintentional,
being inconsistent with his ordinary feeling toward us. 'Also it is plain
that men are calm and placable when they are in any state (in any con-
dition or circumstances, internal or external) which is antagonistic to
angry feeling, as when engaged in any sport or amusement, when they
are laughing, at a feast, in fine weather (or in a prosperous state), in
success, in a state of repletion or satisfaction; in short, in any condition
of freedom from pain (negative pleasure), or (positive) pleasure—except
that of wanton outrage (ὑβρις is always ὅτως ἤρθη, II 2. 5)—and of
virtuous, good hope'. Of ετεικης it is said, Eth. N. v. 14, init. μεταφέρω-
μεν αυτη του αγαθου. It can be substituted, by metaphor, for αγαθου. The
bad state of mind implied by a vicious hope does not exclude the feeling
of anger.

ευημερια] It is hard to say whether this is meant for a 'fine day',
'fine weather', like ειδια, which certainly tends to placidity of temper,
and general ευημαρια and ευκολια—(in which sense it is actually used in
Hist. Anim. vi 15. 6, οταν ευημεριας γενομενης αναθεματιστην η γη, and
again § 7, οταν ευημεριας, and Xenoph. Hellen. II 4. 2, και μαλ' ευημεριας,
ουσις, Soph. Aj. 799, λευκων ευμερον φαος)—or metaphorically, for a
'state of prosperity, health and happiness', in which sense ευημερος,
ευημερειν and ευημερια are employed. See again Hist. Anim.
VIII 18. 1, ευημερουσι δε (are in a flourishing condition) τα ζωα κατα τος 
αρας κ.λ. v I I. 5, προς την άλλην του σωματος ευημεριαν. Pol.III 6. 1278 b 29, ας ευνουσης
των ευημεριας εν αετω (τω ζωα) και γλυκυττρος φυσικης. iv (VII) 2, 1324 a 38,
εμποδιον τη περι αυτου ευημερια (of the prosperity of a country).
vii (VI) 8, 1322 b 38, ευημεροσταται ποδεστει, viii (V) 8, 1308 b 24, το ευημερον
της πολεως. And in the same sense ευημεριας γενομενης δε ειρηνην κ.λ. ,
of a state, as before, VIII (V) 6, 1306' b 11. De Gen. An. iv 6. 16, ευημερειω
τοις σωμασιν. Eth. Nic. I 9, sub fin. της ταιωνης ευημεριας, including all
the elements of happiness or prosperity, according to the vulgar notion.
In Aristotle at all events the preponderance of usage is decidedly on the
side of the metaphorical application.

§ 13. 'Further (men are brought to a calm or placid state of mind)
by lapse of time when they are no longer fresh (in their anger (when their
anger is no longer fresh) ; for time brings anger to an end'.

χρονιζειν is 'to pass' or 'spend time', κεχροικοτες, men that have
'already passed some time', since the angry fit came on. For examples
of the use of the word see the Lexx. υπογνιοι, 'fresh, recent', of things
still under the hand of the workman. See note on I 1. 7.

Gaisford quotes in illustration of the topic, Thucyd. III 38, (Cleon) 
θαυ-
mαξα μεν των προθεσιων αδις περι Μυτιληνιων λεγει, και χρονων διατρηδη 
εμποιησατον ας εστι προς των ηδυκηκατων μαλλων. ου γαρ παθων το δρασια 
αμβλυτερα τη οργη επεξερχεται. And Eustath. ad II. Ω, p. 1342. 46, ο δι 
mεσου καιρος μαλατης την εν τοις θυμουμενοις σκληρωτη, αυτει ηθελευειν των
γὰρ ὀργήν ὁ χρόνος. παύει δὲ καὶ ἐτέρου ὀργῆν μείξω
ἡ παρ' ἄλλου ληφθείσα τιμωρία πρότερον· διὸ εὖ
Φιλοκράτης, εἰπόντος τινὸς ὀργίζομένου τοῦ δήμου "τί
οὐκ ἀπολογεῖτ'" "οὕτω γε" ἔφη. "ἀλλὰ πότε;
"οταν ἄλλον ἓδω διαβεβλημένον." πράοι γὰρ γίγι-
νονταί ὅταν εἰς ἄλλον τὴν ὀργὴν ἀναλώσωσιν, οἶνον
eἰπώντα ὅτι (Soph. Electr. 179) χρόνος εὐμαρής θεός. Βιργ. Αεν. ν 781,
Iunonis gravis ira, nec exsaturabile pectus, quam nec longa dies pietas
nec mitigat ulla (Victorius), describes the implacability, the lasting
nature, of Juno's anger, which is the direct opposite of πράοτης. This
is πικρότης: οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται, Eth. N. .iv
11, 1126 a 20: likewise κάτος, rancorous, vindictive wrath, said of one who
πέττει τὴν ὀργὴν, (nurses his wrath to keep it warm. Burns.) Ib. line 25.
And opposed to these are the ὀργίλοι (irascible), ὀξεῖς, ἀκρόχολοι, (ita Bekk.)
Ib. line 18; these παχέος ὀργίζονται and παύονται παχέος, lines 13, 15.
'And again a more violent animosity conceived against one person is
appeased by punishment previously exacted from another (who may not
have excited it so strongly): and therefore the saying of Philocrates was
to the point, when some one asked at a time of popular excitement
against him, 'why do not you defend yourself?' 'No, not yet', he replied.
'Well, but when?' 'As soon as I have seen some one else under accusa-
tion', (or 'under a similar suspicion': διαβάλλειν, 'to set two people at
variance', being specially applied to 'calumny'). 'For men recover their
calmness and evenness of temper, as soon as they have expended their
anger upon another object'. So Eth. N., u. s., 1126 a 21, παύει δὲ γίνεται
ὅταν ἀντιποθισαι ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονή ἀντὶ τῆς λύτης
ἐμποτίσα. "Tanta enim'est primi impetus in ira vis, ut cupiditatem
fere omnem effundat." Schrader. He also cites from Plutarch's Life of
Alexander the case of Alexander the Great, who expended his anger
against the Greeks on the destruction of Thebes, and afterwards spared
Athens. Victorius supplies a very pertinent passage from Lysias, Or. xix
ὑπὲρ τῶν 'Αριστοφάνους χρημάτων §§ 5, 6, ἀκοῦὼ γὰρ ἐγώ...οτὶ πάντων
dεινότατον ἐστὶ διαβολή μάλιστα δὲ τούτο ἔχοι ἀν τις δεινότατον, ὅταν πολ-
λοι ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῇ αἰτίᾳ εἰς ἅγωνα καταστῶσιν ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οἱ τελευταῖοι
κρώμενοι σῶζονται πεπαμμένοι γὰρ ὀργῆς αὐτῶν ἀκροάσθε, καὶ τοὺς ἐλέγχους
ηδὶ ἑβελόντες ἀποδέχεσθε.
On Philocrates, of the Attic deme Hagnus ('Ἀγρούσιος), a contempo-
rary and political rival of Demosthenes, see two columns of references
from the Orators, chiefly Demosthenes and Aeschines, in Baiter and
Sappe's excellent Index nominum, appended to their edition of the
Greek Orators, III 137 seq. [See also Arnold Schaefer's Demosthenes und
seine Zeit, II 345 and elsewhere. s.]
'As happened in the case of Ergophilus; for though they (the Athe-
nian assembly) were more indignant with him than with Callisthenes,
they let him off, because they had condemned Callisthenes to death the
day before'. Callisthenes and Ergophilus were both of them Athenian
generals commanding in the Chersonese, B. c. 362. See Grote, Hist. of
§ 13. Or a declaration, the symptoms, in the punishment, of the abuse of that which is done, or the desire to do it, or the desire of others to have it done, or the desire of others to avoid it. 

§ 14. ‘Sympathy or compassion calms angry feeling; and if the offence (which has aroused their indignation) has been visited by a heavier punishment than those who are thus angry would themselves have inflicted (their anger is appeased); for they think they have received a sort of (στέσθαι) satisfaction (for the injury),’ or ‘exacted as it were a penalty (for the offence).’

§ 15. ‘Or again, if they think that they are themselves in fault, and are suffering no more than they deserve; for justice, ‘reciprocity’, or fair retaliation, excites no anger: and so they no longer think that the treatment they receive is in violation of their natural rights, and this, as we said, is essential to (or the notion of) anger. ’

§ 16. ‘And men in anger are more easily pacified if they think that (those that they desire to punish) will never find out that the punishment is due to them (that they are the authors of it) and that it is in compensation for their own injuries’; (this is the φαινομένη διεργασία of the defi-
γὰρ ὅργη τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐστὶν ὁ δήλον ὅ’ ἕκ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ. διὸ ὅρθως πεποίηται

φάσθαι Ὅδυσσηα πτολιπόρθιον, ὥσ ὦν τετιμωρημένος εἶ μὴ ἡσθετο καὶ ὑφ’ ὦ καὶ ἀνθ’ ὄτου. ὥστε ὦτε τοῖς ἀλλοίς ὅσοι μὴ αἰσθάνονται ὅργις ὁντιοι, ὦτε τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν ἔτι, ὥσ πεποίητοι σε τὸ ἐσχατόν καὶ οὐκ ἀληθοῦσιν οὐδ’ αἰσθησομένοις, οὐ οἱ ὅργιζόμενοι ἐφίενται. διὸ εὖ περὶ τοῦ "Εκτορὸς ὁ ποιητὴς, παῦσαι βουλόμενος τὸν Ἀχιλλέα τῆς ὅργης τεθνεῶτος,

κωφὴν γὰρ δὴ γαίαν ἀεικλίζει μενεάτων.

ntion: see note on p. 10, ‘for anger is always directed against individuals, (II 2. 2, infra 4. 31, where this is made the characteristic of anger, as opposed to hatred,) as appears from the definition’. This inference from the definition is drawn from the φαινόμενα τιμορία which is the object of the angry man. If the punishment is to be such as can be actually seen, the anger cannot be directed against abstractions like classes or kinds, but must have a single, palpable, concrete, and also animated object; something that can feel, and shew that it is hurt.

‘And therefore (the trait of character, the representation, in) the verse’ (of Homer, Odys. ix 504) ‘is right and true (to nature, rightly conceived and expressed), “Tell him that it is Ulysses waster of cities (that blinded him)”—as though his revenge was not complete’ (i. e. the revenge of Ulysses, or of the character in Homer; which is the suppressed nomin. to πεποίηται, and with which τετιμωρημένοι agrees: lit. the character is rightly represented in the verses as not fully avenged) ‘unless the other (the Cyclops) was aware by whom and for what’ (the blindness was inflicted).

The passage runs thus: Κῦλωψ, αἳ κέν τίς σε καταβυτητον ἀνθρώπων ὀφθαλμοι εἴρηται ἀεικελήν ἄλωτον, φάσθαι Ὅδυσσηα πτολιπόρθιον ἐξαλαῶσαι, ὅπων Λαέρτεω, ἵθαξα ἐν ὁλι’ ἔχοτα. ‘So that men are not angry with all the rest (all besides those who are actually within reach), who are out of sight (far away, for instance), nor any more with the dead’ (ἔτι, they do not retain their anger beyond the grave) ‘as with those who have endured the last extremity, and are no longer susceptible of pain, nor indeed of any feeling, which (to give the other pain and to make him feel) is what the angry man aims at. And therefore the poet (Homer, Iliad, Ω 54) has well said of Hector, wishing to represent Achilles as ceasing from his anger against the dead (lit. wishing to put a stop to his anger, i. e. represent it as ceasing): “For in truth it is but dumb (senseless) earth that he is outraging in his wrath.”’ Or rather, παῦσαι βουλόμενος means to suggest or assign a reason or motive for Achilles’ ceasing from his anger: the words being those of Apollo, who is haranguing the
17. I, instead of the character Apollo, represented in the poem, are an instance of a not unfrequent confusion in expressions of this kind. It is the substitution of the author himself for his personage or character; or the conversion of the doctrine of a given philosopher or school into the philosopher or school that holds it. Plat. Rep. ii 363 b, τοις δὲ ἀνασίουσιν ἀποκύτωσιν ἐν Ἀιδοῦ, καὶ κοσκίνῳ ὀδόρν ἀναγκάζουσιν φέρειν, of Musaeus and the Orphics, who 'represent them as buried, and compelled to carry...' Theaet. 183 A, ίνα μὴ στήσαμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ, the Heraclitans to wit, 'that we may not represent them as stopping'—contrary to their doctrine of the universal flux. Similarly the Eleatics, Ib. 157 A, are called οἱ ἱσταντες, 'the stationers,' meaning those who represent every thing as stationary or at rest. So Soph. 252 A, the opposition school, of Heraclitus, receives the name of οἱ ἰέντες, 'the fluent philosophers,' 'the flowing gentry,' instead of their theory: and compare Theaet. 181 A, τῶν τὰ ἀκίνητα κινοῦντων. A good example is Thuc, i 5, οἱ πολιαί τῶν ποιητῶν τὰ πόντες τῶν καταπλέοντων...ἐρωτώτες εἰληφταί εἰσον, making their characters put these questions. Arist. Ran. 15, if the vulg. be retained (Meineke omits it), Ib. 833, ἔτερατέντο, 911 (Aeschylus), πράσιστα μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν καθισμὸν (introduced in a sitting position) ἐγκαλύψει. In Aristotle it is still more common: de Gen. Anim. 722 b 19, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς γεννᾷ. Metaph. A 8, 989 b 34, οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι...γεννώσετο τῶν οὐρανῶν, de Anima 1 2, 405 a 25, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος...ἐξ ἴσης τάλας συνηστάσει, 'of which he represents, holds theoretically, everything else to be composed.' Ib. 404 b 16 and 24, (certain philosophers) τὴν ψυχὴν συνιστάσιν. De Gen. et Corr. i 1, 314 a 9, ὅσοι πάντα ἐξ ἐνός γεννώσετο, and b 1, τοῖς ἐξ ἐνός πάντα κατασκευάσοντο. De part. Anim. i 1 21, 630 b 11, οὕτως τὸν κόσμον γεννώσετο, and § 22, 640 b 17, ἐκ τῶν τοιοῦτων σωμάτων συνιστάσθη τὴν φύσιν πάντες. See Dr Lightfoot's notes on Ep. ad Gal. vi 13, οἱ περιπεριμένονες, 'the Circumcisionists,' the advocates of Circumcision. Similarly in Latin, Juven. vii 151, quin perimit saenos classis numerosa tyrannos. Hor. Sat. ii 5 41, Furius hibernas cana nive consuet Alpes.

§ 17. 'It is plain therefore that those who want to soothe a man down (bring him down to a placid state from the exaltation of his passion) must derive their propositions (or the traits of character) from these topics, presenting themselves in such a light—assuming such a character themselves—as is represented in the foregoing analysis, and the objects of their anger as either formidable, or worthy of high respect, or benefactors, or involuntary agents, or as excessively afflicted at what they have done.' αἰσχύνη here is the feeling of reverence or awe which is felt in the presence of any one who is entitled to unusual respect or admiration (see note on c. 2. 22); and αἰσχύνης ἄξιος is equivalent to τοιοῦτως πρὸς τὸν αἰσχύνην ἄξιος: and ὑπεραλγοῦντας is the representative of the μεταμελόμενοι of § 5.
I have already hinted a doubt in the notes on the preceding chapter whether πράσης is properly ranked amongst the πάθη. I think that it can be made plainly to appear that it is not. It is introduced no doubt for the purpose of giving the opposite side to the topics of anger, because the student of Rhetoric is in every case required to be acquainted with both sides of a question. And this purpose it may answer very well without being a real opposite of ὀργή or indeed a πάθος at all. If we compare πράσης with the other πάθη analysed in this second book, we find that it differs from all of them in this respect—that the rest are emotions, instinctive and active, and tend to some positive result; whereas πράσης is inactive and leads to nothing but the alloying, subduing, lowering, of the angry passion, which it reduces to a particular state, the right or mean state of temper. It seems plain therefore that it is in reality, what it is stated to be in the Ethics, a ἐξίς, not a πάθος, of the temper; an acquired and settled state of one of the πάθη, viz. ὀργή, in the mean state (or due measure) of which (the πάθη) all virtue resides. It is accordingly represented in the Ethics as a virtue, the mean between irascibility and insensibility, the due measure of the passionate element or emotion of our nature; and as a virtue it is the control or regulation of our temper. The true πάθος is the ὀργή, the instinctive capacity of angry feeling, which may be cultivated by habit and education and developed in either direction, for good or evil; till it becomes ὀργιλότης irascibility, or ἀγοργησία insensibility—if it take a wrong direction—or else settles into the mean state of a calm and placid temper. And this is the view that is taken of it in Nic. Eth. iv 11, init. πράσης is μεσότης περὶ ὀργῆς; Ib. 1125 θ 30, τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἑστὶν ὀργῆς; line 34, βουλετάται γὰρ ὁ πράσος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀγεσθαί ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀν ὁ λόγος τάξιν οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτος καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρώμαν χαλεπαίνειν. This is doubtless the correct view; and the other, though no doubt subsequent to that of the Ethics, is adopted in the Rhetoric merely for convenience, philosophical accuracy not being required. Compare the introductory note to this Chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

1. 'Let us now proceed, after having first defined love and loving, to analyse its objects, motives or occasions'.

§ 2. ἐστῶ] as usual, in the popular Rhetoric. See note on 1 5, 8, &c.

'Let love then be assumed to be, the wishing to another whatever we think good, for his sake, not for our own, and the inclination to do such things (to do him good) to the utmost of our power'. Eth. Nic. viii 3, sub init. ὡς δὲ φιλούντες ἄλληλους βουλοίται τὰ γάθα ἄλληλους ταύτης ἢ φιλούσιν. This makes the nearest approach to a regular definition of φιλία in the Ethics, and is constantly recognised as the principle of love through-
out the treatise on \textit{philia}, in Books VIII and IX. It represents the desire or the inclination of doing good to the object of your affection, which is naturally, or has become by habit, instinctive, and therefore a \textit{πάθος}. In both definitions \textit{βουλέσθαι} is prominent and characteristic. Love is a feeling, a sort of appetite, the wish to do good; the power and the means of doing good being alike accidental and non-essential, though it is true (which is here added to the definition) that the inclination is always present, and will be gratified when the means are forthcoming. The words \textit{έκεινο} \textit{ένεκα} \textit{άλλα} \textit{μὴ} \textit{άυτο} express the unselfishness, the disinterested character, of the emotion. \textit{ό} \textit{δὲ} \textit{βουλόμενο} \textit{τιν} \textit{εὐτραγεῖν} \textit{εὐπλῆ} \textit{έχου} \textit{εὐπορίας} \textit{δὴ} \textit{έκεινο} \textit{οὐκ} \textit{έουσ} \textit{έφυσ} \textit{έκεινο} \textit{έιναι}, \textit{άλλα} \textit{μᾶλλον} \textit{εαυτῷ}, \textit{καθάπερ \ οὐδὲ} \textit{φίλος}, \textit{εἰ} \textit{θερασεῖ} \textit{εαυτῶν} \textit{διὰ} \textit{τῶν} \textit{χρήσιν} (Eth. Nic. IX 5 sub fin.). Cicero, de Nat. Deor. I ult. (quoted by Schrader), has the same remark. He adds, ‘Prata et arva et pecudum greges diliguntur isto modo quod fructus ex iis capiuntur. Hominum caritas et amicitia gratuita est.’

‘And a friend is one that loves, and is beloved in return. And those that have this disposition, or entertain this feeling to one another’. \textit{ένον} \textit{γὰρ} \textit{έν} \textit{άντιπεπονθῶσιν} \textit{φίλιαν} \textit{έιναι}. Eth. N. VIII 2, 1155 b 34.

§ 3. ‘From this assumption the necessary consequence is that a friend is one who sympathizes with us in our joys and sorrows, rejoicing at the good that befalls us, and grieved at that which gives us pain, not with any ulterior motive; but solely on our friend’s account. For all feel joy in obtaining the object of their wishes, and pain at the reverse, so that the pleasures and pains that they feel are an indication of the nature of their wish’. The pleasure or pain felt on the occasion of a friend’s good or bad fortune is the test of the nature of their wishes, and therefore of their friendship or hatred. And also, as every one feels pleasure at \textit{his} \textit{own} success and pain at disappointment, so by the rule \textit{φίλος} \textit{άλλος} \textit{άυτός}, \textit{έτερος} \textit{άυτός}, ‘a friend is a second self’, (Eth. N. IX 4, 1166 a 31, 9, sub init. et 1170 b 6), the test of friendship is this community of pleasure and pain between friend and friend. \textit{Idem velle alque idem nolle ea demum firma amicitia est}, says Sallust. This same principle of ‘fellow-feeling’ as the basis of friendship (which is here principally in question) runs through the following sections to § 7.’ Zeno, the Stoic, \textit{ἐρωτηθεῖσι}, \textit{τί} \textit{ἔστι} \textit{φίλος}; \textit{άλλος}, \textit{ἐφη}, \textit{ἔγω.} Diog. Laert. VII 1, (Zeno) § 23.¹

¹ The reverse of the medal is presented by the cynical La Rochefoucauld, \textit{Maxime} 81, ‘Nous ne pouvons rien aimer que par rapport a nous, et nous ne
§ 4. "And those who have now (by this time, ἂδη) learnt to regard the same things as good and bad (to each), 'id est, qui eandem fortunam subiere, et in eum statum ac conditionem vitae venere, ut quod aliis molestum sit ipsis quoque incommodet, et quod alios iuvet codem pacto ipsos sublevet' (Victorius); 'and those who have the same friends and the same enemies; for between such there must needs be a community of wishes, (good to the common friend, harm to the common enemy); and therefore, by wishing for another the same things that he desires for himself, a man plainly shows that he is that man's friend'. See the illustrations from the Eth. N. quoted in the preceding note. For καὶ οἷς δὴ (Αε and Bekker), Ω, Υb and Ζb have ἂδη, which is the reading of Victorius, and is supported by Vater. The latter notes (as I had myself observed) that δὴ 'you know', 'to be sure', to attract attention, is not at all in Aristotle's manner (it is Platonic, not Aristotelian) in a mere enumeration like this. I doubt if there is another instance of it in the Rhetoric. ἂδη on the contrary, which Victorius has represented in his explanation, is quite in point, and in fact adds something to the sense.

§ 5. "And men love their benefactors in general, (those who have done good) either to themselves or to those whom they care for; or those who have done them great and important services, or have shewn forwardness; readiness, in doing them; or if they were done on similar, i.e. great, occasions (when the need was urgent, or the benefit signal), and for their sakes alone; or those whom they suppose to wish to do them good': the manifest inclination, τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων, § 2, being, as a test of friendship, equivalent to the actual performance. For ἂν, Murctus, Wolf, and Brandis' Anonymus (in Schneidewin's Philol. Iv. i. p. 46) read καὶ οἷς, as the commencement of a new topic.

faisons que suivre notre goît et notre plaisir quand nous préférons nos amis nous-mêmes; c'est néanmoins par cette préférence seule que l'amitié peut être vraie et parfaite," and 83, "Ce que les hommes ont nommé amitié n'est qu'une société, qu'un ménagement réciproque d'intérêts, et qu'un échange de bons offices; ce n'est enfin qu'un commerce où l'amour propre se propose toujours quelque chose à gagner." The author of the Leviathan takes an equally low view of human nature, and derives from self-love, in some form or other, all our emotions and desires. They are all reducible to 'appetite' or 'desire'. "That which men desire they are also said to love: and to hate those things for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the same thing; save that by desire we always signify the absence of the object; by love most commonly the presence of the same." Hobbes, Leviathan, Pt. i. ch. 6. For a philosophical analysis of the 'Tender Emotion,' its origin and varieties, see Bain, Emotions and Will, Ch. vi [Ch. vii, ed. 1875].
εἰ έν τοιούτωι καίροις, καί αὐτῶι ἑνεκα· ἵνα ὡς ἄν ὁ ὀίωνται βούλεσθαι ποιεῖν εὖ. καί τοὺς τῶν φίλων φίλους καί φιλοῦντας οὐς αὐτοί φιλοῦσιν. καί τοὺς
7 φιλομένους ὑπὸ τῶν φιλομένων εαυτοῖς. καί τοὺς
τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔχθροις καί μισοῦντας οὐς αὐτοί μισοῦσιν,
καί τοὺς μισομένους ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτοῖς μισομένων
πᾶσι γὰρ τούτους ταύτα ἀγαθά φαίνεται εἶναι καί
εαυτοῖς, ὥστε βούλεσθαι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθά, ὥ περ ἦν
8 τοῦ φίλου. ἐτὶ τοὺς εὐποιητικοὺς εἰς χρῆματα καί

τοιούτωι] 'such as, similar to' the before-mentioned, i.e. μεγάλοις.
With this use of τοιούτως comp. Pl. Phaedo 59 A, 67 A, 79 C, 80 C, εἰς τις
χαριέτως ἐξων τὸ σῶμα καί ἐν τοιαῦτη ἁρα, 'at a similar period of life',
like the preceding, i.e. χαριέσθη. (See Stallbaum's note.) Thuc. III 58, Παυσανίας
ἔδαπτον αὐτούς νομίζουν ἐν γῇ τε φιλία τιθέναι καί παρ' ἀνδράσι τοιούτωσ 'and
amongst men of the same sort', i.e. φίλοις. Demosth. de F. Leg. § 103,
καί τούναντίον ὀργῆν, ἄν τοιαῦτα φαίνεται πεποιηκός, sc. ὀργῆς ἄξια. Arist.
Pol. 1 8, 1256 a 36, οἱ δ' ἀδρ' ἀλείας, ὅσοι λίμνας καί ἐλη καί παταμοῦν ἡ
θᾶλαταν τοιαῦτην προσοικοικίαν, 'who live by a sea of the same kind', i.e.
of the same kind as the before-mentioned lakes, marshes, rivers, in
which fish are to be found. Ib. II 4, 1262 b 1, ἢτον γὰρ ἔσται φιλία……
δεὶ δε τοιούτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους, sc. ἢτον φίλους. Ib. VIII (V) 10,
1310 b 12, ἢ καθ' ὑπεροχήν τοιούτου γένους 'a similar family', to the
preceding.

§ 6. 'And friends' friends, that is (καί) the friends of those whom we
love ourselves'. And those who are beloved by those that are beloved
by ourselves'. If friendship is mutual, surely this is a 'vain repetition'.

§ 7. 'And those who have the same enemies, or hate the same people
that we ourselves hate, and those that are hated by the same people as
we are hated by: for all such persons suppose the same things to be
good as we do ourselves, and therefore they wish the same things as
we do; which was the definition of a friend'. § 2, βούλεσθαι τιν ἄ διεται
ἀγαθά. These common hatreds, founded on the principle of idem velle
alque idem nolle, and expressed in the proverb κοινά τά φίλων,
are one of the strongest bonds of union by which religious and political
parties, for example, are held together. On κοινά τά φίλων, see Plat. Legg. v
10, 739 C, a passage worth comparing on this subject of 'communism':
chapter, on this topic; καὶ ἡ παραμία "κοινά τά φίλων" ὄρθος, ἐν κοινωνία
γάρ ἡ φιλία, 1159 b 32. And on the same, IX 8, 1168 b 6, καὶ αἱ παραμίαι
δὲ πάσαι ὑμογραμμωνοῦσιν, οἱ πο το "μία ψυχῇ" καὶ "κοινά τά φίλων" καί
"ἴσοτις φιλότις" καὶ "γόνων κνήμης ἐγγύων" κ.τ.λ.
τοῦ φίλου] Anglice, 'a friend'; on the generic use of the Greek
definite article see note on § 31 of this Chapter.

§ 8. 'Again, those who are capable of and inclined to'(both of which are
contained in the termination -ικὸς) 'do service to others in the way of assist-
ance, either pecuniary, or tending to their personal safety: and this is why the liberal, and brave, and just are held in honour. The liberal aid them with money; the brave defend them from personal injury (εἰς σωτηρίαν); and the just are always ready at least to pay their debts, and if they don't do them any positive service, at any rate can be depended upon to abstain from fraud and wrong. This is the utilitarian view of virtue, which we have had already very prominently brought forward in 1 9; see for instance §§ 4, 6. Comp. 1 6.6.

§ 9. The connexion between this topic and the preceding is thus given by Victorius. 'The truly just are not easy to recognise, and we are apt to be deceived by the outside show and to mistake unreal for real justice. Consequently, in default of better evidence of justice in men, they assume (ὑπολαμβάνοντα) those to be just who mind their own business, and live upon their own resources or labour, and do not prey upon others, μὴ ἄφι ἐτέρων ζύντας. Such are those who work for their bread, and amongst these especially, those who live upon (from the produce of) agriculture; and of all the rest (or else), those most of all who labour with their own hands'.

οἱ ἄπο γεωργίας αὐτοπαγοῦι] See note on 1 12.25. Hesych. αὐτοπαγοῦς, ὁ δὲ ἐαντοῦ ἐργαζόμενος. In the Oeconomics, attributed to Aristotle, 1 2, 1343 a 25, agriculture is described as the first (in the natural order), and the greatest and most virtuous of all employments, κτήσεως δὲ πρῶτη ἐπιμέλεια ή κατὰ φύσιν κατὰ φύσιν δὲ η γεωργική προσέρε, καὶ δεύτεραι δόσαι ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, οἰον μεταλλευτικὴ καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλη τοιαῦτη. ἦ δὲ γεωργικὴ μάλιστα ὅτι δικαία οὐ γὰρ ἄπτ' ἀνθρώπων οὐθ' ἐκώντων, ὀσπερ καπηλεία καὶ οἱ μισθαρνικαὶ, οὐτ' ἀκώντων ὀσπερ οἱ πολεμικαὶ. This explains the μὴ ἄφι ἐτέρων ζύντας of the text. Agriculturalists do not make their profit of men, but of the land which they cultivate.

§ 10. 'And the temperate' (those who exercise self control), 'because they are not inclined to wrong'. Being temperate, and their passions under strict control, they are not tempted by any licentious and ill-regulated desires to gratify these by wrong doing. The import and extent of the virtue of σοφροσύνη are best set forth by Plato in the Gorgias. It is the principle of order and moderation in the human composition, and is hardly distinguishable from the conception of δικαιοσύνη, the virtue that regulates the entire human machine, in the Republic.

1 This redundant ἄλλος with the superlative—the superfluous union of the comparative with the superlative—may be illustrated here by two parallel examples from Shakespeare. Mids. Night's Dream, v. 1. 250. This is the greatest error of all the rest. Macbeth, v. 8. 4, Of all men else I have avoided thee.
Dr Whewell in his Transl. of the Gorgias thinks that the character assigned to it by Plato is best expressed by the term 'self-control'.

And those who abstain from business', lead an easy quiet life, and don't meddle with other people's business, 'for the same reason'. ἀπράγματω is opposed to πολυπράγματον, a meddler, or busy-body.

§ 11. 'And those we should (otherwise, on general considerations) like to be friends, provided they manifest the same inclination—make it clear' (φαίνωνται emphatic), 'that they wish it (on their side); and such are the good in respect of moral virtue', (men may be good or excel in other things, as the βοηθ ἀγαθός Μενέλαος excellent in shouting, and τύχ ἀγαθός Πολυδεύκης in boxing); 'and men who are held in repute, either by every one, or by the best, or by those whom we ourselves admire and respect, or by those who respect and admire us'. If we read ἐν οἷς θαυμάζοντων αὐτῶν (Bekker retains τοῖς) with Α, Ω, Y, Z, which Spengel adopts, these four last particulars will be all neutrals. 'And those who are distinguished, either in every thing ('admirable Crichtons'), or in the best things (qualities, pursuits, studies, accomplishments, or rank, wealth, power, according to taste), or in things which we ourselves respect and admire, or in those things which they admire in us (lit. in those things in which they admire us').

§ 12. 'And further, those who are pleasant to pass our life, or spend the day, with; such are men who are good-tempered and cheerful', (ἐυκολος contrasted with δύσκολος, transferred from good and bad digestion κάλος, to the temper and character; Arist. Ran. 82, of the good-tempered, genial Sophocles), and not inclined to find fault with any accidental error or mistake (not critical and censorious), and not quarrelsome, or contentious: for all such are combative, pugnacious; and people that contend with one (in word or act, by contradiction, or interference with and opposition to our tastes and wishes) appear to have wishes contrary to ours—and as to have the same wishes is characteristic of friendship, § 4, it is plain that people of this sort cannot be our friends. Comp. Eth. Nic. VIII 6, 1157 b 15, οὐδεις δὲ δύναται συνήμερευς τῷ λυπημφ οὐδὲ τῷ μη ἦδη. These two words are joined together again in Eth. Nic. VIII 6, 1157 ο 21, Ib. c. 15, 1162 b 14, 16.

συνήμερευς] This form of verb, principally with the prepositions εν and συν—also in two or three cases with ἐπι—which assumes for its explanation the dative of the indefinite pronoun, αὐτῷ or αὐτῇ, αὐτοῖς or αὐταῖς, as the case may be, (the repetition of some substantive immediately preceding in which the person or thing resides, or with which it is associated,) as understood after the preposition, is expressed in our idiom by adding the preposition at the end
of the phrase. Thus, the two verbs here in question are represented in English by 'to pass one's life with', 'to spend the day with', the phrase at full length being, τοὺς ἡδεῖς ὀστε τινὰ συνιδαγαγείν αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖς being the persons previously mentioned. Porson, Advers. p. 265, has referred to notes of various Commentators, who have illustrated this idiom, and Elmsley has supplied four examples, on Eur. Bacch. 508, ἐνδυστυχὴσι τοῦνομ' ἐπιτήδειος εἶ. Add the following, Soph. Oed. Col. 790, χθονὸς λαχεῖν τοσοῦτον, ἐνθανεῖν μόνον, 'earth enough to die in'. Phoen. 727, ἐνδυστυχὴσι δεινῶν εὐφρόνων κνέφας (comp. Shaksp. Lear, III 4. 116, a naughty night to swim in). Ib. Erec. Fragm. XX v 22 (Dind.) ἧθη, λαμπρὰ συγγελῶν μόνον. Arist. Nub. 422, ἐπιχαλκεῖνειν παρέχομαι ἀν, 'I would lend myself to be forged on' (παρέχομαι ἀν supply ἐμαυτόν, as Aj. 1146, πατεῖν παρείχε τὸ βέλουτι ναύτοι, 'lent himself to be trodden on'); Id. Equit. 616, ἄδιον γε πᾶσιν ἐπολοίξατι, 'to shout at', Pac. 1127, ap. Elms. Thuc. III 23, οἵ βέβαιος ὅστε ἐπελθεῖν, 'ice, not firm, unsafe, to tread on'. And the false antithesis in II 44, καὶ ὁς ἐνευδαμονηθαί τε ὁ βίος όμοιος καὶ ἐντελεύτησα ἐνεμετρῆθη. II 74, γῆ...εὔμενη ἐναγοικίσασθαι τοῖς Ἑλλήσιον 'a land propitious for the Greeks to fight in'. 1 2, ὅσον ἀποζημίωσα, 'enough to live off' or 'on'. Xenoph. Symp. II 18, οἰκεμα ἐνδρόωον, Ib. III 8, (ἡν) ἰκανῶς γένοιο ἐγκοινάσασθαι. Memor. III 8, 8 (οἰκεία) ἱδίστη ἐνδιατάσασθαι. Plat. Polit. 302 B (πολιτεία) ἱκανὰ χαλεπὴ σχῆμα, 'by no means hard to live with'. Ib. E, βαρυτάτῃ ἐνυκρίσασα. Phaedr. 228 Ε, ἐμαυτόν σοι ἐμμελετῶν παρέχειν. Phaedo 84 A, παραδιδόωνα ἐαυτὴν (τὴν ψυχὴν) πάλιν αὐ ἐγκαταδείκνυ. Herod. VII 59, ὁ χάρος ἐπιτήδεος ἐνδιατάζει τε καὶ ἐναριθμήσατι. Comp. VI 102, IX 7, quoted by Elmsley. Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 12, 1331 b 12, ἀγορὰ ἐνυχολαξίαν 'a market-place to lounge in'. Lucian, Ver. Hist. I 31, ἰκανῶν μυριάδορ πόλει ἐνοικεῖν. Aelian, Hist. Anim. VI 42, στιβάδα ἐγκαθείσεν. Dem. de Cor. § 198, τὰ τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἀτυχήματα ἐνυδακμίου ἀπέκειτο. ἐγκαταλείπειν, passim. Matth. Gr. Gr. 533, obs. 2.

§ 13. καὶ αἱ ἐπιδεξίοι] Arist. has changed his construction from the accus. to the nomin., from the objects to the subjects of liking—for love is here out of the question: these are men who are popular and agreeable in society. We may supply φιλούνται, or βαδίοι φίλοι γίγνονται. 'And those who are dexterous at replying and submitting to railery—who can take, as well as give, a joke, gibe—' (for here again there is community of sentiment, another instance of fellow-feeling ταύτῳ φαίνεται ἄγαθον, the foundation of friendship) 'for the mind of each party is set upon (their efforts are directed to, σπεύδοντο) the same thing (mutual amusement, a friendly reciprocity in amusing each other) as (that of) his neighbour, the opposite in the 'wit-combat' or jesting-match, and each of them is equally capable of taking a joke, and returning the taunt, but neatly, gracefully, with propriety'.

ἐπιδεξίος is one of those adjectives compounded with ἐπι, in which the preposition expresses either the tendency or inclination (lit. direction), or the liability to anything, which is defined in the second part of the


tοθάσαι καὶ ὑπομείναι ἐπὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφότεροι

compound. ἐπιδείξιος is a man that has a tendency to the use of his right hand, the sign of skill and dexterity; the right and left hand being severally the symbols of dexterity or cleverness and awkwardness; dexter, laevus; δεξιός, δεξιότης, σκαίος, ἀμφότερος; gauche.

Another secondary notion, propitious and unpropitious, belonging to these terms, is derived from the observations of augury, according as the omens appear on the right or left hand: but in Latin, at all events, the notion of 'awkwardness' conveyed by laevus, and the opposite by dexter, cannot have been suggested by this, because in their practice omens on the left, laevus, sinistra, were favourable.

ἐπιδείξιος is therefore one who has a tendency to δεξιότης, and follows the analogy of ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπιθάνατος (liable to danger and death), ἐπικινδυνικός, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπικί

τωθάσειν is a variety of σκώπτειν, to gird at, mock, jeer at, some one in particular; both of them (as well as others of the same class) being distinguished from other forms of wit or pleasantry by their personal direction, or personality. The word occurs in Plato and Aristophanes, Vesp. 1362 and 1368, and once in Herodotus [II. 60]. It is plain from the application of it, for instance in the passages of Aristophanes, that its special meaning is what we now call 'chaffing' or 'poking fun at', the repartees, or witticisms, mostly of a highly personal character, which pass between the combatants in what is also nowadays called 'a slanging match'. This is confirmed by the use of the word in Arist. Pol. IV (vii) 17, 1336 b 17. The author is there condemning the practice of αἰσχρολογία, 'indecent language', which should not be tolerated in a model state. An exception however is made in favour of certain seasons of especial licence, as at the Eleusinian mysteries, and the orgies of particular deities to whose worship this τωθάσμος 'licentious raillery' was appropriate, and permitted by law, οἷς καὶ τὸν τωθασμον ἀποδίδοντο αὐτόμοι: such were Dionysus during the celebration of the Bacchanalia, Aphrodite, Priapus, Hermaphroditus, Ilythia, and others; see Schneider ad loc. Comp. Addenda p. 509, and Eaton.

All this is abundantly illustrated in the Chorus of the Ranae, 316—430. It is descriptive of the wild license that prevailed, and of the indecent language of the τωθάσμος that was then allowed—see particularly the application of the τωθασμῶς, in the shape of indecent personalities, 416—430; and the τωθασμῶς is there represented by various phrases indicative of its character, τῶν ἀκόλουθον φιλαπαίγνον τιμᾶν, 334; βωμολόχοις ἑπετη, 'scurrilous' phrases, 358; κατασκόπων καὶ παίζων καὶ χλευάζων, 375: παίζων καὶ σκώπτων; and finally (as already mentioned) by the

AR. II.
σπεύδουσι τῷ πλησίον, δυνάμενοι τε σκώπτεσθαι καὶ 
14 ἐμμελῶς σκόπτοντες. καὶ τοὺς ἑπαυνοῦτας τὰ ὑπάρ-
χοντα ἀγαθά, καὶ τούτων μᾶλλα ἀφοβοῦνται μὴ 
15 ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς. καὶ τοὺς καθαρίους περὶ ὁψίν, περὶ 

**specimen** given at the end. Comp. Vesp. 1362, ἥν αὐτῶν τοὐθάσω νεανίκως ὁδὸς ποθὸν ὑπῆρε πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων. This license of language, allowed during the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, reached its height at the bridge over the Cephalisus, which was crossed and recrossed by the initiated on their way to and from Eleusis; where they were doubtless also waited by a very numerous mob quite ready to take part in the fun. Hence γεφυρίζων and γεφυρισμάζων, ἐξ ἀμάξις λέγειν. Bentl. Phal. I p. 335, Monk's Ed. [p. 307, ed. Wagner]. See on this also Müller, Hist. of Gr. Lit. c. xi § 5, p. 132, Engl. Tr.

A similar license of language and conduct was permitted at the Roman Saturnalia, 'the slaves' holiday': and was also illustrated by the Fescennina, or Fescennine verses (Liv. vii 2), in which the countryfolk (and afterwards the townsfolk) assailed and ridiculed one another in extemporaneous verses. Fescennina per hunc inventa licentia novem, versibus alternis opprobria rustica fudit, Hor. Ep. ii 1. 145; proxax Fescennina locutio, Catull. 61. 124; Victorius ad Arist, Pol. iv (vii) 17. u. s. quotes Athenacus, XIV 622 F, of the φαλλοφόροι, εἶτα προστρέχοντες ἐτῶ-
θαζον οὕς προέλθουσαν.

§ 14. 'We like also those that praise our virtues and accomplishments (the goods we have, and those in particular of which the posses-
sion is doubtful (which we are afraid we do not possess)'. Praise is the test of virtue, (19, and Introd. Appendix B, p. 212,) and the acknowledg-
ment of others that we do actually possess the excellences of which we are ourselves in doubt. This confirmation of our hesitating opinion as to our own merits must of course be gratifying, and we accordingly like those that praise us.

§ 15. 'Cleanliness and neatness in the face and general appearance, and in the dress, and in fact (as it is exhibited) in the whole life'; in a man's habits, and all that he does in his daily life. "Cleanliness" is said to be "next to Godliness"; and there is no doubt that neat and cleanly habits and appearance in person and dress, some of which also heighten personal attractions, are prepossessing, and apt to inspire a liking for a man. We (English) also apply the same terms to the build or frame of the body of men and animals—to denote the absence of all impurity and imperfection, the superfluities, excrescences, deformities, which, like the dirt that overlies and disguises and deforms the true sur-
face underneath, mar the symmetry and harmonious proportions of the body—'clean built', 'clean made', 'neatly built and made'. This form of 'cleanness' is also prepossessing, and an element of comeliness, which tends to liking. It is the apta composito membrorum quae movet oculos, et delectat hoc ἰπσο, &c. Cic. de Off. I 28. And besides this, cleanliness of person and neatness in dress, implying a regard for personal ap-
pearance, imply also thereby attention to and regard for the opinion of
16 ἀμπεχόνην, περὶ ὅλου τὸν βίον. καὶ τοὺς μὴ ὀνει- 
διστὰς μῆτε τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων μῆτε τῶν εὐεργετή-
17 μάτων· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐλεγκτικοὶ. καὶ τοὺς μὴ μη-
σικάκους, μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, ἀλλ' 
eὐκαταλλάκτους· οίους γὰρ ἀν ὑπολαμβάνωσι εἶναι
others—whereas a solitary or savage would never think it worth while—
and thus establish a sort of claim upon our regard. The excess of this
attention to the person, shewn in the coxcomb and the petit maître, is a
sign of egotism and vanity, and consequently displeasing.

καθάριος is Lat. munitus. Of personal appearance, καθάριος ἀκολου-
θίας, 'a neat little footboy', Posidon. ap. Ath. xii 550 λ; ἢ σκευασία
coorum artibus dicens', Meineke ad loc., 'neatness and cleanliness in
dressing and serving a dinner'. In two Fragments of Eubulus,—Tērbai,
Fr. i, (Meineke, u. s. III 258,) and Ephippus, Obeliaph. Fr. i (Meineke
u. s., III 334), in both of which the same verse is found, μὴ πολυτέλος,
ἀλλὰ καθαρείως ὅτι ἢ, ὀσία ἐνεκα.—καθαρείος (another form of καθάριος)
is applied to cleanliness in a religious sense. The subject is the pur-
chase of fish. The same opposition of καθαρείος and πολυτέλος occurs
again in Nicostr. Antyll. Fragm. 3 (Meineke, III 280) where Meineke
notes, "His locis καθαρείος fere munditiae cum frugalitate coniunctae
notionem habet, ut apud Strabonem III p. 154 a, καθαρίως καὶ λιτῶς." In
Athen. III 74 D (ap. Liddell and Scott), καθαρείος βίος has the sense of 'a
frugal life', opposed to πολυτέλης, as in the Comic Fragments, and in
Diod. v 33 (ap. cosdem), καθάριος τῇ διαίτῃ. Xenoph. Memor. ii 1. 22, of
virtue, in Prodicus' apologue, κεκοσμημένη τὸ μὲν σώμα καθαρίωτητι (to
make her attractive) τὰ δ' ἀμματα αἰδοί. Herod. ii 37 of the Egyptian
practice of circumcision 'for cleanliness' sake', καθαρίωτητος ἐνεκα. Such
are the examples of this attractive καθαρίωτης, in habits of life, manners,
dress and personal appearance, as they appear in the ordinary language
and in common life.

§ 16. 'And we like those who are not inclined to reproach us either
for trifling faults and errors, or for the benefits (they have conferred on
us); for both of these are censorious, (faultfinders).'

§ 17. 'And those who don't bear malice' (this is one of the character-
istics of the μεγαλόψυχος, Eth. Nic. iv 9, 1125 a 2, οὔδε μησηκάκος' οὐ γὰρ
μεγαλόψυχον τὸ ἀπορμηνούενεν, ἀλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μάλλον παρορνάην,
'and are not retentive' (if φυλάττειν be 'to guard, keep in possession', as
Xen. Mem. III 4. 9, ad servandum idoneum, Sturz, Lex.: or 'observant',
'on the watch for', if 'to be on the look out for'; so Xen. Mem. III 1. 6,
φυλακτικὸν καὶ κληττῆυν: opposed to ἀφυλακτος, and ἀφυλαξία, Hier. vi 4)
'of complaints and accusations, but easily reconciled'. Instead of keeping
in mind the complaints and accusations to which our errors and faults,
though perhaps trifling, will give rise, and so prolonging the estrange-
ment and the quarrel between the two friends, these are ready at any
moment for a reconciliation. And this is, 'because they think themselves
equally liable (to these faults and errors, and equally requiring forgive-
18 πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ πρὸς αὐτούς οἶονται. καὶ τοὺς μὴ κακολόγους μηδὲ εἰδότας μήτε ταῦ τῶν πλησίων κακὰ μήτε τὰ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τἀγαθὰ: ὥ γὰρ ἀγαθός
19 τοῦτο δρα. καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀντιτεύοντας τοῖς ὀργίζομένοις ἢ σπουδάζουσιν μαχητικὸ γὰρ οἱ τοιούτοι.
καὶ τοὺς πρὸς αὐτοὺς σπουδαίως πιὰ ἔχοντας, οἴον θαυμάζοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ σπουδαίους ὑπολαμβάνοντας
20 καὶ χαίροντας αὐτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα πεποιθότας περὶ ἀ μάλιστα βουλονται αὐτοῖ ἢ θαυμάζοντας.
21 ἔσθαί ἢ σπουδαίοι δοκεῖν εἶναι ἢ ἠδείς. καὶ τοὺς 

ness) with the others'; _lil._ because such as they suppose themselves to be to the rest of mankind, (i.e. such as is their liability to give unintentional offence to others,) such they think others are to them: that others are no more liable to them than themselves.

§ 18. ‘And those who are not inclined to evil-speaking’, (those who are constitute a topic of ὀργη', c. 2. 13), ‘and don’t know (don’t notice) what is bad in their neighbours, nor in themselves, but only what is good (all their good points); for this is the conduct of the good man’. Comp. Plat. Theaet. 173 D, of the wise man, εὔ ἢ κακὸς τι γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἢ τι το κακὸν ἐστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέλεην ἢ οἱ βαλάστης λεγόμενοι χῖες. An indisposition to evil-speaking is also a characteristic of the μεγαλόφυγος, Eth. N. IV 9, 1125 a 8, διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν. (This is from no wish to avoid offence, but because he is so supremely indifferent to all others, that he abstains from blaming, as from praising, them.)

§ 19. And people are liked ‘who do not strive against, try to thwart, offer opposition to, those who are angry, or in earnest’ (earnestly, seriously, occupied with anything); ‘for all such are pugnacious’. Comp. § 12, πάντες γὰρ οἱ τοιούτοι μαχητικοί, οἱ δὲ μαχημένοι τάναντι φαινονται βούλεσθαι, which is the opposite to friendly feeling. ‘And we have a liking for any one that has a good feeling of any kind towards us, such as admiration, and respects us; and thinks well of us, and delights in our society; and this most especially when it happens in the case of any thing for which we wish to be admired ourselves, or thought well of, or to be agreeable’. The first of the two is also a topic of ὀργή', 2. 17.

§ 21. ‘And those who resemble one another (have a mutual liking), and those who are engaged in the same pursuits’; (the pleasures of similarity are noticed and illustrated in 111. 25, see the notes there); ‘provided their interests don’t clash’, (they don’t trouble or annoy one another. ἐνοχλεῖν, see note on 111. 9; παρά in the compound here, expresses an aggravation of the annoyance, the going still further astray from the right path,) ‘and they are not competitors for their livelihood, (as all tradesmen are;) whence the proverb (of rival artists or tradesmen) κεραθείς κεραθεί', ‘two of a trade’, Hesiod, Op. et D. 25. On this and the opposite proverbs, see note on 111. 25.
§ 22. 'And those who desire the same things, so long as there is enough for them to share them together: otherwise, the case is the same here again'. Here again, as in the preceding topic, the competition is fatal to friendship.

§ 23. 'And those (we like) with whom we are on such terms as to feel no shame in betraying our (apparent) conventional faults before them, provided, however, that this does not arise from contempt'; provided that they are not so far our inferiors that we totally disregard their presence. That is, those who are so intimate that we can afford to take liberties with them. Such are the members of a domestic circle, or any very intimate friend, who knows our ways, and from habit has learned to overlook any slight mark of disrespect. Schrader has illustrated this by an epigram of Martial, X 14, which though rather coarse is too apposite to be passed over: Nil aliud video quo te credamus amicum Quam quod me coram pedere, Crispe, soles, 

aiσχύνοσθαι] See note on II. 222.

ta prods doxa] opposed to ta prods aλήθειαν (=ta καθ' αυτά) in the next topic, 'the apparent or conventional' faults which violate the rules of society and good-breeding—and 'the real', moral and legal offences, Rhet. II 6. 23, 12. 10. to prods doxa in this opposition is defined, Topic. I 3, 118 a 21, opo de tou prods doxa to μηδενος συνειδός μη αν σπουδάσα. υπάρχει, which is an exact description of the conventional and unreal, to dia tnh dɔxan αρετéων. The same distinction of the conventionally and really disgraceful occurs in Eth. Nic. IV 15, 1128 b 23, ei δ' εστι τα μεν κατ' αλήθειαν αισχρά τα δε κατα δόξαν, ουθέν διαφέρει, ουδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα. The conventionally disgraceful is illustrated by Aspasius ad locum, ως το εν ἀγορα ἐσθίειν (and this by Theophr. Char. XI ό βδελυρός, who goes in full market, πληθυνσι της ἀγορᾶς, to the fruit-stalls, and stands chattering with the vendor, and eating the fruit). Dancing was another of these conventional solecisms. See the story of Cleisthenes and Hippoclides in Herod. vi 129, which gave rise to the proverb oδ ὑφνις 'Ιπποκλείδη (διὰ τινος ὄρχησιν καὶ την ἀναδείπιν): and of Socrates in Xenoph. Symp. II 17, see note 6 p. 152 of Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, Vol. I No. 2 on 'The Sophists'.

Compare also I 7. 36, where to prods doxa is defined much as in the Topics, δολαθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἐν ἔλειο. See note ad loc.

§ 24. 'And the reverse, those before whom we are ashamed to exhibit our real faults'. Those whom we respect and stand in awe of, and whose good opinion we value.
And those with whom we vie (in friendly rivalry, for distinction; see note on 1 2. 22.), or by whom we wish to be emulated—not envied (which is destructive of friendly feeling)—we either love (already from the very first sight of them) or conceive the wish to become friends with them.

§ 25. 'And those whom we help to secure any good for themselves (so Victorius)—provided in so doing we do not ourselves incur greater evil'. The joint efforts are a bond of sympathy, and fellow-feeling (συμπάθεια) makes men friends: but this community of feeling would be destroyed if we were to be losers by our help; for then the other's feeling would be pleasurable but our own painful.

§ 26. 'Another amiable quality which secures regard, is the remembrance of and continued affection to friends absent as well as present; and this is why everybody likes those who extend this feeling to the dead. And in general, all (are liked by others) that shew a strong affection for their friends, and never leave them in the lurch, never desert them in distress and difficulty; for of all kinds of good men those are most liked who shew their goodness in the strength of their affections'. Eth. Nic. VIII 1, sub fin. τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους ἐπαυνοῦμεν; and c. 10, init. μᾶλλον δὲ τὸς φίλιας οὗτος εὖ τῷ φίλειν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαυνομένων, φιλών ἄρετῇ τὸ φίλειν θέου, οὕτω ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἄξιον, οὔτοι μόνοι φίλοι καὶ η ἡ τοῦτων φίλεια. Victorius refers to Terent. Phorm. III 3. 30, solus est homo amico amicus, and Apollodorus, from whom Terence translated it, μόνος φίλειν γὰρ τοὺς φίλους ἐπιστάται; (this is Apollodorus of Carystus in Euboea, a poet of the New Comedy, to be distinguished from another of the same name, of Gela; his play Ἐπιδικαζόμενος is represented in Terence's Phormio, Prolog. 25). Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. Hist. Crit. Vol. I 464—6, Vol. IV 447.

§ 27. 'And those who don't assume an artificial character in their intercourse with us'; (who are open, sincere, frank, straightforward: this is the social or conversational virtue of ἀληθεία, Eth. Nic. IV 13, the mean between ἀλαζονεία and εἰρωνεία. ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐτέκαστος τις ὁν ἀληθευτικός καὶ τῷ βιῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ υπάρχοντα ὁμολογων
τούς φίλους τά πρόσ δόξαν οὐκ ἀισχυνόμεθα· εἰ οὖν ὁ ἀισχυνόμενος μὴ φιλεῖ, ὁ μὴ ἀισχυνόμενος φιλοῦντι ἐοίκεν. καὶ τούς μὴ φοβεροὺς, καὶ οἷς θαρροῦμεν· 28 οὐδὲς γὰρ ὃν φοβεῖται φιλεῖ. εἰδὴ δὲ φιλίας ἐταρεία 29 οἰκείοτης συγγένεια καὶ ὁσα τοιαύτα. ποιητικὰ δὲ π. 64. φιλίας χάρις, καὶ τὸ μὴ δειπθέντος ποιησάι, καὶ τὸ ποιησοῦντα μὴ δηλώσαι· αὐτοῦ γὰρ οὕτως ἕνεκα φαίνεται καὶ οὐ διὰ τι ἐτερον.

ἐιναι περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε ἑλάττω. 1127 a 24. The εἰρων of the Ethics, the self-deprecator—like Socrates—who affects humility, is here ὁ πλαστόμενος of the example); 'and such are those who are always talking about their own weaknesses and failings'.

πλάττευει, properly said of a sculptor, who moulds a clay model, is extended to moulding or fashioning in general, and hence to any artificial production; artificialis fingere: and so here. It is hence applied to the training of the body, σώματα πλάττοντες, Plat. Phaedo 82 d (Heindorf ad loc.), Tim. 88 c, and of the mind, Rep. II 377 c, καὶ πλάττευει τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερεῖν. Ib. V 466 a, of a society; VI 399 D, of general education; Gorg. 483 A, of moral training.

'For it has been already said that in the company of friends we are not ashamed of any little violation of conventional propriety (§ 23) : consequently, if one who is ashamed is no friend, one who is not ashamed in such cases is likely to be a friend'.

'And those who are not formidable to us, and in whose society we feel confidence; for no one loves one of whom he is afraid'. I Ep. St John iv 18, "There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth out fear; because fear hath torment. He that feareth is not made perfect in love," gives the reverse; no one can fear one whom he perfectly loves.

§ 28. ‘The kinds of friendship are, (1) companionship (the mere fact of being often together, implying no high degree of friendship—sodalitas eorum qui saepe una versantur, Schrader), (2) intimacy, familiarity, (constant and intimate, ‘domestic’, association, like that of members of the same family, οἰκείοτης from οἶκος; a higher degree of friendship, confirmed by habit and long association), (3) actual relationship, and all other connexions, relations, of the like nature. These are three degrees of association; and, εν κοινωνίᾳ πᾶσα φιλία ἐστί, Eth. N. viii 14, init. The whole chapter is upon the various degrees and relations of friendship or love, of marriage, of parent and offspring, the several bonds of connexion, and the foundations of them. The same principle lies at the root of all, συνέχει το κοινόν.

§ 29. ‘Affection and love are produced by a favour or benefit conferred, and conferred without solicitation, and never disclosed, by the benefactor: under these conditions the recipient construes it as

1 A striking contrast in the point of view between the Philosopher illustrating a rhetorical topic, and the Christian Apostle illustrating the love of God.
30 peri de e'xpras kal tou mivein phanevén wós ek twv P. 1382. évantíon deì thewrein. poïtika de e'xpras orgi, e'pí-31 reasmoì, diabolidì. orgi mèn oún éstîn ek twv pròs éauton, e'xhra dé kai' áneu tou pròs éauton' eèn òar conferred for his sake alone, and from no other motive'; which is the definition of philia, § 2. The plural poïtika includes the xáris and its two qualifications.

§ 30. 'The affections of enmity and hatred may plainly be studied from the opposites (of the preceding topics of philia)'. On peri e'xpras thewrein, see note on I 9. 14. 'Productive of enmity are anger, spite, calumny'. [On epíreasmoi, see note on II 2. 3.]

§ 31. 'Now anger is excited by personal offences, but enmity without personal offence as well; for if we suppose a man to be of such and such a character we hate him. And anger always deals with individuals, as Callias or Socrates' (dorgi is here made to govern the same case as its verb dorgi'seöba). With the statement comp. II 2. 2); 'but hatred is directed also against classes; for every one hates a thief or an informer'.

On tôn eléptn, the def. art. denoting a member of a class, which we render by the indefinite, see note on I 7. 13. 'And the one is curable by time, the other incurable. And the one is desire (êfeiśis subst. of êfeiśba 'to aim at') of (inflicting temporary) pain, the other of (permanent) mischief; for the angry man wishes to see (the effect of his vengeance), to the other this makes no difference (whether he see it or not)'.

1 Compare Pl. Phaedo 88 c, áapistan tois proeqerímnois loygois; Euthyphr. 13 D, òi latrois upnptekhì; 15 A, tâ par' hìmov òa và tois theoi; Theae. 177 A, tìn autòs òmiovata; 176 B, òmiovata theoi; Soph. 252 D, álhlèios epikoumias; Gorg. 622 D, botheia éautì; Parmenid. 128 C, botheia tò Paramevndou lògu (Arist. Polit. v 111 (vi) 5, 1320 a 32, ò botheia tòs ápàrois); Symp. 182 D, ò parakleseis tò èrówn para pàntwn; Rep. vi 493 D, pòlei diakonias; Ib. 498 B, upnptekhì phenofóra; Aesch. Agam. 415, pterois òptadoi òpnon kelytudos; Soph. Oed. Col. 1026, tâ òdòlo tò òh dikai khtìma; Trach. 668, tòs sów 'Iraalei dorrmpatò; Aj. 717, òthiôm 'Atevidence megàlòv te nekevov; Eur. Ion 508, tò òthevov têka òthatoi; Iph. T. 1384, oúranov pêstma (i.e. tò âp' oúranov pëstwòs). On a similar constr. of òpò and other prepositions with the genitive after a passive substaútico (instead of vern) see Stallbaum on Pl. Phaedo 99 c, òlinh ùpò toû oúranov. Add to the examples there gi en the following: Eur. Here. Fur. 1334, stèfanois 'Eláchvnon ùpò; Thuc. vi 87, èpinoulaís ògr' òmov; Pl. Protag. 354 A, tâs ùpò tòn latров òpereías; Gorg. 472 E, tò nuxhâkein dhèkeis ùpò theòv te kai ànthròpov; Rep. ii 378 D, 'Hvras dé òdeímovos ùpò ìdòs kai 'Hfalostrò tòs miaèse ùpò patës; Arist. Eth. Nic. x 9, 1179 a 22, èpìmeleva tòw ànthropivn ùpò theòv; Categ. S. 8 b 32, metaðolh ùpò nósoù; de Anima ii 8. 11, 420 b 27, ò phugì tòu ánapeu'menou aèròs ùpò tûs ev toûous moraîos phugìs.

2 ëfeiśis, a rare word. It occurs twice in Plat. Legg. iv 717 A, where the metaphor is thus illustrated: òkatoùs òm'éw òmov òmov, òd òde stogûxete'va: bèlè òde autòs kai oðou òi tôs blèsev ëfeiśis k.t.l. Ib. ix. 864 B, òlpiadòn òd kai dòxh tòs alhàov òpari to àrmatov ëfeiśis. Defin. 413 C, bòuùios ëfeiśis metà lòguov órdo. [So also in Eth. Nic. iii 7, 1114 b 6, ëfeiśis tòv tèlou. For its like sense, 'appeal', see Dem. Or. 57, ëfeiśis pròs Euboulùdhn, § 6, tìn èis òmov ëfeiśis, and Pollux 8. 62 and 126. s.]
υπολαμβάνωμεν εἶναι τοιόνδε, μισοῦμεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν ὀργή ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ' ἐκαστὰ, οίον Καλλία ἡ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἀπάσι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἵατον χρόνῳ, τὸ δ' ἀνίατον. καὶ τὸ μὲν λύπης ἐφεσίς, τὸ δὲ κακοῦ· αἰσθέσθαι γὰρ βούλεται ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, τῷ δ' οὐδὲν διαφέρει. ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν λυπηρὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα, τὰ δὲ μάλιστα κακά ἥκιστα αἰσθητά, ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη οὐδὲν γὰρ λυπεῖ· η δ' παρουσία τῆς κακίας. καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης, τὸ δ' οὐ μετὰ λύπης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ μισῶν οὐ. καὶ ὁ μὲν πολλῶν ἀν γενομένων ἔλεησεν, ὁ

Comp. def. of ὀργή II 2. 1, ἄρξεσ τιμωρίας φανομένης, and the note. 'Now all painful things (all things that give pain) are things of sense, (pain is conveyed to us only by the senses,) but the most evil things are least perceptible, wickedness and folly; for the presence of evil (of this kind) causes no (sensible) pain. And the one is accompanied by pain (in the subject of the affection, by definition), but the other is not: for one who is angry feels pain himself, but one who hates does not. And the one might under many circumstances feel compassion (for the offender, and remit the punishment), the other never; for the angry man only requires compensation (for his own suffering) in the suffering of the object of his anger, but the other his utter destruction (annihilation)'.

With τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης κ.τ.λ., compare Pol. VIII (v) 10, 1312 ὅ 32, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μίσος· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀργή μετὰ λύπης πάρεστι, ὥστε οὐ ῥήδιον λογιζέσθαι, ἢ δ' ἔχθρα ἀνεν λύπης.

[έλεησεν] Victorius refers in illustration to Soph. Aj. 121, where Ulysses says of Ajax, ἐποικεῖτο ὑπὸ θυτηροῖν ἔμπης καὶ πέρ ὡτα δυσμενῆ. This shows that the feeling by which he was affected towards his rival was not a long-standing grudge or hatred, but a temporary animosity arising out of the contest for Achilles' arms.

Plutarch in his little treatise, περὶ φθόνου καὶ μίσους, p. 536 D, Wytenbach, Vol. III p. 165, gives an account of μίσος from which something may be added to Aristotle's description. In c. 2, it is said that hatred is due to a sense of injury either to oneself, or to society at large, and sense of wrong to oneself: μῖσος ἐκ φαντασίας τοῦ ὅτι πονηρὸς ἡ κοινὸς ἡ πρὸς αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ὁ μισοῦμεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι δῶμετε αὐτῷ πεφύκας μισεῖν κ.τ.λ. In c. 3, the author remarks that hatred may be directed against irrational animals; some people hate cats, or beetles, or toads, or snakes; Germanicus could not abide either the sight or the crowing of a cock, and so on; envy however arises only between man and man. This is not the case with anger; which is sometimes excited even by inanimate objects—Bain [quoted on p. 13]. c. 5; Hatred may be praiseworthy, as
58 ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ B 4 § 32; 5 § 1.

οὗτος: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀντιπάθειν βούλεται ὃ ὀργη-ζεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἶναι.

32 φανερὸν οὐν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους καὶ ὄντας ἀποδεικνύει καὶ μὴ ὄντας ποιεῖν καὶ φασκούτας διαλύειν, καὶ δι’ ὀργὴν ἢ δι’ ἐχθρῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντας ἐφ’ ὁπότερ’ ἂν προαρπήται τις ἄγειν.

ποία δὲ φοβοῦνται καὶ τίνας καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, ὥδ’ ἔσται φανερὸν. ἔστω δὴ φόβος λύπης τῆς ἡ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ή λυπηροῦ οὗ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἶν τινί ἔσται μισοπονηρία—ὡς also anger, in the shape of νέμεις, righteous indignation, or of moral disapprobation—envy never can. In the last chapter, 538 D, he thus defines it; ἔστω δὲ μισοῦντος μὲν προαίρεσις κακῶς ποιήσαι (Arist. ἐφάσις κακοῦarpa) καὶ τὴν δυνάμειν οὔτος ὀρίζοντα, διάδειν τινα καὶ προαιρεσιν ἐπιτηρητικὴν τοῦ κακῶς ποιήσαι (on the watch to do him mischief) τῷ φθόνῳ δὲ τούτῳ γοῦν ἀπέστι. The distinction between envy and hatred, in respect of the amount of mischief which they would do to their respective objects, is then described, and the treatise ends.

§ 32. This section points out the application of the contents of the preceding chapter to the purposes of Rhetoric. 'It is plain from all this that it is possible, in respect of enmity and friendship, either, when men are enemies or friends, to prove it; or if not, to represent them as such; or if they assert or maintain it, to refute their assertion; or, if there be a dispute (about a feeling or an offence), whether it be due to anger or enmity, to refer it, trace it, to either of the two which you may prefer'.

διαλύειν] sc. τὴν φάσων, διλευεῖν, δισσώλευεῖν, argumentum, officia, argumentationem, 'to break up, dissolve', and so metaphor. 'answer, refute' an opposing argument. See Introd. on λευ., p. 267, note. This seems the most natural interpretation of φασκόντας διαλύειν. However, in II 11.7, it is applied to the breaking up, dissolution, or extinction of the emotions themselves: so that it is possible—I think, not probable—that here also it may be meant 'in case of their asserting that they are friends or enemies to proceed to destroy those relations in them'—only, I don't quite see the use of this for rhetorical purposes; and the other is certainly not only easier to effect in itself, but also more to the point here. If they assert that they are friends or enemies, and you wish to shew the opposite, you must refute their arguments, or destroy their case, which the preceding analysis will enable you to do.

CHAP. V.

On Fear. Compare Bain, on the 'Emotion of Terror'; Emotions and Will, c. 5 [c. viii, ed. 1875].

§ 1. 'What sort of things, and what persons, are the objects of fear, and how it is manifested, will be plain from what follows'. ἔστω] as before; see note on 1 5. 3.
Let fear be defined, a pain or disturbance arising from a mental (presentation or) impression (φαντασία, note on I II. 6) (a vivid presentiment) of coming evil, destructive or painful: for it is not all evils that men are afraid of, as for instance of the prospect of being wicked or dull (slow, stupid), but only those that amount to great pain or ruin: and this too only if they appear to be not far off, but close at hand, so as to be imminent or threatening. For things very remote are not subjects of alarm: for every one knows that he must die, but by reason of death not being actually impending, people care nothing at all for it.

It is the proximity of danger that causes fear. Gaisford quotes a poetical illustration from Pind. Nem. VI 94, τὸ δὲ πάρ πολὺ ναὸς ἐλευθόμενον ἕξει κυμάτων λέγεται παντὶ μέλλων δυνῖν τῷμον.

On fear, and its proper objects, see Eth. Nic. III 9. At the commencement of the chapter it is said, φοβοῦμεθα δὲ δήλων ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δὲ ἕστιν ὡς ἄπλοις εἰπεῖν κακὰ, δίῳ καὶ τῶν φόβων ἰρίζονται προσδοκίαι κακῶν. But of evil in general, all moral evil is to be shunned, and the fear of it is right, and to be encouraged: in the control of this kind of fear, courage is not shewn. It is in overmastering the sense of danger, in controlling the fears that interfere with the exercise of our duties, and especially the dread of death (the most fearful of all things) in battle, that true courage resides—διὸς μὲν ὁ φοβερὸς λέγεται τῷ ποιητικῷ φόβῳ. ταῦτα δὲ ἕστιν ὡς φαίνεται ποιητικῇ λύπῃ φθαρτικῇ: it is not the anticipation of pain of all kinds, as the pain of envy, of rivalry, of shame, that is entitled to the name of ‘fear’, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μόνως ταῖς ταυταῖς φαιομέναις ἐσσεθαί λύπαις φόβοις γίνεται, ὡς ὁ φῶς ἀναρετικῷ τοῦ ζωῆς αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τούτων λέγεται μόνος τῶν φοβερῶν, ὅταν πλήσησιν τὸ τῆς ταυτίτης φθάρια λυπήν. φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος ὅταν πλήσουσιν φαίνεται. Eth. Eudem. III 1, 1229 a 33, which is in exact conformity with Aristotle's definition. Comp. infra § 2, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ κίνδυνος, φοβερόν πλησιασμός.

δύνασθαι, to have the capacity, power, the force, and hence value, of; to amount to; becomes thus equivalent to ἵσχυειν or σθενεῖν, Elmsley ad Med. 127, οὐδένα καμόν δύναται θυτιθεῖν. Thuc. I 141, τὴν αὐτὴν δύναται δοῦλαιν. VI 40, λόγου ἐγκαὶ δυνάμειν. Similarly it denotes the value of money, Xen. Anab. I 5. 6, ὁ σιγλὸς δύναται ἐπὶ ὀβάλοις καὶ ἡμιοβάλων ἀπτικοῦ: or the general force or effect or amount of anything. Rhet. III 14. 5, τῶν τῶν δικαιοκήσεων προοίμια ταύτῳ δύναται ὑπὲρ τῶν δραμάτων οἱ πρόλογοι, 'amount to much the same', 'have much the same effect'. It also expresses in particular the value or meaning, signification, of a word, or anything else (like the Latin valere), Herod. II 30, δύναται τοῦτο τὸ ἔτος οἱ εἰς ἀριστεράς χειρὸς παριστάμενοι βασιλεῖ. Ib. IV 192, τὸ ὄνομα δύναται κατὰ ἐλλάδα γλώσσαν, θυσιν. Ib. VI 98. Thuc. VII 58, δύναται δὲ τὸ νεοδιαμόδες ἑλεύθερον ἡδὴ εἶναι. Aristoph. Plut. 842, τὸ τριβόων τί δύναται; (What's the meaning of this thread-bare cloak?). Plat. Protag. 324 A, Crat. 429 D, ἀρμα τοῦτο σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; Euthyd. 286 c, δύναται ὁ λόγος. Xenoph. Anab. II 2. 13. Demosth. de Cor. § 26, τὸ δὲ τοῦτο
2. This being the definition of fear, fearful things, the objects of fear, must needs be such as appear' (fear being εἰκ φαντασίας) 'to have a great power of destroying, or doing mischief, all kinds of mischief, that is, which tend to, take the direction of, great pain'. συντείνειν is 'to send together', said properly, of several things which conspire or converge to one focus or centre of attraction; or metaphor, which have a common aim or tendency. 'And therefore the signs or indications of such things (the symptom of the approaching fever or death, the clouds gathering before the storm, the first threatenings or indications of any great calamity, as impending ruin, the death of a dear friend, and so forth) are themselves fearful: because they announce the proximity of the object of dread, that it is near at hand; for this is the meaning of danger—the near approach of anything that is dreaded'.

§ 3. 'Examples of such things are the enmity or anger of those that have this power of doing mischief: for as it is quite clear that they desire it, it follows that it must be close at hand'. That they desire it, we know from the definitions of ὑβρίς and ἔχθρα: the former being an ὑβρις τιμωρίας, the other an ἐφεσίς κακοῦ, II 4. 31.

§ 4. 'A second is wickedness or vice armed with power; for it is the inclination, the deliberate purpose, the evil will, which is characteristic, is involved in the very notion, of vice or wickedness (as of virtue)'. And therefore injustice, the desire of unfair advantage, or any other vice, when it has the power will be certain to exercise it, in order to gratify this constant inclination.

§ 5. 'Again, outraged virtue, if it have the power' (of avenging the wrong: revenge is a virtue, I 6. 26, I 9. 24), 'is formidable; for it is plain that she has always the inclination when outraged (to right herself by retaliation, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς δίκαιον), and now she has the power'.
§ 6. 'And fear in those that have the power of doing mischief' (φοβερός
ē̂στι, is to be dreaded); 'because any such also (as in the two preceding
cases) must always be on the watch, ready to act in a state of prepara-
tion'. He is always prepared to anticipate the attack of others, which
he dreads, by attacking them as a precautionary measure; but he also has
the power of executing his designs against them; his fear therefore is
formidable.

§ 7. 'And as the majority of mankind are no better than they should
be (inclined to the worse; χείροις τοῦ δέοντος, 'worse than they ought to
be', or τοῦ εἰσόδους, 'below the mean standing of morality', 'rather bad'),
and slaves to their own interest, and cowardly in all dangers, it is for the
most part a formidable thing to be dependent upon any one else (at the
mercy of, in the power of; ἐπὶ πένες, see note on I 1.7, ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι); and
therefore the accomplices in any deed of horror are to be feared as
likely either to turn informers' (if they are ήπττους τοῦ κερδαίνει, especially;
though cowardice might have the same effect), 'or to leave their com-
rades in the lurch' (ἐν τοῖς κινδυνοῖς namely, in which their cowardice is
shown); run away and leave them to bear the brunt of the danger.

That the 'majority are worse' is proverbial; οἱ πλείους κακοί.


§ 8. 'So are those that have the power of doing wrong, to those who
have the capacity of (are particularly liable, or exposed to) being wronged;
for, for the most part, men do wrong whenever they can'. With the doc-
trine of man's fallen nature we have here of course nothing to do. But
the imperfection and frailty of man, his weaknesses and liability to error,
are recognised by the popular philosophy of the multitude and confirmed
by the proverbs that convey it, οἱ πλείους κακοί, errare humanum est, and
the like. Compare the observations on equity, the merciful or indulgent
consideration of these human infirmities, in I 13. 15—17, and the ordi-
nary language on the subject illustrated in the note on the αἰτίαν ἀνθρω-
πικαί, I 2.7—all of which belongs properly to Rhetoric. Victorius quotes
Arist. Plut. 362, ὃς οὖν ἄτεχνος ἐγένετο ἐστιν οὐδένας, ἄλλ' εἰσὶ τοῦ κέρδους
ἀπαντες ἠπττοι. Plato seems to be nearer the truth on this point, οὕτως
ἂν ἥγησατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ ποιηροὺς σφόδρα διέγους ἑναί ἑκατέρους,
τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείους.

'And those who have already been wronged, or think they are
wronged at the time; for these are always on the watch for an opportu-
nity' (of avenging the wrong received). 'And those that have already
done a wrong, if they have the power (of doing an injury), are to be
dreaded, because they are afraid of retaliation (τὸ ἀντιπαθεῖν, Eth. N. v 8, init.); for it was previously laid down that anything of that kind is to be feared'. § 6, καὶ φόβος τῶν δυναμένων τι ποιῆσαι. Proprium humani ingenii est odisse quem laeseris, Tacit. Agric. c. 42. Seneca, de Ira, II 23, Hoc habent pessimum animi magna fortuna insolentes: quos laesurunt et oderunt (Lipsius ad locum). Ennius ap. Cic. de Off. II 7, Quem metuunt oderunt; quem quisque odit periisse expetit.

§ 9. 'And rivals in the same pursuits, for the same objects, (are afraid of one another)—rivals, I mean, for those things which they cannot both enjoy together; for with such, men are always at war'.

§ 10. 'And those who are evidently formidable to our superiors (must necessarily be so to us; the a fortiori argument, or omne maius continet in se minus), because they must have more power to hurt us, if they have it also to hurt our superiors. And also those who are feared by our superiors (must also be formidable to us) for the same reason'. The difference between these two cases lies in the φοβεροῖ and φοβουνται. The first are those who are evidently and notoriously objects of dread by reason of their rank, power, station on the one hand, and their manifest hostility on the other: the second are secret enemies, men of no apparent resources for mischief, whose real character and designs are known to our superiors, though not to the world at large. This is the substance of Victorius' explanation.

§ 11. 'And those who have ruined or destroyed our superiors'; again the a fortiori argument; 'and those who assail our inferiors; for they are either already formidable to us, or (will be so) when their power has increased. And of those that have been injured (by us), and our acknowledged enemies, or rivals, not the quick-tempered and out-spoken', (the μεγαλοψυχος is παρδηγαστής, one who freely and frankly speaks his mind to and about his neighbours, without mincing his language, Eth. N. IV 9, 1124 b 29; παρδήγσια 'frankness', between friends and brothers, Ib. IX 2, 1165 a 29), 'but the calm and composed, and dissemblers, and cunning;
for these leave us in doubt whether their attack is imminent, and consequently never make it evident that it is remote. Cf. definition, in § 1. πράοι, such as hide under a calm exterior resolution and a deliberate, vindictive purpose: ‘still waters’ that ‘run deep’.

eirwne[ is here employed in its primary and proper sense, of dissimulation or cunning, Philemon. Fab. Inc. Fragm. III 6, οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀλώπυς ἢ μὲν εἰρων τῇ φύσει ἢ δ’ αὐθέντας, Meineke, Fr. Comm. Gr. IV 32; not in the special meaning which Aristotle has given it in Eth. N. II 7, and IV 13, sub fin., where eirwneia stands for the social vice or defect in προσποίησις, (pretension) ‘self-deprecation’, undue remissness in asserting one’s claims; and is opposed to ἀλαζοεία, excessive self-assertion, bragadocio and swagger.

ἀδήλης, φανεροί] attracted to the subject of the sentence, instead of ἀδήλην ἐστὶ μὴ εἶναι. The participle is used instead of the infinitive in most of these cases, δήλος εἰμι ποιῶν. Other adjectives follow the same rule; Aristoph. Nub. 1241, Ζεῦς γελοῖος ὁμώμενος, Pl. Phaedr. 236D, γελοῖος ἐσμειαυτοσχεδιάζων, Arist. Eth. N. X 8, 1178 δ’ 11, οἱ θεοὶ γελοῖοι φανοῦται συναλλάττοντες κ.τ.λ. Comp. IV 7, 1123 δ’ 34. Thucyd. I 70, ἀξίας νομι-ζομεν εἶναι τοῖς πέλασ φύόν ἐπενεγκείν. Other examples are given in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 279, comp. 549.5. Stallbaum, ed. Gorg. 448 D.

§ 12. ‘And all fearful things are more fearful, in dealing with which (Victorius) any mistake we happen to make cannot be rectified, i.e. remedied—when the consequences of an error of judgment in providing against them are fatal, and can never be repaired—where the remedy (of the error and its consequences) is either absolutely impossible, or is not in our own power but in that of our adversaries. When we are threatened with any formidable danger, from the machinations (suppose) of an enemy, if we make any fatal or irreparable mistake in the precautions we take to guard against it, the danger is greatly aggravated: our precautions and defences have failed, and we lie unprotected and exposed to the full weight of the enemy’s blow. ‘And those dangers which admit of no help or means of rescue, either none at all, or not easy to come by. And, speaking generally, all things are to be feared which when they happen in the case of others, or threaten them, excite our pity. Comp. c. 8. 13, διὰ ἐφ’ αὐτῶν φοβοῦνται, ταῦτα ἐπ’ ἄλλων γεγονόμενα ἐλεοῦσιν.

‘Such then are pretty nearly, as one may say, the principal objects of fear, and things that people dread: let us now pass on to describe the state of mind or feelings of the subjects of the emotions themselves.'
PHTORIKHΣ B 5 §§ 12, 13.

φοβερά ἐστίν ὁσα ἐφ' ἐτέρων γιγνόμενα ἢ μέλλοντα ἐλεεινά ἐστιν.

τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερά, καὶ ἢ φοβοῦνται, σχεδοῦ ὑπ' ἡ ἐπείν τὰ μέγιστα ταῦτ' ἐστίν' ὡς δὲ διακείμενοι 13 αὐτοὶ φοβοῦνται, νῦν λέγομεν. εἰ δὴ ἐστιν ὁ φόβος μετὰ προσδοκίας τοῦ πείσεσθαι τι φθαρτικὸν πάθος, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται τῶν οἰόμενων μηδὲν ἂν παθεῖν, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἢ μὴ οἶονται παθεῖν, οὐδὲ τούτους ὑφ' ὃν μὴ οἶονται, οὐδὲ τότε ὅτε μὴ οἶονται. ἀνάγκη ἐλεεινάς, as Aristotle, according to the MSS, is accustomed to write it, violates Porson's rule, Præpf. ad Med. p. viii, that ἐλεεινάς and not ἐλεεινὸς is the Attic form of the word.

§ 13. 'If then fear is always accompanied with the expectation of some destructive suffering':—the necessary alternative ἢ λυπηρόν of the definiendum is here omitted and left to be understood: as it stands, the assertion is untrue; fear can be excited by something short of absolute ruin or destruction. A general who had seen hard service replied to one who was boasting that he had never known the sensation of fear, Then sir you have never snuffed a candle with your fingers (this was in the days of tallow)—'it is plain that no one is afraid who thinks that he is not likely (ἄν) to suffer anything at all, (that he is altogether exempt from the possibility of suffering), or of those (particular) things that they think themselves unlikely to suffer; nor are they afraid of those (persons) whom they think incapable of doing them harm', (μή οἶονται, sc. παθεῖν ὅν: and ὑφ' ὃν is allowed to follow παθεῖν, because a passive sense is implied in it, 'to be hurt or injured by') 'nor at a time when they don't think them likely to do so'.

As an illustration of ὑφ' ὃν μὴ οἶονται, Victorius quotes Homer Od. i (IX) 513, where the Cyclops expresses his disgust at having been blinded by a contemptible little fellow, 'weak and worthless' like Ulysses: νῦν δὲ μ' ἐδὼ δλίγος τε καὶ οὐτίδανος καὶ ἄκινος φθαλμοῦ ἀλίασεν επει' μ' ἐδαμάσασαν οἶνος.

1 This is one of the very numerous varieties of the σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ σημαντικὸν, and is especially common after neuter verbs, but also occurs with transitive verbs, or indeed any verb which is capable of being interpreted in a passive sense. Such are θαλεῖν, Eur. Ion 1225, φυγεῖν 'to be banished'; ἀναστήσας, γεγονόται, Gorg. 515 E, πάρχεῖν (very common), ἐκπίπτειν, ἐκπλεῖν, Dem. c. Aristoc. 678, ἐστάναι (to be stopped) ὑπό; Arist. Top. Ε 4, 133 b 4, κέεσθαι; Herod. i. 39, vii. 176, τελευτᾶν, παρείσας; Plat. Rep. VI 509 b, τὴν ἀρχήν ἀπόλλεσον ὑπὸ Μήδων; Is. Lagg. 695 ν, ὑπὸ φόβου τε δέλαντες; Rep. III 413 c, οἴδονταν ὑπὸ κοιμαράτων; Arist. Ran. 940, &c. &c. And so with ἐκ, ἀπό, πρὸς, especially in the Tragic poets: Soph. Oed. Rex 37, 429, πρὸς τοῦτον κλεῖν ὑμεῖς εἴδεις; 516, πρὸς γ' ἐξου ἐπιπλοῦναι; 824, παιδὸς ἐξ ἐμοῦ θαλεῖν; 970, 1454, ὑπ' ἐξ ἐκεῖνων...θάνοι, 1488. Aj. 1293, βοῦς ὑπὸ σμύκρας μάστιγος...εἰς ὁδὸν πορεύεται, and 1320, οὐ κλεῖνες ἐσομεν...τοῦ' ὑπ' ἄνθρωπος ἀργίως.
Fear therefore necessarily implies, or is a necessary consequence of, the expectation of probable suffering in general (the opinion that they might suffer, of the likelihood of suffering), and (suffering) from particular persons (ποιοί τοις), and of particular things, and at particular times.'

§ 14. Consequently also, the following classes of persons are not liable to fear.

'Exempt from (not liable to) the expectation of probable suffering are those who are, or think they are, in a condition of great prosperity', (the plural of the abstract noun indicates the various items or kinds of success, prosperity, or good luck, represented by εὐτυχία,) 'and therefore they are insolent (inclined to wanton outrage) and contemptuous (prone to slight—contemptuously indifferent to—the opinions and feelings of others) and audacious or rash—men are made such by, (such characters are due to), wealth, bodily strength, abundance of friends, power—and (on the other hand) those who think that they have already endured all the worst extremities (all that is to be dreaded, πάντα τὰ δεινὰ) and have been thus cooled down (frozen, their sensibilities blunted, all the animal heat, and its accompanying sensibility, has been evaporated) (to apathy and indifference) as respects the future (possibility of suffering) like those who are already under the hands of the executioner (ἡδ, in the very act of undergoing the sentence of death); but (that fear may be felt) there must be at the bottom' (of Pandora's box, as a residuum; or underlying, as a basis or ground of confidence, ὑπείναι,) 'a lurking hope of salvation remaining, (περὶ οὗ about which is concerned) to prompt the anguish' (of the mental struggle, ἀγῶν, implied in fear). Romeo and Juliet, v 1. 68, Art thou so base and full of wretchedness, and fear'st to die? and foll. King Lear, iv 1. 3, To be worst, The lowest and most deserted thing of fortune.....lives not in fear.

ἀποτυμπανίζομεν denotes a punishment—often capital, as it is here—of somewhat uncertain signification. It is generally understood to mean flogging or beating, sometimes to death, with cudgels; so much is certain; and the τύμπανον, the drum, or instrument made to resemble it, probably served as the block. So Alford explains it, note on Ep. to Hebr. xi. 35, q. v. “an instrument like a wheel or drumhead on which the victim was stretched and scourged to death.” (It was not scourging, but beating to death with sticks). It is sometimes called τροχύς. Schol. ad Arist. Plut. 476, ὥ τύμπανα καὶ κιφωτες τύμπανα ἔξιλα ἐφ᾽ αὐς
σωτηρίας, περὶ οὗ ἀγωνιῶσιν. σημεῖον δὲ ὁ γὰρ φῶς θεουλευτικοὶς ποιεῖ, καίτοι οὐδεὶς θεουλεύεται

ἐτυπώμενον ἔχροντο γὰρ ταῦτα τῇ τιμωρίᾳ. "Non infrequens verbum" (ἀποτυμπανίζεως; it is common only in Plutarch; Wittenbach supplies several instances; and it appears in the Septuagint, Maccab. III 3. 27, IV 5. 32, 9.20, where the instrument is called προχός, in the Epist. to the Hebrews, I.c., and in Josephus) "nec tamen cadem ac diserta significatione; nam univere est verberat, ut τυμπανίζεως, sed addita praeposito adfert notionem ad finem verbarum; quod est vel ciusmodi ut verberatus inter verbera moriatur, fusturariam: vel ut vivus dimitatur, quae fustigatio quibusdam dicitur:" and then follow some examples. Wittenbach, ad Plut. Mor. 170 A de Superst., item ad 60 A. Hesych. τυμπανίζεται, ἵσχυρός τυπτεται, τύμπανον, εἴδος τιμωρίας. Phot. Lex. τύμπανον, τὸ τοῦ δημίου ἔξοδον, ὧ τοὺς παραδιδομένους διεχείριστο. Comp. Bretschneider, Lex. Nov. Test. s.v.

ἀπο-τυμπανίζεως, as Wittenbach observes, denotes the fatal character of the beating, ἀπὸ 'off'; that the punishment was 'finished off', 'brought to an end'. So ἀπεργάζεσθαι 'to complete a work', ἀποτελεῖν, ἀποκάμενεν, ἀπομάχεσθαι 'to fight it out', Lysias, πρὸς Σίμωνα § 25, ἀποσπειράσθαι, ἀποτολμᾶται, ἀποθνάσκειν (to die off, die away), ἀποκαλεῖν (grate away), ἀπορίζειν (rub away, to an end), ἀπόλλυσθαι and ἀπόλλυμα. The same notion of carrying out, or completion, is conveyed by ἐκ in composition, as ἐκτελεῖν, ἐξικεσθαι, ἐξαινεῖν, and others; the difference between the two prepositions being, that ἀπὸ is 'from a surface', 'off', ἐκ is 'from the inside', 'out of', 'out'. The verb ἀποτυμπανίζεως in this form denotes the aggravation of an ordinary beating; and corresponds to the Roman fusturarium, which is confined to capital punishment by beating with sticks for desertion in the Roman army; Cic. Phil. III 6, Liv. v 6 ult. Fusturarium meretur qui signa deserit aut praesidio recedit; and is opposed, in its severity and fatal termination, to the ordinary flagellatio or verbera. The verb is found in Lysias, κατ 'Ἁγοράτον, § 56, ('Ἁγοράτον) τῷ δημῷ παρέδωτο, καὶ ἀπετυμπανίσθη, 57 and 58. Demosth. Phil. Π 126.19, ἀντὶ τοῦ τῶν μὲν βοηθεῖν τοὺς δὲ ἀποτυμπανίσαι. Rhet. II 6. 27.

σημεῖον δὲ—οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν ἀνεκπίστων] 'an indication' (a sign, not an absolute proof, or conclusive sign, ἀπόδειξις or τεκμήριον) 'of this is, that fear inclines men to deliberation, and yet no one deliberates about things that are hopeless', or beyond the sphere of expectation. On the objects of βουλευσις, see Eth. Nic. III 5. We do not deliberate about things eternal and unchangeable; or about the constant motions of the heavens, or of the processes of nature; or about things that are constantly varying; or about things accidental and due to chance. We deliberate only about things which concern ourselves and human affairs in general, and of these only such as are in our own power, in which the event can be controlled by our own agency: and this is repeated throughout the chapter. Comp. VI 2, 1130 a 13, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχόμενων ἄλλοις ἔχειν, things necessary and invariable; over which therefore we have no control. It is plain therefore that these things which we do not deliberate about are ἀνάληπτα; they are beyond our
§ 15. This is now applied to the practice of the rhetorician. 'And therefore they (the audience) must be made to think, or feel, whenever it is better (for you, the speaker) that they should be afraid, (when the occasion requires you to excite this emotion in your hearers,) that they are themselves liable to suffering; for in fact (as you suggest) others greater than they have suffered (and therefore a fortiori they are liable to it); and you must shew that their equals and those like them (in position, character, and circumstances) are suffering or have suffered, and that from such as they never expected it from, and in the particular form, and at the particular time, when it was unexpected'.

παρασκευάζειν] 'to bring into a frame of mind, or excite a feeling is used here as above, ii 1.2 and 7. See the notes there.

§ 16. 'From this explanation of the nature of fear and things fearful, and of the several dispositions that incline us to fear individually, we may plainly gather what confidence is, and the sort of things that inspire confidence, and the dispositions or habits of mind that incline us to confidence: because confidence is the opposite of fear, and that which inspires the one, the object of the one, is opposite to that which inspires, the object of, the other: and therefore, the hope (which θάρσος implies, its hope) of what is conducive to security, is attended by a fancy' (or mental representation, or impression, derived from and connected with sense, see on 11.6) 'of their being close at hand, and the expectation' (ελπὶς in its alternative, general, sense) 'of things to be dreaded by a fancy of either their non-existence or remoteness'. This latter fancy being characteristic of fear, defin. § 1, we may infer that the opposite fancy is characteristic of confidence.
§ 17. ‘Things that inspire confidence are (therefore) things dreadful or dangerous when at a distance’—it is the remoteness of them, not the things themselves as the text seems to say, that inspires the confidence—‘and things that embolden us (cheering, inspiriting) when close at hand. And if there be means of rectifying, setting right again, repairing, remedying, the mischief we dread (after it is done), or of helping, defending ourselves against it, rescuing ourselves from it, (before it is done; comp. § 12, where Schrader thus distinguishes the two, correctio mali praeviri, auxilium mali imminentis,) numerous or effective, or both, and we have neither been already injured ourselves nor injured others—the first on the principle on which the proverb is founded, “the burnt child dreads the fire,” what we have already suffered we fear to suffer again; and the second, because when we have done no injury we fear no retaliation—‘or again if we have either no rivals and competitors at all, or such as we have are powerless; or, if they have power, are our friends or benefactors or indebted to us for services’. All these are topics opposite to those of fear, comp. §§ 8, 9, 10, 12; from which it appears that the rivalry of the antagony stole in the competition for the same things, where there is not enough of them for both the competitors; the rivalry, which naturally engenders ill-feeling, makes you afraid of some injury from your competitor, a fear which is exchanged for confidence, as far as the other is concerned, when there is no rivalry between you. ‘Or if those who have the same interests are more numerous or more powerful, or both, (than those whose interests are different, our rivals or competitors)’. § 18. This is an answer to the question ποσι διακείμενοι βαρραλείοι εἰσὶν § 16. ‘The feelings and dispositions in ourselves indicative of confidence are, the opinion which we entertain of great success in our previous undertakings, and of having hitherto been exempt from injury, or if we have often run into danger and escaped’: all of these are apt to make men sanguine as regards the future. Comp. Virg. Aen. i 198, O socii, neque enim ignari sumus ante malorum, O passi graviora, dabit deus his quoque finem. Vos et Scyllacum rabiem...revocate animos maestumque timorem miltile, forsae et haec olim meminisse invabili...ille fias regna resurgere Troiae. Durate et vosmet rebus servate secundis. Hor. Od. i 7. 30, O fortes, petioraque passi mecum saepe viri, nunc vino
PELLITE CURAS, CRAS INGENS ITERABINUS AEQVOR. 'For there are two things which make men insensible (to danger), either never to have experienced it (from ignorance, which inspires confidence) or to have plenty of helps, resources, means of defence, to resist and overcome it; as in dangers at sea, those who have never had experience of a storm are confident as to the future, and those who have derived from their experience plenty of resources'. What is said here of the inexperience of men at sea tending to confidence seems to be contradicted by the observation in Eth. Nic. III 9, 11 15 $ 1, αὐχ ὁυτῷ ἑδὲ ὡς οἱ βαλάπτιοι οἱ μὲν γὰρ απεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τῶν βάλτατον τών τοιούτων δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐκλήδες ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. Victorius thus reconciles the apparently conflicting statements: in the passage of the Ethics the brave men, who have had no experience, do keep up their courage though they despair of safety, and are indignant at such a death as that of drowning; the death which they covet being death on the field of battle: the sailors on the contrary are sanguine by reason of the resources which their experience has taught them. Still the contradiction is not removed by this explanation; for in the Rhetoric the inexperienced are confident, in the Ethics they are in despair, though their courage may not fail. In fact the two cases are not identical, nor intended to be so. In the Ethics the virtue of courage is displayed in the extremest danger, in the other there is no virtue at all; the ignorance of the danger inspires confidence—not courage—and that is all. The passage of the Rhetoric is explained by another in Magn. Mor. I 21, quoted by Schrader, έστι γὰρ καὶ κατ᾽ ἐμπειρίαν τις ἀνδρείος, οἰον οἱ στρατιώται ὁυτῷ γὰρ οίδασι δι᾽ ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι ἐν τοιούτῳ τόπῳ ἢ ἐν τοιούτῳ καιρῷ ἢ οὕτως ἔχοντι αὐδύνατο τι παθεῖν...πάλιν οὖν οὐκ οἴον ἀνδρείοι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίον τῆς ἐμπειρίας οἱ γὰρ ἀπειροὶ τῶν ἀποβησομένων οὐ φοβοῦνται διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.

'ΤΡΙΤΟΝ ΑΠΙΔΕΙΣ] 'Tritum apud Graccos proverbium a priore horum modorum penitet, quo affirmatur, suave esse bellum inexperto: γλυκές ἀπείρας πάλεμος.' Victorius.

§ 19. Comp. § 10. 'And whenever (the danger apprehended) is not an object of apprehension to our peers (those resembling us in rank, station, wealth and resources), or to our inferiors, or to those whose superiors we suppose ourselves to be; this opinion (of superiority) is entertained toward those whom we have overcome (in some previous competition, or contest for the mastery), either themselves, or their superiors or equals'.

RHTORIKΗΣ B 5 §§ 18, 19.
§ 20. Another ground of confidence is, 'the supposition that we possess in greater quantity or in a higher degree those points of superiority which make (our enemies) formidable: such are wealth, bodily strength', (carry on πλήθος and ἴσχυς to the three following genitives,) 'number and power (force) of friends, of territory, of military provision, (the last) either of every kind, or the most important and valuable.

§ 21. 'And if we have done no injury, either to no one at all, or to few, or if those few are not the sort of persons that are feared'. Compare § 8, which supplies the reason: it is, because they don't fear retaliation, On peri δὲν (=οἷς) φοβοῦνται, see note on 1 9.14.

'And, in general, if our religious relations are in a favourable state (our account with Heaven stands well), and especially' (τά τε ἄλλα καὶ, 'not only in account else, but especially in this': comp. ἄλλως τε καὶ, καὶ δὴ καὶ) 'in the communications of' (τά ἄπο, 'what proceeds from,' the intimations as to our future conduct derived from them) 'omens' (signs from heaven, to direct us) 'and oracles'. Victorius quotes Cicero (who calls σημεία sometimes notae, indications, sometimes signa), and Plutarch to shew that λόγια means 'oracles'. λόγιον and χρησμός are used indifferently by Herodotus for 'oracle', and the word is also found, though rarely, in other writers; Thucydides, Aristoph. Eq. 120, Eurip. Heracl. 405.

'For the angry feeling is accompanied with confidence, and to abstain from wrong oneself and yet to be wronged by others is provocative of anger, and the divine power is supposed to aid (side with) the injured'. The argument is this, Innocence of wrong is a ground of confidence: but this may be extended to the general (ἄλως) case of the divine favour, and the feeling of confidence is heightened if we believe that we have heaven on our side, which we argue from favourable omens and oracles. This divine authority strengthens our conviction of our innocence, of our having right on our side (so Victorius), and therefore our confidence. Another reason for this increase of confidence is the angry feeling which is excited in us by the sense of unjust treatment from others to whom we have done no wrong, for anger always implies confidence; and at the same time we feel ourselves under the protection of heaven, which is always supposed to take the part of the innocent and injured. θαῦμα-λέον ἢ ὄργῃ. Comp. Cic. Acad. Pr. II 44.135, ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi celerem esse dicebat (veteres Academici), referred to by Victorius and Majoragius.
§ 22. The last ground of confidence is 'the thought or opinion, in undertaking any enterprise, that we are not likely to, or (certainly) shall not, meet with any disaster, or that we shall succeed. And so much for objects of fear and confidence'.

**CHAP. VI.**

On shame or modesty, and shamelessness or impudence and effrontery.

Prof. Bain's remarks on shame—*Emotions and Will*, p. 142—are so brief that they may here be quoted entire. It falls under the general head of Emotions of Self, and in the subordinate division under that of self-love. "The feeling of shame is resolved by a reference to the dread of being condemned, or ill-thought of, by others. Declared censure and public infliction, by inviting the concurrent hostile regards of a wide circle of spectators, constitute an open shame. One is also put to shame by falling into any act that people are accustomed to disapprove, and will certainly censure in their own minds, although they may refrain from actually pronouncing condemnation. This is the most frequent case in common society. Knowing the hard judgments passed upon all breaches of conventional decorum, it is a source of mortification to any one to be caught in a slip; they can too easily imagine the sentence that they do not actually hear. The character of the pain of all such situations exactly accords with the pains of expressed disapprobation." [Chap. XI § 16, ed. 1875.]

§ 1. 'The exciting causes of shame and shamelessness, the objects of them, i.e. the persons to whom they are directed, and the dispositions or states of mind that they represent, will be clear from the following analysis'. *ποία* here is generally expressed by *ἐπὶ ποίως*, of the exciting causes, which occurs in § 3.

On *aiðōs*, as a *páðos*, the sense of shame, see Arist. Eth. Nic. II 7, and more at large, IV 15. There, as here, no distinction is made between *aiðōs* and *αἰσχύνη*. On the distinctions which may and may not be made between them, see Trench, *N. T. Syn.* [§ xix] p. 73; and on *aiðōs* contrasted with *ἐφορφορύνη*, ib. § xx. p. 76. They differ as the Latin *verecundia* (*aiðōs*), and *pudor* (*αἰσχύνη*): the first is a subjective feeling or principle of honour, Germ. *scham*; the second presents this in its objective aspect, as the fear of disgrace (from others, external) consequent on something already done, Germ. *scham* and *schande*. Döderl. *Lat. Syn.* Vol. III. p. 201. *aiðōs* precedes and prevents the shameful act, *αἰσχύνη* reflects upon its conse-
2 πίνας καὶ πῶς ἐχοντες, ἐκ τῶν δὴ δῆλον. ἐστὶ δὲ ἀποκλήσεις in the shame it brings with it. This latter conception of αἰσχύνη corresponds to Aristotle's definition here, and in Eth. N. iv 15 init. φόβος τις ἀδόξιας. On αἰδώς, as a principle of action, and νέμεις, the two primary notions of duty, duty to oneself, and duty to others or justice, see an interesting note of Sir A. Grant, on Eth. N. ii 7. 14. In Soph. Aj. 1073—1086, the two fundamental principles, by which human conduct should be regulated, the foundations of law, justice, and military discipline, are αἰδώς or αἰσχύνη, and δεός or φόβος. δεός γὰρ δ' πρῶτεστιν αἰσχύνη οὐ ἀρχαίοι σωτηρίαν ἔχων τῶν ἐπίστασον. See Schneidewin's note on line 1079.

Aristotle both here and in the Ethics represents αἰδώς or αἰσχύνη, and consequently the opposite, as πάθη, instinctive emotions; and Bain by classing shame amongst the emotions takes the same view. Eth. N. iv 15, init. περὶ δὲ αἰδώς ὡς τῶν ἀρετῆς οὐ προσῆκει λέγειν πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐσκεῖν ἢ ἔξει. ὅριζεται γονῷ φόβος (which is a πάθος) τῆς ἀδόξιας, ἀποτελεῖται δὲ τῷ περὶ τὰ δεόντα παρατηκίων ἐρωταίονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνώ-μενοι, οἱ δὲ τῶν βάσιν ἐρωταίονται ἀῤῥιστώς. συμφατικά δὲ φαινέται πως εἶναι ἁμφότερα, ὅπερ διόκει πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξεις εἶναι. This view of 'shame' or 'modesty' as a πάθος and not a ἔξεις, an emotion and not a moral state or virtue, is commented on and criticized by Alexander Aphrodisiensis in his ἄπορια καὶ λύσεις, Bk. Δ c. κα (21), περὶ αἰδώς. The chapter opens with a reference to the two passages of the Nic. Ethics in which the subject is treated, and after an examination and criticism of the definition, he proceeds thus; ἡ γὰρ αἰδώς οὐκ ἑσκεῖ ἀπλῶς εἶναι φόβος ἀδόξιας, ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρῶτερον ἀλλοτριώμενο πρὸς τὰ ἀἰσχρὰ, δ' ἢν οἱ οὖτως ἐχοντες φοβοῦνται τὴν ἐπ' αὐτῶς ἀδόξιαν. εἰ δὲ ἑστὶ τουτὸν ἡ αἰδώς, οὐκ ἐτ' ἀν οὐδὲ πάθος ἀπλῶς εἶς, ἀλλ' ἔξεις τις καὶ διάθεσις, τὸ προερημένον ἐπεται πάθος.

The character of the ἀναίσχυντος, as depicted by Theophrastus, Character c. θ'. περὶ ἀναίσχυντος, has not much in common with the analysis of Aristotle Aphrodisiensis in his ἄπορια καὶ λύσεις, Bk. Δ c. κα (21), περὶ αἰδώς. The chapter opens with a reference to the two passages of the Nic. Ethics in which the subject is treated, and after an examination and criticism of the definition, he proceeds thus; ἡ γὰρ αἰδώς οὐκ ἑσκεῖ ἀπλῶς εἶναι φόβος ἀδόξιας, ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρῶτερον ἀλλοτριώμενο πρὸς τὰ ἀἰσχρὰ, δ' ἢν οἱ οὖτως ἐχοντες φοβοῦνται τὴν ἐπ' αὐτῶς ἀδόξιαν. εἰ δὲ ἑστὶ τουτὸν ἡ αἰδώς, οὐκ ἐτ' ἀν οὐδὲ πάθος ἀπλῶς εἶς, ἀλλ' ἔξεις τις καὶ διάθεσις, τὸ προερημένον ἐπεται πάθος.

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§ 2. ἐστι] marking the popular nature of the definition, which may be assumed for the occasion, though perhaps not strictly exact and scientific, has been already noticed several times, and will occur again in the definitions of the next two chapters.

'Let it be assumed then that shame is a kind of pain or disturbance (of one's equanimity, or the even balance of the mind, which is upset for the nonce by the emotion) belonging to' (περὶ, arising or manifested in) 'that class of evils which seem to tend to discredit' (loss of reputation—φόβος τῆς ἀδόξιας, the popular definition, in Eth. N. iv 15, init.)—'present past or future' (this marks the confusion or identification of αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη, see above), 'and shamelessness a kind of slight regard of, con-
temptuous indifference to' (on ολιγωρία, note on Π 2.1, comp. Π 2.3), 'and an insensibility to these same things'. On the connexion of ονησιχνησία and ολιγωρία, comp. Demosth. de F. L. § 228, τίνα τόν ἐν τῇ πολει φήσαιν' ἄν βεληνωτάτων εὑρει καὶ πλεονετῆς ονησιχνησίας καὶ ολιγωρίας μεστόν (see Shiltee's note); adv. Conan. 1268 and 9, §§ 38, 39, 'δ' τοίνυν τάντων ονησιχνησίτων...τὴν δὲ τούτων πρὸς τὰ τοιαύτα ολιγωρίαν κ.τ.λ.

§ 3. 'From this definition of shame it follows of necessity that we are ashamed of all evils which are of such a kind as are thought to bring disgrace either on ourselves, or those we care for; and of this kind are all deeds or acts that proceed from any form of vice, throwing away one's shield for instance, or running away; for these proceed from cowardice. Or to defraud (a friend) of a deposit, for this proceeds from injustice'.

ἀποστερήσων, as distinguished from other varieties of the confusion of μείων and ἐμμ, is applied to the meaner vices of cheating and defrauding, as opposed to robbery and theft accompanied with violence. It is particularly appropriate to withholding a deposit, from the preposition with which the verb is compounded: you not only deprive your friend of his loan, but you keep back from him something which is his due: as ἀπὸ in ἀπαθεῖν, ἀποδίδοναι, ἀπονείμεν, et sim. Comp. Π 7.5 and note (1). Cic. Tusc. Q. 111 8, Sed quia nec qui propter metum praesidium reliquit, quod est ignaviae; nec qui propter avariam clam depositum non reddidit, quod est inutilissimum...Victorius.

§ 4. 'And sexual intercourse with forbidden (improper) persons, or in forbidden places (as a consecrated building), or at forbidden times; for this proceeds from licentiousness'. ὅποιον ou δεῖ, ὅτε μὴ δεῖ. This variation of the negative, where no difference is intended, is by no means unusual. If translated strictly, ou denotes particular places, and μὴ times in general, any indefinite or hypothetical times; lit. 'at times, if any, when it is forbidden'.

§ 5. 'And to make a profit of mean and trifling things, or of things base and vile, or from the helpless and impotent, as the poor or the dead; whence the proverb to rob (even) a corpse of its winding-sheet;
daínev ἀπὸ μικρῶν ἢ ἀπ’ αἰσχρῶν ἢ ἀπ’ ἄδυνάτων, p. 68.

κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ αἰσχρῶν] is illustrated by the well-known story of Vespassian, Sucton. Vesp. c. 23, Reprehendunt filio Tito, quod etiam urinae vectigal commentum esset, pecuniam ex prima pensione admonuit ad nares, sciscians, num odore offendoretur? et illo negante, at qui, inquit, e lotio cst'. Erasm. Adag. p. 199, 'e turpibus, velut ex lenocinio quaestuque corporis.' Another illustration of profit derived from a disgraceful source was (in the opinion of the Athenians of the 4th cent. B.C.) the practice of the λογογράφους, or δικογράφους, δικογραφία, Isocr. αὐτίδοσις § 2,) the rhetorician who wrote speeches for the use of parties in the law-courts. The amount of discredit which this employment brought upon those who practised it may be estimated from the following passages. Antiphon commenced this practice (Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. xxxiii. § 1. Westermann, Geschichte der Beredsamkeit, 40. 10), and thereby brought upon himself the assaults of the Comic poets; καθάπτεται δέ η κωμῳδία τοῦ Ανυπαρκότος ὥσ...Λόγους κατὰ τοῦ δικαίου συγκειμένου ἀποδιδομένου πολλῶν χρημάτων. Plat. Phaedr. 237 c, 'διὰ τάσις τῆς λοιδορίας ἔκαλε λογογράφοι. Stallbaum ad loc. In Legg. xi 937 D ad fin., it is solemnly censured and denounced: a prohibitory law is enacted, and the penalty is death to the citizen, and perpetual banishment to the alien, who shall presume thus to pervert the minds of the administrators of justice. See also Stallbaum, Praef. ad Euthydem. p. 46. Dem. de F. L. § 274, λογογράφους τοῖνοι καὶ σοφιτᾶς ἀποκαλῶν; where Shilleto cites other examples from the Orators. Isocrates, περὶ ἀντίδοσεως, is obliged to defend himself from the imputations of his enemies and detractors, who charged him with making money by this employment, § 2, βλασφημοῦντας περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς διατριβῆς καὶ λέγοντας ὥσ ἐστι περὶ δικογραφίαν—which is much the same, he continues, as if they were to call Phidias a dollmaker, or Zeuxis and Parrhasius signpainters. And again § 31, ἐκ δὲ τῆς περὶ δικαστηρία πραγματείας εἰς ὁργῆν καὶ μίσος ὑμᾶς καταστήσεως. Lastly, the author of the Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37), 33, has this topic, for meeting a calumniuous charge, ἐὰν δὲ διαβάλλουσιν ἡμᾶς ὡς γεγραμμένους λόγους λέγοντας λέγειν μελετῶμεν ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ μαθῇ τοις συνηγοροῦμεν κ.τ.λ. I will only add that this sense of the word is not to be confounded with the other and earlier one of prose writers and especially of the early 'chroniclers', antecedent to and contemporaries of Herodotus; in which it is employed by Thucyd. i 21 and Rhet. ii 11. 7, iii 7. 7, 12. 2.


Other proverbs of the same tendency are quoted by Erasmus, Adagia, p. 199. Ἀναρίτις ἐτραπάτος, ἀπὸ νεκροῦ φορολογεῖν ‘to take tribute of the dead’. αἰτεῖν τοὺς ἀνδριάντας ἀλφίτα, ‘to beg of the very statues’, κνωμάρτραξ, Aristoph. Equit. 41, ‘a skinflint’. And Appendix to Adagia, s. v. avaritiae, p. 1891.
And allow the Kai the ov begging 75 or interpretation, am 7 such Athens, previous according able attainable certainly former going compensation) order importunity and unselfishness sign upon when He understands under that is the extreme, in defect, of the mean or virtue in the expenditure of the money, the excess being dσωτία, reckless prodigality: it is therefore undue parsimony, meanness, stinginess in expense. aἰσχροκερδεία is one of Theophrastus' Characters, Χ'.

§ 6. 'And either to lend no assistance at all when you have the power or too little'. (ὕπτων sc. τοῦ δέοντος). 'Or to receive assistance from those who can less afford it'.

§ 7. 'And borrowing when it will look like begging, to ask a favour under the guise of a loan (begging is a sign of impudence); or begging when it will bear the appearance of asking for a return' (of a favour: the shamelessness of this consists in the pretence that you have a claim upon the person from whom you are in reality begging: a favour, even supposing that your claim is well founded, ought never to be conferred from any expectation of a return: comp. 19, 16, and 19, also 11. 4. 2, on the unselfishness of friendship), 'and asking for a return (repayment or compensation) when it will have the appearance of begging'. (If you have really done the other a favour, and so have a claim to compensation, still you must not put it in such a way as to seem to beg for it; begging is a sign of impudence.) The 'borrowing' propensities of the aναλυχντος appear in Theophr. Char. θ', ὁν ἀποστερεῖ, πρὸς τῶν ἄπελθων δανείησθαι: and also near the end. Victorius interprets the three cases differently. He understands the δόξει of the other party in the transaction; the first case is 'to anticipate the other by asking for a loan, when you fancy he is going to beg of you'; the second is that of the poorer party who begs when the other is going to demand repayment, and so stops his mouth; the third is that of the richer of the two, who has often assisted the other on former occasions, and being tired of lending him money, when the other comes to renew his solicitations stops his mouth by asking for repayment. This I allow to be just as good, perhaps better, in point of sense, certainly more amusing, than my own interpretation: but as far as I am able to judge, the latter is more naturally suggested by the Greek, and more in accordance with precedent, as collected from the language of the previous topics of these chapters on the πάθη. The first of these three, according to Victorius's interpretation, is well illustrated by Timon of Athens, ιι. 2. 49, What a wicked beast was I to disfurnish myself against such a good time...I was sending to use Lord Timon myself, &c.

'And to praise (your friend, from whom you want to get money) in order to induce him to suppose that you are begging, and after a failure, repulse, rebuff, to go on all the same'—this is the shamelessness of importunity—'for all these are signs of illiberality or meanness'.
§ 8. ‘To praise a man to his face is flattery’ (subaudi σημείον)—Terent. Adelph. 11 4. 6. *Ah vereor coram in os te laudare amplius, ne id assentandis magis quam quod gratum habeam facere existimes* (Victorius)—as is also overpraising a man’s good qualities, and disguising (by smearing over and so obscuring, as a writing, or blotting out) all his bad points (all his pecadillos and weaknesses); and excessive sympathy with his distress (exhibited) in his presence, and everything else of the same kind; for they are all signs of flattery. oι τασεωι κόλακες, Eth. N. IV 8, 1123 a 2, Ib. VIII 9, 1159 a 14, υπερχύμενοι γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τουτοῦτος εἶναι καὶ μάλλον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι. A distinction is taken between ἁρεσκος and κόλαξ in Eth. Nic. IV 12, sub fin., which is here disregarded. The ἁρεσκος, the ‘over-complaisant’, is what we usually understand by κόλαξ or flatterer; but κόλαξ is here confined to *interested* flattery; εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων, and is in fact equivalent to the ordinary παράσιτος. Theophrastus, Char. β' ε', maintains the distinction. One of the characteristics of κόλακες ἢ καὶ ἐπανέσαι δὲ ἀκούοντος: this appears also in the ἁρεσκος, Ch. ε'.

§ 9. ‘And the refusal to undergo labours which older men (than ourselves are willing to endure); or men brought up in the lap of luxury, in luxurious habits (which engender tenderness, and delicacy, and effeminacy, and in general tastes and habits averse to labour); or those who are in higher authority’ (if they condescend to undertake them, we are a fortiori bound to do so; or rather perhaps, in consideration of the μαλακία which seems intended to include all the preceding, for the same reason as the last mentioned, that they have not been inured to labour); ‘or in general, those who are weaker, less capable of undertaking them, than ourselves; for all these are signs of softness, delicacy, or effeminacy’. The oι ἐν ἐξουσία μάλλον may be illustrated by the case of a commanding officer on a march dismounting from his horse, and walking on foot by the side of his men. Such an example would certainly shame any of the men who complained of fatigue. [Xen. Anab. 111 4. 46—49.]

§ 10. ‘And receiving favours from another, either once or frequently, and then reproaching him with the service he has done: all signs of a mean spirit and a low, grovelling, mind and temper’. On μικροψυχία ‘ littleness of mind’, see Eth. N. IV 9.
§ 11. 'And saying any thing about yourself, making any kind of boast or profession about yourself',—no expression, however exaggerated, of self-laudation that you abstain from; no profession of any art or science that you do not lay claim to—'and taking the credit of, appropriating, other people's merits and advantages', symptomatic of quackery, undue and unfounded pretension or assumption. The worthiness of praise distains his worth, If that the prais'd himself bring the praise forth. Troilus and Cressida, I 3. 241.

ἐπαγγέλλονταί to announce or proclaim—to the world in the way of profession in general, or especially the profession of any art, science, or practice; and almost technically (by Plato) applied to the magnificent profession—without corresponding performance—of the Sophists. Rhet. Π 24. 11, of Protagoras' profession, what he undertook to do, viz. τὸν ἴττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν.—On ἀλαξονεία see note on I 2. 7.

'And in like manner the products or results of each of all the various vices of the character, and the outward signs of these (inward vices) and every thing that resembles them; for they are disgraceful (base and therefore to be shunned, in themselves), and provocative of shame (in us)'.

§ 12. 'And besides all these, the want (absence) of any of these estimable things of which all our peers, or most of them, have a share. By 'peers' I mean clansmen (members of the same race or tribe), fellow-citizens, equals in age, relatives, or, in general terms, those who are on an equality (on a level) with us; for now (that we have reached this stage, not perhaps before), it is shameful not to participate in advantages, such as education, or anything else in the same way, to so high a degree as they do. And all these disadvantages are still more disgraceful if they appear to be due to ourselves, and our own fault; for by this it does appear that they result rather from (internal) vice' (of character, the bad προάρεια which stamps them with the vicious character), 'if we ourselves be to blame for the introduction (pre-existence), the actual (present) existence, or future growth of them'.
§ 13. ‘And the endurance, present, past, or future (in the anticipation) of any such things as tend to dishonour and reproach, men are ashamed of; and these are all acts of service or subservience of person or shameful deeds, under which head comes wanton outrage’ (meaning here that particular kind of ὑβρίς which lies in an outrage on or violation of the person; ὑπηρετεῖν is equivalent to χαρίζεσθαι, sui copiam facere, the surrender of the person to the service or gratification of another).

§ 14. This concludes the first branch of the analysis of shame and its opposite, ποία αἰσχύνονται καὶ ἀνισχυροτοῦσιν, § 1, shameful things. We now proceed to consider the second, πρὸς τινάς, the persons, namely, before whom, in whose presence, this feeling is especially excited (lit. to whom the feeling is, as it were, addressed). These two divisions exhibit the two πάθη in their objective aspect, things and persons. The third, commencing at § 24, gives the subjective view of them, shewing how the persons who feel shame and the reverse are themselves affected by them, and what in them are the signs of its manifestation.
καὶ ταύτης αὐτῆς χάριν ἄλλα μὴ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης φροντίζει ἄλλα ἢ διὰ τοὺς δοξάζοντας, ἀνάγκη τούτοις αἰσχύνεσθαι ἄν λόγον ἔχει.

15 λόγον δ᾽ ἔχει τῶν θαυμαζόντων, καὶ οὐς θαυμάζει, καὶ υἱῷ ὁν βουλέται θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς οὐς φιλο-

16 τιμεῖται, καὶ ὁν μὴ καταφρονεῖ τῆς δόξης. θαυμά-

ζεσθαι μὲν ὁν βουλέται ὕπο τούτων καὶ θαυμα-

ζούσι τούτων ὅσοι τι ἐχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τῶν τιμῶν,

ἡ παρ᾽ ὁν τυγχάνουσι δεόμενοι σφόδρα πινὸς ὁν

17 ἐκεῖνοι κύριοι, οἰον οἱ ἐρωτεῖς. φιλότιμονται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ομοίους, φροντίζουσι δ᾽ ὡς ἀληθεύοντων τῶν

φρονίμων, τοιότου δ᾽ οἱ τε πρεσβύτεροι καὶ οἱ πεπαι-

18 δεμένοι. καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν φανερῷ

'Such and such like are the things that men are ashamed of. And as shame is a fancy or mental impression about discredit or loss of reputation (def. § 2), and this on its own account, with no reference to any ulterior results or consequences (of the loss of it), and no one cares for the opinion except on account of those who entertain it, it follows of necessity that the persons to whom shame is addressed are those whom we hold in account (take account of, regard and esteem)'

§ 15. 'We take account of those that admire and look up to us, and those whom we admire and look up to (comp. I 6.29), and by whom we wish to be admired, and those whom we are ambitious of rivalling (II 2.24, note, 4.24), and those whose opinion we don't despise'.

§§ 16, 17. 'Now the persons whom we wish to be admired by, and whom we ourselves look up to, are those who are in possession of any good of that class which is highly valued (which confers distinction), or those from whom we have an excessive desire to obtain something that they are masters of, as lovers; those that we vie with, or strive to rival, are our equals; and those that we look up to as authorities on any question (regard as likely to speak, or rather see, the truth in any disputed question on which their opinion is asked) are the men of practical wisdom; and such are men advanced in life and the well educated'.

§ 18. In the first clause of this section, as Schrader has noticed, there is a momentary transition from the persons who feel shame to the things which produce it; in the second, a return is made to the masculine. Supply αἰσχυνονται. 'And of things that take place, of acts done, under our very eyes, and openly (in broad daylight, or very prominent and conspicuous in position) men are more ashamed: whence also the proverb, the seat of shame is in the eyes. And the shame is deeper in the presence of those who will be always with us (constantly in our society, as members of our family, intimate friends; and the closer the intimacy the deeper the shame), and those who pay attention to, take particular
μᾶλλον' ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παρομία, τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμῷς εἶναι αἰδώ. διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς αἰεὶ παρεσομένους μᾶλλον αἰσχύνοντα καὶ τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμῷς ἀμφότερα. καὶ τοὺς μὴ περὶ ταύτα ἐνό- Ρ. 1384 ὃ.

19 χους. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τάναντια δοκεῖ τούτοις. καὶ notice of us (study our character and actions); because both these are cases of special observation'.

ἀμφότερα] the abstract neuter; 'both the preceding things, or cases'; these two facts, or observations on the manifestation of shame, that it is more felt in the presence (1) of intimate associates and (2) curious observers, are confirmed by the proverb that the seat of shame is in the eyes;—when we are very much ashamed of anything we turn away our eyes, and dare not look our friend in the face. So Sappho to Alcaeus, supra 1 9. 20—whatever the true reading may be—directly expresses this in the phrase αἰδῶς ἔχει ὀμματα.

The principal organ by which the emotion is expressed or manifested is naturally regarded as the seat of that emotion: and this is by no means confined to shame, but is extended not only to other emotions, but even to justice by Eurip. Med. 219, δικὰ γὰρ οἷκα ἐνεχθὲν ὕπτων: the eyes are in this case represented as the organs of injustice, not discerning right and wrong. So Eur. Hippol. 246, καὶ ἐὰν αἰσχύνην ὀμμα τέρτασθαι. Id. Ctesph. Fr. xviii (Dind.), αἰδώς ἐν ὀφθαλμῶις γίγνεται τέκνον (apud Stobaeanum). Arist. Vesp. 446, ἅλλα τοῦτοι γ᾽ οἷκα ἐν οὐδὲν ἐν ὀφθαλμῶισιν αἰδώς—τῶν παλαιῶν ἔμβαδον. Athen. XIII 564 B (Gaisford), καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐφ᾽ τοῖς ἑρασταῖς εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἑρωμένων ἀποβλέπειν ἢ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς, ἐν οἷς τὴν αἰδῶν κατοικεῖν. Theogn. 85, οἶνων ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ τε καὶ ὀφθαλμῶισιν ἐπεστιν αἰδῶς. Theoc. xxvii 69, ὀμμασιν αἰδομέν. (Paley ad Suppl. 195, Latin ed.) Apollon. Rhod. iii 92 (Victorius). Suidas s. v. αἰδώς. καὶ ἑτέρα παρομία “αἰδῶς ἐν ὀφθαλμῶις,” παρ᾽ ὅσον οἱ κεκακώμενοι τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς οὐκ αἰδοῦνται, ἡ ὅτι τοὺς παρὼντα ὀρῶντες αἰδοῦνται μᾶλλον οἱ ἀνθρώποι ἢ τοὺς ἀγώντας. Eustath. ad II. N 923. 18 (Gaisford), Ἀριστοτέλους γὰρ φιλοσοφότατα παραδομένων οἰκητήριον αἰδῶς εἶναι τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς. Id. ad Odys. ε' 1754. 39, ὁ Ἀριστοτέλεις μαρμένον τὴν αἰδῶ ἐν ὀφθαλμῶισ ἐναι, σύν των αἰδημονίων καὶ εἰς αὐτῆς ὤψεως χαρακτηρισμένων, οἱ ἐφ᾽ οἷς αἰδείσθαι χρή χαλάσω τὰ βλέφαρα καὶ βλέπειν ἀτενές ὁνόμασι. In Probl. xxxi 3, 957 b 11, this is directly stated as a matter of fact without any reference to the proverb or to vulgar opinion, ἐν ὀφθαλμῶισ γὰρ αἰδῶς, as an explanation of something else.

So of love, the eye is the medium or channel by which it is conveyed; Eur. Hippol. 527, ἔρως, ἔρως, ὁ κατ᾽ ὀμμάτων στάζεις πόδων. Aesch. Agam. 419, ὀμμάτων θ᾽ ἐν ἀχρητίας ἔφει πᾶσα Ἀφροδίτα, on which see Donaldson, New Crat. § 478. Ib. 742 (Dind.) μαλακῶν ὀμμάτων βέλος δηξίδυμον ἐρωτός ἄνθος. Plat. Phaedr. 251 θ, τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροήν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων—the Emotion theory—which is afterwards explained, ib. 251 C, Cratyl. 420 b, ἔρως δὲ, ὅτι ἐσθεν ἐξεβεθεν...ἐπείσατος διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων...ἐκαλεῖτο. Arist. Eth. Nic. ix 12, init. ὄστερ τοὺς ἔρως τὸ ὅριν ἀγαπητοτυτον ἐστὶ καὶ μᾶλλον αἰρόνται ταύτῃ τὴν ἀνθραίνην ἦ τὰς λοιπὰς ὡς κατὰ
"Such that I say, 'Gnostic Gems,' quoted by King, ‘the evil eye’ in the same passage love is described as a kind of ophthalmia, or infection by the eye. Similarly φθονος, ‘the evil eye’, Aesch. Agam. 947 (Dind.), μὴ τις πρόσαθην ομμάτων βάλοι φθονός—where Paley quotes Eur. Inú̂s Fragm. 11, ἐν χερσὶν, ἣ σπλάγχνουσιν, ἣ παρ' ομμάτα ἑσθ' ἡμιν (ὁ φθονός).—φόβος, Aesch. Pers. 168 (Dind.), ἀμφὶ δ' ὀφθαλμοῖς φόβος. ἀχος, Soph. Aj. 706, ἀλυσεν αἰῶν ἀξον ἀπ' ομμάτων Ἄρνης. S. Petr. Ep. 11 ii. 14. ὀφθαλμοὶ ἔχοντες μεστοὺς μοιγαλιός, S. Joh. Ep. I ii. 16, ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. χαρὰ, ‘tears of joy’, Soph. Electr. 894, 1304, 1231, γεγονὸς ἐρρεῖ δάκρυν ὀμμάτων ἀπὸ. Aesch. Agam. 261, χαρὰ μ' ύφεςει δάκρυν ἐκκαλουμένη. Ιb. 527. Prov. vi. 17, haughty eyes are an abomination to the Lord. Isaiah v. 15, the eyes (i. e. pride) of the lofty shall be humbled. Ezekiel v. 11, neither shall mine eyes (i. e. either mercy or justice) spare. Habak. i. 13, thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil. All these various examples shew, what may also be inferred from our own ordinary language, in which we speak indifferently of the eye of mercy and of pity on the one hand, and of the eye of anger, of envy, of scorn, of hatred, of jealousy on the other, that the eye may be taken to represent in language any emotion whatsoever, good or bad, of which it is in nature the most prominent organ of expression.

§ 19. ‘Again, in the presence of those who are not liable to the same imputations (as we lie under for some shameful act); for it is plain that (in this matter) their feelings and opinions must be contrary to our own. And of those who are not inclined to be indulgent, to make allowance for, apparent faults; for things which a man does himself he is generally supposed not to find fault with in others, and therefore (the converse must be true) what he does not do himself he is plainly likely to condemn in others’. Such as—according to Hudibras—Compound for sins they are inclined to, by damning those they have no mind to [1 i. 215].

νέμεσις is righteouus indignation, moral disapprobation or reprobation; the opposite of ἀλεος and συγγραφή, which take the indulgent and merciful view of human frailty. Infr. cc. 8, 9. Comp. 9. 1.

§ 20. ‘And of those who are inclined to gossiping (to telling tales, betraying secrets, publishing, divulging them to their acquaintance in general): because there is no difference (in regard of the effect upon the other) between not thinking (a thing wrong) and not publishing it to the world’. That is, as far as the effect upon the person who has done something wrong is concerned, and the amount of shame which it causes him, it makes no difference whether the other really thinks it wrong, or merely says so, to the world. In no other sense are ‘not thinking’ and ‘not telling’ the same. ‘Tell-tales are, such as have received an injury,—for

AR. II.
γελτικοὶ δὲ οὐ τε ἡδικήμενοι δια τὸ παρατηρεῖν καὶ οἱ κακολόγοι· εἶπερ γάρ καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀμαρτάνοντας, ἐτὶ μᾶλλον τῶν ἀμαρτάνοντας. καὶ οἰς ἡ διατριβή ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πέλας ἀμαρτίαις, οἰον χλευασταῖς καὶ κωμῳδοποιοῖς· κακολόγοι γάρ πως οὕτω καὶ ἐξαγ-γελτικοί. καὶ ἐν οἷς μηδὲν ἀποτετυχίκασιν ὅσπερ γάρ θανμαζόμενοι διάκειται. διὸ καὶ τοὺς πρῶτον

these are always on the watch, lying in wait (παρά lurking in the neighbour hood) (for an opportunity of retaliation)—and those who are censorious and inclined to evil-speaking in general: for the latter, (supply κακολογοῦσιν, or κακῶς λέγουσι,) if they speak evil of the inoffensive or innocent, a fortiori are likely to do so of the offenders or guilty.

παρατηρεῖν] infr. III 2. 15. Xen. Mem. III 14. 4, with an evil design, 'to lie in wait for', Polyb. xvi 3. 2, ap. Liddell and Scott. Add Arist. Top. Θ 11, 161 a 23, ὅταν ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος τάναντα τῷ ἐφωτότι παρατηρή προσ-επηρέαζων, of one, who in a dialectical discussion 'wantonly' (πρὸς, in addition to his proper functions, as a work of supererogation) 'and spitefully or vexatiously (ἐπηρέαζων) lies in wait to catch his opponent' in some logical trap or other.

'And those whose occupation or amusement (διατριβή, ἁσ extrav·) lies in finding fault with their neighbours, such as the habitually sarcastic (busy mockers, Ps. xxxv. 16), and comic poets or satirists in general: for these are in a sense (in some sort may be considered as) professional evil-speakers, and libellers of their neighbours'. To the readers of Aristophanes, and indeed of Comedy—especially ancient Comedy—in general, this satirical and libellous character, which has become identified with their art (κωμῳδείν, Aristoph., Plato, &c.), needs no illustration. Hor. A. P. 281—4.

χλευασταῖς] See ii 2. 12, and note. II 3. 9.

'And those with whom we have never before met with a failure (in curred reproach or damage, sustained a repulse, lost credit—explained by ἡδικήμενοι infra); for we are to them as it were objects of admiration and respect' (διάκειται, lit. we are to them in such a disposition, or position, attitude, posture)—they have never yet had occasion to find fault with us, we have hitherto not lost caste in their estimation—'and this is why we feel ashamed in the presence of (are reluctant to refuse) those who ask a favour for the first time, because (on the supposition that) we have never yet lost credit in their eyes (and this respect which they have for us we should be loth to impair)'.

ὡσπερ θανμαζόμενοι] Objects of shame (οὐς αἰσχύνοντα) are those before whom men feel ashamed of any offence against virtue or propriety: comp. ἡ αὐτὸ ἡ ὧν φρονιζεῖ, § 3: also §§ 15, 24.

'And these are either such as have recently conceived the wish to be friends with us—for they have hitherto seen only the best of us—and hence the merit of Euripides' answer to the Syracusans—or, of acquaintances of long standing, such as know nothing against, know no ill of us',
The answer of Euripides to the Syracusans is given—*invented* say some—by the Scholast, in these words: Εὐριπίδης πρὸς τοὺς Συρακουσίους πρέσβεις ἀποσταλεῖς καὶ περὶ εἰρήνης καὶ φιλίας δείμενος, ὡς ἐκείνοι ἀνεύευν, εἶπεν· ἔδει, ἀνδρεῖς Συρακοσίοι, εἰ καὶ διὰ μὴν ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ γε διὰ τὸ ἀρτι υἱόν δέσσαι, αἰσχύνεσθαι ἡμᾶς ὡς θαυμάζοντας. We know nothing from any other source of Euripides having ever been employed on any other occasion in any public capacity; but as Aeschylus fought at Marathon, and Sophocles was one of the ten generals who conducted the exhibition against Samos under Pericles, there seems to be no *a priori* objection to the employment of another tragic poet in a similar public service. That Euripides could speak in public we learn from a reference of Aristotle to another answer of his, Rhet. III 15. 8. Nevertheless the objection has been held fatal to the soundness of the reading, and Ruhnken, *Hist. Crit.* (ap. Buhle), has proposed to substitute *Ὑπερίδου* for *Εὐριπίδου* in our text, the one name being constantly confounded by transcribers with the other. Sauppe *Orat. Att.* Vol. III. p. 216, *Fragm. Oratt.* xv argues the question, and decides (rightly, I think) in favour of the vulgate. There is in fact no reason whatsoever, except our ignorance, for denying that Euripides could have been sent ambassador to Syracuse. Sauppe thinks that the occasion probably was the negotiations carried on between Athens and Sicily from 427–415, previous to the Sicilian expedition. His note ends with an inquiry whether another Euripides, Xenophon's father, *Thuc.* II 70, 79, may possibly be meant here. The extreme appropriateness of the answer to Aristotle's topic, which seems to have suggested the suspicion of manufacture for the special occasion, tells in reality at least as much in favour of its genuineness; it is because it *is* so appropriate, that Aristotle remembers and quotes it.

§ 21. 'And not only the *things* already mentioned cause shame, but also the signs and outward tokens and indications of it' (a *σημεῖα* is, in logic, the *ordinary* accompaniment of something the existence of which it *indicates*; the *invariable* accompaniment, a *certain* proof of the existence of it, is a *τεκμηρίων*), 'as in the case of sexual intercourse, not merely the act itself, but the signs of it. And similarly, people are ashamed not merely of shameful acts, but also of shameful words, foul language.'

*Quod factu foedum est, idem est et dictu turpe.* Soph. *Oed.* R. 1409, ἀλλ'
22 ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγοντες. ὦμοιος δὲ οὐ τοὺς εἰρημένους μόνον αἰσχύνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς δηλώσοντας αὐ-
23 τοῖς, οἷον θεράποντας καὶ φίλους τούτων. ὦλως δὲ
οὐκ ἀἰσχύνονται οὕθ' ἀν πολὺ καταφρονοῦσι τῆς
dόξης τοῦ ἄληθευεν (οὐδεις γὰρ παιδία καὶ θηρία
αἰσχύνεται) οὔτε ταυτά τοὺς γυνώριμους καὶ τοὺς
ἀγνώτας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν γυνώριμους τὰ πρὸς ἄληθειαν
δοκοῦντα τοὺς δὲ ἀπώθεν τὰ πρὸς τὸν νόμον. 

24 αὐτοὶ δὲ ὅδε διακείμενοι αἰσχυνθείειν ἂν, πρῶτον
μὲν εἰ υπάρχοντες πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχοντες οὕτω τινὲς οίους
ἐφαμεν εἶναι οὐς αἰσχύνονται. ἢσαν δ' οὖντι ἡ θαν-
οῦ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔσθ' ἀ μηδὲ ὑμαν καλῶν. Isocr. ad Demon. § 15, ἀ ποιεῖν
αισχρόν, ταῦτα νόμιζε μηδὲ λέγειν εἶναι καλῶν.

§ 22. 'And in like manner we are ashamed (of any disgraceful
action) before those who will reveal or betray it to them' (viz. the before-
mentioned τοῖς βαυμάζοντιων and the rest: αὐτοῖς is due to Victorius for
varia lectio αὐτοῖς); 'as servants, and their friends'.

§ 23. 'And in general, people are not ashamed in the presence of
those for whose opinion, in respect of perceiving the truth and forming a
sound judgment on it, they have a very great contempt—for no one feels
shame in the presence of children or brutes—or of the same things' (ταυτά
cogn. accus. after αἰσχύνονται understood) 'in the presence of persons well
known to them and of strangers; but in the presence of intimates they
are ashamed of things which are considered (δοκοῦντα) really and essen-
tially, in that of the remote (from them in connexion), of what is only
conventionally, disgraceful'. On this distinction of πρὸς ἄληθεαν and
πρὸς δόξαν =πρὸς τὸν νόμον, see note on 11 4. 23: and on ἀπώθεν (the ter-
mination) note on 1 11. 16.

§ 24. This section is the commencement of the third division of the
analysis of shame and its opposite; the subjective view of them, shewing
how they appear in the persons themselves who are affected by them.

'The likely subjects of shame themselves are, first of all men of such
a disposition, or in such a state of mind, as if they had certain others
standing to them in the same relation as those of whom we said they
stand in awe'. Such are persons whom they respect and admire, whom
they regard as authorities, whose judgment and opinions they look up to.
A somewhat complicated assemblage of words to express this simple
meaning, that the disposition to shame is the same state of mind as that
which has been before described as felt in the presence of certain classes
of persons of whom we stand in awe; which are immediately specified.
'These were (i. e. are, as we described them, ὃν τις τῆς δόξης φροντίζει,
tῶν βαυμάζοντων, καὶ οὕς βαυμάζει κ.τ.λ. ante §§ 14, 15) either those that we
admire, or that admire us, or by whom we wish to be admired, or those
from whom we require any aid or service which we shall not obtain if we
lose our credit with them; and these either as actually looking on, actual spectators (of what we say or do), of which Cydias' harangue on the allotment of Samos furnishes an example—for he required them to imagine the entire Greek people to be standing round the Athenians in a circle, as actual spectators, and not mere (future or expectant) listeners, of the decree they are about to make—or if such be near at hand, or likely to be listeners' (to what we have to say: this especially for the deliberative speaker).

The Σάμου κληρονομία here referred to is not the allotment of the Samian lands amongst Athenian citizens after the revolt of the island and its subsequent reduction by Pericles in 440 B.C. Thucydides, who gives an account of the treatment of the Samians after their defeat, I 117, makes no mention of any such allotment. It is referred by Ruhnken, Hist. Crit., and by Grote, Hist. of Gr. x 407 and note, 408, to Timotheus' conquest of Samos in 366, and the subsequent Athenian settlement there in 352; of the former of which Cornelius Nepos speaks, Vit. Timoth. c. 1, ap. Clinton F. H. sub anno 440. It was against this allotment of Samos that Cydias (of whom nothing seems to be known beyond this notice, his name does not even occur in Baiter and Sauppe's list of Orators,) made his appeal to the Athenian assembly, and invited them to decide the question of spoliation, as though all Greece were standing round them looking on. Isocrates, Paneg. § 107, is obliged to defend his countrymen from the reproach (ουρείδεα) of this and similar practices, not specially named, by the plea that the appropriation of the territory was not due to rapacity, but solely to the desire of securing the safety of the desolated properties by planting a colony to defend them.

'And therefore also men in misfortune don't like (are ashamed) to be seen by their quondam rivals or emulators, because these are admirers'; and therefore, by the rule previously laid down, they are ashamed to appear before them in this undignified and melancholy condition.

§ 25. And men are disposed to feel shame, 'whenever they have attached to them any disgraceful deeds or belongings, derived either from themselves or their ancestors, or any others with whom they are in near relation'. ἀγγείοις, 'nearness of kin', gives the right of succession
Èργα καὶ πράγματα ἣ αὐτῶν ἢ προγόνων ἢ ἄλλων τινῶν πρὸς οὐς ύπάρχει αὐτοὶς ἀγχιστεία τις. καὶ ὀλως ὑπὲρ ὅν αἰσχυνονται αὐτοὶ. εἰσὶ δὲ οὕτωι οἱ εἰρημένοι καὶ οἱ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀναφερόμενοι, ὃν διδάσκαλοι ἦ σύμβουλοι γεγόνασιν, ἥ εἰν ἂσιν ἑτεροί ὤμοιοι, 26 πρὸς οὺς φιλοτιμοῦνται πολλα γὰρ αἰσχυνόμενοι διὰ 27 τοὺς ποιοῦντος καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ οὐ ποιοῦσιν. καὶ μέλλοντες ὀράσθαι καὶ ἐν φανερῷ ἀναστρέφεσθαι τοῖς συνειδόσιν αἰσχυντιλοὶ μᾶλλον εἰσίν. ὅθεν καὶ Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ποιητὴς μέλλων ἀποτυμπανίζεσθαι ὑπὸ Διονυσίου ἑίπεν, ἰδῶν τοὺς συναποθνήσκειν μέλλοντας


‘And, as a general rule, those on whose behalf (account) we ourselves feel ashamed (when they are guilty of any shameful act). These are such as have been just named (sc. πρόγονοι ἢ ἄλλοι τινὲς κτλ.) as well as all such as fall back upon us (ἀναφερόμενοι, re-lati, who refer to us, as patrons or authorities), those, that is, to whom we have stood in the relation of instructors or admirers; or indeed if there be any others, like ourselves, to whom we look up as competitors for distinction: for there are many things which out of consideration for such we either do or avoid doing from a feeling of shame’.

§ 27. ‘And when we are likely to be seen, and thrown together’ (ἀναστρέφεσθαι, versari, conversari; of converse, conversation, in its earlier application) ‘in public with those who are privy to (our disgrace), we are more inclined to feel ashamed’. Comp. Thucyd. I 37, 4, καὶ τοῦτῳ τὸ εὐπρεπὲς ἀστοιχίαν οὕτω ἦν ἡ ξυναδικήσωσιν ἑτέροις προβεβληστα, ἀλλ’ ἂν ἂν πάντως κατὰ μόνας ἀδικώσα, καὶ ὅπως ἐν ὧ μὲν ἂν κρατῶσι βιάζωστα, ὡς ἅν λάθωσιν πλέον ἔχωσιν, ἤν δὲ τού τι προσλάβωσιν ἀνασχυντῶσι. “May be spared their blushes, as there are none to witness them.” According to the proverb, Pudor in oculis habitat. Arnold ad loc.

‘To which also Antiphon the poet referred (обще, from which principle he derived his remark) when, on the point of being flogged to death by Dionysius, he said, as he saw those who were to die with him (his fellow-sufferers) covering their faces as they passed through the gates (at the city gates, where a crowd was gathered to look at them), “Why hide your faces? Is it not for fear that any one of these should see you to-morrow?”’
On Antiphon the tragic poet, see II. 2.19; and on ἀποστηματίζεσθαι, c. 5. 14.

ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι, 'to hide the face' especially for shame. Plat. Phaedr. 243 B, γυμνῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ υἱῷ ἀσπερ τότε ὑπ’ αἰσχύνης ἐγκαλυμμένος. In Phaedo 117 C, Phaedo covers his face to hide his tears, ἀστακτὴ ἐξώρη τὰ δάκρυα, ὡστε ἐγκαλυμμένον ἀπέκλαυ ἐμαυτόν. Stallbaum refers to Dorville ad Charit. p. 274. Aesch. c. Tim. § 26, (Timarchus) γυμνὸς ἐπαγκρατιάζειν ...οὕτω κακῶς καὶ αἰσχρῶς διακειμένος τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ μέθης καὶ βδελυγίας, ὡστε τούς γε ἐν φρονοῦντας ἐγκαλύμασθαι, ἀισχυνθέντας υπὲρ τῆς πόλεως κ.π.λ. In the 3rd of the letters attributed to Demosthenes, 1485. 9, τίς Ἀριστογείτων κρίσεως ἀναμυνηθέντες ἐγκαλύμασθε (hide your faces for shame).

Also for fear, Arist. Plut. 707, μετὰ ταῦτ’ ἐγώ μὲν εὐθὺς ἐνεκαλυψάμην δείσας, Ib. 714.

Plutarch, X Orat. Vit., 'Ἀντιφών, relates this story of Antiphon the orator. He was sent on an embassy to Dionysius tyrant of Syracuse; and, at a drinking party, the question arising, which was the 'best bronze' in the world, τίς ἀριστός ἐστι λαλός; Antiphon said that was the best of which the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton were made. Dionysius interpreting this as implying a similar design upon himself ordered him to be executed. Others say that the order was given in a fit of passion brought on by Antiphon's criticism of his tragedies.

ἡ μὴ τίς ὑδ] The alternative ἡ prefixed to the interrogative sentence, expresses the opinion of the writer or speaker, 'It is so—isn't it?' ‘You do think so, don't you?' and is most familiar in the Platonic dialogues; also very frequent in our author. The alternative, which conveys this, refers to a suppressed clause or clauses, "Is it so and so, or so and so,—or rather, as I myself think and suppose that you do also, is it not thus?" In order to express this, in translating we supply the negative. Socrates' ἢ οὐ; 'You think so, don't you?'; which occurs so constantly (in Plato) at the end of his arguments, may seem to contradict this. But it really amounts to the same thing. Socrates, meaning to imply that he expects the other's assent, says (literally) 'or not?'; which is, being interpreted, 'You surely don't think otherwise?' Dionysius' ἡ μὴ consequently mean when expressed at full length 'Is it anything else, or is it not rather as I suppose, lest'...

'So much for shame: of shamelessness, the topics may plainly be derived from the opposites of these'.

CHAP. VII.

χάρις, the πάθος, or instinctive emotion, of which this Chapter treats, represents the tendency or inclination to benevolence, to do a grace, favour, or service, spontaneous and disinterested (§§ 2, 5) to another, or to our fellow-man. It also includes the feeling of gratitude, the instinctive inclination to return favours received.
§ 1. 'The objects of benevolence, the circumstances and occasions (on which it is exercised), and the dispositions, characters, and moods of mind (of those who exercise it), will be evident when we have defined benevolence'.

§ 2. 'Let us then assume benevolence to be that, in accordance with (under the influence of) which he who has the feeling is said to do a service to one who is in want of it, not in return for anything (as a compensation or payment)—it must be spontaneous as an instinct—'nor for his own benefit, but for the advantage of the other party (to the transaction, ἐκεῖνο): the favour is great if it be (conferred on) one who is in extreme need of it, or if (the benefit it confers) be of great value or difficult (of attainment), on occasions of the like kind (μεγάλοις καὶ χαλεποῖς), or if it be unique' (a solitary instance of such a service, the only time it ever was conferred: supply ἢ ἀν μόνος ὁ ύπουργὸς ύπουργήσῃ or simply χαρίσται), 'or the first of its kind or the most important of its kind (lit. more than any one else has ever done)'.

A passage of Cicero, de Invent. xxxviii. 112, will serve as a commentary on this. Beneficia ex sua vi, ex tempore, ex animo eius qui facil, ex caso, considerantur. (The character of acts of benevolence is gathered or determined from these four considerations.) Ex sua vi quaerentur hoc modo: magna an parva, facilita an difficilia, singularia sint an vulgaria, vera an falsa, quanam exornatione honestatur: ex tempore autem, si tum quum indigereamus, quum ceteri non possent, aut nollent, opitulari, si tum quum spes deseruisset: ex animo, si non sui commodi causa, si eo consilio fecit omnia ut hoc conficer posset: ex caso, si non fortuna sed industria factum videbatur aut si industria fortuna obstissit. From this close resemblance I should infer, not that Cicero had Aristotle's work before him when he wrote the de Inventione, but rather that it had been handed down, perhaps from him in the first instance, as a common-place in the ordinary books of Rhetoric.

It was a disputed question, says Ar. again, Eth. Nic. viii 15, 1163 a 9, seq., whether the magnitude of a favour or benefit is to be measured by the amount of service to the recipient, or by the beneficence of the doer of it: the former being always inclined in the estimate of its value to underrate, the latter to overrate it. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαύτα φασὶ λαβεῖν πυρὰ τῶν εὐφρεντῶν ἀ μικρὰ ἢν ἐκεῖνοι καὶ ἐξὶν παρ’ ἐτέρῳ λαβεῖν, κατασκοιτίζοντες· οἱ δὲ ἀνάπαυσι τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ παρ’ ἀλλῶν οὐκ ἢν, καὶ ἐν κατάξεις η τοιαύτας χρείας.

1 τῇ τοῦ δρᾶσαντος εὐφρενισ. The amount of pains, labour, risk, or sacrifice incurred by the conferrer of the benefit here seems to be regarded as the measure of his 'beneficence'. 
εκείνω τι μεγάλη δ’ ἃν ἦ σφόδρα δεομένω, ἦ μεγάλων καὶ χαλεπῶν, ἦ ἐν καιροῖς τοιούτοις, ἦ μόνος ἦ πρῶς τοις ἦ μάλιστα. δέησεις δ’ εἰσίν αἱ ὀρέξεις, καὶ τοῦτων μάλιστα αἱ μετὰ λύπης τοῦ μὴ γιγνομένου τοιαύται δὲ οἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, οἶον ὁ ἔρως. καὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κακώσεσι καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις καὶ γὰρ ὁ μὴ ἀντὶ τινος] This might seem at first sight to exclude gratitude from the notion of χὰρις; but this I believe cannot be intended; though gratitude and ingratitude are not distinctly noticed in the chapter. The case is this. χὰρις in this chapter is employed exclusively in its subjective sense (see the Lexx.), to denote one of the instinctive feelings: when therefore it is applied to express gratitude, it is the feeling only, and not the actual return of the favour, which is taken into account. This is expressed by the words μὴ ἀντὶ τινος, which signify that it is ‘independent of the actual requital of the benefit conferred’: and, indeed, gratitude may be equally felt when the receiver of the favour has no means of repaying it in kind. This independent or subjective feeling of gratitude is therefore opposed in the words μὴ ἀντὶ τινος to the notion of a μισθὸς, the ‘payment’ or wages which a workman receives in fulfilment of an implied contract; where there is no feeling of gratitude or obligation remaining on either side after the work is done and paid for. Whereas gratitude is a permanent feeling, and the sense of obligation still remains after the requital or repayment of the service. The opposite to this is διὰ ἀπέδωκαν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔδωκαν, § 5. It may be argued in certain cases that what appears to proceed from gratitude or spontaneous benevolence, is in reality nothing but the repayment of an obligation, with which χὰρις is not concerned.

§ 3. ‘All our natural impulses are wants, and of these those especially which are accompanied by pain at the non-attainment (μὴ γεγομένου) of their object: such are the appetites and desires, as love’. On ὀρέξεις see p. 9, note on 11 2. 1. The connexion of this remark is with the δεομένω of the preceding definition. The feeling (and the consequent act) of benevolence always implies the satisfaction of some want in the recipient of the favour; if he did not want it, it would be no favour. And besides this, the magnitude of the want is a measure of the magnitude of the favour and of the benevolence that prompts it. Aristotle therefore proceeds to notice some of the principal wants, in the satisfaction of which χὰρις is manifested in the highest degree. All our natural impulses imply wants—the ὀρέξεις, the ‘conative’ or striving faculties, all aim at some object which they desire to attain. To the ‘impulsive’ element of our nature, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, belong the appetites and desires such as love (the animal passion). (Besides these the ὀρέξεις includes θυμός, and βουλήσεις ‘the will’.) These appetites and desires, being always accompanied with pain when thwarted or failing to attain their object, are for this reason ‘wants in the highest degree’, μάλιστα δέησεις.

καὶ αἱ (ἐπιθυμίαι) ἐν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κακώσεσι καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις (μάλιστα δέησεις εἰσίν)] ‘Also those (desires) that occur in (belong to) bodily
κινδυνεύων ἔπιθυμει καὶ ὁ λυπούμενος. διὸ οἱ ἐν πενίᾳ παριστάμενοι καὶ φυγαῖς, καὶ μικρὰ ὑπηρετήσωσιν, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς δεήσεως καὶ τὸν καιρὸν κεχαρισμένον, οἴον ὁ ἐν Λυκείῳ τὸν φορμὸν δοὺς. ἀνάγκη οὐν μάλιστα μὲν εἰς ταύτα ἐχειν τὴν υπουργίαν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, εἰς ἵσα ἤ μείζω. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ φανερὸν καὶ ὅτε καὶ ἐφ' οἷς γίγνεται χάρις καὶ πῶς ἐχοῦσι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τούτων παρασκευαστέον, τους μὲν δεικνύτας ἢ οὕτας

sufferings or injuries (are wants of a high degree): for in fact (this a note on the preceding) every one that is in danger or in pain feels desire'. For ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ λυπούμενος compare supra c. 4 § 3, γιγνομένων δὲν βούλονται χαίροντι πάντες, τῶν ἐναντίων δὲ λυποῦνται, ὅτε τὶς βουλήσεως σημείων αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτὸς δουλαν.

κάκωσις, in its ordinary use, and especially in its legal application, denotes a particular kind of injury or suffering, viz. ill-treatment. It also however bears the more general sense, at least three times in Thucydides, II 43, where κάκωσις is a repetition of κακοπραγοῦσε, and implies ill-fortune, disaster, suffering: VII 4, and 82, τοῖς τε τραύμασι καὶ τῇ ἀλη κακώσει, where the sense is unmistakable, and coincides exactly with the use of it here.

'And therefore it is, that those who stand by (assist or succour, παριστάμενοι) a man in poverty or exile, however slight the service they render, by reason of the magnitude of the want and the occasion, confer a great favour' (or, 'are very agreeable, acceptable'. The word seems to include both senses): 'like the man who lent the mat ἐν Λυκείῳ'. A friend in need is a friend indeed.

I have not attempted to translate the word Λυκείῳ. We do not even know whether it is the name of a man or a place: it might also be the title of a play or a speech, from which the instance was borrowed. Victorius says, 'historia ignota mihi est'; Schrader, 'quis, cui, quando dederit, incertum (rather ignotum) est.' The meaning is plain enough: it is a case like that of Sir Philip Sidney's cup of cold water, in which circumstances of time and place enormously enhance the value and importance of something which in ordinary circumstances is trifling and worthless [cf. Vol. 1. pp. 84, 144].

§ 4. 'Accordingly, the service that is received' (by the recipients, which seems to be the subject of ἔχειν) 'must be especially directed to these same things' (viz. the satisfaction of the more urgent wants and desires. I have followed Bekker in retaining ταῦτα. MS Aέ has ταῦτα, and Q, V, Z τοιαῦτα, which is adopted by Victorius), 'or if not, to things equal or greater. And therefore, now that the times, circumstances, and dispositions of mind, which give rise to benevolent feeling, have been pointed out, it is plain that it is from these sources that we must provide our materials (for producing it in our audience), by shewing that the one party (the recipient in the transaction) either is
§ 5. 'It is plain too from what sources (or topics) may be derived the materials for depriving (those who have conferred a favour) of (the credit of) this kindly and benevolent feeling, and making them (and their act appear, representing them as) devoid of all such feeling and intention'. This is Victorius’ interpretation, and I think more consistent with what follows than that of Schrader, who understands it of the audience, and not of the benefactor; and explains it, ‘facere ut affectu illo, qui ad gratiam habendam referendamve fertur, vacui fiant auditores.’ ἀχάριστος and ἀχάριτος, ‘without grace’, stand in the first instance for ‘unpleasing, disagreeable’—so in Homer, Theognis, Herodotus—and express the opposite of κεχαρισμένος, supra § 3: and this, with the substitution of the special sense of χάρις as a πάθος for the general sense of grace, beauty, favour, is the meaning given to the words by Aristotle here: ‘without grace’ is here to be understood ‘without this kindly feeling’. The ordinary use of the word for ‘ungrateful’ is founded upon a third sense of χάρις, viz. gratitude.

For (we may argue) either that the (boasted) service is, or was, done from motives of self-interest, and this, as we said, (ἡ, by definition, § 2,) is not benevolent feeling, or that the service was an accident of coincidence, or done under constraint, or that it was a payment and not a free gift, whether the party was aware (of his obligation to the other, so Victorius) or not: for in both cases (whether conscious or unconscious) it was a mere barter or exchange, and therefore again in this respect no benevolence'.

1 γεγενημένους. There seems to be no intelligible distinction here made between εἴραι and γέροεθαι; at least, none that is worth expressing in the translation. What again is the difference intended between the two verbs in this passage, γενόμενα ἢ ἐσόμενα, 11. 8. 13? It may be supposed that Aristotle has only used the latter verb in default of a perfect of the former. And it is certain that the Greek writers do occasionally employ forms of γέροεθαι where our idiom requires the substitution of the simple ‘to be’. If the word here to be translated literally, the notion of ‘becoming’ must be rendered by ‘having come to be in, or fallen into, such want’.

2 If I understand Aristotle aright, I cannot see how the alternative εἰτε μὴ εἰλόρες can be fairly and properly included in this topic; though it might of course be employed by an unscrupulous speaker to delude an unintelligent audience. It seems to me that the forgetfulness or ignorance that anything is due to the person who receives the favour does alter the character of the transaction; that the gift in such a case may be a free gift, and the feeling that prompts it χάρις, disinterested benevolence, and that the τι ἄντι τινως does not here fairly apply.
Neither tov. for d'fyoTepias Schrader n for OTL and toxctTTOV TKeTTTeov crowding, make appositely gift as Antiphanes (fv accept to a derived he it the two lence) or referred this passage, in or are the two Euai/Spt avfj.TTiXf videbatur, illustration fl of Halonnesus), as referred to by Aeschines katâ Ktησιωφόντος § 83. ‘Αλλοννησον εδίδου (Philip offered to give, make us a present of Halonnesus), δ’ δ’ (Demosthenes) ἀπηγόρευε μη λαμβάνειν, εἰ διδώσων ἄλλα μη ἀποδίδοσιν (if the offer is to be regarded as a free gift instead of a repayment), peri συλλαβῶν διαφέρομενοι: and (in Athenaeus vi 223 D—224 B) by the orator Cothocides; and the Comic Poets, Antiphanes (ἐν Νεοτίδι), Alexis (ἐν Στρατιώτη and ἐν Ἀδελφοῖς), Anaxilas (ἐν Ἐυανθρία), and Timocrates (ἐν Ἡρωσων), who ridicule the objection as a mere verbal quibble. The phrase seems to have passed almost into a proverb. Demosthenes truly observes, “majoris tamen ponderis res erat quam videbatur, ut ex hoc quoque loco intelligitur.” Demosthenes seems to have advised his Athenians to refuse the offer as a gift, and only to accept it as a repayment of an outstanding obligation. The argument derived from Aristotle’s topic when applied to the case would be different. This offer is prompted by no χάρις or kindly feeling, as Philip represents it; for it is no free gift but the mere payment of a debt. Consequently he is διάρματος, and we owe him no χάρις, or gratitude, in return.

ouβ' οὔτως] ‘neither in this way’. ‘Neither in this way’ (i.e. in the two last cases of intentional or even unintentional repayment, included as one under the head of repayment), is it true χάρις, any more than in the two preceding, where the act is (1) not disinterested, or (2) accidental or compulsory.

§ 6. ‘And (in estimating the value of the feeling or act of benevolence) we must examine it under all the Categories; for χάρις may be referred to that of substance (the fact) or quantity, or quality, or time, or place’. Schrader has illustrated the first three of these, but examples are hardly necessary where they so readily suggest themselves. Brandis, in the tract so often cited [Philologus iv 1], p. 26, observes on this passage, that though there can be no doubt that when Aristotle wrote this he had the list of categories lying before him, whether or no the book was then written cannot be decided.

‘And it is a sign (of the ἀχαριστία, the absence of benevolent feeling, that there was no intention of obliging us, and that we therefore owe
PHILOPHICUS B 7 § 6; 8 §§ 1, 2.

§ 2. Pity, according to the popular definition, which is all that Rhetoric requires, is a feeling of pain that arises on the occasion of any evil, or suffering; manifest, evident (apparent, to the eye or ear), deadly or (short of that) painful, when unmerited; and also of such a kind as we may expect to happen either to ourselves or to those near and dear to us, and that it seems to be near at hand: for it is plain that any one who is capable of feeling (lit. is to feel) the emotion of pity must be such as to suppose himself liable to suffer evil of some kind or other, himself or his friends; and evil of that kind which has been stated in the definition, or like it, or nearly like it.

On φαινόμενον = φανερόν, evident, unmistakable, see note on p. 10 (II 2. 1). Victorius understands it to mean "quod nobis malum videatur: possemus enim in hoc falli, atque eam miserram esse judicare quae minime sit." But this surely would be expressed by δοκεῖν, not φαίνεσθαι: and to say nothing of the numerous examples by which the other interpretation is supported, (some of which are given in the note above referred to,) this seems to be more appropriate to what follows, and to the nature of the πάθος itself: for the feeling of pity is strong in proportion to the vividness with which the suffering is brought home to us. The actual sight of it, when we see the effect of the injury (and perhaps also a graphic description of it from an eye-witness), gives it a reality and a force which

1 Toup, quoted by Gaisford, very unnecessarily conjectures εἰ Ἐλαστὸν μὲν, "si minus dederint quam par esset."

2 A remark of Lessing, at the end of the first section of his Laokoon, will serve as a commentary on Aristotle's φαινόμενον. "Alles stoische ist untheatralisch;
νειν, ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειν ἀν παθεῖν ἡ τῶν intensify our sympathy. That this is Aristotle's meaning appears most clearly from a subsequent passage, § 8, where these painful things are enumerated, and are found to be all of them bodily affections: and still more perhaps from § 14, where the effect of πρὸ ὁμολογίας ποιεῖν is described. Aristotle has omitted, designedly or not, all mention of mental suffering: perhaps he thought that not being actually visible it was incapable of exciting pity. See further on this in note on II 8.8.

Again, this view of the meaning of the word is in exact agreement with a preceding observation upon pain, II 4.31, that 'all painful things are objects of sense, (that is, all feelings which can properly be called painful are excited by sensible objects), and the greatest evils, as wickedness and folly, are the least sensible; for the presence of vice causes no pain'. Victorius, who however does not refer to this passage, has pointed out that the kind of evil which excites pity is distinguished and limited by the epithets φθαρτικός καὶ λυπηρός; which upon the principle laid down in c. 4.31 excludes the greatest evils, moral and intellectual, as objects of pity.

With τοῦ ἀναξίου τυχάνειν comp. II 9.1, αὐτικεῖται τῷ ἐλεεῖν... ὁ καλοῦσι νεμεσάντ᾽ τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοτραγίαις. κ.τ.λ. When a bad man suffers we look upon it as a deserved punishment, and feel no pity, unless we deem the punishment to be excessive. 'Alas', says Carlyle, of the end of the Girondins, 'whatever quarrel we had with them, has not cruel fate abolished it? Pity only survives.' French Revolution, Pt. III. Bk. IV. c. 8, ult.

The last clause of the definition, ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς κ.τ.λ., expresses the compassion, sympathy with the sufferer, the fellow-feeling, implied in pity. Haud ignara mali miseris succurrere disco. It is only in this form, as 'compassion', that the emotion enters into Mr Bain's list; Emotions and Will, p. 112, [chap. VII § 22, ed. 1875]. Compassion, according to him, is one of the benevolent affections, a group subordinate to the family of Tender Emotions. This appears to be a juster view of the nature and connexion of the feeling than the account given by Aristotle. The fact is, as I have elsewhere stated, that the conception of general benevolence and love and duty to our fellow-creatures, is of modern and Christian origin, and finds no place in Aristotle's Ethical System: the χάρις of the preceding chapter includes but und unser mitleiden ist allezeit dem leiden gleichmässig welches der interessirende gegenstand äussert. Sieht man ihn sein elend mit grosser seelisch ertragen, so wird diese grosse seelisch zwar unsere bewunderung erwecken, aber die bewunderung ist ein kalter affekt, dessen unthätiges staunen jede andere wärmere leidenschaft, so wie jede andere deutliche vorstellung, ausschliesset."

1 This however seems to require some qualification: it is true of course of all bodily pain; but are not certain mental states, as doubt, suspense, uncertainty, disappointment, also painful? In the case of ἔλεος, Ar. probably means that at least some sensible image, a mental representative, or φαντασία, proceeding from some object of sense, is required to excite the painful feeling. But surely we can pity the mental as well as the bodily sufferings of a friend, provided he makes them sufficiently distinct and intelligible to us.

2 Review of Aristotle's System of Ethics, 1867, p. 52.
aντον τινα, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται: δὴ λο\nγαρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸν μέλλοντα ἐλεήσειν ὑπάρχειν τοι-
οῦτον οἶον οἶεσθαι παθεῖν ἂν τι κακὸν ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν
αὐτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοιοῦτο κακὸν οἶον εὑρηταὶ ἐν τῷ ὅρῳ
3 ἡ ὁμοιὸν ἡ παραπλήσιον;] διὸ ὦτε οἱ παντελῶς ἀπο-
λωλότες ἐλεοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γάρ ἂν ἐτὶ παθεῖν οἴονται:
πεπόνθασι γάρ) ὦτε οἱ υπερευναιμονεὶς οἰόμενοι, ἀλλ' ὑβρίζουσιν ἐι γάρ ἄπαντα οἴονται ὑπάρχειν τάγαθα,

a small part of it, being in fact confined to doing a service to a friend in need. Again the limitation of pity to those sufferings to which we ourselves or our friends are exposed, ascribes a selfishness to the emotion which seems not necessarily to belong to it. In fact if this were true, the God of the Christian, and the gods of the heathen would be alike incapable of it. Hobbes, in accordance with his theory of universal selfishness, goes beyond Aristotle in attributing the feeling solely to self-love. Leviathan, Pt 1. c. 6. ‘Grief for the calamity of another is Pity; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore is called also Compassion, and in the phrase of this present time a Fellow-feeling. And therefore’ (he continues, another point of contact with Aristotle,) ‘for calamity arising from great wickedness the best men have the least pity; and for the same calamity those have pity that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.’ [Hobbes, as is well known, analysed Aristotle’s treatise in his Brief of the Art of Rhetorick, first printed with date in 1681. The Leviathan was published in 1651. S.]

The Stoic definition, quoted by Victorius from Diog. Laert., Zeno, vii 1, is in partial agreement with that of Aristotle, but omits the last clause; ἐλεός ἐστὶν λύπη ὧς ἐπὶ ἀναξίως κακοπαθοῦντι. Whence Cicero, Tusc. Disp. IV 8.18, misericordia est aegritudo ex miseria alterius inuria laborantis. But the Stoics, though they thus defined pity, nevertheless condemned the exercise of it: Diog. Laert., u. s., § 123, ἐλεήμονας μὴ εἶναι συγγνώμην τῷ ἔχειν μηδενὶ μὴ γὰρ παρεῖναι τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἐπιβαλλούσας κολάσεις, ἐπεὶ τὸ γ’ ἔκειν καὶ ὁ ἔλεος αὐτῆς θ’ ἐπείκεια οὐδενεὶ ἐστὶν ψυχῆς πρὸς κολάσεις προσποιουμένη χρηστότητα μὴ δ’ οἴεσθαι σκληροτέρας αὐτὰς εἶναι. “Pity, anger, love—all the most powerful social impulses of our nature—are ignored by the Stoics, or at least recognised only to be crushed.” Lightfoot, Dissert. II on Ep. to Philip. p. 320.

§ 3. ‘And therefore, neither are those who are utterly lost and ruined inclined to pity—for they suppose themselves to be no more liable to suffering, seeing that their sufferings are all over (their cup of suffering has been drained to the dregs)—nor those who deem themselves transcendentally happy; on the contrary, they wax wanton in insolence. For, supposing themselves to be in possession of every kind of good, it is plain that they must assume also their exemption from all liability to evil; which in fact is included in the class total of goods’.

πεπόνθασι] See note on εἰρήσθω, 1 ii. 29, and the examples of the
διήλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι παθεῖν μὴδὲν κακὸν.
4 καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οίοι
νομίζειν παθεῖν ἄν οἱ τε πεπονθότες ἤδη καὶ διαπεφευ-
γότες, καὶ οἱ πρεσβυτεροὶ καὶ διὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ δὲ
ἐμπερίαν, καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς, καὶ οἱ δειλότεροι μᾶλλον,

indicative perfect there collected. Cf. Troia fuit. Fuit Ilium et ingens
gloria Teurtorum.

§ 4. ‘Persons inclined to think themselves (especially) liable to
suffering are such as the following; those who have already suffered
some disaster from which they have made their escape (i.e. were not παν-
τελῶς ἀπολωλότες, completely ruined by it), and men advanced in years,
by reason of the prudence (or wisdom) and experience¹ (which belong to
advanced age), and the weak (in body; who are powerless to protect
themselves against aggression and injury), and those who are of a rather
more timid disposition than ordinary (this is weakness of mind), and men
of study and cultivation, for these are men who can accurately calculate'
(the chances of human life; by the experience and knowledge which their
studies have taught them. So Victorius).

καὶ διαπεφευγότες] This is a remarkable exemplification of that rule
of Rhetoric, that every question has two sides, of which either may be
maintained indifferently according to circumstances, and that all its
materials and reasonings are confined to the sphere of the probable.
Here we have a flat contradiction of the statement in the chapter on
φόβος and βάρσος, II 5. 18, where we are told that repeated escape from
danger is a ground of confidence. The fact is that it may give rise to
either, according to the temper and turn of mind of this or that indi-
vidual; the sanguine will derive confidence from repeated escapes; the
anxious and timorous, and the student or philosopher, the Solon, who
has learnt by bitter experience that no one can be accounted happy
until the end has come,—the second class, the πεπαιδευμένοι, [will be
affected in exactly the opposite manner], for the reason given by Aristotle
himself, εὑρίσκοντος γάρ. There can be no doubt that he had two different
kinds of characters in his mind when he made the opposite statements.

οἱ δειλότεροι μᾶλλον] It is quite possible to find a distinct meaning
for both these comparatives and not regard them as mere tautology.
The comparative in Greek, Latin, English, when it stands alone, with
the object of comparison suppressed, has two distinguishable signifi-
cations; μᾶλλον, for example, is either (1) μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος, ‘too
much’,(ne guid nimis), more than it ought to be; or (2), what we express
by ‘rather’, (itself a comparative of rathe ‘early’)—comp. Ital. piuosto,

¹ By these they have been taught the instability of all human fortunes; τὰν-
θρόπιστα, their constant liability to accident and calamity and ‘all the ills that
p. 563 (Fr. incert. 44 Dind. [fr. 1059, ed. 5]). ‘θυτήσει γάρ ὑν καὶ θυτὰ πεισθεῖσθαι
dékei’ θεοῦ βίοι ἐξ ἀξίως ὁμορφῶς ὑν; Iibid. p. 568 (No. 45 Dind. [fr. 1060,
ed. 5]).
5 καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι: εὐλόγιστοι γὰρ. καὶ οἱς υπάρ-χουσι γυναικεῖς ἡ τέκνα ἡ γυναικεῖς: αὐτοῦ τε γὰρ 6 ταῦτα, καὶ οία παθεῖν τὰ εἰρημένα. καὶ οἱ μὴ τὲ ἐν ἀνδρίας πάθει ὄντες, οὗν ἐν ὀργῇ ἡ θάρρει (ἀλόγιστα γὰρ τοῦ ἐσομένου ταῦτα), μὴ τὲ ἐν ψυχροτητῇ διαθέσει (καὶ γὰρ οὕτω οἱ λογιστοὶ τοῦ πείσεσθαί τι), ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μεταξύ τούτων. μὴ τέ αὐτοῖς λεγομένοι σφόδρα: οὐ γὰρ ἐλεοῦσιν οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι δι᾽ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκεῖῳ

πιτοστὸ γρασσὸ ‘rather fat’), i.e. more than ordinary, μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰριθῶς, a little in excess, rather more than usual. Hence οἱ δελτέροι μᾶλλον may be rendered ‘rather too timid’, more in a slight degree than men usually are, and also ‘unduly timid’, more so than they ought to be. Examples of this ‘double comparative’—it being assumed apparently that it is in all cases a mere tautological reduplication—are given by Victorius ad I 7. 18, and by Waitz (from Aristotle) on Top. I 1, 116 b 4, Vol. II p. 465. I have shewn on 7.18, that μᾶλλον καλλιον there is not a case in point, both of the words having each its own meaning. Of the reduplicated comparative and superlative, some examples are given in Matth. Gr. Gr. §§ 458, 461, and of the latter, by Monk, Hippol. 487.

εὐλόγιστος, opposed to ἀλόγιστος § 5, means one that ἐν λογίζεται, is good or ready at calculating, or reasoning in general: and marks the reflecting, thoughtful man, as opposed to the careless and unreflecting, who does not look forward or take forethought at all.

§ 5. ‘And those who have parents or children or wives (are inclined to pity), because these are one’s own (part and parcel of oneself) and at the same time liable to the accidents before mentioned’.

§ 6. ‘And those who are neither in a state of feeling implying courage, as anger or confidence,—for these (ταῦτα, τὰ παθή) take no thought for’ (‘are devoid of calculation or reflexion’, as before) the future—nor in a temper of insolence and wantonness—for these also never reflect upon the possibility of future disaster, but those who are in a state of mind intermediate to these. Nor again those who are in excessive terror, for people who are startled (frightened out of their wits) have no pity for others because they are absorbed by their own emotion (or suffering). oikeίῳ ‘that which is their own’, or proper to them at the moment, and so does not allow them to think of the suffering of others, opposed to τῷ ἀλλοτρίῳ. Comp. infra § 11, τοῦ γὰρ δεινῶν ἔτερον τοῦ ἐλευθέρου, καὶ ἐκρυπτοποιοῦν τοῦ ἔλεουν κ.τ.λ., and King Lear, v 3. 230. Albany. Produce their bodies, be they alive or dead. This judgment of the heavens, that makes us tremble, touches us not with pity. Compare also, I 14. 5, ὀ οἱ ἀκόντιστας φοβοῦντα μᾶλλον ἢ ἐλεοῦσιν, and Cic. Tusc. Disp. III 27, quoted by Victorius on that passage.

πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει.) From the primary, physical, sense of πρὸς with the dative at, by, upon, (μᾶλλον ποτὶ γαῖῃ, Hom. II. A 245,) and so ‘resting upon’, is immediately derived, by an obvious metaphor, that
7 πάθει. καν οἶωνταί τινας εἶναι ἐπιεικὲς· ὁ γὰρ μηδένα οἰόμενος πάντας οἴησται αἰξίους εἶναι κακοῦ. καὶ ὅλως P. 1386. δὴ ὅταν ἔχῃ οὕτως ὁ συμ- of 'mentally resting upon, fixed upon, devoted to, busily engaged in (as a pursuit)', or as here, 'absorbed in'; generally with εἶναι but also with other verbs signifying a state of rest. The usage is very inadequately illustrated, in fact, hardly noticed, in most of the grammars and lexicons that I have consulted, with the exception of that of Rost and Palm: I will therefore add a few examples that I have noted, though some of these are to be found in the lexicon above named. Wytenbach, on Plut. de ser. num. vind. 549 D (Op. vii p. 328), and on Plat. Phaedo 84 C (p. 223), has supplied instances chiefly from Plutarch and still later writers, to which Heindorf refers in his note on a passage of the Phaedo. Plat. Rep. vi 500 B, πρὸς τὸι οὖσι τῇ διάνοιαν ἔχοντι (with the mind, i.e. the attention fixed upon), Ib. viii 567 A, πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν (βιοῖ ἱερρῷ) ἀναγκαζόμενοι εἶναι, Ib. IX 585 A, πρὸς πληρώσει τε καὶ ἱδίαν γγένεσθαι. Critias, 109 E, Parmen. 126 C, πρὸς ἐπική τὰ πολλὰ διατριβεῖ. Phaedo 84 C, Phaedr. 249 C, πρὸς ἐκείνους δεί ἐστι μῆμψ, D, πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γνωμομένοις. Demosth. de Cor. § 176, ἡ...πρὸς τῷ σκοπεῖν...γένεσθαι (seriously occupy yourselves in the consideration...give your serious attention to it). Id. de Fals. Leg. § 139, ὀλοι πρὸς τῷ λήμματι ἢ. Aesch. c. Timarch, § 74, πρὸς τῇ ἀνίγκη ταίτη γγένεσθαι. Ib. adv. Ctes. § 192, πρὸς ἑτέρῳ τῷ τῆς γνωμῆν ἔχειν. Arist. Pol. viii (v) 8, λεκ. 1308 b 36, πρὸς τὸι ἑότοι σχολαζεῖν (to have leisure to attend to their private affairs), 1300 a 5, πρὸς τὸι εἶναι, Ib. line 8, διατριβεῖ πρὸς τοῖς ἑργοῖς. Ib. c. II, 1313 b 20, πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ὄντες ἀσχολοῦντο πιστοῦλουσεῖν. Ib. vii (VI) 4, 1318 b 13, πρὸς τοῖς ἑργοῖς διατριβεῖν. Similarly in Latin: Cic. de Or. i 8, 34, studium in quo estis. Hor. Sat. i 9, 2, totus in illis. Epist. i 11, omnis in hoc sum.

§ 7. ‘We pity also any of those that we deem men of worth: for if there be any one who thinks that there are none, such will believe that every one deserves to suffer’.


‘And indeed in general, (a man is inclined to pity) whenever he is in such a mood as to call to mind things similar that have happened either to himself or to one of those he loves, or to anticipate the possibility’ (γενόμενα without ὄν) ‘of their happening either to himself or his friends’. On the ellipse in τῶν αὐτοῦ see the note on the parallel case, ii 2. 1, ἦ τῶν αὐτοῦ.

§ 8. 'We have now stated the moods of mind in which men are inclined to pity; what the objects of pity are, is plain to be seen from the definition: that is, of things which cause pain and suffering all are pitiable that are also destructive, and (in fact) everything that is destructive and ruinous; and all evils of which chance is the cause, provided they be of sufficient magnitude'.

On ἀπίσαι καὶ ἀπίσεως, Victorius and Schrader are agreed, that λυπηρός represents mental, and ὀδυνηρός bodily, pain or suffering. But it is certain that in ordinary usage either of them can be applied to both. That λύπη and λυπηρός include bodily pain appears from the regular opposition of ἡδονή and λύπη expressing pleasure and pain in general: equally so in Aristotle's psychology, where ἡδονή and λύπη are the necessary accompaniments of sensation in all animals; and in Plato's moral philosophy (Gorgias, Phaedo, Philebus, &c.), where they most unmistakably include all kinds of pleasures and pains. ὀδύνη and ὀδυνηρός, though most frequently perhaps applied to pain of body (as especially in Homer, also in Plato and in Soph. Phil. 827, ὀδύνη bodily, opposed to ἄγας mental, pain), can also be used to express mental suffering, as may be seen by consulting Rost and Palm's Lexicon. ῬΩΘΩ, proprie corpore......transfertur ad animi dolorem (Ellendt, Lex. Soph. s. v.). The derivation of ὀδύνη from a root ed 'eat', ἐδω, ἐσθίω edo, and of λύπη from a root ἅπ 'to break', (Curtius, Grundz. der Gr. Etym. I. pp. 218, 240) throws no light upon
the distinction between them: both, according to the natural growth of language, have a physical origin, and are transferred by metaphor to the expression of mental affections. But, read by the light of the explanatory § 8, the difficulty is at once cleared up. Only ὀθυπηρά is repeated, which shows that the difference between this and λυπηρά is—here at all events—one of expression merely and not of conception. This is confirmed by the details of things painful which are enumerated in § 8, all of them evils affecting the body alone. And this is in fact an explanation of the meaning of φαινομένα κακὰ in the definition, that being most evident or palpable which is presented immediately to the sense. Comp. note on φαινομένα § 1.

Of ἀναιρετικά Victorius says that it is not in itself precisely distinguishable in sense from φθαρτικά, but (as I have expressed in the translation) the latter term applies only to some particular cases of λυπηρά and ὀθυπηρά, whilst ἀναιρετικά is extended to all things destructive.

§ 9. ‘Painful and destructive are, death’ (in its various forms, plur. sundry kinds of death) ‘and personal injuries’ (such as wounds or blows inflicted in an assault—δίκη ακίας is an action of ‘assault and battery’ under the Athenian law) ‘and all bodily suffering or damage’ (of any kind, see ante 11 7. 3, and note), ‘and old age, and disease, and want of food’.

§ 10. ‘The evils which are due to chance (accident or fortune) are the entire lack, or scarcity, of friends—and therefore also to be severed’ (parted, divorced, torn away, divelli, distrahi, ab aliquo, Cicero.) ‘from friends and familiars is pitiable—personal ugliness or deformity, weakness of body, mutilation’ (or any maimed crippled condition of body, which prevents a man from taking an active part in the service of the state, and discharging his duties as a citizen).

The three last of the evils mentioned, αἰσχὸς, ἀσθένεια, αναπηρία, occur again, as Victorius notes (without the reference, which is also omitted by Gaisford who quotes him), Eth. N. III 7, 1114 a 22, seq., in a passage (which will serve as a partial commentary on the text of the Rhetoric) in which the distinction is drawn between defects and injuries bodily and mental as misfortunes, due to nature or accident, and the same when we have brought them on ourselves by carelessness or vice. Thus ἀναφρότης or αἰσχὸς may be due to nature, διὰ φύσιν, or to the neglect of athletic exercises, ἀγμανασίαν, or carelessness in general, ἀμέλειαν: in the former case it is the object not of censure but of pity; in the latter it is to be blamed. The same may be said of ἀσθένεια, and πῖρωσις, the equivalent of ἀναπηρία in the Rhetoric; the instance of the mutilation or crippled condition there given is blindness; ‘no one would reproach a man blinded either by nature or disease or a blow, but would rather pity him; but if
We see Theaet. Tr. 5, for 'And when an ill result follows from what might naturally have been expected to lead to good', i.e. when in any enterprise or course of action, we have done everything that seemed likely to ensure success, and yet fail (or 'come to grief') in spite of all our endeavours, this again is a misfortune, or piece of ill-luck: 'and the frequent repetition of accidents of this kind'.


§ 11. 'And the occurrence or accession of some piece of good fortune after a calamity (or disaster which prevents one from enjoying it; as when a man succeeds to an estate in his last illness), as the present from the 'Great King' did not reach Diopetithes till after his death'. This is illustrated by Schrader from Vell. Patrec. II 70, Deciderat Cassii caput cum evocatus adventit nuncians Britann esse victorem.

πεπουθότος γενεσθαι] for πεπουθῶτι, the genitive absolute being substituted for the proper case after the verb. This irregularity occurs more frequently in Aristotle than elsewhere. Comp. Rhet. II 23.7 (this is a doubtful instance), Id. § 24, ὑποβεββηλμένης τινος...ἐδόκει. Ib. § 30, ἀμα εἰρημένων γνωρίζειν. Polit. II 11, 1273 b 7, βέλτιον δὲ...ἀλλ' ἄρχων γε ἐπιμελείται τής σκολής. Ib. c. 2, 1261 b 5, ἄρχων ἐτερο ἐτέρας ἄρχων ἄρχων ἄρχων. De Anima I 5, 410 b 29, φησι γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ διόν εἰσίναι ἀναπνεόντων (for the ordinary ἀναπνεοῦσιν). Ib. II 8, 420 b 26, ἀναγκαίον εἰσὶ ἀναπνεομένον εἰσεῖναι τὸν ἀέρα. Phys. VI 9.7, 240 a 9, συμβαίνει δὴ τὸ δὲ ἐίναι καὶ τὸ Γ...παρ' ἀλλήλα κινούμενον (for κινούμενα). De Gen. Anim. II 2.8, 735 b 34, ἐξελθόντος δὲ...ἐκ τοῦ ἀποπνεύσῃ τὸ θέρμων κ.τ.λ. In Rhet. I 3.5, ὡς χείρον, an absolute case, nomin. or accus., is probably an example of the same irregularity. The same usage occurs not unfrequently in Plato, but generally with the addition of ὡς. See Phaedo 77 E, 94 E, διανοούμενων ὡς ἄρμονιδις ὄντως. Rep. I 327 E, ὡς μη ἀκούομενών ὡντα διανοεῖσθαι. V 470 E, VII 523 C, ὡς λέγοντός μον διανοεῖ. Cratyl. 439 C. Theaet. 175 B, γελᾷ οὐ δυναμένων λογίζεσθαι. This is further illustrated by Matth., Gr. Gr. § 569.

Somewhat similar is the very common transition from dative to accusative, and especially when the adjective or participle is joined with an infinitive mood as the subject; in which case it may be considered as a kind of attraction: so Sympos. 176 D, οὐτὲ αὐτὸς ἐδεξήσαμε ἀν πιεῖν, οὔτε ἄλλο συμβολεύονσαμ, ἄλλως τε καὶ κρατηλῶντα ἐκ τῆς προτεραιας; where the participle is attracted back to πιεῖν. Ib. 188 D, where δυναμένων is similarly attracted to ὀμιλεῖν from
Διοπείθει τα παρά βασιλέως τεθνεώτι κατεπέμφης.
καὶ τὸ ἦ μηδὲν γεγενηθαι ἀγαθὸν, ἦ γενομένων μὴ εἶναι ἀπόλαυσιν.

ἐφ' οἷς μὲν οὖν ἐλεοῦσι, τάυτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα

the preceding ἦμιν, with which it ought strictly to agree. Instances of a
change (without such attraction expressed, but apparently derived from
it by analogy,) from dative (or genitive) to accusative may be found in
Elmsley's note on Eur. Herac. 693. Two of these arc, Aesch. Choeph.
408, μοι κλώνουσαν, and Soph. El. 479, ὑπεστὶ μοι βράσα...κλώνουσαν. Add
Plat. Rep. III 414 A, τιμᾶς δοτέον ζωτί...λαγχάνοτα, V 453 D, ἦμιν νεωτέον
καὶ πειρατέον...ἐλπίζοντας. The opposite change occurs in Rht. I 5. 13,
where μείζονι is substituted for μείζουν after υπέρεχειν.

Διοπείθει] This reference to the death of Diopeithes, commander of the
Athenian troops who defended the Thracian Chersonese against the
incursions of Philip, B.C. 342—341, see Grote, Hist. of Gr. [Chap. 90] Vol. xi
p. 622 seq., furnishes one additional item of evidence, hitherto I believe
unnoticed, as to the date of publication of the Rhetoric. Demosthenes
defended Diopeithes and his conduct against the Philippizing party at
Athens in the speeches περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ and the third Philippic,
both spoken in the last half of 341. Grote, u. s., p. 624. The earliest
date assignable to the death of Diopeithes is consequently 340 B.C. This
may be added to the passages, which go to fix the date of this work, cited
in the Introd. p. 37 seq. Little more is known of Diopeithes: the refer-
ences to him in Demosthenes are collected by Baiter and Sauppe, Oratores
Attici III. Ind. Nom. p. 40. Most of them occur in the two speeches
above mentioned: he is referred to again in the letter attributed to Philip
(Orat. 12), and de Cor. § 70, as the author of a certain ψήφισμα together
with Eubulus and Aristophon. In the Schol. on Demosth. (Baiter and
Sauppe, u. s., III p. 72 b 17) περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ, we have the following
notice, οὗτος ὁ Διοπεῖθης (there are three others named in the Orators)
pατὴρ ὃν Μενάδρον τοῦ καμικοῦ ὁ δὲ Μενάδρος φίλος ἤν Δημοσθένους,
δὲ ὑπὸ τὸν Διοπεῖθους Βούλευται. [See however A. Schaefer's Demosthenes
II 422, where the father of Menander is identified with Diopeithes of
Cephisia and not with Diopeithes of Sunium, the general referred to in
the text.] Compare also Clinton, Fasti Hellenici II 144.

παρά βασιλέως] The 'Great King', the king of Persia, as unique
amongst sovereigns, and standing alone, far above all the rest who bore
the title, appears consequently as βασιλέως, without the definite article.
Being thus distinguished from all other kings, his title, like proper names,
and some of the great objects of nature where there is only one of the
kind, requires no additional distinction, and consequently the article is
omitted.—The reigning king of Persia was at this time Ochus, who took
the name of Artaxerxes (Artax. III.). Diodorus apud Clinton, Fasti
Hellenici, p. 315: on Ochus, ib. p. 316.

'And (it is pitiable) either never to have attained to any good at all
(i.e. desired good or success) or after having attained to lose the enjoy-
ment of it.'
12 ἐστὶν· ἐλεοῦσα δὲ τοὺς τε γνωρίμους, ἐὰν μὴ σφόδρα ἐγγὺς ὅσιν οἰκειότητι· περὶ δὲ τούτους ὤσπερ περὶ αὐτοὺς μέλλοντας ἔχουσιν. διὸ καὶ Ἀμασίς ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ υἱὲ ἀγομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν οὐκ ἐδάκρυσεν, ὡς φασίν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ φίλῳ προσαιτοῦντι τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐλεευνόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ δεινόν· τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν ἔτερον τοῦ ἐλεευνοῦ καὶ ἐκκρουστικόν τοῦ ἐλέου καὶ πολλάκις τῷ
§ 12. ‘These and the like are the things (the ills or sufferings) that we pity: the objects of pity (persons) are our friends and acquaintance—provided they are not very closely connected with us; for in regard of the latter we are in the same state of mind’ (have the same feelings, i.e. in this case the feeling of anxiety and alarm) ‘as we are about ourselves when threatened with (the like disaster)’, μελλοντας (ταῦτα πείσεσθαι). ‘And for this reason it was that Amasis, as is reported, wept, not at the sight of his son led away to death, but of his friend begging: for this is a spectacle of pity, that of terror: for the terrible is distinct from the pitiable, nay, it is exclusive of pity, and often serviceable for the excitement of the opposite feeling’.

The king of Egypt, here by an oversight called Amasis, was in reality Psammenitus, his successor on the throne. The horrible story of Cambyses’ ferocious cruelty here alluded to is told by Herodotus III 14, with his accustomed naivety, as if there was nothing in it at all extraordinary or unusual. It will be sufficient to quote in the way of illustration Psammenitus’ answer to Cambyses’ inquiry, why he acted as Aristotle describes, which will likewise serve as a commentary on oikeiōtēti in our text. ὡς παῖ Κύρου, τὰ μὲν οἰκήμα τὸ μεῖζω κακὰ τὸ ἀνακλάειν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑταίρου πένθος ἡμῶν τὴν δακρύσαν· ὡς ἐκ τολῶν καὶ εὐδαιμονῶν ἐκπεσόν ἐν πτωχήν ἀπίκται ἐπὶ γήρας οὐδὲ. τὸ οἰκήμα τοῦ, his son’s death, and his daughter’s humiliation. As to the substitution of Amasis for Psammenitus, Victorius and Buhle think it may be explained either by a slip of memory on Aristotle’s part, or by a variation in the story in the account given by other authorities. I have no doubt myself that the true explanation is the former. We have already seen that our author is very liable to misquotation, as I believe to be the case with all or most of those who, having a wide range of reading and an unusually retentive memory, are accustomed to rely too confidently upon the latter faculty. The vague ὡς φασίν confirms this view. If Aristotle had remembered as he set down his example that he had it from Herodotus, it seems to me quite certain that he would have mentioned his name.

ἐκκρουστικῶν] prop. ‘expulsive’, inclined to strike or drive out (having that nature or tendency), the metaphor being taken, according to Victorius, from two nails, one of which being driven in after the other forces it out, or expels it. He quotes Eth. Nic. III 15, sub fin., (αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι) ἐν μεγάλα καὶ σφοδρά ὄσα, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρουσῶσιν. Plut. p. 1088 A, non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum c. 3, (πόνος) ὑπ’ ἄλλον πόνων, ὀσπερ ἡμῶν σφοδρότερων, ἐκκρούσεσιν ἀπαλλάττεται, and
13 ἐναντίων χρήσιμων. ἔτι ἐλεοῦσιν ἐγγὺς αὐτοῖς τοῦ δεινοῦ ὄντος. καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσί κατὰ ἥλικιος, κατὰ ἥθη, κατὰ ἐξεις, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένην ἐν πάσι γὰρ τούτοις μᾶλλον φαίνεται καὶ αὐτῷ ἂν ὑπάρξαι. ὠλος γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα δει λαβεῖν ὅτι, ὅσα

Cic. Tusc. Disp. IV 35. 75, etiam nullo quidem amore veterem amorem, tamquam clavon clavum, equidem putant. ἡλῶ ἡλὼ ἕκκρουέων is a proverb, occurring three times in Lucian, de merc. cond. c. 9, Vol. I. p. 716, ed. Hemst., pro lapsu inter salut. c. 7, I 733, Philopseudes, c. 24, III 39, ἡλὼ, φασίν, ἕκκρουέις τοῦ ἡλῶ.—ἐναντίῳ] sc. πάθει.

χρήσιμων] seems to refer to the rhetorical use of the topic, rather than to the promotion of the feeling itself, to which the word is less appropriate. On the mutual exclusiveness of terror and pity compare I 14. 5 (note), and § 5 of this chapter. The pity and terror therefore, which it is the object of tragedy to excite and purify, Poet. VI 2, can never be simultaneous.

I will just observe here in passing that these two emotions are appealed to in that branch of Rhetoric which was collectively called affectus and divided into indignatio and miseratio, technically δείσις and ἔλεος; δείσις is otherwise called σχέσιασμός (Rhet. II 21. 10). Though they might be scattered over the whole speech, the proper place for them is the conclusion, the ἕταλγος or peroratio, because the impression is then most vivid and intense, and is 'left behind', like the bee's sting, in the minds of the audience, τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις (Eupolis, of Pericles).

The importance of these to the rhetorician may be estimated by the fact that Thrasymachus, one of the most celebrated of the early writers on Rhetoric, gave his work the title of ἔλεοι (Cicero, miserations) referred to by Aristotle, Rhet. III 1 7, and ridiculed by Plato, Phaedr. 267 c. The ἔλεοι certainly 'had a wider scope than their name would indicate' (Thompson's note ad loc.), for Aristotle expressly mentions in the passage quoted that they included remarks upon language and style. See further on this subject, Introd. p. 367, and 368 note 3.

§ 13. 'Further' (returning to the last term of the definition, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλὴν σων φαίνηται) 'men are pitied when danger or suffering is impending and close at hand'. (δεῖνὼν is any object of δέος or dread; derived from δέος as δείπνος from ἔλεος, κλεινός from κλέος.) 'We pity also those who are like us, in age, or character, or habits of mind (moods, states of mind, moral and intellectual, virtuous and vicious), in reputation (of various kinds, expressed by the plural), or in blood (race and family): for in all these cases there seems to be a greater likelihood of the same misfortune occurring to oneself as well as the others (καὶ αὐτῷ): for here again' (ἐνταῦθα, καὶ as well as in the case of fear, referring to II 5. 12, "the same things that we dread for ourselves, we pity in others") 'in a general way we must suppose' (λαβεῖν 'to take up, receive', an opinion; to assume or believe; or perhaps 'to gather' as the result of observation, and so form an opinion of conclusion) 'that all things
that we dread in our own case, the same we pity when they happen to others'.

§ 14. 'And seeing that all calamities and sufferings are (especially) objects of pity when they appear close at hand, and yet things that either have happened ten thousand years ago, or will happen ten thousand years hence, neither in expectation or recollection do we ever pity equally, if at all, ὅμωίωσι, as we do things close at hand, whether past or to come,) it necessarily follows from this (that pity is heightened when the object is brought near us) that those (orators) who aid the effect of their descriptions (lit. join with the other arts of Rhetoric in producing ἔλεος) by attitude (gestures, action in general), by the voice, and dress, and the art of acting in general, are more pitiable (i.e. more successful in exciting pity): because, by setting the mischief before our very eyes (by their graphic representation of it) they make it appear close to us whether as future or past?  

πρὸ ὀμμάτων] which is almost technical in Rhetoric, is again used to denote a vivid, graphic, striking representation, III 2. 13, Ib. 10. 6, and in III 11. 1, seq. is explained and illustrated. Comp. Poet. c. xvii 1, δει δὲ τοὺς μέθοις συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξι συναπεργαζέσθαι (aid the effect by the language) ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον ὀυτό γὰρ ἐν ἑναργέστατα ὡρών, ὅπερ παρ' αὐτοῖς γιγνομένοις τοῖς πραπτωμένοις, εὐρίσκει τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστ' ἀν λανθάνοιτα τὰ ὑπεννατία. Ib. § 3 we have the same phrase that occurs here, τοῖς σχῆμασι συναπεργαζόμενοι. Compare also Poet. xiv 1, τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἔλευσιν ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως γίνεσθαι κ.τ.λ., de Anima III 3, 427 b 18, πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἐστι ποιησάσθαι. ὅπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδολοποιοῦντες'. Cicero expresses this

1 Referring to mental pictures, in aid of the memory as a kind of memoria technica, such as that of a large house-front with various windows, or the plan of a building, or any other divisions, occurring in a regular order, in which the topics of a speech or argument may be lodged as it were; the plan of this is retained in the mind, and will suggest the topics in their proper order. These 'mnemonic' artifices—τὰ μνημονικά, "mnemonics"—are described in Auct. ad Heren. iii. xvi. 29, seq. Such aids to the memory are of two kinds, loci and imagines; the former are 'the places', or compartments, the sequence of which suggests the order or arrangement of the imagines, which are the "forms, marks, images, of the particular things which we wish to remember, such as horse, lion, eagle, &c." The same subject is treated by Cicero, de Orat. ii 86. 351—360, from whom the author of the other treatise has manifestly borrowed. The invention of this
by the equivalent phrase, subicere oculis, Orat. XL 139. Auct. ad Heren. iv 47.60, ante oculos ponere (de similitudine); hoc simile...sub aspectum omnium rem subiecit. Quint. VIII 6. 19, translatio...signandis rebus ac sub oculos subiciendis reperta est. Ern. Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v. ιμμα.

§ 15. 'And things that have happened recently, or are about to happen speedily, excite more pity for the same reason'; i.e. because the recent occurrence or immediate anticipation makes almost the same impression upon us as if the suffering or disaster were actually present, and enacted as it were before our eyes.

§ 16. 'And all signs (of any tragic event), and acts (of the sufferer, represented in narrative or description), (the exhibition) for example (of) the dress of the sufferer and everything else of the same kind, or his (last) words, or anything else connected with those who are in the very act of suffering, for instance such as are actually dying' (in articulo mortis). It is hardly necessary to mention the use that is made by Mark Antony of this 'sign' in exciting the people after the murder of Caesar by the exhibition of his 'mantle',—"you all do know this mantle"—pierced by the dagger of his assassins, in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, III 2. 174, since it must be fresh in every one's recollection. The incident and accompanying circumstances and the effect of Antonius' speech are related by Plut., Vit. Anton. c. 14, from whom Shakespeare may have derived it; and referred to by Quint., VI 1. 31. Suetonius, Jul. Caes. c. 84, gives a very different account of what passed on this occasion. See also Appian, Bell. Civ. II 146 (Schrader). Another example occurs in Aesch. Choeph. 980, where Orestes after the death of Clytemnestra holds up to the spectators the bathing robe in which his father was murdered, ἔδεσθε...τὸ μηχάνημα, ἔδεσμον ἄδιπρα ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. 982, ἔκτειναρ᾽ αὐτόν, which is also referred by Hermann to the display of the robe.

'And most pitiable of all is the case when men have borne themselves bravely (worthily), at such critical moments, because all these things intensify our commiseration (in three ways), by the appearance they have of being close upon us, and by the suggestion (or impression, ὅσ) of unmerited suffering and by the vivid representation of it (as though it took place before our eyes)?. The gender and construction of αὐξίου

ars memoriae is there attributed to Simonides, §§ 351—353. The theory of the art and practice is, that as of all mental impressions those derived from the senses, of which the sight is the keenest and most powerful, are the most distinct, vivid and intense; quare facilitate animo teneri posse ea quae percipierunt auribus aut cognitione, si etiam oculorum commendatione animis tradentur.
Chapter IX.

The subject of the following chapter, νέμεσις, is briefly noticed by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. II 7 sub fin., together with αἰσθήσις, as a πάθος, an instinctive emotion, which approaches nearly to a virtue, and may therefore be included in a list of virtues. The detailed description of it, which ought to have followed that of αἰσθήσις in IV 15, is lost, together probably with some concluding observations leading up to the separate discussion of justice in Bk. V., and justifying its connexion with the other virtues and conformity to the law of the 'mean', which is barely mentioned in the fifth book as it stands at present. νέμεσις is defined in Eth. N. II 7, as here, ὁ νεμεστικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξιῶσι εὐ πράττουσι, and is placed in the scheme as a mean, or virtuous state of feeling, between φθόνος the excess, and ἐπιχαρεκκλαία the defect, of indignation. Of this we shall have to speak further in the explanation of §§ 2—5, which reads like a criticism and retraction of the misstatement of the Ethics, and very much strengthens the evidence of the later composition, as well as publication, of the Rhetoric. See Introd. p. 48. A definition of νέμεσις and φθόνος is found likewise in Top. B 2, 169 b 36, φθόνος ἐστὶ λύπη ἐπὶ φανομένη εὐπραγία τῶν ἐπεικῶν τινὸς, and again, p. 110 a 1, φθονερὸς ὁ λυπομένος ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄγαθῶν εὐπραγίαις, νεμεστικὸς δὲ ὁ λυπομένος ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν κακῶν εὐπραγίαις. Fuller and better than all these is that of Eudemos, Eth. Eud. III 7, 2, ὁ νεμεστικός, καὶ ὁ ἐκάλου ὁ ἄρχαιος τῆς νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖται μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χάρειν δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις· διό καὶ θεὸς ἀποδίδομεν τῇ νεμεσίᾳ.

Comp. § 2 of this chapter, διὸ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τῇ νεμεσίᾳ.

Of the earlier notion of νέμεσις, alluded to in the foregoing passage, viz. that of divine vengeance or retribution, or the power that exercises it, a good description is found in a fragment of Euripides, Fr. Inc. 181 (Dind.), ὅταν δὲ ἔδης πρὸς ὑψος ἥρμενον τινὰ, λαμπρῷ τῇ πλούσῃ καὶ γένει γαυρομένον, ὀφρύν τε μεῖζον τῆς τύχης ἐπηρκότα τούτου τοχεῖαν νέμεσιν εὐδ' ἐπισοδικαία ἐπαίρεται γάρ μείζον ὑπὸ μείζον πέτη [tollitam in altum, ut lapis graviori ruant. Claudian, in Rufinum, I 22.]

This doctrine of the ἄρχαιος is well illustrated by two stories in Herodotus, that of the interview between Solon and Croesus, 1 29—33, and
what followed it c. 34, metà δὲ Σώλωνα οἰλοχέμουν, ἔλαβε ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλη Κρόισου' ὃς εἰκάσα, ὅτι ἐνόμισε ἐουτόν εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων ὀλβιωτατον: and the story of Polycrates, III 39—43. On these two stories see the remarks in Grote's Hist. of Gr. IV 263, and 325 [Chap. XI and XXXIII].

Compare also Hom. Od. XIV 283, Δίως δ' ὀπίζητο μὴν δεξίων, δοστε μάλιστα νέμεσσάτω κακά ἐργα. Herodotus says in another place, VII 10, οὐ γὰρ ἐν φρονεῖν ἄλλον μέγα ὁ Θεὸς ἢ ἐωτόν. Aeschylus (Fr. Inc. 281, Dind.) has presented νέμεσις in its human aspect as the natural indignation which is felt at undeserved good fortune, κακοὶ γὰρ εὖ πράσσοντες οὐκ ἀνασχέτοι. Fr. Inc. 243, line 3, ἡμῶν γε μέντοι Νέμεσις ἐσθ' ὑπερτέρα, καὶ τοῦ θανόντος ἢ δίκη πράσσει κότον.

According to Aristotle's definition of νέμεσις 'a feeling of pain at undeserved good fortune', it represents the 'righteous indignation', arising from a sense of the claims of justice and desert, which is aroused in us by the contemplation of success without merit, and a consequent pleasure in the punishment of one who is thus undeservedly prosperous. It is no selfish feeling, § 3; if it had any reference to oneself and one's own interests it would be fear of evil consequences arising to us from the other's prosperity, and not indignation. It implies also its opposite, the feeling of pleasure at deserved success or prosperity. In this narrow sense it is treated in the present chapter. It is in fact one form in which 'moral disapprobation', founded upon the distinction of right and wrong, shews itself in our nature. Aristotle, in classing it with the πάθη, makes it instinctive; not therefore a virtue, nor necessarily requiring moral cultivation. Of moral approbation and disapprobation see the account given by Butler, at the commencement of his Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue. He also seems to regard these two as natural instincts, when he says of them, "we naturally and unavoidably approve of some actions under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good desert; and disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert." See also Serm. VIII. 'On deliberate anger or resentment.' Prof. Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 321, [Chap. XV § 22, ed. 1875], in treating of 'moral disapprobation', expresses himself thus; "the feeling that rises up towards that person (a guilty agent) is a strong feeling of displeasure or dislike, proportioned to the strength of our regard to the violated duty. There arises a moral resentment, or a disposition to inflict punishment upon the offender," &c. But such an instinctive sense of right and wrong has a much wider scope and sphere of action than Aristotle's νέμεσις, which is confined to one particular class of cases upon which this moral instinct or faculty operates.

§ 1. 'The nearest opposite to pity is what is called righteous indignation; for to the feeling of pain at undeserved misfortunes is opposed in some sort (or sense), and proceeding from the same temperament, the feeling of pain at undeserved good fortune'.

μάλιστα μὲν] seems to have for its correlative δοξεῖτε δὲ, § 3, and the sense is this:—Pity is most opposite to righteous indignation1, though

1 I find, on looking through a very long note of Victorius, after writing the above, that he has so far anticipated me in this observation.
πραγματικος αντικειμενον ἐστι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἴθως τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξιεις ἐνπραγ-ματικοῖς. καὶ ἀμφότερά πάνθη ἴθως χρηστοῦ· δει γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἀναξιοῖς πράττουσι κακῶς συνάχθεσθαι καὶ ἐλεεῖν, τοῖς δὲ εὑ νεμεσαν ἀδικον γὰρ τὸ πάρα τὴν ἀξίαν γυγνόμενον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν

3 τὸ νεμεσάν. δὸξει ὃ ἀν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεείω τῶν αὐτῶν ἀντικείσθαι τρόπον ὡς σύνεγγυς ὁν καὶ ταυτῶν

envy seems to be as much so, but is not. I have therefore substituted a period after τὸ νεμεσάν for the comma of [Bekker’s Oxford edition of 1837. The punctuation given in the text is also found in Bekker’s Berlin editions and in Spengel’s].

§ 2. ‘And both of these feelings are indicative of good character (i.e. of a good disposition of mind shewing itself outwardly in the character): for it is our duty to sympathise with unmerited misfortune and pity it, and to feel indignant at unmerited prosperity: because all that happens to a man’ (τὸ γιγνόμενον, Victorius, ‘quod fit’, ‘all that is done’; meaning I suppose ‘whenever the rule of justice is violated’, in any case, generally. But I think ‘happens’, which includes the injustices of nature and fortune, as well as those of man, is more to the purpose here) ‘not in conformity with his deserts is unjust, and this is why we ascribe (or assign, render as a due; see note on I 1.7) righteous indignation to the gods as well as to men (καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς).’

παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν] i.e. in violation of the principles of distributive justice. ἀξία is the ‘value’ of anything, by which its worth or merits or deserts are measured. It is the principle and basis of distributive justice, and should determine the assignment of power and property in the state. It does in fact regulate the distribution of them; only the standard of a citizen’s value, his ἀξία, varies with the constitution under which he lives; for in a democracy the principle of distribution is founded upon liberty, in an oligarchy upon wealth or birth, in an aristocracy upon virtue. See the passage of Eth. N. ν 6, 1131 a 24 seq. from which I have been quoting. Quarrels and factions and complaints always arise out of the undue apportionment of civil rights and power in the state, ὅταν ἡ ἱδίᾳ μὴ ἵνα ἡ μὴ ἵνα ίσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμονται. But the true standard by which the share of the individual citizen should be measured is virtue or merit and the power of doing the state service, Pol. III 9 ult. Justice in this sense is a proportion. ἐτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ’ ἄξιον τοῦτο δήλων’ τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον εἰ ταῖς διανομαῖς ὑμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ’ ἄξιον τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μὲντοι οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν. Compare 1b. viii 12 on the three forms of constitution, 1160 b 13, the change from aristocracy to oligarchy is due κακίᾳ τῶν ὀρχύστων, οἱ νέμοσι τὰ τῆς πίλεως παρὰ τὴν ἄξιαν; and in family life κατ’ ἄξιον ὁ ἀνήρ ἀρχησ, καὶ περὶ παῦσα ἀ δεῖ τῶν ἀνδρα. If he encroaches on his wife’s rights his government becomes an oligarchy, παρὰ τῶν ἄξιων γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ ἑ ἄμεσον. On the same subject of political justice see Pol. III 9, from the beginning.

§ 3. ‘But it may be thought that envy as well (as νεμεσις, καὶ) is
The absence of all selfish, interested motive, distinct from (independent of) the feelings themselves, (and their direct objects, supply τῶν παθῶν,) these emotions, on the contrary (ἀλλὰ), being entirely on our neighbour’s account, must be common to them all (common to all men who have the feeling); for they are now no longer the one righteous indignation and the other envy, but (both of them) fear—on the supposition namely that the pain and perturbation are due to the expectation that some evil consequence to ourselves will follow from the other’s good fortune.’

The grammar of this sentence is to be explained by regarding all the words ὅτι αὐτῷ—τῶν πλῆσιῶν as one collective abstract notion, which would be commonly expressed by a verb in the infinitive mood, and therefore neut., τὸ; this notion being negativated by μὴ ‘the non-existence, want, absence of it.’ The usage is by no means uncommon, but occurs generally in much shorter phrases, from which this differs only in the number of words included. Matth., Gr. Gr. § 272 c, and Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 457. 1, 2, 3, will supply sufficient examples. Aristotle’s formula descriptive of the λόγος or ἔδος ‘the formal cause’, τὸ τὶ ἣν εἶναι, ‘the—what it was (designed) to be’, is a good illustration.

On γὰρ ἐτι On ἐτι in a negative—ήδη in an affirmative sentence, see note on ἤδη, 1 1. 7.

§ 4. ‘Plainly too these will be accompanied by the opposite feelings also (in addition, καὶ); for one who feels pain at unmerited ill fortune, will feel either pleasure or no pain at the misfortunes of those who do deserve them (ἐναρχεῖσαι = ἄξιοι); for example, no man of worth would feel pain at the punishment of parricides or murderers, when it befalls them, for at the sufferings of such we should rejoice, as in like manner.
άλυπος ἐσται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑναντίως κακοπραγοῦσιν· οἷον τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μιαφόνους, ὡς τύχωσι τιμω-
ρίας, οὐδεὶς ἂν λυπηθείν χρηστός· δεῖ γὰρ χαίρειν ἐπὶ τοῖς τιμωτοῖς, ὡς δ’ αὐτῶς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὗ πράττουσι
κατ’ ἀξίαν ἄμφω γὰρ δύκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν τὸν ἑπιεικὴ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐλπίζειν ὑπάρξει ἂν, ἀπερ τῶ
5 ὁμοίω, καὶ αὐτῷ. καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους ἀπαντᾶ
tαῦτα, τὰ δ’ ἑναντίαι τοῦ ἑναντίον· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς
at the prosperity of such as deserve it: for both (the sufferings of the
one and the prosperity of the other) are agreeable to justice and give
joy to the good man’ (ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἑπιεικὲς ἔπαυνόμεν...καὶ...μεταφέρομεν
ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, Eth. Nic. v. 14, 1137 b 1), ‘because (being a good man
himself) he must needs hope that what has fallen to the lot of his like,
may fall also to his own’.

τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μιαφόνους λυπηθεὶν] Vater explains the accus. after
the passive verb by supposing a change of construction. Ar. having intended
to write, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐλεήσει (sic) χρηστός. This is quite unnecessary. The accu-
sus after passive and neuter verbs, indicative of the local seat of any affec-
tion, an extension of the cognate accus., is common enough fully to justify
the construction of the text. At the same time there is a difference be-
tween such an expression as this, and the ordinary case of the local accus.,
such as ἀλγεῖν τὴν κεφαλὴν. The accus. κεφαλὴν directly and properly
expresses the seat of the affection as in the subject who himself feels
the pain: and this is the ordinary case. But in our text the seat of the
pain1 is transferred from subject to object, the feeling migrating, as it
were, and taking up its temporary residence in the parricides and
murderers who are the objects of it. But whatever the true explanation
may be, there are at all events several precisely parallel instances—
some of which may be found in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 414, and Jelf, Gr. Gr.
§ 549 c—quite sufficient to defend this particular use of the accus.
Hippol. 1355, τοὺς γὰρ ἐνυφέθησι βεοὶ θυσίσκοιτας οὐ χαίρουσιν, where the
dying are just as much the objects of the joy (or the absence of it)
as the murderers are of the pain in the passage before us. Similarly
αιχώνεσθαι, (frequent in the Rhet. and elsewhere,) as in Eur. Ion 1074,
where αἰσχύνομαι τῶν πολύνυμνον βέον, is to feel awe in the presence of the
god; who is the object of this feeling of shame, just as the murderers are
of the painful feeling. Victorius thinks that the prepos. διὰ is understood,
‘as it often is in the Attic writers, such as Thucydides, Lysias, Aristop-
phanes!’ He contents himself however with the general assertion, and
quotes no example.

§ 5. ‘And all these (ταύτα is explained by ὁ γὰρ, ‘nämlich’, κ.τ.λ.) be-
long to the same kind of character (or disposition), and their opposites

1 It is in fact not the pain, but the absence of it, that is here in question: but
as this would make nonsense of the illustration, nonentities having no local habita-
tion, I must be allowed to substitute the positive for the negative conception.
to the opposite temper; that is to say, it is the same sort of man that takes a malicious pleasure in mischief and that is given to envy; for whenever the acquisition or possession of anything (by another) is painful to a man (envy), he must needs feel pleasure at the privation or destruction of the same (ἐπιχαρέκακια)'.

στέρησις. Categ. 10, is one of the four kinds of opposites, relative opposites, contraries (as black and white), state and privation (ἐξίς, στέρησις), affirmation and negation. στέρησις is defined ib. 12 a 26 seq. It is the absence or want of a state which is natural and usual to that in which the state resides, as sight to the eye: τυφλὸν ὁ τὸ μὴ ἔχων ὅψιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν. A man's blindness is a στέρησις, because with him sight is natural: the term is not applicable to animals born without eyes, ἐκ γενετῆς οὐκ ὅψιν ἔχουσα: these cannot properly be said to be deprived of sight, which they never had. στέρησις therefore in the present passage implies a loss of some good which had been previously gained or possessed, and is distinguished from φθορά, as privation or loss from ruin or destruction. Victorius understands φθορά of destruction, decay, as opposed to γενεσίς which is implied in γενομένῳ; a man may be deprived of or lose a possession, that which grows may decay and come to nothing, 'Interitus manifesto generationi alieius rei contrarius est.' I cannot think this interpretation as appropriate as the other: γίγνεσθαι, to come to the possession of something, to gain or acquire it, is properly opposed to ὑπάρχειν, to have it already in possession, long-standing and settled.

'And therefore all these feelings (νέμεσις, φθόνος, ἐπιχαρέκακια) are obstructive of pity, but different (in other respects) for the reasons already stated; so that they are all alike serviceable for making things appear not pitiable.'

The introduction of these epistolical remarks, §§ 3—5, upon the connexion and distinctions of the three πάθη above mentioned, otherwise not easy to explain, may possibly be accounted for, as I have already suggested, by referring them to the statements of Eth. Nic. 1108 b 4, which Ar. now sees must be retracted. There they are reduced to the law of the mean by making νέμεσις the mean state of the pleasure and pain felt at our neighbour's good or ill fortune; of which φθόνος is the excess, the pain being felt at all good fortune deserved or undeserved, and ἐπιχαρέκακια the defect 'because the feeling falls so short of pain that it is actually pleasure'. The words of § 5, καί ἐστι τοῦ ἱδόν...ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ἐπιχαρέκακος καὶ φθονερός, κ.τ.λ. are, whether they are intended for it or not, a correction of the blunder made in the Ethics. It is plain enough, as we are here told in the Rhetoric, that the two πάθη in question are but two different phases of the same ἱδόν or mental disposition: the same man who feels pain at his neighbour's good fortune
6. \( \delta \varepsilon \delta \iota \alpha \tau \varsigma \varepsilon \tau \varsigma \varepsilon \epsilon \eta \iota \nu \varepsilon \nu \nu \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \eta \nu \alpha \)\( \varepsilon \iota \varphi \varepsilon \kappa \varepsilon \zeta \kappa \alpha \kappa \alpha \iota \varsigma \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \)\( \nu \varepsilon \mu \varepsilon \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \)\( \tau \varsigma \iota \varsigma \)\( \nu \varepsilon \nu \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \varsigma \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \)\( \iota \alpha \nu \)\( \sigma \mu \sigma \iota \varsigma \nu \)\( \varsigma \)\( \tau \varsigma \iota \varsigma \)\( \nu \varepsilon \nu \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \varsigma \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \)\( \nu \varepsilon \nu \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \)\( \tau \varsigma \iota \varsigma \)\( \nu \varepsilon \nu \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \varsigma \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \)\( \iota \alpha \nu \)\( \sigma \mu \sigma \iota \varsigma \nu \)\( \varsigma \)\( \tau \varsigma \iota \varsigma \)\( \nu \varepsilon \nu \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \varsigma \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \)\( \nu \varepsilon \nu \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \)\( \tau \varsigma \iota \varsigma \)\( \nu \varepsilon \nu \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \varsigma \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \)\( \iota \alpha \nu \)\( \sigma \mu \sigma \iota \varsigma \nu \)\( \varsigma \)\( \tau \varsigma \iota \varsigma \)\( \nu \varepsilon \nu \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \varsigma \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \)\( \nu \varepsilon \nu \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \)\( \tau \varsigma \iota \varsigma \)\( \nu \varepsilon \nu \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \varsigma \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \)\( \iota \alpha \nu \)\( \sigma \mu \sigma \iota \varsigma \nu \)\( \varsigma \)\( \tau \varsigma \iota \varsigma \)\( \nu \varepsilon \nu \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \varsigma \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \)\( \nu \varepsilon \nu \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \)\( \tau \varsigma \iota \varsigma \)\( \nu \varepsilon \nu \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \varsigma \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \)\( \iota \alpha \nu \)\( \sigma \mu \sigma \iota \varsigm

will feel pleasure at his misfortunes, and the two cannot be opposed as extremes. Again, the description of \( \epsilon \pi \chi \alpha \rho \kappa \varepsilon \kappa \alpha \kappa \alpha \iota \varsigma \nu \) as a defect of \( \nu \varepsilon \mu \varepsilon \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \) and opposite of \( \phi \beta \omega \varsigma \) cannot be sustained: the objects of the two feelings are different: envy is directed against the good fortune of another, the malicious pleasure of the other is excited by his ill fortune. See also Grant's note on the above passage of the Ethics.

After this digression we return to the analysis of \( \nu \varepsilon \mu \varepsilon \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \alpha \nu \iota \nu \sigma \varsigma \lambda \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \).

§ 6. ‘Let us begin then with an account of righteous indignation, who, that is, are the objects of it, the occasions that give rise to it, and the states of mind of the subjects of it, and then pass on to the rest (of the \( \pi \acute {a} \theta \iota \), to what remains to be said of them)’.

§ 7. ‘The first of these is plain from what has been already said, for if righteous indignation is (as it has been defined) a feeling of pain which is roused against any one who appears to enjoy unmerited prosperity, it is clear first of all that this indignation cannot possibly be applied (directed) to every kind of good’; (virtue for example and the virtues are exceptions.)

§ 8. ‘For no one is likely to feel indignant with one who becomes just, or brave, or acquires any virtue in general’, (that is, one who by exercise and cultivation attains to any special virtue, or to a virtuous character in general)—‘nor indeed is compassion’ (the plur. \( \epsilon \lambda \epsilon \sigma \iota \) indicates the various acts, states, moments of the feeling) ‘bestowed upon (applied to) the opposites of these’ (VICES, namely, which ought to be the case, if the others were true)—‘but to wealth and power and such like, all such things, namely, to speak in general terms (without mentioning possible exceptions, \( \alpha \pi \lambda \omega \varsigma \) opposed to \( \kappa \alpha \theta \acute {e} \kappa \alpha \sigma \tau \omicron \nu \) as the good (alone) deserve’.

So far the meaning is clear; the good as a general rule are entitled to the enjoyment of wealth and power and the like, and when they do acquire them we feel no indignation because we know they deserve them; it is upon the undeserving that our indignation is bestowed. But as the text stands, and as far as I can see there is no other way of understanding it, there is another class of persons, viz. those who are endowed with natural or personal advantages, such as birth or beauty, which, being independent of themselves and mere gifts of nature, cannot be objects of moral indignation, though they may be of envy, who are coupled with the morally good as deserving
of wealth and power. This however cannot possibly be Aristotle's meaning: birth and beauty certainly have no claim per se to any other advantages. When a bad man makes his way to wealth or power, we infer that they have been acquired by fraud or injustice, and thence that he is undeserving of them, which excites our indignation; but no such inference can be drawn from the possession of birth or beauty, there is no such thing as illicit, or undeserved possession of them. Aristotle seems to have meant, what Victorius attributes to him, that, besides moral excellence, natural gifts and excellences are also exempt from righteous indignation, for the reason above given—that they are gifts of nature, and the possessors are in no way responsible for them: and this is fully confirmed by the connexion of what immediately follows. Bekker, Spengel, Buhle and the rest are alike silent upon the difficulty, and Victorius, though he puts what is probably the right interpretation upon the passage, has not one word to shew how such interpretation can be extracted from the received text.

§ 9. 'And seeing that antiquity (possession of long standing) appears to be a near approach to a natural gift or endowment' (i.e. to carry with it a claim or right, nearly approaching to that conferred by nature), 'of two parties, that have possession of the same good, the one that has come by it recently, and thereby attained his prosperity, provokes the higher degree of indignation: for the nouveaux riches give more offence than those whose wealth is transmitted from olden time and by right of family (of inheritance): and the like may be said of magistracies (offices of state), of power (in general), of abundance of friends, of happiness in children (a fair and virtuous family), and anything else of the same sort. Or again, any other good that accrues to them, due to the same causes; for in fact in this case again the newly enriched who have obtained office by their wealth (been promoted in consequence of their wealth) give more pain (or offence) than those whose wealth is hereditary. And the like in all similar cases'. Comp. ii 16. 4. ἀρχαιόπλουτος,
"The reason of this is, that the one seems to have what is his own (that which naturally and properly belongs to him), the other not; for that which constantly presents the same appearance (shews itself in the same light) is thought to be a truth (or substantial reality), and therefore it is supposed that the others (οἱ ἐτεροὶ δοκοῦντοι) have what does not really belong to them. Here we have a good example of the distinction between φαίνεσθαι and δοκεῖν. The former expresses a sensible presentation, a φαντασία, an appeal to the eye or other senses: δοκεῖν is an act of the understanding, an operation and result of the judgment, a δόξα an opinion or judgment, appealing to the reasoning faculty or intellect, consequently τὸ φαίνεσθαι represents a lower degree of certainty and authority than δοκεῖν. Eth. Eud. VII 2, 1235 b 27, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται κἂν μὴ δοκῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα. The distinction appears again in περὶ ἐννιάκων, c. 3, 461 b 5, φαίνεται μὲν οὐν πάντος, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ πάντως τὸ φανόμενον, ἀλλὰ ἐὰν τὸ ἐπικρίνον κατέχηται ἢ μὴ κινήσῃ τὴν οἰκείαν κίνησιν. Ib. 462 a 1, οὐ μόνον φανεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξη εἶναι δύο τὸ ἐν, ἀν δὲ μὴ λανθάνῃ, φανεῖται μὲν οὐ δόξης δὲ, κ.τ.λ. See also Waitz ad Anal. Post. 76 b 17, II p. 327.

'And whereas every kind of good is not to be indiscriminately assigned to any one at random, but a certain proportion and fitness (appropriateness) is (to be observed in the distribution or assignment of the one to the other)—as for instance arms of peculiar beauty (high finish) are not appropriate to the just man but to the brave, and distinguished marriages' (i.e. the hand of a lady distinguished for beauty, virtue, accomplishments, high birth and so forth, τὴν ἄξιαν δεῖ γαμεῖν τὸν ἄξιον, III 11.12) 'should not be contracted with men recently enriched, but with members of noble houses—then as I say (οὐ) if a man being worthy fails to obtain what suits him' (is appropriate to his particular sort of excellence) 'it is a case for indignation'.

τοῦ τυχόντος ἄξιον] The good that is 'worthy of' a man, here seems to

1 The use of the word νεόπλουτος is assigned to the author of the argument as one of the reasons for ascribing the speech rather to Hyperides than Demosthenes.
mean that which suits, befits, is appropriate to him: 

mean that which suits, befits, is appropriate to him: *non omne bonum cuiuis homini congruit*, Victorius. Similarly ἀξίων with a dat. of the person is used to signify ‘worth his while’, ‘meet’, ‘fit’, as Arist. Ach. 8, ἀξίων γὰρ Ἑλλάδι, ib. 203, τῇ πόλει γὰρ ἄξιων ἀληθεῖν τῶν ἄνδρα, and Equit. 616, ἄξιων γε πάνω ἐπαλολῆξι.

εἰν ὦν κτλ. after καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐκαστὸν is an Aristotelian irregularity of construction. The apodosis of ἐπεὶ is νεμεσθὼν at the end of the second paragraph. The unnecessary ὦν has crept in like the apodotic δέ, in the resumption of a previous statement, (on which see I 11.11, note on δήλον δέ, Vol. 1. p. 20)—after the parenthetical illustrations; the protasis is forgotten, or overlooked in the writer's haste, and a new sentence introduced by ὦν terminates with the apodosis. I have collected a number of examples of similar irregularities from our author's writings. I will here only quote those that illustrate this particular form of oversight. ἐπεὶ δέ... τὰ μὲν ὦν, Top. Θ 8, 160 α 35. ἐπεὶ ἀναγκαῖον ... and after five lines, τῆς μὲν ὦν δύραθεν, de Somn. et Vig. c. 3, sub init. ἐπεὶ δέ...ἀνάγκη ὦν... Rhet. Π 11.1. εἰ γὰρ, ...ἀνάγκη δή, Phys. vi 4 init., 234 β 10, 15. ἐπεὶ δέ...ὅπον μὲν ὦν, Pol. vii (vi), 5, 1320 α 17, 22. The remainder are cases of εἰ δή— ὀτὲ, ἐπεὶ—ὀτὲ, εἰ ὦν—ὀτὲ, ἐπεὶ δέ—διὰ (I), ἐπεὶ—δῆλον δέ, which may be reserved for a future occasion. Meanwhile see Zell on Eth. Nic. vii 14, Π 324. Spengel in Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 34. Bonitz, Arist. Stud. Π 11. p. 129 seq. One example cited by Bonitz, p. 131, from de Anima III 3, has a parenthesis of nearly 20 lines between its ἐπεὶ δέ and ὕτι μὲν ὦν. On ὦν in resumption, after a parenthesis, ‘well then, as I was saying’, see Klotz on Devar. de Partic. p. 718. Hartung, Partikellehre, Π 22 seq.

'It is matter of indignation also (subaudi νεμεσθὼν from the foregoing clause) for the inferior to compete with the superior, nay and especially where the inferiority and superiority lie (or manifest themselves) in the same department, province, study or pursuit.' With τοὺς εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ must be understood ἦττονας καὶ κρείττονας from the preceding. The case here described is that of an indifferent artist, painter or sculptor, setting himself up as the rival of Apelles or Phidias; of Marsyas and Apollo; of the frog and the ox in the fable.

μᾶλιστα μὲν ὦν] The μὲν in this phrase is the ordinary correlative of δέ in the next sentence, εἰ δέ μη. The other particle, ὦν, though its

1 I will venture here to express my conviction that Dr Donaldson is right in the account he gives of these two particles, New Crat. §§ 154, 155; that μὲν viz.
precise meaning in this context may not be quite certain, and it is somewhat unusual in this collocation, is nevertheless fully justified by similar examples to be quoted immediately. The origin of the particle is, as it seems to me, as yet unexplained. It has been traced to various roots, as may be seen by consulting Donaldson, *New Cratylus* § 189. Klotz on Devar, *de Partic.* p. 717 seq., Hartung, *Partikell.* 118, Doderlein, and Rost, in Rost and Palm's *Lex.*, but in none of these derivations have I been able to find any intelligible connexion with the actual senses of the word. Yet until we know the root of the word and its affinities, we shall hardly be able to trace historically the various senses which diverge from its primary meaning. It is a connective particle, which draws an inference or conclusion from something preceding, 'then, accordingly', (1) logically in an argument, and (2) in the continuation of a narrative, the consequence primarily implied having passed into the mere notion of what is subsequent, 'that which follows', in both its senses. Hence in all Greek authors μὲν oνν is habitually employed in this second sense, like the French 'or', and our 'now' or 'then', to impart a slight degree of liveliness and animation to a continuous narrative or discussion. From the first or inferential signification, it acquires this intermediate sense of, 'so then', 'well then', 'accordingly', which lies halfway between the logical and the temporal application; just like our 'then', which has both these senses, only derived in the reverse order, the particle of time in the English 'then', passing from the temporal to the logical use. For this μὲν oνν at the commencement of a new paragraph the orators—Demosthenes in particular, with whom μὲν oνν is comparatively rare, Aeschines in a less degree—often substitute τοινν or μὲν τοινν, which is used precisely in the same way. "μὲν oνν, in continuando sermone cum quadam conclusionis significacione usurpatur." Hermann ad Viger. note 342.

The other prevailing signification of μὲν oνν when used in combination, which, though by no means confined to them, is found chiefly in dialogues as those of Plato and Aristophanes—in the former most frequently in the familiar πάντι μὲν oνν—has a negative corrective sense conveying an emphatic assertion, sometimes to be rendered by a negative; being employed to correct, in the way of strengthening or heightening, a previous statement or assertion; and while it assents to a proposition indicates an advance beyond it. Dem. de Cor. § 316, διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας, οὕτως ὑπερεργεῖας, οὐ μὲν oνν εἴποι τις ἄν ἠλίκας. Ib. § 130, ὁψή γὰρ ποτὲ—ὁψή λέγω; ἕδε μὲν oνν καὶ πρόπνη κ.τ.λ. Aesch. Eum. 38, δεύσερα γὰρ γραῦσ οὐδέν, ἀντιπάσ μὲν oνν. Eur. Hippol. 1012, ματαῖος ἑρ ἢν, οὐδαμοί μὲν oνν φρεν ὤν. In all these cases it may be translated 'nay more', or 'nay rather'. Similarly in answers it expresses a strong assent, πάντι μὲν oνν, μάλιστα μὲν oνν, κομιδῇ μὲν oνν, 'just so', 'quite so', 'exactly so'. In all these cases it may be rendered 'inmō', 'nay rather'. Herm. ad Vig. n. 343. In the same

is the neut. of an older form μῆς, μᾶ, μὲν, of which μᾶ alone remains in the language, the numeral 'one'; and δὲ connected with δίο 'two'; though as far as I know he stands alone in the opinion; the origin usually assigned to it being that it is a weaker form of δῆ. Donaldson's view of the primary meaning and derivation of these particles is so completely in accordance with all their actual usages, and is so simple and natural, that it seems to me to carry with it its own evidence, and to need no further proof of its truth.
sense it appears in the Aristophanic ἐμῶν μὲν οὖν, ἐμὸν μὲν οὖν, 'no, mine; no mine', in answer to Cleon's nauseous offer to the Demus, Equit. 911; and elsewhere. πάνω μὲν οὖν is to be explained thus; I not only assent to what you say, but I go farther, I am absolutely convinced of it; 'nay more (or nay rather), absolutely so'. The οὖν in all these instances, and others like them, conveying thus a strong emphasis, at the same time may be considered to retain its consequential sense, 'conclusionis significationem', indicative of what follows, something else, 'accordingly', which is contained in the assent to the preceding statement, and thus the two usages of it are connected. The μὲν in the combination of the two particles is explained by Dr Donaldson, New Cratylius § 154—rightly I think—by a tacit reference to some suppressed sentence with the correlative δὲ, μὲν being always opposed to δὲ expressed or understood. πάνω μὲν οὖν would imply ἄλλος δὲ οὖν. (Donaldson supplies τί δὲ ἕπειτα; 'but what then?') Following this explanation we may render μάλιστα μὲν οὖν in our text 'nay more, most of all, in the highest degree'.

I will now conclude this long note on a phrase which I have never seen fully explained, with a few examples parallel to that of our text. Soph. Ant. 925, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὖν τὰ δ' ἐστιν ἐν θεοῖς καλά......εἰ δ' οὐδ' ἀμαρτήσωμαι κ.τ.λ. Plato, Phaedo 90 E, ἀνδριστόν καὶ προβουλητῆς ὑψίος ἔχειν, σοι μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κ.τ.λ., on which Stallbaum, not. crit., observes, οὖν ἅπατε de vitio suspectum seclusimus. With what reason, we have seen. Eth. Nic. VI 7, ἐπικάλεσα μὲν οὖν, where οὖν, as here, seems to be superfluous, and is certainly unusual. Ib. VII 9, 1151 a 14, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν εὑμετέπειστος, ὁ δ' οὖ. Polit. I 2.1252 b 29, γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζην ἐνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὔ ζην. Ib. IV (VII) 10, sub init., τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Λέγουσον Σέπαστριος, οὐς φασίν, οὕτω νοομεθείσαντος, Μίνω δὲ τὰ περὶ Κρήτην. De Soph. El. 6, 169 a 19, οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν...οἱ δ' ἄλλοι κ.τ.λ. Hist. Anim. V 16, 548 a 25, αἱ μὲν οὖν...αἱ δ' κ.τ.λ. De part. Anim. IV 11. 10, 691 a 28, ἀνδρωφόρος μὲν οὖν...οἵ δ' ἱχθυες καὶ ὀρνίθες...Magn. Mor. II 3, 1199 b 1, οὶ δ' αὐτοὶ ὁ δίκος...οἶδεν ἀλλ' εἰ αὐτῷ...Ib. c. 6, 1203 a 16, τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἀκρατούς...τοῦ δὲ ἀκολάστου κακόσ. 'Whence also this saying'. Here follow two hexameter lines as an illustration of the foregoing topic; Cebriones, who knew that the divine vengeance falls upon those who attack their superiors, 'avoided the encounter of Ajax son of Telamon'. II. XI 542. This is followed by a line which is rejected by the recent editors from the text of Homer, but appears again in the Life of Homer, attributed to Plutarch. See Paley's note ad loc. ' (Chiefly in the same art, profession, or pursuit),
or if not in the same, any case whatsoever of competition of inferior with superior (understand ἀμφισβητεῖν); of a musician, for instance, with a just man ("ut si musicus cum iusto viro de dignitate contendat." Victorius); because justice is better than music'. The claims of the two are unequal, of which the inferior ought to be sensible. 'So now from all this it is clear what are the objects and occasions of righteous indignation; such they are (as we have described them) and such-like'.

οῖς καὶ δι' αὖ...δῆλον] There is an inaccuracy here in the language, δῆλον should be δῆλου or δῆλα in agreement with one or other of the antecedents to the relatives; or else οἷς should be τίσιν, and 'δι' αὖ, διὰ τίνα or ποία. Aristotle, when he wrote δῆλον, seems to have had in his mind his usual formula for designating these two departments of inquiry, in the πάθη, viz. τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίους. The same oversight occurs again c. 2 § 27, where οἷς &c. is followed by εἰρηνα, which is impersonal, and cannot supply an antecedent to οἷς. The mistake is again repeated, c. 10 § 5, and, reading οἷς, in c. 10 § 11.

§ 12. We now pass to the third division of the analysis of νέμεσις; the subjects of it, the characters, tempers, states of mind which are especially liable to it. 'Those who are inclined to this kind of indignation in themselves are, first, such as happen to be deserving of the greatest blessings and at the same time in possession of them; because it is unjust that those who are unlike us should have been deemed worthy of (should have been enabled to attain to) the like advantages'. This is against the principle of distributive justice above described, which assigns honours and rewards, &c. κατ' αξίαν. See on § 2, above. The actual possession, as well as the right or claim to these good things, is necessary to the excitement of the indignation provoked by this comparison. The mere claim without the satisfaction of it would be rather provocative of envy or anger than of righteous (disinterested) indignation: when a man is satisfied himself, he is then ready to take a dispassionate view of the successes and advantages of his neighbour. When under the influence of personal feeling he is not in a state of mind fit to measure the comparative claims of himself and the other.

§ 13. 'And secondly, such as chance (have the luck) to be good and worthy men, because they both decide aright, and hate all injustice'. They have both the faculty and the feeling necessary for the occasion; the intellectual faculty of discernment, and the hatred of all that is wrong, which are both essential to the excitement of righteous indignation. On σπονδαίος and its opposite φάδλος, see note on 1 5. 8.

§ 14. 'Or again, such as are of an ambitious temper, and eagerly striving after certain actions' (πάθεις, modes of activity, such as public employments in the service of the state; these are also objects of
ambition, as giving scope for the exercise of special excellences, for the attainment of distinction, of honours, and the like); 'and especially when their ambition is directed to such objects as the others happen to be unworthy of'. The greater a man's ambition, and the stronger his desire of the honours and distinctions which he feels to be due to himself, the deeper his resentment at the unfairness of their attainment by those whom he knows, by comparison with himself, to be undeserving of them.

§ 15. 'And in general, all such (besides the really meritorious) as think themselves deserving of things (honours, rewards, emoluments), of which they deem others undeserving, are inclined to feel indignant with them and for (on account of) them (for the honours, &c. which they have unworthily obtained). And this also is the reason why the servile, and mean-spirited, and unambitious, are not inclined to feel indignation; because, that is, there is nothing which they think they do deserve'.

§ 16. 'From all this it is plain what sort of men those are at whose misfortunes, and calamities, and failures, we are bound to rejoice, or (at any rate) to feel no pain: for from the statements already made, the opposites (i.e. opposite cases and circumstances) 'are manifest: and therefore if the speech put those that have to decide (ἐπίνεια applicable to all three branches of Rhetoric) in such and such a frame of mind (namely, such as have been described), and shew that those who claim, appeal to, our compassion—as well as the things (the occasions and circumstances) for which they claim it—are unworthy to meet with it (in the particular case), or of such a character and reputation in general as to repel it altogether, it is impossible (for the judges or other audience) to feel it'. The persons here meant are, according to Victorius, rei et adversarii, the prisoner under trial, in a criminal, the opponent in a civil case: but besides these the other ἐπίκτης, the audiences of public as well as panegyrical orations, must be included, who are equally liable with the judges in a court of law to be unduly influenced by an appeal to the feelings on the part of an unscrupulous advocate or declaimer.
Envy, the next of the πάθη that comes under consideration, is here defined 'a painful feeling occasioned by any apparent' (i.e. palpable, conspicuous) 'good fortune, the possession, namely, (or acquisition) of any of the good things before mentioned'—most likely the 'good things' enumerated in 1 cc. 5, 6—which falls to the lot of (περὶ τοὺς ὑμιόνων; commonly has reference to, i.e. is directed against, 'those like us', (in various ways, detailed in the next section) 'not for any personal consequences to oneself (understand γένησαι or συμβαίνην), but solely on their account', because they are prosperous or successful, and it pains us to see it; usually (not always) because some comparison, some feeling of rivalry or competition, is involved in it, when we contrast our own condition with theirs—"rival-hating envy", Shakesp. Richard II. Act 1. sc. 3. 131)—and therefore it is περὶ τοὺς ὑμιόνων; commonly has reference to, i.e. is directed against, 'those like us', with whom, that is, we come into competition in anything. δὲ ἑκεῖνος is further explained in c. 11. 1, ὥστε (φθονερὸς) παρασκευάζεται τὸν πλῆσιον μὴ ἐχεῖν (τὰ ἀγαθὰ) διὰ τῶν φθόνων. Such seems to be the meaning of the definition. [For a consecutive translation of § 1, see p. 123.]

Victorius, here as before, and again on c. 11. 1, renders φανομένη 'or that which appears to be so' in the more ordinary sense of the word. But here at all events it cannot have this meaning, for there is no alternative in Aristotle's text; and without it he is made to say, that it is only 'seeming' prosperity that gives rise to the feeling. See note on II 2. 1. Again he and Schrader both understand μὴ ἰνα τι αὐτῷ [sic], 'not from any dread of loss or danger, or prospect of advantage to oneself, from the other's good fortune', the second of which only is contained in ἰνα τι αὐτῷ; the first would require μὴ instead of ἰνα; and also is contradictory to what was said in c. 9 § 3, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβῆσαι ἕτερον,—οὐ γὰρ ἐτί ἔσται τὸ μὲν νέμεσι τὸ δὲ φθόνος, ἀλλὰ φάνος, ἐὰν διὰ τοῦτο ἡ λίπη ὑπάρχῃ καὶ ἡ ταραχή, ὅτι αὐτῷ τι ἔσται φαβλῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκεῖνος εὐπραξίας.

The definition limits the objects of the pain, and is thus a second correction, in addition to the criticism of c. 9 §§ 3—5 (on which see note), of the erroneous language applied to φθόνοι Eth. Nic. II 7, sub fin., ὥστε (φθονερὸς...ἐπὶ τὰ σιμ. λυπείται.

Envy seems to have been regarded by the ancients as the worst and most distressing of all the painful emotions. Invidia Siculi non invenere tyranni maius tormentum, says Horace, Epist. I 2. 58. Σωκράτης τῶν φθόνων ἔμη γυνῆς εἶναι πρίονα; and Menander, ὥστε τὸ κάκιστον τῶν κακῶν πιότων φθόνος, Men. Fr. Inc. XII 6, ap. Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. IV 235 (quoted by Orelli ad loc. Hor.). "Of all other affections (envy) is the most importune and continual......It is also the vilest affection and the most
depraved; for which cause it is the proper attribute of the devil,” &c. Bacon, Essays, Of Envy, sub fin.

This is doubtless a fact. There are additions, of course, to this passage. Invidentiam esse dicunt (Stoici) aegritudinem suscipiam propter alterius res secundas, quae nihil noceant invidenti. Nam si quis doleat eius rebus secundis a quo ipse laedatur, non recte dicatur invidere; ut si Hectori Agamemnon: qui autem cui alterius commoda nihil noceat tamen eum doleat his frui, is invidet profecto. This leaves the objects of the pàðos unlimited, which seems to be the true account of it. So Horace, Ep. I 2. 57, Invidus alterius macrescit rebus opinis.

I will conclude this note with two or three more modern definitions. “Grief for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joined with endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called Emulation: but joined with endeavour to supplant or hinder a competitor, Envy.” Hobbes, Leviathan, Of the Passions, Pt. I, ch. 6. Envy and Emulation, γῆλος, aemulatio, usually go together in a classification of the pàðη, being evidently closely connected. See the passages in Diog. Laert. and Cic. above quoted; and so also Aristotle. This definition very nearly approaches to that of Ar., only omitting the μη ἵνα τι αὐτῷ.

“Envy”, says Locke, Essay, &c., Bk. II. Ch. 20, Of modes of pleasure and pain, “is an uneasiness of the mind, caused by the consideration of a good we desire, obtained by one we think should not have had it before us.” Here again the notion of ‘competition’ enters into the definition.

Lastly, Bain, Emotions and Will, Ch. vii, classes this under the general head of emotions of self, and connects it, like his predecessors, with Emulation, § 9 [p. 105, ed. 2, 1865]. Comparison and the desire of Superiority, lie at the bottom of both Emotions. “The feeling of Envy is much more general in its application. Referring to everything that is desirable in the condition of some more fortunate personage, there is
γαρ οι τοιουτοι οις εισι τινες όμοιοι η φαίνονται.
2 ομοιους δε λέγω κατα γένος, κατα συγγένειαν, καθ' ἡλικίαν, καθ' ἐξίν, κατα δόξαν, κατα τα υπάρχοντα.

combined a strong wish for the like good to self, with an element of malevolence towards the favoured party." This differs from Aristotle in the introduction of the selfish and the malevolent elements, and removes the unnecessary restriction to cases of competition, by which he has limited its objects and scope. It is I believe a much truer and more philosophical account of the Emotion.

Bacon’s Essay, Of Envy, has some points in common with Aristotle. Bacon places the sting of envy in the want of something which another possesses. “A man that hath no virtue in himself, ever envich virtue in others. For men’s minds will either feed upon their own good or upon others’ evil; and who wanteth the one will prey upon the other; and whoso is out of hope to attain to another’s virtue will seek to come at even hand by depressing another’s fortune.” This introduces Aristotle’s principle of rivalry and competition as the foundation of envy. Again, with §§ 2 and 5, may be compared, “Lastly, near kinsfolk and fellows in office and those that have been bred together, are more apt to envy their equals when they are raised. For it doth unbraid unto them their own fortunes; and pointeth at them, and cometh oftener into their remembrance, and incurreth likewise more into the note of others: and envy ever redoubleth from speech and fame.” This arises from their constant association, which gives frequent occasion to envy. “Again, envy is ever joined with the comparing of a man’s self; and where there is no comparison, no envy; and therefore kings are not envied but by kings;” compared with the end of § 5.

§ 1. ‘The occasions, objects, and mental dispositions, that give rise to envy may be clearly gathered from the definition of it; that it is, viz. a feeling of pain occasioned by manifest or conspicuous good fortune, the accession, that is, of any one of the good things previously mentioned, (chiefly) in the case of any one of those like us, for no personal advantage or gain to ourselves that is likely to accrue from it, but simply on their account: for such as have, or think they have, any like them, i.e. persons similar to themselves, in such things as are likely to bring them into rivalry and competition, will be most subject to the feeling of envy’.

§ 2. ‘By like or similar I mean, those who are of the same race (or are alike in stock), of the same family (relatives), alike in age, in states’, mental and bodily (virtues of all kinds, accomplishments, acquirements, and excellences of mind and body, when developed, confirmed and permanent are εξίν: qui artibus scientiis et huiusmodi rebus pares sunt, Victorius: this may be included in the other, more general, meaning), ‘in reputation, in property or possessions’ (of any kind, patrimonio ac re familiai, Victorius). This is well illustrated by a passage of Cic. Brutus, c. XLII § 156, quoted by Victorius on § 5. Simul illud gaudeo, quod et aequalitas vestra, et pares honorum gradus, et artium studiorumque finitima vicinitas, tantum abest ab obtructatione invidiae, quae solet
In reality envy is not confined, as Aristotle seems to say, to these classes of people as objects; nor even to those with whom we are likely to come into competition; it seems rather that there is no limit, within the circle of humanity, to the objects on which it may be exercised. A man may envy a baby its innocence, its health, its rosy cheeks, or the poorest and meanest his health and strength: the feeling of pain which belongs to envy no doubt proceeds from an involuntary comparison of oneself with another, who has some valuable possession which we happen to want; and the unsatisfied desire, contrasted with the gratification of it in some one else, friend or foe, good or bad, high or low, in a malevolent disposition—not in the wise man, as Socrates has it—breeds the feeling of pain. Aristotle’s definition may be thus summed up: envy is a feeling of pain, excited, usually if not always, by the successful competition of a real or supposed rival. ‘Those also’ are disposed to it ‘who (have nearly attained to) want but little of complete satisfaction (of possessing every thing desirable)’. A long and uninterrupted course of success and prosperity, and the attainment of nearly all that is desirable, seems to give them a right to what still remains deficient; and the envy which they would in any case feel of the possession of it by another, gains strength by the contrast with their own deficiency. Here again it is the competition and the comparison of our own condition with that of another, the want and the inferiority, that add a sting to envy.

μικροῦ] like ὀλίγου, adv. ‘nearly’, ‘within a trifling distance of’, is a genitive with δένου understood.

tο (μὴ) if ἐλλείπει is impersonal, as it usually is, is redundant as far as the sense is concerned; if not, το μὴ υπάρχειν is its subject. In illustration of the former case, see Hermann ad Αj. 114, ἐπειδὴ τέρψις ἐστὶ σοι τὸ δρᾶν, who (unnecessarily, I think1) distinguishes two senses of the phrase, and exemplifies it by several instances all taken from Sophocles the great storehouse of Greek idiom. Add these two from prose authors, Dem. de F. L. § 180, p. 392, ὁκ ἄρμασις ἐστιν αὐτοῖς...το μὴ πράττεων, Plat. Tim. 20 c, πρόφασις το μὴ δρᾶν (vid. Stallbaum ad loc.), and the present passage. Examples from Thucydides are to be found in Shilleto’s note, ad Dem. de F. L. § 92. See also Matth. Gr. Gr. §§ 541, 542.

‘And this is the reason why those who undertake great enterprises—engage in great actions—and the successful are envious: because they think that all such are carrying off what properly belong to themselves’, i.e. the profits, honours, and distinctions to which they are entitled. The difference between this feeling and that of νέμεσις is confined to this, that the latter distinguishes between the deserving and undeserving, the former does not. Comp. II 9. 3.

1 Indeed he allows it himself, qui usus, specie magis quam re, a priore illo diversus est.
§ 3. 'And those who have a pre-eminent reputation for anything, and especially for wisdom or happiness'. The latter, says Victorius, on account of its extreme rarity. These three classes, desiring to engross all the success, credit, good fortune, themselves, grudge the acquisition or possession of them by their competitors, or any others. 'And the ambitious are more prone to envy than the unambitious': because they set a higher value upon honours and distinctions. 'And the pretenders to wisdom and learning' (like the Sophists, ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστής ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας ἄλλ’ αὐξ ὀivos, de Soph. El. 1, 165 a 21), 'owing to their ambition of this kind of reputation, because they are ambitious of the credit of wisdom'. Plat. Phaedr. 275 β, δεξιόσοφοι γεγονότες ἀντί σοφῶν ('the conceit of wisdom instead of the reality.' Thompson). 'And as a general rule, all those who are covetous of distinction in anything (art, study, pursuit, accomplishment, acquirement), are in this envious (of the distinction of others). Also the little-minded (mean-souled), because to them everything appears great (by comparison)'; and therefore an object of desire, which when unsatisfied breeds envy. μικρούσια, opposed to μεγαλοφυσία, is defined in Eth. Nic. 11 7, 1007 β 22, περὶ τιμην καὶ ἄτμιαν ἐλεον: again IV 7, 1123 β 10, the μικρούσιος is described as ὁ ἐλαττόνων ἡ ἄξιος ἐαυτών ἄξιών, one who rates his claims to honour and distinction too low: and further, 1b. c. 9, sub init. ὁ μικρούσιος ἄξιος ὦν ἄγαθων ἐαυτών ἀποστερεῖ ὦν ἄξιος ἐστι. Having this mean opinion of himself and his own merits and deserts, and no power of appreciating what is really great, he is of course likely to over-estimate in others the gifts and advantages which he supposes himself to want, and so becomes indiscriminate in his envy. In 1 9. 11, 12, μικρούσια occurs in a somewhat different sense, that of meanness in general, and especially in the use of money. Some Latin equivalents of μικρούσια and μεγαλοφυσία are cited by Heindorf on Hor. Sat. 12 10, Sordidus atque animi quad parvi nolit haberi. Schrader quotes from a little treatise, περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, attributed (most improbably) to Aristotle, which gives a very different account of μικρούσια from that which we find in his genuine works. It occurs c. 7, 1251 β 16, but is not worth transcribing.

§ 4. 'The kinds of good things which give occasion to envy have been already mentioned' (that is, they may be inferred from the preceding enumeration of the classes of persons who are most liable to envy).
For everything of which men covet the reputation, or of which they are ambitious—be they deeds done or possessions acquired—striving after fame (the credit of the achievements and acquisitions), and every kind of good fortune (successes and acquisitions due to fortune, and not, like the others, to a man’s own exertions)—with all these, as one may say, envy is concerned; and most of all, the objects of our own aspirations, or whatever we think we have a right to ourselves, or things of which the acquisition confers a slight superiority or a slight inferiority. A very great superiority or inferiority places a man beyond the reach of envy. It is when the competition is close, and the difference between the competitors small, that the apparent value of the good competed for is greatly enhanced, and the envy excited by the success of the opponent proportionately strong.

σχεδόν

(1) ‘near at hand’, (2) ‘pretty nearly’, is familiarly used, especially by Plato and Aristotle, to modify too general an assertion: signifying, that your words in the general expression that you have, inadvertently as it were, let fall, are not to be construed strictly and literally, but room must be left for possible exceptions; that the statement is pretty nearly exact, but not quite. Hence it becomes equivalent to ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἔτοι εἰπεῖν, ‘as one may say’, ‘so to speak’, which similarly qualifies what may be an over-statement of the case, demanding a fair latitude of construction. Plato sometimes writes σχεδόν τι, Aristotle (I believe) rarely or never. [*σχεδόν δὲ τι, Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις, Θ 3, 253 b 6, sed τι om. codd. E F H K.*] Index Aristotelicus.]

§ 5. φανερὸν ὡς] See note on II 9. 11, at the end.

It is plain too who are the objects of envy, from the mention that has been already made of them incidentally (ἁμα simultaneously; with something else, another subject, to which it did not properly belong: in § 2, namely, as an appendix to the definitions); ‘those, namely, who are near to us in time, and place, and age, and reputation, are the ordinary objects of envy’.

*τοῖς ἐγγύς...Ἠλίκια...φθονοῦσιν* Victorius illustrates Ἠλίκια by the instance of Fabius Maximus’ defence of himself against the suspicion of having opposed himself to Publius Scipio out of envy: *docuit enim si nullae aliae res ab ea culpa ipsum vindicarent, aetatem saltem liberare debere; quod nulla aemulatio seni cum P. Scipione esse posset, qui ne filio quidem ipsius aequalis foret [paraphrased from Livy XXVIII. 40, where the defence is given in oratio recta].
καὶ πρὸς οὐς φιλοτιμοῦνται: φιλοτιμοῦνται μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς εἰρημένους, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μυριοστὸν ἐτῶν ἐντας ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐσομένους ἢ τεθνεῶτας οὐδές, οὐδὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἐφ’ Ἡρακλείας στῆλας. οὐδ’ ὦν πολὺ οἶνονται παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις λείπεσθαι, οὐδ’ ὄν πολὺ ὑπερέχειν, ἠσαντῶς καὶ πρὸς τούτοις 6 καὶ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς καὶ ἀντεραστὰς καὶ ὄλως τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν

‘Whence the saying’, (of doubtful authorship: attributed by the Scholiast to Aeschylus, apud Spengel) “Kinship is well acquainted with envy too.” And those whom we are ambitious of rivalling’ (on πρὸς οὖς φιλοτιμοῦνται, see note on II 2. 22); ‘which occurs towards those just mentioned (τοῖς ἐγγὺς κ.τ.λ. opposed to the following, who are all πόρρω, ἀπόθεν, ‘far off’ in place or time); but towards those who were alive ten thousand years ago (lit. to whom it is now the 10,000th year since they were, from the time of their existence), ‘or those who are yet to be (yet unborn), or already dead’, (differs from the first in the length of time—the dead may be recently dead), ‘never: nor towards those who are at the world’s end’.


‘Nor (do we attempt to rival) those to whom, either by our own judgment, or that of everybody else, we are brought to the opinion that we are far inferior’, (this is the general case of superiority and inferiority, dignitate atque opibus, Victorius,) ‘or superior; and the same is true with regard to similar things as to these persons’, i.e. the same that has been said of these persons, may be applied equally to the corresponding things for which men compete (this is the special case of competition in some particular art, pursuit, or excellence; the case for example of an ordinary mathematician and Sir Isaac Newton; or in any other art or profession the distinguished and the undistinguished practitioner).

§ 6. ‘And seeing that this ambition of rivalry is (especially) directed
against (pointed at) our competitors in some struggle or encounter (i.e. any ἄγων, in which there are ἄγωνιστά or 'combatants': law-suits, battles, games, and such like), or in love (rivalry proper), or generally against those who are aiming at the same things, these must necessarily be the chief objects of envy: whence the saying "two of a trade". See supra II 4. 21, I 11. 25. Hesiod. Op. et D. 25, καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτων τέκτων.

§ 7. 'Such as have attained a rapid success are objects of envy to those who have either succeeded with difficulty, or not at all'.

§ 8. 'And those whose possession (of any coveted object, or success, is a reproach to ourselves: and these too are near us and like us' (in the senses defined in §§ 5 and 2. The meaning is, the attainment of something which is the object of competition, or success, on the part of a rival is a reproach to us, when the other is not greatly our superior, but nearly on the same level, and in our own sphere, ἐγγὺς καὶ ὁμοιός; we argue that if he could attain to it, it ought to have been within our reach); 'for it is plainly our own fault that we fail to obtain the good thing, and so the pain of this produces the envy'.

παρ' αὐτοῖς 'along of' ourselves, see Arnold on Thuc. I 141. 9 and Dem. Phil. I § 11, p. 43 (quoted by Arnold) where it occurs twice, παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ῥόμοι, παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀμέλειαν, in both, 'by' the agency, or cause, of... so that the prepos. with the accus. is used in two diametrically opposite senses. Arnold's parallel English vulgurism seems to explain very well this meaning of the word; the notion of travelling alongside of, readily suggests the notion of constant companionship, and that of consequence, as in the two logical usages of ἔπεσθαι and ἄκολουθεῖν, to 'accompany' as well as to 'follow'. Otherwise, the sense of constant companionship may give rise to the notion of friendly aid in producing some effect or consequence, and so it passes into the signification of δια, or nearly so.

§ 9. 'And we are apt to envy those who either have now in their possession, or have once possessed', (so I distinguish ἔχουσι and κεκτήμενοι, which however ordinarily express the same thing. Victorius translates habent possidentque; which not only conveys no distinction at all, but mistranslates the alternative ἥ, which clearly shews that
Aristotle did mean two different things, 'anything to which we ourselves had a natural claim or had once possessed (subaudi δοσα αυτοι κεκτημα); and this is why seniors are prone to envy their juniors'. Victorius recurs here to the case of Q. Fabius Maximus and Scipio, already cited on § 5. Maximus in his old age was naturally suspected of envy in the opposition he offered to Scipio's command in Africa; people thought he was jealous (this is nearer to jealousy than envy) of the reputation that the young general was rapidly acquiring, which interfered with his own earlier claims to similar distinction. The case of a similar jealousy of a younger rival, in any science, art, or profession, is too notorious to need special illustration.

§ 10. 'And those that have laid out large sums (for the attainment of any object) envy those who have obtained the same success at a small expense'. Here again the envy arises from having been beaten in the competition. τοις ὀλγα (δαπανησασι).

§ 11. In this last section there are two or three points requiring consideration which it will be as well to dispatch before proceeding to the translation. The first is, whether we are to read ἐφ' οἰς or οἰς without the prepos.; and then, what do ἐφ' οἰς or οἰς and ἐπὶ τις, severally represent. Spengel, following MS Δ', retains ἐφ' οἰς; Bekker in his third ed., for once departs from that MS and reads οἰς, although, as it seems, none of the MSS give any various reading. It seems therefore on this ground preferable to retain ἐφ' οἰς if we can; and we have next to consider how it is to be interpreted, and how distinguished from ἐπὶ τις. ἐφ' οἰς and οἰς are equally irregular after δῆλον (see note on II 9. 11, at the end), and the grammar therefore throws no light upon the reading. As far as the grammar and interpretation are concerned there seems to be no objection to retaining ἐπὶ.

We have then to decide whether οἰς or τις stands for persons or things; either of which is possible. However if the choice is to be made between them, τις seems the more natural representative of persons, and οἰς of things; and so in general, throughout these analyses of the feelings, Aristotle is accustomed to designate the persons who are the objects of them by the pronoun τινες.

Thirdly, there is no objection to ἐπὶ τις χαίρουσιν in the sense of 'at' or 'by whom they are pleased' (lit. ἀπον whom their pleasure is bestowed or directed), 'in whom they find pleasure', though the bare τις is more usual (possibly this may be Bekker's reason for his alteration [of ἐφ' οἰς]); and if there were any doubt about it, it would be sufficiently supported by ἐπὶ ποιοις (what sort of persons) χαίρεται, c. 9. 16. Consequently, as I can see no sufficient reason for altering the text contrary to all manuscript authority, I have retained ἐφ' οἰς, understanding it of things, the occasions of joy or delight; and ἐπὶ τις of the persons who excite the feeling in us.
The next clause, ὁσ γὰρ ὁυκ ἔχοντες λυποῦνται, κ.τ.λ. presents some difficulty, and Muretus and the Vetus Translatio, followed by Schrader and Wolf, reject the negative ὁυκ (or μὴ as it stood in the MSS employed in the older editions). This however would make the two opposite feelings of pleasure and pain the same state or disposition of mind, which I think could not possibly have been Aristotle's meaning. Victorius takes what I believe to be the right view on the point. The meaning will then be, that the negative, the contradictory, of pain, i.e. pleasure (the two never co-existing), is excited by the opposite circumstances to those which are productive of the pain of envy; if pain under particular circumstances is excited by the sight of the good fortune of another, substitute the opposite, ill fortune for good fortune in each case, and you will have the appropriate topics for giving rise to the feeling of pleasure in your audience. This, says Victorius, is ἐπιχαίρεκακία, wanton malice, malevolent pleasure in the misfortunes of others. The above interpretation is at all events free from the objection to which Schrader's is liable, namely that it makes Aristotle say that the same mental state or disposition is painful and pleasurable. The choice between the two depends mainly upon the interpretation of οἱ τοιοῦτοι and πῶς ἔχοντες. I understand by the former the φθονεροὶ, the common character of all the classes distinguished in the analysis; Schrader of the members of the several classes, the ambitious, the prosperous and successful; and in his view these classes must fall under the several 'states of mind' designated by πῶς, ὁς, οὕτως, ἔχοντες, such as ambition; though how it can be applied to others, such as 'the prosperous and successful', his second instance, he does not inform us. If by the 'state of mind' the πάθος or emotion is meant (which seems to be Spengel's view), it is quite impossible that two such states, one pleasurable and the other painful, can be the same. Schrader, however, appears to take the πῶς ἔχειν in a different sense, for the character or habit of mind, the mental constitution, which tends to produce such and such feelings; and in this point of view, though ambition (his first instance) may fairly enough be called a disposition of mind, yet I cannot see how the second, the prosperous and successful men, or prosperity and success, can well be included in the designation.

In conclusion I will transcribe part of his note, that the reader may have the opportunity of deciding for himself; merely adding that manuscript and editorial authority is against his omission of the negative, and that though his interpretation is very plausible at first sight, I doubt whether it can be right, for the reasons stated. "Veritas autem huius lectionis e re ipsa quoque fict manifesta, si per προτάσεις a § 2 ad 9 transeas, et huc illas applies. Ambitiosi e. g. dolent honore alterius, iidem, sive codem modo affecti, gaudent alterius opprobrio. Qui res magnas gerunt, et fortuna utuntur prorsimma, dolent."

1 This is certainly so. Take, for instance, the first words of the following chapter, πῶς δ' ἔχοντες ἡγούμεν, the state of mind in which ἡγοῦμαι is shewn, or resides: which identifies ἡγοῦμαι with the state in question.
tai' aposte av auton men parasskenaistorwos ou'tws 'exewn, oi d' elneisbhai h' thugxaneiv tivos agathou aix- oymenoi ows oioi eirhmenoi, dholon ws ou teu'zontai el'eau parad twon kuriwn.

1. pws d' exontes zhloousi kai ta poia kai etpi tisw, evbenvi esti dholon ei gar esti zhlos lupti tis etpi fainomene parousia agathon entimwv kai en-
si alium ad eundem fortunae gradum cernant evectum: iisdem vero illi gaudent cum alios longe infra se relinqui conspiciunt.'

And now to proceed with the translation:

'It is plain too what are the occasions, the objects, and the states of mind of such (the envious); that is to say, that the same state of mind which is absent in the painful feeling, will be present in the joy that is excited by the opposite occasions' (or thus, 'whatever may be the state of mind the absence of which manifests itself in, or is accompanied by, pain, the same by its presence on the opposite occasions will give rise to pleasure'). 'Consequently, if we ourselves (i.e. any audience) are brought into that state of mind (envy or jealousy), and those who lay claim to (think themselves deserving of) compassion from us, or any good that they want to obtain from us' (as kratei, judges of any kind, in a disputed claim; but it is equally true of men in general), 'be such as the above described (i.e. objects of envy), 'it is plain that they will never meet with compassion' (which will apply to thugxaneiv tivos agathou as well as to elneisbhai 'from the masters of the situation' (those who have the power to bestow either of them, those with whom the matter rests).

parasskenaizeiv, "to prepare the minds of," the judges or audience, said of the speaker who puts them into such and such a state of mind or feeling, is rendered by kataasskenaizeiv, supra II 1.2 (see note ad loc.) and § 7, where it is applied in two somewhat different senses.

CHAP. XI.

With envy, as we have seen, is closely connected zhlos or emulation; both of them originating in the desire of superiority, which manifests itself in rivalry and competition with those who so far, and in that sense, resemble us (peri toid omoious), that we are necessarily brought into comparison with them. Both of them are painful emotions—the pain arises from the unsatisfied want which they equally imply—and the difference between them is this, that envy is malevolent; what the envious man wants is to deprive his neighbour of some advantage or superiority, and do him harm by reducing him to his own level; the pain of emulation springs from the sense of our own deficiencies and the desire of rising to a higher level of virtue or honour: consequently the one is a virtuous, the other a vicious, feeling; emulation leads to self-improvement, and the practice of virtue; the object of envy is nothing but the degradation or injury of another: or, as Aristotle expresses it, emulation aims at the acquisition of good things, envy at
the deprivation of them in another, the infliction of harm and loss on one's neighbour.

Such is Aristotle's account of emulation; according to him the feeling is one, and that virtuous. The Stoics however, as interpreted by Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iv 8. 17, distinguished two kinds of aemulatio:—ut et in laude et in vitio nomen hoc sit. Nam et imitatio virtutis aemulatio dicitur: et est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo quod concupierit alius potius ipse careat. And again, c. 26. 56, aemulantis, angii alieno bono quod ipse non habeat. The two definitions differ also in this, that in Ar.'s all emulation is painful and all virtuous; in that of the Stoics, one form of it is virtuous but not painful, the other painful but not virtuous; and in fact it is difficult to distinguish the latter form of it from envy.

The Stoic definition of Zeno and (apparently) Chrysippus, Diog. Laert., Zeno, vii 111, gives only the painful and vicious form of ξῆλος, λύτην ἐπὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ παρείναι ἰὲν αὐτῶς ἐπιθυμεῖ. Cicero attributes his double definition also to Zeno.

Hobbes' and Bain's definitions of the affection I have already quoted in the introductory note to Ch. x. Locke, in the chapter there referred to, does not include emulation in his list of 'Passions', or 'Modes of pleasure and pain'.

Stewart, Outlines of Moral Philosophy, Pt. ii. Sect. iii. 5, has some remarks upon emulation, which he classes with the desires, and not (as Aristotle and others) with the affections. "It is the desire of superiority which is the active principle; and the malevolent affection is only a concomitant circumstance." Here he is in accordance with Aristotle. "When emulation is accompanied with malevolent affection, it assumes the name of envy."

"Emulation," says Butler, Sermon I., On Human Nature, note 4, "is merely the desire and hope of equality with, or superiority over others, with whom we compare ourselves. There does not appear to be any other grief in the natural passion, but only that want which is implied in desire. However, this may be so strong as to be the occasion of great grief. To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority by the particular means of others being brought down to our own level or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see that the real end which the natural passion, emulation, and which the unlawful one, envy, aims at, is exactly the same; namely that equality or superiority; and consequently, that to do mischief is not the object of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end." At all events, the malevolent feeling is a constituent element of the emotion of envy, without which it would not be what it is: though the actual doing mischief may not be essential to it.

1. 'The dispositions of emulation (the states of mind which exhibit it, in which it resides), its occasions and objects, will be clear from what follows'. τὰ ποία here stands for 'the sort of things' which excite emu-
i, and vępyov, for the, upon If, OTOU 133 11, which Victorius, castation character be unnecessarily, 8ta one. This (sc. directed, pronunciation, and direction, in order to acquire, The assumption, on the basic distinction of virtue, and ambition, is given, and the note there; and ἐπὶ ποίους χαίρειν c. 9 § 16. ‘If, namely, emulation is a feeling of pain on the occasion of the manifest (unmistakable) presence of good things, highly valued and possible for ourselves to acquire, (σερι in respect of, in the case of, i.e.) belonging to, or acquired by, those who have a natural resemblance to ourselves (in temper, faculties, powers, gifts and accomplishments natural or acquired, or anything which brings them into contrast with us); not because another has them (which is envy) but because we ourselves have them not (and so, feeling the want, are anxious to obtain them, in order to raise ourselves to the level of our assumed rival)— and accordingly, (the latter,) emulation is virtuous and a property of virtuous men, envy on the other hand vicious and of the vicious: for whilst the one is led by his emulation to procure (contrive, manage) for himself the attainment of these goods, the other is led by his envy to manage merely that his neighbour shall not have them:—(This is mere malevolence, the desire of harm or loss to another, without any corresponding advantage to oneself. The sentence from διό to φθόνον, is a note on the distinction of ξιλος and φθόνον: the argument is now resumed, and the apodosis commences with the irregular δη, introduced unnecessarily, more Aristotelio, after the parenthesis as correlative to the εἰ of the πρότασις, see note on II 9. 11, 1: 1. 11)—then, I say (if emulation be such as it has been described), those must be inclined to emulation who think themselves deserving of good things which they do not possess'; (sc. δυνατῶν αὐτοῖς ὅτιον, provided they are possible for them to attain. This connecting link, omitted by Aristotle, is supplied by Muretus and Victorius, and doubtless explains the connexion of the reasoning,) ‘for no one lays claim to things manifestly impossible’. § 2. ‘And this is why the young and the high-minded are of this character’. With οἱ νέοι comp. c. 12. 6 and 11. The latter of these two passages gives the reason why the young are inclined to emulation, it is διὰ τὸ ἄξιων αὐτῶν μεγάλων; which also makes them μεγαλόφυσιοι. Emulation in the μεγαλόφυσιοι must be confined to rivalry in great things, if it is to be consistent with the character assigned to them in Eth. Nic. IV 8, 1124 b 24, καὶ εἰσὶ τὰ ἐντιμα μη ἕνας, ἥ ὁποιοι προτενόουσιν ἄλλους καὶ ἄρχον εἶναι καὶ μελητὴν αλλ' ἥ ὁπον τιμὴ μεγάλη ἡ ἐργον, καὶ ὀλγων μὲν πρακτικον, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὄνομαστῶν. In fact self-sufficiency is characteristic of the μεγαλόφυσιοι, ὁ μεγάλων αὐτῶν ἄξιων ἄξιος ὁν, who therefore is devoid of all vulgar ambition, διὰ τὸ ὀλγα τιμὰν.
Also, those who are in possession (themselves, opposed to ο ATH οi ἄλλοι ἄξιουν, in the following sentence) of such good things as are worthy of men that are held in honour: such are, namely (γάρ), wealth, abundance of friends (an extensive and powerful connexion), state offices, and all the like. For, on the supposition that they have a natural claim to goodness, because the good have a natural right to these things [ὁti προσήκε τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἑξουσία], good things of this kind they emulously strive after. That is to say, they start with the assumption that their natural character is virtuous, and then, because wealth and power and such like have a natural connexion with, i.e. are the proper rewards of, virtue, they are eager to obtain them, and vie with their competitors in the pursuit of them. The meaning of this sentence is further elucidated by comparison with what is said in § 7. We are there informed that some kinds of good things, such as those that are due to fortune, or mere good luck, without merit, may be the objects not of emulation but of contempt. άγαθα ἃ τῶν ἐντίμων ἄξια ἐστιν ἄνδρῶν are consequently confined to those good things the acquisition of which implies merit.

προσήκε] imperfect. is properly 'had a natural claim'. The past tense, precisely as in the familiar use of the imperfect, 'so and so is as I said', referring back to a past statement, here signifies, 'has a claim, as they were in the habit of believing'. I have not thought it worth while to express this in the transl., as the phraseology is Greek and not English. Muretus, approved by Vater, writes προσήκε, overlooking the force of the imperfect.

In ἀγαθὸς ἑξουσία, ἀγαθὸς for τό is as abnormal as 'goodly' would be, used as an adverb for 'well'. It occurs once again, Top. E 7, 136 b 28, οὐκ ἐστι τοῦ δικαιῶν τοῦν το ἀγαθὸς. Amongst the Classical Greek writers, Aristotle appears to enjoy the monopoly of it [but the present passage and the parallel just quoted from the Topics are the only instances given in the Index Aristotelicus]; it is found also in the Septuagint (Stephens' Thesaurus s. v.), and apparently nowhere else.

'And also (opposed to the preceding), those whom everybody else

1 Here and elsewhere I have followed Schleiermacher, who in his Translation of Plato, invariably renders γάρ 'nämlich.' The same word in English, though not so usual as in the other language, is perhaps the nearest equivalent to the Greek γάρ. It is used thus in a specification of particulars, videlicet, that is to say, in confirmation of, assigning a sort of reason for, a previous statement.

2 Brandis, in the tract on the Rhet. in Schneidewin's Philologus, IV i. p. 46, following apparently the opinion of Muretus and Vater, calls the passage a verderbe Stelle, for which I can see no foundation whatsoever. The sense and connexion are perfectly intelligible, the imperfect προσήκε has been explained, and ἀγαθῶν defended by the use of it in the Topics. Bekker, Ed. III., retains the v. 1. The version of the Anonymus (apud Brandis) ἔχουσι γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ διὰ τὸ εἴθεται αὐτῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑλλαὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔχειν τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀ προσήκει ἔχειν τοὺς ἀγαθῶν, seems to me to be sufficiently close to the received text to be intended for a paraphrase of it, and not (as Brandis thinks) to suggest a different reading.
³ναι, ἵνα ἀ προσήκῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἐχουσι', ζηλοῦσι τὰ (2) τοιαύτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν. καὶ οὕς οἱ ἄλλοι ἄξιοιν. 3 καὶ άν πρόγονοι ή συγγενεῖς ή οἶκειοι ή τὸ ἔθνος ή ἣ πόλις ἐντιμοὶ, ζηλωτικοὶ περὶ ταῦτα: οἶκεια γὰρ 4 οἴονται αὐτοῖς εἶναι, καὶ ἄξιοι τοῦτων. εἰ δ' ἐστὶ ζηλωτὰ τὰ ἐντιμα ἀγαθα, ἀνάγκη ταῖς τε ἀρεταῖς εἶναι τοιαύτας, καὶ οὕσα τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁφέλμα καὶ εὐεργετικά· τιμώσι γὰρ τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς. καὶ ὅσων ἀγαθῶν ἀπόλαυσις τοῖς πλησίον ἐστίν, οἴον πλοῦτος καὶ κάλλος μᾶλλον ὑγιείας. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ ζηλωτοὶ τίνες· οἱ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ

1 Conicet Vahlen. ὁτι προσήκῃ τοῖς ἀγαθῶς ἐχουσι, MSS.

thinks worthy of them'. They are stimulated to exertion by the praises, and exhortations, and encouragement of their friends.

§ 3. ‘Any distinction acquired or enjoyed by one's ancestors, orkinsmen, or intimate friends, or race, or nation’ (the city in Greece is represented by the nation in modern language), 'has a tendency to excite emulation in those same things (in which the distinction has previously manifested itself); the reason being, that in these cases people think that (these distinctions) are their own (properly belonging, appropriate, to them), and that they deserve them'. Supply, καὶ (οἴονται αὐτά ἐναι) ἄξιοιν τοῦτων. On πρόγονοι, Victorius aptly quotes Cicero, de Off. I 35, quorum vero patres aut maiores aliqua gloria praestiterunt, ιίον σελερομυς κεδίον γενερά ολαιδισ εκσελ ειτας; et seq.

§ 4. ‘And if all good things that are held in honour are objects of emulation (i.e. of emulous exertion, what we vie with others in trying to acquire), all the virtuous must needs be of this same kind (ἐντιμοὺς), and everything that is profitable and productive of benefit to the rest of the world, because all benefactors and good men in general are held in honour. And especially those good things of which the enjoyment’ (particularly sensual enjoyment: see the account of the three kinds of lives, the ἀπολαυστικός, πρακτικός, and θεωρητικός, Eth. Nic. I 3: compare III 13, 1118 a 31, τῇ ἀπολαύσει, η γίνεται πάσα δι’ ἄφης καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποιοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις, VII 6, 1148 a 5, σωματικά ἀπολαύσεις) ‘can be shared by one's neighbours, wealth for instance, and personal beauty, more than health’. The enjoyment of beauty may no doubt be ‘shared by one's neighbours’, because the sight of it is always agreeable; but how it, or health, can be called ‘an object of emulation’, I own I am at a loss to see. No help is given by the Commentators. Did Aristotle, absorbed in his distinction, forget for a moment that the instances selected were inappropriate to the topic he was employed in illustrating?

§ 5. ‘It is plain too who the persons are, that are the objects of emulation: they are, namely, those who possess these and similar
advantages. These are those already mentioned, such as courage, wisdom, power: the last class, men in power, are objects of emulation in virtue of their frequent opportunities of doing service, conferring benefits; examples are generals, orators, and all that have the like power or influence. The power that orators have of doing service is exemplified in Crassus’ eulogy on Rhetoric, Cic. de Orat. 1 8. 32, (referred to by Victorius): Quid tam porro regium, tam liberale, tam munificentum, quam opem ferre supplicibus, excitate afflictos, dare salutem, liberare periculS, retinere homines in civitate?

§ 6. ‘And again, those whom many desire to resemble, or to be acquainted with, or their friends’. These, according to Victorius, are three classes of possessors of an ἐγκόμιον ἐντιμον which makes them objects of emulation. ‘Or those who are admired by many, or by ourselves’.

§ 7. ‘And those whose praises and panegyrics are pronounced either by poets or speech-writers’ (i.e. especially, writers of panegyrical speeches). On the distinction of ἐπαυνος and ἐγκόμιον see Introd., Appendix B, to Bk. 1. c. 9, p. 212 seq.

λογογράφοι. This word is used in two distinct senses. In its earlier signification it is applied to the Chroniclers, the earliest historians and prose writers, predecessors and contemporaries of Herodotus; of whom an account may be found in Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. XVIII, and Mure, Hist. of Gk. Lit. Bk. iv. ch. 2, 3, Vol. iv, and Dahlmann, Life of Herodotus, Ch. vi. sect. 2, and foll. In this sense it occurs in Thuc. 1 21, upon which Poppo has this note: “Aut solutae orationis scriptores universi, aut historici vel etiam μνογράφοι” (this early history was often of a mythical and legendary character), “denique orationum panegyricarum auctores hoc ambiguo vocabulo significantur.” (The later, and most usual, meaning of the word is here omitted.) As this was for some time the only prose literature in existence, the λογογράφοι might well be contrasted with the poets, so as to signify ‘prose writers’ in general. And this, according to Ernesti, Lex. Technologiae Graecae s.v., is the sense that it bears here, Dictier und prosatische Schriftsteller. Isocrates also, Phil. § 109, has the same contrast, ὀτε τῶν ποιητῶν ὀτε τῶν λογοποιών.

The later and commoner signification, which appears so frequently in the Orators (see examples in Shilleto’s note on Dem. de F. L. § 274), dates from the time of Antiphim, who commenced the practice, which
became common, and was pursued for instance by Isocrates and Demo-
thenes, of writing speeches, for which he received remuneration, for the
use of parties in the law-courts. Public feeling at Athens was very
much against this supposed prostitution of a man’s talents and special
knowledge (which may be compared with Plato’s horror, expressed in
the Phaedrus, of making a trade of teaching), and λογογράφος became
a term of reproach. Perhaps the earliest example of this application is
the passage of the Phaedrus, 257 c, where Lysias is said to have been
taunted with it by a political opponent, διὰ πάσης τῆς λοιδορίας ἐκάλεσ
λογογράφος. Aeschines applied it very freely to his rival Demosthenes.
On this import of the word Gaisford (ad hunc locum) quotes Schol. Plat.
p. 63, λογογράφους ἐκάλουν οἱ παλαιοὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ μισθῷ λόγους γράφοντας, καὶ
πιπρῶσκοιτάς αὐτοὺς εἰς δικαστήρια ῥήτορας δὲ τοὺς δὲ ἐαυτῶν λέγοντας.

But besides this special sense, λογογραφία and λογογράφος are said of
speech-writing and speech-writers in general (so Pl. Phaedr. 257 E, 258 b),
and especially of panegyrical speeches, like those of Isocrates, and of
speeches written to be read in the closet, and not orally delivered in the
law-court or public assembly: and as this is the most appropriate to the
present passage of Aristotle, who is speaking of eulogies in poetry and prose;
and is likewise the sense in which it is used in two other passages of the
Rhetoric, III 7.7, 12.2, I have little doubt that it is to be so understood here.
Hermogenes περὶ ἰδεῶν, β. chap. 10, περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου, Rhetorics
Graeci, Vol. II. p. 405, 6, and again chap. 12, περὶ τοῦ ἀπλώς πανηγυρικοῦ,
ib. p. 417, in treating of the πανηγυρικὸς λόγος, the name by which he
designates Aristotle’s ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος, seems to divide all literature into
three branches, poetry, spoken and written speeches; distinguishing ῥήτορες
and λογογράφος, and both of them from ποιηταί; ἀριστος οὖν κατὰ
πάνων λόγων εἰκῆ καὶ ποιητῶν ἀπάντων καὶ ῥήτορον καὶ λογογράφον Ὀμήρος
(p. 406, 9, and elsewhere). And (in the second passage above referred to)
he includes ἱστορία under the general head of λογογραφία, οὐδὲ μὴν ἡ λογο-
γραφία ἄλλα καὶ ἡ ἱστορία, p. 417, and still more expressly ἱστορίας τε καὶ
tῆς ἄλλης λογογραφίας, p. 418. Rhetoric, when treated as the art of com-
position, λέξει, may no doubt be considered to embrace all prose litera-
ture, which will so fall into two divisions (1) public and forensic
speeches, orally delivered, and (2) all written compositions. [“The relation
between ancient oratory and ancient prose, philosophical, historical,
or literary, is necessarily of the closest kind.” Jebb’s Attic Orators 1.
p. lxii.] In Rhet. III 12. 2, the written style, λέξεις γραφικῆ, is opposed to the
ἀγωνιστική, which has to be employed in actual encounter, spoken and
acted, not (necessarily) written; and the συμβουλευτικὴ and δικαινικὴ
to the ἐπιδεικτικῆ. The art of composition therefore, and prose composition
in general, may properly be referred to this third branch of
Rhetoric, the declamatory or panegyrical, as Hermogenes expressly, and
Aristotle tacitly, do refer it: and so λογογράφος may mean either a speech-
writer (as opposed to ῥήτωρ), or a writer of prose (as opposed to poetry).

‘The opposites of all these (the foregoing classes of persons) are
objects of contempt: for contempt is the opposite of emulation, and the
notion of the one to the notion of the other’ (the substantive in -is denotes
the process, or operation of the feeling; the infin. with to the abstract
conception of it). ‘And those who are so constituted as to emulate others,
or themselves to be the objects of emulation, must necessarily be inclined to feel contempt for all such persons—and on such occasions (an unnecessary parenthetical note, which interrupts the construction)—as lie under the defects and disadvantages opposite to the good things which are the objects of emulation. Hence contempt is often felt for the fortunate, when their luck comes to them without those good things which are really valuable (i.e. which depend in some degree upon merit for their acquisition).

‘Here ends the account of the means (lit. channels, media) by which the several emotions are engendered and dissolved, (furnishing topics or premisses) from which the arguments (modes of persuasion) that belong to them may be derived’.

diakýnetai] is here applied to the dissolution, breaking up, and so bringing to an end, of the páthě themselves. In a former passage on a similar subject, c. 4 § 32, it seems rather to have its logical sense of breaking up, or refuting an argument.

eirhētai] it has been stated, and is now over [Vol. I. p. 225, note].

CHAP. XII.

We now enter upon the consideration of the second kind of ἡθι, which may be employed as a subsidiary proof or instrument of persuasion, to assist the cogency of the logical arguments. This occupies the six following chapters from 12 to 17; in which the salient features or characteristics of the three ages, youth, old age, and manhood or the prime of life; and of the three social conditions of noble birth or family, wealth, and power, are set forth in detail. The import of these chapters, and their connexion with the main subject of the entire work, which explains and justifies their position here, has been already treated in the Introduction, pp. 110—112, to which the reader is referred. The study of these ‘characters’ will enable the speaker to accommodate his language and arguments to their several tastes and dispositions.

The four stages of human life, as described by Horace, Epist. ad Pis. 156 seq., have much more in common with Shakespeare’s ‘seven ages’, (As you like it, Act II. sc. 7 [lines 143—166]), than with Aristotle’s analysis. Horace writes with a view to the use of the poet, and describes them as they should appear in the drama or the Epic poem: his cha-
racters are the dramatic characters: Aristotle writing for the rhetorician applies his analysis to the purposes of argument; reserving the dramatic expression of character for the third book, where it naturally falls under the treatment of style and expression. Horace's object appears in the lines, Ne forte seniles mandentur iuveni partes pueroque viriisque, semper in adiunctis aequoque morabimur aptis [176].

Bacon's Essay, Of Youth and Age [XLIII], is too well known to need more than a mere reference. Two such observers as Aristotle and Bacon must of course agree in the general outline of the two contrasted characters; but Bacon's is a brief sketch, presenting the leading features of both more particularly as they exhibit themselves in the conduct and management of business, and in public life: Aristotle fills in the details of the picture in a much more complete and comprehensive analysis.

Plutarch, in the treatise de virtute morali, c. xi, discussing the moral constitution of the human subject, illustrates his material theory of the origin of the πάθη by reference to the characters of the young and old, which he thus describes; διὸ νέοι μὲν καὶ ζεσίς καὶ ἵπποι (headlong, hasty, precipitate,) περὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις διάνυσαν καὶ οἰστρόναι αἵματος πλήθει καὶ θερμοπλήθει τὸν δὲ πρεσβυτέρον ἧ πρὸς τὸ ἐπικρατεῖ οὐκ ἡ τιμὴ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ καταστάνειν, καὶ γίνεται μικρὰ καὶ ἀσθενὴς: ὠσκεὶ δὲ τὰ λόγα τοῦ παλαιτικοῦ τῶν σώματι συναπομαραμομένων. Compare with this Rhet. I 12.8, ὁσπερ γὰρ οἱ οἰμωμένοι, οὖνω διάθεμα εἴσιν οἱ νεοὶ ὑπὸ τὴς φύσεως: and 13.7, οἱ πρεσβύτεροι ἑναντίως ἀδιάκαιται τοῖς νεόις: κατεγνωμένοι γὰρ εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ θερμοί. ὡστε προωδυσποίηκε τὸ γῆρας τῇ δείλῃ καὶ γὰρ ὁ φόβος κατάψυξις τίς ἑστι. The curious correspondence of the metaphors in the two authors' description of the hot impetuosity of the one and the cold phlegmatic temper of the other, is accounted for by similarity of theory as to the origin of the πάθη. With both the explanation is physiological, and in the spirit of modern inquiries in the same department. Aristotle's views may be gathered from the de Anima I 1, 403 a 3, seq. He there describes them as inseparable from the body and its matter and functions; with the possible exception of τὸ νοεῖν 'thought and intelligence', which is there included with the πάθη as a property of 'life', and they are ranked with sensation in general: φαίνεται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείονον—the independent existence of the intellect, or part of it, being left an open question—οὐδὲν ἀνείππη τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ νοεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ τὶς τοῦ πνεύματος, θυμόν, ἐνεργοῦς καὶ άμμαντὸς, as see further, ib. line 16: and ib. line 31, a 'physical' definition of anger (which he seems to accept as correct as far as it goes) is given, ἐφός τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ: this is the definition of the ἀγάμη of the πάθος. Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b 14, σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεται ποιείν εἶναι ἀμφότερα (αιδώ καὶ νέμεσιν) ῥητοὶ δικὶ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐξεστ欧盟. Near the end of the 12th chapter Plutarch further assigns as the πάθη τῶν νέων, αἰσχύνη (comp. Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b 16 seq.), ἐπιθυμία (Aristotle, ἐπιθυμητικοί, c. 12.3), μετάνοια (Ar. εὑρετάβληται, c. 12.4), ἡδονή, ἀλήθεια (meaning of course that they are excessively susceptible of these two feelings), φιλοσοφία. (Ar. ib. § 6.) Against Spengel's view of these ἡθον—viz. that they are the analysis of the ἁθον proper, ἐν τῷ λέγοντι, taken by Aristotle out of the order of treatment, which he had originally laid down for the three great divi-
sions of rhetorical proof, πίστεις, ήθος, πάθος; and placed after, instead of before, the πάθος— I will here add to what I have already said in the Introd. p. 112 (and p. 110 on the real difference between the two kinds of ήθος described in II 1 and here), that, whereas in II 1 reference is made for details to the analysis of the virtues in I 9, the political characters of I 8, and the characters of the three ages and conditions of life, are not noticed at all; and for the best of reasons: because they in fact belong to a different class of ήθος; the object of the first, ήθος proper, being to impress the audience favourably as to your own character and good intentions; that of the second to adapt your tone, sentiments and language, to the tastes and feelings of certain special classes whom you may have to address; you study their 'characters' for the purpose of introducing into your speech what you know will be acceptable to each of them. And precisely the same thing may be said of the political characters.

§ 1. 'The varieties of men's characters in respect of their instinctive feelings and developed states and of their several ages and fortunes (conditions of life), let us next proceed to describe'. § 2. 'By feelings or emotions I mean anger, desire, and such like of which we have spoken before (II 2—11), and by settled states, virtues and vices: these too have been discussed before, as well as the objects of individual choice, and of individual action (what sort of things they are inclined to do, or capable of doing, πρακτικαί). The second reference is to I 9, and probably also to I 5 and 6, on good absolute and comparative, as the object of human aspiration.

On πάθη, δυνάμεις, έξεις, see Eth. Nic. II 4; and on the import of ήθος and its relation to έθος, Introd. p. 228, Appendix C, to Bk. I. c. 10.

Vater raises a difficulty about the connexion of the above passage with the concluding sentence of the last chapter, which he says he cannot understand. "How could Aristotle after stating that he had concluded the description of the πάθη immediately add, as though nothing had been said about them, nunc autem qui mores aut animorum motus— replicemus"? My answer is that he does not say so: the two sentences have reference to two totally different things: at the end of c. 11, he tells us that he has now finished the analysis of the πάθη, and shews by the analysis how they can be applied to the purposes of the rhetorician, how to excite and allay them. What he says at the opening of c. 12, is that he is now going to treat of the application of these πάθη and the έξεις which grow out of them to the characters of certain ages and conditions of life. The Latin words quoted are a mere mistranslation: the κατά is overlooked, and the sentence rendered as if it were τά δὲ ήθη καὶ τά πάθη ... διέλθωμεν. Vater accordingly on this ground, and also on that of the passage of Quintilian (immediately to be noticed), supposes that something is lost here.

The passage of Quintilian, v 10. 17, presents a real difficulty. In referring to Aristotle in secundo de Arte Rhetorica libro—which can only
mean this place—he adds to what we actually find in Aristotle several other 'characters' of which no trace is now to be found in his text, "ut divitias quid sequatur, aut ambitum, aut superstitionem; quid boni pro-bent, quid malì petant, quid milites, quid rustici; quo quaeque modo res vitiari vel appeti solet." Both Victorius (Comm. ad II 17, 6, p. 358, ed. 1548), and Spalding (ad loc. Quint.), attribute the discrepancy to a lapse of memory on Quintilian's part, who was here quoting without book. The former, in a sarcastic note, thinks that it is much more probable to suppose that Quintilian, without referring to the text of his author, added de suo what he thought ought to be there, than that anything has been lost in a book which presents no trace of any hiatus. To which Spalding adds, "non uno quidem loco vidimus videbimusque Quintilianum memoriae vitio e libris afferentem, quae in is non plane cadem legerentur. Cf. IV 2. 132." In this explanation I think we must acquiesce. Spengel also, in his tract über die Rhet. des Ar. (Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851) p. 43, attributes this want of coincidence to a 'mistake' of Quintilian.

§ 2. ἡλικία, κ.τ.λ.] 'The ages are youth, prime of life (manhood), and old age. By "fortune" I mean, birth, and wealth, and power of various kinds (plural), and their opposites, and in general good and bad fortune'.

§ 3. 'Now the youthful in character are prone to desire, and inclined to do (to carry out, put in practice or execution) anything they may have set their hearts upon. And of the bodily appetites lust is that which they are most disposed to follow (to give way to, or obey), and in this (sc. τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, this particular appetite) they are incontinent'. If ταῖς is right (some MSS have τῆς), ταύτης is a piece of careless grammar, denoting lust as a single appetite, of which the plural preceding represents the varieties, or moments. Comp. Eth. Nic. I 1, 1093 a 5, seq. ἐν δὲ (ὅ νεός) τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὦν—it will be in vain and unprofitable for him to study moral philosophy, which is a practical science, whereas he has as yet no sufficient control over his own actions—οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ ἠλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζην καὶ διώκειν ἑκαστα.
§ 4. 'Changeable and fickle are they in respect of their desires and appetites; and these are violent but soon subside: for their wishes and volitions (βουλήσις includes both) are sharp (keen, eager) and not strong or enduring (non fīrma, non perdurantia, Victorius), like the hunger and thirst of the sick' (the plural of the abstract nouns, here, as usual, the various or successive moments, accesses of the two appetites). Comp. Eth. N. 11, 1128 b 16, of πάρη ὑλίκια τὸ πάθος ἀρμοζεί, ἀλλὰ τῇ νῇ οὐδέμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικοῦτος αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ξόντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὡπ τῆς αἰδοὺς δὲ κωλύσεθαι. Horace, A. P. 160, (puer) mutatur in horas (εὐμετάβαλοι); 165, et amata relinquere pernix (ἀφίκοροι); 163, cœrus in vitium flecīt.

ἀφίκορος. As this word is not explained nor sufficiently illustrated in the Lexicons, it will be well to supply the deficiency by a few examples. This appears to be its earliest appearance in the extant Greek literature. It does not become at all common till Plutarch's time. Hesychius and Suidas supply the derivation. ἀφίκορον ἀπλησμον. ἡ ἁμα τῷ ἀφασθαὶ κορεννύμενον ταχεῶς, ἀφίκορος κωμαστικός (καμαστρός, Salmasius), ταχεῶς διλαγοροῦν, καὶ κόρον λαμβάνουν. ἀφίκοροι εὐμετάβλητοι (Hesychius s. v.). ἀφίκοροι εὐμετάβλητοι ἢ τὰ ταχεῖα καὶ ἁμα τῷ ἀφασθαὶ κορεννύμενος. "διὰ τε τὴν φυσικὴν τῶν Νομαίδων ἀφίκοριαν" (fickleness) κ.τ.λ. (Polyb. X. 1. 4; the quotation in Suidas is inexact), καὶ ἀδείς (M. Anton. I 16, Bekker ad loc.) "συντηρητικῶν δεῖ εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς φίλον καὶ μηδαμοῦ ἀφίκορον" (Suidas, s. v.). Thus the primary meaning of the word is, one that is satiated by a mere touch, ἀφεῖ ακορεσμένος, κορεσθεὶς, easily satisfied with anything, soon tired of it; fickle, changeable, fastidious; fastidiosus, ad mutationem proclivis (Ast's Lex. Plat. s. v.); "quem cito omnis rei fastidium capit, ac simul atque attigit satiatus illa expletusque est" (Victorius ad hunc locum). It is found in the Pseudo-Plat. Aitiaochus, 369 A, as an epithet of the ὑμεῖς. Once in Lucian, Calumniae non temere credendum, c. 21, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ φιλόκαινον, ὅ φύει τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ ἀφίκορον. Once in Polybius, the passage quoted by Suidas. More frequently in Plutarch, πέρι παιδῶν ἀγώγης, c. 9, p. 7 B, τοῦ μονόκαλον λόγον...πρὸς τὴν ἀσκησιν ἀφίκορον (tiresome, speedily producing weariness or disgust) καὶ πάντῃ ἀνεπιφόρων. Id. πῶς δεῖ τοῦ νέου ποιμάτων ἐκούνει c. 4, p. 20 B, it is coupled in the same sense with ἐφιμέρων καὶ ἀδίεμονων, with which it is almost synonymous. Id. περὶ πολυφιλίας, c. 2, p. 93 D, διὰ τὸ φιλόκαινον καὶ ἀφίκορον (praestentium fastidio, Lat. Transl. ap. Wytenbach). περὶ ἀδόλεχαίας, c. 5, p. 504 D, μόνος ὁμορος τῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀφίκοριας περιγεγενέας. Ἐρωτικὸς, c. 5, 752 B, "Ερως χωρίς Ἀφροδίτης...καὶ πλήσιμοι καὶ ἀφίκοροι. ἱβ. c. 16, 759 F, "Οτι οὐν ἄξιος ἐν ηδεῖς κατ' ἐπίκουρον, c. 3, p. 1088 B, τὸ σώμα...ἐν τάπαις (ταῖς ἡδοναῖς) ἀσθενείς τι καὶ ἀφίκορον (satietati, fastidio odonoixi). σφάρδα ἐπιθυμοῦσιν) Victorius refers in illustration to Caesar's saying of Brutus, guidquid vult valde vult [Cicero, ad Att. X. 1. 2]; which Plutarch renders, τῶν δ' ὁ βουλετάς σφάρδα βουλεταί [Brutus, c. 6].
§ 5. 'And passionate and quick-tempered (hasty), and apt to give way to their impulses. And under the dominion of (slaves to) their passion (θυμός, here the angry passions: on the more technical sense of θυμός, as one of the three divisions of the ὀρέξεως in a psychological classification, see in note on II 2.1); 'for by reason of their love of honour they had broke (put up with) a slight, but always resent any thing which they suppose to be a wrong'. Hor. A. P. 159, puer...iram colligit ac ponit temere et mutatur in horas.

§ 6. 'And fond as they are of honour, they are still fonder of victory: for youth is desirous of superiority, and victory is a kind of superiority'. The φιλοτημία of youth seems to be represented in Horace's euidus, A. P. 165, 'desirous', that is, of honour and glory; not, of course of money, covetous or avaricious. Comp. II 2.6; and I 11.14, 15, on the pleasures of victory in competitions of all kinds, founded on the natural desire of superiority which is an instinct of humanity. Victorius quotes Cic. de Fin. v 22. 61, (de pueris) Quanta studia decertantium sunt: quanta ipsa certamina: ut illi offeruntur lactitia cum vicerint, ut pudet victos:...quos illi labores non perforunt ut aequalium principes sint. 'And both of these they are fonder of than of money: in fact for money they have no fondness at all (lit. in the very least degree), owing to their never yet having had experience of want; to which Pittacus' pithy saying (or ἀπόφθεγμα II 21.8) of Amphiaraus is in point'. Until we know what the saying was—dictum hoc Pittaci intercidi, says Buhle—we cannot decide whether eis is to be interpreted 'against' Amphiaraus or merely applied or addressed 'to' him; [perhaps simply 'on'; with ἀπόφθεγμα eis Ἀμφιάραος, compare in this sense Pindar, Ol. VI. 13, αἰνος, ὅν Ἀδραστος ἐς Ἀμφιάρου φθέγξατο.]

§ 7. 'And not ill-natured but good-natured, because they have as yet had but few opportunities of observing the (prevalent) wickedness (of society)'. πονηρίας, plural, the acts or cases of villainy which meet us so frequently in the experience of life.

The meaning of ἐνθείς here may be determined by its opposite κακοθείς, which is thus defined in c. 13. 3; κακοθείς τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον ὑπολαμβάνειν πάντα. It therefore denotes the simple, innocent, artless, candid turn of mind which 'thinketh no evil', and puts a favourable interpretation upon any doubtful act or expression. This is of course the primary
In Herod. III 140, there is a doubtful instance, δι' ευθείας, which Schweighäuser explains by animi bonitas, though the more unfavourable signification is equally probable. And in Demosth. c. Timocr. 717. 2, τὸς ὑμετέρας εὐθείας certainly bears the same sense as Aristotle gives to the word here. But in its ordinary application—even in Herodotus and the tragedians; in Plato, with whom it is very frequent, almost invariably—'simplicity' has degenerated into silliness or absurdity, by that process of deterioration, common in language, which Trench, Study of Words, Lect. II. 'On the morality in words,' has abundantly illustrated. He refers to εὐθείας without naming it, p. 46. Bouhongie and Einfall have precisely the same double sense. [Cf. Vol. I. p. 175.]

I must however add that it is equally possible that Ar. may have meant here that youth are 'simple-minded', i.e. prone to a simple and literal interpretation of everything as they see it, without penetrating beneath the surface, 'inclined to think well of everything'—and so Victorius, ingenii simplicis et fatui, bene de omnibus existimantibus—especially as Ar. himself has twice used the word in the disparaging sense, III 1.9; 12.2. Comp. Plat. Rep. III 409 A (quoted by Victorius), δι' ὑμετέρας εὐθείας ὑποτε νῦν ὁ ἐπεικεῖς βαίνονται, καὶ εὐεξιατήριον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδικών, ἀτε νυκτίς εὐκουστε ἐν ἑαυτός παραδείγματα ὁμοοπαθῆ τοῖς πονηρώσι. [Martial, xii. 51, Tam sacre nostrum decipii Fabullinum Miranda, Aule? Semper homo bonus tiro est.]

καὶ εὐπρεποὶ, κ.τ.λ.] 'And credulous (easy of persuasion), owing to their having been hitherto seldom exposed to deceit'.

§ 8. 'And sanguine; for youths, like men when in a state of drunkenness, are pervaded by a heat due to their nature (i.e. their physical structure); and also at the same time because they have not as yet had much experience of failure'. The first is the physical, the second the intellectual or logical, explanation of the phenomenon.

οἴνωμενοι] This is one of the verbs beginning with o, which "seldom or never receive the augment", as οἴστραν p. p. oίστρημένος, "compounds of οἶαξ and οἶων, ὁχωκα Aesch. Pers. 13, Soph. Aj. 896." Mattth. Gr. Gr. §168 obs. "This seems," he adds, "to have originated from the old orthography, in which ω was as yet unknown." οἴωμένον, Eur. Bacch. 1284. Similarly, εὖ for ἐὖ, in εἰρείν, εἰρηκέναι, καθεῦδε, εἰλόγησα. See Ellendt's Lex. Soph. s. v. οἶνος, Elmsley ad Bacch. 686, who (following Porson) writes οἴνωμενος, though the manuscript authority is against him. See his note ad loc., and on εἰρείν see Lobeck ad Phrynichum, p. 140. οἴνωμενος occurs no less than five times in Eth. N. vii, from c. 5 to 15.

With διά-θερμος, as a compound, 'hot or heated all through', pervaded,

With the statement comp. Plutarch (already referred to), and the rest of the preliminary note on c. XII. The heat in youth is supposed to be caused by the boiling of the blood, this being the physical origin of the πάθη, (as anger, de Anima 1 1, 403 a 31, already cited,) which are specially characteristic of the young, see note supra § 3. The young are again compared to drunken men, Eth. Nic. VII 15, 1154 b 10, ὡμοίως δὲ ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὐξήσιν ἀσπερ οἱ οἰνώμενοι διάκεινται, καὶ ἡδονὴ τῇ νεότητι. The physical explanation of both these comparisons is given in Probl. XXX I. 27, τὸ δὲ θερμῶν τὸ περὶ τῶν τόπων ὡς φρονούμεν καὶ ἐλπιζόμεν ποιεῖ εὐθύμων· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πίειν εἰς μέθυν πάντες ἔχουσι προβύμως, ὅτι πάντας ὁ οἶνος ὁ πολὺς εὐελπίδας ποιεῖ, καθάπερ η ἡμέρα τούτων παῖδας (cited by Zell): which not only serves as a commentary on the present passage, but also proves that Zell's, and not Fritzsche's (ad Eth. Eudem. Z 15, 1154 b 9—11), interpretation of the second is the true one. "Inde igitur iuvventutis et ebrietatis affinitas, quia utraque corpori calorem impertit." (Fritzsche in alia omnia abibt: q. v. si tanti est.) That διάβηροι here and βερμοὶ c. 13. 7, are to be interpreted literally as well as metaphorically will further appear by a comparison of the passage referred to in the note on II 13. 7 [p. 154].

And their lives are passed chiefly in hope ("eiam sibi propositam habent in vita ac sequuntur ut omnium suarum actionum ducem." Victorius); for hope is of the future, but memory of the past, whilst to youth the future is long but the past short; for in their earliest years? (so Victorius, comp. τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ, c. 13. 8) 'it is impossible for them to remember anything (i.e. they have nothing or hardly anything to remember), whilst everything is to be hoped for'. I have adopted (as also Spengel) Bekker's conjecture οἰνὸν τὲ for οἰνονταί, which has little or no meaning. τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ may also very well be interpreted literally 'on the first day of their existence', the extreme case being taken for the purpose of illustration. With this interpretation οἰνονταί may be retained; for it now will have the meaning, that on the very first day of their existence, even then, they suppose—they can't be sure—that they remember nothing, &c.

The phrase ζῶσιν ἀπίθανα, which recurs in § 12, τῷ ἠθεὶ ζῶσι μάλλον ή τῷ λογομορᾷ, and c. 13. 12, expresses the same thing, viz. 'living in the exercise or practice of', as ζῆν κατὰ πάθος and τοῖς πάθεσιν ἥκολουμεναί,
§ 9. 'And rather inclined to courage (ἀνδρείότεροι τοῦ εἰσόδοτος, or τῶν ἀκλλων); for they are passionate and sanguine, of which the one produces the absence of (or freedom from) fear, the other positive confidence: because on the one hand fear and anger are incompatible (II 3. 10, ἀδύνατον ἰμα φοβεῖσθαι καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι, 5. 21, θαρραλέον γὰρ ἡ ὀργή), and on the other hope is a sort of good thing that inspires confidence'.

§ 10. 'And bashful, sensitive to shame; because they have not yet acquired the notion of (ὑπολαμβάνειν) any other standard of honour and right, but have been trained (schooled) by the conventional law alone'. οὔνομα is here the law established by society, the conventional usages in respect of honour and conduct, the traditions and customary observances of good breeding, any violation of these calls a blush to the cheek of youth. Old age, the opposite, has lost this quick sense of shame; διὰ γὰρ τὴν μὴ φροντίζειν ὅμως τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀνυφέρων ὁλογροφοῦν τοῦ δικαίου, c. 13. 10. πρεσβύτερον δ’ οὔδεις ἢν ἐπανεἶσθαι ὅτι αἰσχυντικός, Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b 20. Νόμος in this sense is opposed to φώςει, as in the famous antithesis, the abuse of which is one of the principal sources of paradox and sophistry (πλεῖστος τόπος τοῦ ποιεῖν παράδοξα λέγειν), τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τῶν νόμων. ἦν δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀλήθεα, τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκοῦν. Topic. IX (de Soph. El.) 12, 173 a 7 seq. In this more comprehensive application of the term, however, the positive laws, of human origin, enacted in the various states and cities, are included amongst the 'social conventions'. On the similar antithesis of πρὸς δόξαν and πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, see note on II 4. 23, comp. c. 6. 23. In the former case truth or reality is opposed to popular opinion and its results; in the latter reality and right are represented as the 'natural' law or order of things. In this passage the ἀλήθεια has a moral character; τὸ καλὸν, the 'true' is here the 'right' or 'noble', the ultimate end of the moral action. On this sense of καλὸν, see my Review of Aristotle's System of Ethics, 1867, p. 14.

§ 11. 'And high-minded (having lofty thoughts and aspirations) for
two reasons: first, because they have not yet been humiliated by (the experience of) life—trends and aspirations have not yet been checked and lowered by the experience which life gives of the impossibility of realising them—'but are as yet without experience of the force of circumstances' (τὰ ἀναγκαία, things that constrain and compel us against our will, control our actions, and thereby check and prevent the carrying out of lofty designs, of high and generous purposes: 'enforced actions'; says the Rhet. ad Alex. c. i § 10, τὰ ἀναγκαία, τὰ μη ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἰστα πράττειν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐς ἀνάγκης θέιας ἢ ἀνθρωπίνης οὐτως ἰστα); 'and secondly, because highmindedness is characterised by the consciousness of high desert (thinking oneself deserving of great rewards and successes), and this belongs to the sanguine temper': and therefore may be inferred from § 8. The definition of μεγαλόφυνχος, Eth. N. IV 7, sub init., is ὡς μεγάλων αὐτῶν ἀξίων ἀξίος ὄν. The two last words, essential to the definition (as may be seen from what immediately follows), are omitted in the Rhetoric as not required for the occasion. The consciousness of exalted merit, which does form a part of the definition, is sufficient here for the purpose aimed at, namely to connect highmindedness with the sanguine temperament, Hor. A. P. 165, sub limitis, full of high thoughts and aspirations.

§ 12. 'And in action they prefer honour to profit'—utilium tardus prosisor, Hor. A. P. 164—for their conduct in life is rather due to the impulses of their character, than guided by reasoning and calculation; the latter being directed to profit, whereas honour and the right are the aim of virtue'. The intellect and its calculations are here distinctly excluded from any participation in virtue, which is assigned solely to the moral character; the impulses, ἐρεξεῖς and πάθη, duly cultivated and regulated, pass into virtues. This is in direct contradiction to the doctrines of the Ethics, which give to the two virtues of the intellect, σοφία and φρόνησις, 'wisdom, speculative and practical', even the predominance over the moral virtues; identifying true happiness with the exercise of the former. But our author is here departing from his Eudaemonistic ethical system, which makes happiness (in a transcendent sense no doubt) the end of all human action; and substituting for it the more popular and higher view of the τέλος, which represents it as the abstract good and noble, or the right, τὸ καλὸν; a standard and an end of action independent of all sordid and selfish motives or calculation, with which it is here brought into contrast. This view of the τέλος appears incidentally, as an excrescence upon the systems (to which it is opposed), in the Nic. Ethics, as III 7, sub init. Ib. c. Io, 1115 b 24, and especially IX 8, p. 1169 a 4, et seq. With what is said in our text, comp. Eth. N. IX 8, 1168 a 34, ὡς ἐπεικὴς (πράττει) διὰ τὸ καλὸν, καὶ ὅσον ἂν βελτίων ἕ μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλὸν.
On λογισμός, the discursive, reasoning or calculating faculty or process, opposed to the νοῦς, and identical with διάνωσi in its lower and limited sense, see Eth. Nic. vi 1, 1139 a 6 seq.; where the entire intellect is divided into two faculties, (1) the νοῦς, or pure reason, δ' θεωροῦμεν, the organ of speculation, and of a priori truth, τὸ επιστημονικόν, and (2) the διάνωσι (in its special sense) the understanding, the organ of reasoning, and of deliberation or calculation in practical matters, τὸ λογιστικόν.

The exact opposite of all this [§§ 8—12] appears in the character of old age, c. 13 §§ 5, 9, 10, 11, 14. Old men are δυσέλπιδες, ἀναίσχυντοι, μικρόνυχοι, ξύσι πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον and κατὰ λογισμόν.

§ 13. ‘And they are more fond of their friends and companions than the other ages (prime of life, and old age), owing to the pleasure they take in social intercourse (‘their liking for company’), and to their not yet having learnt to measure everything by the standard of profit or self-interest, and therefore not their friends (either)’. Of the three kinds of friendship, Eth. N. viii 2, 3, 4, founded severally upon (1) good (i.e. real, moral, good, the only basis of perfect friendship or love), (2) pleasure, and (3) profit or utility, that of young men belongs to the second. Of these it is said, c. 3, 1156 a 13, ὧν νοοῦσι δὲ καὶ οἱ δὲ ἡδονή· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιώς τινας εἶναι (by reason of their moral character) ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπελούς, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἤδεις αὐτοῖς.

§ 14. ‘And all their errors are in the way of excess and undue vehemence, contrary to Chilon’s maxim (μηδὲν ἄγαν, οὐ γείδ nīmis); for everything that they do is in excess; for their love is in excess, and their hatred in excess, and everything else in the same way. And they think they know everything, and therefore are given to positive assertion, which (this confidence in their own knowledge and judgment) in fact accounts for their tendency to excess in everything’. μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν· καὶ ρόδος δ' ἐπὶ πάσαν ἄμοιτος ἐργασὶν ἀνθρώπων (Theognis, 401, Bergk). “Cum enim omnia sibi nota esse putent, nec se labi posse credant, nihil timide tractant,” Victorius, who also quotes, in illustration of a ‘positive assertion’, Hist. Anim. vi (21. 3), έν έως δὲ δυσχερίζοσται δέκα μήνας κύριαν ήμερολεγόν (to the very day—counting the days throughout the month till you come to the very end). The word occurs again in the same sense 1b. c. 37. 5, and indeed is common enough in other authors.

Of Chilon, to whom is ascribed the famous proverb which inculcates moderation in all things—the earliest hint of the doctrine of ‘the mean’—an account may be found in Diog. Laert. i 3. 68, seq., and in Mure’s Hist. of Gk. Lit., Bk. iii, c. 6 § 16, Vol. iii, p. 392. He was a native of Lacedaemon, and his floruit is placed in 396 B.C. "Dubitatur quis sapientium
πάντα γὰρ ἀγαν πράττουσιν φιλοψί τε γὰρ ἀγαν καὶ μισούσιν ἄγαν καὶ τάλλα πάντα ὁμοίως. καὶ εἰδέναι πάντα εἶναι καὶ δισχυρίζονται τούτο γὰρ 15 αὐτιόν ἐστι καὶ τοῦ πάντα ἄγαν. καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὑβρίν καὶ οὐ κακουργίαν. καὶ ἐλεητικοὶ διὰ τὸ πάντας χρηστοὺς καὶ βελτίων ὑπολαμβάνειν. τῇ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀκακία τοὺς πέλας μετροῦσιν, ὡστ' 
16 ἀνάξια πάσχειν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν αὐτοὺς. καὶ φιλο-


§ 15. 'The offences they commit incline to insolence or wanton outrage, not to mean or petty crimes and mischief'. Their crimes, when they commit them, are rather those of open violence, outrage of personal dignity, wanton aggression and the like, than of that mean and low form of wrong-doing manifesting itself in all underhand dealings, as fraud, cheating, calumny, and other similar offences, which work their mischief secretly and insidiously, as it were underground, or in the dark: the former being directed more especially against the person, ὑβρισθεὶς ἀτμία, II 2.6: the latter against a man's property, fortune, character. Compare II 2.6, which gives the reason for this distinction, διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι ὑβρισταὶ ὑπερέχεια γὰρ ἰδοντα (they think to shew their superiority) ὑβρίζοντες. Οἱ ὑβριστοὶ, ικλίνεται as an instance II 16.4, where this kind of offence is again attributed to the πλούσιοι: as it is also in Polit. vi (iv) 11, 1295 b 9. Excess in personal beauty, or strength, or birth, or wealth, and their opposites, weakness and poverty and meanness of condition, give rise severally to two different orders of offences: γίνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑβρισταὶ καὶ μεγαλοπιθηροὶ μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργω καὶ μικροπιθηροὶ λιῶν τῶν δ' ἀδικήματα τὰ μὲν γίνεται δὲ ὑβρίν τὰ δὲ διὰ κακοῦργίαν. Compare Plat. Legg. v 728 E, ὡς δ' αὐτῶς ἢ τῶν χρημάτων καὶ κτημάτων κτῆσις κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ρυθμὸν ἔχει' τὰ μὲν ὑπέροικα γὰρ ἐκώστων τούτων ἔχθρας καὶ στάσεις ἀπεργάζεται ταῖς πόλεις καὶ ἔδιδα, τὰ δ' ἐλλείποντα δουλείας ὡς τὸ πολύ.

'And disposed to compassion, because they suppose every one to be good (absolutely) or better (comparatively, than they really are; so Victorius); for they measure their neighbours by their own harmlessness (or freedom from malice and the love of mischief), and therefore assume that their sufferings are unmerited': which is the occasion of ἔλεος, II 8.1.

§ 16. 'They are also fond of laughing (mirth, fun), and therefore disposed to pleasantery or facetiousness; for pleasantery is wantonness
γέλωτες, διό καὶ εὐτράπελοι· ἡ γὰρ εὐτραπελία πε-
pαιδεμένη ὑβρις ἐστίν.

I. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν νέων τοιοῦτον ἔστιν ἡθος, οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐναν-
schooled by good breeding. From the description of εὐτραπελία given in Eth. Nic. II 7, 1108 a 23, and IV 14, ab init., it results that it is 'easy, well-bred (τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου, τοιοῦτα λέγει καὶ ἀκούει ὅτα τῷ ἐπιτεκεί καὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἀρμότει) pleasantry in conversation, of which it is the 'agreeable mean', lying between βουμολοξία, 'buffoony' the excess, and ἀγροκία, 'rusticity, boorishness', the inability to see or give or take a joke. It is a social virtue (one of three), and one of the accomplishments of a gentleman. It forms part of the relaxation of life, ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, which includes διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδίας, all the lighter occupations of which amusement or relaxation is the object and accompaniment, op-
posed to the serious business of life, and corresponds exactly to the French passe-temps; (on διαγωγή, which may include even literary pursuits, or studies, anything in fact that is not business, compare σχολή, and is so in some sense opposed to παιδία, which is therefore inserted here to qualify it, see Bonitz ad Metaph. A 1,981 b 18). 1128 a 10, οἱ δ’ ἐμελῶς παιζόντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οὗτος εὐτραπελία (from their versatility). The two terms are exactly represented by Cicero's facetus and facetiae. Wit, sales, takes two forms, dicacitas and facetiae; the first, raillery, pungent and personal, σκόμμα, σκώπτεις; the second, easy and agreeable, giving grace and liveliness to conversation or writing. Utetur utroque; sed altero in narrando alicuid venuste, altero in iaciendo mittendoque ridi-
culo, et seq., Orat. xxvi 87. Compare de Orat. II 54. 219, where the dis-
tinction is somewhat different, or at all events expressed by different terms. de Off. I 30. 104, genus locandi elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum, facetum, et passim. Cowper's John Gilpin furnishes a good specimen of εὐτραπελία: Now Gilpin had a pleasant wit, and loved a timely joke.

'Such then is the character of the young'.

CHAP. XIII.

The character of age we have already seen, and shall further find, to be in almost all points the exact opposite of that of youth. Victorius thinks that the desire of bringing out this contrast was Aristotle's reason for departing from the natural order in his treatment of the three ages. The authors quoted at the commencement of the last chapter will again serve for illustrations of the topics of the present. [Aristotle, as well as Horace, confines himself almost exclusively to the delineation of the unfavourable side of the character of old age, suppressing its redeeming features.] Horace represents his opinion at the opening of his sketch (A. P. line 169), Multa senem circumveniunt incommoda which he pro-
cceeds to describe.

§ 1. 'Elderly men, and those who have passed their prime, have most of their characters (formed) of the elements opposite to these; for from their long experience of life, its frequent errors and failures
And if supply is ever hereafter to be given, the one who writes it shall shew that a7ri(TT6iv Kai KaxvnoTOTros may is, that it, and for the reason that the young are prone to suspicion by reason of their incredulity, and incredulous from their experience. Καχυποτος is otherwise written καχυπώτος in Plut. Phaedr. 240 E (Zurich Editors, and Thompson ad loc.), though in Rep. 111 409 C, it appears as Aristotle writes it, and according to the Zurich Editors without varia lectio. ἐποτεύειν and -είσθαι occur in Herod., Thucyd., Aristoph. and Lysias.

§ 4. 'And for the same reason neither their love nor their hatred is ever deep, but according to the precept of Bias, their love is such as may hereafter become hatred, and their hatred love'. This famous and often
φιλούσι σφόδρα οὖτε μισούσι διὰ ταύτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν Βιαντος ύποθήκην καὶ φιλούσιν ὡς μισήσοντες καὶ 5 μισούσιν ὡς φιλήσοντες. καὶ μικρόγυχοι διὰ τὸ quoted saying of Bias of Priene, the last of the seven sages (585—540 B.C.) —on whom see Diog. Laert. I 5, 82 seq. and Mure, Gk. Lit. III 393,—is again referred to, without the author’s name, II 21. 13. I will give two or three of the most important references. Soph. Aj. 678 (Lobeck’s Ed.), a well-known passage of six lines, concluding with the reason or explanation of the precept, τοῖς πολλοῖσι γὰρ βροτῶν ἀπιστός εὖθ’ εταιρείας λιμὴν. Comp. Lobeck ad loc., and to the same effect Oed. Col. 614, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἰδίᾳ, τοῖς δ’ ἐν υστέρῳ χρόνῳ, τὰ τερτιὰ πικρὰ γέγενται καθὶς φίλῳ. Diogenes, u. s., § 87 (in the same chapter several more of his apophthegms are quoted), ἔλεγε τὸν βιῶν οὐτὸ μετεῖν ὡς καὶ πολὺν καὶ ὁλγον χρόνον βιωσόμενον, καὶ φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσονται τοὺς γὰρ πλείστους εἰς κακοὺς, and again § 88, ἀπεβεβέγαστο οἱ πλεῖστοι κακοί, which gives his reason for the rule. A similar sentiment is found in Eurip. Hippol. 253, χρὴν γὰρ μετρῶς εἰς ἄλληλως φιλίας θυσίαν ἀνακρίνασθαι κ.τ.λ. Cic. de Amic. XVI. 59, Négbat (Scipio) ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiae potuisse referiri, quam eius, qui dicisset ita amare oportere ut si aliquando esset osurus: nec vero se adduci posse ut hoc, quernadmodum putaretur, a Biante esse dictum crederet, qui sapient habitus est unus e septem, sed impuri cuinisdam aut ambitiosi, aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis, esse sententiam. Publius Syrus apud Gell. Noct. Att. XVII 14 (ap. Schneidewin ad loc. Aj.), Ita amicum habeas, posse ut fieri hume inimicum putas. Bacon de Augm. Scient. VIII c. 2, Works, Ellis and Sped. ed., Vol. I. p. 788, “Septimum praeceptum est antiquum illud Biantis; modo non ad perfidiam, sed ad cautionem et moderationem, adhibeat: et ames tanquam inimicis futurus, et oderis tanquam amatorus. Nam utilitates quasque mirum in modum prodit et corrumpit si quis nimium se immerserit amicitias infelixibus, molestis et turbidis odiis, aut puerilibus et futilibus aemulationibus.” Comp. Adv. of Learning, II xxiii. 42. La Bruyère, Caract. c. 4 (in Ellis’ note), “Vivre avec nos ennemis comme s’ils devoient un jour être nos amis, et vivre avec nos amis comme s’ils pouvoient devenir nos ennemis, n’est ni selon la nature de la haine, ni selon les règles de l’amitié: ce n’est point une maxime morale mais politique. On ne doit pas se faire des ennemis de ceux qui mieux connus pourroient avoir rang entre nos amis. On doit faire choix d’amis si surs et d’une si exacte probité que venant à cesser de l’être ils ne veuillent pas abuser de notre confiance, ni se faire craindre comme nos ennemis,” (on which Mr Speeding has another commentary, too long to quote). Finally, Demosthenes, c. Aristocr. § 122, p. 600 (quoted by Gaisford), expresses his approbation of the maxim as a rule of action. He refers to it as a current precept, without naming the author, and sums up in conclusion, ἀλλ’ ἀχρ’ τούτων καὶ φιλεῖν, οἶμαι, χρὴ καὶ μοιεῖν, μηδετέρου τὸν καίρον ὑπερβαλλοντας; that is, neither friendship nor enmity should be carried too far, and so interpreted, as to exclude the possibility of a subsequent change of feeling.

§ 5. ‘And they are little-minded, because their spirit has been humbled by life (the experience which they have had of life and its
ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Β 13 §§ 5—7. 153

tetapeinōσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου· οὐδὲνος γὰρ μεγάλου
οὐδὲ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.

6 καὶ ἀνελεύθεροι· ἐν γὰρ τι τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἢ οὕσια,
.sendKeys(168,653,51,668) ἄμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἱσασιν ὥς χαλεπὸν τὸ
7 κτήσασθαι καὶ ῥάδιον τὸ ἀποβάλειν. καὶ δεῖλοι καὶ

πάντα προφοβητικοὶ· ἕναντίως γὰρ διάκεινται τοῖς
delusions and disappointments has taught them how little they can
do, and thereby lowered their aims and aspirations, and deprived them
of all spirit of enterprise and high endeavour); for they (now) desire
nothing great or extraordinary (standing out from and above all others
of the same class, περιττοῖ, singular, striking, extra-ordinary, above the
common herd, and the ordinary level; note on 1 6.8), but only what
tends to (the uses, or the ease and comfort of) their life. This again
is in direct opposition to the character of youth, c. 12. 11.

§ 6. ‘And (for similar reasons) illiberal’ (in money matters; mean,
parsimonious: this is because they have known want; whereas their
opposites, the young, who have never known it, are inclined to liberality,
ἤκιστα φιλοχρηματο, c. 12 § 6); ‘for property is one of the necessaries
of life; and at the same time they know by (their) experience how hard
it is to get, and how easy to lose’. ὅς, of course, may also be ‘that’;
and the literal translation is ‘that gain or acquisition is hard, and loss
easy’. Hor. A. P. 170, Quaerit et inventis miser abstinent et timet uti.
Comp. Eth. Nic. IV 3, 1121 b 13, δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πάσα ἀδναμία
ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν. Pericles (in the funeral oration, Thu. II 44, ult.)
disputes this, though he allows that it is a prevailing opinion; όσοι
δὲ αὐτοῖς παραβηκάται...καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀρχεῖ τῷ ἡλικίας τὸ κερδαίνειν, ὡσπερ
tινὲς φασὶ, μᾶλλον τέρψει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι. Byron, on the other hand
accepts the Aristotelian view. So for a good old-gentlemanly vice
I think I’ll e’en take up with avarice (Don Juan).

§ 7. ‘And cowardly, and in everything (always) inclined to dread,
in anticipation of coming danger (or, always inclined to anticipate
danger and evil), their disposition being the reverse of that of the young:
for they are cooled down (chilled by age), the others hot’. Hor. A. P.
171, res omnes timide gelideque ministrat, the gelide being manifestly
taken from Aristotle. On ἀνελεύθεροι, Gaisford cites Bacon on this topic.
The passage which he refers to in the Engl. Vers. occurs in de Augm.
Plautum miraculi loco habere, quod senex quis sit beneficus; Benignitas
huius ut adolescentuli est” (Mil. Glor. III 1. 40). Bacon has misquoted:
the line runs, Nam benignitas quidem huius oppido adolescentulist
(Ritschl). Bentley on Hor. A. P. 172 has made use of this characteristic,
προφοβητικοί, in support of his emendation παβίδο ἀνδρεάστικου.
Orelli observes on this that it contradicts ἱπὸ longus which occurs just before.
But the two are not absolutely contradictory; a man may look far forward
in his hope of a long life, and yet be fearful and anxious about what that
future may bring. This physical theory of heating and cooling as
applied to human character and passions is illustrated by Probl. XXX1.22, οὕτως φοβερόν τι ὅταν εἰσαγγελθῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ψυχροτέρας οὐσις τῆς κράτεως τύχης, δεδολοί οἰεί προωδοποιήκη γὰρ τῷ φόβῳ, καὶ ὁ φόβος καταψύχει. δηλοῦσα δὲ οἱ περίφοβοι τρέμουσι γὰρ. See the same, §§ 29, 30. Διὸ καὶ οἱ μὲν παίδες εὐθυμότεροι, οἱ δὲ γέρωντες δυναμότεροι. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ θερμοί, οἱ δὲ ψυχροί τὸ γὰρ γῆρας καταψύχει τις. § 32, ἥθοποιον τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν μάλιστα τῶν ἐν ἥμιν ἐστίν. Victorius refers to de Part. Anim. II 4, 650 ὁ γὰρ φόβος καταψύχει προωδοποιήται οὐν τῷ πάθει τὰ τουαύτην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ κράσιν (of the blood). On this physical or physiological account of the πάθη, and their connexion with the condition of the blood and muscles, and their different degrees of heat and cold, see further in the remainder of the same chapter. θερμωτήτος γὰρ ποιτικῶν ὁ θυμός (passion produces heat as well as heat passion), τὰ δὲ στερεὰ θερμανθέντα μάλλον θερμαίνει τῶν ὕσην οἱ δὲ ἱένε (the muscles) στερεῶν καὶ γεώδεις, ωστε γίνονται οἶον πυρία (vapour-baths) ἐν τῷ αἰματι καὶ ζησιν ποιοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς θυμοίς. 1b. 650 ὁ 35, πολλῶν δὲ ἐστίν αὐτία ἡ τοῦ αἵματος φύσις καὶ κατὰ τὸ θῆσος τοῖς ξοῖοι καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν, κ.π.λ. 651 a 12.

'And therefore old age prepares the way for cowardice (on προωδοποιεῖν, see note on 1 1.2); in fact fear is a kind of cooling down'. Comp. Horace's gelidé, A. P. 171, already quoted. "Virg. Aen. 1 69, exemplum Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra. Servius, frigore, i.e. timore, et est reciproca translatio, nam et timor pro frigore, et frigus pro timore ponitur." Schrader.

§ 8. 'And fond of life, and more than ever in their last days' (not, 'their very latest day'). Victorius ad c. 12. 8, τῇ πρώτῃ ἐμέρᾳ. So also Bentley, in note on A. P. 172, translates, 'sub superno vitae die', 'because all desire is of the absent, and therefore what they (most) want (are deficient in), that they most desire'. Orelli, on Hor. A. P. 170—178, compares φιλόξωι with avidus futuri, which he retains; (also Bentley, on verse 172). He also quotes Soph. Fragm. 64 (Dind.), τοῦ ξυν γὰρ οὔδεις ὥς ὁ γηράσκων ἐφι.

§ 9. 'And they exceed the due measure in self-love, this again (as well as illiberality and cowardice) being a kind of little-mindedness' (which is characteristic of them, supra § 5). The connexion of μικροψυχία and φιλωται [a word used in late Greek only] seems to be this: Little-mindedness (Eth. N. iv 9, init.) is the undervaluing of oneself, and one's own advantages. This narrows and cramps the mind, which is consequently incapable of lofty aims and aspirations. A form of this is selfishness, or self-love, which is thus described, Eth. N ix 8.
The text is too fragmented to provide a coherent translation or interpretation.
happen are bad (full of defects)—at all events the results are mostly disapp"o Inting (things mostly turn out for the worse)—and besides this, owing to their cowardice.\footnote{His. c. Timarch. § 21, \textit{οὐχ ἢ γνώριμον ὁ ποιμὴν ἢ ὁ πρεσβύτερος τῷ μὲν ἐθνὸν ἄκραζοντι, ἢ δὲ τόλμα ἤδη αὐτοῦ ἀρέχα τε ἐπλείπειν διὰ τὴν ἐμπείρια τῶν πραγμάτων.}

§ 12. \textit{And they live by (their) memory rather than by hope} (comp. c. 12. 8, and the note there, ζόων ἐπιθετικί), \textit{for what remains to them of their life is short, but that which is past long; and hope is of the future, but memory of the past. Which is also the reason of their garrulity (habit of chattering or prattling)}; for they are continually talking about what has happened, their delight being in recollection.\footnote{The aged Cephalus says of himself, Plat. Rep. I 328 D, \textit{εὐ ἤδη ἢ τὸ ἑαυτῷ ἑωράγων ἢ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχετα ἐπελείπειν διὰ τὴν ἐμπείρια τῶν πραγμάτων.}} The aged Cephalus says of himself, Plat. Rep. I 328 D, \textit{εὐ ἤδη ἢ τὸ ἑαυτῷ ἑωράγων ἢ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχετα ἐπελείπειν διὰ τὴν ἐμπείρια τῶν πραγμάτων.}

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§ 13. \textit{And their fits of passion (θυμός, as before, the passionate, angry impulses; one of the three ὀρέξεως, with ἐπιθυμία and μολύμεοι) are sharp, but feeble, (neither strong nor lasting,) and of their appetites, some have failed altogether, others become enfeebled, so that they are not prone either to the feeling of desire or to act under its impulses, but only according to the dictates of self-interest. Accordingly men at this time of life are thought to have the disposition to temperance, or self-control, besides (sc. the preceding); not only because their appetites are relaxed (slackened, ἀνίεσθαι contrasted with ἐπιεῖσθαι, met. from stringing the lyre, note on I 4. 12), \textit{but also because they are slaves to their own interest.}} \textit{σοφροσύνη} being the \textit{acquired} and \textit{fixed habit}, or \textit{virtue}, of self-control, \textit{σῶφρον} the possessor of the virtue, and \textit{σωφρονικοῖ} those who are inclined or have a tendency to it; those men, whose desires and passions are so feeble as to require no control, gain credit in the eyes of the world for the disposition to (termination -κός) the virtue itself.

\footnote{Eth. N. III 13, 1117 Δ 35, \textit{τοὺς περὶ τῶν τυχόντων καταργῶντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολεσχίας...καλοῦμεν.}}
RHEORIKHΣ B 13 §§ 13—16. 157

κατὰ τὸ κέρδος. διὸ καὶ σωφρονικοὶ φαίνονται οἱ ἐπὶ τὴν λικοῦτοι· αἱ τῇ γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνέικασι, καὶ δουλεύουσι τῷ κέρδει. καὶ μᾶλλον ξῦσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἴθος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λογισμός τοῦ συμφέροντος τὸ ὑδός τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστὶν. καὶ ταδικήματα ἀδικώς σὺν εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὑβρίν. ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ γέροντες εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ οὐ διὰ ταῦτα τοῖς νέοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ διὰ ἀσθένειαν· πάντα γὰρ οὐνται ἐγγὺς εἰναι αὐτοῖς παθεῖν, τούτο δὲ ἣν ἐλεητικὸν. οὗτοι ὀδυρτικοί εἰσί, καὶ οὐκ εὐτράπελοι οὐδὲ φιλογέλουν· ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ ὀδυρτικὸν τῶν φιλογέλωτι.

16 τῶν μὲν οὖν νέων καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τὰ ἴθη τοιαύτα· ὡστε ἀποδέχονται πάντες τούς τὸ σωφρονικόν recurs in Eth. N. VI 13, 1144 b 5, and is found in Xenophon and Plato, and the adverb in Aristophanes.

§ 14. 'And their course of life is directed rather by calculation than character: for calculation is directed to one's own interest, whereas character is indicative of virtue'. The opposite of this, c. 12. 12.

ἴθος] is 'the impulse of character', as before. Virtuous 'dispositions' or 'characters' are natural to us, Eth. N. VI 13, u. s. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐκατά τῶν ἴθῶν ύπάρχειν φύσει ποι· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἄνδρειοι καὶ τάλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς. These however are not virtues—Eth. N. II 1, sub init., οὐδεμιᾶ τῶν ἴθους ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται—but dispositions or tendencies to virtue, δυνάμεις, which may be developed into ἔξεις, of which σωφρονικός (having a tendency to σωφροσύνη) is an individual instance.

'And the offences which they commit incline rather to petty knavery and mischief than to insolence and wanton outrage'. See c. 12. 15, and the passages there referred to.

§ 15. 'Old men also (as well as young, c. 12. 15) are inclined to compassion, but not for the same reason as the young; in the one it is from humanity, in the other from weakness; for all calamities that happen to others seem to be near at hand, impending over, themselves (near at hand to themselves to suffer, ὡστε αὐτοῖς παθεῖν αὐτά), and this is what was said (Ὑν, viz. c. 8 § 1) to incline men to pity. And hence it is that they are querulous (dificilis, querulus, Hor. A. P. 173) and not given to pleasantry nor fond of mirth; for a querulous disposition (habit of complaining, bemoaning oneself) is opposite to love of mirth'.

§ 16. 'Such are the characters of the youthful and elderly; accordingly, since language conformable to their own character, as well as persons similar to themselves, are acceptable to every one, it is plain
enough how we are to use our words in order that we and our speeches may assume such and such a character. The study of the tempers, and manners and habits and modes of thought of these two ages and the rest, will enable us without difficulty to assume the tone and language which are in conformity with the taste of any particular kind of audience which we have to persuade: everybody likes to be addressed in his own style, to hear the sentiments and language which are habitual to himself.

**CHAP. XIV.**

§ 1. 'The character of men in the prime of life will plainly lie between the other two, by subtraction of the excess of each, (so that) they are neither excessively confident—for that kind of disposition is rashness—nor overmuch given to fear, but in a right state of mind as to both, neither implicitly trusting nor altogether distrusting everyone indiscriminately, but rather with a due distinction according to the real facts of the case'.

άφαιρεῖν, properly opposed to προστίθεναι, as in a numerical calculation to add and subtract. Hence withdraw, remove, et sim. For example, Plat. Cratyl. 431 C, προστίθεις ἡ ἀφαιρῶν γράμματα. Ib. 432 A. Phaedo 95 E, bis, et alibi. Xen. de Rep. Ath. III 8 and 9, κατὰ μικρὸν τι προσθέντα ἡ ἀφελοῦντα, 'by slight and gradual addition or subtraction' (said of the changes of political constitutions).
... 2, θαρροῦντες and θρασύτης here preserve their proper distinction, θάρσος, true courage, θράσος, reckless audacity or impudence, though these senses are often interchanged. The verb θαρσέων or θαρρεί, as Plato, Aristotle, and the later Greeks write it, has never the unfavourable sense.

§ 2. 'And the conduct of their life will be directed neither to honour alone, nor to self-interest, but to both'. Compare 12.12; 13.9. 'And neither to parsimony nor to profligate extravagance, but to what is fit and proper', i.e. the mean, ἔλευθεριότης; Eth. N. II 7, 1107 b 10, IV i, 1120 a 1, seq.

§ 3. 'And similarly in respect of passion and appetite. And they will be temperate (sober-minded, under self-control) with courage, and courageous with self-control: for in the young and old these two are separated (or distinguished), the young being brave and licentious (devoid of self-control), and the elders sober and temperate but cowardly'. 'Self-control is the form in which the virtue appears especially in Plato's Gorgias and Republic, where it is described as a regulating principle which guides the whole man, ordering and harmonising his entire moral constitution.

'And, speaking in general terms, all the advantages (good qualities, elements of good character) that youth and old age have divided between them (= ἔξει διηρμηνέα), both of these the others enjoy; and whereinsoever (the two first) are excessive or defective, in these (they observe, subaudī oί ἀκμάζωντες ἔχουσιν) a due moderation (or mean) and a fitness or propriety of conduct'.

ὅσα διήρηται ἡ νεότης καὶ τὸ γῆρας] I think διαιρείσθαι must be here middle, said of those who divide amongst themselves, have shares in any joint work or possession. Thuc. VII 19, διελόμενοι τὸ έργον. An objection might be taken to this, that διήρητοι is singular and not plural, and
λουσιν ἢ ἐλλείπονσιν, τούτων τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἄρ-4 μόττον. ἀκμάζει δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἐτῶν μέχρι τῶν πεντεκαιτριάκοντα, ἢ δὲ ὄντῳ περὶ τὰ ἐνὸς δεῖν πεντήκοντα.

that no one can share a thing with himself. But although the verb is singular in form, being connected grammatically with υἱός alone, which stands next to it; yet it is evident that γῆς is meant to be included in the distribution as well as the other. It is accordingly equivalent to διηγομένων ἡχον. I think it cannot be passive; the analogy of πιστεύοντες τοι to be trusted with something' ἐπιστράφθαι τι, and the like, cannot be applied to this case.

τὸ μέτριον] is Plato's summiun bonum, the highest in the scale of goods, in the Philebus; also the Horatian auræa mediocritas: it may also stand for the Aristotelian μέσον, which at all events is the sense in which it is employed here.

τὸ ἄρμοστον] that which fits, the fitting; derived by metaphor from the carpenter’s, joiner’s and builder’s trades; is nearly equivalent to τὸ πρόσωπον, and like it refers us to the fitness of things, as a standard of good, to a harmonious organisation or order of the universe, a system physical or moral which has all its parts dove-tailed, as it were, together, arranged in due order and subordination, carefully and exactly fitted together; Cicero’s αἷτα compositio (membrorum, of the human figure [de officiis I 28.98]).

§ 4. ‘The body is in its prime from 30 to 35 (years of age), the soul (i.e. the intellectual and moral faculties) about nine and forty’ (50 minus one: δεῖν is δεῖον, wanting so much).

Two of the numbers here mentioned are multiples of seven. The stages of life are determined by a septenary theory, the earliest record of which is an elegiac fragment of doubtful genuineness (Porson), attributed to Solon (ap. Clemen. Alexandr. Strom., Bergk, Lyr. Gr. p. 332 [346, ed. 2], Sol. Fragg. 25), in which the seventy years allotted to human life, and its successive stages of growth, development and decay, are divided into ten periods of seven years each. The dates here given by Aristotle for the prime of body and mind, agree tolerably well with the verses of the fragment. τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ πᾶσς τίς ἐν ἔβδομάδι μέγ' ἀρίστος ἑξαχτὸν ἦν τ' ἄνδρες σήματι' ἤχουν' ἀρετῆς. The fifth septenary is the marriageable age. In the seventh the intellect and powers of speech have reached their prime. ἐπὶ τὰ δὲ (49) νοῦν καὶ γλῶσσαν ἐν ἔβδομάσιν μέγ' ἀρίστος κ.π.λ.

The same theory, whether derived from Solon or not, which seems to have been generally current, reappears in Polit. IV (vii) 16, 1335 b 32, κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοιαῖς ἀκμήν' αυτὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς πλεῖστοις ἦσσε τῶν ποιητῶν τινές εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦσιν ταῖς ἐβδομάσι τὴν ἥλικιαν, περὶ τῶν χρόνων τῶν τῶν πεντήκοντά ἐτῶν (i.e. 7 × 7 = 49); and again Polit. ib. c. 17, 1336 b 37, δύο δὲ εἰσὶν ἥλικια πρὸς ύς ἀναγκαῖον δημηρθήσατο τὴν παιδείαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ μεχρὶ ἡβης καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν ἀδ' ἡβης μεχρὶ τῶν ἐνὸς καὶ εἰκοσιπετῶν. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἐβδομάσις διαρδοῦσιν ταῖς ἥλικιας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγονται οἱ
Пери μὲν οὖν νεότητος καὶ γήρωσ καὶ ἀκμῆς, ποίων ἡθῶν ἔκαστόν ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω τοσάυτα: περὶ δὲ τῶν αὕτων καὶ τα ἀπὸ τύχης γεγομένων ἀγαθῶν, δὲ ὁσα αὐτῶν καὶ τα καλῶς (leg. κακῶς, Spengel), δεῖ δὲ τῇ διαφέρει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν. Nevertheless the theory is departed from in assigning the proper age of marriage in the two sexes; ib. c. 16, 1335 a 28, the woman is to marry at 18, the man at 37 'or thereabouts'; neither of them divisible by seven; ἐν τοσάυτα γὰρ ἀκμάζουσι τε τοῖς σώματι σύνθεσις ἐσται κ.π.λ. And in line 35, the term of human life is again fixed at 70 years. So the Psalmist [xc. 10], “The days of our years are threescore years and ten.”

And to the same theory (the number seven, marking a crisis, or stage of growth, in the life of an animal,) reference is frequently made, in the Hist. Anim., as vii 1.2, 16, 18, c. 12.2, and elsewhere: from all which it may be concluded that Aristotle was a believer in it. Plato, Rep. v 460 E, fixes the prime of life in a woman at the age of 20, in a man at 30: in Legg. iv 721 A, and in three other places, the age of marriage is fixed from 30 to 35, though in one of them (vi 772 E) 25 is also named. Compare on this subject Hes. Opp. et d. 695 seq. Xenoph. de Rep. Lac. 16, (Stallbaum’s note on Plato l. c.).

But the theory of the virtues of the number seven was carried to a far greater extent, as may be seen in 1-6 of Macrobius' Commentary on Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis, of which the sum is given in a quotation from the Somnium Scipionis:—Cicero de septenario dicit, Qui numeros rerum omnium fere nodus est. Everything in nature is determined by the number seven. Near the end of the chapter, we are told, in conformity with Aristotle’s statement, Notandum vero quod, cum numerus se multiplicat (at the age of 49, 7 x 7), facit aetatem quae proprie perfecta et habetur et dicitur: adeo ut illius aetatis homo, utpote qui perfectionem et attigerit tam, et neculum praeterierit, et consilio aptus sit, nec ab exercicio virium alienus habitetur. This is the prime of mind and body together. Quinta (hebdomas) omne virium (strength and powers of body alone), quanta esse unicoique, possunt, complect augmentum. All this came no doubt originally from the Pythagoreans; as may be inferred from Arist. Met. N 6, 1093 a 13, where this number seven, is said to be assigned by them as the cause of everything that happened to have this number of members; seven vowels, seven chords or harmonics, seven Pleiads; animals shed their teeth in seven years—yes, says Ar., some do, but some don’t—and seven champions against Thebes. And from this and similar considerations they inferred some mysterious virtue in the number; and identified it with νοῦς and καρόξ. (Ritter and Preller, Hist. Phil. c. 2, Pythag. § 102, note a.)

‘So for youth and age and prime of life, the kind of characters, that is to say, that belong to each, let thus much suffice’ (to have been said).

CHAP. XV.

A γνώμη of Phocylides may serve as a motto of this chapter. καὶ τόδε Φοκυλίδεω τί πλέον γένος εὐγενεῖς εἶναι οἶς αὐτῷ ἐν μέθοις ἑπτα χάρις,
§ 1. 'Of the goods arising from fortune, as many of them, that is, as have an influence upon men's characters, let us proceed to speak next in order'.

§ 2. 'One characteristic of noble birth is that the ambition of the possessor of it is thereby increased. For everyone that has anything to start with, or to build upon', (as a nucleus, focus, or centre of attraction: ὑπάρχειν, to underlie, to be there already, prop. as a basis or foundation for a superstructure,) 'is accustomed to make this the nucleus of his acquisitions or accumulations, and high or noble birth implies or denotes ancestral distinction'. σωφρείειν πρὸς τι, lit. to bring to this, in order to heap round it, any subsequent accumulations. The meaning is, that any new acquisitions of honour or property that a man makes, will generally take the form of an addition to some stock which he already has, whenever he has one ready for the purpose, ὅταν τι ὑπάρχῃ.

'This condition of life is inclined to look down upon even those who resemble, are on a level with, (in condition, wealth, rank, distinction, and so forth,) their own ancestors, because their distinctions, in proportion to the degree of their remoteness, are more distinguished (than those of contemporaries) and are easier to brag of' (more readily admit of boastful exaggeration). Distance lends enchantment to the view. Honours and distinctions shine with a brighter lustre in the remote ages of antiquity, and confer more dignity upon those who by right of inheritance can claim a share in them, than those of the same kind, and equal in all other respects, when acquired by contemporaries—familiarity breeds in some degree contempt for them—just as ἀρχαῖοις ὄντες is a higher claim to consideration than νεωπλουτεῖν, II 9, 9, q. v. Antiquity of possession carries with it a prescriptive right.

καταφροντικὸν] agrees with τὸ εὐγενὲς, the abstract for the concrete, und. from the preceding εὐγένεια. An abstract term is often particularised, or expressed by the component members in detail, as in construction of antecedent and relative, such as Polit. 1 2, 1252 b's, κοινωνία...ἀὐτὸς Χαρένθας καλεῖ... This construction is an instance of that wide-spread and multiform grammatical 'figure', the σχήμα πρὸς τὸ σημανώμενον, which, in a great variety of different ways, departs from the usual construction of words and adapts it 'to the thing signified'; as, in the case above given, the abstract virtually includes all the component members of the society who are expressed in the plural relative.
3 ἐντιμότερα καὶ εὐαλαξόνευτα. έστι δὲ εὐγενεῦς μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀρέτην, γενναῖον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως. ο’ περ ὅσ’ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ
eualaxoneuta] On ἀλαξωνεία and ἀλαξὼν, see note on 1 2.7. Of the
two significations of the word, that of ‘bragging’ is here uppermost.
§ 3. ‘The term εὐγενεύς (well-born, come of a good stock, of noble
race, or descent) is applied to mark distinction (excellence) of race;
γενναῖος (of noble character) to the maintenance of the normal type of
character’ (keeping up to, not degenerating from, the true family
standard). The difference between εὐγενεύς and γενναῖος lies in this;
that in the former the race or descent, γένος, is directly expressed as the
prominent and leading idea; it indicates that the εὐγενεύς comes of a
good breed, but says nothing of the individual character; in the latter
it is the character, conformable to the excellence of the breed or race,
that is put prominently forward. The account here given of εὐγενεύς
is illustrated by the definition of it in 1 5.5; it denotes in fact the ex-
cellences and distinctions of one’s ancestors, as distinguished from one’s
own. See the passages there collected. In Hist. Anim. I 1, 483 b 18,
these two words are defined and distinguished almost in the same terms;
eὐγενεύς μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξ ἄγαθοῦ γένους, γενναῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐξιστάμενον
ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως. Ar. is here characterising the dispositions of
animals. Some are ἔλευθερα καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ εὐγενῇ ὄνον λέον, τὰ δὲ γενναῖα
καὶ ἀρμα καὶ ἐπίθυμα, ὄνον λύκος, from which it appears that γενναῖος
is strictly and properly only the maintenance of a certain type of cha-
racter, which need not necessarily be a good one; though in ordinary
usage it is invariably applied to denote good qualities. On εὐγενεύς,
see Herm. Pol. Ant. § 57.
ἐξίστασθαι1 ‘to quit a previous state’; of a change in general, especially
a change for the worse, degeneration. Plat. Rep. II 480 A, τῆς ἐιστὸῦ
ἴδεας ἐκβαίνειν…εἰπέρ τι ἐξίσταστο τῆς αὐτοῦ ἴδεας’ of God, changing his
own proper form, and descending to a lower. Eth. Nic. VII 7, 1150 a 1,
ἀλλ’ ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὡσπερ οἱ μαՀᾶμοντι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Pol. VIII (V)
6, sub fin., οἱ δημοκρατίαι καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξίστανται ενίσχετον εὐχ εἰς τὰς ἐναντίας
πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. Ib. c. 9, 1309 b 32, ὀλιγαρχίαι καὶ δημοκρατίαι…ἐξεστη-
κόναι τῆς βελτίστης τάξεως.
On φύσις as the τέλος, the true nature, the normal or perfect state
of anything, see Pol. I 2, 1252 b 32, ὑ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστιν’ οἰ̃ων γὰρ ἐκατότων
ἐστὶ τῆς γενείας τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαρμέν τῆν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκατοῦ, ὡσπερ
ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, ὀκιὰς. Grant, on Eth. Nic. II 1. 3, distinguishes five
different senses of φύσις in Aristotle, of which this is the last.

1 ‘Which (the maintenance of the ancestral character) for the most part
is not the lot of the well-born, but most of them (the members or descendants
of an illustrious family) are good-for-nothing’1 (εὐτέλης υἱὸς, cheap. Fortes
non semper creantu frortibus); ‘for there is a kind of crop in the families
of men (φόρος here implies an alternation of φορά and ἄφορα, of good
and bad crops) just as there is in the produce of the soil (lit. the things

1 παῦροι γὰρ τοι παῖδες ὁμοίοι πατρί πελλοντα οι πλούνες κακοις, παῦροι δὲ τε
ou συμβαίνει τοῖς ευγενεσίς, ἂλλ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εὐτελεῖς. φορὰ γὰρ τὸς έστιν εν τοῖς γένεσιν ἀνδρῶν ἄσπερ εν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς χώρας γιγνομένους, καὶ εὑντε ἀν ἢ ἀγαθὸν τὸ γένος, εγγίνονται διὰ τινος χρόνου that grow in the country places); for a certain time (διὰ with gen., along the course or channel of, during,) remarkable men (distinguished above their fellows, standing out from among them, περὶ,) grow up in them, and then (after an interval of unproductiveness) they begin again to produce them. There are two ways of understanding ἀναδίδωσιν; either it is active, 'to send up, produce', as the earth yields her fruits, and this is the natural interpretation, and supported by the use of the word in other writers: or, as Rost and Palm in their Lex., zurückgehen, 'to go back', relapse into a state of barrenness, on the analogy of ἀναχωρήσεως and sim. ['deficit'. Index Aristotelicus]. In this case διδόναι is neut. (by the suppression of the reflexive pronoun) as indeed both itself and its compounds frequently are—and may be either 'to give (itself) back, to give way', or perhaps rather, like ἀνειόν, ἀνείότατα, to relax or slacken in production (ἀνεί, Soph. Phil. 764). Victorius gives both renderings; I have adopted his second version ['posteaque rursus, intervallo aliquo temporis edit ac gignit industrius item atque insignes viros'], which seems to me the more natural interpretation of ἀναδίδωσιν.


With the whole passage compare Pind. Nem. xi 48, ἀρχαῖα δ' ἀρεταὶ ἀμφέροντι ἀλλασσόμεναι γενεάς ἀνδρῶν σθένος, εν σχῖρα δ' οὗτ' ὄν μελανι παρτόν ἑδοκαν ἄρουρα' δινέερα τ' οὖτ' ἐδεικνύει πάσαις ἑτέρων περ' ὀδοῖς [al. περάδοις] ἄνθος εὑνόεις φέρεις, πλούτω ὕσον, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀμείβοντι. καὶ χρώμάτων οὕτω σθένος ἀγεί Μοῦρα. Ib. vi 14 (Gaisford).

'When clever families degenerate, their characters acquire a tendency to madness, as for instance the descendants of Alcibiades and Dionysius the elder (tyrant of Syracuse), whereas those of a steady (staid, stable) character degenerate into sluggishness or dulness' (of which the stubborn ass is the type; ὃς δ' οὕτος...ἐβίβασατο παῖδας νοθής, δ' ὃς πολλὰ περὶ μόσαιν ἀμφίς εἶναι [xi. xi 559]), as in the case of those of Conon and Pericles and Socrates'. We learn from Plato, Men. 95 B—94 E, that the son of Themistocles, Cleophonatus; of Aristides, Lysimachus; the sons of Pericles, Paralus and Xanthippus; of Thucydides (the statesman and general, the opponent of Pericles and his policy), Melesias and Stephanus; all de-
generated from their fathers; and in spite of the advantages of their education turned out nevertheless either quite ordinary men, or altogether bad.

The alliance of quickness of wit or cleverness and madness is marked again in Poet. XVII 4, 1455 a 32, εὐφρῶν ὁ ποιητικὸς ἔστιν ἡ μανικοῦ (the poet's 'fine frenzy'). Probl. XXX i 18, ὥσοι μὲν πολλῆ καὶ ψυχρὰ ἐνυπάρχει (ὧν κράσις τῆς μελανίης χολῆς) νωθροὶ καὶ μωροὶ, ὥσοι δὲ λιαν πολλῆ καὶ θερμῇ μανικοῦ καὶ εὐφρετεῖ κ.τ.λ. Great wits are sure to madness near allied, and thin partitions do their bounds divide. Dryden [Absalom and Achitophel, i 163].

οὐσίαν) settled, steady characters, is illustrated by Thuc. II 36, ἐν τῇ καθεστηκτικῇ ἡλικίᾳ ('mature and vigorous age'), Soph. Aj. 306, ἐμφρον μᾶλν πῶς εἶναι χρόνῳ καθίσταται ('settles down again into his senses'). Aesch. Pers. 300, λέειν καταστάσας ('first compose thyself, and then speak'). Blomfield, Gloss. ad loc., refers to Ar. Ran. 1044, πνεύμα καθεστηκτικός, and Eurip. Orest. 1310, πάλιν κατάστησθ' ἡσύχη μὲν ὅμματι. Theophr. ap. Plut. Symp. i 5, p. 623 B, μάλιστα δὲ ὁ ἐνθουσιασμός εὔστασθαι καὶ παραρρέσει τῷ τε σῶμα καὶ τὴν φωνῆν τοῦ καθεστηκτικοῦ. Victorius points out a similar opposition of the two characters here contrasted, in Probl. III (16.1). What is here called αὐτεριά and νωθρότης is there designated by τετυφωμένους, a term of similar import. διὰ τί ὁ οἶνος καὶ τετυφωμένους ποιεῖ καὶ μανικοῦ; ἐναντία γὰρ ὑπὲρτερείας. (τετυφωμένος is explained by Harpocrates and Suidas of one who has lost his wits in the shock of a violent storm; whether by the storm itself which has confounded him, or by the accompanying thunderbolt: Hesych. s. v. μεμφώναι; and τετυφωμένος, ἀπόλυχος. ἐμπέφηρονται. ἐμβρονίσθενα. ἐπήρηθα. Hence, of one στυφίζοντας, ἐμβρονίσθης, παράπληξις, out of his wits; or of fatuity, dulness in general).

CHAP. XVI.

§ 1. The characters that accompany wealth (the characteristics of wealth) lie on the surface within the view of all (lit. for all to see; ἐπισολής ἀπασιν ὡς' αὐτός ἰδεῖν αὐτὰ' comp. i 15. 22, and note there); for they are insolent, inclined to violence and outrage, and arrogant (in their conduct and bearing), being affected in some degree (their nature altered, the alteration for the worse regarded as a kind of suffering or affection) by the acquisition of wealth. These dispositions originate in the supposition that (in having wealth) they have every kind of good, all goods in
one; for wealth is as it were a sort of standard of the value of everything else, and consequently it seems as if everything else were purchasable by it'.

§ 2. 'They are also voluptuous (dainty and effeminate, molles et delicati, Victorius), and prone to vulgar ostentation, the former by reason of their self-indulgence (the luxury in which they live) and the (constant) display of their wealth and prosperity (εὐδαιμονία, as well as ἄλλων, = πλούσιος); ostentatious and ill-bred, because they (like others) are all accustomed to spend their time and thoughts upon what they themselves love and admire (and therefore, as they think about nothing but their wealth, so they are never weary of vaunting and displaying, which makes them rude and ostentatious), and also because they suppose that everybody else admires and emulates what they do themselves'. Foolishly supposing that every one else feels the same interest in the display of wealth that they do themselves, they flaunt in their neighbours' eyes till they excite repugnance and contempt instead of admiration.

τρυφεροί denotes luxury τρυφή, and its effects, luxurious, effeminate, voluptuous habits: Eth. N. VII 8, 1150 a 1, ὁ δ’ ἐλλειπώς πρὸς ἀι τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ ανυπερβλητοῖς καὶ δύναμις, ὡς δ’ καὶ τρυφή, καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφή μαλακία τίς ἐστιν. Eth. Eudem. II 3. 8, ὁ μὲν μηδεμίαν ὑπομένων λύπην, μηδ’ εἰ βελτίων, τρυφερός.

σαλάκωνες denotes vulgar ostentation, and is very near akin to, if not absolutely identical with, βαναναία and ἀπειροκαλά; the former is the excess of μεγαλοπρέπεια, proper magnificence in expenditure: the βαναναία goes beyond this, spending extravagantly where it is not required: Eth. Nic. IV 6, 1123 a 21, seq., ἕν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν διασανημάτων πολλὰ άναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος—of which some instances are given —καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει ὁ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνα, ἄλλα τῶν πλοῦτων ἐπιδεικνυόμενοι, καὶ διὰ ταύτα οἶκειον βαμβάζονται. Ib. c. 4, 1122 a 31, ἢ δ’ ὑπερβολὴ (ἐλευθερώτητος) βαναναία καὶ ἀπειροκαλα (bad taste) καὶ ἀσαυτά τοιαῦτα,...ἐν οἷς ὧν δὲ καὶ ὃς σὺν δὲ λαμπρυνώμεναι. Comp. Eth. Eudem. III 3. 9, ἄσωστος (spendthrift) μὲν ὁ πρὸς ἀπανταν ὑπερβάλλων, ἀνελεύθερος δ’ ὁ πρὸς ἀπανταν ἐλλείπων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μικροπρεπὴς καὶ ὁ σαλάκων’ ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβαίλλει τὸ πρότερον (ὁ σαλάκων), δ’ ἐλλείπει τοῦ πρότερον. Hesych. s. v. σαλακώνωσα ἢ ἐν πενίᾳ ἀλαζωνία. σαλακωνίσα (after a different and wrong explanation, he adds) ὁ δ’ Θεόφραστος σαλακώνα φησιν εἶναι, τὸν διασανιάσα ὅπως μὴ δέ; which agrees with Aristotle. Suidas, s. v. σαλάκων' προσποιούμενοι πλούσιοι εἶναι, πένης ῥέν (as Hesych.), καὶ σαλακώναι ἀλαζωνία ὑπὲρ τὸ δεῖν, καὶ σαλακώναι ἀλαζονεύεσθαι. Ib. διασαλακωνίσα, διαθυρυφασθαί. "εἶτα πλουσίων ὡδὶ προβάς τρυφερὸς τι διασαλακωνῶσιν" (s' swagger', Arist. Vesp. 1169).

σολοίκοι] rude, ill-mannered, ill-bred'; liable to make mistakes, or commit solecisms; first, in language—σολοικίζειν, τῇ λέξῃ βαρβαρίζειν, Top. I (de

′Qui cum barbarae loquerentur, inde vocabulum hoc ad omnes vitiosos sermone utentes, et tandem ad illos quoque qui in actionibus suis in- eptiunt, est translatum′ (Schrader). Strabo XIV c. 5, Cilicia. Diog. Laert., Solon I 51, ἐκείδεν τε ἀπαλλαγεῖς (ὁ Κροῖδος) ἐγένετο ἐν Κιλικίᾳ, καὶ πόλεων συνάφισσαν ἢν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν (Solon) Σόλους ἐκάλεσεν (others represent Soli as founded by the Argives and Lindians from Rhodes. Smith’s Dict. Geogr. Vol. III 1012 b); ὄλγους τε τινάς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγκατάφηκασιν, οἱ τῷ χρόνῳ τῆς φωνῆς ἀποξενοδότησεν Ἀξιόθεναν, καὶ εἰσίν οἱ μὲν ἑκατέριν Σοληίς, οἱ δ’ ἀπὸ Κύπρου Σόλου. Schrader therefore is incorrect in saying, ‘Solis oppidum cuius incolae Solocci’; σολοίκος is derived from Σόλος, but is not the name of one of its inhabitants.

′And at the same time, these affections are natural to them, for many are they who require (the aid, the services) of the wealthy′. They have an excuse for being thus affected by their wealth; the numerous claimants upon their bounty elate them with a sense of superiority, and at the same time by their servility give them frequent opportunities of exercising at their expense their ostentation and ill manners. On οἱ ἐξωτερεῖς, the possessors of property, σιν. χρήματα, see Monk on Eur. Alc. 57.—′Whence also—this also gave occasion to the saying of Simonides about the philosophers and men of wealth to Hiero’s wife, when she asked him whether it was better to get rich or wise (to acquire riches or wisdom): Rich, he replied: for, said he, I see the philosophers waiting (passing their time) at the doors of the rich′. This same story is alluded to by Plato, Rep. vi 489 c, without naming the author of the saying, who indignantly denies its truth. The Scholiast, in supplying the omission, combines the two different versions of Aristotle and Diog. Laert., and describes it as a dialogue between Socrates and Eubulus. Diog. Laert. (II 8. 4, Aristip. § 69) tells the story thus: ἐρωτηθεὶς (Aristippus) ὑπὸ Διονυσίου διὰ τί οἱ μὲν φιλόσοφοι ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ πλουσίους ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν φιλοσόφων οὐκέτι, ἐφι, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἴσασιν ἄν δεότατοι, οἱ δ’ οὐκ ίσασιν.

1 The merit of another mot attributed to Aristippus, as it is also connected with our present subject, may excuse its insertion here. Διονυσίου ποτ’ ἔρμολον (τῶν Ἀριστιπποῦ) ἐπὶ τῇ ἥκου, ἐφι...ὅποτε μὲν σοφίας ἐθέων, ἥκου παρὰ τῶν Σωκράτην νῦν δὲ χρημάτων δεόμενοι παρὰ οἱ ἥκου. Diog. Laert. u. s. § 78.

§ 3. καὶ-τὸ _οίσθαι_ (ἐπεται τῷ _πλούτῳ_). ‘Cum καὶ _οἱ_ _οίσθεν_ _peregere_ _oporteret_ ὁ _οίσθαι_ _posuit._’ Yater. ‘Wealth too is accompanied (in the minds of its possessors) by the opinion of a just claim to power (office, authority); and this is due to the supposition that they have what makes power worth having (άξιον). This I think is the only way of translating the text, with _άξιον_: and so the _Vetus Translatio_; _habere enim putant quorum gratia principari diguum_. The version of Victorius is _quod tenerere se putant ea, quae qui possident regno _dignum_ sunt_. But this seems to require _άξιον_, though the sense and connexion are certainly better; _άξιον_ had suggested itself to me as a probable emendation. Bekker and Spengel retain _άξιον_. ‘And in sum, the character that belongs to wealth is that of a thriving blockhead (a prosperous fool, good luck without sense).’ Victorius very properly observes that _εὐθαμωία_ is not to be understood in its strict ethical sense of real happiness, which must exclude folly, but it is used here loosely as a synonym of _εὐτυχία_. He also quotes a parallel phrase in Cic. de Amic. (54), _nihil insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest._

§ 4. ‘However there is a difference in the characters of the recent and the hereditary possessors of wealth, in that the newly-enriched have all the bad qualities of their condition (τά) in a higher degree and worse (than the others); for recently acquired wealth is a sort of want of training in wealth (in the conduct, the use and enjoyment of it)’. On the habit of the _παρενευ_, Victorius quotes Plut. Symp. vii, p. 708 C, καὶ _περὶ_ _όνων_ _διαφοράς_ καὶ _μίρων_ _ἐρωτῶν_ καὶ _διαπερθόμενοι_ _φορτικῶν_ _κομιδῶν_ καὶ _νεόπλουτων_; and Gaisford, Aesch. Agam. 1009, εἰ _δ’_ _όνων_ _άνάγκη_ _τῆς_ επιμέρετοι _τύχης_, _ἀρχαιοπλουτῶν_ _δεσποτῶν_ _πολλῆς_ _χάρας_; οἱ _δ’_ _οὖν_ _ἐκπιλασσαν_ _ἡμᾶς_ _καλῶς_ _άμοι_ _τε_ _δύολαι_ _πάντα_ καὶ _παρά_ _στάθημι_. Blomfield’s Glossary, Donaldson’s _New Crtal_. § 323. _Suthra_ II 9. 9.

‘And the crimes that the wealthy commit are not of a mean character—petty offences of fraud and mischief—but are either crimes of insolence and violence or of licentiousness, such as assault (outrage on the person) in the one case, and adultery in the other’.
απαιδευσία πλουτόν ἐστὶ τὸ νεόπλουτον εἶναι. καὶ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν οὐ κακουργικά, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὑβριστικὰ τὰ δὲ ἀκρατευτικά, οἶον εἰς αἰκίαν καὶ μοιχείαν.

1 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως σχεδὸν τὰ πλείστα φανερὰ ἐστὶν ἢθη· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχει ἡ δύναμις τῷ πλοῦτῳ τὰ δὲ βελτίων φιλοτιμότεροι γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρωδεστέροι εἰσί τὰ ἢθη οἱ δυνάμενοι τῶν πλουσίων διὰ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι ἐργῶν ὅσα ἐξουσία αὐτοῖς πράττειν διὰ τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ σπουδαστικώτεροι διὰ τὸ ἐν επιμελείᾳ εἶναι, ἀναγκαζόμενοι σκοπεῖν τὰ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ σεμνότεροι ἡ βαρύτεροι· ποιεῖ
eis aikian k.t.l.] signifies the direction or tendency, or the issue or result, of the particular aikēma. This distinction of crimes has already occurred twice in the delineation of the characters of Youth and Age, II 12. 15 (see note), and 13. 14. aikia, the legal crime of assault and battery, is here adduced as an illustration of ὑβρις, though under the Attic law it is expressly distinguished from it; ὑβρις denoting a higher class of crimes, subject to a γραφή or public prosecution, aikia only to a δίκη, private suit or action. [Isocr. Or. 20 §§ 2, 5; Dem. Or. 54 (Conon) §§ 1, 17. Comp. Jebb’s Attic Orators II 215—6.]

CHAP. XVII.

§ 1. ‘And in like manner also of power, most of the characters are pretty clear, the characteristics of power being in some points (or particulars) the same as those of wealth’.

§ 2. ‘In others better (but still of the same kind); for the powerful are more ambitious and more manly (or masculine) in their characters than the wealthy, which is due to their aspiring to such deeds (achievements) as their power gives them the liberty of effecting’. ἐστὶν δ’ ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἑπαυούμεν ὡς ἀνδρώθη (shewing how nearly the two characters coincide), Eth. Nic. IV 10, 1125 b 11, ἀνδρώθεσι ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν, Ib. c. 11, 1126 b 2. The power supplies the occasion of doing great deeds, and the habit of doing them forms the ambitious and masculine character: wealth does not confer such opportunities.

§ 3. ‘And more active and energetic, by reason of the constant attention they are obliged to pay in looking to the means of maintaining their power’; which without such close attention might probably slip from their hands.

§ 4. ‘And they are rather proud and dignified than offensive, because their distinguished rank (or position) by making them more conspicuous (than all the rest) obliges them to moderation (in their demeanour). This pride and dignity is a softened (subdued) and graceful arrogance (or assumption)’.
of "exhorted" in general; Dem., de Cor. § 35, speaks of the
αναγνώσια and βαρύτης of the Thebans, where it evidently means im-
portunitas. Similarly in Isocr. Panath. § 31, it belongs to the character of
the πεπαιδευμένοι, to assume themselves a becoming and fair behaviour to
their associates, καί τὰς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἄρδια καί βαρύτητας εὐκόλως καί
ῥάδιος φέρονται; where it seems to denote offensiveness in the form of ill
manners. Here it is applied to a particular kind of offensiveness or bad
manners, which shews itself in that excess or exaggeration of σεμνότης or
pride called arrogance and assumption. ‘Whenever they do commit a
crime, the criminality shews itself, not in a trifling and mean offence, but
on a grand scale, in high crimes and misdemeanours’.

§ 5. ‘Now the characters of good fortune are indeed found (or ex-
hibited, principally) in the parts (the three divisions) of those already
mentioned—for all those which are considered the most important kinds of
good fortune do in fact converge to these—but also besides these, good
fortune (prosperity) provides an advantage (over a man’s neighbours) in
respect of happiness of family, and all personal gifts and accomplish-
ments’.  

πλεονεκτείνω] must here, I think, be used, not in its ordinary and
popular acquired signification, of seeking an undue share, covetousness,
greed, rapacity, but in the simple and literal meaning, which it sometimes
bears, of having an advantage (of any kind) over others. The ordinary
sense—though Victorius appears to understand it so—seems to me quite
inappropriate to the passage. These other kinds of good fortune are
supplied in the list given 1 5.4, where ευτεκία and τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἄγαθα,
are both introduced, and the particulars of the latter enumerated.

§ 6. ‘Now though good fortune makes men more arrogant, over-
weening and inconsiderate, thoughtless, yet good fortune is attended by
one excellent characteristic, viz. that (the fortunate) are pious or lovers of
the gods’ (God-fearing, we say), ‘and have a certain religious character,
their trust in them being due to the good things they have derived from
fortune’; they are in reality due to fortune, but are ascribed by them to the
divine grace and favour. Lactantius, Div. Inst. II 1.8 (quoted by Gaisford),
gives a truer account of this matter: Tum (in prosperis rebus) maxime
Deus ex memoria hominum elabitur, cum beneficis eius fruunt:s homonem
dare divinae indulgentiae debere. Al vero si qua necessitas gravis
presserit, tunc Deum recordantur. And Lucret. III 53, multoque in
rebus acerbis acris advertunt animos ad religionem.

'So of the characters which follow the various ages and conditions
of life enough has been said; for the opposites of those that have been
described, as the character of the poor man, the unsuccessful (un-
fortunate), and the powerless, may be easily ascertained from their
opposites', i.e. by substituting the opposites of their opposites, the
characteristics, viz. of poverty, misfortune, powerlessness, for those of
wealth, prosperity, and power.

CHAP. XVIII.

The following chapter marks a division of the general subject of the
work, and a stage or landing-place, from which we look back to what
has been already done, and forwards to what still remains to do. The
evident intention of the writer is to give a summary statement of the
entire plan, and the main division of his system of Rhetoric, contained
in the first two books, which comprise all the intellectual part, τὰ περὶ
τὴν διάνοιαν, II 26.5, all that depends on argument; as opposed to the
non-essential and ornamental part, style, action, and arrangement, treated
in Bk. III. And it may fairly be supposed that it was also his intention
to arrange these divisions in the same order as that which he proposed
to follow in the actual treatment of the subject.

But in the text, at any rate of the first half of the chapter, to τοιμτεὼν,
this order is not observed; and there is altogether so much irregularity
and confusion in the structure of the sentences, and such a mixture of
heterogeneous subjects, that it seems tolerably certain that we have not
this portion of the chapter in the form in which Aristotle wrote it. First,
the long parenthesis about the applicability of the terms κρίσις or decision,
and κρίτης, judge or critic, to all the three branches of Rhetoric, has no
natural connexion with the context—though at the same time it is quite
true that the use of the parenthesis, a note inserted in the text, is a marked
feature of Aristotle's ordinary style: still this would be an exaggeration, or
abuse of the peculiarity. Spengel has pointed out (Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851,
p. 35), that the whole of this parenthesis, ἐστι δὲ—βουλεύοντα [p. 175, line 2,
to p. 176, last line], is nothing but an expansion of a preceding passage,
1 r. 2, the same notion being here carried out into detail. But although it is so much out of place that it is hardly conceivable that even Aristotle (whose style is not remarkable for its close connexion—is in fact often rather rambling and incoherent) should have introduced it here, as part of an enormous protasis of which the apodosis or conclusion relates to something entirely different; yet as it bears all the characteristic marks of the author’s style, including the irregularity and the heaping of parenthesis upon parenthesis, though it was most probably not written for this place, there is no reason to doubt that it proceeds from the pen of Aristotle.

The parenthesis ends at βουλεύοντας, and we ought now to resume the interrupted πρότασις. This appears, according to the ordinary punctuation, (with the full stop at πρότερον,) to be carried on as far as πρότερον, the conclusion or apodosis being introduced by ὄστε, as usual. The grammar ἐπει...όστε is no objection to this, since we have already seen (note on II 9, 11) that Aristotle is often guilty of this, and even greater grammatical irregularities. But the sense shews that the passage when thus read cannot be sound. There is no real conclusion; for it by no means follows that, because ‘the employment of all persuasive speeches is directed to a decision of some kind’, and because (second member of protasis) ‘the political characters’ have been described (in I 8), ‘therefore it has been determined how and by what means or materials speeches may be invested with an ethical character’. In fact it is a complete non-sequitur.

Bekker [ed. 3] and Spengel, in order to establish a connexion between protasis and apodosis, put a comma at πρότερον; suppose that the preceding sentence from the beginning of the chapter is left incomplete, without apodosis, at βουλεύοντας; and that ὄστε marks the conclusion only from the clause immediately preceding; the meaning then being, that the description of the ‘political characters’ in I 8 is a sufficient determination of the modes of imparting an ethical character to the speech. But this cannot be right: for not only is the fact alleged quite insufficient in itself to support the conclusion supposed to be deduced from it, but also the two kinds of characters designated are in fact different; and it could not be argued from the mere description of the characters of I 8, that the ἥδος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι had been sufficiently discussed and determined; which is in fact done—so far as it is done at all—in II 1, and not in I 8.

Other proposed alterations and suggested difficulties in the rest of the chapter may be left for discussion to their place in the Commentary: the meaning and connexion of this part are in general perfectly intelligible, though omission, interpolation, and obscurity or error are alleged against this and that phrase; and the order of the actual contents of the work coincides essentially and in the main with that which is here followed.

I have now to state the views of two recent critics and commentators upon the whole passage, in its connexion with the order of the several divisions of the entire work.

Spengel’s views upon this subject are to be found in his tract über die Rhetorik des Arist., in the Transactions of the Bav. Acad. 1851,
pp. 32—37; a work which I have already had frequent occasion to refer to. He had previously spoken of the order contemplated and adopted by Aristotle, in the arrangement of the three main divisions of his subject; the analysis of the direct proofs, πίστεις, by logical argument, and the two modes of indirect confirmation of the others, the ἔνδη, and the πάδη. The passages which he himself quotes in illustration of the first order in which Aristotle proposes to take them, pp. 25—27, shew that the order is πίστεις, ἔνδη, πάδη; nevertheless Spengel inverts the two last, p. 30 et seq., omitting the actual treatment of the ἔνδη, as a subsidiary argument or mode of persuasion in 11 1, the true ἔνδη ἐν τῷ λέγοντι; and, as it seems to me, confusing that with a totally different set of characters, which are delineated as an appendix to the πάδη, and consequently after them in 12—17. This I have already pointed out, and explained the real application of the six characters of 12—17 to the purposes of Rhetoric, in the Introduction p. 110, foll. and at the commencement of c. 12 in the Commentary. Spengel notices the inconclusive ὅπτε in the apodosis, c. 18. 1 (p. 34), apparently assuming that the passage is corrupt, but throws no further light upon the interpretation or means of correcting the section. Next we have, p. 36 foll., an attempt to prove that τὰ λοιπὰ, in § 5, is to be understood of the treatment of the πάδος and ἔνδη contained severally in c. 2—11 and 12—17 of Bk. II, and that consequently from the words ὅπος τὰ λοιπὰ προσβένεται ἀποδώμεν τὴν εἷς ἀρχής πρόθεσιν we are to conclude that the order of the treatment of the contents of the first two books was as follows; the ἔνδη, or πίστεις εἷς ἄντω τοῦ λόγου (as if the ἔνδη and πάδος were not equally conveyed by the speech itself), occupying the first book; next, the four κοινοὶ τόποι, and the second part of the logical πίστεις, II 18—26; and thirdly, the πάδος and ἔνδη in the first seventeen chapters of Bk. II, which originally formed the conclusion of that book, though now the order of the two parts is inverted.

Vahlen, in a paper in the Transactions of the Vienna Acad. of Sciences, Oct. 1861, pp. 59—148, has gone at some length into the questions that arise out of this eighteenth chapter, where it is compared with other passages in which Aristotle has indicated the order in which he meant to treat the several divisions of his subject. Op. cit. 121—132. His principal object in writing, he says, p. 122, is to defend against Brandis’ criticisms Spengel’s view that the original arrangement of Aristotle in treating the subjects of the second book has been subsequently inverted in the order in which they now stand; Aristotle having intended to complete the survey of the logical department of Rhetoric before he entered upon the ἔνδη and πάδη. He is of opinion (p. 126) that the analysis of the κοινοὶ τόποι came next (in accordance with the original plan) to the ἔνδη of the first book; and consequently that there is a gap at the opening of the second between the conclusion of the ἔνδη and the commencement of the ἔνδη and πάδη; and that as a further consequence, the words in § 2, ἐτὶ δ’ ἐξ ὧν ἔνδηκον—διώρισται, are an interpolation of some editor of Aristotle’s work, who introduced them, after the κοινοὶ τόποι had been transferred to their present place, as a necessary recognition of what had actually been done. His principal object is in fact to establish what he conceives to be the true order of the several parts of
the work; and in doing so he deals, as it seems to me, in the most arbitrary manner with Aristotle's text. He assumes a Redactor, or Editor, who has taken various liberties with the text of his author, and has interpolated various passages, chiefly relating to the ἥθη, to supply what he conceived to be deficient after the order had been changed. How or why the order was changed, neither he nor Spengel gives us any indication; and the supposition of these repeated interpolations has little or no foundation except his own hypothesis of the inseparable connexion of the εἰθη and κοινοὶ τόποι: for my own part I cannot find in the passages which he quotes in support of this opinion, or elsewhere in Aristotle's Rhetoric, any statement of a necessary connexion between the two, such as to make it imperative that the κοινοὶ τόποι should be treated immediately after the εἰθη. The order of treatment which we find in the received text appears to be sufficiently natural and regular to defend it—in default of the strongest evidence to the contrary—against the suspicion of dislocation and interpolation, though no doubt the order suggested by Vahlen may be, considered in itself, more strictly logical and consecutive.

On the connexion of the clauses of the passage now under consideration (c. 18 § 1), and how and why the long inappropriate parenthesis was introduced here—which are, after all, the things that most require explanation—he leaves us as much in the dark as his predecessor Spengel. His interpretation of τὰ λοιπά (which Spengel seems to have misunderstood), and anything else that requires notice, may be left for the notes on the passages to which they belong.

I have suggested in the Introduction, p. 250, the possibility of the accidental omission of some words or sentences between εἰθηται πρότερον and ὅστε διωρισμένον, in order to supply some connexion between protasis and apodosis, and give some significance to the conclusion; but without any great confidence in the success of the attempt to solve the difficulty: to which I am bound to add that it leaves unexplained the introduction of the parenthesis, ἐτι δὲ—βουλέωτος, which, however and whenever it may have been introduced, is here most certainly out of place. And I will now proceed to give a summary of the contents of the chapter, as I understand them.

All speeches which have persuasion for their object are addressed to, or look to, a decision of some kind. In the two more important branches of Rhetoric, the deliberative and forensic, ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἁγῶνων, the decision and the judge may be understood literally: in the third or epideictic branch, the audience is in some sense also a judge, in his capacity of critic, being called upon to decide or pass sentence on the merits of the composition. Still it is only in the first two that the term 'judge' can be applied to the hearer in its absolute, or strict and proper sense (ἀπλῶς κριτής). Then, as a second member of the protasis, comes a clause which has the appearance of being a continuation or supplement of something which has been lost—a reference, namely, to the treatment of the ἥθης in II 1, which might justify the conclusion that follows, that 'it has now been determined in what way and by what means speeches may be made to assume an ethical character'. Still the sentence and its statements remain incomplete: for if, as it appears, Aristotle's intention was to give an enumeration in detail of the main divisions of his Rhetoric
in the order in which he had placed them, the omission of the important department of the πάθη would be quite unaccountable, unless indeed—which I am myself inclined to believe—he meant to include the πάθη under the general head of ἡθικοὶ λόγοι; which, as the treatment of the πάθη belongs to Ethics, and the effects of the use of them by the speaker are purely ethical, he was fairly entitled to do. At the same time, if this be admitted, the first part of the protasis with the parenthesis appended has no sufficient connexion with the conclusive ᾦστε: nor is it clear why the 'political characters', which do not come under the ἡθος proper, should be especially singled out as one at least of its representatives: though, if I am right in supposing something to be lost which stood before this clause, it might very likely have contained something which led to the mention of these characters, as one of the varieties of ἡθος which impart an ethical colour to the speech.

However, let us suppose at least, as we fairly may, that Aristotle's intention, however frustrated by corruption of his manuscript, was to tell us what he had already done from the commencement of the second book, and what he next proposed to do in the remainder of it. He has hitherto been employed (in this book) upon the Ethical branches of the art, by which the character of the speaker himself may be displayed in a favourable light, and the emotions of the audience directed into a channel favourable to the designs of the orator, § 1.

We now take a fresh start, and from a new protasis, which states that the εἴσθη, from which the statesman and public speaker, the pleader, and the declainer, may derive their premises and proofs, have been analysed under these three branches of Rhetoric, and also the materials, which may serve for imparting an ethical colour (in two senses, as before) to the speech, have been already despatched and determined, we arrive at the conclusion that it is now time to enter upon the subject of the κωνοὶ or universal topics—three in number as they are here classified, the possible and impossible, the past and the future, and amplification or exaggeration and depreciation—which comes next in order; and is accordingly treated in the following chapter. When this has been settled, we must endeavour to find something to say about enthymemes in general, arguments which may be applied to all the branches of Rhetoric alike, and examples, the two great departments of rhetorical reasoning or proof, 'that by the addition of what still remained to be done' (that is, by the completion of the logical division of the subject, by the discussion of enthymemes and examples, c. 20, the enthymeme including the γνῶμη, c. 21, the varieties of enthymeme, demonstrative and refutative, c. 22, and specimens of these, c. 23, fallacious enthymemes, c. 24, and the solution of them, c. 25, with an appendix, c. 26), 'we may fulfil the engagement, the task, which we proposed to ourselves at the outset of this work'.

§ 1. ἦστε δὲ, ἄν τε πρὸς ἑνα κ.τ.λ.] Comp. 1 3. 2. 3, of which most of the statements of this parenthesis are a repetition, though in other words. This may help to account for the introduction of it here, where the
The author is reviewing the progress of his work; the same train of reasoning recurs to his mind, and he starts again with the same topic.

κριτής ο εἰς [Comp. III 12. 5.]

ἐὰν τε πρὸς ἀμφισβητοῦντα κ.τ.λ.] 'Whether you are arguing against a real antagonist (in a court of law, or the public assembly), or merely against some thesis or theory (where there is no antagonist of flesh and blood to oppose you); for the speech must be used as an instrument, and the opposite (theory or arguments) refuted, against which—as though it were an imaginary antagonist—you are directing your words'. In either case, if you want to persuade or convince any one, as an antagonist real or imaginary, you are looking for a decision or judgment in some sense or other: in the case of the defence of the thesis, the opposing argument or theory, which has to be overcome, seems to stand in the place of the antagonist in a contest of real life, who must be convinced if you are to succeed. When you want to convince anyone, you make him your judge.

ὁσπέρ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν κ.τ.λ.] 'the composition of the speech is directed (submitted) to the spectator (for his judgment or decision) as though he were a judge'. The spectator, the person who comes to listen to a declamation, like a spectator at a show, for amusement or criticism, stands to the panegyric, or declamatory show-speech, as a critic, in the same position as the judge to the parties whose case he has to decide. 1 3. 2, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἀκροατῶν ἢ θεωρῶν εἶναι ἢ κριτήν...ὅ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως (κρίνων) ὁ θεωρός.

'But as a general rule it is only the person who decides the points in question in political (public, including judicial) contests that is absolutely (strictly and properly) to be called a judge; for the inquiry is directed in the one to the points in dispute (between the two parties in the case) to see how the truth really stands, in the other to the subject of deliberation'.
The division of the work, from I 4. 7 to I 8 inclusive, in which is contained the analysis of the various εἰθη, or special topics, which belong to the deliberative branch of Rhetoric. The punctuation πρότερον, ὥστε, in Bekker's [later] editions and in Spengel's, making ὥστε—ποιητέον the apodosis to the preceding clause only, has been already mentioned in the introductory note to this chapter [p. 172, middle], and the arguments against it stated.

ἐφηται πρότερον] I c. 8, see especially § 7: the notes on § 6, and Introd. p. 182, and p. 110.

§ 2. ἡτερον ἢν τὸ τέλος] ἢν, 'is as was said', sc. I 3. 1, seq. ὥστε and πρότασις are the popular prevailing opinions which form the only materials of Rhetoric, πρότασις the premisses of his enthymemes, which the professor of the art constructs out of them. Vahlen, Trans. Vienna Acad. u. s., p. 128, remarks that this combination of ὥστε and πρότασις occurs nowhere else except here and in II 1. 1, and is an additional mark of the connexion between that passage and this chapter. συμβουλεύοντες] in I 4. 7, to I 8; ἑπιδεικνύμενοι in I 9; and ἀμφισβητοῦντες, I 10—15.

ἐν δὲ ......διάφωσα] Vahlen (u. s., p. 126), in conformity with his somewhat arbitrary hypothesis, has, as already mentioned, condemned this clause as an interpolation, partly on account of the absence of the πάθη where they required special mention. I have already observed that in default of any other evidence of the spuriousness of the passage we may very well suppose that Ar. intended to include them in the ἡθικοὶ λόγοι [see p. 175 init.].

§§ 3, 4. The four κοινοὶ τόποι, common to all three branches of Rhetoric. These are illustrated in c. 19.

προσχρησκό] to employ them in addition to the εἰθη.

AR. II.


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ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Β 18 § 5.

...καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες ἡ ὑέγοντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες ἡ 5 ἀπολογούμενοι. τοῦτων δὲ διορισθέντων περὶ τε ἐνθυ-

μημάτων κοινῆ πειραθόμεν εἰπέν, εἰ τι ἔχομεν, καὶ

περὶ παραδειγμάτων, ὅπως τὰ λοιπὰ προσβέντες ἀπο-

δῶμεν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν· ἕστι δὲ τῶν κοινῶν τὸ

μὲν αύξειν οἰκεῖότατον τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, ὥσπερ εἰρηταί,

τὸ δὲ γεγονός τοῖς δικαικοῖς (περὶ τοῦτων γάρ ἡ κρι-

σις), τὸ δὲ δυνατόν καὶ ἐσόμενον τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς.

...πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου λέγω-

1+ ἡ ἀποτρέποντες Bekker(ed.1831) Λο. καὶ προτρέποντες καὶ ἀποτρέποντες Q, Yb, Zb.

ἡ ἀποτρέποντες is rejected by Bekker and Spengel [ed. 1867], and is certainly suspicious. The latter had already remarked, Trans. Bav. Acad. [1851], p. 33, note 2, that Ar. never uses συμβουλευένων for προτρέπεων, as he has done in this case if the text be genuine. Therefore, either συμβουλεύωντες must be changed into προτρέποντες (printed by an oversight ἀποτρέποντες) or better, ἡ ἀποτρέποντες erased: the course which he has adopted in his recent edition. Of course Arist. employs συμβουλευένων as a general term including both persuasion and dissuasion; as in ι1 22. 5 and 8 (referred to by Spengel).

§ 5. Next to the κοινοὶ τόποι will follow the illustration of the κοινοὶ πίστεις, c. 20, 1, the universal instruments of all persuasion, Example (c. 20), Enthymeme (and its varieties) c. 21—24, with an appendix on Refutation, c. 25 (and a shorter one of a miscellaneous character, c. 26).

τὰ λοιπὰ interpreted by Spengel, u. s., of the ἡθὺ and πάθη, which he supposes to have been treated last in this book; and by Vahlen (rightly, as I think) of the logical part of the treatise, the enthymemes and examples, ‘which still remain’ (after the analysis of the κοινοὶ τόποι) to be handled, u. s., p. 129). Brandis, ap. Schneidewin’s Philologus II 1, p. 7, note 7, unnecessarily limits τὰ λοιπὰ to the contents of cc. 23—26. Schrader, “doctrinam de elocutione et dispositione hoc verbo innuit, quam tertio libro tradit.” Vahlen, u. s., pp. 128 and 132, contemptuously rejects this interpretation.

ἀποδῶμεν τὴν πρόθεσιν] On ἀποδῶμα, see note on I 1. 7. Here, to foiliil a purpose or intention, lit. to render it back, or pay it as a due, to the original undertaking.


τὸ γεγονός......περὶ τοῦτων] ‘Fact’, as an abstract conception, and therefore neut. sing., is represented in its particulars or details—the particular, individual, instances, from which the notion is generalised—in the plural τοῦτων.

CHAP. XIX.

In the following chapter the κοινοὶ τόποι are treated under the three heads, (1) of the possible and impossible, (2) fact, past and future, and (3)
amplification and depreciation; for the topic of degree, of greater and less, or the comparative estimate of goods, which might be distinguished from the third, seems here, and c. 18, 3, 4, to be included in it. In the latter of the two passages, this third tópos is called simply περὶ μεγέθους, and here the two parts are included under the one phrase περὶ μεγάλων καὶ μικρῶν, which is equivalent to αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν, and denotes one general topic. I wish so far to correct what I have said in the Introd. p. 129. They may also be divided into four, or six heads.

—Of the importance of the first in deliberative oratory Cicero says, de Orat. ii. 82. 336, Sed quid fieri possit aut non possit quidque etiam sit necesse aut sit, in utrque re maxime quaerendum. Incidit enim omnis iam deliberatio, si intelligitur non posse fieri aut si necessitas afferetur; et qui id docuit non videntibus aliis, is plurimum vidit.

Quintillian has some observations on the possible, and necessary, as partes suadendi, Inst. Or. iii. 8. 22—26.

On δύναμις, δυνατῶν and the opposite, and their various senses, there is a chapter in Metaph. Δ 12.

§ 1. 'The possibility of anything, in respect of being or coming to be, implies the possibility of the contrary: as, for example, if it be possible for a man to be cured, it is possible for him also to fall ill: for there is the same power, faculty, potentiality, i.e. possibility of affecting a subject, in the two contraries, in so far as they are contrary one to another'.

ὑ ἐναντία] i.e. solely in respect of their being contraries, and excluding all other considerations. As in the instance given, a man is equally liable to be affected by health and sickness in so far as they are contraries, without regard to any properties or qualities in himself, which may render him more or less liable to one or the other. This is Schrader's explanation.

τάναντία] 'contraries' is one of the four varieties of ἀντικείμενα, 'opposites'. These are (1) ἀντιφασις, 'contradiction' (or contradictories), κατάφασις and ἀπόφασις, affirmation and negation, affirmative and negative, to be and not to be, yes and no. (2) τά ἐναντία, 'contraries' which are defined as the extreme opposites under the same genus—good and bad, black and white, long and short, quick and slow, &c.—which cannot reside in the same subject together. (3) Relative opposites, τα πρός τι, as double and half, master and servant, father and son, &c. And (4) opposites of state and privation, ἐξις and στέρησις, the possession of something and the privation, absence, want, of it; as sight and blindness. (This last term, however, privation, is properly applied only to cases in which the opposite, possession or state, is natural to the possessor; in which consequently that which wants it, is deprived—defrauded, as it were—of something to which it has a natural claim: blindness can only be called a στέρησις when the individual affected by it belongs to a class
of animals which have the faculty of vision: τυφλὸν λέγομεν ὑπὸ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὀφθ, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὀτὲ πέφυκεν ἔχειν. Categ. c. 10, 12 a 26 seq.) On "opposites", see Categ. cc. 10, 11. Top. B 2, 103 b 17—23. Ib. c. 8, 113 b 15 seq. Ib. E 6. Metaph. Δ 10, 1018 a 20 seq. (where two more kinds are added, unnecessarily, see Bonitz ad loc.) and 1, 1055 a 38, where the usual four are alone mentioned. Cicero, Topic. XI 47—49, enumerates and illustrates the same four. Of ἐναρθρία he says, Haece, quae ex eviom genere contraria sunt appellantur adversa. Contrarium with him is Aristotle's ἀντικείμενον, the genus, or general notion of opposite.

The argument from contraries, as employed here, is this: the possibility of anything being or becoming the one, implies that of being or becoming the other; only not both at once: a virtuous man may always become (has the capacity, δύναμις, of becoming) vicious, and the converse; but ἐναρθρία, when the one state is actually present, and realized in the subject, it excludes the other. This reciprocal possibility in contraries arises from the fact that the two contraries belong to the same genus or class. Black and white both fall under the genus colour, of which they are the extremes; they pass from one into the other by insensible gradations of infinite variety, from which we may infer that any surface that admits of colour at all, will admit either of them indifferently apart, but not together; two different colours cannot be shewn on the same surface and at the same time.

§ 2. Again, likeness or resemblance, τὸ ὁμοιόν, between two things suggests or implies a common possibility; if one thing can be done, the probability is that anything else like it can be done equally.

This is a variety of the argument from analogy. We have a tendency, which appears to be natural and instinctive, to infer from any manifest or apparent resemblance between two objects, that is, from certain properties or attributes which they are seen or known to possess in common, the common possession of other properties and attributes, which are not otherwise known to belong to them, whereby we are induced to refer them to the same class. So here, the likeness of two things in certain respects, is thought to imply something different, which is also common to both; a common capacity or possibility. The argument being here applied solely to the use of Rhetoric, the things in question are rather actions and their consequences than facts and objects: if it has been found possible to effect something, to gain some political advantage for instance, in several previous cases, we argue that in the similar, parallel case which is under consideration, the like possibility may be expected.

This however, though the popular view of the argument from analogy, and the ordinary mode of applying it, is not, strictly speaking, the right application of the term. Analogy, τὸ ἀνάλογον, is arithmetical or geometrical proportion, and represents a similarity, not between objects themselves, but between the relations of them. See Sir W. Hamilton, Lect. on Logic, Vol. II. p. 165—174, Lect. XXXII, and on this point, p. 170. Whately (Rhet. p. 74, c. 1), "Analogy, being a resemblance of ratios, that should strictly be called an argument from analogy, in which the two cases (viz. the one from which, and the one to which we argue) are not themselves alike, but stand in a similar relation to something else; or, in other words, that the common genus that they both fall under, consists
3 δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ὁμοιον. καὶ εἰ τὸ χαλεπότερον
4 δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ῥᾴδιον. καὶ εἰ τὸ σπουδαῖον καὶ καλὸν
γενέσθαι δυνατὸν, καὶ ὡλὸς δυνατὸν γενέσθαι: χαλε-
5 πῶτερον γὰρ καλὴν οἰκίαν ἡ οἰκίαν εἶναι. καὶ όν

in a relation." This he illustrates by two examples of analogical reason-
ing. One of them is, the inferences that may be drawn as to mental
qualities and the changes they, undergo, from similar changes (i.e. rela-
tions) in the physical constitution—though of course there can be no
direct resemblance between them. Hamilton's illustration of analogy
proper is derived directly from a numerical proportion: that of analogy
in its popular usage is, "This disease corresponds in many symptoms
with those we have observed in typhus fevers; it will therefore correspond
in all, that is, it is a typhus fever," p. 171.

Butler's Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion to the constitution
and course of Nature may be regarded as an analogy of relations between
them and God the author of both, in the proper sense of the word, though
in his Introduction he twice appears to identify analogy with mere like-
ness or similarity.

Lastly, the logical description of Analogy is to be found in Thomson's
Laws of Thought, § 121, 'Syllogism of Analogy', p. 250, seq. The author's
definition is, p. 252, "the same attributes may be assigned to distinct but
similar things, provided they can be shewn to accompany the points of
resemblance in the things, and not the points of difference." Or 'when
the resemblance is undoubted, and does not depend on one or two
external features'), "when one thing resembles another in known parti-
culars, it will resemble it also in the unknown.'

On the different kinds of ὁμολογία and ὁμοια, consult Metaph. A 11,
1018 a 15, with Bonitz' note, and 1b. 1 3, 1054 b 3, seq., also Top. A 17, on
its use as a dialectical topic.

§ 3. 'Thirdly, if the harder of two things (as any undertaking, effort,
enterprise, such as the carrying out of any political measure) is possible,
then also the easier'. This is by the rule, omne malus continet in se
minus; or the argumentum a fortiori.

§ 4. 'And (again a fortiori) the possibility of making or doing any
thing well, necessarily carries with it the possibility of the making or
doing of it in general' (ὡλὸς, the general or abstract conception of making
or doing; in any way, well or ill): 'for to be a good house is a harder thing
than to be a mere house', of any kind. The same may be said of a fine
picture, statue, literary composition, or any work of art; anything in
short in which ἀρετή, merit, or excellence, to σπουδαίον, can be shewn.
ῥᾴδιον γὰρ ότιον ποιήσαι ἡ καλῶς ποιήσαι. Top. Z 1, 139 b 8 (cited by
Schrader). Compare with this Metaph. D 12, 1019 a 23 (on the various
acceptations of δυνατῶν), ἢτι ἢ τὸν καλὸς τοῦτ‘ ἐπιτελεῖν (SPATHAI) ἢ κατὰ
προϊσταμέν‘ ἐνίοτε γὰρ τόσο μόνον ἢ πολεμεῖν ἢ εἰπώντας, μὴ καλῶς ἢ μὴ
ὡς προειλθοντα, ὥσ φαίμεν δύνασθαι λέγειν ἢ βαδίζειν; which may possibly
have suggested the introduction of the topic here.

§ 5. 'The possibility of the beginning of anything implies also that
of the end: for nothing impossible comes into being or begins to do so,
as for example the commensurability of the diameter (with the side of the square) never either begins to, nor actually does, come into being: *To begin implies to end,* says Tennyson, *Two Voices* [line 339]. In interpreting a rhetorical topic which is to guide men's practice, it is plain that we must keep clear of metaphysics. The beginning and end here have nothing to do with the finite and infinite. Nor is it meant that things that can be begun necessarily admit of being finished: the Tower of Babel, as well as other recorded instances of *opera interrupta,* shew that this is not true. And though it may be true of the design or intention, of any attempt, that it always looks forward to an end, immediate or remote, still to the public speaker it is facility and expediency, rather than the mere possibility, of the measure he is recommending, that is likely to be of service in carrying his point. All that is really meant is, that if you want to know whether the end of any course of action, plan, scheme, or indeed of anything—is possible, you must look to the beginning: beginning implies end: if it can be begun, it can also be brought to an end: nothing that is known to be impossible, like squaring the circle, can ever have a beginning, or be brought into being. Schrader exemplifies it by, *Mithridates coepit vinci, ergo et debellari poterit.* Proverbs and passages on the importance of *ἀρχή* are cited in the note on 17. 11.

The incommensurability of the diameter with the side of the square, or, which is the same thing, the impossibility of squaring the circle, is Aristotle's stock illustration of *the impossible:* see examples in Bonitz ad Metaph. A 2, 983 a 16. Euclid, Bk. x. Probl. ult. Trendelenburg, on de Anima III 6. 1, p. 500, explains this: the diameter of a square is represented by the root of 2, which is irrational, and therefore incommensurable with the side. He also observes that Aristotle cannot refer to the squaring of the circle; a question which was still in doubt in the time of Archimedes could not be assumed by Aristotle as an example of impossibility. The illustration, which passed into a proverb, *ἐκ διαμέτρου ἄντικείσθαι,* is confined to the side and diameter of the parallelogram. See also Waitz on Anal. Pr. 41 a 26.

'And when the end is possible, so also is the beginning, because everything takes its origin, is generated, from a beginning'. The end implies the beginning: everything that comes into being or is produced—everything therefore with which the orator has to deal in his sphere of practical life—has a beginning. Since the beginning is implied in the end, it is clear that if the end be attainable or possible, so likewise must the beginning be.

§ 6. 'And if it is possible for the latter, the posterior, the subsequent, of two things, either in substance and essence, or generation, to be brought into being, then also the prior, the antecedent; for instance, if a man
ei τὸ ὑστερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἢ τῇ γενέσει δυνατὸν γε
νέσθαι, καὶ τὸ πρότερον, οὖν εἰ ἄνδρα γενέσθαι δυ-
can be generated, then a child; for that (the child) is prior in generation
(every man must have been first a boy; this is εὐ γενέσει, in the order
of growth, in the succession of the natural series of generation or
propagation): and if a child, then a man; because this (the child, ἐκεῖνη
being made to agree with ἀρχὴ instead of παῖς) is a beginning or origin'.
This latter example is by the rule that every end necessarily implies a
beginning; a child stands in the relation to mature man of beginning
to end: and therefore every grown man must have passed through the
period of childhood; which is also reducible to the other rule, that the
possibility of subsequent implies that of antecedent, of which the pre-
ceding example is an illustration.

τὸ υστερον, τὸ πρότερον] The two principal passages on the various
senses in which πρότερον and υστερον, before and after, earlier and
later, antecedent and subsequent, prior and posterior, can be applied,
are Categ. c. 12, in which five varieties are distinguished, and Met. Δ 11,
in which there are four. On the former passage Waitz says in his Comm.
p. 316, "non premendam esse divisionem quam nostro loco tradidit:
apparet enim non id agi in his ut ipsa rerum natura exploret et per-
vestigetur, sed 'ut quae usus ferat sermonis quotidiani distinguantur
alterum ab alto et explicantur.'

In the Metaphysics, the divisions are four. In the first, prior and
posterior refer us to a series and an order, established either by nature
or by the human will, under which the τῇ γενέσει of the Rhetoric will
naturally fall. Of this there are five varieties, (1) κατὰ τόπον, local (comp.
Phys. IV 11, 219 a 14, seq.); (2) κατὰ χρόνον, chronological, the order of
time (Phys. IV 14, 223 a 4, seq.); (3) κατὰ κίνησιν; (4) κατὰ δίναμαν, capacity
or power; capacity a natural order, power either of nature or human
choice; (5) κατὰ τὰξιν.

In the second the order of knowledge is referred to: only in two dif-
ferent applications the meaning of the two terms is inverted: in the order
of growth the particular is prior to the universal, sense and observation
to generalisation or induction; in the order of dignity, the universal is
prior to the particular, as the whole to the individual parts. The one is
πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς, the other, πρότερον ἀπλῶς.

The third, πρότερα λέγεται τὰ τῶν προτέρων πάθη, the priority of the at-
tributes of the prior (in some series), as straightness is prior to smooth-
ness, because the line is prior to the plane or surface—the notion is
that the plane is generated from, and so, in growth and origin, posterior to
the line; and therefore the attribute of the latter is prior to that of the
former—is not, as Bonitz remarks, coordinate with the three others,
"pendet enim a reliquis, quae suapte natura sunt priora, tamquam
accidens a subjecto suo qui inhaeret."

The fourth, the οὐσία of the Rhetoric, priority and posteriority in
essence or substance, τὰ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν; priority in this sense
belongs to things ἄσα εὑδηκται εἴημα ἄνεων ἀλλων: that is, things which are
independent of others, whereas the others (the posterior) are dependent
on them: the latter imply the former, the former do not necessarily imply
the latter. Such is the relation of one and two; two always imply one,
one does not necessarily imply two. Similarly the first category, οὐσία
substance, is prior to all the others, which express only properties and
attributes of the first. This priority is οὐσία, which is evidently inserted
merely because it was suggested by the opposite γένεσις, and being utterly
useless in Rhetoric, from which all nice distinctions and subtleties of all
kinds are alien, is accordingly passed over in the illustration. This divi-
sion of οὐσία also includes priority of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, where again
the order of growth and of dignity inverts the relation of the two: δύ
ναμις, the capacity, being of course prior in growth or time, the ἐ
έργεια, actus, the realization, or active and perfect condition, being superior in the
order of dignity and importance, or in conception, λόγος.

Another division is that of οὐσία substance, λόγος conception, and
χρώμα. Metaph. Θ 8, 1049 b 11, seq.

See further on this subject, Bonitz ad Met. Δ 11, Comm. p. 249—252;
Waitz ad Organ. p. 14 a 26 (Categ. c. 12). Trendelenburg, Categorienlehre
p. 38, seq., 72, seq.

§ 7. ‘And things (in general) are possible which are the objects of
love or desire’—these πάθη, being instinctive and natural, show that the
objects of them are attainable, because “nature does nothing in vain”,
a constantly recurring principle in our author: οὐδένα γὰρ, ὡς φαμέν,
μάθην ἤ φύσις ποιεῖ, Pol. I 2, 1253 a 9, et ous ἢ φύσις μηθέν μῆτε ἄτελες.
pοιεῖ μῆτε μάθην, I. b. c. 8, 1256 b 20, et passim: if the desires could not
be satisfied, nature would not have implanted them in us—“for no one
either loves or desires anything impossible for the most part”: the quali-
lication ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, is added to allow for the exceptional cases
of insane or infatuated passion as that of Pasiphae (referred to by
Victorius) or of Pygmalion; or a child’s desire to have a star to play
with.

§ 8. ‘And all sciences and arts imply the possibility of the existence
or generation of their objects’. The sciences, as natural history, moral
and political philosophy, chemistry, geology, &c., have facts or pheno-
mena, actually existing, which are to be observed and generalized,
for their objects; the practical arts produce, or bring into being, their
objects, as painting, sculpture, and the fine arts in general, also the
useful and mechanical arts. This I think is the distinction here intended.
Moral and political philosophy come under the head of sciences which
have facts, moral and social, for the objects of their study; though they
belong to the practical department of knowledge, and have action for
their end and object. ἐπιστήμη and its object τὸ ἐπιστημένον, are relative
terms, the one necessarily implying the other, Categ. c. 10, 11 b 27, καὶ ἦ
ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῷ ἐπιστημόν ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι ἀντίκειται; and often elsewhere.
This may help to establish the necessary connexion which is assumed
between knowledge, science, art, and their objects. But I do not suppose
that Ar. here means to assert the existence of a natural law which con-
nects them; but only that, as a matter of fact, men never do choose as an
§ 9. ‘And again, anything (that we wish to do, or to effect, in the ordinary course of life, as in our business or profession) of which the origin of generation lies in things which we would (if we wished it, opt. with ἄν) influence or control either by force or persuasion (meaning by ἐν τούτοις μεθ' in particular, as appears from what follows; but not excluding things, as circumstances, conditions and such like, the command of which might enable us to effect our purpose); such are (persons whom we can influence or control) those whose superiors we are in strength and power, or those who are under our authority, or our friends. The two first classes illustrate the ἀναγκάζειν the force of superior strength, and of authority natural (as that of a parent or master) or legal (the authority of the magistrate); the third, friends, who are amenable to persuasion, exemplify the πείδευν.

§ 10. ‘If the parts are possible, so also is the whole: and if the whole of anything, so are the parts, as a general rule: for if slit in front, toe-piece, and upper-leather, are capable of being made, then also shoes can be made; and if shoes, then front-slit, toe-piece, and upper-leather’. A whole implies its parts, and the parts a whole. Whole and part are relative terms: neither of them can stand alone, nor has any meaning except in reference to its correlative: hence of course the possibility of the one necessarily implies the possibility of the other. ὅλον λέγεται οὗ μηθὲν ἀπεστὶ μέρος ἐκ ὅν λέγεται ὅλον φύσει, Metaph. Δ 26, 1023 b 26. Ib. c. 2, 1013 b 22, the whole is said to be τὸ τί ἤν εἶναι, the λόγος or formal cause of a thing, that which makes the combination of parts what it was to be, viz. a whole, and therefore of course inseparable from it.

The qualification, ὅσ' ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, of the universal possibility of the divisibility of a whole into its parts, seems to be introduced to meet the objection which might arise from the existence or conception of ἀδιάφορα, such as a geometrical point, or an atom, or the human soul, or Parmenides’ ἕν, ὅλον, μονογενές, ...ἐν ᾠνεχές [Ritter and Preller, Hist. Phil. § 145].

Of the parts of a shoe here mentioned we have absolutely no information either in ancient or modern authorities. The explanation of the word πρόσχισμα, given by Photius, who refers to Aristophanes for an example of it, εἴδος ὑποδήματος; and by Hesychius, the same words with the
addition of ἀπασμένων ἐκ τοῦ ἐμπροσθεν, and Pollux—will not apply here at all events, nor to Ar. Probl. xxx 8, ὑπόδημα ἐκ προσχισμάτως, where it is plainly, as here, a part of the shoe, and not the whole—though it is probable enough that Aristophanes in the passage referred to by Pho-tius may have meant it by ὑπόδηματος εἰδός: and κεφαλὶς and χιτῶν are passed over in total silence: they appear in none of the dictionaries of antiquity that I am acquainted with, nor are the ordinary Lexicons more instructive. We are left therefore to conjecture as to the precise meaning of them, but I think the consideration of the words themselves will help us at least to understand what they represent.

πρόσχισμα is 'a slit in front' of the shoe, with which Aristotle's use of the word in the Problem above quoted exactly agrees. This I think is fully confirmed by a drawing of a ὑπόδημα in Becker's Charicles, p. 448 (Transl. ed. 2), which is a facsimile of a modern half-boot laced up in front. The πρόσχισμα is the slit down the front, which when the shoe is worn has to be laced up. This seems pretty certain; but of κεφαλὶς I can only conjecture from the name, that it is a head-piece, or cap, covering the toes, and distinguishing this kind of shoe from those in which the toes were left uncovered, which seems to have been the usual fashion. χιτῶν—guided by a very common use of the word, which extends it from a covering of the body to any covering whatsoever (in Rost and Palm's Lexicon, s. v. No. 2, Vol. ii. p. 2466)—I have supposed to mean the upper leather, the object of which, just like that of the tunic or coat, is to protect or cover the upper part of the foot, and keep out the cold. Stephens' Lexicon referring to this passage translates κεφαλὶς tegumentum capitis! Xen. Cyrop. viii 2. 5, (where σχίζων and χιτῶν are used in connexion with shoes,) and Schneider's note, throw no additional light upon the exact meaning of these three words.

§ 11. 'The possibility of a genus or class implies that of any subordinate species, and conversely; if a vessel can be built, then triremes; and if triremes, then a vessel'.

§ 12. 'And if the one of two things that stand in a natural relation to one another (i.e. two relative terms; see above, §§ 8 and 10) be possible, then also the other; as double implies the possibility of half, and half of double'. Categ. c. 10, ii b 26, διπλός καὶ ἕμιπλός is one of the stock examples of one kind of ἐν πρός τι, the category of relation. Of these relative opposites Cicero says, Top. xi 49, nam aliæ quæque sunt contrari-orum genera, velut ea quae cum aliquo conferuntur: ut dulcius, simplicius; multa, paucia; longum, brevi; maurus, minus. In de Invent. i 30. 47, the argument from these opposites is thus illustrated; In eis rebus quae sub eandem rationem cadunt hoc modo probabile consideratur: Nam si Rodis turpe non est portorium locare, ne Hermaeconti guidem turpe
pevukots, kai thateov, idou ei dipleiaon, kai h'mosu, 13 kai ei h'mosu, kai dipleiaon. kai ei etheu techny kai paraphkeyns dunaton genesthai, mallon dia techny kai epiemelias dunaton ethen kai Agathow eihrta kai miu ta mev ge crh techny prasssew, ta de h'min anagyke kai tych prosofygetai.

14 kai ei tois xeiropsi kai ytthos kai afrovestepois est conducere. To which Quintilian (referring to this place of Cicero, and quoting the example) adds—de suo apparently, for it is not in the original—Quod discere honestum, et docere [comp. Cicero, Orator, § 145]. Victorius. Ar. Rhet. II 23. 3, poinein ati paganen ti kelleisai and peponikina. ei gar menei geno anachro to pawlein, au' h'min to oineisai.

§ 13. ’And if a thing can be done without art or preparation (or perhaps rather, apparatius) it is a fortiori possible to do by aid of art’ (dia with gen. through a channel, medium, and hence, by means of, and pains (study, attention)). This is not the exact converse of the topic of § 3, which implied the possibility of a thing being done at all from that of its being well done; here the use of art, study and attention, and any other artificial means by which we assist nature, is alleged as facilitating the construction of anything, or of carrying out any purpose or design that we may have in view: the possibility of doing anything without art implies a fortiori the possibility of doing it with additional help and contrivance.

In the two verses of Agathon (from an uncertain play) which follow, the old reading was kai miu ta mev ge tyn techny proassew, ta de h'min anagyke kai techny prosofygetai, but Porson’s transposition of techny and techny (ad Med. 1090), which is undoubtedly right, has been adopted by Bekker, ed. 3, and Spengel, as it was by Elmsley, ad Med. 1062. This alteration brings them into the required correspondence with Aristotle’s text. “If”, says Aristotle, “anything can be effected without art”,—which is interpreted as it were by Agathon’s “accident, and necessity or overpowering force”. But techny may be very well retained; and the translation will be: “And moreover it falls to our lot to do (effect) some things by art, others by force and mere accident”. prosofygetai occurs three times in this sense, efficior, accido, in Sophocles, Oed. Col. 1200, Electr. 761, Trach. 1163 (Ellendt’s lex.).

§ 14. ‘And anything that is possible for inferiors in capacity (and personal qualities in general), and power or position, and intelligence, is a fortiori possible to the opposites (those who are superior) in all these’. Schrader quotes in illustration: Ergo hae (ferre laborem, contemnere vulnus,) veteranus miles facere poterit, doctus vir sapiensque non poterit? ille vero melius ac non paullo quidem (Cic. Tusc. II 17). Galgacus, ap. Tacit. Agric. 31, Brigantes femina duce eexvere coloniam, expugnare castra, ac nis felicitas in soordiam vertisset, exvere ingum potuere: nos integri et indoniti primo statim congressu non ostendemus quos sibi Caledonia viros sepseuerc?
δυνατόν, καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῶις μᾶλλον, ὡσπερ καὶ Ἰσο-
κράτης ἐφι δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ ὁ μὲν Ἐὐθυνος ἔμαθεν, αὐτὸς
15 δὲ μὴ δυνήσεται εὑρεῖν. περὶ δὲ ἄδυνατον δήλον ὑπὸ ἔκ
τῶν ἑαυτῶις τοῖς εἰρημένοις υπάρχει.

16 εἰ δὲ γέγονεν ἢ μὴ γέγονεν, ἐκ τῶν δὲ σκεπτεόν.

'As indeed Isocrates said, that it was monstrous to suppose that what
an Euthynus could learn he himself should be unable to discover'. Of
Euthynus Buhle says, 'de Euth. nihil constat, praeterquam quod ex
hoc loco colligi potest, fuisset eum stupidi et sterilis ingenii hominem.'
After all it is only Isocrates' estimate of him that we have to judge by:
in comparison with himself most of Isocrates' contemporaries were to him
contemptible. The name of Euthynus does not occur in Isocrates' extant
orations. A doubtful speech, πρὸς Ἐὐθύνου (Ready wit), is printed with
his works. This Euthynous was ἄνεψιος Νικίον, § 9. Of course he cannot
be the person here meant. Euthynus, a wrestler, is mentioned by De-
mosthenes, c. Mid. § 71, who might possibly be the man for whom Isocrates
expressed his contempt.

[The latter part of the speech πρὸς Ἐὐθύνου, Isocr. Or. 21, has not
been preserved, and Aristotle may possibly be here referring to something
in the part that is now missing. Perhaps the only difficulty about this sup-
position is the loose sense in which Ἰσοκράτης ἐφι must then be interpreted,
as the speech in question (whether written, as I believe, by Isocrates, or
not) was not delivered by him. In another speech, Isocr. πρὸς Καλλίμα-
χον, Or. 18 § 15, we have the words: ϑαυμάζω δ' εἴ αὐτὸν μὲν ἰκανὸν γνώμων
νομίζει, οτί εἰ...ἐμε δ' οὐκ ἄν οἰεται τοὺτ' ἐξευρεῖν, εἴπερ ἐβουλώμην ψευδῆ λέγειν,
ὅτι κ.τ.λ., and Aristotle may, after all, be quoting memoriter, as is his
wont, from the latter passage; in this case we should have to suppose
that Ἐὐθύνος is a slip of memory for Καλλίμαχος. See Blass, die Attische
Beredsamkeit, ii 203; and comp. Jebb's Attic Orators, ii 259. 8.]

§ 15. 'On the impossible, it is plain that the orator may be supplied
with topics from the opposites of those which have been already men-
tioned (on the possible').

ὑπάρχει] 'are already there', ready at hand, for use; as a stock, on
which he may draw for his materials.

§ 16. The second of the καὶνὰ τῶν is the topic of fact, 'whether such
and such a thing has been done or not'; this is most useful in the forensic
branch, in courts of law. It is the στάσις στοχαστική, status coniecturalis
the first of the legal issues, and the first question that arises in a case.
To this is appended, §§ 23—25, fact future; or rather, future probability,
whether so and so is likely to happen or not. This of course belongs
almost to the deliberative orator, who has to advise upon a future course
of policy. The following topics suggest arguments to prove the probability
of some act having been committed which the pleader wishes to establish
against his antagonist.

'First of all we may infer that if anything that is naturally less likely
to have occurred has happened (been done), then (a fortiori) anything (of
the same kind) that is more usual may probably have happened also'.
The 

The probability the degree of which is estimated by the frequency of recurrence, being in the latter case greater. Introd. p. 160.

§ 17. 'And if (in a relation of prior and posterior, antecedent and consequent) the usual consequent (of the antecedent) has happened, then (we may argue that) the antecedent also has happened; as, for instance, the having forgotten something implies a previous learning, some time or other, of the same'. Learning is the necessary antecedent of forgetting; without the first the second is impossible. As this is a necessary connection, the argument from it is a 

§ 18. When power is combined with the will to do a thing, we may argue that the thing has been done: this is human nature: every one, having the power to do what he wishes, does it; because there is no impediment, nothing to hinder him from the gratification of his desire. Polit. VIII (v) 10, 1312 b 3, 

§ 19. 'Further, it may be argued that an act has been done, if the supposed perpetrator had the wish or desire to do it, and no external circumstances stood in his way; or if he had the power of doing it (some injury to another), and at the same time was angry; or if he had at the same time a desire and the power of satisfying it', (the desire here is especially lust, and the act done, adultery); 'for men for the most part are wont to gratify their impulses when they have the power of doing so; the bad from want of self-control, and the good because their desires are good or well-directed (because they desire what is good, and nothing else).

ἐβουλέτο, ἐπεθύμει] "Voluit prævia deliberatione, concupivit ex affectu." Schrader. If Schrader meant by voluit that 

First, however, it must be admitted that neither of the two terms, 

πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, εἰ τὸ ἦττον γνίγνεσθαι περικός 

17 γέγονεν, γεγονός ἂν εἰή καὶ τὸ μάλλον. καὶ εἰ τὸ ὑστερον εἰμιθὸς γνίγνεσθαι γέγονεν, καὶ τὸ πρότερον 

18 καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐβουλέτο, πέπραξεν πάντες γάρ, 

όταν δυνάμενοι βουληθῶσι, πράττουσιν ἐμποδῶν γάρ 

19 οὐδέν. ἦτε εἰ ἐβουλέτο καὶ μηδὲν τῶν ἰξω ἐκώλυνεν,
καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ὁργίζετο, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐπεθύμει· ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ὥν ὁρέγονται, ὅν δύνωνται, καὶ ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φαύλοι δι' ἀκρασίαν, οἱ δ' ἐπιεικεῖς ὅτι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. καὶ εἰ ἐμελλε ὅλον class of desires, mental as well as bodily; and thus becomes identified or confounded with βουλήσις.

From a comparison of three passages of our author in which we find notices of βουλήσις, we draw the inference that it means will and not will. Will implies purpose; and we are distinctly told in Eth. Nic. III 4, III 1 b 20 seq. that βουλήσις is distinguished from προαίρεσις, deliberate moral purpose, by the absence of this. Further the exercise of προαίρεσις is confined to things which are in our power to do or avoid; the wish sometimes is directed to what is impossible or unattainable, to immortality for instance or happiness. It is also directed to the end, whereas προαίρεσις looks rather to the means of attaining the end. τέλος ἐστι τῶν πρακτῶν ὅ ἐστι αὐτὸ βουλήματα, Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 a 19. Further it is always directed to what is good, real or supposed, Rhet. I 10. 8. Psychologically considered, it belongs to the family of the ὀρέξεις, the instinctive impulses which prompt to action, acting unconsciously and without deliberation. These are three, de Anima II. 3, 414 b 2, ὀρέξεις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία (appetite) καὶ θυμός (passion, especially anger), καὶ βουλήσις (wish, the mental desire of good). (βουλήσις, Rhet. u. s., is distinguished from ἐπιθυμία, by this intellectual character of discrimination between good and bad; ἐπιθυμία being a mere animal appetite, ἁλογος ὀρέξεις). Comp. de Anima I. 5, 411 a 28, ἐτε ὅ το ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ βούλεσθαι καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ὀρέξεις, where the two are again distinguished. And in Rhet. u. s. the three ὀρέξεις are divided into λογική and ἁλογος, the former character belonging to βουλήσις, the latter (irrational) to θυμός and ἐπιθυμία. ἐπιθυμία therefore is bodily appetite, and ἐπεθύμει here, as a cause of crime, though not excluding hunger and thirst, refers more particularly to lust. In the second case, ἐπιθυμοῦσιν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν, 'desire' is extended to intellectual impulses, which can distinguish good from bad; and is thus confounded with βουλήσις, which denotes wishing, but not willing. It is to be observed that the discrimination which is exercised by βουλήσις in the choice of good, is purely impulsive or instinctive, otherwise it would not be one of the ὀρέξεις: it employs no calculation or deliberation like the προαίρεσις preparatory to decision, and does not always stimulate to action; as when it is directed to impossibilities.

εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ὁργίζετο] Because anger, as long as it lasts, is always accompanied by the desire of vengeance, which, if a man have the power, he will be sure to wreak on the object of his anger, II 2. 2. After each of these three clauses supply πέπραξεν, from § 18, as the apodosis.

§ 20. καὶ εἰ ἐμελλε γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ποιεῖν] What seems to be meant is this; anything which was on the point of being done, we may assume to have actually happened; or whatever a man was on the point of doing, that he actually did. Expressed at full length this would run, καὶ εἰ τι ἐμελλε γίγνεσθαι, (ἐγένετο)· καὶ (εἰ τις ἐμελλε) ποιεῖν, ἐποίησεν, οὐ πέπραξεν
[γίγνεσθαι, καὶ] ποιεῖν· εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ
ποιῆσαι. καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ὅσα πεφύκει πρὸ ἑκείνου ἢ
ἐνεκα ἑκείνου, οἶνον εἰ ἥστραγε, καὶ ἐβρόντησεν, καὶ
ἐπείρασε, καὶ ἐπράξεν. καὶ εἰ ὅσα ὑπερθον πε-
φύκει γίγνεσθαι ή οὐ ἐνεκα γίγνεται γέγονεν, καὶ τὸ

(again from § 18). In any other Greek author one would hardly perhaps venture upon thus supplying an ellipse; but I see no other way of extracting at once sense and Greek from the text. There appears to be no variation in the MSS. Bekker, ed. 3, and Spengel, read καὶ εἰ ἔμελλε
[γίγνεσθαι, καὶ] ποιεῖν. In § 19, the latter also puts ἐβούλετο καὶ, and (after ἐκάλουν) καὶ ἐδυνάτον (so Λ for ἐδύνατο), in brackets, as interpolations. The last three words are also omitted by MS Z. It seems to me that, in the two latter cases at least, the text is perfectly intelligible and defensible. The only reason alleged for omitting the five words in brackets in § 19 is that, if we retain them, εἰ ἐβούλετο...ἐκάλουν is a mere repetition of the preceding εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐβούλετο. That this is not the case, Victorius has pointed out in his explanation. The former of the two topics, § 18, combines power and wish: both together are certain to produce the act. The latter statement is different; the wish alone is sufficient to produce the act—provided there are no external impediments in the way: in that case the mere wish, the internal impulse, is not sufficient.

'For it is natural or likely—this is all we want for our argument—that one who is waiting to do something, or on the point of doing it, would also actually carry out his intention, and do it: the probability is that it has been done'.

§ 21. In this connexion of antecedent and consequent, if it is usual, but not necessary, it is a sign, σημεῖον, and uncertain; when necessary, it is a τεκμήριον. Anal. Pr. Π 27, sub init. σημεῖον (here including both kinds) δὲ βούλεται (would be, if it could: aspires to be) εἶναι πρότασις ἀποδεικτικὴ ἀναγκαῖα ἢ ἐνδοξος' οὗ γὰρ ἄντων ἔστιν ἢ ἐν γενεμένων πρότερον, ἢ υπερθον γέγονε τὸ πράγμα, τοῦτο σημεῖον ἐστὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἢ εἶναι.

'And again, if what had been previously (πεφύκει, 'had always been', the regular accompaniment) the natural antecedent of so and so, (of the assumed event, or imputed act,) or means to a certain end, has happened, (then the ordinary consequent has happened, or the end aimed at been attained); for instance, we infer from the occurrence of thunder that there has been lightning; and from the attempt, the execution of a crime'. By ἐπείρασε, says Victorius, is meant—principally, not exclusively—στυφρον, 'seduction', the attempt on a woman's chastity: on this use of the verb πεφύκει see Ruhnken ad Tim. s. v. p. 210. Timaeus explains it, πεπράξεν διὰ λόγον παῖδα ἢ γυναῖκα. Plat. Phaedr. 227 C, Arist. Plut. 150, and Lat. tentare.

'And (the converse) if what had been the ordinary natural consequent of something else, or the end of certain means (the aim and object of certain actions) has happened, then we infer that the ante-
cedent in the one case has occurred, the means to the end in the other have been employed, as we infer lightning from thunder, and the attempt from the execution of an act or crime. And of all these cases, in some the connexion is of necessity, in the rest only for the most part. The natural antecedent and consequent, as the uniform order of nature, is the necessary connexion: of the uncertain issues of human agency, the end has more than probability can be predicated: the natural order of the universe is the natural order of the universe, and to this the natural order of the universe is due. An argument of probability is always an argument of probability, and is of no other kind. Consequently, the connexion of motives and actions, and of actions with one another, follows only a general rule, and this rule can never be applied with absolute certainty.

§ 22. Materials for arguments on the topic of "not happening," the disproof of a statement of fact, may plainly be derived from the opposites of the preceding, which shew how it may be established. The verb is omitted: supply, as in § 15, ἰπάρχει. This omission of the verb probably accounts for the omission of ὅτι in MSS Q, Yb, Zb.

§ 23. Arguments for the establishment of the probability of future events and consequences clearly may be derived from the same source: for where the power and the wish to do anything are united, the thing will be done; as likewise when desire, anger, and calculation, are accompanied by the power of gratifying the two first, and carrying out the third. Spengel has again, without manuscript authority, bracketed καὶ λογισμός as an interpolation; doubtless because it is not mentioned in §§ 18, 19, of which this is a summary. The objection has been already anticipated and answered by Victorius. Calculation or reasoning is implied, he thinks, in the desires of good men, which are always directed to what is good. I cannot think however that this is what Ar. means here by λογισμός. And if we insist upon the strict interpretation of ἐνδυνάμωσιν, as excluding any operation of the intellect, still it is hard to deny the author the opportunity of supplying in § 23 what he has omitted to notice in § 19. The statement is perfectly true: "calculation plus the power" of carrying it out will produce future consequences: neither does it contradict anything that has been said before, but merely supplements it. After all even Aristotle is a man, and liable to human infirmities; and certainly his ordinary style of writing is not of that character which would lead us to expect rigorous exactness: on the contrary it is hasty and careless in a degree far beyond the measure of ordinary writing. Upon the whole, I see no reason whatsoever for
excluding καὶ λογισµῷ from the text: the MSS warrant it, and Bekker retains it.

διὰ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ.] The meaning of this obscure sentence seems to be this:—It follows from what has just been stated, διὰ ταῦτα—the statement, that is, that the co-existence of impulse (desire and passion) with power, is a sure source or spring of action—that the intention which these impulses suggest,—whether it be immediately, in the very impulse (or, starting-point, first start) to action, or (future) when a man is anxiously waiting for his opportunity (ἐν μελλήσει),—is most likely to be carried out; and then an additional reason is assigned for the probability of the future event when it is on the point of taking place, either immediately, or not long hence, that things that are impending (acts or events) are for the most part much more likely to happen than those that are not impending. With ἐν ὀρμῇ comp. Soph. Phil. 566, οὗτοι καθ' ὀρμὴν δρῶσιν.

I subjoin Victorius' explanation. "Vi etiam horum locorum, si operam dabat ut gereret, ac iam iamque eam rem aggregiebatur (hoc enim valere hic arbitror ἐν ὀρµῇ), aut denique si post facere aliquando statucerat (quod significari arbitror hoc verbo μελλήσει) dici potest id futurum: duos autem, si ita legatur, manifesto locos complectitur: quorum prior rei tentandae peragendaeque propinquior erat: alter tantum facere in animo habebat."

§ 24. 'And if the things that had previously been in the habit of preceding, in a natural order of succession, have already happened, (then we may expect the usual consequent); if the clouds gather, we may expect rain'.

συννεφεῖν, transitive, Arist. Av. 1502. Here impersonal, according to the analogy of verbs which express states of weather or atmospheric phenomena, ὄν, ὑφεῖ, ἐβρόντησε, ἡστραφεῖν, σινὴρ § 21, ἐσειαε, Thuc. v. 52.

The impersonal use of these verbs is explained by the original expression, and subsequent omission of a subject, ὁ Θεὸς or Ζεὺς (the God of the sky). In their ignorance of the natural causes of these and similar phenomena, they attributed them to divine interposition [Shilleto on Thuc. i 51. 2, ἔνεσκόταξ].

§ 25. 'And if anything which would serve as means to a particular end (act or event) has happened, then we may infer that the end or object which these imply is likely to be brought about; as a foundation implies a future house'.
26 ἐπὶ δὲ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ μείζονός τε καὶ ἐλάττων καὶ ὀλίγως μεγάλων καὶ μικρῶν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἦμιν ἐστὶ φανερόν. εἰρη-
ται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς περὶ τε μεγέθους ἀγαθῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἀπλῶς καὶ ἐλάττωνος.
ὡστ' ἐπεὶ καθ' ἑκαστὸν τῶν λόγων τὸ προκείμενον τέλος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οἶον τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, φανερὸν ὅτι δι' ἑκείνων ληπτεόν τὰς
27 αὐξήσεις πάσιν. τὸ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτά τι ὑπετέιν περὶ

§ 26. The last of the three κοινὸς τόπος is that of amplification and depreciation, of exalting and magnifying or disparaging and vilifying any-
thing, according as we desire to set it in a favourable or unfavourable light. Its usual name is αὔξειν καὶ μειούν, II 18. 4; 26. 1; III 19. 3. Comp.
Introd. p. 276, on II 26, and the note. Though this is a κοινὸς τόπος, and therefore can be used in the three branches of Rhetoric, it is most
especially applicable to the ἐπιδεικτικὸν γενός, and finds there its most
natural and appropriate sphere; I 9. 40.

' The subject of (ἐπὶ) the arguments or inferences that may be drawn
as to the value of things, absolute or comparative; of greatness and
littleness of things in themselves, or relatively to one another; or in
general of things great and small; is clear from what has been already
said'. They have been treated of under the head of the deliberative
branch of Rhetoric, in I 6, on things good in themselves, and I 7, on the
degrees, or comparative value of them.

ἀπλῶς] simpliciter (Victorius), seems to be more applicable to μεγέθους
than to the relative μείζον καὶ ἐλασττον. As it is applied here to the latter,
it must mean that the degree, or relative value, is the only thing which is
taken into the account of them in that chapter.

' And therefore, since in each of the three kinds of speeches (I 3. 5)
the end or object proposed is some form of good, that is to say, either the
expedient, or the fair and right, or the just, it is plain that these must be
the channels by which they are all (all three kinds of speakers) supplied
with the materials of their amplifications'.

οἶον] 'that is to say', nempe, scilicet, not 'for instance'; defining or
explaining, not exemplifying; occurs perpetually in Aristotle's writings.
Waitz has some examples on Categ. c. 4, 1 b 18; comp. note on 4 b 23;
and Bonitz on Metaph. A 4, 985 b 6. [For some instances, see infra, note
on III 1. 4.]

§ 27. 'But to carry our inquiries beyond this into the subject of
magnitude and excess or superiority absolutely and in themselves is mere
idle talk (trifling with words): for for use, or practical purposes (the
needs or business of life), particular things are far more important (au-
thoritative, carry greater weight with them, are more convincing) than
universals'. What is said here of particulars being more useful than
universals for practice, or for the practitioner in any art, and therefore
for the rhetorician, is illustrated by Metaph. A 1, 981 a 12, πρὸς μὲν οὕν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδέν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔπιτυχάνονται ὁρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπειρους τῶν ἀνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχόντων. οὕτων δὲ οἳ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' έκαστόν ἐστι γνώσει, ἢ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πάντα περὶ τὸ καθ' ἐκαστόν εἰσιν' οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὑμάζει ὁ ἑρμηνευτός. ἐκάλλιαν ή Σωκράτην. In Rhet. I 2. 11, where at first sight this might seem to be contradicted, the author is speaking of Rhetoric as an art, which deals with universals, if it be a true art and not a mere empirical practice: here as a practice, and as employed by a practitioner.

κενολογεῖν] is found in the same sense applied to the mere variety or idle talk, without meaning, of the Platonic ideas, in Metaph. A 9, 991 b 20, and the repetition of the same passage, M 5, 1079 b 26.

CHAP. XX.

Having now finished the treatment of the special modes of rhetorical proof, the εἴθε, ἰδῶς, πάθος and κοινῷ τόποι, we have next to speak of the universal.

Hitherto the objects of our investigation and analysis have been of a special character, included under particular sciences, chiefly moral and political, and also, under the three branches of Rhetoric, the topics severally appropriate to each: the ἰδῶς and πάθος, the secondary arguments, by which a favourable impression of the speaker's character is conveyed to the audience, and they themselves brought into the state of feeling which his purpose requires, are likewise confined to Rhetoric: as are also the κοινῷ τόποι—common to all the three branches, though even these are not equally applicable to all, and may therefore in a sense be included under the term ἰδα (so Schrader).—We now proceed to what remains to be done before we bring the logical and intellectual division of Rhetoric to its conclusion—to give an account of the two universal methods common to all reasoning of every kind, compared with which all the rest may be called ἰδα, viz. deduction, demonstration, syllogism, and induction; or, as they appear in Rhetoric, in the imperfect forms of enthymeme (inference) and example; which are in fact the only two methods by which we can arrive at truth and knowledge. ὅτι δὲ οὕν μόνον οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ ἀποδεικτικοί συλλογισμοί διὰ τῶν προειρημένων γίνονται σχημάτων (the figures of syllogism), ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοί, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἠτίσουν πιστικά καὶ καθ'
§ 1. First of all then let us speak of example; for example is like induction, and induction is a beginning or origin. δ' εκ συλλογικῶν μέθοδων, νῦν ἄν εἴη λεκτέων. ἄπαντα γὰρ πιστεύομεν ἢ διὰ συλλογικοῦ ἢ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς. Aristotle supposed that inductive reasoning could be reduced to a syllogistic form [Grote's Aristotle I 268]. Anal. Pr. II 23, 68 b 9. ἐπερ μαθησόμεν ἢ ἐπαγωγὴ ἢ ἀπόδειξις. Anal. Post. I 18, 81 a 40. This explanation will reconcile the apparent contradiction of including the κοινὸς τόπος under ἔκδικος; it is only as contrasted with the still more universal induction and demonstration that they can be so called.

'These common (universal) modes of persuasion, or rhetorical proof, are generically two (two in kind as we say; two species in one genus), example and enthymeme; for γνώμη is a part of enthymeme.' This last remark is meant to correct the ordinary treatment of the γνώμη as a distinct species of argument, apart from the enthymeme, of which in reality it is a mere variety. This is actually done in the Rhet. ad Al. c. 7 (8). 2 and c. 11 (12). The γνώμη and its logical character are described in the next chapter, § 2.

§ 2. 'First of all then let us speak of example; for example is like induction, and induction is a beginning or origin'. δὴ δῆλον δὴ ὦτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἑπαγωγῆς γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ γὰρ αὐξηθεὶς οὖν ἡ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ. Anal. Post. II 19, 100 b 3, and the whole chapter. Induction is a beginning, because from and by it, originally from objects of sense, we collect all our primary (πρῶτα) and universal first principles, the highest ἀρχαί, from which all our syllogisms must ultimately be deducted. It seems that this is assigned as a reason for beginning with παράδειγμα, which is a variety of induction, rather than with ἐνθύμημα, the rhetorical offshoot of ἀπόδειξις, demonstration or deduction. On παράδειγμα, or example in general, see Introd. p. 103, seq.

'Of examples there are two kinds: one of them is to relate past facts, the other to invent them for oneself. Of the latter again, one kind is comparison or illustration; the other λόγοι, fables, like Aesop's and the Libyan'; (and the fables of Phaedrus, La Fontaine, and Gay). The illustration, 'those of Aesop and the Libyan', is confined to only one of the two kinds of λόγοι, fables proper, in which animals, plants, or even inanimate objects are endowed with speech and reason: the other includes fictions, tales, stories: analogous cases, fictitious, and made for the occasion, or more usually derived from the writings of poets, especially epic and tragic, philosophers, historians, or any authors of credit. See further on these terms and divisions, Introd. pp. 254—6, and the
§ 3. ἃτι δὲ τὸ μὲν πράγματα λέγειν τοιὸνδε τι, ὡσπερ εἰ τις λέγων ὅτι δεὶ πρὸς βασιλέα παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἔαν Ἀγνυπτον χειρώσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ Δαρείος οὐ πρότερον ᾿Ρ. 1393 ὅ. διέβη πρὶν Ἀγνυπτον ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη, καὶ πάλιν ἑρίζει οὐ πρότερον ἐπεχειρήσε πρὶν ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη· ὥστε καὶ οὕτος ἔαν λάβη, διαβῆσεται· διὸ 4 οὕκ ἐπιτρεπτέον· παραβολὴ δὲ τὰ Σωκρατικά, οἴον

references there given: and on λόγοι, 'fables', p. 255, note. On the Fable, see some excellent remarks in Müller, H. G. L. c. xi 14, 15; and G. C. Lewis, in Phil. Mus. I 280, "On the fables of Babrius." He begins with this definition:—"A fable may be defined to be an analogical narrative, intended to convey some moral lesson, in which irrational animals or objects are introduced as speaking."

§ 3. ἃτι δὲ τὸ μὲν πράγματα λέγειν] For παραδείγμα of the older editions, I accept with Bekker, ed. 3, Spengel's alteration πράγματα λέγειν. It is suggested by MS A' παραδείγματα λέγειν, and supported by § 8, τὰ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων; see in Trans. Bav. Acad. Munich 1851, p. 49.

'The historical example (τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγεγενημένα) is of this kind: as if, for instance (a deliberative speaker) were to say, We must arm against the King' (the Great King, the King of Persia, as usual without the article), 'and not allow him to subdue Egypt: for in fact Darius did not cross (the Aegean to attack us) until he had secured (got possession of) Egypt, but as soon as he had done that, he did cross; and Xerxes again did not make his attempt upon us until he had seized it, but crossed as soon as he was master of it: and therefore (the inference from the two examples or historical parallels) this King also is likely to cross if he is allowed to seize it, so that we must not permit it'. The case here given in illustration is probably an imaginary one, εἰ τις λέγων; and this seems to be Victorius's opinion. But it is barely possible that the recovery of Egypt by Ochus, ὁ μετονομασθεὶς Ἀρταξέρξης (Diod.), about 350 B.C., Clint. Fast. Hell. ii, p. 316 and note w, may have attracted the attention of the Athenian assembly, and this argument have been used by one of the speakers on the question. Max Schmidt, in his tract On the date of the Rhetoric, makes use of this passage as helping to fix it, pp. 19—21. Artaxerxes' expedition to Egypt was undertaken in 351 B.C., and continued through the next year. Both the rival sovereigns, Nectanebus, the reigning king, and Artaxerxes, sent ambassadors to the Greek states for aid, and the subject excited general interest at Athens, as well as in the rest of Greece. It was at this time that Aristotle, who was then employed on his Rhetoric, introduced this illustration, which was suggested by what was actually going on at the time.

§ 4. παραβολὴ is juxtaposition, setting one thing by the side of another for the purpose of comparison and illustration; taking analogous or parallel cases; it is the argument from analogy, ἐν τις διωνται ὑμῶν ὑπάρχειν.

§ 7. A good instance of παραβολὴ in this sense occurs, Pol. 11 5, 1264 δ 4, where Plato is said to derive a παραβολὴ, or analogy, εἰ τῶν θηρίων
PHTORIKHIS B 20 § 4.

ei' tis legei oti ou dei klerwtous, archeiv. omoiv gar p. 89. wseper an ei' tis touvs abhntas kleroini mi o an ovwn-
tai agwvizesbai alla o an lاخwv, h toun plw-
tiron on tina dei kubervn kan klerwseion, ws deon ton
(i.e. dogs), to prove that the pursuits and occupations of men and women should be the same.

1 Of parabolh' the Socratic practice or method is an example; as for instance if one were to say, that the magistrates ought not to be chosen by lot: for this is analogous to the case of choosing for the athletes (who were to enter the lists) not those who are fitted for the combat, but those upon whom the lot falls; or to choosing the steersman out of a crew of sailors on the principle that it was the man who won the toss, and not the man of knowledge and skill (the man who knows his business), that ought to be chosen'.

This very same analogy is ascribed to Socrates by the accuser at his trial, as one of those which he was in the habit of using, Xen. Memor. 1 2.9. And the same mode of inference, from the analogy of the mechanical and other arts, was transmitted by Socrates to Plato, and through him to his pupil Aristotle, in whose writings it constantly appears in illustration of many of his moral and social and political theories. It is to this practice of Socrates that Critias refers, when he and Charicles, during the tyranny of the Thirty, summoned him before them, and forbade him to continue his dialectical practice and intercourse with the young Athenians. Socrates inquires what sort of questions he is ordered to abstain from. Ib. 1 2. 37, o de Kritias, allia twvde to i se aplexesthai, efey, dehevi, o Sowkrate, twn skntwv kai twv tektwn kai
twn chalkeiv kai gar oima anutovs hdh katapetrophbai diathyllovmenvos uto
sow. Similarly Callicles, Plat. Gorg. 491 A, ni tovs theous, sotevwv ye dei
skntwv te kai kubvfas kai magieovs legov kai iatpovs ovdhen paiwe, k.t.l. Alcibiades, Sympos. 221 E, onow gar kathiliov sknti kai chalkeia tvdis

1 Parabolh is thus described by Gaisford, 189. a. p. 176 (ap. Gaisford, legetai de
parabolh dioti tov legeomenv paraballevi, toutest sti synkhrivei kai paratithse, prag-
mata tis nymion elwsas ati glines. Ope ophelieis pantos nymiwsteron einai tov dei paralhptai. Kakia gar parabolh to agvstov ati auynethi...dioti oide didaskalikhi
h tiaidht esti parabolh. On the definition, and various definitions of the 'parable,' see Trench on the Parables, Ch. 1 Introd. The author in defining parable, and distingushing it from fable, seems to confine himself too exclusively to the New Testament parables, when he says that the latter "is constructed to set forth a truth spiritual and heavenly," whereas the fable "never lifts itself above the earth"; it "inculcates maxims of prudential morality, industry, caution, foresight," all its morality being of a worldly character, p. 2. And again, p. 9, "the parable differs from the fable, moving as it does in a spiritual world, and never trespassing the actual order of things natural." Aristotle, to whom Dr Trench does not refer, distingushes parable in general from fable by this; that the former depicts human relations (in which the N. T. parable coincides with it); it invents analogous cases, which are not historical, but always such as might be so; always probable, and corresponding with what actually occurs in real life. The fable is pure fiction, and its essential characteristic is, that it invests beasts, birds, plants, and even things inanimate with the attributes of humanity.
§ 5. The fable may be exemplified by that of Stesichorus about Phalaris, and that of Aesop, in his defence of the demagogue.

For when the Himereans had elected Phalaris general with absolute power, and were about to give him a body-guard, Stesichorus, after having finished the rest of his argument (or discussion), told them a fable, 'how a horse was the sole possessor of a meadow, when a stag came, and desiring to take vengeance upon the stag for spoiling his pasture he asked the man (or a man tiwá, MS A*, Spengel) if he could help him to chastise the stag: the other assented, on the condition of his accepting a bit and allowing himself to mount him with his javelins: so when he had agreed and the other had mounted, instead of his revenge he himself became a slave henceforth to the man: so likewise you, said he, see to it that ye do not in your desire of vengeance upon your enemies share the fate of the horse: for the bit ye have already—when ye elected a general with absolute power, but if ye grant him a body-guard and let him get on your backs, then henceforward ye will be Phalaris' slaves.' The same fable is briefly told by Horace, Ep. i. 10. 34, Cervus equum pugna melior communibus herbis pellebat, &c.

This fable of Stesichorus, which Aristotle here assigns to the age and case of Phalaris, is by Conon 'a writer in Julius Caesar's time,' Bentley, Phalaris, Vol. i. p. 106 (ed. Dyce [p. 101 ed. Wagner]) transferred to that of Gelon; and this latter version is regarded by Bentley as the more probable; 'the circumstances of Gelon's history seem to countenance Conon.' 'If we suppose then with the Arundel marble that Stesichorus lived Ol. LXXIII 3,' (this is highly improbable; it places Stesichorus' floruit a full century too low, in the year B.C. 486; which should indeed be 485, the year in which Gelon became master of Syracuse, Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, sub anno,) 'it exactly
agrees with the age of Gelon, and Conon's account of the story may seem more credible than Aristotle's. And then all the argument that would settle Phalaris' age from the time of Stesichorus, will vanish into nothing (which is probably Bentley's principal reason for maintaining the paradox). Mure, Müller and Clinton, *F. H.*, *sub anno* 632, place the date of Stesichorus' birth in B.C. 645; 643 or 632, and 632, severally; 'so that,' says Müller, *H. G. L.* ch. XIV 4, (as he lived over 80) 'he might be a contemporary of the Agrigentine tyrant Phalaris, against whose ambitious projects he is said by Aristotle to have warned his fellow-citizens (he was a native of Himera) in an ingenious fable.' Mure likewise, Vol. III. p. 226, follows Aristotle. Clinton, *F. H.*, places Phalaris' accession to the throne of Agrigentum in B.C. 570. On Phalaris, see Mr Bunbury's article in Smith's *Biographical Dictionary*. Mr B. says, it would appear from Aristotle, Rhet. ii 20, if there be no mistake in the story there told, that he was at one time master of Himera as well as Agrigentum.

On εἰ δύνατ' ἂν, see Appendix at the end of this book, *On ἂν with the optative after certain particles.*


'And Aesop in Samos as advocate for a demagogue on his trial for a capital offence, said that a fox in crossing a river was driven into a cleft or chasm (in the bank); being unable to get out, she suffered for a long time, and many dog-ticks fastened upon her. And a hedgehog, in his wanderings, when he saw her, took compassion upon her, and asked her, if he should (was to, optative) remove the dog-ticks from her. But she would not allow it. And upon his asking her why, she replied, because these are already satiated with me and suck (draw) little blood; but if you remove these, others will come, hungry, and drain me of all the blood that is left. But you too, men of Samos, he continued, *this* one will do you no more harm, for he has got rich; but if you put him to death, others will come who are poor, and they will waste all your public property by their thefts.'

This fable is referred to also by Plutarch, *An seni gerenda respublica* p. 790 C, ἦ μὲν γὰρ Αἰσώτειος ἀλάτης τὸν ἑξίνον οὐκ ἐστ' οὖς κράτῶνας

7 λώσουσι τὰ κοινὰ κλέπττοντες.” εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ λόγοι ἰδι-αὐτῆς ἄφελεῖς βουλόμενον, ἃν γὰρ τούτους, ἑφὶ, μεστοὶ ἀπαλάξις ἔτεροι προσαίρει πεινώντες. Victorius.

εἰς φάραγγα] φάραγγα has two senses, ‘a cliff’, as Alem. Fragm. 44 (Bergk), εὔνοοιν ὄρεσι κυρωφά τε καὶ φάραγγες; and ‘a chasm’ or ‘cleft’, which it bears here. A fox in attempting to cross a rapid river has been carried down by the torrent, and lodged in a rent or chasm of the precipitous bank, and is there caught as it were in a trap, prevented from getting out by the rapidity of the stream in front. This sense of φάραγγα is illustrated by Thuc. 1.76, bis, where it is used of the pits or clefts in the rocks into which the Athenians threw the bodies of the Spartan ambassadors who had been betrayed into their hands and then murdered, the Lacedaemonians having previously treated Athenian prisoners in the same manner, ἀπέκτειναν πῶντα καὶ εἰς φάραγγας ἐνεβάλαν. Eur. Trad. 4.48, φάραγγες ὑδάτι χειμάρρῳ μέσουσα, whether they are narrow clefts or ravines traversed by winter torrents. Arist. Equit. 4.248, of Cleon, φάραγγα (met. νοταγο, a chasm or abyss, which swallows up all the income of the state) καὶ χάρυβδών ἀρπαγῆς. Xen. de Ven. 5.16, Hares when pursued sometimes cross rivers, καὶ καταδύονται εἰς φάραγγας “are swallowed up in their chasms or abysses.”

Another of these political ‘fables’, of Antisthenes (Socraticus), is referred to by Ar., Pol. 1.13, 1284 a 15. Speaking of the folly of attempting to control by legislation the born rulers, who, one or more, excel all the rest of the citizens together in virtue, and are like Gods amongst men, he adds, “they would very likely reply if the attempt were made, ἀπερ’Ἀντισθένης ἐφὶ τοὺς λεοντας δημιουργοῦσαν τῶν ἀσυπόδων (hares) καὶ τὸ ἱσθον ἀξιωντον πῶντας ἐσχε.”

κυνοράϊσται, ‘dog-ticks’. These canine-tormentors are as old as Homer. Argus, Ulysses’ dog, in his old age was covered with them: ἐνθα κύων κεῖτ.”Ἀργος ἐνίπλειος κυνοραϊστών. Od. ρ’ (XVII) 300.

§ 7. ‘Fables are adapted to public speaking, and the virtue they
have lies in this, that whereas (μέν) similar facts that have really happened are hard to find, fables are easier (to invent—εὑρεῖν being unconsciously used in two different senses); for they must be invented, like the parallel, analogous, cases; (which, as we have seen, are invented for the occasion, but must be conformable to the circumstances of real life,) that is to say, if one has the faculty of seeing the analogy, which may be facilitated by the study of philosophy'. Philosophy is used here in a vague and popular sense, for intellectual study, and mental exercise in general. So research and philosophising are identified, Pol. v (VIII) 11, sub fin. 1331 a 16, ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν. Comp. III 11.5, οὖν καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ ὄμοιον καὶ ἐν πολὺ διέχουσιν θεωρεῖν εὐστόχου, and the note there. The tracing of resemblances in nature is the foundation of analogous reasoning, and consequently of the inductive method. ζητεῖν δὲ δει ἐπιβλέποντα ἐπὶ τὰ ὄμοια καὶ ἀδιάφορα, πρῶτον τί ἀπαντᾷ ταύτον ἔχουσιν, κ.π.λ. Anal. Post. 11 13, 96 b 7. In Top. A 13, 105 a 25, ἡ τοῦ ὄμοιου σκέψις is said to be one of four ἰσχίαν δι' ὧν εὑρηκόμεν τῶν συλλογισμῶν. Comp. c. 17, 108 a 7, seq. on analogies. See Trendelenburg, El. Log. Ar. § 59, p. 137. On the various senses of φιλοσοφία and πραγματεία (which are often identified) see Waitz, ad Org. 96 b 15, 11. p. 415.

On Isocrates' comprehensive use of this word see note in Camb. Journal of Cl. and Sacred Phil. Vol. II, No. 5, p. 150, and especially the passage of peri ἀντιδόσεως §§ 180—192, 'where he includes in it all branches of mental education, in which Rhetoric of course occupies the foremost place.' Other references are there given1. [Comp. Isocr. Paneg. § 10 τὴν περὶ τοὺς λόγους φιλοσοφιαν (with note) and especially Jebb's Attic Orators, 11, p. 37.]

λόγοι δημηγορικοί] δημηγορικῶν γένεως, or δημηγορία, is one of the alternative names of the first branch of Rhetoric, the συμβουλευτικῶν. I 1.10, peri τὰ δημηγορικά καὶ δικαίως, τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας, ἐν τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς, ἡ δημηγορία. III 12. 5, ἡ δημηγορικὴ λέξις. Historical examples (as indeed we are told in the next section) of similar cases that have already occurred, must of course be more useful to one who is addressing a public assembly on matters of state policy, than to the pleader in a court of justice, or a declaimer in an epideictic speech. But these, says our text, are not always easy to be found; either there are none at all, or they are rare; or at all events easily forgotten: whereas fables, and other analogous cases, which may be invented for the occasion, may be easily supplied if the faculty of tracing resemblances already exists; if not, it may be cultivated by exercise in philosophical study.

ἀγαθῶν] some virtue, something good (about them), comp. I 2.10, φανερῶν ὦτι καὶ ἐκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἔδος τῆς ἁρμονίας.

1 φιλοσοφία is inadequately rendered 'literature' in Introd. p. 256.
§ 8. 'Now the arguments or inferences by way of fables (τὰ διὰ, with genitive, which are conveyed 'through the channel of', are conveyed 'by'), are easier to supply (provide) oneself with, but those by way of facts (historical parallels) are more serviceable for deliberation; because the future for the most part resembles the past'. We can therefore argue with probability from the results of circumstances past, to the results of similar circumstances, which are now under deliberation, in the future. Men are much the same in all ages; human nature is tolerably constant in its operations and effects; the same motives prevail, and lead to similar actions; what has been in the past, will be in the future.

§ 9. 'Examples must be used, in the absence of enthymemes, as direct logical proofs—for this is the road to persuasion (or conviction)—if we have them, as (confirmatory) evidence, and they are to be employed as a supplement to our enthymemes: for when put first they resemble an induction (the several examples are the particulars, or facts, from which the general rule is collected), but induction is not appropriate to Rhetoric, except in rare cases; but when they are appended to the others they are like evidence, and evidence is always acceptable (the witness always carries weight, is always listened to; people are inclined to believe him)'.

The enthymeme is the σώμα τῆς πίστεως, I 1. 3, ἀπόδειξις ῥητορική ἐνθύμημα...κυριότατον τῶν πίστεων, 1b. § 11. On the application of the term ἀπόδειξις to rhetorical proof, see note on I 1.11.

ἐπίλογος is here simply equivalent to τὸ ἐπιλεγόμενον, something added, appended, as a supplement, and not to be understood as the technical ἐπίλογος, the concluding member of the speech, the peroration.

ἐπιλόγῳ χρώμενον τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν] This cannot mean 'using the enthymemes as a supplement', which is directly contrary to what the author intends to say. The construction is, χρώμενον (αὐτοῖς ὡς) ἐπιλόγῳ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν, that is ὡς λόγος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν as a λόγος—'argument' or 'sentence'—after, following, supplementary to, the enthymemes. And this is confirmed by ἐπιλεγόμενα μαρτυρίοις in the next clause. This construction, the substantive taking the case of its verb, is fully justified by the examples given in the note on II 4.31, supra p. 56, note 1.
And therefore also, if you put your examples first you must necessarily employ a considerable number; if you introduce them afterwards even one is enough; for even a single witness that can be relied on is of service. This is a second objection to putting the examples first. If you do so, they will resemble an induction: but an induction derived from only one or two particulars is of little or no force. Therefore the particular cases must be numerous; and so, not only the induction itself is inappropriate in Rhetoric, but you will also be obliged to make it long.

'So the subject of the number of kinds of examples, and how and when they are to be employed, has been dispatched (disposed of).'

CHAP. XXI.

Of γνώμαι 'maxims', general sentiments of a moral character, which serve as enthymemes, and are therefore included here as introductory to the treatment of them, an account has been given, with reference to other writers on the same subject, in Introd. p. 257 seq., to which the reader is referred. Compare on this subject Harris, Philolog. Inq. Vol. iv. p. 182 seq. The author mainly follows Aristotle.

For examples of γνώμαι see Brunck's Poetae Gnomici, passim: and Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr., Theognis, Phocylides, Solon, &c.

§ 1. γνωμολογία, 'the subject, or art of maxim-making', occurs again, Pl. Phaedr. 267 C, as part of the contents of Polus' rhetorical repertory. As to (the art of) maxim-making, we shall best arrive at a clear understanding of the objects, times, and persons, to which and at which the employment of it is most appropriate in our speeches, when it has been first stated what a maxim is.

§ 2. 'A maxim is a declaration—not however of particulars or individuals, as, for instance, what sort of a person Iphicrates is, but universally (a general statement, an universal moral rule or principle)'. ἀπό-

1 This may help to throw light on the disputed explanation of this word in the passage of Plato, see Dr Thompson's note ad loc. It is there translated 'the style sententious.' γνωμολογία is here, at any rate, the science or study, the theory (λόγος), and (in Rhetoric) the use or practical application, of γνώμαι, maxims or general moral sentiments; after the analogy of ἀστρολογία, μετεορολογία, δικαλολογία (Rhet. 1 i. 10), φιλολογία (Plut.) and a great number of modern sciences; the use of the maxim predominates in the application of γνωμολογεῖν throughout the chapter.
phiavsi, ou menoi peri tov kath' ekaston, oin poivos

tis 'Iphikratis, alla katholou' kai ou peri pan ton

katholou, oin oti to eu thy tw kaupulyw enantion, alla

peri osow ai praxeis eisi, kai aireta n feukteta esti

pros to prattew. "wst epe i evnwmata o peri

tou twv synulogismou esti sxeidon, ta te sympera-

matatouvv envmumatwn kai ai arxai afairebentos t oxygen

vnoi eisiv, oin

chr' de ou poiv, ois tis artirfanon pefvo anh,

paideas perissow evkaidaksevai sofoiv.

phiavsi (apofainew) a 'declaration' or 'utterance'. Here again we

have in two mss the varia lectio apofasii. See on this, note on 8 2.

Comp. § 9, ois agrakou malasty grumotptos eis kai radia apofaiwntai,

and § 16, dia to apofainen elwv ton twn grwmwn lejwnta...

apofainen elwv seems to have some special connexion with grwmu in its

ordinary signification as well as this technical application. See Heindorf

on Gorg. § 48, p. 466 c. In several passages which he quotes the same

verb is used for declaring a grwm, in the sense of opinion. ["So Protag.

336 D, twn eautoi grwmwn apofainen elwv; ib. 340 B." Dr Thompson on

Gorg. i. c.]

'And not of all universals, as, for example, that straight is opposed to

crooked, but only of those which are concerned with (human) actions, and

are to be chosen or avoided in respect of action.' This concern with human

action—praxeis can only be predicated of human beings—gives the grwm its

moral character. See, for instance, the beginning of the second chapter of

Eth. Nic. ii. Of actions it is said, 1104 a 31, autha grw eis kura

kai tou poias gnevethai tais eixeis; they determine the moral character.

And so frequently elsewhere. This moral character of the grwm however,

though it undoubtedly predominates in the description and illustration

of it through the remainder of the chapter, is not absolutely

exclusive: the grwm may be applied likewise to all practical business of

life, and all objects of human interest, as health in § 5; and praxeis must

be supposed virtually to include these. With this definition that of

Auct. ad Heren. IV 17. 24 deserves to be compared: it is not so complete

as Aristotle's, but may be regarded as supplementary to it: Sententia

(i. e. grwm) which is also the term by which Quintilian expresses it, Inst.

Orat. viii 5) est oratio sumpta de vita, quae aut quid sit aut quid esse

opoteat in vita breviter ostendit, hoc pacto: it is there illustrated to

the end of the chapter. One useful precept for the guidance of the rheto-

rician in the employment of the grwm may be quoted here, especially as

Aristotle has omitted it. Sententia interponi raro convenit, ut vix

actores, non vivendi praecptores videamur esse. grwma often take the

form of 'precepts'. Harris, s. s., p. 182.

'And therefore since rhetorical enthymemes are as one may say'}
that All see but These they 2.

It processes of allowance of jealousy his &clausulam next premisses the subjects this apyia some ences some which active "geneous other, Quint. other, this children is due Theaetetus they whole this is gain things here is this things are led the into and consequent neglect of their duties as citizens, into which they are led by their studious habits. This is what provokes the jealousy and hostility of the citizens. Plato's unpopularity at Athens was due to the same cause. Plato justifies himself against these charges of his enemies in four well-known passages, in the Republic [vi 484—497], Theaetetus [172 c] and Gorgias [527]; and in the seventh Epistle, if that be his [see Introd. to Dr Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, pp. xii—xiv].

These lines are put into the enthymematic form, as an argument, in § 7. It is a specimen of a practical syllogism, or enthymeme, logic applied to action or conduct. As a syllogism it would run thus: All

(σχεδών 'pretty nearly', that is, not absolutely, but generally, making allowance for some which are not concerned with the practical business of life—so Victorius) 'the logical mode of reasoning or inference on these subjects (the business of life and human actions), when this syllogistic process is withdrawn (and the major premiss or conclusion is left alone), the conclusions and major premisses of enthymemes are γνώμαι'. These premisses and conclusions taken by themselves are mere enunciations of some general principle: they do not become enthymemes, i.e. inferences or processes of reasoning, till the reason is added—sententia cum ratione, Quint. and Auct. ad Heren., Introd. p. 257—which is stated in the next sentence. Hanc guidem partem enthymematist quidem initium aut clausulam epichrematis esse dixerunt: et est aliquando, non tamen semper. Quint. VIII 5. 4 (d e Sententiis, VIII 5. 1—8, q. v.).

'For instance, "No man that is of sound mind ought ever to have his children over-educated to excess in learning," (Eur. Med. 294). Now this is a maxim (moral precept, the conclusion of the enthymeme): but the addition of the reason, and the why (the aitia or cause) makes the whole an enthymeme, for example, "for besides the idle habits which they thereby contract to boot" (into the bargain—the comparative ἀλλος, other, in this common, but illogical use of the word, brings two heterogeneous things into illicit comparison: see [p. 46 supra and note on iii 1. 9]) "they reap (gain as their reward) hostile jealousy from the citizens." The ἀργία here is the literary indolence, or inactivity, the withdrawal from active life and the consequent neglect of their duties as citizens, into which they are led by their studious habits. This is what provokes the jealousy and hostility of the citizens. Plato's unpopularity at Athens was due to the same cause. Plato justifies himself against these charges of his enemies in four well-known passages, in the Republic [vi 484—497], Theaetetus [172 c] and Gorgias [527]; and in the seventh Epistle, if that be his [see Introd. to Dr Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, pp. xii—xiv].

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ought to avoid, or no man should be rendered liable to, idle habits and the hatred of his fellow-citizens: children who are over-educated do become idle and unpopular; therefore children ought not to be over-educated.

'And again, “There is no man who is altogether happy”'—Eur. Fragm. Sthenel. 1 (Dind., Wagn.). The reason, which converts it into an enthymeme, is supplied by Aristoph. Ran. 1217, ἦ γὰρ περὶκῶς ἐσθλὸς οὐκ ἔχει βίον, ἢ δυσγενὴς ἄνυ. (he is here interrupted by Aeschylus who finishes the verse for him with λημύθων ἀπαλεσθεν: but the Schol. supplies the conclusion) πλοῦσιάν ἀράι πλάλη.

'And another, "there is none of mankind that is free"' is a γνῶμη, but with the addition of the next verse (τῷ ἔχομεν ἔπει) it becomes an enthymeme, "for he is the slave either of money or fortune."' From Eur. Hec. 864. Our texts have θυγνῶν for ἀνθρῶν: doubtless it is one of Ar.'s ordinary slips of memory in quotation, and a very unimportant one. But I think as a general rule, it is quite unsafe to rely upon our author's quotations in correction of any reading in more ancient writers.

§ 3. 'If then a γνῶμη is what has been described, there must necessarily be four kinds of γνῶμη: either with, or without, an appendage or supplement (containing the reason). It is first put forward independently as a γνῶμη, and then, if it is not generally acceptable, and a reason is required, this is added, and it becomes an enthymeme.

§ 4. 'Those that require proof (ἀποδείξεις 'demonstration', as before, used loosely for proof of any kind) are all such as state anything paradoxical (contrary to received opinion; or surprising, unexpected, contrary to expectation, and to anything that you ever heard before) or anything which is questioned (or open to question): those that have nothing unexpected about them (may be stated, λέγοντει) without a supplement.' These together make up the four kinds.

§ 5. The first two kinds are those which require no supplement.

'Of these, some must require no supplement owing to their being already well known, as, "best of all is wealth for a man, at least in my opinion," because most people think so'.

The line here quoted is of uncertain origin. There was a famous σκάλων, drinking-song or catch, usually attributed to Simonides, which Athen., xlv 694 E, has preserved amongst several that he there quotes; and it is also to be found in Bergk's Collection, Fragm. Lyr. Gr. Scola,
(φαίνεται γάρ τοῖς πολλοῖς οὕτω), τὰς δ' ἀμα λεγο-
ménas δήλας εἶναι ἐπιβλέψαις, οἶον
οὐδείς ἐραστής ὦς τις οὐκ ἄει φιλεῖ.
ο τῶν δὲ μετ' ἐπιλόγου αἱ μὲν ἐνθυμίματος μέρος εἰσίν,
.CheckBox

χρὴ δ' οὖ ποθ' ὦς τις ἄρτιφρων,

13. It runs thus: ύμαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ βιατῷ, δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν
φιλὰν γενέσθαι, τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλούτειν ἄδολως, καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβαίν μετὰ
τῶν φίλων. This is repeated by Anaxandrides in some iambics of his
Thesaurus, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Comm. Gr. III 169), and quoted by
Athen. immediately after the σκόλιον as a parallel or illustration.
Anaxandrides does not know the author; ὄ το σκόλιον εὐρῶν ἑκεῖνος,
οὕτῳ ἦν. Plato has likewise quoted it in Gorg. 451 E, and elsewhere (see
Stallbaum's note). The Scholiast on this passage says, τὸ σκόλιον τούτο
οἱ μὲν Σιμώνιδου φασίν, οἱ δὲ Ἐπιχάρμου. On which Meineke, u. s., note,
says 'Nonne igitur pro ἡμῖν legendum ἐμῖν, et ipsi ille versus, ἀνδρὶ δʹ
ὑμαίνειν κ.τ.λ., Epicharmo tribuendum?' The trochaic metre is doubtless
in favour of this supposition, but that shews on the other hand that
it could not have formed part of the scolion above quoted, which is in
quite a different measure: and also, supposing it to be taken from that,
it would be a most improbable and unmeaning repetition of the first
line. If therefore Meineke is right in attributing it to Epicharmus, it
must have belonged to another and independent scolion. Another
scolium in Cramer, Anecd. Paris. on Ar. Rhet. has τὸ "ἀνδρὶ δʹ ὑμαίνειν
ἄριστον." Σιμώνιδου ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῶν σκολιῶν αὐτοῦ ἐπῶν. οἱ δʹ Ἐπιχάρμου.
Meineke, u. s. Simonides at all events has something like it, ὀδὴ καλῶς
σεφίας χάρις, εἰ μὴ τις ἔχει σεμνῶν ύμίεων. This places health at the
head of the list of goods: another distich, quoted in Ar. Eth. Nic. 1 9,
Eth. Eudem. init., as 'the Delian inscription' ἐπὶ τὸ προτύπου τοῦ
(Stob. ciii 15, Dind. Fr. 326), places health second in the order, or rather,
perhaps, leaves the question open. Aristophon of Sicyon (Athen. xv 702
A) wrote a hymn to Health, beginning ύμία πρεσβίστα μακάρων; he also
regards it as the greatest of all blessings, ὀδὴν δὲ χαρὶς οὕτως
ἐὐδαιμών ἐφι, line 8. See in Bergk, Fr. Lyr. Gr. p. 841 [p. 984, ed. 2].
Comp. Philem. Fr. Inc. 62, αὖτὸ δʹ ύμίεων προτότο, εἰτ' εὐπραξίαν κ.τ.λ.

'Whereas others (the second kind, of division 1) (though previously
unknown) are clear the very moment they are uttered, provided you
pay attention to them,' (or perhaps, 'the moment you cast your eye
upon them'). Comp. Top. Γ 6, 120 a 32, 34; δ 15 and 30, E 4, 132 a 27.
ἐπίθεσις Anal. Pr. 1 29, 45 a 26, ἐπιβλέψεων Ib. v 17, προσεπιβλέπειν
Ib. v 21 (from Waitz). Upon the whole I think the comparison of these
passages is in favour of the former of the two interpretations: and so
Victorius.

οἶνον κ.τ.λ.] 'as "no lover is inconstant in his affection."

§ 6. 'Of those which have the supplement (these are the two kinds
of the second division), some are part of an enthymeme, as "no man of sound mind ought," (the commencement of the verses of Euripides in § 2), and the rest have an enthymematic character, but are not part of an enthymeme: which (the latter) are in fact the most popular. αἱ μὲν ἐνθυμήματος μέρος may be thought to be a careless expression, contradictory to the description of enthymeme in I 2.13: since it is characteristic of the enthymeme that it omits at least one of the premisses (see on the enthymeme Introd. p. 104), and therefore a γνώμη with the reason appended represents a conclusion with one premiss, which is an enthymeme. The explanation seems to be that an enthymeme is an assumed syllogism: the inference which it draws rests upon the possibility of constructing a syllogism out of it: if that cannot be done, the inference is not valid. So that in one sense the enthymeme is a true and complete syllogism, in another, in so far as it expresses only one premiss, it may be called a part of it, and incomplete. And this serves to explain the statement of I 2.13, τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμὸν (i.e. a mode of syllogistic reasoning), καὶ ἐξ ὁλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλάττων ἢ ἐξ ὁμοίων ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμὸς.

'And all those have this (latter) character in which the reason of the (general) statement is made to appear, as in this, “mortal as thou art, guard, keep (cherish), not immortal anger;" for, to say "that a man ought not to keep his anger for ever" is a γνώμη; but the addition, "as a mortal" (because he is a mortal), states the (reason) why. And like it again is this, "Mortal thoughts" (or a mortal spirit—that is, one which confines its aims and aspirations within the limits of its mortal condition), "not immortal, become a mortal man."

The first of these two quotations is used by Bentley in his Dissertation on Phalaris, p. 247 [p. 229 ed. Wagner], and foll. He does not attempt to fix the authorship of it, but contents himself with saying "this, though the author of it be not named, was probably...borrowed from the stage," p. 247, but afterwards, p. 249 [231], "and even that one (the verse in question) is very likely to be taken from the same place" (viz. Euripides). Subsequently, p. 262 [243], he speaks of it as from "a poet cited by Aristotle," and "Aristotle’s poet." He quotes from Euripides’ Philoctetes, Fragm. IX (Dind.), XII (Wagner), a parallel passage as having been borrowed by the author of Phalaris, διὸ περὶ δὲ θυσίων καὶ τὸ σῶμ’ ἡμῶν ἐφι, οúτω προσῆκε μηδὲ τὴν ὀργὴν ἔχειν ἀδανατόν, ὅσιος σωφρονεῖν ἐπισταται. The same verse, with ἐξθραίνω of ὀργήν, occurs also in Menander, Γνώμαι μονόστιχοι, line 4, ap. Meineke Fragm. Comm. Gr. 340. Wagner, Incert. Trag. Fragm. p. 183, "Auctor versus, quisquis fuit, imitatus est Eurip. Fragm. 790 (sc. Philoct.)", and to this also he ascribes the γνώμη attributed to Menander, ἐξθραίνειν being "sive calami errore, sive imitatione."
γνώμη, τὸ δὲ προσκείμενον "θητοῦν οὔτα" τὸ διὰ τί λέγει. ὦμοιον δὲ καὶ τὸ
θητῶν χρη τὸν θητῶν1, οὐκ ἀθάνατα τὸν θητῶν1
φρονεῖν.

7 Φανερῶν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πόσα τε εἵδη γνώ-

καὶ πέρι ποίον ἐκαστὸν ἀρμόττει: περὶ μὲν γὰρ
tῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἢ παραδόξων μὴ ἀνεύ ἐπι-
λόγου, ἀλλὰ ἢ προθέντα τὸν ἐπιλόγον γνώμην χρη-

1 Θατὰ…Θατὸν. 'Si Epicharmi est versus, male vulgares formas θητᾶ atque
θητῶν exhibet Α. .doricam formam ceteri omnes praeterunt.' Spengel.

The second verse, θατὰ χρῆ κ.τ.λ., is ascribed by Bentley to Epicharmus; a supposition with which the dialect and metre agree. Müllach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. p. 144, Fr. Epicharm, line 260. This maxim is alluded to, but condemned, in the exulting description of perfect happiness, Eth. Nic. X 7, 1177 b 32, οὐ χρῆ δὲ κατὰ τῶν παρανοώντας ἀνθρώπων
φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπων οὖν οὐδὲ θητᾶ τὸν θητῶν, ἀλλὰ εἰπταὶ ἐνδέχεται ἀδιαν-
τίζειν κ.τ.λ. Buhle quotes Horace, Od. II 11, 11, quid acternis minorem
consilii animum fatigas?

For the use of the article in τῶν θητῶν, indicating a member of a
certain class, see notes on I 7.13, II 4.31.

§ 7. 'It is plain then from what has been said, how many kinds of
γνώμη there are, and on what sort of subject (or occasion) each of them
is appropriate; for (when it pronounces) on things questionable or para-
doxal (or unexpected, surprising, as before) the supplement must not
be omitted (subaudī ἀρμόττει λέγει); but either the supplement should
come first, and then the conclusion (of the inference) be used as a
γνώμη—as, for instance, if it were to be said (returning to the first
example, § 2), "now for my own part, since we are bound neither to incur
jealousy nor to be idle, I deny that they (children) ought to be educated";
or else, say this first, and then add the supplement (the reason)'.

τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἢ παραδόξων κ.τ.λ.] "Ni enim ratio addatur, fidem non inveniet huiusmodi sententia. Melius esse iniuriam accipere
quam inferre (this is the apparent paradox maintained by Socrates in
Plato's Gorgias and Republic): supplicium misereri non sporteret, et his
similia qui audit reicit; at si rationes annexantur, haur dubie assen-
tietur; nempe qui facit iniuriam semper improbus est, at qui patitur
probus esse potest. Et misericordia intempestiva iustitiae solut esse
adversa." Schrader.

'(When they are) about things, not unexpected, but obscure' (not
immediately intelligible. Understand δεῖ, ἀρμόττει, λέγειν αὐτάς), 'you
must add the (reason) why, as tersely as possible'. A popular audience is
always impatient of long explanations, and long trains of reasoning; or
enthymemes, II 22. 3; comp. I 2.12, III 17.6. In assigning therefore the
reason for the ambiguous or seemingly paradoxical γνώμη, we must express
ourselves in the fewest possible words, as briefly and compactly as possible.
σθαι τῷ συμπεράσματι, οἶον εἶ τις εἴποι „έγις μὲν οὖν, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε φθονεῖσθαι δεῖ οὔτ' ἀργὸν εἶναι, οὐ̈ φημι χρήναι παιδεύεσθαι,” ἦ τούτῳ προειπότα ἐπειπείν τὰ ἐμπροσθὲν, περὶ δὲ τῶν μὴ παραδόξων ἀδήλων δὲ, 8 προστιθέντα τὸ δίοτι στρογγυλώτατα. ἀρμόττει δ' ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ τὰ Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα καὶ τὰ αἰνιγματώδη, οἴον εἶ τις λέγει ὁ περ Ση-


§ 8. ‘In such cases (or on such subjects) Laconic utterances and enigmatical sayings are appropriate, as when one employs what Stesichorus said at Locri, that they had better not be so presumptuous, lest their cicales should be brought to chirp on the ground.’ Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα; pithy, sententious, utterances, which have become proverbial in our word ‘laconic’. Plutarch has made a collection of ‘Laconic Apophthegms’, from which it appears that they are usually of a character rather wise than witty—though there are also some extremely smart repartees in answer to impertinent questions or observations—pithy, pungent, pregnant, expressed with pointed brevity, which indeed is characteristic of them, and is also the ‘soul of wit’.

I will quote only one (a short one) as a specimen. Antalcidas: πρὸς δὲ τῶν ἀμαθεῖς καλοῦντα τοὺς Λακεδαμονίους Ἀθηναίον, μόνοι γοῦν, εἶπεν, ήµεῖς οὐδὲν μεµαθῆκαµεν παρ’ ὑμῶν κακόν. Quite true (says Ant.); we are deplorably ignorant—“At any rate we are the only people that have learnt no mischief from you.” The word is applied to two sayings of Theramenes, before his death, Xen. Hellen. II 3 ult. For a description of these Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα as pointed and pithy as the ρήµατα described, see Pl. Protag. 342 E [ἐνέβαλε ῥήµα ἄξιον λόγου βραχύ καὶ συνε-στραµµένον ὀσπέρ δεινὸς ἀκούστης].

αἰνιγματώδη] hard, obscure, ambiguous sayings, which like riddles require solution before they can be understood; like that pronounced by Stesichorus to check the presumptuous insolence of the Locrians: the solution of which is, that cicalas always sit in trees when they chirp. So that, οὐ γίνονται τέττιγες ὅπου μὴ δένδρα ἐστιν, Arist. Hist. An. v 30, 556 a 21 (the entire chapter is on τέττιγες). When the trees are gone, when they have been felled and the land ravaged, then it is that the cicalas will
have to sing their song on the ground. This is what the insolence of the Locrians will bring them to. See Mure, Hist. Gr. Lit. (Stesichorus), III 248. He says, note 2, “Similar is our own popular proverb of ‘making the squirrels walk’, denoting a great fall of wood.” This is repeated nearly verbatim, III 116. Demetrius, peri érphneias (peri synbáseos ónomátaων) § 99 (Vol. III. p. 284, Spengel, Rhet. Gr.), attributes the saying to Dionysius, without telling us to whom it was said: and calls it an ἀλληγορία. And again, § 243, peri dénóstos (III p. 315), oúto kai τὸ χαμόθεν οἱ τέττιγες υἱὸν ἀσονται δεινότερον ἀλληγορικῶς ῥηθέν, ἢ εἰπε ἀπλῶς ἐρήμηθα, τὰ διένδρα ὄμων ἐκκοπήστα. The felling of the trees, especially the fruit trees, always accompanied the ravaging of a country in a hostile incursion. Hence δεινότομων Thuc. I 108, of Megara, comp. II 75. 1, IV 79. 2. Dem. de Cor. § 90 (in a Byzantine decrec), καὶ τῶν χώρων διώνοτος καὶ δεινόκοποντος. [Dem. Or. 53 (Nicostr.) § 15, φυτευτήρια...κατέκλασεν, οὗτο δεινός ως οὐδ' ἄν οἱ πολέμους διαθένην].

§ 9. ‘The use of maxims, or sententious language, is appropriate in respect of age (time of life) to elders, and as to subjects, should be directed to those in which the speaker has experience; since for one who is not so far advanced in life to employ maxims is as unbecoming as story-telling (i.e. fables, legends, mythical stories), whilst to talk about things that one knows nothing of is a mark of folly and ignorance (or want of cultivation).’ On μυθολογεῖν Victorius says, “Fabellarum sane auditiones delectantur pueri; non tamen ipsa fabula fingere aut narrare convirruit.” And this, because young people have as yet had little or no experience of life, and if they pronounce maxims and precepts at all, must do it of things of which they are ignorants: and this shews folly, as well as ignorance. So Quintilian, who supplies the reason for this precept: VIII 5.8, ne passim (sententiae) et a quocunque dicantur. Magis enim decent eos in quibus est auctoritas, ut rei pondus etiam persona confirma. Quis enim ferat haurum aut adolescentulum aut etiam ignobilem, si indicat in dicendo et quodammodo praecipiat? “It has been said too they come most naturally from aged persons, because age may be supposed to have taught them experience. It must however be an experience suitable to their characters: an old general should not talk upon law, nor an old lawyer on war.” Harris, Philol. Inq. Works IV 186. The Justice in the ‘Seven Ages’ (As you like it [II 6. 156]), who is advanced in years, is full of wise saws and modern instances. ‘A sufficient indication (of the truth of what has just been said, viz. that it is only the simpleton, or the ignorant and uneducated, that pronounces maxims upon subjects of which he knows nothing), is the fact that rustics (clowns, boors) are especially given to maxim-coining, and ever ready to shew them off (exhibit them).’ This propensity to sententiousness, and the affectation of superior wisdom which it implies, characteristic of the ‘rustic’, has not escaped the observation of Shakespeare: whose numerous ‘clowns’ are all (I believe) addicted to this practice. Dogberry in Much ado about nothing—see in
ὅν ἐμπειρός τις ἑστίν, ὥς τὸ μὲν μὴ τηλικοῦτον ὀντα γνωμολογεῖν ἀπρεπῆς ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ μυθολογεῖν, περὶ δ’ ὧν ἀπειρον, ἡλίθιον καὶ ἀπαιδεύτων. σημεῖον δ’ ἰκανόν· οἱ γὰρ ἀγροίκοι μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι εἰσὶν καὶ ῥαδίως ἀποφαίνονται. καθόλου δὲ μὴ ὄντος καθόλου εἰπείν μάλιστα ἀρμόττει εν σχετλιασμῷ καὶ δεινώσει,

particularly, Act III Sc. 5—the ‘fool’ in Lear I 4—‘Touchstone’ in As you like it, III 3 and ‘Costard’ in Love’s labour’s lost, throughout; are all cases in point.

ἀγροίκος, country-bred, rustic, boor, clown, implying awkwardness and the absence of all cultivation and refinement of language, manner, mind, is opposed to ἀστεῖος which represents the opposite, city life, and city breeding, the city being the seat of refinement, cultivation personal and intellectual, civilisation and fashion; as rusticus to urbas, and Country with its associations, to Town and its belongings, in our dramatists and light literature of the two last centuries, the echo of which has not quite died away.

§ 10. ‘Generalising, where there is no generality (stating a proposition or maxim universally which is only partially true), is most inappropriate in complaint and exaggeration, and in these either at the commencement (of either of the two processes), or after the case has been made out (proved, ἀποδεικνυμι here again in a vague and general sense).

σχετλιασμός, “conquestio, h.e. ea pars orationis qua conquerimur et commoti sumus ex injuria vel adversa fortuna’. Ernesti, Lex. Technologiae Graecae, s.v. Conquestio est oratio auditorum misericordiam captans, Cic. Inv. I 55. 106, who gives a long account of it divided into 16 topics. This was the subject of Thrasymanthus’ treatise, the ἔλεοι (miserationes Cic. [Brutus § 82]), referred to by Arist., Rhet. III 1. 7; the contents are satirically described by Plat., Phaedr. 267 C. It was “a treatise, accompanied with examples, on the best modes of exciting compassion” (Thompson ad loc.). What follows, ὀφλίας τε αὐτ ὁ.π.λ. describes the art of δείνωσις, which no doubt accompanied the σχετλιασμός in Thrasymanthus’ work. On Thrasymanthus’ ἔλεοι see Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. Vol. III 274, No. 9. σχετλιασμός therefore is the act of complaining, or the art of exciting the compassion of the audience for the supposed sufferings of the speaker himself or his client by age, penury, distress, or wrong or injury from others; and its appropriate place is the ἐπιλογος, the peroration of the speech. See Rhet. III 19.3.

δείνωσις is a second variety of the same κοῦντο κόπος, viz. ἀνίχνεις and μείωσις, to which both of these are subordinate. There is in fact a natural connexion between the two: pity for the person wronged is usually accompanied by indignation against the wrong-doer. This is indignatio, of which Cicero treats de Inv. i 53. 100—54. 105. Indignatio est oratio per quam concipitur ut in aliquem hominem magnum odium aut in rem gravis offensio concitetur. The art of exciting indignation or odium
I1 καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἀρχόμενον ἡ ἀποδείξαντα. χρήσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς τεθρυλημέναις καὶ κοιναῖς γνώμαις, ἕαν ὀσι χρήσιμοι διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κοιναί, ὀς ὀμολογοῦν—against any person or thing, by exaggeration or intensification; vivid description heightening the enormity or atrocity of that against which you wish to rouse the indignation of the audience. 


Macrobius Saturn. IV 6 (ap. Ernesti u. s.), Oportet enim, ut oratio pathetica aut ad indignationem aut ad misericordiam dirigatur, quae a Graecis οἴκτος καὶ đeivòsis appellatur: horum alterum accusatori necessarium est, alterum reo; et neesse est initium abruptum habeat, quoniam satis indignanti leniter incipere non conventit.

The illicit generalisation above mentioned is one of the arts employed to heighten the two πάθη which are most serviceable to the orator, ἔλεος and ὄργῃ or νέμεσις by σχετισμῷ and đeivòsis. The first is well illustrated by Victorius from Catullus, Epith. Pel. et Thet. 143, the deserted Ariadne exclaims, ίαμ ίαμ nulla viro inranti femina credat, Nulla víri speret sermones esse fideles &c. (similarly Ovid, Fasti III 475, Nunc quoque ‘nulla viro clamabo ‘femina credat’) and Eur. Hec. 254, ἀχάριστον ὑμῶν σπέρμα ὅσοι δημηγόρους ξηλότει τιμᾶς. This is a generalisation from the single case of Ulysses. Add Cymbeline, Act II 5. 1; Posthumus. Is there no way men to be, but women must be half-workers? We are bastards all &c. and (already quoted in Introd.) Virg. Aen. IV 369, varium et mutabile semper femina; and Hamlet, Act I Sc. 2, [146], Frailty, thy name is woman. So οὐδὲν γειτονίας χαλιπτότερον § 15.

§ II. ‘Maxims which are in everyone’s mouth (notorious), and universally known, should be also employed if they are serviceable (when they are to the point): for the fact that they are universal (universally known and employed) being equivalent to an universal acknowledgment (of their truth), they are generally supposed to be right (true and sound)’.

τεθρυλημέναις καὶ κοιναῖς γνώμαισι] Such are the sayings of the seven sages, and of the old gnomic poets in general, Theognis, Hesiod, Phocylides and the rest, which everybody remembers and repeats. ἄρπιλεως is to repeat again and again, as ὑμεῖς, decantarce. Zonaras, συνεχῶς λέγειν. Suidas and Photius, λαλεῖν, κυκλ. (Hesych. θρυλλεῖ, ταρασσεῖ, ἤχει. ἄρπυλλοι, ψευθραμοί, ὄμιλαι.) Arist. E. Q. 348, τὴν νίκτα τρηλων καὶ λαλῶν ἐν ταῖς ὀδοῖς, of the sausage-monger, who after having made, as he thinks, a good speech, walks about the streets all night repeating it over and over again, and chattering. Eurip. El. 909, καὶ μὴ δὲ ὀρθρων γ’ οὕποι εἰςἐλιμπανον θρυλων, ἀ γ’ ειπείν ἤθελον. “She had long practised and considered her speech in the early dawn of the mornings.” Paley. For τεθρυλημέναις cf. also III 7. 9; 14. 4, ‘notorious’. Plat. Phaedo 65 B, 76 D. τοιοῦτον, Ib. 100 B, Rep. VIII 566 B. Isocr. Panath. § 237, περὶ ἔμπληγεν § 55, (λύγους) τούς
πῶς ἀπαντῶν, ὃρθῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν, οἶον παρακαλοῦντι ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν μὴ θυσαμένους
εἰς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης,
καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ῥήτους ὄντας
Εὐνός Ἑυνάλιος,
καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναρείν τῶν ἐχθρῶν τὰ τέκνα καὶ μηδὲν
πᾶλιν παρ’ ἐμῶν διατεθρικμένους. Ast, Lex. Plat. decantare. May not
βρύλλεω (so it is sometimes written) be an onomatopoeia from the sound
of the harp, like ὑβτανάλω, Arist. Plut. 290; the notion of constant
repetition, recurrences being derived from ‘harping’ perpetually on the
same string, chorda qui semper oberrat eadem? [Horace, A. P. 356].
παρακαλοῦμεν] lit. ‘to a man exhorting’; when Ar. wrote this dative he
was most likely thinking of ἐν ὁδί Χρήσιμω, rather than of anything else;
though it is extremely uncertain. ‘As for instance in an exhortation to
make the adventure—run the risk of battle—without previous sacrifice’.
θυσαμένους] Schrader interprets liiare, said of a sacrifice which προ-
πιλίται the deity to whom it is offered. He may possibly mean that it is
the use of the middle voice that gives it this sense ‘for themselves, for
their own benefit’.
εἰς οἰωνὸς κ.τ.λ.] Hom. II. xii 243 (Hector to Polydamas, who has
threatened him with an evil omen). οἰωνὸς in the γνώμη has reference
to the preceding θυσαμένους. Talk not to me of your omens (from
sacrifice) says the officer, cheering on his men, who are disheartened by
the absence of favourable omens; “One omen is best of all, to rally
for our country’s defence.” Pope, “And asks no omen but his country’s
cause.” Lord Derby, “The best of omens is our country’s cause.” Applied
by Cicero to his own public conduct and intentions, Ep. ad Attic. II 3.
ult. Schrader quotes Cic. Cato Maior, 3. 4, Q. Fabius Maximus, augur
cum esset, dicere ausus est optimis auspiciis ea geri quae pro reipublicae
salute gerentur: quae contra rempublicam fierent contra auspicia fieri.
‘And again an exhortation to run the risk (subaudī παρακαλοῦμεν ἐπὶ
tο κινδυνεύειν) with inferior forces’; Εὐνός Ἑυνάλιος, II. xviii 309. This
again is from a speech of Hector, expressing his readiness to encounter
Achilles. Ωδ μν ἐγώει φευξομαι...ἀλλὰ μάλι ἀντιν τηρομαι, ἢ κε φέρησθι
μέγα κράτος, ἢ κε φερόμιν. Εὐνός Ἑυνάλιος, καὶ τε κτανέοντα κατέκα. This
passed into a proverb for ‘the equal chances of battle’. Archilochus,
(Bergk, Fr. Lyr. Gr. No. 56, p. 479 [p. 550, ed. 2]), ἐπήτυχων γὰρ Εὐνός ἄν-
xxviii 19, In pugna et in acti, ubi Mars communis et victum saepè
erigeret et affigeret victorem. Ib. v 12, xxvi 1 (quoted by Trollope on the
verse of Homer).
And an exhortation (und. as before) to destroy enemies’ children

1 Gaisford, echoing F. A. Wolf, says of this, “Recte statuit W. haec non sana
esse. Mihi videtur verbum aliquod excidisse.” In a writer like Aristotle there is
nothing at all extraordinary in such an ellipse as I have supposed: in any other it
might no doubt lead one to suspect an omission.


§ 12. Some proverbs also are γνώμαι: for example, “an Attic neighbour” is a proverb (and also may be used as a γνώμη). νήπιος ὁς κ.τ.λ. is quoted as a proverb in 15. 14; here it is a γνώμη. It may be added to the list of Trench’s ‘immoral proverbs’, On Proverbs, p. 82 seq.

On the παρομοία, its definition and character, see Erasmus, Adag. Introd.: and Trench, “on the lessons in Proverbs.”

What sort of neighbour an Attic neighbour was, may be best gathered from the description of the Athenian character drawn by the Corinthians, and contrasted with that of their Lacedaemonian rivals, in their speech at the Congress at Sparta. Thuc. I 70. The restless, excitable, intriguing spirit, the love of novelty and foreign adventure, the sanguine temper, quick wit, and daring audacity, therein described, must necessarily have made them the most troublesome and dangerous of neighbours; ever ready to interfere in their neighbours’ affairs, and form schemes of aggrandisement at their neighbours’ expense. Another proverb of the same kind is mentioned by Schrader as having been applied to the Franks, Francum amicum habeas, victimum non habeas: it is found in Eginherd’s Life of Charlemagne. Gibbon also refers to it, without naming his authority. In the 10th century at Constantinople, “a proverb, that the Franks were good friends and bad neighbours, was in every one’s mouth.” Decline and Fall, ch. XLIX. Vol. IV. p. 509 (Murray, 1846).

§ 13. Maxims may also be cited in opposition to, or in contradiction of, those that have become public property—by these I mean such as ‘know thyself’, ‘avoid excess’ (the maxims or adages of Solon and Chilon)—whenever one’s character is likely to be put in a more favourable light (thereby), or the γνώμη has been pronounced in an excited state of feeling (by the opponent who is to be answered); of this ‘pathetic’ γνώμη an instance is, if for example a man in a fit of passion were to say that it is false that a man is bound to know himself, “this gentleman at any rate, if he knew himself, would never have claimed to be elected general.”

Aristotle has said that there are two classes of cases in which a
generally accepted or 'universal' maxim—such as Solon's γνῶθι σεαυ-
tῶν—may be contradicted with effect. One of these is, when the γνῶμη itself, including the contradiction of it—as appears from the example—is uttered in a state of excited feeling, real or assumed, such as indignation. The example of this is a man in a fit of passion, ὄργιζομενος, loudly asserting that Solon's universally accepted maxim, or the precept conveyed by it, is untrue, or at any rate liable to exception; for if so and so (some imaginary person) had had a true knowledge of himself (and his own incapacity) he never would have aspired to be a general; but he has done so, and succeeded in the attempt: and this success shews the falsity of the rule, as a prudential maxim, at any rate in this case; and also being undeserved provokes the indignation of the speaker. And it is to be observed that this success without merit is necessary to inspire the feeling, the existence of which is distinctly stated. The case is that of Cleon, Thuc. iv 27 seq. Victorius however understands it in a different sense. According to him the case is that of an Iphicrates, who raised himself from a low condition to the height of power and distinction: Rhet. i 7. 32, Ἰφικράτης αὐτὸν ἑνκομίαζε λέγον ἐξ ὑπήρξε ταύτα ; i 9. 31, ἐξ ὑπήρξε εἰς ὑπήρξε ταύτα ; if Iphicrates had 'known himself', i.e. remembered his origin, he never could have entered upon such a career. But it seems to me that this is not a proper interpretation of 'self-knowledge', and that the maxim could not be applied in this sense: the mere recollection of his former low estate surely is not entitled to the name of knowledge of self. Iphicrates, instead of disobeying the precept, conformed to it in the strictest sense; he did know himself so well, he was so fully aware of his capacity for fulfilling the duties of the office, that he did not hesitate to apply for and exercise the command of an army. Victorius' words are: "παθητικός δicit, qui ira percitus ita loquetur" (but what is the occasion of the anger, when it is thus interpreted? The mere contradiction of an universal maxim does not give rise to a fit of passion), "falsum est omnino, quod aiunt, debere homines seipsos nosse: hic enim profecto si se ipsum cognosset nunquam praetor ducere exercitum voluisset." It may perhaps be meant that the speaker assumes indignation in order to give force to his contradiction: or really gets into a passion at the thought of the folly of mankind for believing it.

Our character is bettered, men's opinion of our character is improved, by saying for instance (subaudi οἶνον εἰ τις λέγοι, ant tale aliquid) that we ought not, as is said, to love as the prospect of our love being turned into hatred, but rather the reverse, to hate as if that was likely to become love'. This is Bias' precept or suggestion, ἵποθηκη, see note on II 13. 4.

§ 14. 'The language (statement, expression) should be accompanied
by the manifestation of the deliberate moral purpose (by which the moral character of every thought and action is estimated), or if not, the reason (at any rate) should be added; as thus "a man's love should be, not as people say, but as though it were to be lasting (as deep and fervent and assured, as though it were to endure for ever); for the other (the reverse) has the character of treachery (belongs to, is characteristic of, a designing, plotting, treacherous man; implying deceit together with evil designs of future mischief)." This is the construction that may be put upon it: it also admits of a more favourable interpretation: see the note on Π 13. 4, already referred to. 'Or thus, "but the statement, the maxim, does not satisfy me: for the true, sincere, genuine friend should love as if his love were to last for ever." And again, neither does the (maxim) "nothing to exceed (satisfy me); for the wicked surely should be hated to excess."

§ 15. 'These γνῶραι are of the greatest service (help) to our speeches—one of which' (the other follows in the next section) 'is due to, arises out of, the want of cultivation and intelligence in the audience; for they are delighted if ever any one chance to light upon, and express in general terms, any opinion that they hold themselves, but partially'.

φορτικότης, as far as Classical Greek is concerned, appears to be a ἀπαξ λεγόμενον: it is found also in Eustathius (Steph. Thes. sub v.). φορτικός, from φόρτος a burden or load, burden-like, burden-ish, and hence met. burdensome, oppressive, annoying: especially applied to vulgarity, in person, manners, or intellect. The last of these senses, intellectual vulgarity, the want of cultivation and refinement, and especially of philosophical cultivation—a coarse and vulgar habit of mind, which looks merely at the surface of things, with little or no faculty of observation or power of distinction, and contents itself with a mere vulgar knowledge shared with the mass of mankind—is, if not peculiar to Aristotle, at any rate much more commonly found in his writings than in others. In this sense the φορτικός does not differ much from the ἀπαίδευτος, and is opposed to the χαριέλι, which, in Aristotle, often expresses the highest degree of grace and refinement, arising from the study of philosophy. It is in this signification that the word is used here, meaning a want of intelligence and of philosophical or (generally) intellectual training, which disqualifies men for making distinctions and estimating the value of an argument; consequently they measure the validity of a
γὰρ εάν τις καθόλου λέγων ἐπιτύχῃ τῶν δοξῶν ἂς ἐκείνοι κατὰ μέρος ἔχουσιν. ὦ δὲ λέγω, δῆλον ἐσται ὥδε, ἀμα δὲ καὶ πῶς δεῖ αὐτὰς θηρεύειν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ γνώμη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἀπόφασις καθόλου ἐστίν, χαίρουσι δὲ καθόλου λεγομένου ὦ κατὰ μέρος προ-υπολαμβάνοντες τυγχάνουσι: οἶον εἴ τις γείτοσι τύχοι κεχρημένοι ἢ τέκνοις φαύλοις, ἀποδεῖξιν ἂν τοῦ εἰπόντος ὅτι οὐδὲν γειτονίας χαλεπῶτερον ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἥλιθιότερον τεκνοτοιαία. ὡστε δεὶ στοχα- reason not by its logical force or cogency, but by its coincidence with their own previously conceived opinions; which they love to hear exaggerated by the orator, who humours them by these illicit generalisations. The Scholast explains it ἀγροκιάων. Victorius has, I think, entirely mis- taken the meaning of the word. The φορμακτίης here ascribed to vulgar audiences is much the same as the μοιχηρία τῶν ἄρηστῶν, III 1.5, the vices or defects, which oblige the orator to have recourse to τάλα ἢκο τοῦ ἀποδείξια in order to convince them, because they are unable to appreciate logic alone. Comp. I 2.13, on this subject, ὦ γὰρ κριτής ὑπόκειται εἰσι ἄπλοιος. See also on III 1.5.

' My meaning will be explained, and at the same time also how they (the γνώμαι) are to be caught' (hunted, pursued, like game, Anal. Pr. I 30, 46 a 11, θηρεύειν ἄρχάσας), 'by what follows (ὅδε)'. 'The γνώμη, as has been stated (§ 2), is an utterance or declaration expressed universally; and an audience is always delighted with the expression, as of an universal truth, of any opinion which they previously, but partially, entertain: for example, if a man chanced to have bad neighbours or children, he would be glad to hear (approve) any one who said "nothing is more troublesome (harder to bear) than neighbourhood" (abstract for concrete, γείτονες neighbours), or "nothing is more foolish than the procreation of children".— Possibly also, though this is doubtful, a man with a frail wife might like to hear Hamlet exclaim "Frailty, thy name is woman."


στοχαζότερα κ.τ.λ.] 'And therefore (the speaker) must guess what their previous (already formed) opinions are and what sort of things they are about (ὅσον they think about what), and then express this opinion in a general proposition on these matters'. Schrader quotes Cic. de Orat. II 44. 186, (M. Antonius) sicut medicum... sic cum aggredior ancipitem causam et gravem, ad animos indicum pertractando omni mente in ea cogitatione curaque versor, ut odoror quam sagacissime possim quid sentiant quid existiment quid expectent quid velitint, quo deduci oratione facillime posse videantur.
ζεσθαὶ πῶς τυγχάνονσι ποῖα προϋπολαμβάνοντες, 16 εἰθ’ ὤντω περὶ τούτων καθόλου λέγειν. ταῦτην τε δὴ ἔχει μίαν χρήσιν τὸ γνωμολογεῖν, καὶ ἐτέραν κρείττων ἡθικοὺς γαρ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους. οἱ δὲ ἑχοῦσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὑσοῖς δὴν ἢ προαίρεσις. αἱ δὲ γνώμαι πᾶσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσι διὰ τὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν προαίρεσεων, ὡστ’ ἄν χρησταί ὡσιν αἱ γνώμαι, καὶ χρηστοθήνθη φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα.

περὶ μὲν οὖν γνώμης, καὶ τὶ ἐστὶ καὶ πόσα εἴδη αὐτῆς καὶ πῶς χρηστέον αὐτῇ καὶ τίνα ὥφελειαν ἵ ἔχει, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα: περὶ δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου CHAP.XXII.

πῶς ποία] Two interrogatives without copula: common in Greek—but in verse rather than prose—as Soph. Phil. 1090, τοῦ ποτε τευξομαι...πόθεν ελπίδος.

§ 16. 'This then is one use (or usefulness, advantage) of the employment of γνώμαι, there is also another, and a better; that is, that it gives an ethical character to our speeches. All speeches have this moral character in which the moral purpose is manifested'. Comp. III 17.9. The οἱδος referred to in III 16.9 is of a different kind, it is dramatic character, the third of the three distinguished in Introd. p. 112.

'All γνώμαι have this effect, because any one who uses a γνώμη makes a declaration in general terms about the objects of moral purpose (or preference), and therefore if the γνώμαι themselves are good (have a good moral tendency) they give to the speaker also the appearance of good character'. On ἀποφαίνεσθαι, see above on II 21.2.

'So, for the treatment of γνώμη, its nature, number of kinds, mode of employment, and advantages, let so much suffice'.

CHAP. XXII.

On the treatment of enthymemes in general. A summary of the contents of this chapter is given in the Introduction, p. 260 seq., and the enthymeme in its logical aspect described in the same, p.101—8. The principal part of it is occupied with the selection of topics of enthymemes, preparatory to, and exemplified by, c. 23, the τόπου τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων. [On the enthymeme, see Grote's Aristotle 1 291—3.]

On the selection of topics, comp. Top. A 14. "Derivatum est hoc caput ex εἰστηρια προαίρεσιν, ratione conquirendi medioc terminos"—the middle term which connects the two extremes and so gives rise to the conclusion, is therefore the thing to be looked for in constructing a syllogism—"quae docetur, Anal. Pr. 1 27—32: ut seq. cap. (23) e libris Topicerum, c. 24 et 25 ex Elenchis Soph. est traductum." Schrader. Of course the mode of treatment is adapted to the purposes of Rhetoric. I will repeat
This text discusses the nature of enthymemes and their distinction from dialectical syllogisms. It notes that enthymemes are a kind of syllogism with at least one implicit premise, whereas dialectical syllogisms have all premises explicitly stated. The author, however, observes that the enthymeme is more flexible and less constrained than the syllogism, as it may contain hidden assumptions.

The text elaborates on the differences between enthymemes and dialectical syllogisms, highlighting their distinct characteristics and uses. It emphasizes the importance of understanding these distinctions in the study of rhetoric and logical reasoning.

Key points:
- Enthymemes differ from strict dialectical syllogisms in form.
- Materials and the extent of disputation are factors in distinguishing between dialectician and rhetorician.
- The enthymeme maintains the form of the syllogism but with fewer explicit premises.
- The distinction is crucial for understanding argumentation in rhetoric and logic.

The text concludes with a summary of the material, stressing the significance of recognizing these differences in the effective use of language and argumentation.
λαμβάνοντας συνάγειν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀσαφές διὰ τὸ μῆκος, τὸ δὲ ἀδολεσχία διὰ τὸ φανερά λέγειν. τούτο γὰρ αἵτιον καὶ τοῦ πιθανωτέρους εἶναι τοὺς ἀπαίδευτους τῶν πεπαιδευμένων ἐν τοῖς ὀχλοις, ἀσπερ φασίν

belongs to the regular syllogism; this is also for the sake of brevity; the formal syllogism is unsuitable to the orator who has a great deal to say, and is hastening to his conclusion, fearing to weary his audience, because it expresses a great deal that is self-evident, and may well be left for the hearers themselves to supply. Besides this, the enthymeme which he employs obliges him to omit either one of the two premisses or the conclusion; which of them it is to be, depends upon the degree in which the reasoning will be intelligible without it: anything that is absolutely φανερόν should (in reasoning) be omitted to save time. These are the two points in which the use of the enthymeme differs from that of the dialectical syllogism.

With respect to the first, the dialectician, whose object is merely to gain the victory in the dispute, and who has an antagonist more or less a match for him, can take his own time, and need not accommodate his reasoning to the intelligence of his opponent: to the rhetorician, the time allowed is generally limited, he has usually an uneducated and perhaps unintelligent audience to address, which he must keep in good humour, and therefore neither puzzle nor weary. The second point conveys the essential difference between the enthymeme and dialectical syllogism, that in the former οὐ πάντα δεὶ λαμβάνοντας συνάγειν. πάντα may also include, what Schrader adds, "multas propositiones probabiles, communes, intempestivas," which "plane omitti debere praecipit."

On ἀδολεσχία, see note on ΙΙΙ 3.3. Eth. Ν. ΙΙΙ 13, 1118 a 1. Comp. de Soph. El. c. 3, 165 b 15.

tούτῳ γὰρ] γὰρ here can hardly bear its usual signification, that of 'a reason assigned': the fact—that the uneducated are more convincing to a mob than your philosopher—is not the reason of the preceding statement, but rather the reverse; the previous statement explains (supplies the reason or explanation of) the fact. It must therefore be a case of that use of γὰρ which Schleiermacher in his translation of Plato represents by nämlich, videlicet; a use of the word which frequently occurs in the Platonic dialogues. And so I have translated it: though it is to be observed that if nämlich always represents the Greek γὰρ (in these special cases), the English 'namely' will not always represent the German nämlich. [Comp. note I on p. 134, and Shilleto on Thuc. l. 25. 4.]

'This, namely, is also the reason why the ignorant (or illiterate) have a greater power of persuading when they are addressing a mob than the highly educated or cultivated (in dialectics and philosophy), as the poets say that the uncultivated are the more accomplished speakers in a crowd'.

οἱ ποιηταὶ is generalised from one, viz. Euripides, who alone is referred to. The plural sometimes expresses the single individual plus those like him. So we speak of 'our Newtons and our Bacons',
as if there were several of them, 'poets, Homers and Virgils'; or else conveys contempt, 'don't talk to me of your Hegels and Schel-lings' (from some one who was no admirer of German philosophy) and so on. Soph. Phil. 1306, \( \psi \nu \delta \delta \kappa \eta \rho \kappa \nu \alpha s \), of Ulysses alone (Schneidewin). Sim. Plat. Rep. III 387 c, \( \kappa \omega k \kappa \upsilon o \upsilon \tau e \ kai \ \Sigma \tau \gamma \alpha s \). Aesch. Agam. 1414, \( \chi r \rho \upsilon \delta \dot{\iota} \omega \mu e \lambda \gamma \mu a \ \tau \omega \nu \dot{\upsilon} \ \alpha ^{\prime} \lambda \pi \omega . \) (Longin. \( \pi e r i \ \dot{\upsilon} \gamma \sigma \nu o u s \ \S \ 23, \varepsilon \gamma \dot{\iota} \lambda \delta \nu o u s ^{\prime} \varepsilon \kappa t o r e s \ \tau e \ kai \ \Sigma \alpha p \rho \dot{\iota} \delta \delta \dot{\iota} \varepsilon s \), Eur. Rhes. 866, \( \alpha i k \ \iota \delta a \ \tau o s \ \tau o u s \ \dot{o} \upsilon s \ \lambda e \gamma e i s \ ' \dot{\alpha} \delta \nu \sigma \sigma i s . \) Hor. Ep. II 2. 117, Catonibus atque Cethegis, Lucan, Phars. I 313, \( n o m i n a \ \varepsilon \gamma a , \ C a t o n e s , \ q u o t e d \ \i n \ \text{Blomfield's Gloss. ad loc.} \) Arist. Ran. 1041, Πατρόκλων Τεῦκρων Θυμολεύτων (characters of Aeschylus). See Valckn. ad Theocrit. Adon. line 141, sub fin. \( \Delta e \nu k a l \omega \nu i a s . \)

The verses here referred to, not directly quoted, are from Eur. Hippol. 989, \( o i \ \gamma a \pounds \ \epsilon n \ \sigma o f o i s \ \phi \alpha \upsilon \lambda o i , \ \tau a r \ \dot{\alpha} \chi \lambda \mu \ \mu o u s i k \omega \kappa r e r o i \ \lambda e \gamma e i s . \) The same verses are referred to by Plutarch, de Educ. Lib. c. 9, p. 6 b.

\textit{mouσικός}, has here an unusual sense, which seems to be borrowed from the notion of \textit{cultivation}, literary and intellectual, which the term expresses: hence 'skilled in', 'highly trained or cultivated' in the practice of a \textit{particular} art. So Rost and Palm Lex. \textit{wohlunterrichtet}, geschickt. "Accomplished in" seems to unite the two meanings; general cultivation, with special skill in the particular art. Ast's \textit{Lex. Plat.}, on \textit{mouσικός}: "Et in universum \textit{decenter}. Plat. Rep. III 403 A, \( \dot{\epsilon} r o s \ \pi e \phi u k e \ \ldots \mu o u s i k \omega s \ \epsilon r \alpha v, \ \text{Legg. VII 816 C}.

'For the one (the \textit{πευδαιμόνι}) talk about generals and universals, the others about (\textit{lit. 'from'}), the materials \textit{from} which the speech is derived) what they really know, and things that are near to us (near, that is, to our observation, things sensible; and to our interests, those which nearly concern us). The \textit{kouνā kai kathόλου} are the general or abstract, and universal notions, with which alone the philosopher and man of science care to deal. These are of course remote from popular knowledge and interests. The \textit{artist} also is conversant with 'generals' and not with 'particulars or individuals': the rules of art are all general rules. Experience or empiricism deals with the particular: \( \eta \ \mu e n \ \epsilon m p e i r i a \ \tau o v \ \kappa a \theta \ \epsilon \kappa a s t o w \ \epsilon s t i \ \gamma r o s i s \), \( \eta \ \delta e \ \tau \epsilon \chi \iota h \ \tau o v \ \kath\omega l o u . \) Metaph. A I, 981 a 15. Rhet. I 2, 11, II 19. 27. But although these \textit{abstract} universal truths and rules are in themselves better known, \textit{kath' aυτά, ἀπλῶς, τῇ φύσει γνωριμότερα}, that is, convey a higher and more comprehensive kind of knowledge, yet \textit{to us}, \( \eta \mbox{μι}, \ \pi r o s \ \eta m\dot{a}s, \) things of sense and the \textit{concrete}, the visible and palpable, are nearer or closer ('\textit{γνως}', \textit{clearer} and more interesting, and in this sense, better known; the knowledge of these \textit{comes to us first}, as the simpler \textit{πρότερον}, appeals to our senses, and is consequently more in accordance with our lower nature. The distinction of absolute or objective, and relative or subjective, knowledge is very familiar to Aristotle. See Phys. Auscult. at the

\footnote{\textit{φύσις} is used in more than one sense: thus it may be applied to the normal or abstract notion of \textit{nature}, its true and highest form, \textit{perfect nature}; or an imperfect nature, as it shews itself in us and our imperfect faculties and condition.}

'We therefore must not derive our arguments or inferences from all possible opinions' ("ex omnibus quae probantur, et vera esse videntur." Victorius); 'but select them out of those which are defined or determined or settled for us (marked off, and separated from the rest, as especially suitable to our purpose) (in some way or other) as, for instance, either by the judges (i.e. their known opinions: this in a law case) or those whose authority they accept'.

That is, there are many truths, such as scientific generalities, which may indeed be included amongst opinions (because they are believed as well as known) but yet are alien to the purposes of Rhetoric, and also many opinions, properly so called, which are unfit for its use, οὐκ ἐξ ὃν ἐτύχει, I 2.11; and besides this, "every fool has some opinions", I 2.11; we must therefore make a selection if we wish to persuade— we had been already told that though the sphere of Rhetoric, like that of Dialectics, is theoretically unlimited, I 2.1, yet that in practice it is usually confined to the business of life and human action, and therefore that its materials are in fact drawn from Politics, including Ethics, from political and social philosophy, ib. § 7.

Here however there is a still further restriction—we must select out of the vast range of probable opinions those which happen to suit our immediate purpose: for instance, if we are arguing a case in a law-court we must draw our inferences from such opinions as they (the judges) themselves are known to hold, or at any rate such as those whom they regard as authorities are known to approve. κρίνειν and κρίνεις, as we have seen, II 1.2; 18.1, may be extended to the decision of audiences in all three branches of Rhetoric, the assembly, the judges, and the βεβαία or θεώρυ of an epideixis, and Victorius takes this view. As however κρίνουσιν is qualified by ὁδὸν, which shows that there are other analogous cases, the two audiences of indirect κρίνουσι may perhaps be left to be understood.

τῶν δοκούντων] 'probable opinions', comp. II 1.6; 25.2, and φαίνεται in I 2.11, and in the succeeding clause.

καὶ τοῖτο δὲ] 'And this too should be clear—the speaker should be quite certain—that it does so appear to—that this is really the opinion of—all or most (of any audience)'.—If δὲ be retained (so Bekker), compare note on I 6.22. MS A' δὴ. Quaere δὲ? Victorius seems to understand it so, as he uses the word δέβετ; perhaps supposing that the notion of 'ought' is carried on from the preceding λεκτέον: and this is confirmed by the following οὖν ἔγνειν.
ΦΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Β 22 §§ 3, 4. 225

3, ὅτι οὗτος φαίνεται, δῆλον εἶναι ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις. καὶ μὴ μόνον συνάγει ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.

4 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δει λαβεῖν ὅτι περὶ οὗ δεὶ λέγειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι εἰτέ πολιτικός συλλογισμὸς εἶθ᾿

'And his inferences should be drawn not only from necessary propositions, but also from those that are only true for the most part, probabilities. The τεκμήριον, the certain sign, the necessary concomitant, is the only necessary argument admitted in Rhetoric: its ordinary materials are εἰκάσια and σημεία, things by their very name and nature only probable. On these materials of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 160 seq. One might suppose from the phraseology adopted here, μὴ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, that the necessary propositions and conclusions were the rule and the probable the exception; instead of the reverse. The true statement is found in I 2. 14. Comp. Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 δ 32—36.

§ 4. 'So first of all it must be understood that anything we have to speak or reason about' (on συλλογίζεσθαι et sim. for reasoning in general, see note on I 1. 11), 'whether it be on a political subject or any other whatever, it is necessary to (have in our possession) be acquainted with everything that belongs to this also (καὶ besides the συλλογισμὸς itself, or the particular point which the argument has in view), either all or some (according to circumstances); for if you have nothing (no information, no facts) in your possession (as material) you will have nothing to draw your inferences from'. The same thing is stated, and nearly in the same words, Anal. Pr. I 30, 46 a 3, ἡ μὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων ἢ αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφιῶν καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὅπως τονοῦν καὶ μάθημα (all learning and all philosophy and science begin with observation,) δεῖ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει περὶ ἐκάτερου ἄδρειν, καὶ τούτων ὡς πλείστων εὑρεῖν. And again, a 22, ὥστε ἂν ληφθῇ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ἑκαστοῦ, ἡμέτερον ἢδὲ τὰς ἀποδείξεις ἐτοίμως ἐμφανίζειν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν παραληφθεῖν τῶν ἀληθῶν ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἐξομεν περὶ ἀπαντοῦ, οὔ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀποδείξεις, ναῦτην εὗρειν καὶ ἀποδεικνύειν, οὐ δὲ μὴ πέρικεν ἀποδείξεις, τοῦτο ποιεῖν φανερόν. The ὑπάρχοντα here spoken of are all that properly belong to a thing, all its properties, qualities, attributes, all its antecedents and consequences—these are especially important in human actions, the rhetorician's subject—everything closely connected with it, whether similar or different, as opposites, relative terms and so on: in short, if you have to speak or reason upon any subject, if you wish to succeed, you must first know all about it. This is illustrated at length from the three branches of Rhetoric in the next five sections.

λαβεῖν I take to be here λαβεῖν τὸ νῦν ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ, to seize or grasp with the mind, apprehend, conceive.

πολιτικὸς] Politics, including Ethics, being almost exclusively the source from which rhetorical enthymemes are to be drawn, though theoretically the field of rhetorical practice is boundless: see note on p. 224. Otherwise, πολιτικὸς συλλογισμὸς may mean 'a rhetorical syllogism' or

AR. II. 15
§ 5. ‘As an instance of what I mean—how could we possibly advise the Athenians’ (the συμβουλευτικῶν γένος) ‘whether they should make war or not, unless we know what is the nature of their power (or forces), whether it is a naval or military force, or both, and its amount or magnitude, and what their revenues are, and their friends or enemies, and besides all this what wars they have waged, and with what success (or possibly, what are their modes of warfare)—and everything else of the same sort’. Compare with this 1 4. 7, to the end, on political topics.

§ 6. ‘Or deliver a panegyric’ (the ἐπιθετικῶν γένος) ‘if we had not the sea-fight at Salamis, and the battle at Marathon, or all that was done on behalf of the Heraclidae, or anything else of the like sort. For all (panegyrists) derive their encomiums from the fair deeds, renown, distinctions (of their hero), real or supposed’.

These are the stock subjects of the Athenian declaimers: ου χαλεπῶν Ἀθηναίως ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπανεισ, 1 9. 30, III 14. 11. Plato’s Menexenus has all these topics, the Heraclidae, 239 b; Marathon, c. 10; Salamis, c. 11. Isocrates, Panegyricus, §§ 54—60; 64, 65; Marathon and Salamis, § 85 seq. Comp. Philipp. § 147. de Pace § 37. Panath. § 194, Eurystheus and the Heraclidae; § 195, Marathon. He can’t even keep it out of the peri ἀντιδόσεως (though that speech is of a purely personal nature); where it appears again, § 306. Lysias, ἐπιτάφιος, §§ 11—16, 20—26, 27—43. And the same three topics recur in the same order, only more briefly treated, in the ἐπιτάφιος attributed to Demosthenes, § 8 seq. Pseudo-Dem. peri συντάξεως § 22. Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 259. Demosth. c. Aristocr. § 198. These topics are not introduced in the Speech for the Crown.

The tragic poets wrote dramas upon the same stories of unfailling interest, as Aeschylus’ Persae, and Euripides’ Heraclidae; and Aristophanes refers desirously to this habit of self-glorification, Acharn. 696—7, Vesp. 711, Equit. 781—783, and 1334. The Μαραθωνομάχη, the warriors of Marathon, Ach. 181, Nub. 966, is not applied altogether in jest.

[ἐν Μαραθῶνι is an instance of departure from the stereotyped ad-
Marcaθών μάχην ἢ τὰ ὑπὲρ Ἡρακλειδῶν πραχθέντα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιοῦτων· εἴ γὰρ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἢ 7 δοκοῦντων ὑπάρχειν καλῶν ἔπαινοις πάντες. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ψέγουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, σκοποῦντες τι ὑπάρχει τοιοῦτον αὐτοὶς ἢ δοκεῖ υπάρχειν, οἶον ὅτι τοὺς Ἑλλήνας κατεδουλώσαντο, καὶ τοὺς πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον συμμαχεσαμένους καὶ ἄριστεύσαντας ἴμν- 
дрαποδίσαντο Αἰγινήτας καὶ Ποτιδαίατας, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ἀμάρτημα ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. ὡς ὅ αὐτώς καὶ οἱ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ οἱ ἀπολογούμενοι ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σκοποῦ-
8 μενοι κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται. οὐδὲν δὲ δια-

verbal form Maradaν, without the preposition. See Cobet, Variæ Leccionis, p. 201, and Dr Thompson’s ed. of the Gorgias, p. 152.]

§ 7. ‘And in like manner also topics of censure are derived from the opposites of these, by considering what of the like (i.e. τὸ ἐναντίον, the opposite) nature actually belongs, or seems to belong, to them?’ (the objects of the censure; things as well as men: see note in Cambr. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil., Vol. II., No. 5, p. 158), ‘as for instance, that they (the Athenians) reduced the Greeks to servitude and made slaves of the Aeginetans and Potidaeans, men that had shared in the fight and distinguished themselves against the barbarian (in the Persian invasion), and everything else of the like kind; and any other similar offence that can be alleged against (lit. belongs to) them’. On the treatment of the Aeginetans, see Thuc. ii 27; and of the Potidaeans, Ib. c. 70. Against the charges brought against the Athenians of abusing their maritime supremacy, and oppressing their subject states, and other iniquities, Isocrates, Paneg. § 100 seq., defends them as well as he can: μετά δὲ ταῦτα ἦδη τινὲς ἡμῶν κατηγοροῦσιν, ὡς ἐπειδή τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς βαλάντης παρελάβομεν πολλῶν κακῶν αἵτινες τοὺς Ἑλληνας κατέστημεν, καὶ τὸν τε Μηλίων ἀνδραποδίσαμον καὶ τῶν Σκιωναίων ἔλεβον ἐν τούτοις τῶν λόγων ἡμῶν προφέροντων κ.τ.λ.

‘And in like manner also, plaintiff and defendant (in a court of justice) derive their (arguments in) accusation and defence from the circumstances of the case, which they have to consider (take into account)’. τὰ ὑπάρχοντα are here the acts and facts alleged, the characters of the two parties, and such like.

Schmidt, On the date of Aristotle’s Rhet. p. 17, remarks on the three last sections, that the examples therein given would have been used by none but a resident at Athens, and go far to shew that the Rhetoric was written in that city.

§ 8. ‘But in doing this (in acquiring the requisite information on the facts of the case, and the character and history of the person) it
makes no difference whether our subject be Athenians or Lacedaemonians, man or god; for whether we advise Achilles' (for any individual), 'or praise or censure, or accuse or defend him, we must alike make ourselves acquainted with all that belongs, or is thought to belong to him, in order that from this we may have to state whatever belongs to him and to his interests, whether fair or foul (noble or base, right or wrong), in praise and censure; just or unjust, in accusation and defence; and in advising' (advice or counsel includes ἀποτρέπειν as well as προτρέπειν) 'expedient or injurious'.

§ 9. 'And in like manner any subject whatsoever is to be dealt with; as for example, the question of justice, whether it be good or bad, (must be discussed from topics) derived from the belongings of justice and good'. Victorius reminds us of Thrasymachus' thesis in the first book of Plato's Republic—and he might have added that of Callicles in the Gorgias—that injustice is in reality, and by nature, superior to justice, which is the good of others, but injurious to the just man himself.

§ 10. 'And therefore since everyone manifestly demonstrates (i.e. argues, infers) in this way (i.e. from and by the knowledge of everything that belongs to his subject) whether his reasoning takes the exact or rigorous form of the syllogism (as in scientific demonstration, and probably also in dialectical argument), or employs the laxer mode (of the rhetorical enthymeme)'

1 This I take to be the meaning of διὰ τοῦ λόγου. The other interpretation, 'it is plain by reason', or 'reason shews that', is supported by Muretus and Vater.
is clearly necessary, as in the Topics (or Dialectics, in general), first to have ready on each particular subject a selection already prepared of the probabilities and of those circumstances of the case which are most suitable, appropriate (opportune, timely, seasonable, germane to the matter in hand); (these are to be kept in stock, and ready prepared for use on occasion: from which are distinguished τὰ ἕκτε ὑπογυνοῦ;) and also about circumstances (evidence, or what not) that arise on the sudden, to pursue your inquiries in the same way (make yourself acquainted with them as far as possible in such an emergency); turning your attention not to things indefinite (such as universals, intellectual and moral) but to what actually belongs to the subject of your speech, and including (drawing a line round, enclosing with a line) as many, and as close (nearly connected) to the subject, as possible: for the more of these circumstances there are in your possession, so much the easier is it to prove your point; and the closer the connexion, so much the more appropriate are they, and less general?

Of the selection of προτάσεις for syllogisms, Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 b 6, it is said, διαμερεῖον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων (antecedents, consequents, and concomitants) ὅσα τε ἐν τῷ τί ἐστί, καὶ ὅσα ὡς ὑδά (ḳατηντῖα: properties which, though not of the essence of the subject, are yet inseparably attached to it, and peculiăr to, characteristic of it), καὶ ὅσα ὡς συμβεβηκότα κατηγορεῖται, καὶ τούτων ποία δοξαστικοῖς καὶ ποία κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν ὅσῳ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πλείονοι τοιούτων εἰσποίη τις βάττον ἐντεύξεται συμπεράσματι, ὅσῳ 8' ἐν ἀλήθεστέροις μᾶλλον ἀποδείξει. Mutatis mutandis, and omitting the ποία κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν 'the truths of science', this agrees with what we find in the Rhetoric.

ακριβέστερον] the more exact mode of reasoning by formal syllogism, demonstrative or dialectical: the latter probably included, because, as far as the form is concerned, the dialectical syllogism follows precisely the same rules as the other, and the construction of the two is identical.

μαλακότερον] softer, more yielding, less stiff and rigid and unbending, is naturally transferred to a more relaxed or less rigorous mode of reasoning, in force and substance, i.e. to the rhetorical enthymeme. Though the word is very often used metaphorically, I can find no other instance of this particular application of the metaphor. [For the metaphor, compare Metaph. E 1, 1025 b 13, ἀποδεικνύοντι ἡ ἀναγκαίωτερον ἡ μαλακότερον, ib. K 7, 1064 a 6, δεικτικὰ τὰ λοιπά μαλακότερον ἡ ακριβέστερον, de generatione et corruptione, B 6, 333 b 25, ἐδει αὐτὴ ὁ ὀρίσασθαι ἢ ὑποθέσθαι ἢ ἀποδείξατι, ἢ

Victorius renders it, “as by general use, so also, ita etiam ratione quadam confirmatur,” meaning by ratio the process of reasoning. As to the first, it seems to me that διὰ τοῦ λόγου would be a very affected and unnatural way of expressing either ‘by reason’, or ‘by reasoning’: it would rather be τῷ λόγῳ if that were the meaning. Also διὰ with the genit., which denotes the channel, medium, course, or means, of anything, is much more appropriately joined with δεικτικὰ, with which my version connects it, than with δήλοιν, which, to say the least, would be very unusual Greek.
(οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀπαντῶν λαμβάνουσιν ἄλλα ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἐκαστον υπαρχόντων), καὶ διὰ τοῦ λόγου δὴλου ὤτι ἀδύνατον ἄλλως δεικνύαι, φανερῶν ὤτι ἀναγκαίον, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς, πρῶτον περὶ ἐκαστον ἐχειν ἐξειλεγμένα περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ τῶν ἐπικαιροτάτων, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐξ ὑπογνίοι γιγνομένων ἐπιτείν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀποβλέποντα μὴ εἰς ἀオリστα ἄλλα ἀκριβῶς ἢ μαλακῶς, ἢ ἀμοί γε τοις, ἱβ. Ν 3, 1090 b 8, μὴ λιαν ἢ μαλακὸς (ὁ λόγος), de Caelo, Δ 6, 313 b 4, ἐνστὰς λυπεῖ μαλακώς. *Index Aristotelicus* (Bonitz).] ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς* Brandis, in the tract so often referred to [Philol. IV i] p. 18, notices on this "that it marks the connexion between Rhetoric and the Topics, i.e. dialectics", being a reference to II 23. It seems not to refer to any particular passage of the Topics, but merely to state in general terms that the mode of treating the Topics is the same in Rhetoric as in 'the Topics', i.e. the entire work, or the practice of dialectics in general. Similarly Schmidt, in the tract *On the date of the Rhet.* p. 2, "verisimile est etiam in tribus alis locis (videlicet, II 22. 10, II 23. 9, II 26. 4) eum non suos de arte topica libros (we need not go so far as this) sed hanc artem ipsam intellexisse." Is it possible that this may be one of the, I might almost say, *ordinary lapse* of the Aristotelian memory in quotation, and that he has referred to the Topics instead of the Prior Analytics? In the latter, I 30, quoted above on § 4, there is a passage which contains a statement very closely resembling what has been said here about the selection of topics, 46 a 10, ὅπως μὴ βλέπωμεν εἰς ἀπαντα τὰ λεγόμενα...ἄλλα εἰς ἐλάπτω καὶ ὁρμημένα, καθ ἐκαστον δὲ ἐκλέγειν τῶν ὑντων, ὅπως περὶ ἄγαθον ἢ ἐπιστήμης. Whether this be so or not, the passage at all events deserves to be compared with this section of the Rhetoric. Top. A 14 is upon the selection of προτάσεις, chiefly in the shape of δόξα for dialectical purposes; but cannot, I think, be directly referred to here.

ἐξειλεγμένα, ἐκλογής, § 12.] "The collection of premisses, whether scientific theses, or dialectical organa, or rhetorical specific data, is expressed by the word ἐκλέγειν or ἐκλαμβάνειν," Poste, *Poter*. Anal. p. 121, note 1, comp. p. 25, and note 1. The terms occur constantly in the Anal. Prior. [Comp. supra 1 2, 1358 a 23, βέλτιων οὖν ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰς προτάσεις.] The use of them is not confined to Aristotle, and seems to be technical. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 10 (II), § 2, ἐκληπτέων.

ἐπικαιροτάτων* So Top. Γ 6, 109 a 36, μάλιστα ἐπικαιροι καὶ κοινοί τῶν τόπων. ἱβ. Η 4 init.

§ 11. ἐξ ὑπογνίων* See note on I 1, 7, p. 11. The phrase is applied here to circumstances that arise out of the occasion, which you must seize on as well as you can; extemporaneous, sudden, unprepared, and therefore unprepared; temporary accidents of the subject in hand, quae repente eventunt (Victorius). These we must collect as well as we can, on the spur of the moment; but the same rules are to be observed as in the other cases. Poste, u. s., p. 24, "singular circumstances."
eis tā ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ὅν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιγράφων-
tas ὅτι πλείστα καὶ ἐγγύτατα τοῦ πράγματος· ὅσῳ
μὲν γὰρ ἂν πλείω ἐχεται τῶν ὑπάρχοντων, τοσοῦτῳ
φάναι δεικνύαι, ὅσῳ δ’ ἐγγυτερον, τοσοῦτοι οἰκειότερα
καὶ ἵπτον κοινά. Λέγω δὲ κοινὰ μὲν τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν
Ἀχιλλέα ὅτι ἀνθρωπός καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἡμιθέων καὶ ὅτι
ἐπὶ τὸ ᾽Ιλιον ἐστρατεύσατο· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοις
ὑπάρχει πολλοῖς, ὡστ’ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ τοιοῦτος

περιγράφων] περιγράφειν and περιγραφῇ are usually applied to the
outline of a drawing, so περιγραφθῶν tāγαθον of a rough sketch or out-
line of good (opposed to ἀναγράφω, to fill up, lit. draw over, this outline)
Eth. N. 1 7, init. and περιγραφῇ 1b. 1098 a 23: but this is not applicable
here. Præfinitionem seponentemque says Victorius. The meaning required
seems to be that of ‘enclosing’, for the purpose of keeping things sepa-
rate from others, so that you may be able to lay your hand upon them
at once when you want them, and not have to sort them at the time: for
this purpose you draw a line of demarcation round them, which keeps
them from getting mixed up with other things that resemble them, or at
all events that you don’t want just then. [Metaph. Κ 7, 1064 α 2, ἐκάστῃ
γὰρ τούτων περιγραφαμένη τι γένος αὐτῇ περὶ τούτο πραγματεύεται.]

ἵπτον κοινά] ‘less general’, and therefore more special, ἵδα. κοινὰ is
illustrated in the next section; from which it appears that it means here
the wider and higher generalisations which are attributes of very large
classes, and have therefore nothing special, distinctive, and characteristic,
about them. Neither of them is used in a technical sense, as genus and
species. ἵδα are peculiarities and peculiarities of individuals.

In contrast with what is here said of the selection of rhetorical topics
compare Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 b 1 seq., on the selection of topics for demon-
strative syllogisms: in these the major premises and conclusions must
be universal and necessary, and the rules laid down are in conformity
with that. Near the end of the chapter, ληπτεῖν δὲ κ.τ.λ. 43 b 32, seq. a
supplementary note is added, on probable (τὰ ὅσ’ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) questions
and their syllogisms, referring to dialectical and rhetorical proofs.

§ 12. ‘By “common” or “general” I mean, saying (for instance) in
praise of Achilles, that he is a man, or one of the demigods, or that he
joined the expedition against Troy; for these things belong (these dis-
tinctions are shared by, are common) to many others besides, so that one
who does this (such an one) praises Achilles no more than Diomede.
By “special” or “peculiar”, what belongs’ (properly as a separable accident,
but not technical here) ‘to no one else but Achilles, as for instance to
have slain the famous (τῶν) Hector, the best and bravest of the Trojans,
and the renowned Cycnus, who, being invulnerable, prevented the landing
of the whole (Greek) army; and that he was the youngest of those that
made the expedition, and joined it without taking the oath’ (unsworn,
i. e. voluntarily, whereas the rest were compelled to serve by their engage-
ment to Tyndareus), ‘and anything else of the same kind’.
13 eis μὲν ὁυν τρόπος τῆς ἐκλογῆς καὶ πρῶτος οὕτως ὁ τοπικός, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἐνυμημάτων λέγομεν. στοιχεῖον ἔδει λέγω καὶ τότον ἐνυμήματος τὸ αὐτὸ. πρῶτον δὲ εὗρομεν περὶ ὁν ἀναγκαίον εἰπεῖν πρῶτον.

Κύκνος] Cynicus does not appear in Homer. The earliest mention of him seems to be that of Pindar, Ol. II 82 (146), who uses him for the same purpose as Aristotle, viz. for the glorification of Achilles. (Ar.'s notice may possibly be a reminiscence of Pindar.) 'Ἀχιλλέα...ὁς Ἐκτόρ' ἐσφαλε, Τρώας ἀμαχον ἄστραβη κίονα, Κύκνος τε βαθάκῳ πόρεν, 'Ἀνατοι παῖδι' Διός (Memnon.) The story of Achilles' encounter with Cynicus at the landing of the troops, the long conflict with his 'invulnerable' antagonist, and how Achilles finally destroyed him, are all related at length by Ovid, Met. XII 64—145. He was the son of Neptune, Ovid u. s. 72, proles Neptunia; is again classed with Hector, line 75; and in lines 135—144 is described as finally crushed and strangled with the thong or fastening of his own helmet.

ἀτρωτος] not unwounded, but invulnerable (invulnerable by ordinary weapons; not absolutely, since he was killed). Pind. Nem. X 11, ἀτρώτω κραδίᾳ, 1sthm. III 30 ἀτρωτοι παιδε θεών. Plat. Symp. 219 E.

οὐκ ἕνορκος] The oath sworn by Helen's suitors to her father Tyndareus at Sparta, that they would defend him whom she chose for her husband against any aggression. This was Menelaus. Victorius quotes, Pausan. Lac. c. 24, ὁμιρος δὲ ἐγραψε μὲν τῆς ποιήσεως ἁρχόμενος ὡς 'Ἀχιλλεὺς χαρίζομεν τοῖς Ἀτρέοις παισί, καὶ οὐκ ἐνέχωμεν τοῖς ὅρκοις τοῖς Τυνδάεω, παραγένοιτο εἰς Τροιάν. The passage referred to seems to be II. Α 158. Ulysses says the name of his son Neoptolemus, Soph. Phil. 72, σὺ μὲν πέλευκας οὖν ἕνορκος αὐθενί k.t.l.: and Philoctetes of himself, Ib. 1026. The story of the oath is told in Eurip. Iph. Aul. 49—65; and frequently alluded to elsewhere in the Tragic writers. Comp. Soph. Aj. III, Teucer of Ajax, οὐ γάρ τι τῆς σῆς οἰν' ἑστρατεύσατο,....ἀλλ' οἶνεξ ἄρκων οίσαν ἢν ἐκόμητος.

§ 13. 'One method of the selection then, and the first (most important), is this, namely the topical (dialectical, following the dialectical method, that by topics); and now let us pass on to the elements of enthymemes; by elements and topics of enthymemes I mean the same thing'. This is repeated, c. 26. I. On στοιχείον = τόπος, and why so called, see Introd. pp. 127, 128. Add to the examples there given, Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37). 9, στοιχεία κατά κατά πάντων, which seems to mean τόποι.
14 εστι γαρ των ενθυμηματων ειδη δυο· τα μεν γαρ δεικτικα εστιν ότι εστιν η ουκ εστιν, τα δε ελεγκτικα, και διαφερει ωσπερ εν τοις διαλεκτικοις ελεγχοι και συλλογισμος. εστι δε το μεν δεικτικων ενθυμημα το εξ ωμολογομενων συναγειν, το δε ελεγκτικων το τα ανομολογουμενα συναγειν. 

σχεδον μεν ουν ημιν περι

'But (before we proceed to do so) let us first state the necessary preliminaries'.

§ 14. 'Of enthymemes namely there are two kinds: for some undertake to shew that something is, or is not, so and so—direct proof; the establishment of a proposition, affirmative or negative—others are refutative; and these differ just like refutation and syllogism in dialectics'. On this and the next section see Introd. pp. 262, 3, and the notes.

§ 15. 'The demonstrative enthymeme (which proves directly) is, to draw an inference' (to 'gather', colligere; corresponding to the conclusion, συμπίεσμα, of the regular syllogism) 'from universally admitted premisses (those general probabilities which everyone is ready to admit); the refutative is to draw inferences or conclusions not agreeing (with the opinions or inferences of the adversary)'. The αδειγχοι is αντιφασεως συλλογισμος, the negative of, or conclusion contradictory to, the conclusion of the opponent: refutation always assumes an opponent, real or imaginary, whose arguments, or opinions, or theories are to be refuted by proving the negative.

This interpretation is in conformity with the received signification of ανομολογουμενος 'disagreeing with, contradictory'. This negative sense is rare: Plat. Gorg. 495 λ, Ar. Anal. Pr. 1 34, 48 α 21 [τοσο δε ανομολογουμενον τοις προερημενοι], Rhet. 11 23, 23, δις, are the only instances cited; comp. Buttm. Auctar. ad Heind. Gorg. § 108, p. 490. So Victorius, "quae adversentur iis quae ab adversario ostensa prius et conclusa fuerint;" and Augustinus Niphus (quoted by Schrader) "quod ex datis concessive adversario repugnantia atque improbabilia colligit. Repugnantia autem et improbabilia dico quae sunt contra adversariorum opinionem."

§ 16. 'Now of the general heads or classes of the specific topics that are useful or necessary we may be said to be pretty nearly in possession; for the premisses on each particular subject have been selected, so that the special topics from which enthymemes on the subjects of good or bad, fair or foul (right or wrong), just or unjust, must be derived' (these are the ειδη, analysed under the heads of the three branches of Rhetoric in the first book, from c. 4. 7, to 14), 'and in like manner the topics of the characters, and feelings, and states of mind, have been previously taken and are before us' (ὑπάρχουσι are ready for us, for our use).

The construction of the preceding clause ὄστε·οι τοποι I understand to be this, though Vahlen [Transactions of the Vienna Acad. of Sciences, Oct. 1861, p. 131] declares ὄστε and τόπων to be indefensible. Τόπων is attracted, as usual, to the construction of the relative, for οι τοποι εξ αυν δει φερειν τα ενθυμηματα: and οι τοποι is repeated at the
end of the clause—unnecessarily perhaps, but not ungrammatically—in the second part of it introduced by καί. As to the ὄστε, readers of Aristotle must have remarked that his ὄστε's are not always to be very strictly interpreted; sometimes they almost lose the force of a logical consequence, and indicate little more than a sequence. I presume that Vahlen's meaning (which is not explained) is, that ὄστε κ.η.λ. is a mere repetition, and no consequence at all. But the two things spoken of are not precisely identical, and there is a certain connexion of cause and effect between them: it is first said in general terms that the premises upon each subject of Rhetoric have been already selected: and from this it may in a sense be said to follow that we are supplied in detail, with topics for our enthymemes, with εἴδη or special topics under the three branches of Rhetoric, and also for the ήθη, πάθη and ἐξεις in Bk. II.

Vahlen, u. s. pp. 130, 1, for the reasons before mentioned (some account of his views on this subject has been given in the introductory observations on c. 18), condemns the whole of section 16, as the interpolation of an editor, who has inserted (we are not told why) a sentence 'without motive, and disturbing' the connexion, in which of course, following the altered arrangement (which is assumed) he has placed the ήθη and πάθη immediately after the εἴδη (as they now stand).

Besides this he objects to παθημάτων and ἐξειν, with which we have next to deal. πάθημα in this sense for πάθος, is certainly very rare, perhaps unique. But, per contra, there are at least four passages where πάθημα is found in other senses, to express which πάθος is always elsewhere employed. Metaph. A 2, 982 b 16, τῶν τῆς σελήνης παθημάτων, and c. 4, 985 b 12, τῶν παθημάτων (τῆς ὑποκειμένης οὐσίας): Anal. Post. i 10, 76 b 13, τῶν καθ' αίτα παθημάτων, and Anal. Pr. 11 27, 70 b 9 ὅσα φυσικά ἐστι παθήματα: which certainly seem to be sufficient to justify παθημάτων here.¹

¹ [Bonitz (Aristotelische Studien V 50, and Index Aristotelicus) holds that in Aristotle there is no clear distinction of meaning between πάθημα and πάθος, "sed eadem fere vi et sensus varietate utrumque nomen, saepius alterum, alterum rarius usurpari." In the Aristotelian writings, πάθημα is never found in the sing. except in the spurious Physiognomonica 806 a 2; the gen. pl. παθημάτων occurs 38 times, παθῶν only 8. (Note Eth. Eudem. b. 2, 1220 b 6, λεκτὸν ὅτα κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἄττα ἡθή. ἐσται δὲ κατὰ τε τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν παθημάτων, καθ' ὅσω παθητικὸ λέγονται, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐξεις, καθ' ὅσω πρὸς τὰ πάθη ταῦτα λέγονται τῷ πάρχειν πῶς ἢ ἀπαθεῖς εἰναι. μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ διάλειψις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις (?) τῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ἐξειν. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἰῶν ἐπιθυμιάν.) Bernays, while admitting that the words are often used loosely, draws the following distinction: πάθος ist der Zustand eines πάρχειν und besitzt den unersparten ausbrechenden und vorübergehenden Affekt; πάθημα dagegen ist der Zustand eines παθητικὸς und bezeichnet den Affekt also inhärend der offizierten Person und als jederzeit zum Ausbruche reif. Kürzer gesagt, πάθος ist der Affekt und πάθημα ist die Affektion (Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie, Abhandl. der hist. phil. Gesellschaft in Breslau, I. pp. 149, 194—6). The distinction is insisted on in a treatise by II. Baumgart, Pathos und Pathema im Aristotelischen Sprachgebrauch, Königsberg, 1873, pp. 58.]
As to ἔξεων, this, through a deviation from the author’s usual phraseology, who generally confines himself to ἥθη and πάθη, appears again in this connexion, 11. 12 init., τὰ δ’ ἥθη ποιαὶ τινες κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἐξεις κ.τ.λ. The author there himself tells us his meaning, interpreting ἐξεις by ἀρετὰς καὶ κακίας; and I can see no reason for condemning the word, as Vahlen does, except the very insufficient one, that it is unusual. The ἐξεις in this sense, do actually enter into, and in fact constitute the ἔθος, and I do not see why they should not be specially mentioned, if Aristotle chose to depart from his ordinary practice, and do so.

So far then we have been occupied with the ἥθη, special subjects derived from special sciences, and specially employed each in one of the three departments of Rhetoric—this is generally, not absolutely true; for though the three ends of Rhetoric, the good or useful, the just, and the noble or right, are more appropriate and more serviceable, each in one of the three branches, yet any of them can be, and sometimes is, introduced in them all—and we must now turn to the topics, the families, classes, of arguments into which enthymemes in general may be made to fall. This is for convenience of practice, that we may know where to look for them when we want them, and apply that which happens to be appropriate to the particular case. This classification is made in the 23rd chapter, which therefore is the rhetorical representative of the far more extensive and minute classification of dialectical topics, and is the object also of Cicero’s Topica. And as the treatise on fallacies, the book περὶ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων, is appended to the books of the Topics, so we have a similar chapter on rhetorical fallacies (c. 24) added to the analysis of the genuine arguments.

I will here remark (against Vahlen) that the word καθόλου § 17, which contrasts these universal τόπων with the special topics that have preceded, renders the actual mention of them in the foregoing section almost, if not quite, necessary.

§ 17. ‘Let us now proceed further in another way to take (or find)

1 I have noticed in many recent German commentators on Aristotle, Brandis being an honourable exception, a disposition to pin down their author to a fixed and particular mode of expression in certain cases from which he is never to be allowed to deviate. Aristotle is the very last writer to whom any such rule should be applied. He is always hasty, often careless; and, as we have seen in so many instances in this work, is very apt to use words in senses either vague and indeterminate, or (properly) inapplicable, or unusual; and his style is loose and careless to a fault, both in construction and expression. He is a writer who more than all others requires a most liberal allowance for irregularities.
universal topics about everything (taken promiscuously, that is, from any of the δηθ, and applied indifferently to any of the three branches of Rhetoric), and add a supplementary note upon the refutative and demonstrative (subsumi τόπων ενθυμημάτων) topics of enthymemes (the contents of c. 23), and those of apparent' (shams, impostors, not genuine), 'not real, enthymemes; not real, because this is likewise the case with syllogisms (of which enthymemes though mutilated are a copy, and therefore share with the others the fallacious kind)'.

The literal translation of οὐκ ἄντων δὲ ενθυμημάτων, ἐπεὶ περὶ οὐδὲ συλλογισμῶν is, "enthymemes not real, because there are also unreal (not-real syllogisms"; οὐδὲ, neither, being broken up into two parts, of which the δὲ contrasts συλλογισμῶν with ενθυμημάτων, and the οὐ negatives the genuineness (und. from the preceding) of the syllogism, not the syllogism itself.

παρασημαίνομενοι] is a very oddly chosen word to express the treatment of chapters 23 and 24, which are just as much connected with the subject of the work, and treated with as much care and detail, as the rest. It means according to Victorius (and Rost and Palm's Lex.) adscribere, adnotare, applied to something of subordinate interest and importance, or not immediately and closely connected with the subject in hand, as a note on the margin of a manuscript; 'noting beside' the main subject, a supplementary note. This is certainly the meaning of it in Top. Α 14, 105 b 16, where it is applied to the 'noting down' of the opinions of individual philosophers, 'beside', as supplementary to, those which are generally accepted: and also, as Victorius thinks, of παράσημα in de Soph. El. 20, 177 b 6—this is not quite so certain: [ἐν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις παράσημα ποιοῦνται (signa ponunt ad vocabula distinguenda), Index Aristotelicus]. Alexander Aphrodisiensis in his commentary on the former passage adds παραγράφει, apparently as a synonym, or interpretation of the other.

'And after this has been made clear, let us pass on to the determination of solutions and objections, whence they must be brought, from what sources derived, for the refutation of enthymemes'. Of λεγόμενα and its two modes, ἔλεγξις and ἔνστασις, the contents of c. 25, see Introd. 268 seq.

CHAP. XXIII.

In an excellent Review of the study of ancient Rhetoric [by Spengel], read at the celebration of the eighty-third anniversary of the foundation
of the Munich Academy of Sciences, 1842, a clear account is given of the relation of these τόποι ἐνθυμημάτων that follow to the εἴδη of the first book, of which I will give a translation with very slight alterations.

To the first of these he gives the name of 'formal', to the second of 'material' proofs. "Formal proofs, such as they appear in Dialectics and Rhetoric, are of an universal nature, and therefore applicable alike to all branches of science; they form the collective Topics, which Aristotle has elaborated for Dialectics with wonderful completeness in the most comprehensive of all the works of his Organon; whilst in Rhetoric, not without reference to the other, he has selected and put forward only what is most essential. Material proofs are with him such as are derived from the principles of the special sciences, the knowledge of which the orator must bring with him, ready for any occasion on which it may be properly applied. Aristotle is by no means of opinion that a mere superficial description, without thorough knowledge of the object to be described, and alien to the true spirit of it, can be called 'rhetorical' with propriety; on the contrary, the orator must be thoroughly imbued with the knowledge of his subject, whatever department of knowledge it may happen to belong to, and from this special science bring with him his concrete proofs, for the purpose of convincing. Accordingly, for forensic pleading the accurate study of law is indispensable, for the deliberative speaking or counselling that of Politics, the science of government, and similarly for each kind the special knowledge which belongs to it. But this special knowledge cannot be obtained from Rhetoric itself, otherwise it would carry in itself all knowledge, which is not the case: the office of Rhetoric is, to work up the proofs which the special science offers, to combine them with the 'formal', and so to bring the subject within the reach of universal comprehension."

On the contents of this chapter, and its connexion with the Topics, Brandis, ap. Schneidewin's Philologus [iv i.] p. 18, has the following remarks. "We now turn (c. 23) to the universal points of view (topics) most worthy of attention for the formation or refutation of enthymemes, which are briefly discussed. Before passing to this, Aristotle has already pointed out the connexion which exists between this division of the Rhetoric and the Topics (c. 22 § 10). It is perfectly conceivable however that here also (as before, referring to Rhet. 1 7,) what in the Topics has met with a detailed discussion in regard of the various modes of applying them, is here only briefly referred to, and with an exclusive view to the application to be made of them in speaking." He then illustrates this at some length from the two works; but it will be more convenient to leave these details till we come to them in the course of the notes on the topics themselves. [On the Topics, see in general Grote's Aristotle, ch. IX.]

Cicero, Topica, first gives a summary classification of the various forms of these arguments under their most general heads, III 11. These are, coniugata, ex genere, ex forma, ex similitudine, ex differentia, ex contrario, ex adiunctis, ex antecedentibus, ex consequentibus, ex repugnantibus, ex caussis, ex effectis, ex comparatione maiorum aut parium aut minorum, (the last, comp. maiorum et minorum, are the topics of Rhet. 1 7,) which are afterwards described in greater detail and illustrated, cc. IX 38,—xviii 71, Haec ego argumenta, quae transferri in multas causas
possunt, locos communes nominamus, de Inv. II 15. 48. Quintilian treats them, Inst. Orat. v 10, 20—94, and sums them up thus, § 94; Eigo ut breviter contraham summam, ducuntur argumenta a personis, causis, locis, tempore (cuius tres partes diximus, praecedens, coniunctum, insequens), facultatibus (quibus instrumentum subiecimus), modo (id est ut quidque sit factum), finitio, genere, specie, differentibus, propriis, remotione, divisione, initio, incrementis, summa, similibus, dissimilibus, pugnantiibus, consequentibus, efficientibus, effectis, eventis, jugatis, comparisone, quae in plures diducitur species. Jugata are Cicero’s coningata, Aristotle’s σύστοιχα and δομοι πτώσεις.

These arguments can all (?) be turned both ways, and applied to prove either the affirmative δειετικά, κατασκευαστικά, constructive, confirmatory; or the negative, ἔλεγχικα, (23. 30); ἀνασκευαζεῖν, ἀναρεῖν; destructive of the proposition maintained by the theorist (in philosophy), the opponent (in dialectics). Rhetoric τάναττα συλλογίζεται [I 1. 12]. Of the first, εκ τῶν ἐναντίων, this is expressly stated.

§ 1. One class of demonstrative (or affirmative) enthymemes is derived from opposites: we have to consider, namely, whether the opposite (to the one) belongs to (i. e. can be said, or predicated of) the opposite (to the other). Two pairs of opposites are supposed, as in the example, temperance and licentiousness, good, i. e. profitable, and injurious: the question is whether the two opposed terms or things stand in the same relation to one another, i. e. that one can be predicated of the other, as the two first, to which they are opposed: if they can, the original proposition may be maintained, or inferred by the enthymeme; if not, it can be confuted or destroyed. The inference in either case is drawn εκ τῶν ἐναντίων, from the correctness or incorrectness, the truth or falseshood, of the assertion of compatibility or coexistence in the opposites, or that one can be predicated of the other. Thus in the example, if the opposites to the original proposition—temperance is profitable—stand in the same relation to one another as the two members of the first, so that the one can be truly predicated of the other—if the opposite, injurious, is truly predicable of licentiousness—then, so far, we infer the truth of the first; if not, the proposition may be confuted. The inference, like all other rhetorical inferences, is probable, not necessary: it can always be contradicted.

Aristotle, as we have already seen (note on c. 19. 1), distinguishes four kinds of αὐτικείμενα, or opposites; contradictory, contrary (extremes under the same genus, as here σωφροσύνη and ἀκολούθια are the two extremes, virtue and vice, under the genus Ἰθως, moral character), relative, and ἔξω and στέρμοις, state and privation. In the Topics all the four kinds in their relation to this form of argument are successively handled; in the Rhetoric, the treatment is confined to the single kind of contraries, as the most useful and plausible, and the rest passed over. See Brandis, u. s. p. 18. The passage in the Topics corresponding to this is B 8, 113 b 27, seq. [Grote’s Ar. 1, chap. IX pp. 422, 3]; but compare also B 2, 199 b 17; on the import and limitations of ἐναντίον lb. c. 7; Γ 6, init. on the great advantages and wide extent of these two first topics, viz. this, and the next,
υπάρχει, ἀναφεύγει μὲν εἰ μὴ υπάρχει, κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ υπάρχει, οἷον ὅτι τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀκολοφοῦντες βλαβερόν. ἦς ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνικῷ· εἰ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος αἰτίος τῶν παρόντων κακῶν, μετὰ τῆς εἰρήνης δεὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι.

εἰ περ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῖς κακῶς δεδρακόσιν ἀκουσάως δίκαιον εἰς ὅργήν πεσεῖν, οὐδὲ ἄν ἀναγκασθεῖσι τις εὖ δράσῃ τινά, προσήκον ἐστι τῷ ὑφείλεσθαι χάριν.

ἀλλ' εἰ περ ἐστιν ἐν βροτοῖς ψευδηγορεῖν πιθανά, νομίζειν χρή σε καὶ τοῦντιν, ἀπιστή ἀληθῆ πολλὰ συμβαίνειν βροτοῖς.

tῶν συντόκων καὶ τῶν πτώσεων. ὁμοίως γὰρ ἠνδοξὸν τὸ ἀξιόσαι, εἰ πᾶσα ἡδονή ἄγαθόν, καὶ λύσιν πᾶσαν εἰναι κακῶν κ.τ.λ. followed by a series of illustrations: also B 9, 114 b 6. The treatment of opposites in the Topics and Rhetoric corresponds in this, that in both works it has reference solely to the art of reasoning, to the inferences affirmative or negative that may be drawn by constructive, or refutative, syllogisms and enthymemes.

Cicero (who borrows a good deal from Aristotle), Rhetoric, XI. 47, Deinceps locum est, qui a contrario dicitur. Contrariorum autem genera sunt plura: unum eorum quae in codem genere plurimum differunt (Arist.), ut sapientia et stultitia....Hae quae ex codem genere contraria sunt appellantur adversa. His instance is, si stultitiam fugimus, sapientiam sequamur (this in the Aristotelian form would be, If folly is to be shunned, wisdom is to be sought or pursued). He then goes through the three remaining kinds of contraria, following Aristotle.

Ex contrariis, Frugalitas bonum, luxuria enim malum (enthym.). Si malorum causa bellum est, erit emendatio pax: si veniam meretur qui imprudens nocuit, non meretur praemium qui imprudens profuit. Quint. v 10. 73. In the last example, the opposites are, excuse, indulgence (for a fault), and reward (for a service), injury and benefit: the merit or desert is common to both: only in the one case it takes the form of demerit, which deserves punishment: as is also the absence of purpose, of good or ill intention.

ἀναπείν, 'to take up', passes on to the sense of removing, taking away; thence to taking off, destroying; and so finally, when it comes to logic, is applied to the argument which upsets, subverts, destroys, or refutes the adversary's argument or position.

'Or (a second example) as it is in the Messeniaca speech (of Alcidas, on which see note on i 13. 2), "for if it is the war which is the cause of the present evils, it is by the peace (which I now propose) that they must be rectified." συμβουλεῖτε ὁ Ἀλκιδάμας τοῖς Λακεδαμονίοις μὴ καταδουλώσατο τοὺς ἐν Μεσσηνῇ, ἑπιθετῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Εἰ γὰρ ὁ
2 'άλλος ἐκ τῶν ὀμοίων πτώσεων ὀμοίως γὰρ δεὶ ὑπάρ-

πόλεμος, φησί, προζέλησε τάδε τὰ κακά, εἰρήνη πάλιν ταῦτα ἑπαναρθώσεται (Scholiast). 'Verba ipsa Alcidamantis scholiastes videtur conservasse.'

Sauppe ad Alcid. Fragm. Messen. 2. Orares Attici, III 154. Quintilian has borrowed this, see above [middle of p. 239].

"The four lines which follow as a third example are of uncertain authorship: Gaisford attributes them either to Agathon or Theodectes: the enthymeme ex contrario that it contains would suit either of them, since they both cultivated Rhetoric as well as the dramatic art (Wagner Trag. Gr. Fragm. III 185). To avoid the conjunction of εἰ and οὐ, Elmsley, ad Med. 87, proposes ἐπεῖ. Reisig, Coniect. I p. 113 (ap. Pfugk), justly replies that εἰπερ is equivalent to ἐπεῖ, and therefore admits the same construction. On εἰ with ἀν and the optative, see Appendix (on ii 20 § 5) at the end of this book; and on εἰ followed by οὐ, see Appendix C, Vol. I p. 301. For οὐδ' ἄν, Wagner proposes either ἤν or ἀν.

Cicero, de Inv. I XXX 46, has adopted this: In contrario hoc modo; nam si igitur imprudentes laeserunt ignoci convenit, igitur necessario profuerunt haberì gratiam non opertel, and Quintilian, V 10. 73, (above).

The second quotation (example 4), is from Euripides' Thyestes, Fragm. VII (Wagner). This we learn from the Scholiast, quoted in Wagner's note. Matthiae refers to the similar paradox in Agathon's couplet, Rhet. II 24. 10.

§ 2. Top. II. ἐκ τῶν ὀμοίων, πτώσεων] On πτώσεως and σύστοιχα, see note on I 7. 27. πτώσις "grammatische Abbiegung," Brandis [Philol. IV i]. 'Another (inference may be drawn) from similar inflexions; for the inflected words (or, the inflexions of the word) must be capable of similar predication, (for instance from δική by inflexion, or variation of termination, are formed the πτώσεις, δίκαιον, δίκαιος—as well as the grammatical cases, inflexion and declension, and if δίκαιον can be predicatable of anything, then δίκαιος must be predicatable of the same). We may therefore argue, says the example, 'that justice is not all good', taking the negative side, μὴ ὑπάρξει, good is not universally predicatable of justice; otherwise good would be predicatable of the πτώσεις, δίκαιος, which is not true in all cases; 'for all good is ἄρετον, an object of choice; but a just punishment, or to be justly punished, everybody would allow not to be desirable.' This is an application of the topic to its negative, destructive, or refutative use: the inference is that the rule laid down is not true. Compare with this example, I 9. 15, where the same distinction is made: although τὸ δίκαιον and δικαίου ἔργα are similarly predicable, yet this is not the case with the πάθη: ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ (this is therefore an exceptional case to which the ordinary rule of ὀμοίων πτώσεως does not apply) ταῦτα τῶν ἀρετῶν οὐκ ἐδεῖ τὸ δικαίον καλὸν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ζημιοῦσθαι αἰσχρὸν τὸ δικαίος μᾶλλον η ὑ τὸ ὀδίκου.

Brandis u. s. notes on this topic another difference which shews itself between the Topics and the Rhetoric, that whereas in the former the σύστοιχα are usually (not always) added to the πτώσεις in the treatment of it, they are here omitted, and the grammatical form of co-ordinates alone taken into account.
The use of the topic as a dialectical argument is abundantly illustrated in the Topics, in very many places, as may be seen by consulting Waitz's Index ad Organon, s. v. The principal passage on the subject is Top. B 9,—where the *πτώσεις*, the grammatical co-ordinates, are properly subordinated to the more extensive *σύντομα*, things which are logically co-ordinate, 114 b 34. The latter are exemplified by *δικαίων*, *δικαίος*, *δικαίως*, *αὐτόθων*. Compare A 15, 106 b 29, on the application of them to ambiguous terms, *πλευράσως* λεγόμενα, also I 3, 118 a 34, A 3, 124 a 10, and the rest, which indicate their various applications.

Cicero, Top. iv 12, comp. ix 38, illustrates *coniuncta*, which is his name for Ar.'s *πτώσεις*, by *sapiens*, *sapienter*, *sapientia*; and the argument from it by, *Si compascimus ager est, is est compascere*. *Haec verborum coniugatio*, he says, *συνεγέρθη* dicitur: on which Spengel (Specim. Comm. in Ar. Lib. II 23, Heidelb. 1844) remarks, "Non Aristotele qui semper *σύντομα* dicit, sed posteriores, in primis Stoicos, intelligit." In de Or. II 40. 167, they are called *coniuncta*.

Quintillian, who treats the topic with some contempt as hardly deserving of notice, has, Inst. Orat. v 10. 85, *His illud adiicere ridiculum putarem, nisi co Cicero uteretur, quod coniugatum vocant: ut, Eos, qui rem iustam faciant iuste facere, quod certe non egit probatione; Quod compascuum est compascere licere* (from Cicero).

§ 3. Top. III. *ēk τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλα*] The argument, from mutual relation of terms or notions. This is treated, Top. B 8, 114 a 13, under the head of oppositions or opposites, *αντιθέσεις*, or *αντικείμενα*, of which it is one of the four varieties. For example, inferences may be drawn from double to half, and *vice versa*, from triple to multiple and the converse; from knowing or knowledge *ἐπιστήμη*, to the thing known *τὸ ἐπιστημόν*; from sight to a sensation, to the thing seen as an object of sense. The logical objections, *ἐνστάσεις*, that may be brought against it are also given [Grote's Aristotle I. pp. 423, 424].

"Latina schola vocat *relata*. Talia sunt ista: facere pati; emere vendere; dare accipere; locare conducere: et nomina ista: pater filius; dominus servus; discipulus magister." Schrader. He also cites as an example, Cic. Orat. XLI 142, *Sin ea non modo eos ornat penes quos est, sed etiam universam rempublicam, cur aut discere turpe quod scire"

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1 If I am not mistaken, the term *πτώσεις* is a misnomer. If *πτώσεις* are the various inflexions—declensions in an extended sense—of a root-word, the term must be confined to the changes of the terminations: in these appears, not similarity, but difference: the similarity lies, not in the terminations, but in the idea or root common to all the varieties: 'similar' therefore, though it may very well be predicated of the *σύντομα*, is not properly applied to *πτώσεις*. 

AR. II.
honestum est, aut quod nosse pulcherrimum est id non gloriosum docere: a good illustration of the argument from relatives.

This topic has occurred before, II 19. 12, as one of the topics of 'the possible': where the parallel passages of Cic. Topic. xi 49, and de Inv. ii 30. 47, will be found in the note. On the same, Quintilian, Inst. Or. v 10. 78, Illa quoque quae ex rebus mutum confirmationem praestantibus ducentur (quae proprii generis videri quidam volunt, et vocant ex tōn prōs ἄλλα, Cicero ex rebus sub etand rationem venientibus) fortiter consequentibus inuexerim (I should be bold to add to consequents): si portorium Rhodiis locare honestum est et Hermocreonti conducere; et quod discere honestum, et docere (from de Inventione, u. s.). The argument is, 1 If it may be said of one (of the two terms of the relation) that he has done rightly or justly, then the same terms may be applied to what the other has suffered (ποιεῖν and πάθειν, agent and patient, are relative opposites); and similarly (κελεύειν is relative to πέπονθειν) command implies obedience, and the converse (this may be inferred as the ordinary, probable, not a necessary consequence): as Diomedon the tax-collector argued about the taxes (i.e. the farming of them) "If it is no disgrace to you to sell, neither is it to us to buy."

οἶνον ὦς This pleonasm occurs again in § 6, οἶνον ὦς ἰθυκράτης.

Of Diomedon, nothing is known but what we learn from the passage.

'And if the terms fairly or justly can be applied to the sufferer, then also to the doer (or perpetrator) of the act; and conversely, if to the doer then also to the sufferer'. If there be any difference between this and the preceding, εἰ γὰρ θατέρα—πέπονθειν, it is that the first is the general expression of the relation between agent and patient, the second is a particular exemplification of it, in the justification of what would otherwise be a crime.

'But this admits of a fallacy: for though it may be true (in general, or in itself) that deserved suffering involves the justice of the punish-

1 The relation of ποιεῖν and πάθειν, agent and patient, action and passion, is well illustrated in the argument between Polus and Socrates, Plat. Gorg. c. 32, 476 b, seq. It is there shewn by analogy—the usual Socratic and Platonic method—that the relation between the two prevails throughout its various applications, and therefore that crime and punishment follow the same law, and that justice or desert in the punishment of the criminal or patient implies the like justice in the infliction of it by the agent, and vice versa.
ment, yet perhaps (it does not always follow that) you should be the agent of it, that the punishment should be inflicted by you (any particular individual). This fallacy is actually illustrated from Theodectes' Orestes, _Infrd_ c. 24 § 3. The argument is used by Orestes in his trial for the murder of his mother Clytemnestra. In the trial scene of the Eumenides this point is taken into consideration, and the act of Orestes justified by Apollo and Athena on the general ground of the superiority of male to female; the author of his existence, has a higher claim upon the son's affection and duty than the mother, and Orestes was right in avenging his father's death even upon her. Aesch. Eumen. 625 seq., 657 seq., 738—40. Comp. Eur. Orest. 528, where Tyndareus, Clytemnestra's father, says, θυγατίρα μ' ἑτὶ θανών τ' ἐπρᾶξεν ἐνδίκα ἀλλ' οὐχί πρὸς τοῦτ' εἰκὼς ἦν αὐτὴν βασέως: and Orestes, ib. 546, defends himself on the same grounds as in Aeschylus, ἐγὼ δ' ἀνώτατος εἶμι μητέρα κτανών, ὅσιος δ' ε' ἔτερον ὄνομα, τιμωρῶν πατρί. 552, πατήρ μὲν ἐφύτευσεν με κ.π.λ. 562, ἐπὶ δ' ἐθύσα μητέρα, ἀνώτατος μὲν δρῶν ἀλλὰ τιμωρῶν πατρί. Electr. 1244, (quoted by Victorius on φησὶ δ' ἀποκρύψεως—κτανέως,) the Dioscuri to Orestes, δίκαια μὲν νῦν ἤδ' ἐξεῖ σο' δ' οὐχί δρᾶς. The case of Orestes and Clytemnestra became one of the stock examples in the rhetorical books. Auct. ad Heren. I 10. 17, I 15. 25, 16. 26. Cic. de Inv. I 13. 18, 22. 31. Quint. Inst. Or. III 11. 4, and II seq., VII 4. 8.

'And therefore a separate investigation is required, not only whether the sufferer deserved to suffer, but also whether the doer had a right to do it (as, to inflict the punishment), and then make the appropriate use of either: because sometimes there is a difference in cases of this kind (i.e. both kinds of right are not always found together): the punishment may be just, but you may not be the proper person to inflict it, and there is nothing to prevent (the case being) as it is put in Theodectes' Alcmaeon (where this 'division', διαλαβόντα, is actually made): "And did no mortal abhor thy mother?" This is a question put to Alcmaeon, probably by Alphesiboea (Victorius), whose reply includes the words actually quoted, ἀλλ' διαλαβόντα χρή σκοπεῖν, with, of course, a good deal more about the murder which is omitted. 'To which (Alcmaeon) says in reply "na but we must first distinguish, and then consider the case."

(The division or distinction here spoken of is well illustrated by the parallel passage, the case of Orestes, II 24. 3.) 'And when Alphesiboea asks "How?", he replies, "To her they adjudged death, (i.e. decided that she was justly slain,) but (decided also) that I should not have been the murderer." From this reply it may be gathered that the judges in Theodectes' play had made the requisite distinction: the death of Eriphyle they agreed was deserved, but it was not for her son to inflict the penalty. "Alcmaeon Eriphylem matrem suam interfecerat, quod haec Amphiarai mariti salutem prodiderat" (Alcmaeon's act, like that of
Orestes, was justified by the implied murder of his father—the treachery which caused his death. "Alphesiboea fuit Alcmaeonis uxor." Schrader. This fragment is quoted by Wagner, Theodect. Fragm. Alcm. 1, but without a word of commentary, III 118.

On Theodectes of Phaselis, the rhetorician and dramatic poet, the friend of Aristotle, who frequently refers to his compositions in both kinds, and on the rhetorical character of his writings, which is well illustrated here and in II 24.3, see Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. ch. XXVI § 7, who refers to these passages. Also, Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX Vol. III p. 260 seq.¹ To the passages there quoted on this author, add Theopomp. Hist. Phil. Lib. 1, Fr. 26, ap. Fragm. Hist. Gr. (Didot) p. 282; and a ref. to his Philocetes, Eth. Nic. VII 8, 1150 b. 9.

Two other examples follow, but, as Spengel (Tract on the Rhet. in Trans. Bav. Acad., Munich 1851, p. 46) justly says, they have no connexion with the preceding example from Theodectes, and the division which it exemplifies, but are illustrations of the general topic. Retaining the text (with Bekker) as it stands, we must accordingly understand the words έτος δ' εν τούτῳ—μή κτανείν as parenthetical, and suppose that the author, after the insertion of this as a note, proceeds with his exemplification of the general topic. Spengel, u. s., p. 47, suggests that they may have been a later addition by the author himself, a note written on the margin, which has got out of its place. My supposition, of a note, not written on the margin, but embodied in the text as a parenthesis—which is quite in Ar.'s manner—will answer the purpose equally well, and save the text in addition.

¹And, another example, the trial of Demosthenes and those who slew Nicanor; for as they were adjudged to have slain him justly (the act), it was held that his death (the passion or suffering) was just. This is cited by Dion. Halicarn., Ep. 1 ad Amm. c. 12, as a proof that Aristotle was acquainted with and quoted the speeches of Demosthenes, referring it to the case (against Aeschines) for the Crown. In doing so he omits περί. Of course ί περί Δημοσθένους δίκη cannot have this meaning: and it is most probable that it is not the Orator that is here referred to, but Thucydides' general, or some other person of the name.

¹ The unwarrantable identification, there supposed, p. 261, of the Theodecta with the Ρητορική πρός Αλέξανδρον, has been sufficiently corrected in Introd. to Rhet. pp. 55—67, on the Theodecta; where more information will be found about the author and his works.
Neither is anything known of Nicanor and his murderers. On the use of Demosthenes' name in the Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 46, note 2.

'And again, the case of him that died at Thebes; concerning whom he (the spokesman of the defendants) bade them (the judges) decide whether he (the murdered man) deserved death, since there was no injustice in putting to death one that deserved it'. "In hanc quoque historiam nunquam incidi." Victorius. Buhle rightly refers it to the case of Euphron, introduced as an episode, and described at length by Xenophon, Historiam. VII 3. There had been one of the usual quarrels between the aristocratical (οἱ βλατιστοὶ) and the popular party at Sicyon, of which Euphron took advantage, with the design of making himself master of the city. But knowing that as long as the Thebans occupied the acropolis he had no chance of success, he collected a large sum of money and went to Thebes with the intention of bribing the Thebans to assist him. Some Sicyonian exiles learning this, followed him to Thebes and murdered him in the acropolis. Here the murderers were brought to trial before the magistrates and council, who were already there assembled. The accusation of the magistrates, and the speech for the defence, are both recorded. All the accused with one exception asserted their innocence: one alone admitted the fact, and in justification of it pleaded for himself and the rest the guilt of the man that had been slain, just as Aristotle here describes it. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Θηβαῖοι ταῦτα ἀκόνταστες ἐγνώσαν δίκαια τοῦ Εὐφρόνα πεπονθέναι. But the Sicyonians (οἱ πολίται), interpreting the word 'good' in the sense of good to them (τοὺς εὐεργετάς ἐστῶν), said he was a good man, and buried him in the market-place, and adore him as the (second) founder of their city (ὡς ἀρχηγήτην), like Brasidas at Amphipolis (Thuc. V. 11).

The whole of this section, with the exception of the last example, καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θῆβησιν ἀποθανόντος, is quoted by Dionysius l. c. in support of his view that Demosthenes' speeches had been delivered before the composition of the Rhetoric, and were accessible to its author. The difference between the text which he seems to have used and that now received is very great, and apparently unaccountable. Besides minor discrepancies, the entire quotation from Theodectes, ἐν ὑστε γὰρ—καταφέων is omitted; and the clauses preceding and following stand thus, ἐντεὶ δὲ τοῦτο παραλογίσασθαι. οὖ γὰρ εἰ δικαῖος ἔσταθεν ἄν, καὶ δικαίως ὑπὸ τοῦτον πέπονθέν, ὡς ὁ φόνον ἄξια ποιήσας πατηρ, εἰ ὑπὸ τοῦ νυσίν τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ τῆς ἐπίθεσιν ἀπάγαγα, δεὶ σκοπεῖν χεῖρισ...ἀπότερας ἄν ἀμβλυτη. ἐνέστε γὰρ διαφωνέω τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ Ἀλκαμαῖῳ τοῦ Θεόδηκτον, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐν ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους δίκη κτ.λ. All the alterations seem to be for the worse, and in one of them, ἐπαθέν ἄν for ἐπαθέν τι, the grammatical blunder betrays corruption. The additional example of the father and son introduced by Dionysius is, as Spengel observes, not here in point. The very example for the sake of which the extract was made is mutilated, and the explanation, ἐπεὶ γὰρ—ἀποθανόντει, omitted: from which Spengel very justly argues that it could
not have been in the ms that he used: if he had read it there, he could not have so absurdly misapplied the example to the case for the Crown. Spengel has reviewed the two passages in connexion in the tract above cited, pp. 44—47. Our text, which is, when properly explained, perfectly consistent and intelligible, is retained by Bekker and seems to require no alteration; at all events none of Dionysius' variations could be advantageously introduced.

§ 4. Top. iv. The argument from greater to less—from that which is more to be expected to that which is less (Brandis)—and the converse; Top. B 10, 114 b 37 seq. To which is subjoined, § 5, *ei μίτε μᾶλλον μιτε ήττοι*, where two things are compared which are equally likely or probable, and accordingly the one may be inferred from the other: of this there are three cases, *έκ τοΰ όμοίως υπάρχειν ἡ δοκεῖν υπάρχειν τριχῶν*. Top. 1b. 115 a 15. Of the first there are four varieties: according as (1) the more or less is predicated of the *same* object—if pleasure is good, then the greater the pleasure the greater the good; and if wrong-doing is bad, the greater the wrong the worse; the *fact* is to be ascertained by induction—or (2) when one of two things is predicated (in the way of comparison), if of which it is more likely to be predicated is without it (any property or quality), the same may be inferred of the less likely; or conversely, if the less likely has it, *a fortiori* the more likely: or (3) (the reverse of the preceding) when two things are predicated of one, if the more likely is not there, we may infer that the less likely will not, or if the less likely be found there, that the more likely will also: (4) when two things are predicated of two others, if that which is more likely is wanting to the one, the less likely will surely be wanting to the other; or, conversely, if that which is less likely to be present to the one is there, the other will be sure to have that which is more likely [Grote's *Ar. 1. p. 425*]. These nice distinctions, though appropriate to Dialectics, are unnecessary in Rhetoric, and are therefore here omitted; but the examples will suggest the proper use of the topic. The inference in all these cases is plain and will be acknowledged by the audience, and that is all that is required.

The inference from greater to less, or from more to less likely or probable, is commonly called the *argumentum a fortiori*; the rule *omne maius continet in se minus* may also be referred to the same principle, though the two are not absolutely coextensive.

Cic. *Topic. iii. 11*, *Alia (ducuntur argumenta) ex comparatione maiorum aut parium aut minorum*. This is well exemplified in iv 23. xviii 68, Reliquas est comparationis locus cuinis...nunc explicanda tractatio est. Comparantur igitur ea quae aut maiora aut minora aut paria dicuntur: in quibus spectantur haec, numerus, species, vis, guadam eliam ad res alignas affectio. These four modes of application are clearly explained and illustrated in the following sections, 69—71.

De *Orat. ii. 40. 172*, *Maiora antem et minora et paria comparaminus sic: ex maiore; si bona existimatio divitis praestat et pecunia tauto operae expetitur, quanto gloria magis est expetenda: ex minore; Hic
The text contains a discussion on the use of the word "māllon" in a comparison, and the inference drawn from it. The text also includes references to various authors and works, such as Aristotle, Terence, and Spengel. The author critiques the interpretation of certain passages and suggests corrections and alternative readings. The text is a detailed analysis of a specific linguistic and philosophical problem, with citations from classical literature to support the analysis.
On these Aristotelian διπτογραφίαι, see Torstrik, Praef. ad de Anima, p. xxi, seq.

§ 5. The second branch of these inferences from comparison, is that of parallel cases. This is the argument from analogy, the foundation of induction, the observation of resemblances in things diverse, leading to the establishment of a general rule: the Socratic and Platonic Method: comp. c. 20. 4, note. Ex pari, Cic. de Inv. I 30. 47. ut locus in mari sine portu navibus esse non potest tutus, sic animus sine fide stabilis amicitis non potest esse. On the argument from analogy in general, see note on c. 19. 2.

'Again if the comparison is not of greater and less, (but of things equal or parallel): whence the saying, "Thy father too is to be pitied for the loss of his children. And is not Oeneus then, for the loss of his illustrious offspring?" ἀρα marks the inference. "Par infortunium parem misericordiam meretur." Schrader. The verses are supposed (by Victorius, Welcker, Trag. Gr. p. 1012, and Wagner, Fr. Trag. Gr. 111 185) to be taken from Antiphon’s Meleager, which is quoted again § 20, and at II 2. 19. (Antiphon, a Tragic Poet contemporary with the Elder Dionysius, Rhet. II 6. 19, Clinton F. H. Vol. II. Praef. XXXIII, flourished at the end of the fifth cent. B. C. Compare note on II 2. 19.)

The first of the two verses—if the story is that of Meleager—refers to the death of the two sons of Théstius, Toxéus, and Plexippus, by the hand of their nephew Meleager: Oeneus was the father of Meleager, whom he too had now lost. The words are those of some one who is consoling Althéa, Oeneus’ wife, and perhaps belong (says Victorius) to Oeneus himself. The meaning then would be, (Oeneus to his wife,) You speak of the losses of your father whose sons are slain—are not mine as great as his, in the loss of my famous son Meleager? and do we not therefore equally deserve pity? The story is told in Diod. Sic. IV 34 (Schrader), and Ov. Met. VIII. See 86, 87, An felix Oeneus nato victore fructur, Théstius orbis erit? melius lugebitis ambo.

The conduct of Alexander or Paris in the abduction of Helen is next justified by the parallel case of Theseus, who did the same; Isocr.
Theorikhs B 23 §§ 5, 6. 249

Πάτροκλον Ἕκτωρ, καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ἀλεξάνδρος. καὶ εἰ μὴ οἱ ἄλλοι τεχνὶται φαύλοι, οὐδ᾽ οἱ φιλόσοφοι. καὶ εἰ μὴ οἱ στρατηγοὶ φαύλοι ὅτι ἱττῶνται πολλάκις, οὐδ᾽ οἱ σοφισταί. καὶ ὅτι " εἰ δὲ τὸν ἰδιῶτην τῆς ὑμετέρας δόξης ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ὑμᾶς τῆς τῶν 6 Ἑλλήνων." ἀλλος ἐκ τοῦ τῶν χρόνων σκοπεῖν, οἶνον

Helen. §§ 18—20; and every one—and more especially an Athenian audience—must allow that he was a good man and could do no wrong (οὐκ ἡδίκησε) ; and of the Tyndaridae, Castor and Pollux, who carried off the two daughters of Leucippus, Phoebe and Eleaera (or Hilaira, Propert. i 2. 15), Ov. Fast. v 699, Theocr. Id. XXII 137, and these were demigods; and if Hector is not blamed for the death of Patroclus, neither should Paris be censured for that of Achilles. This is from some ἐγκώμιον or ἀπολογία Ἀλεξάνδρον, of an unknown rhetorician, similar to Isocrates' Helen. It is referred to again, § 8, and 24 §§ 7, 9.

'And if no other artists (professors of any art or science) are mean or contemptible, neither are philosophers: and if generals are not to be held cheap because they are often defeated, neither are the sophists (when their sophistical dialectics are at fault)'. From some speech in defence of philosophy, and of the Sophists.

The following is an argument, urged by an Athenian orator upon the general assembly, from the analogy of the relation of a private citizen to the state of which he is a member, to that of the same state as an individual member of the great community of the entire Greek race to the whole of which it is a part: if it be the duty of an individual Athenian to pay attention to, to study, the glory of his own country, then it is the duty of you, the collective Athenians whose representatives I am now addressing, to study in like manner the glory of the entire Greek community. Or it might be used by the epideictic orator in a Panegyric (πανηγυρικός λόγος, delivered in a πανηγύριον), pleading, like Isocrates, for the united action of the Greeks against the Barbarian.

§ 6. Top. v. The consideration of time. This kind of argument, though important in Rhetoric, is inappropriate in Dialectics, and therefore receives only a passing notice in the Topics, B 4, III b 24, ἐτι ἐπὶ τῶν χρόνων ἐπιβλέπειν, εἰ ποὺ διαφωνεῖ, where the word ἐπιβλέπειν shows that it is a mere passing glance, a cursory observation, that it requires: and in Cicero's Topics it is altogether omitted [Grote's Ar. 1 p. 418]. The application of it in Top. B 11, 115 b 11, referred to by Brandis, is different, and indeed unsuited to rhetorical purposes.

On this topic of time, and its importance in Rhetoric, Quintilian, Inst. Orat. v 10. 42 seq., after a preliminary division of time into (1) general (now, formerly, hereafter,) and (2) special or particular time, proceeds, Quo-rum utrorumque ratio et in consiliis (genus deliberatium) quidem, et in illo demonstrativo (τὸ ἐπιδεικτικό γένει) genere versatur; sed in indicitis frequentissima est. Nam et iuris quaestiones fact, et qualitatem distinguat, et ad coniecturam plurimum confert (contributes very greatly to the establishment of the fact—the status coniecturalis or issue of fact—
and especially to the refutation of the assertion of an alleged fact: this is illustrated by the cases following); \( ut \) quum interim probationes inceptu

\[ \text{inceptu} \]

nabilis afferat, quales sunt, \( si \) dicatur \( ut \) supra posui signator, qui ante diem tabularum decestit: \( aut \) commississe aliquid, \( vel \) quum

\[ \text{quum} \]

insans esset, \( vel \) quum omnino natus non esset. Further, §§ 45—48, arguments may be readily drawn \( ex \) \( iis \) quae \( ante \) \( rem \) \( facta \) sunt, \( aut \) \( ex \) coniunctis \( rei \), \( aut \) \( insequentibus \), or from time past, present \( (\text{instans}) \), and future: and these three are then illustrated. Inferences may be drawn from what is past or present, to the future, from cause to effect; and conversely from present to past, from effect to cause. It seems that the two principal modes of applying the topic of time to Rhetoric are (1) that described by Quintilian, in establishing, or, more frequently, refuting the assertion of a fact, which is the chief use that is made of it in the \emph{forensic} branch—this is again referred to, II 24. 11, on which see Introd. p. 274—the consideration of probabilities of time in matters of fact: and (2) the \emph{kairos}, the right time, the appropriate occasion, which may be employed by the \emph{deliberative} orator or politician in estimating the expediency, immediate or prospective, of an act or course of policy; and by the \emph{panegyrist} to enhance the value and importance of any action of his hero, or of anything else which may be the object of his encomium. On this use of \emph{kairos} comp. I 7. 32, I 9. 38, and the notes. For illustrations, see Top. I 2, 117 a 26—b 2.

'Another from the consideration of time, as Iphicrates said in the case \( (\text{subandii dike}) \) against Harmodius, 'Had I before the deed was done laid claim to the statue, provided I did it, you would have granted it me: will you then \( (\text{the inference}) \) refuse to grant it me now that I \emph{have} done it? Do not, then, first make the promise in anticipation, and then, when you have received the benefit, defraud me of it.'" The case, or speech, as it is here called 'against Harmodius', is also known by the name of \( \eta \) \emph{peri} \( \tau \delta \) \( eikovos \): this was the statue which was granted in commemoration of the famous defeat of the Lacedaemonian \emph{μόρα} in B.C. 392. Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 243, Ask the judges why they made the presents, and set up the statues, to Chabrias, Iphicrates, and Timotheus. The answer is, 'Iphikratei \( \delta \) \( μοραν \) \emph{Lakedaemonian} \emph{απέκτενεν.} [Dem. \emph{Lept.} 482 § 84, \emph{τιμωντες} \emph{ποτε \emph{Iphikraton \lambdaω\mbox{}} \emph{μαν} \emph{αυτων \emph{ετημι\mbox{}}\mbox{\v{s}ατε...}\emph{ib.} § 86, \emph{ουδέ} \emph{γαρ} \emph{υμώ} \emph{αρμόττει \dοκειν} \emph{παρὰ} \emph{μεν} \emph{τας} \emph{ευρεγειας \αυτων \emph{προχειρως} \emph{κε\mbox{\v{s}}}, \emph{ο\mbox{\v{s}} η} \emph{μη} \emph{μανων \αυ\mbox{\v{t}}ων \των \emph{ευρεγειας \τιμ\mbox{\v{a}}} \emph{αλλα} \emph{και} \emph{των \emph{εκεινων \φιλων}, \emph{επειδ\mbox{\v{a}} \emph{δε} \emph{χρωνος} \emph{διελθη} \emph{βραχυ\mbox{\v{s}}}, κα\mbox{\v{a}} \emph{ο\mbox{\v{s}} \emph{αυ\mbox{\v{t}}ως} \emph{δεδωκατε \tau\mbox{\v{a}}} \emph{αφαιρε\mbox{\v{t}}\mbox{\v{a}}}]. The speech here referred to was attributed by some—as Pseudo-Plutarch vit. Lys. \emph{συνεγραφα} \emph{δε} \emph{λ\mbox{\v{a}}} \emph{μα} \emph{ι\emph{τις \emph{και} \emph{Iphikratei} \emph{των \mu\mbox{\v{e}} \emph{προς \emph{Αρμ\mbox{\v{d}}\mbox{\v{o}}\mbox{\v{n}}}—to Lysias}'}, which is denied by Dionysius, de Lysia

1 See of this and two other speeches of Iphicrates attributed to Lysias, Sauppe, ad \emph{Fragm. Lys. xviii} and \emph{lxv. Oratores Attici iii} 178 and 190; [also Blass, \emph{die Attische Beredsamkeit}, p. 335].


Iud. c. 12, on two grounds, first the inferiority of the style, which was unworthy of Lysias; and secondly, because Lysias died seven years before the deed for which the statue was granted. Aristotle plainly ascribes it to Iphicrates himself. The speech ἑρίγονος, is quoted again, § 8. See also Clinton Fasti Hellenici II 113, sub anno 371. It was not till after Iphicrates had resigned his military command, and retired into private life, ἀπόδον τὰ στρατεύματα ἰδιώτης γίνετα, that he claimed his statue, μετὰ Ἀλκαθύνην ἄρχοντα, i.e. in the archonship of Pharsiclides, B.C. 371. The grant was opposed by Harmodius, a political antagonist.

And again to induce the Thebans to allow Philip to pass through their territories into Attica, it is argued that, “had he made the claim (or preferred the request) before he helped them against the Phocians (when they wanted his aid), they would have promised to do so; and therefore it would be monstrous for them now to refuse it, because he threw away his chance (then)”;—behaved liberally or with reckless generosity (so Vict.) on that occasion, and neglected to avail himself of his opportunity, (see the lexicons, s. v. προέσβασθα)—“and trusted to their honour and good faith”. The former event occurred in B.C. 346, when Philip allied himself with the Thebans and overran Phocis, and so put an end to the Phocian war. An embassy was sent to the Thebans after the capture of Elatea B.C. 339, to request that Philip’s troops might be allowed to march through their territory to attack Attica; but was met by a counter-embassy from Athens, proposed and accompanied by Demosthenes, who prevailed upon the Thebans to refuse the request, and conclude an alliance with Athens. κατὰ Δυσιμαχίδην ἄρχοντα, Dionys. Ep. I ad Amm. c. II. On this embassy and the proposals there made, see Demosthenes himself, de Cor. §§ 311, 313, from which it would seem that the words here quoted are not Philip’s, but an argument used by his ambassadors. Comp. also § 146, οὖτ’ εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐλθὼν δυνάτος… μὴς Ἐπικαιροῦ διείστων: and Aesch. c. Ctes. § 151, καὶ γράφειν ἐφ’ ἑλλησπόντι στις ἔτη ἰσόμετρα Ἰούλιαν Θεομάς διαδόν ἐπὶ Φιλιππον, (referred to by Spengel, Specim. Comm. ad Ar. Rhet. Heidelb. 1844, p. 15). In the following year, 338 B.C. ἐπὶ ἀρχοντον Χαρώνου, was fought the battle of Chaeronea. M. Schmidt (On the date of the Rhet. Halle, 1837, p. 16) uses this passage in fixing the date of Ar.’s work. [See Introd. p. 38.]

Dionys., ad Amm. c. II, cites the whole of this topic. The only important variations are two manifest blunders; the omission of εἰς before Φωκείς, and διέτευσεν μὴ διόσονων for εἰπότευσε μὴ διόσονων.

§ 7. Top. vi. This topic, “the retort which turns the point of what has been said against ourselves upon him who said it,” viz. the adverse
τὸν εἰπόντα: διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος, οἶον ἐν τῷ Τεῦκρῳ.

party in the law-court or assembly, belongs, as Brandis also remarks, u. s., p. 19, exclusively to Rhetoric. "Cum argumentum ducitur ex iis quae ex moribus vitaque ipsorum dicta sunt, admodumque ipsis congruent, adversus illum ipsum qui dixit: eminet autem, inquit, hic inter alios, ac vim maximum semper habere existimatus est." Victorius. That κατὰ in the definition means 'against' and not 'of' (in respect of) appears from the example. Iphicrates asks Aristophon, who had accused him of taking bribes to betray the fleet, "Would you have done it yourself? No; I am not like you. Well then, as you admit that you, Aristophon, are incapable of it, must not I, Iphicrates, (your superior in virtue and everything else) be still more incapable of it?" As Ar. adds, the argument is worth nothing unless the person who uses it is conscious of his own moral superiority, and knows that the audience whom he addresses shares his conviction: employed against an 'Aristides the Just', it would be simply ridiculous.

διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος κτλ.] This is interpreted by Spengel, Specim. Comm. u. s., p. 16 [and ed. 1867], "Mores sunt qui in hac re in discrimen vocantur; mores enim et vita eminet et litigantes discernit." I doubt if τρόπος, standing thus alone, can mean mores: nor, I think, is the mention of character and manners appropriate in this place: further on it would be suitable. Gaisford's explanation and connexion seem to be upon the whole most satisfactory. "Verba οἶον ἐν τῷ Τεῦκρῳ—εἰπειν puto esse diā μέσου. His certe seclusis belle procedunt omnia. Sententiae nexus hic est; Excellit autem hic modus (vel locûs—reading τόπος), Sed ad fidem accusatoris detrahendum." And in that case, Quintilian's words, v. 12. 19, Aristoteles quotidem potentissimum putat ex eo qui dicit, si sit vir optimus &c., may be a translation of διαφέρει ὁ τρόπος. διαφέρειν, if thus understood, denotes 'pre-eminence, distinction above others'.

οἶον ἐν τῷ Τεῦκρῳ] This is no doubt Sophocles' tragedy of that name; of which four fragments (and one doubtful one) still survive. See Wagner, Fragn. Tr. Gr. 1 388, 9. "Quum Ar. ubi poetarum nomina omisit tantummodo clarissimos quoque respererit, facile inducimur ut eum Sophoclis Teucrum dixisse credamus." And Spengel, Spec. Comm. u. s., p. 16 [and ed.] "Sophoclis puto; si alius esset, nomen addidisset." The same play is quoted again, III 15. 9, whence it appears that Ulysses was one of the characters. In an altercation with Teucer, the latter must be supposed to have used a similar argument, or retort, founded upon his own acknowledged superiority in moral character. See Wagner I. c.

1 Ulysses may be supposed to have accused Teucer of the murder of his brother—comp. Aj. 1012 seq. and 1021, where such a suspicion is hinted at: If you, Ulysses, are shocked at such a crime, do you suppose that I, Teucer, could have been guilty of it? The same argument was employed by Euripides in his Telephus. Fragn. xii, Dindorf, ap. Arist. Acharn. 554. Wagner, ii p. 364. Fr. Tel. 24. ταῦτ' ὅτι ἀδίκου ἐν ἐδραῖ (ita Meineke), τὸν δὲ Τῆλεφον οὐκ ὀλβριεύο. B. Eurip. p. 211, "Telephi verba cum Ulysses loquentis." Ulysses had been making some charge against Telephus, who makes this reply: You would have done so and so: am I not as likely, or still more so, to have done the same? Plut. ἀποθ. βασιλέως, Alex. ii, p. 180 B, Δαμείου ὁδὸν αὐτῷ μερὰ τάλαντα καὶ τὴν 'Αδιαν
who gives a long account of the subject of the play, and compares it with Pausuvis' play of the same name, supposed to be borrowed from Sophocles.

Aristophon was already celebrated as an orator in 403 B.C. (Clinton, F. H., sub anno.) His fame may be inferred from the frequent and respectful mention of him by Demosthenes especially (see for instance, de Cor. § 219, de Fals. Leg. § 339), Aeschines and Dinarchus. See Baiter et Sauppe, Orat. Att., Ind. Nom. s. v., p. 21, Vol. III. He was an Azenian, 'Αζηνιός, and thereby distinguished from his namesake of Collytus, de Cor. § 93. The speech to which Iphicrates here replies was delivered in "the prosecution of Iphicrates by him and Chares for his failure in the last campaign of the Social war, Diod. xvi 15. 21," (Clint. F. H. sub anno,) in the year 355 B.C., at an already advanced age. See also Sauppe, Fragm. Lys. 65, Or. Att. III 190: and note on Rhet. III 10. 6. He died before 330, the date of the de Corona, Dem. de Cor. § 162. On the speech ἐπὸς Ἐφικράτους προδοσίας ἀπολογία, attributed to Lysias (rejected by Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 12, comp. note on § 6 supra; on that against Harmodius), from which Iphicrates' saying against Harmodius is supposed to have been extracted, see Sauppe, Fragm. Lys. LXV, (Orat. Att. III 190): and comp. ibid. p. 191, Aristid. Or. 49, who quotes the same words somewhat differently, and, like Aristotle, attributes them directly to Iphicrates, and not to Lysias. [A. Schaefer, Dem. und seine Zeit, I 155.]

Quintilian, v 12. 10, borrows this example, referring it however to a different class of arguments, probationes quas pαθητικάς vocant ductas ex affectibus, (he means the θυσίας) § 9. After quoting the nobilis Scauris defensio, (on which see Introd. p. 151, note 1,) he adds, cui simile quidam fecisse Iphicrates dicitur, qui cum Aristophontem, quo accusante similis criminis reus erat, interrogasset, an is accepta pecunia rempublicam proditurus esset? isque id negasset; Quod igitur, inquit, tu non fecisses, ego feci? Comp. Spalding's note ad locum.

Dei δε̣ υπάρχειν κ.τ.λ.] 'But (the person who employs the argument) must have this advantage on his side, that the other (the opponent) would be thought more likely to have done the wrong; otherwise, it would seem absurd, for a man to apply this to an Aristides (the model of justice and integrity) when he brings a charge;—(not so), but only for the discrediting (throwing a doubt upon, making the audience distrust, the credibility) of the accuser: (if διάλλα be connected with what immediately precedes, to complete the sense, something must be supplied, such as οὐχ...
μᾶλλον ἄν δοκοῦντα ἀδικήσαι ἐκεῖνον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, γε-
λοίον ἄν φανεῖ, εἰ πρὸς Ἀριστείδην κατηγοροῦντα
tοῦτό τις εὕτειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀπιστίαν τοῦ κατηγό-
ρου· ὅλως γὰρ βούλεται ὁ κατηγορῶν βελτίων εἶναι
τοῦ φεύγοντος· τοῦτ’ οὖν ἐξελέγχων ἄει. καθόλου
οὕτω, ἀλλὰ χρηστῶν¹), and this, because as a general rule the accuser
tends to be (would be if he could) a better man than the defendant:
this (assumption) then always requires confusion². Should not ἄει be ἄει?

βούλεται] βούλεται like ἔδεικνυ frequently implies a tendency, design,
intention, or aspiration—the latter in things animate—would be, would like to be, if it could; and hence
here it denotes the assumption or pretension of superior goodness, 'he
would be better'. Zell, ad Eth. Nic. III i. 15 (III 2, 1110 b 30, Bk.),
Stallbaum ad Phaed. 74 D. Ast ad Phaedr. 230 D, p. 250. Thompson
ead eundem locum. Viger, pp. 263, 264, n. 77.

Eth. N. III 2, 1110 b 30, τὸ δ’ ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι εἰκὲ εἰ τις
κ.τ.λ. 'won't be called', 'don't choose to be called', as if it had the choice.
Hist. Anim. i 16. 11 [495 a 32], βέλει γὰρ εἶναι διμερῆς (wants to be, would
be if it could); of a general tendency, intention or plan, not completely
 carried out) ὁ πλείων ἐν ἀπαι τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. [the
Index Aristotelicus does not quote this passage, either under βέλει or
under διμερῆς, though it is given under πλείων]. Ib. vii 3. 4 [583 b 26],
aι καθάρξει βουλώμεθα· οὐ μὴ ἐκεκριζωθεῖ γε κ.τ.λ. (the same); de Part.
de Gen. An. ii 4, 9, 10 (bis codem sensu). Ib. v 7. 17, [787 b 19], τὰ δ’
δοτὰ ἔτει τὴν τοῦ νεῦρον φύσιν is used in the same sense. This I
believe to be a ἀπάξ λαγάμενων, [no instance is given in the Index
Aristotelicus, s. v. ἔτειν, where even the passage just quoted is not cited).
de part. An. iv 2. 10, βούλεται, 'is designed to be'; so Eth. N.
V 7, 1152 a 21, ὁ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἔμφυσον, animated
justice, the embodiment of abstract justice—this is what he is intended
to be, though he often falls short of it. Ib. c. 8, 1133 b 14, βούλεται
μένειν μᾶλλον. de Anima A 3, 407 a 4, βούλεται, Plato means or intends.
Topic. Z 5, 142 b 27, τὸ δὲ γένος βούλεται τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνειν. Ib. c. 13,
151 a 17. Pol. ii 6, 1265 b 27, ἦ σύνταξις ἀληθ. β. εἶναι (πολτεία) 'is
designed, or intended, to be'. Ib. 1266 a 7, ἐγκλίνεις β. πρὸς τὴν ὀλγαρχίαν.
Ib. i 5, 1254 b 27, c. 6, 1255 b 3, c. 12, 1259 b 6, et saepè alibi. ['"Saepè
per βουλεταί εἶναι significatur quo quid per naturam suam tendit, sive id
assequitur quo tendit, sive non plene et perfecte assequitur." Index
Aristotelicus, where more than forty references are given.]

So Latin velle; Cic. Orat. xxxiii 117, quem volumus esse eloquentem.

Hor. A. P. 89, versibus exponi tragicis res comica non vult.

καθόλου δ’ ὅτποσ ἐστίν κ.τ.λ.] Und. ὁ τρόπος (or ὁ τόπος) from above: not

¹ This is the usual way of connecting the parts of the sentence; but I think
Gaisford's explanation, quoted above, is certainly to be preferred.
² ["In cod. abest kal post Τεόκρω' (p. 252), 'ego addidi; post φανεῖν extat el,
egνο kal scripsi: deinde τοῦτο τις, ego τοῦτ' οὕτως; extremo autem loco δεῖ, Muretus
alique δεῖ." Ussing, in Opuscula Philologica ad Madvigium, 1876, p. 1.]
δ' ἀτοπὸς ἐστὶν, ὅταν τις ἐπιτιμᾷ ἄλλους ἃ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ ἢ ποιῆσειν ἀν, ἢ προτρέπῃ ποιεῖν ἃ αὐτὸς μὴ 8 ποιεῖ μηδὲ ποιῆσειν ἀν. ἄλλος ἐξ ὀρίσμοι, οἶον ὅτι τὸ δαίμονιον οὐδέν ἐστίν ἀλλ´ ἡ θεὸς ἡ θεοῦ

as Victorius, who supposes it to mean an absurd man. 'And in general the use of it is absurd whenever a man censures (taxes) others for something which he does himself, or would do (if he had the opportunity), or exHORTS them to do what he does not do now himself, and never would do (under any circumstances)'. The first of these two cases is that of Satan rebuking sin; the second that of one who preaches what he does not practise.

§ 8. Top. vii. Definition. The definition of terms is the basis of all sound argument, and the ambiguity of terms one of the most abundant sources of fallacy and misunderstanding. A clear definition is therefore necessary for intelligible reasoning. To establish definitions, and so come to a clear understanding of the thing in controversy, was, as Aristotle tells us, the end and object of the Socratic method. The use of the definition in dialectics is treated in the Topics, A 15, 107 a 36—b 5 [Grote's Ar. I p. 404], B 2, 109 b 13 seq. and 30 seq. Cic. Topic. v 26—vii 32. De Inv. ii 17. 53—56. Orat. Part. xii 41. De Orat. ii 39. 164. Quint. v 10. 36, and 54 seq.

The first example of the argument from definition, is the inference drawn by Socrates at his trial from the definition of τὸ δαίμονιον, Plat. Apol. Socr. c. 15. Meletus accuses him of teaching his young associates not to believe in the gods recognized by the state, and introducing other new divinities, ἑτερα δαίμονα καὶ αὐτός, in their place. Socrates argues that upon Meletus' own admission he believes in δαίμονια divine things (27 c); but divine things or works imply a workman; and therefore a belief in δαίμονια necessarily implies a belief in the authors of those works, viz. δαίμονες. But δαίμονες are universally held to be either θεοί or θεῶν παίδες (27 d), and therefore in either case a belief in δαίμονια still implies a belief in the gods. The conclusion is τὸν αὐτὸν ἐλεὼς δαίμονια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι (E).

In Xenophon's apology this argument is entirely omitted; and Socrates is represented as interpreting the καὶ αὐτὸς δαίμονια (which he is accused of introducing) of τὸ δαίμονιον, the divine sign which checked him when he was about to do wrong; and this is referred to the class of divine communications—oracles, omens, divination and so forth.

As to the status of the δαίμονες opinions varied: but the usual conception of them was, as appears in Hesiod, Op. et D. 121, and many passages of Plato, Timaeus, Laws (viii 848 d, θεῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἐποίησιν θεοὶ δαίμονοι), iv 713 b, οὐκ ἀνθρώπους ἄλλα γένους θεοστέρου τε καὶ ἀρείωνοι, δαίμονες, and elsewhere, that they were an order of beings, like angels, intermediate between men and gods, and having the office of tutelary deities or guardian angels to the human race. So Hesiod, u. s., Theogn. 1348 (of Ganymede), Plat. Phaedo 108 B, 107 D, 113 D. Aristotle seems to imply the same distinction when he says, de Div. per Somn. 1 2, init., that dreams are not τε'πέμπτα, because they are natural, δαίμονια μέντοι' ἡ γὰρ
The second example is taken from Iphicrates’ speech upon the prosecution of Harmodius, the ἕκα τοῦ Ἀρμοδίου, ἐπηρέας § 6, “cum Harmodius generis obscuritatem obiceret, definitione generosi et ἐρῴπνητα fastum adversarii repressit et decus suum defendit.” Schrader. Harmodius had evidently been boasting of his descent from the famous Harmodius, and contrasting his own noble birth with the low origin of Iphicrates. The latter replies, by defining true nobility to be merit, and not mere family distinction (comp. II 15, and the motto of Trinity College, virtue vera nobilitas [Iuv. VIII. 20 nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus]); ‘for Harmodius (himself) and Aristogeiton had no nobility anterior to their noble deed’. Next as to the relationship which Harmodius claimed: he himself is in reality more nearly related to Harmodius than his own descendant: true kinship is shewn in similarity of actions: ‘at all events my deeds are more nearly akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton than thine’. This is still more pointedly expressed in Plutarch’s version, Ἀποφθέγματα βασιλέων καὶ στρατηγῶν Iphicr. e, p. 187 b, πρὸς Ἀρμοδίου, τὸν τοῦ παλαιοῦ Ἀρμοδίου ἀπογόνον, εἰς ὁμογένειαν αὐτῷ λοιδοραύμον έφη το μὲν ἐμὸν απ’ ἐμὸν γένος ἀρχεται, τὸ δὲ σὸν ἐν τοι παῖται. This seems to be taken, with alterations, from a speech of Lysias, ap. Stob. flor. 86. 15, quoted by Sauppe, Fragm. Lys. XVIII. Or. All. III 180. Another form of Iphicrates’ saying, briefer still, is found in Pseudo-Plut. peri εὐγενείας c. 21 (ap. Sauppe u. s.), Ιφικράτης ὑπεδιδόμενος εἰς ὁμογένειαν ἐγὼ ἅρσον, εἰτε, τοῦ γένους.

The third is taken from the Alexander of some unknown apologist, quoted before, § 5, and § 12; and c. 24. 7 and 9. On this Schrader; “sententia illius videtur haec esse: Paridem intertemperament habendum non esse, una quippe Helena contentum. Argumentum e definitione temperantis (temperantiae) peitum.” Similarly Victorius, “μὴ κόσμιος est qui una contentus non est...sed quot videt formosam mulierem tot amat. Cum sola Helena ipsa contentus vixerit, non debet intertemperans vocari.”

évōs therefore is ‘one only’, and ἄγασιν ‘to be satisfied with’. ἀπόλαυσις, of sensual enjoyment, Eth. N. I 3, sub init., ὁ ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος, the life of a Sardanapalus. Ib. III 13, 1118 a 30, ἀπόλαυσις, ἡ γίνεται πάσα δὲ ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐν ποτίς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίους λεγομένοις. VII 6, 1148 a 5, τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις.
The fourth is, the reason that Socrates gave for refusing to go to pay a visit to Archelaus; that it would be ignominious to him, to receive favours from a man, and then not to have the power of requiting the benefits (good treatment) in the same way as one would injuries (ill treatment). This was a new definition, or an extension of the ordinary one, of ὑβρις, which is "wanton outrage," supra II 2. 5, an act of aggression. ὑβρις usually implies hostility on the part of him who inflicts it; in this case the offer of a supposed benefit is construed as inflicting the ignominy.


The contempt of Archelaus implied in this refusal is noticed by Diog. Laerct., Vit. Socr. 1 5. 25, ύπερεφρονήσε δ' καὶ Ἀρχελάδον τοῦ Μακεδώνος...μὴτε παρ' αὐτοῦς ἀπελθῶν; and see Schneider's note on Xenophon, Apol. Socr. § 17, on Socrates' ordinary conduct in respect of the acceptance of fees and gratuities and favours in general. On Archelaus and his usurpation of the throne of Macedonía, and his tyranny and crimes, see Plato Gorg. c. xxvi p. 470 C—471 C.

For all these first define the term (they are about to use), and then, having found its true essence and nature, they proceed to draw their inference (conclude) from it on the point that they are arguing. The ὄρος or ὄρημα, 'definition', is itself defined at length, Metaph. Δ 12, 1037 b 25, seq.: and more briefly Top. Α 8, 103 b 15, 101 b 39, Ζ 6, 143 b 20. The definition of a thing is its λόγος, τὸ τί ἦν ἐισὶ σημαίνων, that which expresses the formal cause of a thing; the what it was to be; the essence of it, or that which makes it what it is. Only εἶδος or species can, strictly speaking, be defined: the definition of the εἶδος gives the γένος, the essentials, together with the διαφορά, or specific difference: and these two constitute the definition; which is here accordingly said to express τὸ τί ἐστί, 'the, what the thing really is'. On the definition see Waitz, Organ. II p. 398, and Trend. El. Log. Ar. § 54, et seq. This topic of definition afterwards became the στάσεις ὄρισμα, nomen or finitio; one of the legal 'issues', on which see Introduction, Appendix E to Bk III pp. 397—400.

§ 9. Top. VIII. ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς] Between the topics of definition and division (§ 10) is introduced this topic of ambiguous terms, or words

AR. II.

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that are susceptible of many and various senses, such as *good* (Top. A 15, 106 a 4 [Grote's *Ar. i* p. 402]); which must be carefully examined to see whether or not they are all of them applicable to the argument. It is treated at great length in Top. A 15, and again B 3; and is inserted here (between definition and division) because it is equally applicable to both (Brandis). The exhaustive treatment bestowed upon it in the Topics supersedes the necessity of dwelling on it here; and we are accordingly referred to that treatise for illustration of it. Brandis, *u.s.*, p. 19, objects to *περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς*, "that there is nothing in the Topics which throws any light upon the enigmatical *ὄρθως*," and proposes *περὶ τοῦ εἶ ὀρθῶς* "upon the right use of the terms", i.e. whether it can be applied properly in any one of its various senses or not. But surely the reading of the text may be interpreted as it stands in precisely the same meaning: *οἶνον ἐν τοπικῷ* (λεκτα, or διάρισται) *περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς* (*χρὴσθαι αὐτῷ*), "as in the Topics (we have treated) of the right use of the terms". Muretus has omitted the words in his transl. as a gloss: and Victorius, followed by Schrader and Buhle, understands it as a reference, not directly to the Topics, but to the "dialectical art", as elsewhere, II 22. 10, for instance—see Schrader's note on II 25. 3. "Disciplina Topica intelligenda est." Buhle. It seems to me to be a direct and explicit reference to the passages of the Topics above mentioned, in which the right way of dealing with these ambiguous terms is described.

§ 10. *Top. ix. * *ἐκ διαφέρεσις* the topic of division. This is the division of a *genus* into its *eīδι* or *species*; as appears from the example, the three motives to crime, from which the inference is drawn. *Finitionis subjecta maxime videntur genus, species, differentes, proprium. Ex his omnibus argumenta ducuntur.* Quint. v 10. 55. *Top. B 2*, 109 b 13—29. Γ 6, 120 a 34 [Grote's *Ar. i* p. 435]. On διάφερος in demonstration, use and abuse, see Anal. Pr. i 31. Trendel. *El. Log. Ar.* § 58, p. 134 seq. Cic. *Topic. v* 28, XXII 83, de Orat. II 39. 165. *Sic pars* (rei quae nitur) partitio, *hoc modo*: aut senatum parendum de salute rei publicae fuit aut alius consilium instituendum aut sua sponte faciendum; alius consilium, superbum; suum, adrogans; utendum igitur fuit consilio senatus. Quint. v 10. 63, 65 seq. *Ad probandum valet, et ad refellendum, § 65. Periculosum*; requires caution in the use, § 67. The example, which illustrates the topic by the three motives to crime or wrong-doing, pleasure, profit, and honour, is taken from Isocrates' * antidōs*, §§ 217—220, as Spengel points out, *Trans. Bav. Acad.* 1851, p. 20, note. All the three are successively applied to test the accusation (of corrupting youth) that his enemies have brought against him, and all of them are found to be unsuitable to explain the alleged fact. He therefore concludes by the method of exhaustion, that having no conceivable motives, he is not guilty. It must however be observed that *Αρ.'s διὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον oὐδ' αὐτὸν φασὶν*, is not supported by anything in Isocrates' text. The causes and motives of actions have been already *divided* in 1 10, with a very
II ἀδύνατον, διὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον οὐδ' αὐτοί φασιν. ἄλλος εἴ τις Πεπαρηθίας, ὅτι περὶ τῶν different result. The same terms are there employed, διελώμεθα § 6, and διαιρέσεις § 11.

For an example of this topic, see II 23. 22 in the note.

On the inference from 'disjunctive judgments', see Thomson, Laws of Thought, § 90, p. 160.

§ 11. Top. x. εἰ τις Πεπαρηθίας] The rudimentary kind of induction, of which alone Rhetoric admits: two or three similar cases being adduced to prove a general rule, from which the inference is drawn as to the present case. It is the argument from analogy, or cases in point. This and the following, says Brandis, u. s., naturally find nothing corresponding to them in the Topics. Cic. de Or. II 40. 168, ex similitudine; si ferae partus suos diligunt, qua nos in liberis nostros indulgentia esse debemus? &c. Quint. n 10. 73, est argumentorum locus ex similibus; si continentia virtus, utique et abstinentia: Si fidem debet tutor, et procurator. Hoc est ex eo genere quod εἰπαγωγή Graeci vocant, Cicero inductionem.

εἰ τις Πεπαρηθίας] δικής; comp. § 6, εἰν τῇ πρῶς Αρμόδιων. An extract 'from the well-known Peparethian case', about the parentage of a child; the speaker adduces two analogous cases, or cases in point, to prove the rule which he wishes to establish, that it is the mother who is the best judge of the parentage of the child. Gaisford quotes Homer, Od. A 215, μὴ τῷ μὲν ἐμὲ φησί σοι τοῦ ἔμμεναι, αὐτῷ ἦγορε ὦν οἶδ' οὐ γάρ πω τις ἕν γόνον αὐτὸς ἀνέγνω: on which Eustathius; δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτελεῖ τὰ εἰρήμενα άρθρως ἔχειν.

Πεπαρηθίας[1] "Concionis (ut puto) sive alterius generis scriptionis nomen est Peparethia," Victorius. But in that case it would be masc. (with λόγος understood), not feminine: and the analogy of § 6 is also in favour of the ellipse of δικής. Otherwise we might understand εἰπαγωγής, or γνωσικός.

The meaning is, 'Another topic of inference is induction; as, for instance, it may be inferred as a general rule from the Peparethian case, that in the case of children (as to the true parentage of children) women always distinguish the truth better (than the other sex). And the same rule has been applied, from a similar induction, in two other recorded cases; 'for, in the first, (on the one hand), at Athens, in a dispute in which Mantias the orator was engaged with his son (about his legitimacy), the mother declared the fact (of the birth, and so gained the cause) for the child; and in the second, at Thebes, in a dispute between Ismенийas and Stilbo (for the paternity of a child), Dodonis (the mother)

τέκνων αἱ γυναῖκες πανταχοῦ διορίζουσι τάληθές; τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ Ἀθηνᾶς Μαντία τῷ ῥήτορι ἀμφισβη-π. 1398 τούτι πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἡ μῆτηρ ἀπέφηνεν, τοῦτο δὲ Ἐνήβησιν Ἰσμηνίου καὶ Στιλβωνος ἀμφισβητούντων ἡ Δωδώνις ἀπέδειξεν Ἰσμηνίου τὸν υἱὸν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Θετταλίσκον Ἰσμηνίου εὐνόμιζον. καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, εἰ τοῖς κακῶς ἐπιμελήθεισι τῶν made a declaration that it belonged to Ismenias; and in consequence Thetetaliscus was always regarded as Ismenias' son'.

'Mantias the orator', whose name does not appear in Smith's Biogr. Dict., may be the same person who is mentioned as the father of Manti- theus and Boeotus, of the deme of Thoricus, Dem. Boeot. de nom. §§ 7, 10; comp. §§ 30 (bis), 37. ['Mantias proposed that Plangon should declare on oath before an arbitrator, whether Boeotus and Pamphilus were her sons by Mantias or not. She had assured him privately that if the oath in the affirmative were tendered to her, she would decline to take it... She, however, unexpectedly swore that they were her sons by Mantias.' From Mr Paley's Introd. to Dem. Or. 39, Select Private Orations, 1 p. 131. Comp. supplementary notes on pp. 134 and 182].

Ismenias, whose name likewise is wanting in Smith's Dict., was in all probability the one somewhat celebrated in Theban history, as leader, with Autoclides, of the anti-Lacedaemonian party at Thebes, mentioned by Xenophon, Hellen. v 2. 25 seq. He was accused by his opponent Leontiades, tried, and put to death by a court appointed for the purpose by the Lacedaemonians, who were then (383 B.C.) in occupation of the Cadmeia, Xen. Ib. §§ 35, 36, Grote, Hist. Gr. x pp. 80, 85, 86 [chap lxxvi]. His name is also associated with Mr Grote, H. G. x 380, 387, 391 [chap. lxxix], with that of Pelopidas, as one of the ambassadors to the court of Artaxerxes at Susa in 367 B.C.; and again, as taken prisoner with him by Alexander of Pherae in the following year. The authority for these state- ments appears to be Plutarch, Artax. xxii for the first; and Id. Pelopid. xxix sub fin. for the second: Xenophon does not mention him in this connexion. At all events, it was not the same Ismenias, that was put to death in 383, and accompanied Pelopidas, as ambassador and captive, in 367 and 3661. Of Stilbon, and the other persons named, I can find no further particulars.

'And another instance from Theodectes' "law"—if to those who have mismanaged other people's horses we don't entrust horses of our own, or (our ships) to those who have upset the ships of others; then, if the rule hold universally, those who have ill guarded or maintained the safety and well-being of others, are not to be employed in (entrusted with) the preservation of our own'. Sauppe, Fragm. Theod. Νόμος (Or. All. 111

1 The name Ismenias appears to have been traditional in Boeotia from the very earliest times. 'Ἰσμηνίας ὁ Βοιωτιός is mentioned in the biography of Homer ascribed to Herodotus, §§ 2, 3, as one of the original settlers of the new colony of Cuma in Aeolia, and carrying with him Homer's mother Critheis.
This, the vulgata lection, is retained by Bekker, and even (for once) by Spengel, though \textit{A} has \textit{politikón}. In favour of this,
καὶ Μυτιληναῖοι Σαπφῶ καὶ περ γυναῖκα οὖσαν, καὶ
Δακεδαμόνιοι Χίλωνα τῶν γερόντων ἐποίησαν ἥκιστα
φιλολόγοι ὑντες, καὶ Ἰταλιώται Πυθαγόραν, καὶ
Λαμψακηνοὶ 'Αναξαγόραν ξένον ὄντα έθαψαν καὶ

the reading of the best Ms, it may be urged, that πολίτης would represent
the Chians as disclaiming Homer as their fellow-citizen, quite contrary
to the pertinacity with which they ordinarily urged their claim to the
honour of his birthplace. This was carried so far, that Simonides in
one of his fragments, Eleg. Fragm. 85 line 2 (Bergk), says of a quotation
from Homer, Χίος ἐτεπν ἀνίπ. Comp. Thucyd. III 104. On this 'Ionic'
hand ὃν πολίτης may mean—as Müller supposes, Hist. Gk. Lit. ch. v
§ 1—that they claimed, not Homer's birth, but merely his residence
among them. The other reading πολιτικος affords an equally good
sense; that his Chian fellow-countrymen conferred honours upon Homer,
though not upon the ordinary ground of public services, or active
participation in the business of public life; as the Athenians—had
they so pleased—might have dealt with Plato.

καὶ περ γυναῖκα οὖσαν] "Sappho so far surpassed all other women in
intellectual and literary distinction that her fellow-countrymen, the
Mytileneans, assigned to her the like honours with the men, whom
she equalled in renown; admitted by her countrymen of every age to
be the only female entitled to rank on the same level with the more
illustrious poets of the male sex." Mure, H. G. L. Vol. III p. 273,
Sappho. He refers to this passage. Chilon, Mure, 1b. p. 392. Diog.
Laert., vit. Chil. 68, substitutes the ephory for the seat in the γεροντια
as the honour conferred on Chilon by the Lacedaemonians.

φιλολόγοι] 'of a literary turn'.

'?ταλιώται] (Σικελιώται) Greek settlers in Italy (and Sicily). Victorius
remarks that these are properly distinguished from '?ταλοι', the original
inhabitants, who would not have understood Pythagoras' learning, or
institutions, or moral precepts.

Pythagoras, according to the received account, as reported by Diogenes
Laertius, vit. Pyth., was a native of Samos, to which after various travels
he was returning, when, finding it oppressed by the tyranny of Polycrates,
he started for Croton in Italy; καὶ καὶ νῦν οὐκε θείς τοῖς ?ταλιώταις εδοξάσθη
σὺν τοῖς μαθηταῖς, οἳ πρὸς τοὺς τρικοσίους ὑντες ἀκοινόμουν ἀριστὰ τὰ
πολιτικά, ὡστε σχέδεν ἀριστοκρατιάν εἶναι τήν πολιτείαν, § 3. In
what way the honour of his new fellow-citizens was expressed rather by re-
spect and admiration, than by substantial rewards, may be gathered from
the famous αὐτὸς ἕφα of his pupils, and from a notice in Diogenes,
§ 14, οὖν οὐδὲ ἐδαμάσθη κ.τ.λ.

Ἀναξαγόρας was a native of Clazomenae in Ionia, but, τῆς ἀπο-
χωρήσας εἰς Δαμψαχον αὐτόθι κατέστρεψεν. Diog. Laert., Anaxagoras, § 14,
a custom held in his honour, 1b. τελευτασνα αἱ αὐτὸν ἐδαφαν ενίτις
οἱ Δαμψακηνοὶ καὶ ἐγγυρίσαν ένθαδέ, πλείστον ἀληθείς ἐπὶ τέμα περήσας
οὐρανίων κόσμου, κατεί τ'Ἀναξαγόρας, § 15.
§ 11. This is an inference \( \epsilon k \) \( kri\varepsilon w o s \), 'from an authoritative judgment or decision already pronounced upon the same question, or one like it, or the opposite' (opposites may always be inferred from opposites); 'either universally and at all times' (supply \( o\varepsilon t o \) \( e k e r\kappa i k a n u s \)) 'or, in default of that, by the majority, or the wise—either all or most—or good'. This topic, like the last, is naturally wanting in the dialectical Topics, to which it is inappropriate. Brandis, u. s.

Cicero, Top. XX 78, mixes up this topic with the authority of character, the \( \varepsilon t h o s \) \( e n \) \( t\varepsilon \) \( \lambda e g o v t i \), which ought not to be confounded though they have much in common; the authority being derived from the same source, intellectual and moral pre-eminence, but employed in different ways. The former of the two is made supplementary to the other, \( s e d \) \( e t \) oratores \( e t \) philosophos \( e t \) poetas \( e t \) historicos: \( e x \) \( q u o r u m \) \( e t \) dictis \( e t \) scriptis saepe auctoritas petitur \( a d \) faciendum fidem. Quintilian omits it in his enumeration, v 10.
We have here, and in the following sentence, a classification of 'authorities' from whose foregone decisions we may draw an inference as to the truth of a statement, or the rectitude of a principle, act, or course of policy which we have to support; or the reverse. Such are the universal consent of mankind, quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus: short of that, the judgment of the majority: or of the 'wise', especially professional men, experts, pre-eminently skilled in any art, science, practice, pursuit, or the majority of them: or, lastly, the good, the right-minded, and therefore sound judging; whose minds are unclouded by passion or partiality, unbiased by prejudice, clear to decide aright: men of φρόνησις who have acquired the habit of right judgment in practical business and moral distinctions. The good, or virtuous man, the φρόνιμος or ἀγάθος, or the ὁρθὸς λόγος, appears again and again in Aristotle's Moral and Political writings as the true standard of judgment. Comp. Rhet. I 6.25, ἀγάθον, ὁ τῶν φρόνιμων τις ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡ γνωστῶν προείρηκεν, and see note and references there.

The wise, as authorities; particularly judges and legislators, as well as poets, philosophers, statesmen, prophets and seers, and the like; are one class of μάρτυρες (as attesting the truth of a statement or principle) of the ἄρετοι πίστεις, I 15.13, seq.: where Homer, Periander, Solon, Themistocles (as an interpreter of oracles), and Plato, are selected as examples.

ἡ εἰ αὐτῷ οἱ κρίνοντες] again κεκρίκασιν. 'Or again, (special classes of authorities,) if the judges themselves, or those whose authority they accept (have already pronounced upon the point); or those whose decision we have no power of opposing, such as our lords and masters (any one that has power, control, over us, with whom it is folly to contend); or those whose decision it is not right to oppose, as gods, father, pastors and masters' (whom we are bound in duty to obey).

'An instance of this is what Autocles said in his speech on the prosecution of Mixidemides' (this is lit. 'as Aut. said, what he did say against M.') 'that' (before ei supply δείδων εἰμι aut tale aliquid, 'it was monstrous that, to think that—') 'the dread goddesses' (the Eumenides or Erinnyes) 'should be satisfied to bring their case before the Areopagus, and Mixidemides not!' That is, 'that the authority of the court had been proved by the submission of the Eumenides, Mixidemides was therefore bound to submit in like manner: the jurisdiction and its claims had been already decided. Of the circumstances of the case nothing further is known: but it seems

1 On the force of this argument from universal consent, see Cic. Tusc. Disp. I cc. 12, 13, 14, 15: especially 13, 30 (of the belief in God), and 15, 35, omnium consensus naturae vox est, seq. With which compare the maxim, Vox populi vox Dei.

2 δίκαιν δοσίν is here, as in Thuc. I 28, δίκας ἤθελον δοσίν, 'to submit to trial or adjudication': comp. Aesch. c. Ctes. § 124, and the phrase δίκας δοσίν καλ λαβεῖν, denoting a general legal settlement of differences. The usual meaning is 'to pay the penalty or give satisfaction'.

Λιστα μὲν εἰ πάντες καὶ ἄεί, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀλλ' οἳ γε πλείστοι, ἴ σοφοὶ ἴ πάντες ἴ οἱ πλείστοι, ἴ αγαθοί. ἴ εἰ αὐτῷ οἱ κρίνοντες, ἴ οὐς ἀποδέχονται
from the allusion here, that Mixid. had first refused to submit to the Court of Areopagus the trial of some charge against him, on which he was subsequently, and consequently, prosecuted in one of the ordinary courts of Autocles.

The appearance of the σεμων θεαί as prosecutors in the court of the Areopagus is of course a reference to their prosecution of Orestes in Aeschylus' Eumenides. Of Mixidemides we know but the name. Autocles was a much more important personage. He was an Athenian, son of Strombichides, Xen. Hellen. vi 3. 2, one of the seven ambassadors sent to the congress at Sparta in 371 B.C., in the spring before the battle of Leuctra, Xen. l. c., who reports his speech § 7. Xenophon (u. s. § 7) calls him μάλα ἐπιστρεφθης φήσωρ, 'a very careful orator' (so Sturz, Lex. Xen. and Lexx. but I think rather, 'dexterous', one who could readily turn himself about to anything, 'versatile': and so apparently Suidas, who renders it ἀγχίνος). Autocles was again employed in 362—361 "in place of Ergophilus (Rhet. ii 3.13) to carry on war for Athens in the Helle- spont and Bosporus." (Grote.) Xenophon's Hellenics do not reach this date. His operations against Cotys in the Chersonese, and subsequent trial, are mentioned by Demosth. c. Aristocr. § 104 and c. Polycl. § 12, and his name occurs, pro Phorm. § 53 [A. Schaefer's Dem. u. s. Zeit 1 pp. 64, 134 and iii 2, p. 158]. See Grote, H. G. X 223 [c. lxxvii], and 511 seq. [c. lxxx]. Another Autocles, ὁ Τολμαῖος, is mentioned by Thuc. iv 53, and again c. 119; and another by Lysias, πρὸς Σίμωνα § 12: and a fourth by Aeschines, de F. Leg. § 155.

'Or (another example) Sappho's saying, that death must be an evil: for the gods have so decided; else they would have died themselves': using the gods as an authority for the truth of her dictum.

'Or again, as Aristippus to Plato, when he pronounced upon some point in—as he, Aristippus, thought—a somewhat too authoritative tone, "Nay but," said he, "our friend"—meaning Socrates—"never used to speak like that."

Aristippus draws an inference from the authority of their common master—who never dictated, but left every question open to free discussion, always assuming his own ignorance, and desire to be instructed rather than to instruct—to the proper rule in conducting philosophical discussion. On Aristippus see Grote's Plato, Vol. iii. p. 530, seq. ch. xxxviii.

On this passage, see Grote, Plato, III 471, and note. In qualification of what is there said of Plato's 'arrogance', so far as it can be gathered
from our text, take Victorius' commentary on ὡς ὄντως, with which I entirely agree: "quae sequuntur verba modestiam Platonis defendunt, et paene declarant sine causa Aristippum arrogantiae eum insumulasse: addit enim ὡς ὄντως, ut opinio illius erat." I will not however deny that Plato may even in conversation have been occasionally guilty of dogmatizing: in his latest writings, such as the Timaeus and Laws, and to a less degree in the Republic, such a tendency undoubtedly shews itself: but by far the larger portion of his dialogues, which represent probably nearly three-fourths of his entire life, are pervaded by a directly opposite spirit, and are the very impersonation of intellectual freedom. Following the method and practice of his master, he submits every question as it arises to the freest dialectical discussion, so that it is often impossible to decide which way (at the period of writing any particular dialogue) his own opinion inclines; and always presents in the strongest light any objections and difficulties in the thesis which he is maintaining. I think at all events with Victorius that Aristotle at any rate lends no countenance here to Aristippus' charge of dogmatic assumption. So far as his outward bearing and demeanour were concerned, I can conceive that he may have been haughty and reserved, possibly even morose: but a habit of 'laying down the law,' or of undue assumption and pretension in lecturing and discussion—which is what Aristippus appears here to attribute to him—seems to me to be inconsistent with what we know from his dialogues to have been the ordinary habit of his mind, at least until he was already advanced in life.

ἐπαγγελματικότερον) ἐπαγγελμαθαι is to 'announce', 'make public profession of', as of an art, pursuit, business, practice. Xcn. Memor. 1 2. 7, ἐπ' ὄρετιν, of the Sophists, who,'made a profession of teaching virtue'. So Προταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα, Rhet. II 24. 11. This 'profession' may or may not carry with it the notion of pretension without performance, imposture, sham, φαινομένη σοφία, show without substance: and it is by the context and the other associations that the particular meaning must be determined. Thus when Protagoras says of himself, τοῦτο ἐστὶν, ὃ Σ., τὸ ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι, he certainly does not mean to imply that he is an impostor: when Aristotle I. c. applies the term to him, this is by no means so certain; judging by his account of the Sophists, de Soph. El. i, 165 a 19 seq. Instances of both usages may be found in Ast, Lex. Plat. There can be no doubt that undue assumption or pretension is meant to be conveyed by Aristippus in applying the word to Plato's tone and manner.

'And Agesipolis repeated the inquiry of the God at Delphi, which he had previously made (of the God) at Olympia (Apollo at Delphi, Zeus at Olympia), whether his opinion coincided with his father's;

1 I have expressed my opinion upon some points of Plato's character, in contrast with that of Aristotle, in Introd. to transl. of Gorgias p. xxvii, and note; to which I venture here to refer.
assuming or inferring (συνίσταντα) from the obvious duty of respecting the authority of a father, the disgracefulness of pronouncing the contrary'.

For v. 1. Ηγίσιππος Victorius and Muretus had proposed to substitute Αγγείοντιλις, from Xen. Hellen. IV 7. 2, which has been adopted in the recent editions of Bekker and Spengel; being also confirmed by a variation in the old Latin Transl, which has Hegesippus polis. See Spengel in Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 53. Gaisford in Not. Var. and Victorius. Xenophon in the passage cited tells the whole story. Agesipolis is the first of the three kings of Sparta of that name, who came to the throne in 394 B.C. (Clinton, F. H. II p. 205). His expedition into Argolis, to which the consultation of the oracle was preparatory, was in 390 (Clinton, F. H. sub anno). This Agesipolis has been not unnaturally confounded with his more distinguished fellow-citizen and contemporary Agesilaus, to whom Plutarch, Reg. et Imper. Apophthegm., Agesilaus 7, p. 191 B, erroneously ascribes this saying as an apophthegm (Gaisford). And similarly Diodorus, xiv 97, has substituted the latter name for the former in his account of (apparently) the same event that Xenophon is relating in the passage above cited. See Schneider's note ad locum.

'And Isocrates' argument about Helen, to shew that she was virtuous and respectable, (as she must have been) since (εἴπερ, if—as he did) she was approved by Theseus (Theseus decided, or gave judgment in her favour). Aristotle's εὑρίσκει expresses Isocrates' ἀγαθῆσαντα καὶ θαυμάσασθαν. See ante, I 6. 25. The passage of Isocrates referred to occurs in his Helen §§ 18—22. Compare especially §§ 21, 22. He concludes thus, περὶ δὲ τῶν οὖν πάλαιν προσῆκε τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνον τῶν χρόνων ἐν φρονήσασιν ὑμῶν οὖν αὐτοὺς ἤμας φανεροῖς, to give way to their authority.

'And the case of Alexander (Paris) whom the (three) goddesses (Juno, Minerva, Venus) preferred (selected, decided, by preference; προ, before all others; to adjudge the prize of beauty). This instance is given before, with the preceding, in I 6. 25.

'And—as Isocrates says, to prove that (ὅτι) Evagoras was a man of worth—Conon, at all events after his misfortune, left all the rest and came to Evagoras'. Evagoras, the subject of Isocrates' panegyric, Or. IX, was king of Salamis in Cyprus. In the spring of 404 B.C., after the defeat of Aegospotami (δυστυχίας), he fled for refuge to Evagoras, Xen. Hellen. II 1. 29; the words δυστυχίας ὡς Εὐαγόραν ἠλθε are a direct quotation from the Oration, § 52. This incident of Conon's forced visit is absurdly embellished, exaggerated, and distorted from its true significance by the voluble panegyrist, § 51 seq.
§ 13. Top. xii. ἐκ τῶν μερῶν] the argument from the parts to the whole. This topic, so briefly dispatched here, is much more clearly and fully set forth in the Topics, p 4, i i i a 33 seq. [Grote's Ar. i p. 417], to which we are referred; the same example being given in both. The parts and whole, are the species and genus. Anything of which the genus or whole can be predicated must likewise fall under one of its species, because the species taken together make up the genus; if knowledge for instance be predicadice of something, then some one of its parts or branches—grammar, music or some other species of knowledge—must needs be predicadice of the same; otherwise it is no part of knowledge. And the same applies to the declensions—παρονύμος λεγόμενα, the same root or notion with altered terminations—of the words representing the genus; what is true of ἐπιστήμη &c. is equally true of ἐπιστήμων, γραμματικός, μονοικός. If then all the parts of the genus are or can be known (this is assumed in the text), we have to consider when any thesis is proposed, such as, the soul is in motion (τὴν ψυχήν κίνεισθαι, meaning, that the soul is motion), what the kinds of motion are, and whether the soul is capable of being moved in any of them; if not, we infer, 'from part to whole', that the genus motion is not predicadice of soul, or that the soul is devoid of motion.

κίνησις is usually divided by Aristotle into four kinds, (1) φορά, motion of translation, motion proper; (2) ἀλλοίωσις, alteration; (3) ἀνέξησις, growth; and (4) φθίσις, decay. De Anima i 3, 406 a 12. Again Metaph. A 2, 1069 b 9, κατὰ τὸ τι ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἢ ποιῶν ἢ ποῦ, where γένεσις ἀπλὴ καὶ φθορά are added to the list, and distinguished from ἀνέξησις and φθίσις, but still included in four divisions; γένεσις καὶ φθορά, κατὰ τὸ δόθε or τὸ τι; ἀνέξησις καὶ φθορά, κατὰ τὸ ποιῶν; ἀλλοίωσις, κατὰ τὸ πάθος, ὑπὸ ποιῶν; and φορά, κατὰ τὸ ποιῶν, ὑπὸ ποῦ. In Phys. vii 2 sub init. there are distinguished φορά, ποιῶν, ποιῶν. Categ. c. 14, 15 a 13, six, γένεσις, φθορά, ἀνέξησις, μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, ἢ κατὰ τὸν μεταβολῆς. Plato gives two, Parmen. 138 c, (1) motion proper or of translation and (2) change. To which, p. 162 E, is added as a distinct kind the motion of revolution or rotation, (1) ἀλλοίωσις, alteration, change of character, κατὰ τὸ πάθος, τὸ ποιῶν; (2) μεταβολῆς, change of place; and (3) στρέφεσθαι, revolution. And in Legg. x c 6, 893 b seq., where the distinctions are derived from a priori considerations, ten is the total number, 894 c. (Comp. Bonitz ad loc. Metaph., Waitz ad l. Categ.) Cicero treats this topic of argument, under the general head of definitio, Top. v 26, seq., afterwards subdivided into partitio and divisio, and under the latter speaks of the process of dividing the genus into its species, which he calls formae; Formae sunt haec, in quas genus sine ullius praetermissione dividitur: ut si quis ins in legem, movam, aequitatem dividat, § 31: but does not go further into the argument to be derived from it.

Quintilian, v 10. 55, seq., follows Cicero in placing genus and species under the head finitio, § 55, comp. § 62; in distinguishing partitio and divisio, as subordinate modes of finitio § 63; and points out the mode of drawing inferences, affirmative or negative, from the division of the genus into its parts or species, as to whether anything proposed
can or can not be included under it, § 65. These are his examples. *Ut sit cives aut natus sit oportet, aut factus: utrumque tollendum est, nec natus nec factus est.* Ib. *Hic servus quem tibi vindicas, aut verna tuus est, aut emptus, aut donatus, aut testamento relictus, aut ex hoste captus, aut alienus: deinde remotis prioribus supererit alienus.* He adds, what Aristotle and Cicero have omitted; *periculosum, et cum cura intuendum genus; quia si in proponendo unum quodlibet omiserimus, cum risu quoque tota res solvitur.*

'Example from Theodectes' Socrates: 'What temple has he profaned? To which of the gods that the city believes in (recognises, accepts) has he failed to pay the honour due?"' The phrase *doctrin eis té ierón té én Δελφοῖς* occurs twice (as Victorius notes) in Aesch. c. Ctes. §§ 106, 107. Theodectes' "Socrates," which is (most probably) quoted again without the author's name § 18, was one of the numerous *apologiae Σωκράτους* of which those of Plato and Xenophon alone are still in existence. We read also (Isocr. Busiris § 4) of a paradoxical *κατηγορία* *Σωκράτους* by Polycrates (one of the early Sophistical Rhetoricians, Spengel *Art. Script.* pp. 75—7. *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. 19 vol. III 281—2), which was answered by an *apologia* *Σωκράτους* from Lysias, Speng. op. cit. p. 141. On this see Sauppe, Lys. Fragm. cxiii *Or. Att.* iii 204: which is to be distinguished from another and earlier one, also by Lysias, Sauppe, u. s. Fr. cxii p. 203. [Blass, *Att. Bereds.* 1, p. 342, II, pp. 337, 416.]

Theodectes is here answering the charge of Meletus, *όδε μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοῦ οὐ νομίζων, Xen. Mem. i 1. 1, Apol. Socr. § 11, Plat. Ap. Socr. 26 b.* To this Xenophon, like Theodectes, replies by a direct contradiction, and affirmation of the contrary, Mem. i 1. 2, *θὰνω τε γὰρ φανερὸς ἦν, κ.τ.λ. comp. § 20; and sim. Apol. Socr. § 11 seq. How the charge is met by Plato in his Apology cc. xiv, xv, and dialectically argued, has been already intimated, *supra* § 8,—see note, and comp. iii 18. 2. The difference of the mode of treatment severally adopted by the two disciples in the defence of their master is remarkable. The *inference* implied in Thed.1's argument is this:—You accuse Socrates of impiety and disbelief in the gods. Has he ever profaned a temple? Has he neglected to worship them and do them honour, by sacrifice and other outward observances? The indignant question, implying that the speaker defies the other to contradict him and prove his charge, assumes the negative. But such offences as these are the *parts* of impiety which indicate disbelief in the gods—the orator in his excitement takes for granted that the enumeration is complete, that there is nothing else which could prove disbelief in the gods—and if he is not guilty of any of them, neither can he be guilty of the impiety which includes these, and these alone, as its parts; the whole or genus is not predicabile of him1.

1 This argument may possibly be suitable to a sophist and declarer, but the use of it in a court of justice would certainly he exposed to the 'danger' against which Quintilian warns those who employ the topic in general.
14 τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν ὃν ἡ πόλις νομίζοι;"  

§§ 14, 15. Top. XIII. Argumentum ex consequentibus; ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων τω ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, which Vict. found as a title to the topic in one of his MSS. On ἐπεσθαί and ἀκολουθεῖν, and their various senses, dialectical and in the ordinary language, see note on 16. 3. The general meaning of them seems to be 'concomitant'; that which constantly waits or attends upon something, either as antecedent, simultaneous, or subsequent.

There are two topics of consequents, XIII and XIV. The first is simple. Most things have some good and some bad consequent usually or inseparably attached to them, as wisdom and the envy of fellow-citizens are the ordinary results of education. In exhortation, defence, and encomium (the three branches of Rhetoric) we urge the favourable consequence—the resulting wisdom in the case proposed—if we have to dissuade, to accuse, to censure, the unfavourable; each as the occasion may require. The second is somewhat more complex. Here we have two opposites (περὶ διὸν καὶ ἀντίκειμένων) to deal with—in the example public speaking falls into the two alternatives of true and fair speaking, and false and unfair. These are to be treated 'in the way before mentioned', τῷ πρῶτον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ: that is, in exhorting or recommending we take the favourable consequent, in dissuading the unfavourable. But the difference between the two topics lies in this (διαφέρει δὲ); that in the former the opposition (that must be the opposition of the good and bad consequent, for there is no other) is accidental—that is, as appears in the example, there is no relation or logical connexion between wisdom and envy; they may be compared in respect of their value and importance as motives to action, but are not logical opposites—but in the latter, the good and the bad consequences are two contraries (τὰ ναυτία) love and hatred, divine and human. In the example of the second topic, the dissuasive argument which comes first assigns evil consequences (hatred) to both alternatives of public speaking: that in recommendation, the contrary, love. The topic of consequences, in the general sense, as above explained, has been already applied in estimating the value of goods absolute, 16.3; and in the comparison of good things, 7.5. In Dialectics it does not appear in this simple shape, though it is virtually contained in the application of it to the four modes of ἀντιθέσις or opposition, Top. B 8; and in the comparison of two good things, Top. Γ 2, 117 a 5—15. Brandis u. s. [Philologus IV 1] observes of the two Rhetorical topics, that they could not find an independent place and treatment in the Topics.

Cicero speaks of the general topic of consequence dialecticorum proprius ex consequentibus antecedentibus et repugnantibus, omitting the
simple form in which it appears in Rhetoric. His consequentia are necessary concomitants, quae rem necessario consequuntur. Top. XII 53. The mode of handling it is illustrated, XIII 53.

Quint. v. io. 74, Ex consequentibus sive adiunctis; Si est bonum iustitia, recte indicandum: si malum perfidia, non est fallendum. Idem retro. § 75, sed hae consequentia dico, άκολουθεί; est enim consequens (in Cicero's sense) sapientiae bonitas; illa sequentia, parapámeva, quae postea facta sunt aut futura. And two other examples of the application of the argument, §§ 76, 77. Quintilian naturally, like Aristotle, gives only the rhetorical, and omits the dialectical use of the topic.


The example of Top. is taken from the passage of Eur. Med. 294, already employed in illustration of a γραμφή, II 21. 2. Education of children has for its inseparable attendants wisdom or learning as a good, and the envy of one's fellow-citizens as an evil: we may therefore take our choice between them, and argue either for or against it, persuading or dissuading. (Note a good instance of μὲν οὖν, as a negative (usually) corrective, 'nay rather'; this of course comes from the opponent who is arguing on the other side, that education is advantageous. Also in § 15.)

'The illustration of this topic constitutes the entire art of Callippus—with the addition (no doubt) of the possible, (the κοινός τόπος of that name,) and all the rest (of the κοινός τόπος, three in number), as has been said', in c. 19, namely.

The two notices of Callippus and his art of Rhetoric in this passage and § 21, are all that is known to us of that rhetorician. He is not to be confounded with the Callippus mentioned in 1 12. 29. Spengel, Art. Script. 148—9, contains himself with quoting the two passages of this chapter on the subject. He was one of the early writers on the art of Rhetoric; and it is possible that of that name referred to by
15 ἀλλος, ὅταν περὶ δυοῦν καὶ ἀντικειμένων ἢ προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν δέ, καὶ τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν χρῆσθαι. διαφερεῖ δέ, ὅτι ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ τυχόντα ἀντιτίθεται, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τάναντία. οἶον ἱέρεια οὐκ εἶα τὸν υἱὸν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ, ἔφη, τὰ δίκαια λέγης, οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ σε μισήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἁδικα, οἱ θεοὶ. δεῖ μὲν οὖν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τὰ δίκαια λέγης, οἱ θεοὶ σε φιλήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἁδικα, οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ ταυτὸ τῷ λέγομένῳ τὸ ἔλος πρίασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλας· καὶ ἦ βλαί—

Isocrates—who was born in 436 B.C.—as one of his first pupils, περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 93, may have been this same Rhetorician Callippus.

§ 15. Tiresias, ap. Phoen. 968, οὕτω δ’ ἐμπύρω χρῆσαι τέχνη μάταιος· ἤν μὲν ἔχθρα σημεῖα τύχη, πικρὸς καθέτηχ οἷς ἂν οἰωνοσκότη. Ὑπεύθυν δ’ ἐν' οἴκτου τοὺς χρωμένως λέγων ἀδικεὶ τὰ τῶν θεῶν, is compared by Victorius with the example in the second topic.

This second topic of consequences differs from the preceding in these particulars. In the first, which is simple, the consequences of the thing which is in question are twofold—bad and good, and these are unconnected by any reciprocal relation between them. The second is more complicated, and offers contrary alternatives, which are set in opposition ἀντιτίθεται τάναντία, as δίκαια and ἁδικα λέγειν in the example—and then, 'proceed as before', τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ; that is, state the consequence of each, (favourable in exhortation or recommendation, unfavourable in dissuasion,) and bring the two into comparison in order to strike the balance of advantage or disadvantage between them. In public speaking, for instance, the alternatives are, true and fair, and false and unfair, words and arguments: if your object is to dissuade from it, you adduce the ill consequences of both, and contrast them, so as to shew which is the greater.

'But that is all one with the proverb, to buy the marsh with the salt': i.e. to take the fat with the lean; the bad with the good; the unprofitable and unwholesome marsh (palus inamabilis, Virg. G. IV 479, Aen. VI 438) with the profitable salt which is inseparably connected with it. An argument pro and con, but only of the first kind, Top. XIII, by comparing the good and the bad consequence, according as you are for or against the purchase. An Italian proverb to the same effect is quoted in Buhle's note, comprare il mel con le mosche; and the opposite, the good without the bad, appears in the Latin, sine sacris haereditas, Plaut. Capt. IV 1. 5 (Schrad.). [We may also contrast the proverb μὴ δὲ μέλη, μηδὲ μελίσσας: ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ βουλομένων παθεῖν τι ἄγαθον μετὰ ἀπευκτοῦ (Diogenianus, cent. vi., 58). Cf. Sappho, fragm. 113.]

1 Gaisford, Not. Var., cites this as from Victorius. It is not found in my copy, Florence, 1548.
There is an evident intention in the association of ἔλος and ἄλας: the alliterative jingle, as in so many other proverbs (παθήματα μαθήματα, safe bind safe find), sharpens the point, and helps its hold on the memory.

Some mss have ἐλαυνόν for ἔλος, which is expressed in the Vet. Tr. Lat., ‘ōlim (oleum) emi et sales,’ and by other interpreters; and also adopted by Erasmus, Adag., oleum et salem oportet emere; ‘to be in want of oil and salt,’ implying insanity, against which this mixture was supposed to be a specific. Victorius, referring to the Schol. on Arist. Nub. 1237, ἄλον διασαράγξεις ὅνατ’ ἐν οὖν τοῖς, who notes τούς παραφρο- νοῦντας ἄλοι καὶ ἐλαίων διέβρεχον, καὶ ὥφελούντο, supposes that some copyist having this in his mind altered ἔλος into ἐλαυνόν. At all events the proverb in this interpretation has no meaning or applicability here.

In the following paragraph (καὶ ἡ βλαίοσωσι...ἐκατέρως) the meaning of βλαίοσωσις, the application of the metaphor, and its connexion with what follows, which appears to be intended as an exemplification or explanation of the use of βλαίοσωσις, are, and are likely to remain, alike unintelligible. The Commentators and Lexicographers are equally at fault; Spengel in his recent commentary passes the passage over in absolute silence: Victorius, who reasonably supposes that βλαίοσωσις (metaphorically) represents some figure of rhetorical argument, candidly admits that nothing whatsoever is known of its meaning and use, and affords no help either in the explanation of the metaphor, or its connexion with what seems to be the interpretation of it. Buhle, and W. Dindorf, ap. Steph. Thees. s. v. πραεωραριατοί; Vet. Lat. Tr. claudicatio; Riccoboni inversio. Vater discreetly says nothing; and Schrader that which amounts to nothing. After all these failures I cannot hope for any better success; and I will merely offer a few remarks upon the passage, with a view to assist others as far as I can in their search for a solution.

βλαίοσωσις and ραβάδος, valgus and varus, all of them express a deformity or divergence from the right line, or standard shape, in the legs and feet. The first (which is not always explained in the same way1) seems to correspond to our ‘bow-legged’, that is having the leg and foot bent outwards: for it was applied to the hind legs of frogs, βλαίοσωσις ραβάδος, poet. ap. Suidam. And Etym. M. (conf. Poll. 2. 193,) interprets it, ὁ τοὺς πόδας ἔσ τὰ ἔξω διεστραμμένος (with his feet distorted so as to turn outwards) καὶ τῷ Λ στοιχείῳ ἐσκόμος; so that it seems that it may represent the act of straddling. The adj. itself and some derivatives not infrequently occur in Ar.’s works on Nat. Hist.; likewise in Galen, once in Xenophon, de re Eq. i. 3, and, rarely in other authors; but βλαίοσωσις appears to be an ἀπαξ λεγόμενον. ραβάδος is the opposite defect to this, ‘bandy-legged’, where the legs turn inwards. And to these correspond valgus and varus: the first, qui suras et crura habet extrorsum intortas, of which Petronius says, crura in orbein pandit; and Martial, crura... simulant quae cornua luna. Huic contrarius est varus, qui intrororsus

1 βλαίοσωσις...bandy-legged, opposed to ραβάδος. ραβάδος, crooked, bent, esp. of bandy legs. Liddell and Scott’s Lex. sub vv.
The translation, as the passage stands, is ‘and the βλαίσωρις is, or consists in, this, when each (either) of two contraries is followed (accompanied) by a good and an ill consequence, each contrary to each’, (as in a proposition of Euclid). This is a generalisation of the example in Top. xiv: the two contraries are the fair and unfair speaking; each of which has its favourable and unfavourable consequence; truth, the love of God and hatred of men; falsehood, the love of men and hatred of God. But how this is connected with βλαίσωρις I confess myself unable to discover. The nearest approach I have been able to make to it—which I only mention to condemn—is to understand βλαίσωρις of the straddling of the legs, the Λ of the Etymol. M., which might possibly represent the divergence of the two inferences pro and con deducible from the topic of consequences: but not only is this common to all rhetorical argumentation, and certainly not characteristic of this particular topic, but it also loses sight of the deviation from a true standard, which we have supposed this metaphorical application of the term to imply.

§ 16. Top. xv. This Topic is derived from the habit men have, which may be assumed to be almost universal, of concealing their real opinions and wishes in respect of things good and bad, which are always directed to their own interests, under the outward show and profession of noble and generous sentiments and of a high and pure morality. Thus, to take two examples from de Soph. El. c. 12, they openly profess that a noble death is preferable to a life of pleasure; that poverty and rectitude, is better than ill-got gains, than wealth accompanied with disgrace: but secretly they think and wish the contrary. These contrary views and inclinations can always be played off one against the other in argument, and the opponent made to seem to be asserting a paradox: you infer the one or the other as the occasion requires. This is in fact the most effective (κεφάλατος) of all topics for bringing about this result. The mode of dealing with the topic is thus described in de Soph. El. i. c. 173 a 2, “If the thesis is in accordance with their real desires, the

1 Compare the whole passage §§ 124—126, in illustration of praevarication.
respondent should be confronted with their public professions; if it is in accordance with them [the latter], he should be confronted with their real desires. In either case he must fall into paradox, and contradict either their publicly expressed, or secret opinions." Poste, Transl. p. 43. This is for dialectics: but it may be applied equally well to rhetorical practice, in which there is nearly always a real or (as in the epideictic branch) imaginary opponent. The author proceeds, I.b. 173 a 7, further to illustrate this by the familiar opposition of φύσις and νόμος, nature and convention or custom, which is to be handled in the same way as the preceding, and is πλείστως τότος τοῦ τά παράδοξα λέγειν: referring to Callicles' well-known exposition of the true doctrine of justice conventional and natural, in Plato's Gorgias, c. 38, foll.

This topic does not occur in Cicero's tract, which is confined to dialectics; nor is it found amongst the rhetorical topics of Quintilian's tenth chapter of Book v, which has supplied us with so many illustrations of Aristotle.

'Another; whereas in public and in secret men praise not the same things, but openly most highly extol what is just and right, yet secretly (privately, in their hearts,) prefer their own interest and advantage, from these (i. e. from premisses derived from the one or the other of these two modes of thought and expression, whichever it be that the opponent has given utterance to,) we must endeavour to infer the other: for of all paradoxical topics (topics that lead to paradox, which enable us to represent the opponent as guilty of it,) this is the most effective (most powerful, mightiest, most authoritative). If the opponent has been indulging in some high-flown moral commonplaces about virtue and honour, by an appeal to the real but secret feelings of the audience on such matters, we must shew that such sentiments are paradoxical, or contrary to common opinion; or conversely, if we have occasion to assume the high moral tone, make our appeal to those opinions which they openly profess, and shew that it is a paradox to assume with the opponent that men are incapable of any other motives than such as are suggested by sordid self-interest.

§ 17. Top. xvi. 'Another (inference may be drawn) from the proportion of so and so (ταύτα). This is the argument from analogy in its strict and proper sense, the 'analogy of relations'. See Sir W. Hamilton, quoted at II 19. 2, and on the argument from analogy in general. The analogy or proportion here is the literal, numerical or geometrical proportion, 2 : 4 :: 8 : 16. "Analogy or proportion is the similitude of ratios." Eucl. El. Bk. v def. 8.

This topic also does not appear in the dialectical treatise, where it is inappropriate; nor in Cicero and Quintilian, except so far as the ordinary and popular analogy (see again the note above referred to)
is recognised under the names of similitudo (c) and similia (q). Similitude is between two, proportion requires four terms. Eth. N. v 6, 1131 a 32, ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία λόγων ἐστὶ λόγων (equality or parity of ratios), καὶ ἐν τέταρτοι ἑλαχίστοι. And comp. the explanation of the 'proportional' metaphor in Poet. xxi 11, and the examples, §§ 12, 13. Accordingly of the two examples each has four terms, and the inference is drawn from the similitude of the two ratios.

'As Iphicrates, when they (the assembly, ψηφιοῦται,) wanted to force upon his son the discharge of one of the liturgies' (pecuniary contributions to the service of the state, ordinary and extraordinary, of a very onerous character), 'because he was tall, though he was younger than the age (required by law), said that if they suppose tall boys to be men, they will have to vote short men to be boys': the proportion being, Tall boys : men :: short men : boys. Two ratios of equality. The argument is a reductio ad absurdum. The first ratio is hypothetical. If tall boys are really to be regarded as men, then by the same ratio, &c.

'And Theodectes, in the "law" (which he proposes, in his declamation, for the reform of the mercenary service, see above § 11, note) 'you make citizens of your mercenaries, such as Strabax and Charidemus, for their respectability and virtue, and won't you (by the same proportion) make exiles of those who have been guilty of such desperate (ἀνήκεστα) atrocities?'

Of these 'mercenaries' who swarmed in Greece from the beginning of the fourth century onwards, the causes of their growth, their character and conduct, and the injury they brought upon Greece, see an account in Grote, Hist. Gr. Vol. xi p. 392 seq. [chap. lxxxvii].

Charidemus, of Oreus in Euboea, in the middle of that century, was perhaps the most celebrated of their leaders. He was a brave and successful soldier, but faithless, and profligate and reckless in personal character. Theopomp. ap. Athen. x 436 b. c. Theopomp. Fr. 155, Fragm. Hist. Gr., ed. C. and Th. Müller, p. 384 6 (Firmin Didot). διὰ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν, therefore, is not to be taken as an exact description of Charidemus' character, but is the assumption upon which the Athenians acted when they conferred these rewards. His only real merit was the service he had done them. He plays a leading part in Demosthenes' speech, c. Aristocratem; who mentions several times, §§ 23, 65, 89, the citizenship conferred on him by the Athenians in acknowledgment of his services, as well as—somewhat later—a golden crown, § 145, πρῶτον πολίτης, εἶτα πάλιν χρυσοῦς στεφάνως ὡς εὐεργέτης στεφάνωται, § 157,


PHTORIKHS Β 23 §§ 17, 18. 277

ἐπιείκειαν· φυγάδας δ' οὐ ποιήσετε τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μ. 18 σθοφόροις ἀνήκεστα διαπετραγμένοις; ἀλλος ἐκ τοῦ, τὸ συμβαίνον ἐὰν ἤ ταυτόν, ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ὧν συμβαίνει ταύτα· οἴον Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσέβουσιν οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεούς τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν λέγοντες· ἀμφότερος γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς ποτε. καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ συμβαίνον ἐξ ἐκατέρου λαμβάνει ὃς ταυτὸ ἀεί. "μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὐ περὶ presents, and the name of ‘benefactor’, 185, and 188. Besides the Athenians, he was employed by Cotys and his son Cersobleptes, kings of Thrace, and by Mæmon and Mentor in Asia. A complete account of him and his doings is to be found in Weber’s Proleg. ad Dem. c. Aristocr. pp. LX—LXXXIII.

Of the other mercenary leader, Strabax, all that we know is derived from Dem. c. Lept. § 84, that through the intervention or by the recommendation (διὰ) of Iphicrates he received a certain ‘honour’ from the Athenians, to which Theodectes’ extract here adds that this was the citizenship. We learn further from Harpocrate and Suidas that Strabax is—an ὁνομα κύριον. “De commendatione Iphicratii, ornatus Strabax videri potest Iphicratii in eodem bello (sc. Corinthiaco) adiutoruisse.” F. A. Wolff, ad loc. Dem.

§ 18. Top. xvii. Inference from results or consequents to antecedents, parity of the one implies parity or identity of the other1: if, for instance, the admission of the birth of the gods equally with that of their death, leads to the result of denying the eternity of their existence—in the former case there was a time when they were not, as in the other there is a time when they will not be—then the two assertions (the antecedents) may be regarded as equivalent, or the same in their effect, and for the purposes of the argument ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσέβουσιν, because they both lead to the same result or consequent; so that one can be put for the other, whichever happens to suit your argument.

On Xenophanes, see note on 1 15. 29, and the reff. On this passage, Müllach, Fr. Phil. Gr., Xenoph. Fragm. Inc. 7, “Hoc dicto veteres poetae perstringuntur, qui quum diis aeterntatam (potius immortalitatem) tribuerent, eos tamen hominum instar ortos esse affirmabant eorumque parentes et originem copiose cnarrabant.” And to nearly the same effect, Karsten, Xenoph. Fr. Rell. xxxiv. p. 85. The saying against the asserters of the birth of the gods is not found amongst the extant fragments, but the arguments by which he refuted this opinion is given by Aristotle (?) de Xenoph. Zen. et Gorg. init. p. 974. 1, seq. and by Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. f. 6 A, ap. Karsten p. 107, comp. p. 109.

For καὶ— δὲ, see note on 1 6. 22.

‘And in fact, as a general rule, we may always assume’ (subaudi δὲι, ἔρη, 1 "Von der Gleichheit der folgen auf Gleichheit des ihnen zu Grunde liegenden schliessende.” Brandis [Philologus IV i].
'Ἰσοκράτους ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρῆ φιλοσοφεῖν." καὶ ὅτι τὸ διδόναι γῆν καὶ ὑδωρ δουλεύειν ἐστίν, καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς ἑιρήνης ποιεῖν τὸ aut tale aliquid) the result of either of two things to be the same with that of the other (ἐκατέρου), or with ἑκάστου, as Α', adopted by Spengel, the result of anything; i.e. any things, two or more, that we have to argue about) "as in the example, "what you are about to decide upon is not Isocrates, but a study and practice, whether or not philosophy deserves to be studied." Whether you decide upon Isocrates or his pursuit and study, the inference or result is the same (ταύτων), and can be deduced equally from both. I have here adopted Spengel's emendation of Isocrates for Socrates, "quam emendationem," as Spengel modestly says, "Victorius si integrum vidisset Antidosin nobis non reliquisset." It is given in his Specim. Comm. in Ar. Rhet., Munich, 1839, p. 37. A comparison of this passage with Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδοσεως, § 173, ou γὰρ περὶ ἐμὸν μέλλετε μόνον τὴν ψήφον διοίκειν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν νεοτέρων προσέχουσι τῶν νοῶν, certifies the emendation. Even Bekker has accepted it. At the same time the vulgata lectio Ἱσοκράτους, as Victorius interprets it, yields a very sufficient sense, thus more briefly expressed by Schrader, "Socrate damnato simul damnabitur studium sapientiae: Socrate servato servabantur sapientiae studia," Socrates and his study or pursuit stand or fall together; to condemn Socrates, is to condemn philosophy: and might even be thought to be confirmed by κρίνειν, which more immediately suggests a judicial decision.

'And that (the result, effect, consequence of) giving earth and water is the same as, equivalent to, slavery.' The demand of 'earth and water' by the Persian monarchs from a conquered prince or state, in token of submission, and as a symbol of absolute dominion or complete possession of the soil—therefore equivalent to slavery, δουλεύειν—is referred to frequently by Herodotus, IV 126, Darius to Idanthyrsus, the Scythian king, δεσποτὴς τῷ σῷ δῶρα φέρων γῆν τε καὶ υδώρ. V 17, the same to Amyntas king of Macedonia, Ib. 18, the same to the Athenians, Ib. 73, VII 131, 133, 138, 163. Plin. N. H. XXII 4 (ap. Bahr), Summum apud antiquos signum victoriae erat herbas fornigere victos, hoc est terra et altrice ipsa humo et humatione etiam cedere: quem morem etiam nunc durare apud Germanos scio. It appears from Ducange, Gloss. s. v. Investitura, that this custom was still continued in the transmission of land during the middle ages (Bahr).

'And participation in the general peace (would be equivalent to) doing (Philip's) bidding'. The Schol. on this passage writes thus: Φίλιππος κατηγάκασε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἅν εἰρήνευσιν μετ' αὐτοῦ ἄσπερ καὶ αὐτὰς χάραι, ὡς δὲ Δημοσθένης ἀντιπός ὁ ἣν ὅτι τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης μετὰ τοῦ Φίλιππου ἡμᾶς, ἡδὲ καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας, ἐστὶ τὸ ποιεῖν οὗ προστάτη ό Φίλιππος. Spengel was the first to point out (Specim. Comm. u. s. p. 39) that the κοινῆ εἰρήνη here referred to is the same of which mention occurs several times in a speech περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλεξάνδρον συνθηκῶν—attributed to Demosthenes, but more probably by Hyperides; see the Greek argument, and Grote, H. Gr. (chap. xci) xii 21 and note—
The κοινή εἰρήνη, and the συνθήκαι πρὸς Ἀλέξ. both denote the convention at Corinth of the deputies of all the Greek states, with the exception of the Lacedaemonians who refused to appear, in 336 B.C., "which recognised Hellas as a confederacy under the Macedonian prince (Alexander, not Philip) as imperator, president, or executive head and arm." Grote, u. s. p. 18. The speech π. τ. π. Ἀλέξ. σ., according to the same authority, p. 21, was delivered in 335. But neither Aristotle's quotation, nor the Scholiast's comment, can refer to this speech, as Spengel himself observes. If the Scholiast is right in describing the opposition of Demosthenes as directed against Philip, it must be referred to a different speech delivered by him against the former agreement of a similar kind with Philip, after Chaeronea, which took place two years earlier than that with Alexander, in 338. Grote, u. s., p. 17. Comp. xi 700. [A. Schaefer, Dem. u. s. Zeit, iii 186—193.]

This passage has been already referred to in the Introduction, on the question of the date of publication of the Rhetoric, p. 28; and again, 46 note 2, on the references to Demosthenes in the same work.

'Of the two alternatives (the affirmative or negative side, whether the result is or is not the same, either may be taken, whichever happens to be serviceable'. Or, as Victorius, 'of the two alternatives, which though in themselves different, yet in the result are the same, we may always take that which best suits our argument'.

§ 19. Top. xviii. 'Another (is derived from the natural habit or tendency of mankind) that the same men don't always choose the same things' (Spengel omits τοὺς αὐτοὺς with A; Bekker, as usual, retains it) 'after as before (something intermediate, act, occurrence, period), but conversely' (i.e. do the second time what they have avoided the first, or vice versa); 'of which the following enthymeme is an example'.

ἡ quaeque ἢ? which expresses 'as' (in the way in which), much more naturally than ἢ. This seems to be the required sense: and so I think Victorius understands it, "non eadem iidem homines diversis temporibus sequuntur." The same meaning is very awkwardly expressed, if indeed it is expressed, by rendering ἢ 'or'. In that case ὑπερευ and πρῶτερον must be 'at one time or another': Riccobon 'posterius vel prius' 'after or before'; 'sooner or later'. I will put the question, and leave it to the judgment of others. Which is the more natural expression, the more usual Greek, and more in accordance with the example? 'The same men don't always choose the same things after as before', i.e. the second time, when they have to repeat some action or the like, as the first time, when the circumstances are perhaps different: or, if ἢ be or, 'men don't always choose the same things after or before, sooner or later'. Surely the alternative is here out of place; in this case it should be καλ, not ἢ.

ἐνθύμημα] Victorius interprets this "argumentum ex contrariis conclusum:" on which see Introd. pp. 104, 5, Cic. Top. XIII 55. This is the
κατέλθωμεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα ὅπως μὴ μαχώμεθα." ὅτε μὲν γὰρ τὸ μένειν ἀντὶ τοῦ μάχεσθαι

sense in which it is found in the Rhet. ad Alex., Cicero and Quintilian, and was in fact the common usage of it. But, as far as I can recollect, it never occurs in this special sense, at all events, in Aristotle's Rhetoric; and is in fact one of the leading distinctions between it and the Rhet. ad Alex. Neither was there any occasion to depart here from his ordinary use of the term: for enthymemes, i.e. rhetorical inferences in general, are exactly what he is employed in illustrating throughout this chapter.

The original sentence of Lysias begins with, δεινὸν γὰρ ἐν εἴη, Ὢ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ κ.τ.λ. 'For monstrous would it be, men of Athens, if when we were in exile we fought for our return (to be restored to our home), and now that we have returned (been restored) we shall fly to avoid fighting.' We were eager to fight before (this was, as will appear afterwards, with the Lacedaemonians who aided the Thirty), shall we now after our restoration shrink from it? The example is an instance of what men are in the habit of doing, viz. changing their minds without reason: the argument, that it is unreasonable, and monstrous at all events to do it now.

κατελθεῖν, to return from exile, prop. 'down', κατά, viz. to the shore or harbour, at which almost all returned exiles would naturally arrive; either from the interior of the country, ἀναβαίνειν καταβαίνειν; or from the open sea into port, ἀνάγεσθαι contrasted with κατάγεσθαι, προσχείν. Aesch. Choeph. 3, and his own commentary, Arist. Ran. 1163—5.

This is followed by Aristotle's explanation, which is certainly more obscure than what it professes to explain. 'That is to say (γέρ), at one time (before) they preferred staying (where they were, 'maintaining their ground') at the price of fighting; at another (after their restoration) not fighting at the expense of not staying', i.e. the second time, they preferred not staying, quitting the city, to avoid fighting. It is necessary to interpret ἄρι in this way, not 'instead of'—if the reading be sound, to bring the explanation into conformity with the example; and thus no alteration is required.

The words quoted by Ar. are taken from a speech of Lysias, of which Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 33, has preserved a long fragment; printed amongst Lysias' speeches as Orat. 34. Baiter et Sauppe Or. Att. 1 147. [Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit p. 441 and Jebb's Attic Orators p. 211.] Dion. gives an account of the occasion of it in the preceding chapter. He doubts if it was ever actually delivered. The title of it is, περὶ τοῦ μη καταλῦσαι τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν 'Αθήνας; and its object was to prevent the carrying into effect of a proposal of one Phormisius, one of the restored exiles μετὰ τοῦ δήμου,—this was after the expulsion of the Thirty in 403 B.C., when the demus had been restored and recovered its authority, and the other party were now in exile—to permit the return of the present exiles, but to accompany this by a constitutional change, which should exclude from political rights all but the possessors of land; a measure which would have disfranchised 5000 citizens. The passage here quoted refers to a somewhat different subject. The Lace-
daemonians, who were at hand with their troops, were trying to impose the measure upon them by force, dictating, and ordering, κελεύοντων, § 6, and apparently preparing to interfere with arms. Lysias is accordingly exhorting the Athenians to resist manfully, and not to give way and quit the city again, after their restoration, for fear of having to fight: and Aristotle—and this is a most striking instance of the difficulty that so frequently arises from Aristotle’s haste and carelessness in writing, and also of his constant liability to lapses of memory—quoting from memory, and quoting wrong, and neglecting to mention the occasion of the speech and the name of the author, which he had probably forgotten for the time,—has both altered the words and omitted precisely the two things—δεινὸν ἐν εἴη, which shows what the inference is intended to be, and Δακεδαιμονίοις—which would have enabled his readers to understand his meaning. The passage of Lysias runs thus: δεινὸν γὰρ ἐν εἴη, ὅ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἐφεύγομεν, ἐμαχόμεθα Δακεδαιμονίοις ἵνα κατέλθομεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα ἵνα μὴ μαχόμεθα. And it is now pretty clear what the intention of the writer of the fragment was, namely to stimulate the Athenian assembly not to submit to the dictation of the Lacedaemonians and to encounter them if it were necessary in battle, by urging the inconsistency and absurdity of which they would be guilty, if, whilst they were ready to fight before their restoration to their city, now that they were in actual possession of it they should quit it and return into exile, merely to avoid fighting.

§ 20. Top. xix. The wording of this is also very obscure from the extreme brevity. The title of the topic in one of Victorius’ MSS is ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ τῶν σκόπων τοῦ λαβόντος, συμβαίνειν, ‘inference, from the issue being contrary to the aim or intention of the receiver,’—i. e. a mistake on the part of the receiver of a gift, who takes it as offered with an intention different from the real motive. This however is only a single instance of the application of the topic, and derived solely from the illustration, ὅπως εἶ διὸν κ.τ.λ. The true interpretation is, as Brandis expresses it, u. s., p. 20, the general one, “An inference from the possible, to the real, motive,” as appears from the examples.

Two readings have to be considered: v. l. followed and explained by Victorius εἶ μὴ γένοιτο, which Bekker (ed. 3) has retained; and, Vater’s conjecture, ἢ γένοιτο, following the Schol., αὐτός ἐνεκα εἶναι, ἦτοι, διὸ διδοῦμι σοι νομίσματα (this again refers exclusively to the first example). ἢ γένοιτο, ἦτοι ἵδοκα: which at all events seems to shew that ἢ γένοιτο: this is also expressed in Muretus’ version, ‘cuibus rei causa ali- quid est, aut fieri potest,’ and adopted by Spengel in his recent edition. To this in what follows εἶναι ἢ γεγενήσθαι properly corresponds. The translation will then be, ‘To say, that the possible reason for a fact (eιναι) or motive for an action (γεγενήσθαι), (lit. that for which anything might be, or be done), that is the (true) reason or motive of the fact or action; as in the case of one giving another something, in order to cause him pain by afterwards taking it away (withdrawing it).’ Here is an osten- sible motive—a gift being usually intended to cause pleasure—which
conceals the real motive, which is to cause pain; and this is the inference, you infer from the apparent fact or possible motive to the real one; the object of the topic being to assign a motive which suits your argument. Such then is the general meaning of the topic: the examples are all of the possible concealed motive or intention—which may be bad or good as your argument requires—that being the form in which it is more likely to be of use in Rhetoric. *ov ἐνεκ' ἄν εἶη ἡ γένοστο* 'that for which so and so would, could, or might be, or be done', *(would be naturally or generally, might be possibly,)* expresses the conditionality or possibility of the fact, motive, or intention, a meaning which is confirmed by *ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ.,* in the explanation of the third example. *(I call it the third, ὡς ἐν ἄν—λατσήγη* being an illustration.)

On Victorius' interpretation of *ἐ* *μὴ* *γένοστο,* *'cuius rei caussa aliquid esse potest, quamvis factum non sit,* Vater says, "sed hoc *quamvis factum non sit,* ad rem non satis facit, neque in exemplis quae sequuntur eo respicitur an haec caussa vera sit necne:" *but whether that be so or not, I think that a still better reason may be given for rejecting it, that *ἐ* *μὴ* *γένοστο* cannot be rendered *quamvis* &c., which would require *ἐ* *καί,* or *καὶ* *ἐ* *(κεῖ)* *μὴ* *γένοστο.* Victorius seems to mean, though the Greek (even independently of *ἐ* for *quamvis*) would hardly I think bear such an interpretation, 'to assert that what *may* be the cause of a thing (i.e. an act) really is so, although it has not been (or, were not) done at all'; *in other words, 'though it is not': and this, though I cannot think it the right rendering, can scarcely be said to be altogether 'beside the point.'

On *ἐ* *δοῖν ἄν,* see Appendix on *ἐ* *δίνων* ἄν, c.20.5, *'On ἄν with Optative after certain particles'* [printed at the end of the notes to this Book].

In conformity with the explanation there given, *δοῖν ἄν,* the conditional, is joined with *ἐ,* just as the future might be, of which in fact the conditional (as the tense is in French and Italian) is a mere modification.

The first example, from an unknown Tragic poet (Wagner, *Fragm. Tragic. Gr. III 186),* warns us that 'Heaven bestows on many great successes or prosperity, which it offers not out of good will, with no kind or benevolent intent, but that the disasters that they (afterwards) meet with may be more marked and conspicuous'—a contrast of the apparent with the real intention, from which an inference may be drawn and applied to a parallel case. Victorius compares Caes. de B. G. 1 14 (ad Helvet. legatum) *Consuesse deos immortales, quo gravius homines ex commutatione rerum dolent, quos pro scelere eorum-ulisci velint, his secundiores interdum res et diuturniorem impunitatem concedere. [Cf. Claudian's tolluntur in altum, ut lapsu graviore ruant (in Rufinum I. 22, 23).]*
καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Μελεάγρου τοῦ Ἀντιφώντος, ὁποῖος ἑταῖρος, ὡς δὲ μάρτυρες ἀρετῆς γένονται Μελεάγρῳ πρὸς Ἑλλάδα.

καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Ἀιάντος τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης προείλετο ὄδυσσέᾳ οὐ τίμων, ἀλλὰ ἑντὸς ή ἀκολουθῶν ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τούτον ἑνεκα ποιήσαι.

1 ὅποι ἐνα κάνωσι

'And another from Antiphon's Meleager'. Referred to above, II 2.19, where some account is given of the author, and the story of his play. The author of the Meleager is Antiphon the Tragic poet. See also note on II 23.5, where the lines quoted are probably from some play. Wagner, Fr. Tr. Gr. III 113. Antiph. Fr. 3. Conf. Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 1315. He suggests κάνωσι for κτάνωσι (καίνων is found several times in Soph., twice in Aesch., and once in Xen. Cyrop.). Gaisford, Not. Var. 327, with much less probability ο_inline280;ιχ ὡς κτάνωσι1. (The intention is) not to slay the beast, but that Meleager may have witnesses of his valour in the eyes of all Greece. "Qui locus," says Meineke, l. c., "ex prologo fabulae petitus videtur. Fortissimi quique Graecorum heroes (ita fere apud poetamuisse videtur) convenerunt, non quo ipsi aprum Calydonium interficant, sed ut Meleagri virtutem Graecis testificentur."

A third from Theodectes' Ajax (Aj. Frag. 1, Wagner, u. s., p. 118); cited again § 24, and III 15.10, where the same passage of the play is referred to. It is there employed in illustration of the interpretation of a fact or a motive, favourable or unfavourable according to the requirements of the argument; exactly as in the topic now under consideration. Ar. there explains in much plainer terms its use and application: καίνων ὡς τῷ διαβάλλοντι καὶ τῷ ἀπολυμένῳ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται πλείον ἕνεκα πριακῆς, τῷ μὲν διαβάλλοντι κακοφθατών ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον ἐκλαμβάνοντι (putting an unfavourable construction upon the act and its motive), τῷ δὲ ἀπολυμένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον (the reverse). The same explanation will apply to both quotations alike. Theodectes' play contained no doubt a rhetorical contest—which would be quite in his manner, like Ovid's—between Ajax and Ulysses for the arms of Achilles, in which the argument from the construction of motives would be applied to the fact, by the competitors, in the two opposite senses. Ulysses would refer to the 'preference' (προείλετο occurs in both the passages), shewing a sense of his superior merit, implied by Diomede when he chose him out of all the Greeks to be his companion in the hazardous exploring expedition to Troy by night (Hom. II. K. 227 seq. Ovid. Met. XIII' 328 seq. Est aliquid de tot Graiorum millibus unum A Diomede legi, line 241); Ajax would retort that this was not the real motive of Diomede's choice, but it was that 'the attendant might be inferior to himself' (II 23, 20) or (as it is expressed in III 15.10), 'because he alone was too mean to be his rival', to compete with him in his achievements, and to share in the renown to be thereby acquired.

Of ἐνδέχεται, as illustrating εἰ δολὴ ἄν, I have already spoken.

1 Bekker and Spengel both retain οἰχ ὡς κτάνωσιν!
21 ἄλλος κοινὸς καὶ τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ τοῖς συμβουλεύουσι, σκοπεῖν τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα, καὶ δὴ ἐνεκα καὶ πράττουσι καὶ φεύγουσι ταύτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἢ εἰάν μὲν ὑπάρχῃ δεὶ πράττειν, ἢ ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, μὴ πράττειν. οἴον εἰ δυνάτον καὶ βάδιον καὶ ὑφέλιμον ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ φίλοις, ἢ βλαβερὸν ἐχθροῖς καὶ ἐπιζήμιον, ἢ ἐλάττων ἢ ζημία τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ P. 1400, προτρέπουσι δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἀποτρέπουσιν ἐκ τῶν

§ 21. Top. xx. ‘Another, common to counsellors (in deliberative rhet.) as well as the two parties in forensic pleadings’. This seems to imply that the preceding topic is confined to the forensic branch; and to this, of the three, it is no doubt, most applicable; the suggestion and construction of motives and intentions being there most of all in request. Still in an encounter of two opponents in the public assembly, as in that of Dem. and Aesch., it is almost equally available; and in the remaining branch even more so, as a topic of panegyric or censure. The present topic, like the five preceding, with the partial exception of Top. xv, which appears also amongst the ‘fallacies’ of the de Soph. El., is applicable to Rhetoric alone and does not appear in the dialectical treatise.

It embraces arguments, which may be used in the deliberative kind in exhorting to some act or course of policy, or dissuading from it; and in judicial practice in the way of accusation or defence; in which we have to inquire, first what are the motives and incentives to action, and what things on the contrary deter men from acting. The things which, if they be on our side or are favourable to us, εἰ μὲν ὑπάρχῃ, supply motives for action, are such as possibility, facility, advantage, either to self or friends, (of accomplishing or effecting anything); or anything injurious (hurtful, damaging: that is, the power of injuring) and 1 (bringing loss upon, on this form of adj. see note on 1 4.9) ‘involving loss to enemies, or (if or when) the (legal) penalty (for doing something) is less than the thing (that is, the thing done, the success of the deed and the profit of it’, (‘fructus voluptasque quae inde percipitur’: ‘quod cupiebant quod sequebantur et optabant’ Victorius). The construction of the last words, ἡ ἐλαττον ἡ ζημία τοῦ πράγματος seems to be, if construction it can be called, that ἡ ζημία is continued as an apposition to the preceding nominatives; ‘the penalty being less than the profit’ is another incentive to action. ‘From such cases as these, arguments of exhortation or encouragement are drawn, dissuasive from their contraries (impossibility, difficulty, disadvantage, injury, &c.). From these same are derived arguments for accusation and defence: from dissuasives or deterrents, of defence; from persuasive, of accusation’. That is to say, in defending a client from a charge of wrong-doing, you collect all the difficulties, dangers, disadvantages and so on, to which the accused would be exposed in doing what he is charged with, and infer from them the improbability of his guilt: in accusing, you urge all or any of the opposite incitements to commit a crime, above enumerated. To these last, the inducements to the com-
mission of crime, may be added the topic *cui bono*, ‘Cassianum illud’ [Cic. Phil. II § 35]. Compare with this the passage upon the various motives and inducements to crime and wrong-doing, in I 10. 5 seq., which is there mixed up with a general classification of all sources and causes of action.

‘And of this topic the entire “art” of Pamphilus and Callippus is made up’. Of Callippus it has been already stated, *supra* § 14, that nothing is known but these two notices of Aristotle. It is likely, as I have there pointed out [pp. 271—2], that he was one of the earliest pupils of Isocrates mentioned in his *dōrōs*, § 93.

Pamphilus, the rhetorician, is mentioned by Cicero, de Orat. III 21. 82, together with Corax, in somewhat contemptuous terms, *Pamphilum nescio quem*, and of his Rhetoric, it is said, (tantam rem) *tamquam puériles delicias aliquas depingere*. It is plain therefore that Pamphilus, like Callippus, belonged to the early school of Rhetoricians of the age of Gorgias and the Sophists, and treated his art like them in a ‘puerile’ and unworthy manner. Another, and very brief notice of him occurs in Quintilian, III 6. 34, a chapter on the *status* or *στάσεις*; he rejected *finitio*, the *ὀρική στάσις*. Spalding in his note describes the contents of Pamphilus’ ‘art’ from the passage of the Rhet., and then discusses, without coming to a conclusion, the question whether or no this Pamphilus can be identified with a painter of the same name, mentioned in Quint. XII 10. 6, Pliny in several places, and Aristoph. Plut. 385, and the Schol. Spalding has no doubt that Quint.’s Pamphilus, III 6. 34, is the rhetorician. Spengel, *Art. Script.* p. 149, note 83, thinks that he cannot be the same as Aristotle’s, (erat itaque ille P. non ante Hermagorae tempora,) in consequence of his acquaintance with *στάσεις*, which were of much later invention, and the name of them unknown even to Ar. The same doubt occurred to myself: but I laid the evil spirit by the consideration that though Aristotle was unacquainted with the technical terms and classification of the *στάσεις*, he yet was familiar with the *thing*, which he frequently refers to; and the technical expression may belong to Quintilian and not to Pamphilus. Nine times the name of Pamphilus occurs in the Orators, (Sauppe, Ind. Nom. p. 109, ad *Orat. Att.* vol. III,) but the rhetorician is not among them.

§ 22. Top. xx1. The object of this topic is (says Brandis, u. s., p. 20) to weaken the force of arguments from probability. “In incredibilibus provocatur ad effectum, qui si conspicuus sit, resisti non potest quin, quod incredibile videbatur, iam probabile quoque esse fateamur.” Schrader.

‘Another (class of arguments) is derived from things which are believed to come to pass (*γίγνεσθαι*, actually to take place or happen)
but (still) are beyond (ordinary) belief, (you argue, namely) that they
would not have been believed at all, had they not actually been or
nearly so': i.e. either been in existence, or come so near to it, made so
near an approach to it, as to enable us by a slight stretch of imagination
to realize it so as to be convinced of its existence. Any case of very
close analogy, for instance, to the thing in question might produce this
conviction. ṭ ἐγγύς is a saving clause; 'fact or nearly so'. Rhetorical
argument does not aim at absolute truth and certainty: it is content
with a near approach to it within the sphere of the probable, which is
enough for complete persuasion.

'Nay even more', (we may further argue that these at first sight
incredible things are even more likely to be true than those that are
at first sight probable. Supply δοκούντα ἐστὶ for the constr. and (μᾶλλον)
ἀληθὲς or ὅτα ἐστὶ τῶν εἰκότων καὶ πιθανῶν for the sense): 'because men
believe in (suppose, assume the existence of,) things either actual, real
or probable: if then it (the thing in question) be incredible and not
probable, it must be true; because its probability and plausibility are
not the ground of our belief in it'. The argument of the last clause is
an exemplification of Topic IX, § 10, supra, see note there. It is an
inference ἐκ διαρίσεως, 'from division'; a disjunctive judgment. All
belief is directed to the true or the probable: there is no other alternative.
All that is believed—and this is believed—must therefore be either true
or probable: this is not probable; therefore it must be true. ἀληθὲς
more antiquae philosophiae identifies truth and being: ἀληθὲς here = ὅν.

In other words, the antecedent improbability of anything may furnish
a still stronger argument for its reality than its probability. Anything
absolutely incredible is denied at once, unless there be some unusually
strong evidence of its being a fact, however paradoxical. That the
belief of it is actually entertained is the strongest proof that it is a fact:
for since no one would have supposed it to be true without the strongest
evidence, the evidence of it, of whatever kind, must be unusually strong.
The instance given is an exemplification of the topic in its first and
simplest form.

'As Androcles of Pitthus' (or Pithus, whence ὁ Πιθεὺς; an Attic
deme, of the tribe Cecropis) 'replied in the charge he brought against the law,
to the clamour with which he was assailed by them' (the assembly, before
which he was arraigning the existing state of the law) 'for saying "the
laws require a law to correct them and set them right" which they
thought highly improbable—"why do fish require salt (to keep them
from corruption), though it is neither probable nor plausible that bred
as they are in brine (the salt sea) they should require salt: and so does
oil-cake (στέμφυλα, the cake or mass of olives remaining after the oil has been pressed out) require oil (for the same reason), though it is highly improbable that the very thing that produces oil should require oil itself. Here we have an improbable statement which is shown by two close analogies to be after all very near (έγγος) the truth.

Of Androcles, and the time and circumstances of his proposed alteration of the laws, nothing is known but what appears in our text. The names of three Androcleses occur in the Orators, (Sauppe, Ind. Nom. p. 13, Or. All. iii) of which the first, mentioned by Andocides περὶ μυστηρίων § 27, may possibly be the speaker here referred to. The Androcles of Thuc. viii 65, (comp. Grote, H. G. viii 43 [c. ixii], Plut. Alcib. c. 19,) the accuser and opponent of Alcibiades, assassinated in 411 B. C. by the agents of Pisander and the oligarchical party, is most likely identical with Andocides; the time of the events referred to in both authors being nearly the same. I think upon the whole that it is not improbable that Thucydides, Andocides and Aristotle may mean the same person.1

στέμφυλα] Ar. Nub. 45, Equit. 806, was a common article of food in Attica. It denoted not only the cake of pressed olives, but also of grapes from which the juice had been squeezed. Phrynichus, s. v., has οἱ μὲν πολλοί τὰ τῶν βοστρυχῶν ἐκπίεσμα ἀμαθῶς οἰ δ´ Ἀττικοί στέμφυλα ἐλαύν. Suidas, on the other hand, τὸ ἐκδύμα τῆς σταφυλίς ἡ τῶν ἐλαύν, οίς ἀντὶ ὄψων ἐχρῶτο, and to the same effect, Hesychius. Also Galen, ap. Lobeck, note. Lobeck settles the matter by quoting Geoponik. vi 12. 435, εἶδοναι χρῆ διί στέμφυλα οὐχ, ὅσ τινες νομίζουσι, τῶν ἐλαύν μόνον ἑστὶ πυρήνες, ἄλλα καὶ τὰ τῶν σταφυλῶν γέγαρτα. (πυρήνες must surely be a mistake; no amount of pressing could ever convert grape-stones or olive-kernels into an ὄψων, a dainty or relish, and moreover what is here said, that the oil proceeds from the στέμφυλα, shews that the cake is made of the olives themselves, and not of the mere stones.) The word occurs frequently, as might be expected, in the fragments of the Comic writers: see the Index to Meineke’s Collection.

§ 23. Top. xxii. ‘Another, to be employed in refutation’, (i. e. of an adversary; which, real or imaginary, is always implied in refutation. The office of the ἓλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα is τὰ ἀνωμολογοῦμενα συνάγειν, ‘to conclude contradictories’, II 22. 15; and note: see also Introd. ad h. l. 1

1 The writer of the Article Androcles, in Smith’s Biogr. Dict., has no doubt upon this point. He says on this passage, ‘Ar. has preserved a sentence from one of Androcles’ speeches, in which he used an incorrect figure!’.
καὶ πράξεων καὶ λόγων, χωρίς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, οἷον "καὶ φησί μὲν φιλεῖν ὑμᾶς, συνώ-μοσε δὲ τοῖς πριάκοντα," χωρίς δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ, "καὶ φησὶ μὲν εἶναι με φιλόδικον, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ ἀποδείξαι δεδικασμένον οὐδεμίαν δίκην," χωρίς δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, "καὶ οὗτος μὲν οὐ δεδάνεικε πώποτ’ οὐδέν, ἐγώ δὲ καὶ πολλοὺς λέλυμαι ὑμῶν."

24 ἄλλος τοῖς προδιαβεβλημένοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις καὶ πράγμασιν, ἢ δοκοῦσι, τὸ λέγειν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ πα-

p. 263 and note—"is to take into consideration (and argue from) all contradictions, repugnancies, disagreements (between your statements or conduct, and the opponent's), whatever contradiction may be derived from all times (conflicting dates), actions and words; separately (distinctly; there are three distinct modes of employing it) in the case of the adverse party, as for instance, "and he says he loves you, and yet he conspired with the Thirty": the thirty tyrants namely, after Aegospotami, B.C. 404!: this is from the deliberative branch: 'and separately in your own case (as applied to your own conduct, πράξεως), "and he says that I am litigious, and yet he can't prove that I have ever brought a single case into court:" and again, distinguished from the preceding, the application of it to oneself and the opponent (in the way of a contrast of two opposite characters and modes of conduct), "and he has never lent any one a single penny, whilst I have even ransomed (got you liberated, λέλυμαι) many of you (out of captivity)." This last example reminds us of the contrast drawn by Demosthenes, de F. Leg. pp. 412, 13, seq., of his own character and conduct as compared with that of the rest of the ambassadors to Philip, Aeschines, Philocrates and Phrynon: in which the ransom of captives plays an important part.

This is Cicero's locus ex repugnantibus, Top. III 11, IV 21, where it is illustrated by an example, which concludes, repugnat enim recte accipere et invitum reddere. And further, XII 53 seq. Quintilian, v 10. 74, Ex pugnantibus, Qui est sapiens stultus non est. Ib. 8. 5, ex repugnantibus.

§ 24. Top. xxiii. The title of this topic 'in scripto quodam libro' apud Victorium, is ἀπὸ τοῦ λεγομένης τῆς αἰτίας λύεσθαι διαβολῆν.

'Another, for' (the benefit of; the dative seems to follow λέγειν;) 'those that have been previously brought into suspicion or odium, (whether by actual calumny) or suspected' (thought to be, having the appearance of being, δοκοῦσι, guilty of something wrong, for some other reason —so Vater, reading ἢ δοκοῦσι), 'both men and things, is to state the reason for the (otherwise) unaccountable circumstance: for there must be some reason (ὅτι οὗτος is the αἰτία,) for this appearance (of guilt).' MS A has μὴ δοκοῦσι, which Victorius adopts and defends. All the recent cdd. have ἢ. Victorius understands by μὴ δοκοῦσι a qualification of προδιαβεβλημένοις, to express the unexpected, apparently unreasonable, nature
of the calumny or suspicion, which seems to be quite unsuitable to the character and circumstances of the object of it: "quae tamen nullo modo haerere ipsis videatur, quod alienae ab ea sint." This agrees extremely well with the παραδόξου following, and this reading and explanation is deserving at all events of consideration. It supposes only one case to be contemplated, that of unjust suspicion and consequent calumny. Vater on the contrary thinks that there are two cases intended, direct calumny, and suspicion for any other reason; and that this requires ἡ δοκοῦσι. His transl. is, "Hocines significantur, qui propter calumniam vel alia de causa videantur aliquo modo affecti esse." This is not very clear; but I suppose his meaning to be what I have said. In this case we must understand ἀδικησαί, or something equivalent, after δοκοῦσι.

Spenge1, in his recent edition, says that Victorius' reading and interpretation is refuted by the sense of the passage—which I cannot agree with—and that διαβεβληθαί must be understood after ἡ δοκοῦσι. But what is the meaning of 'apparent' calumny? and how is it distinguished from the other?

There is another point which has hitherto escaped observation, viz. the interpretation of καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ πράγμασι. Victorius interprets it as in apposition to τοῖς διαβεβλημένοις: 'qui valet ad purgandas aliquas et personas et res,' which at first sight seems the most natural and obvious explanation, and I have adopted it in my translation. But then, what are the things that can be calumniated or brought under suspicion? One might suppose that it means human actions: but Victorius renders it res; and in fact actions are necessarily included in τοῖς διαβεβλημένοις; they are the things that are subject to misinterpretation; and therefore there is no ground for a distinction between men and their actions, so far at least as they are subject to calumny. I will venture to suggest, though not with complete confidence, that we might give the words a different construction, and understand them thus, "for the benefit of those who have been unjustly—we must in this case read μὴ δοκοῦσι, unlikely to be guilty—subjected to suspicion, by men (by human agency, directly) or by circumstances" (indirectly; which would be equivalent to Vater's second case). At all events it makes very good sense.

We now come to a still greater difficulty, the interpretation of ὑποβεβλημένης in the example. Α' reads διαβεβλημένης τινὸς πρὸς τὸν νιὸν 'when a certain woman had been brought into suspicion with respect to (i.e. as to her conduct or dealings with) her son,' which gives a very sufficient sense, but is rejected by Victorius as well as Bekker and Spenge1 and modern editors in general.

Victorius' rendering—and no other Commentary that I have seen has a word on the subject—is as follows; I must give it in his own words as it will hardly bear translation. "Ceu cum mater quaedam filium subiisset, corporique ipsius corpus suum supposuisset, ut commode eum oscurari posset, in eo habiuit corporis spectata visa est stuprum cum adolescentem exercere." ὑποβεβλημένης is translated literally.

AR. II.
I see no other meaning that can be attached to the words as the text at present stands, but it must be observed that ὑποβεβλημένης τοῦ αἰτίου is very strange Greek for supposisse filium corpori suo, and I do not see how it can be justified. The accus. after ὑποβάλλειν represents not the thing under which you throw something, but the thing that you throw under something else: and the passive ὑποβεβλημένης meaning 'throwing herself under', is possible perhaps, but by no means usual, Greek. The ordinary construction of ὑποβάλλειν with two objects, appears in these examples. The object of εὑρον is in the accus.; the object under which it is thrown is either in the dat. or has a prepous introduced before it. ὑποβάλλειν πλευρὸς πλευρά, Eur. Or. 223, ὑποβάλλειν μαστὸν σπόδων, Suppl. 1160. Xcn. Oecon. 18. 5, ὑπὸ τὰ ἄτριπτα ὑπὸ τοῦ πόδας. Plut. Brut. 31, ὑπὸ τοῖς ἕλθειν τὰς σφαγὰς, and similarly in the metaphor, applications of it (from Rost and Palm's Lex.). On the genit. ὑποβεβλημένης see note on II 8. 10.

The general meaning of the whole is, that a mother had been seen in this position which she had assumed for the purpose of embracing her own son—which was not known to the witness—was accordingly subjected to the suspicion of illicit intercourse with him: and we are to suppose further, that her character hitherto had been unimpeachable: when the true reason was explained or stated, the calumny was at once quashed (dissolved or unloosed as a knot). On this sense of λύειν, διαλέειν, &c. see note in Introd. on II 25, p. 267, note 1.

A second example is taken from the argument between Ajax and Ulysses in the contest for the arms of Achilles, in Theodectes' tragedy 'the Ajax', already referred to § 20 supra: where Ulysses tells Ajax 'why (the reason, which explains the paradox), though he is really braver than Ajax, he is not thought to be so.' What the reason was we are not told; nor does Ovid. Met. xiii supply the deficiency.

On διότι and its three senses, see note on I 111.

§ 25. Top. xxiv. ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου] the inference 'from cause to effect.' 'If the cause be there (its effect which necessarily follows, must be there too, and) the fact (alleged) is so: if absent, then (its effect is absent too, and) it is not so: for cause and effect always go together, and without a cause (i.e. its proper cause) nothing is'. Brandis, u. s., p. 20, observes, that this like the preceding topics is confined to Rhetoric. Cicero, Top. §§ 58—67, treats of cause in general and its varieties: but has nothing exactly corresponding to this, though he speaks of the great importance of the general topic to orators (65—7). Quintilian, observing that the "argumentatio, qua colligi solent ex tuis quae faciunt ea quae efficiumtur, aut contra, quod genus a causis vocant,"
is nearly akin to that of antecedent and consequent, v 10. 80, exemplifies it in the four following sections.

'Leodamas, for instance, said in his defence, when charged by Thrasylus with having had his name inscribed on the column (as a mark of infamy) in the Acropolis, only he had struck (or cut) it out in the time of 'the Thirty', replied that it was impossible; for the Thirty could have trusted him more if the record of his hatred of the people had remained engraved on the column'. The fact is denied on the ground of the absence of a sufficient cause: an example of the second case, the negative application of the topic, Διὸ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ.

On Leodamas, see on i 7. 13, and the ref. Sauppe, ad Orat. Fragm. xvi, Or. Att. iii 216, thinks it impossible that the two Leodamases mentioned by Ar., here and i 7. 13, can be the same ['mit Recht', A. Schaefer, Dem. u. s. Zeit. i p. 129 n.]. He argues that the Leodamas whose name was inscribed on the column as a 'traitor' (in proditorum indice inscr.), according to Thrasylus, before the domination of the Thirty, that is, not later than 404 B.C. (he says 405), when he must have been about thirty years old, could not have been the Leodamas mentioned by Demosth. c. Lept. § 146, as one of the Syndics under the Leptine law, in 355 B.C., and consequently, that the latter, the famous orator of Acharnae, must have been a different person, because he would then have been nearly 90. Clinton, F. H. ii 111, sub anno 372—3, merely says, quoting Rhet. ii 23. 25, "From this incident it appears that Leodamas was already grown up and capable of the duties of a citizen in B.C. 404, which shews him far advanced in years at the time of the cause of Leptines, in B.C. 355." And this appears to me to be a sufficient account of the matter. Thrasylus' accusation of Leodamas is mentioned likewise by Lysias, c. Evandr. § 13, et seq.

The circumstances referred to in this accusation and defence, and the meaning and intention of the inscription which Leodamas is said to have effaced, are not quite clear. The use of the στῆλη or pillar here referred to was twofold: the object of it in either case was the same, to perpetuate the memory of some act or character to all future time. But the fact or character commemorated might be either good or evil; and in the former case it was the name of a public benefactor, in the latter of some signal malefactor or public enemy, that was inscribed. It is usual to apply the latter explanation to the case here in question, which is probably what is meant; and then it seems the story must be this:—At some uncertain time previous to the expulsion of the thirty tyrants and their Lacedaemonian supporters by Thrasylus and his friends, the recovery of the city, and restoration of the demus in 403 B.C., the name of Leodamas had been inscribed as a mark of infamy—as a traitor to his country, as Sauppe u. s. and Herm. Pol. Ant. § 144. 11 interpret it—according to custom on a pillar erected in the Acropolis for that purpose. Now if it was ‘hatred to the demus’ that was engraved on it (έγγεγραμμένης) as

1 Je n'en vois pas la nécessité.
the sign and cause of his imputed infamy, it follows that it must have been erected at some period when the popular party was in the ascendant; Leodamas of course being a supporter of the oligarchs. When his friends were in power and he had the opportunity, Thrasybulus charges him, inter alia of course, with having 'struck or cut it out' to efface the record. He denies the possibility of their effect by arguing the absence of all assignable cause which could have produced it: for this permanent record of his hostility to the people' would have been an additional recommendation to the Thirty, who would have trusted him all the more for it. Thrasybulus, says Victorius, was accusing Leodamas of being an enemy and a traitor to his country; and one of the arguments he brought forward was the existence of this inscription, the subsequent disappearance of which he attempted to explain. He likewise cites in illustration of the use of the topic Cic. pro Mil. § 32, cum ostendere vellet insidiatorem fuisse Clodium: Quarem igitur pacto probari potest insidias Miloni fuisse Clodium? satis est quidem in illa tam audaci tam nefaria bellua docere magnam et causam, magnam semper in Milonis morte propositam. magnas utilitates fuisse. And, as Cic. goes on to remark, this is Cassianum illud, cui bona fuerit.

Of στήλη the pillar, and στήλιτης, the person whose name is engraved on it, in its unfavourable sense, where the inscription is a record of infamy—which may be compared with our use of the pillory, the custom of posting the name of a defaulter at the Stock Exchange, or a candidate who has disgraced himself in an examination; the object in each case being the same, exposure of the culprit, and a warning to others: the difference between the ancient and modern usages, that the latter are temporary—the following are examples: Andoc. peri μνημ. § 78, in a ψηφισμα: Lycurg. c. Leocr. § 117, ποιήσατε στήλην άναγράφειν τούς διπέρινους καί τούς προδότας: Demosth. Phil. Γ § 42, where an historical example is given, and the whole process described Isocr. peri τού ζεύγους. § 9, στήλιτην άναγράφειν.

Of the favourable sense, Victorius quotes an instance from Lys. c. Agorat. § 72, προσγραφήσαε την στήλην ως ελεγγέτας διότας. Herm. Pol.-Ant. u. s. See also Sandys' note on Isocr. Paneg. § 150.

έκκοψα] Ar. seems here to have arbitrarily departed from his original constr. Having begun with κατηγορεῖν and ὅτι ἂν, he abruptly changes to the infin. as if λέγειν and not κατηγορεῖν had preceded: so that

1 At Milan, says Manzoni, Intro. to the 'Storia della colonnì infame,' in 1530 the judges condemned to the most horrible tortures some persons who were accused of having helped to spread the plague, and in addition to other severe penalties, devravum di più, che in quello spazio (where the house of one of the condemned stood) 'i innalzarono una colonna, la quale dovese chiamarsi infame, con un' iscrizione che tramandasse ai posteri la notizia dell' atterrito e della pena. E in realtà si ingannarono: quel giudizio fu veramente memoriale.
we must supply λέγων to explain the government of the infinitive. It cannot be the optative.

§ 26. Top. xxv. 'Another, to consider whether it ever was, or is still, possible to improve (do better, more advantageously, under more favourable conditions,) in any other way (by following any other course, by any alteration of time, place, conditions, circumstances), any (bad) advice (which the counsellor is charged with having given, Vict.), or anything which he is doing, or ever has done (anything wrong that he is either meditating or has committed), (you infer) that, if this be not so (if he has not taken advantage of these possible improvements, which would have contributed to the success of his advice or design), he is not guilty at all; because (no one would ever neglect such opportunities if he had in his power to avail himself of them) no one, intentionally and with full knowledge, ever prefers the worse to the better.' It seems from the omission of συμβουλεύει and πράττει, and the prominence given to πέρασχεν the past act in the explanation of the reason, that although this topic may be applied to deliberative oratory, it is much more usual and useful in defending yourself or a client in a court of law. You say, My client cannot be guilty of the act with which you charge him, for he could have done it much better, would be much more likely to have been successful, in some other way; at some other time, and place, or under other circumstances: therefore, since he has not chosen to do the thing in the best way that he could, and at the same time had full knowledge of what was the best way of doing it, it is plain that he has not done it now under less favourable circumstances. This is excellently illustrated by Victorius from another passage of Cic. pro Mil. XVI 41. In retorting upon Clodius the charge of lying in wait to assassinate, he first enumerates several favourable opportunities which Milo had previously neglected to avail himself of, and asks whether it was likely that, having acted thus, he should now choose an occasion when time and circumstances were so much less favourable, to carry out such a design: Quemigiturcum omnium gratia voluit (occidere), hunc voluit cum aliquorum quercelae? quem iure, quem loco, quem tempore, quem impune non est uxisus, hunc iniuria, iniquo loco, alieno tempore, periculo capitis, non habitavit occidere?

'But there is a fallacy in this: for it often does not become clear till afterwards (after the commission of the act) how the thing might have been better done, whereas before it was anything but clear'.

§ 27. Top. xxvi. 'Another, when anything is about to be done
πραγμένωι, ἀμα σκοπεῖν· οἶον Ξενοφάνης Ἐλεάταις ἐρωτώσιν εἰ θύωσι τῇ Λευκοθέᾳ καὶ θρηνῶσι, ἢ μή, συνεβουλευν, εἰ μὲν θεὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, μὴ θρηνεῖν,

opposed to what has been done already (by the same person), to look at them together: i.e. to bring together things that had been hitherto separate, and so to be able to compare them—παράλληλα φανερὰ μᾶλλον ἵναι § 30; παράλληλα τὰ ἑναντία μᾶλλον φανεραθαί, III 2. 9, 9. 8, 11. 9, 17. 13, παράλληλα μᾶλλον τἀναντία γνωρίζεται—a process which clearly brings out the contradiction. Brandis u. s. [Philologus IV i] p. 20 thus expresses the argument of the topic, “to detect a contradiction in the action in question.” It seems in itself, and also from the example selected, to be most appropriate in giving advice.

“As Xenophanes, when the Eleates (his present fellow-citizens) consulted him, asked his advice, whether they are to offer sacrifices and dirges to Leucothea, or not; advised them, if they supposed her to be a goddess not to sing dirges (a funeral lament implying death and mortality); if a mortal, not to offer sacrifices. Xenophanes here, by bringing the two practices into immediate comparison—if the example is meant to represent literally the statement of the topic, we must suppose that the Eleates had already done one of the two; deified her most likely; and now wanted to know whether they should do the other—makes the contradiction between sacrificing to (which they had done), and lamenting as dead (which they were about to do), the same person.

Of Xenophanes—of Colophon, but then living at Elea, or Velia, where he founded the Eleatic school—we have already had notice in I 15. 29, and II 23. 18.

εἰ θύωσι] εἰ being here equivalent to πότερον, admits equally with it of construction with the deliberative conjunctive: compare the same deliberative conjunctive in interrogation, as a modified doubtful future; τί ποιῶμεν; ‘what are we to do?’ instead of the direct, ‘what shall we do?’ Matth. Gr. Gr. 526.

This passage is cited by Lobeck, Aglaophamus, Eleus. § 21, Vol. I. p. 167.

Plutarch refers more than once to this dictum of Xenophanes, but supposes it to have been addressed to the Egyptians, about the worship of Osiris, and the propriety of θρηνοὶ in his honour. De Superst. c. 13, p. 171 E, Amator. c. 18, 763 D, de Is. et Osir. c. 70, 379 B. Wytenbach ad loc. de Superst. Athen. XV 697 A, quoting Aristotle, εἶν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ, εἰ μὴ κατέφευσατο ο λόγος’ apud eundem.

\[ § 28. \] Top. xxvii. 'Another, from mistakes made; to be employed in accusation or defence'. The example is an illustration of both; the accusers convert the mistake that Medea made in sending away her children into a charge of having murdered them; Medea retorts the same argument from another mistake which she could have committed had she done what they allege, of which however she is incapable. Brandis, "in any mistake that has been made to find a ground of accusation or defence."

'For instance, in Carcinus' Medea, the one party (of the disputants in the play) charge her with the death of her children—at all events (say they) they no where appear: because Medea made a mistake in (in respect of) sending away her children (instead of merely sending them away, they argued that she had made away with them, since they were no where to be found): her defence is, that it was not her children, but Jason, that she would have killed (if she had killed any one); for she would have made a mistake in failing to do this, if she had done the other too: and of such a mistake she never could have been guilty. "Quasi dicit, quomodo tam stulta fuissem' (how could I have made such a mistake?) 'ut innocentes filios necassem; perfidum autem coniugem et auctorem omnium meorum malorum relinquere?" Victorius.

Carcinus, a tragic poet contemporary with Aristophanes, and his sons, Philocles, Xenotimus, and Xenocles, are often mentioned by Aristophanes, never without ridicule. See Vesp. 1501—12, Nub. 1261, Pac. 782, 864, and in Holden, Onom. Arist. Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. xxvi § 2, passes him over with very slight notice, "known to us chiefly from the jokes and mockeries of Aristophanes." Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 505 seq., Fragm. Comic. Vol. 1., has a long and learned discussion, principally with the object of distinguishing this Carcinus from others of the same name. There was at all events one other tragic poet of the name, whom Meineke supposes to have been the grandson of the former, p. 506, being said by Suidas to be the son of Xenocles (or Theodectes). This Carcinus flourished according to Suidas 'before the reign of Philip of Macedon', in the first half of the 4th cent. B.C. Some fragments of his Achilles, Semele, and Tereus, are given by Wagner in his collection, Fragm. Trag. Gr. III 96, seq. with some others of uncertain plays: but he has omitted all those that are mentioned by Aristotle, the Medea here, the Oedipus in III 16. 11, the Thyestes, Poet. 16. 2. In Poet. 17. 2, there is a reference to a character, Amphiaraus, in a play of his not named, with which Ar. finds fault. Athen. I 22 A. See also Clinton, F. H. 11. Introd. xxiii.
λογεῖται ὅτι οὖκ ἂν τοὺς παίδας ἀλλὰ τὸν Ἱάσωνα ἂν ἀπέκτεινεν· τοῦτο γάρ ἡμαρτεν ἂν μὴ ποιήσασα, εἶπερ καὶ θατερον ἐποίησεν. ἔστι δὲ ὁ τόπος οὗτος τοῦ ἐνθυμήματος καὶ τὸ εἰδος ὅλη ἡ πρότερον Θεο-

29 δῶρου τέχνη. ἀλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄνοματος, οἶον ᾧς ὁ Ὁσφοκλῆς

σαφῶς Σιδηρῶ καὶ φοροῦσα τούνομα,

‘And this topic and the kind of enthymeme is the whole of the earlier art of Theodorus’. Comp. supra § 14 of Callippus, and § 21, of Callippus and Pamphilus.

ἡ πρότερον Θ. τέχνη [i. e. ἡ πρότερον οὔσα, γεγραμμένη, πεποιημένη: as oλ πρῶτον, ‘the earliest writers’, 111 1. 9. Theodorus’ work must have passed through two editions, of which the second, from what is said here, seems to have been larger and more complete. This one is the ‘first’ or ‘earlier’ edition; the one before the second. If this contained nothing but the illustration of the topic of ‘mistakes’, it must have been extremely insufficient as an ‘art of rhetoric’. We must ascribe either to his second and enlarged ‘Art’ or to speeches and rhetorical excertations all that Aristode says of him, together with Tisias and Thrasymachus, de Soph. El. c. 34, 183 b 32, as well as the κανά λέγειν, Rhet. III 11. 6, and his divisions of the speech, III 13. 5; as also the notices of him in Plato’s Phaedrus, Quintilian, Cicero Brut. XII 48, &c., Dionysius, &c. (which may be found in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX. III 284 foll.) Of Theodorus of Byzantium—to be distinguished from another Theodorus, a rhetorician of Gadara, Quint. II 15. 21—see further in Spengel, Art. Script. p. 98 seq.; Westermann, Gesch. der Beredsamkeit, § 30. 16, p. 40, § 68. 7, p. 140. Sauppe, Fragm. Or. Att. VIII. Or. Att. III 164, simply refers to Spengel’s Artem Scriptores, and to his own tract in Zimmerm. diurn. lit. antiqu. 1835, p. 406. [Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, I p. 253.]

§ 29. Top. XXVIII. The argument, ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄνοματος, significant names: "which draws an inference from the signification of a name." Brandis. A dialectical topic akin to, but by no means identical with, this, (the one is confined to surnames, the other extends to all words in general,) occurs in Top. B 6, 112 a 32, to consider the derivation and signification of names with a view to applying them as suits the immediate purpose: which coincides more nearly with Cicero’s topic, quam ex vi nominis argumentum elicitur, quam Graeci ἐτυμολογίαν vocant Top. VIII. 35 seq., than with the rhetorical form of it as it appears here; though both of the others may be regarded as including this special rhetorical application. But in the rhetorical treatise, the de Inv. II 9. 28, we have the same use of names (i.e. surnames) suggested as by Ari-

1 In referring to this paper I take the opportunity of withdrawing all that I have said in p. 286, ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη, and the illustration from Carcinus. It is sufficiently corrected in the note on this section.
stotle; Nam et de nomine nonnumquam aliquid suspicionis nascitur... ut si dicanus idcirco aliquem Caldum vocari, quod temerario et repentino consilio sit.

Quintilian, v. 10. 30, 31, thinks that an argument can seldom be drawn from a surname, except in the case of such significant names as are assigned for a reason, as Sapiens (Cato and Laelius), Magnus (Pompey), and Plenus (?) : or where the name is not significant, but suggests a crime—as the name Cornelius, in the case of Lentulus, was suggestive of conspiracy (for a reason there given). The use of the name recommended by Aristotle's topic (which he does not mention) is pronounced, in the case of Euripides—who represents Eteocles as attacking the name of his brother Polynices, πολυ νεικος, ut argumentum morum—as insipid and tasteless, frigidum. It is however 'a frequent material for jokes; especially in the hands of Cicero, who freely employs it, as in the case of Verres'. The passage of Euripides referred to, is Phoen. 636—7: Eteocles terminates the altercation with his brother with the two lines, ἔδω ἐκ χώρας ἄληθῶς ἰ' ἰ' νομα Πολυνείκη πατήρ ἑδέσο σου θεία προ- νοία νεικίων ἐπάνων. With this use of significant names all readers of the Greek Tragic poets are familiar. It is not to be regarded in them as a mere play on words, but they read in the significant name the character or destiny of its bearer: and thus employed they have a true tragic interest. It is singular therefore that Elmsley, who had certainly studied the Greek dramatists with care and attention, should, on Bacch. 508, after citing a number of examples, end his note with this almost incredible observation, "Haec non modo ψυχρά sunt" (is the epithet borrowed from Quintilian?), "verum etiam tragicos malos fuisset grammaticos. Quid enim commune habent 'Απόλλων et 'Απολλώνια praeter soni similitudinem?" And this is all that is suggested by Ajax's pathetic exclamation, αὐτὶ τίς άυ τορ' φέτε κ.τ.λ. Soph. Α' 439, and the rest! Elmsley has omitted Aesch. S. c. T. 658, ἐπανόμη ἡ κάρτα Πολυ- νείκη λέγω, from his list; and Eur. Antiopa, Fr. i (Dind., Wagner), and Fragm. 2, Ibid. Agath. Fragm. Thyest. i α' Wagn. Fr. Tr. Gr. i 74. Add from other sources, Dante Div. Com. Purg. xiii. 109, Savia non fui, ανωγενα χε Σαπια οις χιαματα. Shaksp. Rich. II., Act ii. Sc. 1 73, Gaunt. O how that name befits my composition! Old Gaunt indeed; and gaunt in being old, &c. The king asks, Can sick men play so nicely with their names? No, is the reply, misery makes sport to mock itself, &c.: which is not a bad answer to Elmsley's objection. This tracing of the character or destiny in the name is particularly common in the Hebrew of the Old Test., as the well-known instance of Genesis xxvii. 36, 'Is not he rightly named Jacob? for he hath supplanted me these two times.' The practice, which seems to be a suggestion of nature itself, is thus shewn to have prevailed in various times, nations and languages.

The Conon and Thrasybulus here mentioned are doubtless, as may be inferred from the absence of any special designation, the Conon, the victor of Cnidus (394 B.C.), and the Thrasybulus, the expeller of the Thirty and restorer of the demus in 403: though there are several others bearing both of these names in Sauppe's *Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att. III.* pp. 63, 4, 81, 2. Thrasybulus is named by Demosth., de Cor. § 219, as one of the most distinguished orators among his predecessors, together with Callistratus, Aristophon, and Cephalus; the two first of these we have had mentioned in the Rhetoric. In de F. L. § 320, he is called τοῦ δημοτικοῦ (the popular Thrasybulus, the people's friend, καὶ τοῦ ἀπὸ Φιλίᾶς καταγεγούντος τοῦ δήμου. Conon and he were contemporaries. Conon died soon after 392 B.C., Clinton, *F. H. sub anno* 388, 3, Thrasybulus, "perhaps in the beginning of B.C. 389." *Ib. sub anno* 390. His name, according to Conon, fitly represented the rashness of his counsels and character. Grote, *H. G. Ix* 509 [chap. LXXV.], in describing the character of Thrasybulus omits to notice this.

In like manner the name of Thrasymachus, the rhetorician, is significant of the hardihood and pugnacity which were combined in his character. The sketch given of him in the first book of Plato's Republic is in exact correspondence with this. "Always true to your name," rash and combative, said Herodicus to him, doubtless provoked by some rudeness of the Sophist in the course of a dialectical disputation. There were two Herodicuses, both physicians; see note on 1 5.10. Doubtless this again is the better known of the two, Herodicus of Selymbria in Thrace; of whose medical practice Plato gives an account, *Rep. III* 406 A seq. In a similar dispute with Polus, another Sophist and Rhetorician, (whose character, in perfect agreement with this, is likewise sketched by Plato in his Gorgias, where he is said to be νίος καὶ ἄγιος' 1) Herodicus again reminds him of the significance of his name, "Colt by

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1 [p. 463 E.] A very brief summary of the leading points of Polus' character as he appears in the Gorgias, is given amongst the 'dramatis personae' of the Introd. to transl. of Gorg. p. lxxvii.
χαλέπτοι γάρ. καὶ ὃς ἡ Ἑὐρυτίδου Ἐκάβη εἰς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην
καὶ τοῦνομ’ ὀρθῶς ἀφροσύνης ἀρχεῖ θεᾶς,
καὶ ὃς Χαρήμων
Πενθέως ἐσομένης συμφορᾶς ἐπάνυμος.

εὐδοκιμεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐνθυμιμάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικά τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν διὰ τὸ συναγωγῆς μὲν ἐναν-

name and colt by nature," And lastly this inveterate punster applies
the same process to 'Draco the legislator', declaring 'that his laws
were not those of a man, but of a dragon; so cruel were they'. Aphi-
stotle, Pol. II 12 sub finem, says of Draco's laws, that they had nothing
peculiar, but ἡ χαλεπτοτής, διὰ τὸ τῆς ζημίας μέγεθος. Nearly every offence
was made punishable with death. Hence Demades said of them that
they "were written not in ink, but in blood." Plut. Sol. 17. Tzetzes, Chil.
5, line 342 sqq. ap. Sauppe, Fragm. Demad. 17, Orat. Alt. III 316; Grote,
H. G. III 202 [chap. x.], whence our Draconian legislation.

The verse that follows is from Eur.'s Troades 999, where Hecuba is
answering Helen, who had been arguing the invincible power of Love.
"All follies are to mortals Aphrodite" (are attributed by men to this
passion, 'take the form of Aphrodite' in their fancy), 'and rightly does
the goddess' name begin the word ἀφροσύνη.' Ἀφροδίτη and Ἀφροσύνη
have the first half of the word in common.

Πενθέως, κ.τ.λ.] 'Pentheus that bearest the name of thy future for-
tune?'. Comp. Bacch. 367 and 508, and Theocr. Id. xxvi. 26, ἔξ ὅρεος
πένθημα καὶ οὐ Πενθήα φέρονσαι.

Probably from Chaeremon's Dionysus, quoted three times in Athe-
naeus (Elms. ad Eur. Bacch. 508), and also probably, like the Bacchae,
on the story of Pentheus, Chaeremon's fondness for flowers and
the vegetable creation in general, noticed by Athen. XIII. 608 D, ap-
ppears throughout the fragments preserved. See infra III 12. 2 where he
is spoken of as ἀκριβῆς, ἀσπερ λογογράφος, on which see note in Introd.
ad loc. p. 325.

On Chaeremon see Müller Hist. Gr. Lit. xxvi 6, and the Art. in
Smith's Dict. Biogr. s.v. He is a poet whose plays are more suited for
reading than acting, ἀναγωγωστικός, Rhet. III u. s. He is quoted again by
Ar. Probl. III 16. In Poet. I 12, his Centaur is spoken of as a μυκῆ
μαψιδία, on the import of which see the two writers above referred to;
and in Poet. 24, 11, this blending of heterogeneous elements is again
alluded to. See also Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 517 seq. Chaere-
mon is one of those who have been erroneously included amongst the
Introd. p. xxxii.

1 This most ingenious rendering was given by Dr Thompson, then Greek
Professor, in a lecture delivered Feb. 6, 1854. [Introd. to ed. of Gorg. p. v.]
300 ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Β 23 § 30.

τίων εἶναι ἐν μικρῷ τὸ ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα, παρ’ ἄλληλα δὲ φανερὰ εἶναι τῷ ἀκροατῆ μάλλον. πάντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλεγκτικῶν καὶ τῶν διεκτικῶν συλλογισμῶν θορυβεῖται μάλιστα τὰ τοιῶτα ὅσα ἀρχόμενα προσφῶσι μὴ τῷ ἐπιπολής εἶναι (άμα γὰρ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφ’ αὐτοῖς χαίρουσι προσαιθανόμενοι), καὶ ὅσων το- σοῦτον ύστερίζουσιν ὡςθ’ ἀμα εἰρημένων γνωρίζειν.

§ 30. The chapter concludes with two observations on enthymemes in general. First, 'Enthymemes of refutation are more popular and applauded than those of demonstration, because the former is a conclusion of opposites' (the def. of ἐλεγχος; see Introd. p. 262, note 1) 'in a small space (or narrow compass), and things are always made clearer to the listener by being side by side (close together, so as to admit of immediate comparison)'. This is repeated in nearly the same words, III 17. 13.

'But of all syllogisms destructive or constructive, such are most applauded as those of which the results are at once (at the very beginning, of the argument) foreseen: not because they are superficial (ἐπιπολὴς, I 15. 22, note ad loc., II 16 i)—for they (the hearers 'are pleased themselves also with themselves at the same time') are pleased (not only with the speaker and his enthymeme, but) with themselves also (ἀμα) for their sagacity in anticipating the conclusion: (and therefore they don't think it superficial)—and those which are only just so far behind—which they can so nearly keep pace with—as to understand them (step by step) as they are delivered'.

ἄμα εἰρημένων] On this genitive, see note on II 8 II. [For the sense, compare III 10. 4.]

CHAP. XXIV.

In the preceding chapter a selection has been given of the topics or special classes of enthymemes which are most appropriate and serviceable in the practice of Rhetoric; and these are τὰ ὅποτα ἐνθύμημα, c. 24. 11, ult., sound, genuine, logical inferences. But besides these there are, in Rhetoric as well as Dialectics, arguments apparent but not real, fallacious, illogical, which are often employed to mislead and deceive. Now, although we are to abstain from the use of these ourselves, οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαύλα πείθειν, I I. 12, it is necessary for the rhetorician to be thoroughly acquainted with them, in order to detect them in others and to refute any unfair reasoning which may be employed against him, (ibidem) : and so vindicate the superiority of truth and right to falsehood and wrong. And accordingly we have in the following chapter a selection of the most prominent rhetorical fallacies, and in c. 25 the solution of them; corresponding respectively to the two parts of the de Soph. El. (cc. 1—15; 16, to the end), which in like manner is appended as a sequel to the Topics in which is expounded and illustrated the genuine and artistic method of the employment of the dialectical syllogism. On Fallacies in

In the Topics, (de Soph. El.) c. 4, 165 b 23, fallacious arguments are classified under two heads, *παρὰ τὴν λέξιν*, fallacies of language, verbal, and *ἐξω τῆς λέξεως*, non-verbal, beyond the sphere of, not dependent upon mere words; *logical* fallacies. "Alterum vitium positum est in prava verborum interpretatione (wort-verbredung), alterum in falsa argumentatione (schluss-fehler)." Waitz ad loc. 165 b 23. *ἐξω τῆς λέξεως, die "welche in
den ausdruck ihren grund nicht haben." Brandis, u. s. [Philologus, iv i] p. 20. "Fallacies in the words, and fallacies in the matter," Whately, *Logic*, ch. v. On Fallacies, § 1. Verbal fallacies are six in number: (1) *ὁμονυμία*, equivocal, ambiguous, *terms, τὸ πλεονάχως λεγόμενον;* (2) *ἀμφιβολία*, general ambiguity in *language, ambiguous expressions, "ambiguous propositions, Poste; (these two may be distinguished as here; or, as in Poet. xxv 21, identified, under the one general term ἀμφιβολία, ‘ambiguity in expression’, in the explanation of them, Top. u. s. 166 a 14 seq., we have ἡ ὁ λόγος the proposition, or combination of words, ἡ τοῦθα, the single word, the ὁμόνυμον; (3) σύνθεσις and (4) διάρεισις, explained and illustrated Top. ibid. 166 a 22—38, illicit combination and separation of words; (5) προσφορὰ, accent, pronunciation—which is of more use in criticising written composition, especially poetry; in Dialectics, where there is no written text, ἀνεν γραφής, it is of little or none. Ibid. 6 1; and (6th and last), *παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως, ‘in figura dictionis;* Waitz, fallacies or ambiguities, arising from the confusion of (assuming the apparent for the real,) different categories—"categories, that is, in their grammatical acceptation, as predicates, or a classification of the parts of speech; when, owing to similarity of (grammatical) form, a thing is referred to the wrong category" (Waitz, note ad loc.). And as this difference of categorical predication is expressed in the termination of words, it may be otherwise represented as "a similarity (or identity) of termination," which leads to fallacy (Poste, Transi. de Soph. El.). Thus the termination -ειν (which marks the infinitive of a verb) in ψυχαίνει implies ‘some quality or disposition of a thing’, (as we say, it is a *neuter* verb), i.e. belongs to the category of *ποιήσις* ἐξων: in τέμενιν or οἰκοδομεῖν, it implies action, ποιεῖν; i.e. it is an active verb; belongs to the category of ποιεῖν. Similarly from a masculine noun with a feminine termination, or the reverse, and a neuter with either one or the other; Ibid. 6 10—19. "falsche grammatische form." Brandis, u. s. p. 22.

Of these, accent, division (probably including the opposite), and ἀμφιβολία, including ὁμονυμία, are illustrated from the poets in Poet. xxv 18—20. There is a fourth, § 21, κατὰ τὸ ἔδος τῆς λέξεως, which may be brought under the more general topic of the dialectical treatise, *παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως.*

Of these dialectical topics four are transferred to Rhetoric: *ὁμονυμία, including ἀμφιβολία, § 2; and σύνθεσις and διάρεισις, together, as one topic, § 3. σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως, § 2, stands for a fallacy of language quite different to that which bears its name in the Topics. The difference is explained in the note on § 2.

Fallacies *ἐξω τῆς λέξεως, in the Topics are seven. (1) παρὰ τὸ συμ-βεβηκός, from the confusion of subject and accident; (2) of absolute
1. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μὲν εἶναι συλλογισμόν, τὸν δὲ μὴ εἶναι μὲν φαίνεσθαι δὲ, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐνθύμημα τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἐνθύμημα, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι φαίνεσθαι δὲ, ἐπεὶ-

2. περ τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμὸς τις. τότε ἐς εἰσὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμιμάτων εἰς μὲν ὁ παρὰ τὴν

(ἀπλῶς) and particular or qualified (κατὰ τι, or πῇ ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ πρῶς τι) statements; (3) ἐλέγχου ἀνγοῦ, ἵγνως ἱεροτρικοῦ, “an inadequate notion of confutation,” Poste, “incisitiae eorum quae ad redarguendum pertinent,” Waitz; (4) τὸ ἐν ἡρῴδη λογισμῷ, ἱετίλιο πρίντιπι, begging the question, assuming the thing to be proved; (5) τὸ μὴ αἰτίου ὥς αἴτιον τὶθειν, “in ratione non recte reddita,” Waitz, the assumption of not-cause for cause; (6) παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον, the assumption that antecedent and consequent are always and reciprocally convertible: that if B follows A, A must follow B. (The order of these two last is inverted in the explanation; 167 b 1 and 21.) (7) τὸ τὰ δύο ἐρωτήματα ἐν ποιεῖν, to put two (or more) questions as one, ‘when it escapes observation that the question is not one but several, and one answer is returned, as though it were one’. De Soph. El. c. 5, 166 b 20—27, where there is a summary enumeration of them; and to the end of the chapter, 168 a 16, where they are explained at length and exemplified.

Of these (1) § 6 (these two are the same only in name; see on § 6); (2) §§ 9, 10; (3) § 8; and (6) § 7, occur also in the Rhetoric. ἐκ σημείου, § 5, falls under the head of τὰ ἐπόμενα; de Soph. El. 167 b 8, ἐν τε τοῖς ὑποθερμικοῖς αἵ κατὰ τὸ σημεῖον ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων εἰσίν. The remaining three (3) (4) (7), are found only in the dialectical treatise. Brandis, u. s. p. 22, expresses his surprise at the omission of these three, and thinks that it argues the later date of the de Soph. El.; though of the priority of the Topics there can be no doubt. Vahlen, Trans. Acad. Vien. Oct. 1861, p. 134, pronounces this to be very doubtful; and proceeds to argue in favour of the earlier date of composition for both treatises. Besides these we have the purely rhetorical topic of δείνως, aggravation, exaggeration, § 4. The paradox or fallacy, εἰκός καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, οὐ ἐστιν τὸ μὴ εἰκός εἰκός, and also τὸ τῶν ὑπὸ λόγων κρεῖττο ποιεῖν, both come under the head of παρὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τι, No. (2), § 10.

§ 1. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνδέχεται] ‘But seeing that besides the (real, genuine) syllogism there may be another, which has only the semblance, not the reality of it; so in the case of the enthymeme, there must necessarily be two corresponding kinds, one real and the other not real, but only apparent, since the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism’, conf. 1 11. 1. The enthymeme is a syllogism incomplete in form. See Introd. p. 103, note 1.

§ 2. ‘Topics of unreal enthymemes are, first, the fallacy that arises from the language’ (παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, as Victorius also notes, is not ‘against’, but ‘along of’, Arnold’s Thuc. 1 141. 9; like διὰ, ‘arising from’, ‘shewn in’, as παρὰ τὴν ὀρθομνήν, § 2, παρὰ τὴν ἕλλειψιν, §§ 3, 9); ‘and of this one part (sort or kind),—as in dialectics, to omit or evade the syllogistic process (that is, to assume without proof) and then in the terms of a syllogistic conclusion to state the result, “therefore it is not so and so
(the conclusion of an ἀλεγχος or syllogism of refutation of an opponent’s thesis) or, therefore necessarily so and so follows” (conclusion of a demonstrative, constructive, syllogism);—so in enthymemes (Rhetoric) the enunciation of a concise, condensed, well-rounded or turned, periodic’ (συνεστραμμένος, Plat. Protag. 342 E: ὅ ἡ κατεστραμμένη λεξις; Introd. p. 308 seq. on III 9, 3) ‘and antithetical sentence passes for an enthymeme’. The completeness in the structure of the period, which “like a circle returns into itself”, its carefully balanced members, and its antithetical epigrammatic character, have the effect of an argument and supply to the deluded listener the lacking proof. The force of the antithesis and epigram in conversation and discussion is too well known to need further illustration. I have followed Vahlen, who has discussed this sentence at length in his paper, already referred to, zur kritik Arist. Schrift. (Trans. Acad. Vien. Oct. 1861, pp. 136—8), in removing the full-stop at το και τό and reading και ἐν for και τό; or perhaps the simple omission of τό would be sufficient. He apologises for the anaclouthis, and the repetition of ἐνθύμημα at the end of the sentence, and proposes two expedients for getting rid of them; unnecessarily as it seems to me: accepting the two alterations, as I have done, the sense is perfect, and the expression of it quite in character with the author’s hasty and careless style. I pass over the attempted explanations of Vater and others. Victorius has given the sense correctly, though his interpretation does not adhere closely to his text. Bekker and Spengel leave the passage unaltered.

The words of de Soph. El. 15, 174 b 8 (comp. 18, 176 b 32), τὸ μάλιστα σοφιστικὸν συνοφάντημα τῶν ἑρωτῶντων, τὸ μηδὲν συλλογισμένον μη ἑρωτήμα ποιεῖν τὸ τελευταῖον, ἀλλὰ συμπερασμάτως εἰπεῖν, ὡς συνλογισμένως, οὐκ ἀρα τὸ καὶ τό, present an unusually close correspondence in word as well as sense with this parallel passage of the Rhetoric: few I think will agree with Brandis in supposing the dialectical treatise to be the later of the two compositions.

‘For such a style’—this condensed and antithetical, periodic, style, the style of Demosthenes and Isocrates,—‘is the proper seat of enthymeme’. χώρα the region or district, sedes, where enthymes are to be found; their haunt or habitat: precisely like τόπος, locus, on which see Introd. pp. 124, 5, and the quotations from Cic. and Quint. So Victorius, “sedes et tanquam regio enth.” It cannot possibly be ‘form’, as Vahlen renders it, (if I do not misunderstand him,) u. s., p. 137, die dem Enth. eigenthümliche Form.

With the statement compare III 9, 8, of antithesis, ἡδεῖα δ’ ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη λέξις...καὶ ὅτι ἐοικε συνλογισμῷ· ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγχος συνεγωγή τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστιν. III 18, 4, τὰ ἐνθύμηματα ὃτι μάλιστα συντρέφειν δεί.

‘A fallacy of this kind seems to arise from the fashion of’ (the style
μένως καὶ ἀντίκειμένως εἰπεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμησα· ἢ γὰρ τοιαύτη λέξις χώρα ἐστὶν ἐνθυμίματος, καὶ έοικε το τοιούτων εἶναι παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως. ἐστὶ δὲ εἰς τὸ τῇ λέξει συλλογιστικῶς λέγειν χρήσιμον τὸ συλλογισμὸν πολλῶν κεφάλαια λέγειν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἐσωσε, τοῖς δὲ ἐτέρους ἐτιμώρησε, τοὺς δὲ Ἕλληνας ἠλευθέρωσεν· ἔκαστον μὲν γὰρ τούτων ἢξ ἄλλων ἀπεδείχθη, συντεθέντων δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων τι γίγνεσθαι. ἐν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμονύμιαν, ως τὸ φάναι σπουδαῖον εἶναι μόν, ἀφ’ οὗ γ’ ἐστὶν ἡ τιμω-

of) 'language used', (i.e. the periodical and antithetical construction of the sentences). Such I think must be the interpretation of σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως, though it differs in toto from the signification of the phrase in Top. (de Soph. El.) 4, 166 b 10, the 6th of the verbal fallacies (see above). Vahlen, u. s., points out this difference, which is sufficiently obvious. Nevertheless Victorius identifies them. Both of them may no doubt be referred to the head of fallacies of language—in its most general sense; but the dialectical topic is a mistake or misuse of the termination of single words, involving a confusion of categories; the rhetorical is an abuse of language in a totally different application.

'For the purpose of conveying by the language the appearance of syllogistic reasoning it is serviceable to recite (enumerate) the heads (of the results) of many syllogisms (previous trains of reasoning); “some he saved, and on the others he took vengeance, and the Greeks he set at liberty”': (this is from Isocr. Evag. §§ 65—9, as Spengel has pointed out, Tract. on Rhet. in Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 22 note. Aristotle has gathered into these three heads of the contents of Isocr.'s five sections. The person of whom this is said is of course Evagoras, the hero of the declamation. The same speech has been already referred to, II 23. 12): 'for each of these points was already proved from something else, but when they are put together, it seems as if some additional (καὶ) conclusion might be drawn from them'.


[ἐν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμονύμιαν] The second topic of verbal fallacies: probably including the dialectical ἀμφιβολία, 'ambiguous propositions', fallacies of language which are not confined to single terms. 'One (fallacious argument) arising from verbal ambiguity; as to say that a mouse is a thing of worth (a worthy and estimable creature)—from it at least the most valued (esteemed) of all religious rites is derived; for the mysteries are of all religious rites most esteemed'. This is taken beyond all doubt from Polycrates' panegyrical declamation, 'the Encomium of
tāτη πασῶν τελετῆ. τὰ γὰρ μυστήρια πασῶν τιμω-
tάτη τελετῆ. ἣ εἰ τις κύνα ἐγκωμίαζων τὸν ἐν τῷ
οὐρανῷ συμπαραλαμβάνει ἢ τὸν Πάνα, ὁτι Πάνδαρος
ἐφησεν

ὡ μάκαρ, ὅν τε μεγάλας θεοῦ κύνα παντοδαπὸν
καλέουσιν Ὀλυμπιον.

ἡ ὁτι τὸ μηδένα εἶναι κύνα ἀτιμότατον ἐστιν, ἀδικε

mice', referred to in § 6: see the note there. The ambiguity from which
the fallacious inference is drawn is of course the assumed derivation
from μῦς instead of μῦν. If mysteries are derived from mice, how great
must be the honour due to the little animal. See Whately, Logic, ch. v.
§ 8, on ambiguous middle.

tελετῆ] is a religious rite, and specially rites into which initiation
enters as a preparation—mysteries; sometimes initiation alone. Athen.
B. 12, p. 40 D, τελετάς καλοῦμεν τὰς ἐτι μείζον καὶ μετὰ τινος μυστικῆς
παραδόσεως ἐορτᾶς. Suidas, s. v., θυσία μυστηριώδης ἡ μεγίστη καὶ τιμωτέρα.
Hesychius, τελεταί ἐορταί, θυσίαι, μυστήρια. Phocion, θυσία μυστηριώδης.
1032, Dem. c. Aristog. § 11,) ascribed to Orpheus. Comp. Plat. Rep. II.
635 Α, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις καὶ καθαρωτι ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσίων καὶ παιδιῶν ἡ ἀθο-
vον εἰσὶ μὲν ἑτοί ἑαυτοῖ, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσαις, ὡς ὃς τελετάς καλοῦσιν, αἱ
τῶν ἕκει κακῶν ἀπολουσιν ἡμᾶς μὴ βύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει. This is
said of the Orphic and Musaean rites and mysteries and initiation into
them, but will apply equally to the Eleusinian, and all others which had
the same object and character. Comp. Protag. 316 D [and Isocr. Paneg.
§ 28].

'Or if one in the encomium of a dog takes into the account the dog
in heaven (the dog-star)'). Κύνων, as the star Sirius, the herald of the dog-
days in summer, Hom. II. XXI 27—29, ἀστέρι... ὅν τε κύνων ἐν ὁρίων ἐπι-
κυνί, et alibi, as a mark of the season, like the Pleiads; also ὑπὸ κύνα,
μετὰ κύνα, περὶ κύνα, Arist. Theophr. al. Canis, canicula, Hor. Od. III

'Or Pan, because Pindar called him "the mighty mother (Cybele)’s
manifold dog". Pindar, Parthenia, Fragm. 6. "Pan optime in illo car-
mine audibat, quo ante Magnae Matris, ubi eius statua, celebrabatur,"
her faithful and constant attendant. This metaphor is converted by
some panegyrist of the animal into an argument in his favour, as if the
god Pan were really a distinguished member of that fraternity 1.

ἡ ὁτι τὸ μηδένα κ.τ.λ.] The meaning of this is obscure. Victorius,
merely observing that this is another fallacious inference as to the value of
a dog, candidly admits that he cannot explain it. Schrader under-

1 Can the term ‘dog’ be applied to Pan, in reference to his character of ovium
custos, (Virg. Georg. 1 17,) as a shepherd’s dog? I suppose not.

AR. II.
And to say that Hermes is the most liberal' (communicative of good things to others (so Schrader); or 'sociable', communicative of himself, superis deorum gratus et imis), 'of all the gods; for he alone goes by the name of Common Hermes'. The latter of the two interpretations of κοινονικόν seems to be right, from the comparison of Polit. 111 13, 1283 a 38, where justice is said to be a κοινωνική ἀρετή, ἡ πάσας ἀναγκαῖον ἀκολουθεῖν τὰς ἄλλας. Eine der bürgerlichen gesellschaft weSENTLICHE TUGEND, i.e. social, (Stahr). The fallacy lies in transferring the special signification of κοινός in the proverb, and applying it in a general sense to the character of the god.

κοινός 'Ερμῆς] Hermes is the god of 'luck', to whom all ερμαία, wind-falls, lucky finds, pieces of good fortune, are due. When a man finds anything, as a coin which has been dropt in the street, his companion immediately puts in a claim to 'go halves', with the proverbial "Common Hermes", i.e. luck is common, I am entitled to share with you. Theophr. Char. xxx, καὶ εὑρισκομένους χαλκῶν ἐν ταῖς οὐδέν ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων θεῶν (ο ἄιοχροκερδῆς) αἰτιᾶσθαι τὸ μέρος, κοινὸν εἶναι φήσας τὸν 'Ερμῆν. Hesychius, κοινός 'Ερμῆς ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν εὐχριστοῦν. Plutarch, Phil. esse cum princ. c. 2, ἄλλ' ἁμοιώσαι καὶ ἀπειροκαθά τῶν κοινῶν 'Ερμῆν ἐμπλάλοις καὶ ἐμμησθον γενεσθαι (apud Erasm. Adag. Liberalitas, 'Communis Mercurius', p. 1144, ed. 1599), the god of gain, profit, luck, has ceased to be as of old common and liberal, and has taken to commerce and mercenary habits. Lucian, Navig. § 12; Adimantus had spoken of some golden visions, to which Lycinus replies, οὐκοῦν τὸ προχειροτάτον τούτο, κοινὸς 'Ερμῆς, φασί, καὶ εἰ μέσον κατατίθει φέρειν τῶν πλουτῶν (let me, as the proverb κοινὸς 'Ερμῆς has it, share your wealth), ἄξιον γὰρ ἀποδάλυσαι τὸ μέρος φίλου συμπά. To be κοινός in this latter sense does not entitle a man or god to the epithet κοινωνικός.

And, to prove that words' (speech, rhetoric; this is probably taken from an encomium on the art) 'are a most excellent, valuable thing; for the reason that the proper reward of good men is, not money, but λόγος (in the double sense of 'words', and 'consideration, estimation'; λόγον ποιείσθαι (ἐξείν) τινός, ἐν οúdeνι λόγοι εἶναι, et similia passim); 'for λόγον

1 On this name as applied to Antisthenes, compare the epigram in Diog. Laert. vi 1. 10, which interprets it thus, τὸν βιον ἡθα καών, 'Antisthenes, ὁδε περικῶς ὅσε δακεὶν κραδίνη ῥήμασιν οὐ στόμασιν, and to Diogenes, vii 2. 60, 61.
§ 3. σύνθεσις and διάρθεσις, 'wrong (fallacious) combination, composition, and disjunction, separation, in reading or speaking', which are here taken together as one form of fallacy, are two in de Soph. El. c. 4, 165 b 26, Ib. 166 a 22, and 33. The solution of them is given in c. 20, where "Euthydemus' argument" is also referred to, and thence no doubt transferred hither.

'Another is, to pronounce in combination what is (properly, or is intended to be) separated, or the reverse, the combined as separate: for since it seems to be the same either way (when combined or separated, and it is in this appearance, and the advantage taken of it, that the fallacy lies), whichever of the two happens to be more serviceable, that must be done'. δὲi does not here imply a moral obligation; it is not intended to recommend the practice; the only obligation is that which is imposed by the art; if you want to avail yourself of this unfair mode of reasoning (which I don't say I approve, I am only stating what the art requires), this is the way to proceed.

'This is Euthydemus' argument. For instance to know that a trireme is in the Piraeus, because he knows each (of two things which are here omitted)'. This example, which is unintelligible as it stands here, has some further light (or obscurity) thrown on it by the form in which it occurs in de Soph. El. c. 20, 177 b 12, καὶ ὁ Εὐθυδήμου δὲ λόγος, ἃρ' οἷδας σὺ νῦν οὐσίας ἐν Πειραιᾷ τριρῆμας ἐν Σικελίᾳ οὐν; but in both much is left to be supplied, the argument alluded to being supposed to be well known, and in every one's recollection. Schrader thus fills up the argument:—What you know, you know in the Piraeus—where the two disputants were standing—this is admitted: but you know also that there are triremes: this also is conceded, because the respondent knows that the Athenians have triremes somewhere; out at sea, or in Sicily, (referring to the expedition of 415 B.C.): whence the conclusion, you know that there are triremes in the Piraeus. The illicit combination (σύνθεσις) in this interpretation—though Schrader does not explain it further—must lie in the conjunction of the Piraeus with the knowledge of triremes, to which it does not belong in the respondent's interpretation of the question: and ἔκαστος will be 'each of these two pieces of knowledge, the knowledge of what is known in the Piraeus, and of the triremes'. They are both known separately, Euthydemus illicitly combines them.

This seems to be a reasonable explanation of the example so far as it is given in the Rhetoric. But it seems quite certain that Aristotle is
 quoating identically the same argument in de Soph. El. The triremes and the Piraeus appear in both, and both are styled Εὐθυδήμου λόγος, the well-known argument of Euthydemus. Schrader, though he refers to the passage, takes no account of the words ἐν Σικελία ὄν, which it seems must have formed part of it. Victorius has endeavoured to combine both in his explanation of the fallacy—I am not at all sure that I understand it: I will therefore transcribe it in his own words verbatim et literatim. "Tu scis te esse in Piraeo: quod concedebatur ipsi (the respondent), ac verum erat. Scis triremes Atheniensium esse in Sicilia (miserant enim eo classem ut eam insulam occuparent); id quoque non inificiabatur qui interrogatus erat. Tu scis igitur (aietbat ille) in Piraeo triremes esse, in Sicilia existens. Qua captione ipsum in Sicilia, scire triremes esse in Piraeo cogebar; cum eo namque, scire in Piraeo, coniungebatur triremes esse: a quo remotum primo pronunciatum fuerat: ab illo vero, in Sicilia, cum quo copulatum editum primo fuerat, disiungebatur: atque ita efficiebatur ipsum, in Sicilia cum esset, scire in Piraeo triremes esse. Quod vero hic adiungit έκαστον γὰρ οἴδεν: separatim scilicet utrunque nosse intelligit, se in portu Atheniensium tunc esse: triremesque item in Sicilia. E quorum conglutinatione fallax ratio conflata, quae inde vocata est παρά σύνθεσιν." By this must be meant, that the two statements, existence or knowledge in the Piraeus, and knowledge of triremes in Sicily, which ought to be kept separate, are combined in one statement, and hence the fallacy: true separately, they are not true together. Whether this is a satisfactory version of Euthydemus' fallacy I fear I must leave it to others to decide. My principal difficulty is as to the mode of transition from the Piraeus to Sicily in the two first propositions, which as far as I can see is not satisfactorily accounted for. What is there to connect the 'knowing that you are in the Piraeus', or 'knowing in the Piraeus', with knowing or being in Sicily? And yet there must be some connexion, apparent at least if not real, to make the fallacy plausible. This is nevertheless Alexander's solution of it. Comm. ad Top. 177 b 12, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἡρώτα ὁ Εὐθυδήμος ἐν Πειραιαῖς τυχαίως, ὥστε αἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τριήρεις εἰς Σικελίαν ἤλθον. ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ τοῦ σοφισμάτως ἀγαθή τομαύτη. "ἀρα γε ὅπως ἐν Πειραιαῖς εἰ; ναὶ. ἀρα ἐν Σικελία τριήρεις οὔσας; ναὶ. ἀρα ὅπως οὕς ὕπατος ἐν Πειραιεί τριήρεις ἐν Σικελία ὄν;" παρὰ τῷ σύνθεσιν τὸ σοφίσμα. However this may be, at any rate, if Plato's dialogue is to be trusted, there is no kind of fallacy however silly, transparent, and contemptible, of which Euthydemus and his partner were incapable; and the weight of authority, notwithstanding the utter want of sense, must decide us to accept this explanation.

Of Euthydemus, and his brother and fellow-sophist Dionysodorus, contemporaries of Socrates, nearly all that we know is derived from Plato's Euthydemus. They had studied and taught the art military,
and the forensic branch of Rhetoric, Euthyd. 273, c. D, before entering at an advanced age upon their present profession, viz. that of ἔρωτητική, the art of sophistical disputation, and of universal confutation, by which they undertook to reduce any opponent whatsoever to silence. Many examples of their mode of arguing are given in the Platonic dialogue, but Aristotle's instance does not appear among them. See also Grote's Plato, on Euthydemus, Vol. 1., ch. xix. The fallacies are exemplified from the dialogue, p. 545 seq. And on Euthydemus and his brother, also Stallbaum's Disp. de Euth. Plat. prefixed to his edition of the dialogues, p. 10 seq. (Ed. 1).

An example of illicit combination is given in the περὶ Ἔρωτητικάς, the treatise on the proposition or elementary combination of words, c. 11, p. 20 δ 35, ἀλλ' οὐχί, εἰ σκυτέως καὶ ἄγαθός, καὶ σκυτέως ἄγαθός. εἰ γάρ, ὅτι ἐκέπερον ἀληθές, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὸ συνάμφως, πολλὰ καὶ ἄποστα ἑσται.

'Another example is that one that knows the letters, knows the whole verse; for the verse is the same thing (as the letters, or elements, of which it is composed)'. The reason given, τὸ ἐπός τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστιν, contains the fallacy. It assumes that the things combined are the same as they are separate; which is not true.

'And (thirdly) to argue, that since twice a certain amount (of food or a drug) is unwholesome, so must also the single portion be: for it is absurd to suppose that if two things separately are good, they can when combined unite into one bad'. If the two parts together are unwholesome, neither of them can be wholesome separately, because the combination of two good things can never make one bad. This is a fallacious con-futation; of a physician, may be, who is recommending the use of a drug. You say that your drug is wholesome: now you only administer a certain quantity. Suppose you were to double it, you would not say that it was wholesome then: but if the two parts together are unwholesome, how can either of them, the component elements being precisely the same in each, be wholesome? two wholesomes could never make an unwholesome. Here the undue combination of the double with the single part produces the fallacy (so Victorius).

'Used thus, it serves for refutation, but in the following way for proof (this is, by inverting the preceding): because one good thing cannot be (made up of) two bad'. If the whole is good, then the two parts, which is not always true. 'But the entire topic is fallacious': in whichever way it is applied (Victorius).

'And again, what Polycrates said in his encomium of Thrasybulus, that he put down thirty tyrants: for he puts them all together'. This again, which without further elucidation would not be altogether intelligible, is explained by two notices in Quintilian, III 6. 26, VII 4. 44.

As an illustration of the argument from number, he gives this, Ἀν Thrasybulo triginta pracmia debeantur, qui tot tyrannos sustulerit?
Here it appears that Polycrates had argued that he deserved thirty rewards for his services, one for each tyrant that he had expelled; an illicit combination. Spalding ad loc. iii. 6, "Hoc videtur postulasse Polycrates, qui dixit:" quoting this passage. On Polycrates see § 6, infra.

'Or that in Theodectes' Orestes, for it is a fallacy of division: "It is just for her that she slays her husband" to die, and for the son to avenge his father: and accordingly this is what has actually been done: (but this is a fallacy) for it may be that when the two are combined, (the sum-total) is no longer just'. Orestes, being the son of her that had slain her husband, was no longer the right person to take vengeance on his murderer. On the use of οὐκῆτι, the opposite of ἤδη, 'not now as before, in former cases', see note on I 1.7, ἤδη, οὔπω, οὐκῆτι.

On Theodectes of Phaselis, see note on II 23.3, and the ref. Also compare the topic of that section with this example from his Orestes, which in all probability is there also referred to. This passage of Aristotle is cited by Wagner, Fragm. Trag. Graec. III 122, without comment, as the sole remaining specimen of Theodectes' Orestes.

'This may also be explained as the fallacy of omission; for the (person) by whom (the deed was done) is withdrawn'. Had it been stated 'by whom' the vengeance was inflicted, the injustice of it would have been apparent. It is stated generally, the particular circumstances which falsify the statement in this case being omitted. παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν is explained in § 9, τὴν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ πότε καὶ πῶς, the omission of time and circumstances, which falls under the more general head of τοῦ ἀπλῶς καὶ μη ἀπλῶς, § 10, an unqualified, instead of qualified statement. It occurs also in § 7.

§ 4. 'Another topic (of fallacious reasoning) is exaggeration, δεινωσὶς—especially the excitement of indignation contrasted with ἔλεος, II 21.10, III 19.3—in construction or destruction (of a thesis or argument). Hac est illa quaec deinōsis vocatur: rebus indiguis asperis, invidiosis, addens vim oratio. Quint. VI 2.24. Ernesti, Lex. Technologiae Graecae, s. v. ἀνασκευάζειν καὶ κατασκευάζειν, are technical terms distinguishing the

1 Λε and three other mss have οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα καὶ πέρα κατασκευάζειν. Spengel, ed. 1867, rightly puts the first in brackets and retains the second, which I have followed in the translation.
two kinds of syllogisms and enthymemes, the destructive or refutative ἔλεγχικοι, and the constructive or demonstrative δεικτικοί, ἀποδεικτικοί: as κατασκευάζειν is to establish something which you undertake to prove, and leads to a positive conclusion, so ἀνασκευάζειν or ἀναφέρειν (a term of the same import) is to break down or destroy, upset, subvert, an adversary's thesis or conclusion, by refuting it, and so leads to a negative conclusion. κατασκευαστικά of enthymeme, II 26. 3.

'This means to amplify, heighten, intensify, exaggerate (a species of the general topic αὔξειν καὶ μειών, amplification and depreciation, the fourth of the κοινοὶ τόποι. Introd. p. 129, comp. II 26. 1), the fact or act alleged (usually a crime), without any proof of its having been committed: for it makes it appear, either that it has not been done' (read οὐ for οὖ, with Bekker and Spengel), 'when the party accused (or inculpated) employs it; or that the accused is guilty when the accuser grows angry (works himself into a fit of virtuous indignation)'. This might seem to confine the topic to accusation and defence in the forensic branch, and no doubt it is in this that it is most useful and most usual; and also this is its most appropriate sphere as a fallacious argument: still as a species of one of the κοινοὶ τόποι it must needs be applicable to the other two branches, and in fact in all invectives, and in epideictic oratory, it is essential. Its appropriate place in the speech is the ἐπίλογος or peroration, III 19. 1, 3.

'Accordingly it is no (true) enthymeme, for the listener falsely concludes (assumes) the guilt or innocence (alleged) though neither of them has been proved'. This is of course a purely rhetorical topic.

§ 5. 'Another fallacy is derived from the use of the 'sign': for this also leads to no real conclusion (proves, demonstrates, nothing). On the sign and its logical character and value, see Introd. pp. 161—3, and the paraphrases of Rhet. I 2.15—18, Ibid. pp. 163—5.

In the Topics, fallacies from the sign are noticed as the form which fallacies of consequence assume in Rhetoric. ἐν τε τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς αἱ κατὰ τὸ σημεῖον ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων εἴειν. De Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 8.

'As for instance if one were to say, "Lovers are of service to states; for it was the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton that put down (put an end to) the tyranny of Hipparchus" . This is a mere apparent sign or possible indication of a connexion between love and the putting down of tyranny: there is no necessary consequence: it is not a τεκμηρίων, a conclusive sign, or indication: no general rule of connexion can be established between them, from which we might infer—without fallacy—
that the one would always, or for the most part, follow the other. Herein lies the difference between the dialectical consequence and the rhetorical sign. The converse of this—from the governor's point of view—is argued by Pausanias in Plato's Symp. 182 C. "Oý γὰρ, οἶμαι, συμφέρει τοῖς ἀρχοντι...φιλίας ἰσχυρᾶς καὶ κοινωνίας (ἐγγίνεσθαι) ὃ δὴ μάλιστα φιλεῖ τά ἅλα πάντα καὶ ο ἑρως ἐμποιεῖν. Ἕργο ὑπτότω ἔμαθον καὶ οἱ ἐνθάδε τῦραννοι: ὃ γὰρ 'Αριστογέιτονος ἑρως καὶ 'Αρμοδίου φιλία βέβαιος γενομένη κατέλυσεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρχήν." Victorius.

'Or again, if one were to say, (it is a sign) that Dionysius (Dionysius, like Socrates and Coriscus, usually, in Aristotle, here represents anybody, men in general) is a thief, because he is a bad man: for this again is incapable of demonstration; because every bad man is not a thief, though every thief is a bad man.' The consequence is not convertible. Ὅ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐπίμενον ἔλεγχος διὰ τὸ οὐσιαὶ ἀντιστρέφει τὴν ἀκολουθησία, (the fallacy in this topic arises from the assumed convertibility of the consequence), de Soph. El. 5, 167 b 1. In the uncertain sign, antecedent and consequent are never reciprocally convertible, the converse does not follow reciprocally, and therefore the sign is always liable to be fallacious. On the different kinds of consequences, see Anal. Pr. 1 c. 27, 43 b 6, seq.

§ 6. 'Another, the fallacy of accident.' This is not the same fallacy as that which has the same name in the Topics, the first of the fallacies εἷς τῆς λέξεως, de Soph. El. c. 5, 166 b 28; "Fallacies of accident are those that arise from the assumption that the same things are predicable alike of the thing itself (τὸ πρᾶγμα, i.e. the logical subject, τὸ ὑποκείμενον). For whereas the same subject has many accidents, it is by no means necessary that all that is predicable of the former should also be predicable of the latter." White is an accident, or predicable, of the subject, man: it is by no means true that all that can be predicated of man can also be predicated of white. The confusion of these, the substitution of one for the other, gives rise to the fallacy. The example is the following:—A Sophist argues that because Socrates is not Coriscus, and Coriscus is a man, Socrates is not a man. Man is the subject, and Socrates and Coriscus are both predicates, attributes, or accidents of man. And if we substitute 'name' for 'man' in the proposition 'Coriscus is a man', the argument vanishes. But both the examples here are instances of accident for cause, and not for subject, which is no doubt a more suitable application of it for rhetorical purposes.

The first example is taken from Polycrates' encomium on mice, quoted above without the name, § 2. One of his topics in praise of them was "the aid they lent by gnawing through the bow-strings." Something similar to this is narrated by Herodotus, II 141 (Schrader), but the circumstances do not quite tally. Sennacherib king of the Arabians and
tois 'Αχαιοὶς ἐν Τενέδω. ὁ δ' ὃς ἀτιμαζόμενος ἐμὴν-7 σεν, συνέβη δὲ τούτο ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ κληθῆναι. ἄλλος τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον, οἶον ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅτι μεγα-


'Or if one were to say that an invitation to dinner is the highest possible honour; because it was the want of an invitation which excited Achilles' wrath against the Achaeans at Tenedos: his anger was really excited by the disrespect, the non-invitation (the form or mode of its manifestation) was a mere accident of it.' ἐπὶ τοῦ 'on the occasion, in the case of'. This is a fallacious inference (drawn either by Arist. himself, or, more likely, by some declamer) from an incident in a play of Sophocles, the subject of which was this (Wagner, Fr. Trag. Gr., Soph., 'Αχαιῶν Σύλλογος, Vol. II. p. 230, from Welcker):—The Greeks on their way to Troy had put in at the island of Tenedos to hold a council as to the best way of attacking the city. Achilles would not attend at the meeting, having taken offence at the neglect, and presumed slight or contempt, of Agamemnon in not inviting him, either not at all, or after the rest, to an entertainment. There are two extant titles of plays by Sophocles, the 'Αχαιῶν σύλλογος, and 'Αχαιῶν σύνδειπνον, or σύνδειπνον, Plutarch, de discr. adul. et amici, 74 l, Vol. I. p. 280, ed. Wytt. ὃς ὁ παρὰ Σωφροκλεί τῶν 'Αχαλλέα παροβίων 'Οδυσσέους οὗ φησιν ἐργίζοντα διὰ τὸ δεῖπνον κτ.λ., citing three verses from the play (Ulysses had been sent with Ajax and Phoenix to Achilles to make up the quarrel). Comp. Athen. I. p. 27 D, Σοφ. ἐν 'Αχαιῶν σύνδειπνον, where four lines are quoted; and VIII 365 B, τὸ Σοφ. δράμα...ἐπιγράφειν ἀξίον τοις Σύνδειπνοις. Cic. ad Quint. Fr. II 16, Σύνδειπνοι Σοφ. Dindorf, Fragm. Soph. (Poet. Sc.) p. 35, following Touph, Brunk, and Böckh, supposes these two titles to belong to the same play, a satyric drama (Dind.). Wagner after Welcker (Trag. Graec. pp. 112 and 233) shews that they were distinct, the 'Αχαιῶν σύλλογος founded on the story above mentioned, the other 'Αχαιῶν σύνδειπνον, or simply σύνδειπνον or σύνδειπνον, derived from the Odyssey, and descriptive of the riot and revelry of the suitors in Penelope's house. See Wagner, Fr. Trag. Gr., Soph., Vol. II. pp. 230 and 380. The case of two distinct dramas is, I think, made out.

§ 7. 'Another from consequence', i.e. from the unduly assumed reciprocal convertibility of antecedent and consequent: just as in the 'sign' (q. v.), between which and this there is no real difference. As we saw in § 5, in the de Soph. El. the sign is spoken of as the rhetorical variety of the general topic of consequence: and they ought not to be divided here.

'As in the Alexander', i.e. Paris; a declamation of some unknown author, already referred to, c. 23 §§ 5, 8, 12; (it is argued) 'that he is high-minded, because he scorned the society of many' (quaere τῶν πολλῶν 'of the vulgar') 'and dwelt alone in Ida': (the inference being that) 'because such is the disposition of the high-minded, therefore he might be supposed to be high-minded.' This is a fallacy, or logical flaw, as Schrader puts it, "quia universalem affirmantem convertit simpliciter, et
HOLLOS and This, TUV it Socrates if such to cations coextensive of rvktc cap vvKTcap taken>ira>v sign, men dressed &amp; dressed others, that all lonely-dwellers are high-minded: and to say that so and so, anybody whatsoever, is high-minded for that reason and that alone, is as much as to say that the rule is universal.

'And again (to argue) that so and so is a dandy and roams at night, and therefore a rake, because such are the habits of rakes'. This, as before, is to say that because (supposing it to be so) all adulterers are smartly dressed and walk at night, therefore all smart dressers and night-walkers are adulterers. This appears also as an example of the sign, the rhetorical form of the topic τό ἐπόμενον, de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 δ 9, βουλόμενοι γὰρ δεῖξαι ὅτι μοιχῶν, τό ἐπόμενον ἐλαβον, ὅτι καλλωπιστὴς ἢ ὅτι νύκτωρ ὁμάται πλανάμενοι. [See infra III. 15. 5.]

καλλωπιστής] Plato Symposium. 174 a. Socrates (going out to dinner) ταῦτα δὴ ἑκαλλωπιστὸν, ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἰώ.

'And another (argument), similar to these (for exalting the condition of poverty and exile), is that beggars sing and dance in the temples, and that exiles are allowed to live where they please': because, these things (enjoyments) being the ordinary accidents or concomitants of apparent happiness, those who have them may also be supposed to be happy'. Here again there is an illicit conversion of antecedent and consequent: if singing and dancing, or living where one pleased, were coextensive with happiness, the inference would be true and the two convertible. As it is, it does not follow that, because these are indications of happiness, or often accompany (follow) it, all men that sing and dance, or can live where they please, are necessarily happy. This is taken from one of those paradoxical encomiums of poverty and exile to which Isocrates refers, Helen. § 8, ἥδη τινε...τυλωσμένη γραφεῖν, ὡς ἔστων ὁ τῶν πτωχευόντων καὶ φευγόντων βίος ξηλωτότερος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἁνθρώπων; such as Alcidamas' πενίας ἐγκαύμων cited above from Menander on § 6. [For ἀπολογία πενίας see Arist. Plutus, 467—597, in the course of which a distinction is drawn between πενία and πτωχεία, 552—4.]

διαφέρει δὲ τῷ πῶς' διὸ κ.τ.λ.] 'But there is a difference in their manner of doing these; and therefore this topic falls under the head of omission,
§ 8. This section, ἄλλος παρὰ τὸ ἀναίτιον—οίον ὡς διὰ τὸύτο γεγονέναι τὸ γάρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡς διὰ τούτο λαμβάνουσι, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, οἷον ὡς ὁ Δημάδης τὴν as well as (καὶ) that of τὸ ἔπομενον'. Beggars and exiles do what appear to be the same things as the wealthy and prosperous, they dance and sing in the temples and sacred precincts, and change their place of residence at their pleasure; but there is a difference in the mode and motive of doing these things, which is omitted; and the omission when supplied explains the fallacy. The beggars dance and sing in the temples to amuse the visitors and obtain an alms; the wealthy and prosperous out of wantonness or exultation; to shew that they have the liberty of doing what is forbidden to humbler people (so Victorius, and Schrader who borrows his note: these may however be mere *signs of happiness* in the εὐθαμώνες). And again, the exiles are obliged to live abroad, and would gladly be at home again; the wealthy and prosperous travel for change of scene, to satisfy their curiosity, or (like Herodotus and Plato) their desire of knowledge. The ἐλλειψις is here of τὸ πῶς, as in § 3, ult. of ἐπὶ τίνος, and in § 9, of πύτε and πῶς, which in each case may be applied to explain the fallacy.

§ 8. This section, ἄλλος παρὰ τὸ ἀναίτιον—οίον ὡς διὰ τὸύτο γεγονέναι, is quoted by Dionys. Ep. ad Amm. c. 12 with no other variation from our text than the omission of οἷον before ὡς.

The fallacy here illustrated is the familiar *post hoc ergo propter hoc*; the assumption of a mere chronological sequence as a true cause: to mistake a mere accidental connexion of the order of time, for one of cause and effect. It is the rhetorical application, and only one variety, of the wider and more general topic of the dialectical treatise (de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 21) *non-causa pro causa*, in dialectical argumentation.

‘Another from the substitution of what is no cause for (the true) cause; for instance (this substitution takes place) by reason of the occurrence of something contemporaneously or subsequently (to that which is presumed to account for it): for it is assumed that what merely follows (in time) is the effect of a cause, and especially by politicians; as Demades, for instance, pronounced Demosthenes' policy to be the cause of all their calamities; because it was after it that the war (with Philip, and the defeat of Chaeronea) occurred’. Victorius refers to a similar charge of Aeschines, c. Ctes. § 134, καὶ ταῦτ' ἡμῖν συμβαίβηκεν ἐξ ὧν Δημοσθένης πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν προσελήλυθεν, compare § 136, army and navy and cities, ἄραν οἱ συν αὐτοπαρασκέψα μένα έκ τῆς τούτων πολιτείας. Dinarch. c. Dem. §§ 12, 13.

This is the only place in which the name of Demosthenes appears in Aristotle's Rhetoric. See on this subject Introd. pp. 45, 6, and note 2. In II 23, 18, a few words of his are quoted, but without the author's name. The Demosthenes mentioned in III 4, 3 is probably not the great Orator.

§ 9. ‘Another from the omission of when and how’; a particular case, like those of § 3, and § 7, of the following topic para to aplōs kai μη ἀπλός; a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter; the omission of particulars in the way of exceptions to a general statement, as time, place, manner, circumstances. ‘For example, that Paris had a right to take Helen; for the choice was given her by her father (Tyndareus, the choice viz. of one of the suitors, whichever she preferred)’. Eur. Iph. Aul. 66, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπιστώθησαν, εὔ δὲ πῶς γέρων ὑπῆλθεν αὐτοῖς Τυνδάρεως πυκνῇ φρενί, δίδωσιν ἐλεύθαι βουνατρὶ μετατήρων ἔνα (Victorius). The whole story of ‘Helen’s choice’, and the sequel, is told by Agamemnon, Iph. Aul. 49 seq., in his speech at the opening of the play, which serves for the prologue.

But this is a fallacy; ‘for (the choice was granted) not it may be supposed (ἰσως) for ever, but only for the first time: for in fact the father’s authority only extends so far’. Helen, acting upon her father’s permission, chose Menelaus; ἢ δ’ εἶλεθ’ ὡς γε µηποτ’ ᾧφελεν λαβεῖν Μενελαον, Iph. A. 70; and here, at this first choice, her father’s authority and her own right to choose ended. The fallacy therefore consists in the ‘omission’ of the particular time, τοῦ πότε; she generalized the time of choice from the particular time to all time; and therefore Paris was not ‘justified’ in taking her.

‘Or again, if one were to say, that to strike a free man is an act of ἃβρις (wanton outrage, liable to a γραφή, a public prosecution): for it is not so in every case (πάντως = ἀπλός), but only (κατὰ τι) when the striker is the aggressor’. This of course makes all the difference in the nature and legal construction of the offence. If the blow is returned, it may be regarded as an act of self-defence; the insulting wantonness, the injury to the sufferer’s honour and personal self-respect, is shewn in the wanton aggression. ἀν τις τύπτῃ τινὰ φήσῃν (ὁ νόμος), ἄρχων χειρῶν ἄδικων, ὡς, εἰ γε ἡ ἡμίνατο, οὐκ ἄδικεν. Demosth. c. Aristocr. § 50.

ἄρχειν χειρῶν ἄδικων is to strike the first blow, to give the offence. The phrase assumes various forms. Rhet. ad. Alex. 36 (37) 39, συνέκυψα μοῦ τὸν υἱόν; ἔγογε ἄδικων χειρῶν ἄρχοντα. Isoer. κατὰ λοχίτου § 1, ζυγατε με λοχίτης ἄρχον χειρῶν ἄδικων. Xen. Cyrop. I 5. 13, Antiph. τετραλογία Γ. Or. 4, B § 1, and § 6, ἄρξας τῆς πληγῆς. χειρῶν is sometimes omitted, Bos, Ellips. p. 301, (527, ed. Schäfer); sometimes ἄδικων, Plat. Legg. ix. 869δ, ἄρχ. χειρῶν πρότερον. Herodotus has ὑπάρχειν ἄδικων ἔργων, 1 5; and various similar phrases, IV 1. VII 8. 2, and 9 a, IX 78; also ἄρχειν ἄδικως et sim. III 130, &c. ὑπάρχειν alone, Plat. Gorg. 456 E,
πάντως, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀρχή χείρων ἀδίκων. ἔτι ὑσπερ p. 107.


§ 10. εν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς]. See note on I 11. 15, where the meaning of this as a technical term is illustrated from the de Soph. El. τὰ ἐριστικὰ here designates a book or treatise; the fallacious, sophistical reasoning exposed in the ninth book of the Topics; just as τὰ διαλεκτικὰ stands for the dialectical treatise, including (as below), or not including, the appendage on Fallacies. The subject of the de Soph. El. is described as περὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστικῶν καὶ ἐριστικῶν, 165 b 10. ἐριστικῇ there, c. 2, is first distinguished from the three other kinds of 'discussion', διὰσκαλικῆ (science), διαλεκτικῆ, and πειραστικῆ, a branch of the latter; and the ἐριστικοὶ are defined, οἱ ἐκ τῶν φαινόμενων ἐνδοξῶν μη ἄνων δὲ συννοηγημοὶ ἡ φαινόμενοι συννοηγημοῖο, which would include the σοφιστικοὶ. Elsewhere the two are distinguished; both are οἱ πάντως νικῶν (victory at any price) προαρμομένοι, 171 b 24; but οἱ τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτο ἐριστικῶν καὶ φιλέριδες δοκοῦσι εἰναι, οἱ δὲ δύος χάριν τῆς εἰς χρηματισμοὺς σοφιστικοῖ: the one dispute out of mere pugnacity and contentious habit, the others add to this a desire of gaining a reputation which may be turned to profitable account.

'Further, as in the cristic branch of dialectics, from the substitution of something as universally or absolutely for that which is so not universally, but only partially, or in particular cases, an apparent (fallacious) syllogism (i. e. enthymeme, see on I 1. 11) is elicited. As in dialectics for instance, the argument 'that the non-existent is (has existence), because non-being is non-being'. (Is, ἐστί, has two different senses, absolute and relative, or absolute and particular: the Sophist, in the second case, intends it to be understood in its most general signification ἀπλῶς, of actual existence: it is in fact a mere copula connecting the one μὴ ὄν with the other, and merely states the identity of those two expressions, which is no doubt a very partial statement indeed: it is true, but nothing to the purpose of the argument. Comp. de Soph. El. c. 25, 180 a 33, 4.) 'Or again that the unknown is an object of knowledge, because the unknown may be known—that it is unknown'. (Here of course the particular that is left out of the account is the ὅτι άγνωστον; whereby the absolute or universal, 'the unknown is knowable', is substituted for the partial or particular statement, that what is knowable is only that it cannot be known.) 'So also in Rhetoric a seeming inference may be drawn from the absolute to merely partial probability'. This topic is illustrated in Plat. Euthyd. 293 c seq. See Grote's Plato, I 546, 7, and 549; [also Grote's Aristotle I 182, note].

The construction of this last sentence which had been obscured by wrong punctuation in Bekker's 410 and first 8vo ed., has in the second been made intelligible and consecutive by removing the full stops at μὴ ὄν and ὅτι άγνωστον, and changing all the colons into commas. The
RHEORIKHΣ Β 24 § 10.

μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν ὄν, ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ ὄν, καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστήτου τὸ ἀγνωστον, ἔστιν γὰρ ἐπιστήτου τὸ ἀγνωστον ὅτι ἀγνωστον, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ρητορικοῖς ἔστιν φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλῶς εἰκὸς ἀλλὰ τί εἰκός. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο οὐ καθόλου, ὦσπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων λέγει τάχ’ ἄν τις εἰκός αὐτό τοῦτ’ εἶναι λέγοι βροτοίσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα.

γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, ὦστε εἰκός καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔσται τὸ μὴ εἰκός εἰκός.

correlative of ὦσπερ ἐν τοῖς ερμαστικοῖς is of course οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ρητορικοῖς: and in the intervening sentence οἷον ἐν μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, the μὲν has also reference to an intended δὲ, to be inserted when Rhetoric comes to be contrasted with Dialectics, which however is never expressed and the μὲν left pendent.

The topic is first defined in general terms, as it appears in the dialectical treatise, and illustrated by two examples of its dialectical use: and then exhibited in its special application to Rhetoric, the paralogism of absolute and particular probability. The first, as in the dialectical examples, is confounded with, or substituted for, the second.

‘This (particular probability, τι εἰκός,) is not universally (true or applicable), as indeed Agathon says: Perchance just this may be called likely, that many unlikely things befall mortals’, Agathon, Fragm. Inc. 5. Wagner, Fragm. Trag. Gr. III 78. Of Agathon, see Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. ch. xxvi. § 3. Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX, Vol. III. p. 257. Spengel, Artium Scriptores, p. 91, merely quotes four fragments from Aristotle. The extant fragments are collected by Wagner, u. s., on p. 73 seq. His style is criticized in Aristoph. Thesm. 55 seq. and imitated or caricatured 101 seq. A specimen of his Rhetoric is given by Plato, Symp. 194 ε seq.

This ‘probable improbable’ is illustrated in Poet. XVIII 17, 18, from tragedy, by the cunning man cheated, and by the defeat of the brave. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο εἰκός, ὦσπερ Ἀγάθων λέγει εἰκός γὰρ γίνεται πολλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός. Comp. xxv 29. On this fallacy the ‘solution’ in Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37) § 29, is based. Dion. Ep. I ad Amm. c. 8, τὸ κακουργήσατον τῶν ἐπιχειρήματων...ότι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἰκός γίνεται ποτε εἰκός.

‘For what is contrary to the probable does come to pass, and therefore what is contrary to probability is also probable (καί, besides what is directly probable). And if so, the improbable will be probable. Yes, but not absolutely (the answer); but as indeed in the case of Dialectics (in the dialectical form of the fallacy), it is the omission of the circumstances (καὶ τὰ ἔστι, in what respect,) and relation and mode that causes the cheat, so here also (in Rhetoric) (the fallacy arises) from the probability assumed not being absolute probability (or probability in general) but
THE TOPICS B 24 §§ 10, 11.

\( \alpha l \alpha ' o u x \ \alpha p l \omega s, \ \alpha l \alpha ' \ \omega s p e r \ \kappa a i \ \epsilon \pi \iota \tau o n \ \epsilon r i s t i k o w n \ \\
\tau o \ \kata \tau i \ k a i \ \pi r o s \ \tau i \ k a i \ \pi \eta \ \ou \ \pi r o s t i b e m e n a \ \pi o i e i \ \\
\tau i n \ \s u k o f a n t i a n, \ \kai \ \epsilon n t a d i a \ \p a r a \ \tau o \ \e i k o s \ \epsilon i n a \ \mu i \ \\
\alpha p l \omega s \ \a l l \a \ \tau i \ \e i k o s. \ \epsilon s t i \ \delta ' \ \epsilon k \ \tau o \tau o u t o v \ \tau o \ \tau o p o u \ \\
\eta \ \K o r a k o s \ \tau e k h y \ \s u n k e m e n h \ : \ \a n \ \tau e \ \gamma a r \ \mu i \ \e n o x o s \ \eta \ \\
\tau i \ \a i t i a, \ \o i o n \ \a \sigma t h e n h s \ \a \nu \ \a i k i a s \ \f e \nu t h h \ : \ \o u \ \gamma a r \ \e i k o s: \ \\
k a w \ \e n o x o s \ \a \nu, \ \o i o n \ \a n \ i \s c h y r o s \ \a \nu \ : \ \o u \ \gamma a r \ \e i k o s, \ \o t i \ \\
some particular, special probability'. That which is only probable in particular cases, as in particular times, places, relations, and circumstances in general, is fraudulently represented as probable absolutely, without any such conditions or qualifications.

\( \sigma u k o f a n t i a, \) in this sense of a logical cheat or deception, transferred from its ordinary meaning, of a false, calumnious information or charge, is not to be found in any of the Lexicons.

§ 11. 'Of (the application of) this topic the (whole) "art" of Corax is composed.' 'This topic', as Ar. afterwards implies, is the topic of \( \tau o \ \e i k o s \) in general, and not confined to the fallacious use of it. In the former of the two alternatives of the example from Corax's Art the argument is fair enough; the feeble man may fairly plead that it was not likely that he should be guilty of an assault upon one much stronger than himself. Of course this does not prove the point, but it would have a considerable effect in persuading the judges of the accused's innocence, 'For whether he (the accused) be not liable to the charge, as for instance if (repeat \( \alpha v \) from the preceding) a weak man were to be tried for an assault, (he defends himself upon the ground that, lit. 'it is because,') it is improbable: or if he be liable (under the same circumstances), as for instance if he be a strong man (he argues—the omission explained as before) that it is improbable because it was likely to seem probable' (and therefore knowing that he would be exposed to the suspicion he was less likely to bring upon himself an almost certain punishment). And in like manner in all other cases: for the accused must be either liable or not liable to the charge: now it is true that both seem probable, but the one is really so, the other not probable in the abstract (\( \alpha p l \omega s \ \sigma i m p l i c i t e r \) ), but in the way that has been already stated', i.e. under the conditions and circumstances before mentioned.


The assault case and its alternatives was evidently one of the stock instances of the rhetorical books. It has been already referred to in 11 12, and re-appears in Plat. Phaedr. 223 B, as an extract from Tisias' art. Again in Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37) § 6.

The topic \( \tau o \ \e i k o s \) which formed the staple of the art of Corax, and was treated in that of Tisias, Plato, l. c., continued in fashion with the
early rhetoricians of the Sophistical school, as we may see by the constant notices of it in Plato. Somewhat later it was taken up by Antiphon, a disciple of this school, and appears in his three surviving school exercises, or μελέται, the Tetralogies. See also de caed. Herod. § 63. On the τόπος of the first of these, see Müller, Hist. Gr. L. XXXIII § 2. It is to be found also in the Rhet. ad Alex.; and of course in the Orators; and it crept into the Tragedies of Agathon. An amusing instance of the alternative application of the argument is the story of the encounter between Corax and his pupil Tisias in the attempt of the former to recover the fees due for his instruction, which Tisias had withheld. Related at length in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. vii, Vol. iii p. 34. It is likewise told of Protagoras and his wealthy pupil Euathlus.

'And this is (the meaning of) "making the worse appear the better argument'" (that is, giving the superior to the inferior, the less probable) argument, making it prevail over that which is really superior, and more probable: which is identical with the second, the fallacious alternative of Corax's τόπος. Cic., Brut. viii 30, extends this profession to all the Sophists. Tunn Leontinus Gorgias...Protagoras Abderites... aliique multi temporibus eisdem docere se profitebantur, arrogantibus sane verbis, quemadmodum causa inferior (ita enim loquebantur) dicendo fieri superior possit. See the dialogue between the δίκαιος and ἄδικος λόγος, Arist. Nub. 889—1104. τῷ λόγῳ—τόν κρείττων, οὗτος εστί, καὶ τὸν ἄττονα, 882. tis άν; λόγος. ἄττον γ' άν. άλλα se niko, τὸν ἐμνον κρείττω φάσκοντ' είναι, 893: and he keeps his word. The fair argument is at last forced to own his defeat, and acknowledge the superiority of his unfair competitor. This was one of the articles of charge of Meletus and his coadjuitors against Socrates, Plat. Apol. 19 b. Socrates is there made to refer to Aristophanes as its original author.

'And hence it was that men were justified in taking offence (in the displeasure, indignation, they felt) at Protagoras' profession: for it (the mode of arguing that it implies) is false, and not real (true, sound, genuine) but only apparent; and no true art (proceeding by, lit. 'included in,' no rule of genuine art), but mere rhetoric and quibbling. And so much for enthymemes, real and apparent. αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τούτα ἐστιν, ἥψη (δ' Πρωταγώρας), ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα ὑπ' ἐπαγγελλομαί. Plat. Protag. 319 ἀ.

This distinction of ἀληθῆς and φαινόμενος, εἶναι and φαίνεσθαι, reality and appearance, the true, genuine, substantial, and the sham, false
semblance, is traced in its various applications at the opening of the de Soph. El. The latter is the especial characteristic of the Sophists and their professions and practice, 165 a 21, c. ii, 171 b 27—34, and elsewhere. It constantly re-appears in Aristotle’s writings.

The imputation here cast on Protagoras’ profession is rather that of logical than of moral obliquity and error, though no doubt the latter may also be implied.

I have already referred to the strong expression of Diogenes, Ep. ad Amm. c. 8, on the use of this topic, above, note on § 10.

CHAP. XXV.

The account of the genuine and spurious enthymemes or rhetorical inferences in cc. xxiii, xxiv, is followed by a chapter upon λύσις, the various modes of refuting an adversary’s argument; the same order being observed as in the corresponding Dialectics (ἀντιστροφή ἡ ῥητορική τῆς διαλεκτικῆς), where we have first (in the eight books of the Topics) the art of logical, systematic, argumentation, laid down and analysed; which is supplemented in an Appendix, Top. ix, or de Soph. El., by an account, (in the first fifteen chapters) of sophistical fallacies and paradoxes, and (from c. 16 to 33) the various modes of ‘solving’ or refuting them [Grote’s Aristotle, chap. x]. The principal difference between them is that the dialectical λύσις deals only with the refutation of fallacious arguments, the rhetorical with that of rhetorical inferences or enthymemes in general. The same subject is treated again, more briefly, in iii 17, under the head of πίστεως, the third ‘division of the speech’, including the establishment of your own case and the refutation of your opponent’s: and in the Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37), under that of accusation and defence.

On λύσις, solution, or refutation in general, and its divisions, according to Aristotle, see Poste, Transl. of Posterior Analytics, Introd. pp. 28—30. Thomson, Laws of Thought, § 127. Trendelenburg, El. Log. Arist. § 41. Cic. de Inv. xii. 79, seq. On refutatio, Quint. v c. 13. On ἐνστάσεις, one of its two divisions, Anal. Pr. 11 c. 26, which is there treated logically and syllogistically, see Poste, u. s., and Appendix C (note) p. 198, Transl. of de Soph. El., Introd. to Rhet. on c. 25, p. 267, seq. In the Topics there is no direct and detailed explanation of λύσις or ἐνστάσεις—λύσις is exemplified in de Soph. El.—though that book is twice referred to, 11 25, 3, 26, 4, as containing an account of the latter of the two. This apparent contradiction will be considered in the note on the former of the two passages.

§ 1. ‘The next thing we have to treat of, after what has already been said (c. xxiii, xxiv), is λύσις, the modes of refuting an opponent’s arguments’. On the meaning and derivation of λύσις, see Introd. p. 267, note.
"This solution or refutation may be effected either by a counter-syllogism (which concludes the negative of the opponent's thesis or conclusion, the regular ἄληθεια) or by advancing a (contradictory) instance, or objection (to one of the premisses proving or indicating a false statement). The conclusion must be refuted by a counter-syllogism. Comp. on these two, c. 26. 3, 4.

§ 2. 'Now these counter-syllogisms may plainly be constructed out of the same topics: for syllogisms' (i.e. not all syllogisms, not the scientific and demonstrative, but dialectical syllogisms, and rhetorical enthymemes: note on 1 1. 11) 'are derived from probable materials, and mere (variable) opinions' (what is generally thought, probabilities;—truth, the conclusions of science, is constant: and scientific demonstration, the object of which is ἄληθεια, does not admit, like Dialectics and Rhetoric, of opposite conclusions, of arguments on either side of a question), 'are often contrary to one another, (and therefore can be converted into opposite enthymemes)'.

§ 3. 'Objections (contradictory instances) are brought (against opposing enthymemes) in four ways, as also in the Topics'. Schrader had long ago observed that the words ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς are not a reference to the special treatise of that name, but express the art, or the practice of it, in general; and this explanation he had already applied to other passages, as 11 23. 9, ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς and 24. 10, ἐν τοῖς ἐραστικοῖς; unnecessarily in those two, as we have seen.

Brandis will not allow that 'the Topics' can ever be applied to Dialectics in general, but thinks that it must be confined to the particular book in which Dialectics are treated as Topics (wherein Vahlen agrees with him). He admits that although the fourfold division of ἐνστάσεις, as here given, is not found in the Topics, as we now have them, (there is a different division into four,) yet the proper place for them is indicated in Bk. Θ c. 10; also, that there are plenty of examples of these four ἐνστάσεις in the Topics; and also that they are found (substantially, not by name and description,) in the Analytics. Nevertheless, he hesitates to suppose that there can be a direct reference to the Topics here and suggests the possibility of an alteration of Bk. Θ subsequent to the composition of the Rhetoric, or of an omission of something in our present text. Tract in Schneidevin's Philologus iv. 1, p. 23.

To this Vahlen very fairly replies, zur krit. der Ar. Schrift. II 23, 1402 a 30, (Trans. Vien. Acad. Oct. 1861, p. 140), that Aristotle "has so often exemplified the application of these four kinds of ἐνστάσεις in the eighth book of the Topics—see especially c. 2, 157 a 34, and d 1, ff.—and elsewhere throughout the treatise—as in the Topics of πρὸς τι (Z 8, 9), γένος (Δ), ἰδιων (Ε),—that he might very well refer to that work.
“The words καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖσ τοπικοῖσ need not be referred to more than the φερόνται ἐνστάσεις (the bringing or application of objections), and the expression here is no less correct than in 1403 a 31.” (26.4): and consequently (he says) Brandis’ two suggestions are superfluous. The reference to the Topics in Rhet. I 2.9 is a case exactly parallel to this. It is not made to any particular passage, but what is stated may be gathered or inferred from the contents of that work. Compare note ad loc., and see Introd. p. 154, note i.

On ἐνστάσεις and its four kinds, Introd. pp. 269—271; where the examples that follow, §§ 4—7, are also explained. We learn from the chapter of the Analytics that ‘objections’, directed against the premisses of a syllogism (or enthymeme), may be either universal or particular; and that the syllogisms into which they are thrown are either in the first or third figure.

ἐξ ἐαυτοῦ] which in the next sentence becomes ἀφ’ ἐαυτοῦ, is, as Schrader puts it, “Cum ex eo quod antecedenti enthymematis nobis oppositi, eiusdemque vel subiecto vel predicato inest, contrarium argumentum exculpitur, eoque id quod objectum est confutatur.” An argument derived ‘from itself’ must mean ‘from the opponent’s enthymeme itself’, and so retorted on him.

§ 4. ‘Supposing for instance your adversary’s major premisses were, “all love is good”, the objection may be opposed in two ways: either (universally) by saying that all want or defect’ (one of Plato’s notions of love, Philebus, comp. Rhet. I 11.11, 12) ‘is bad: or particularly, that, if that were the case, the ‘Caunian love’ would never have passed into a proverb (this is a particular instance; some love), if there had been no form of love at all.’

Καῦνος ἐρως] The reading of all MSS but Ac is κάλλιστος ἢ κάκιστος ἐρως. Who could have divined from this, without the aid of that MS, that Καῦνος was what the author had written? asks Spengel, Trans. Bav. Acad. u.s. 1851, p. 50. What Aε really does read is Καῦνος according to Bekker, Καῦνος according to Spengel.

The saying is proverbial for ‘an illicit, or unfortunate (fatally ending) passion’—in either case πονηρός—such as that of Byblis for her brother Caunus; which was πονηρός in both its senses. Suidas, s.v. ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ κατορθομένων ἐπιθυμμῶν. Καῦνος γὰρ καὶ Βυβλίς ἀδέλφαι ἐνυπνήσαν, Hesychius ἐν Καῦνο τιμᾶται (under the next word we have Καῦνος...καὶ πόλις Ρώδου) καὶ ὁ σφοδρός. Erasim. Adag. Amor. No. 1. “De fœdeo amore dicebatur; aut si quis ea desideraret quae neque fas esset concupiscere neque liceret
5 Καύνιος ἔρως, εἰ μὴ ἦσαν καὶ πονηρό ἐρωτεῖς. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐνστασις φέρεται, οἶον εἰ τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἢν οτι ὁ ἄγαθος ἀνήρ πάντας τοὺς φίλους εἰ ποιεῖ, 6 ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ μοχθηρὸς κακῶς. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοίου, εἰ ἢν τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὅτι οἱ κακῶς πεποιθότες ἀεὶ μισοῦσιν,

assequi. Biblis Caunum fratrem impotenter adamavit; a quo cum esset repulsa, sibimet necem conscivit." Ovid, Met. ix 452—664, who says (662) that she wept herself to death, and was changed into a fountain. Byblis in exemplo est ut ament concessa puellae; Byblis Apollinei cor- recta cupidine fratris, Non soror ut fratrem, nec quia debebat amavit.

§ 5. ‘The case of a contrary instance or objection is exemplified by the following, suppose the opponent’s enthymeme is this’ (i. e. has for its major premiss, is constructed upon the principle that, derives its conclusion from this, ‘that all good men’ (ὁ ἄγαθος, the definite article marks the class: note on 1 7. 13, comp. II 4. 31), ‘or good men invariably, do good to all their friends, the objection may be taken, that the opposite is not true; that bad men do not harm to all theirs’. “The allegation of contraries,” Poste, Transl. of de Soph. El. Appendix c, p. 197. If it be true that all good men do good to all their friends, the contrary of this, that all bad men do harm to all theirs, must be true likewise. But the latter is known not to be universally true; to some of their friends bad men do harm, to others not: it is not necessary therefore that good men should always help all their friends; they may be good without that. So Victorius. Comp. Top. B 9, 114 b 6 seq. where two other examples are given: σκοπεῖν δὲ...καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον, οἴον ὅτι τὸ ἄγαθον οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢδ' οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ κακῶν λυπηρῶν ἢ εἰ τοῦτο, κάκειον. καὶ εἰ ἡ δικαιο- σύνη ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ ἀδίκια ἀγγεία, καὶ εἰ τὸ δικαῖος ἐπιστημονικὸς καὶ ἐμπειρώς, τὸ ἀδίκου ἀγγούντως καὶ ἀπείρως. And again B 7, 113 a 1 seq. αἱ μὲν οὖν πρῶται δύο κ.t.l...line 8, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πάντα τέταρτα ποιεὶ ἐναντίων. τὸ γὰρ τοὺς φίλους εἰ ποιεῖ τῷ τοὺς φίλους κακῶς ἐναντίον ἀπὸ τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἢδὸς ἐστί, καὶ τὰ μὲν αϊρέτων τὸ δὲ φευκτόν. “But the other four combinations, benefiting a friend, hurting a friend: benefiting an enemy, hurting an enemy: benefiting a friend, benefiting an enemy: hurting a friend, hurting an enemy: are all respectively contraries.” Poste, u. s. p. 201.

§ 6. ‘An example of an objection from similars (is the following), suppose the enthymeme (i. e. the premiss, as before,) to be, that those who have been injured always hate, (it may be met by the objection,) “nay but, neither (no more than in the other case) do those who have been well treated always love”’. This, as Victorius observes, may plainly be taken as an example of the preceding kind of ἐνστασις ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου. It may also exemplify that of ‘ similars’, to which Arist. has here applied it. Ill treatment is no necessary proof of hatred, any more than kindness and benefits are necessarily accompanied by love. The premiss, ‘those who are injured always hate’, we encounter with the objection, of a similar, parallel, case, that ‘those who are well treated don’t always love’. 
Parallel cases are also illustrated in Top. B 10, 114 b 25, but not as objections, though objections might be derived from them.

§ 7. A fourth kind is that of, 'judgments, or decisions proceeding from distinguished men: as for instance, if the enthymeme be, that drunkards should have allowance made for them (and be punished less severely than if they had been in their sober senses), because they sin in ignorance, an objection may be taken, that then Pittacus is no longer commendable (i.e. loses his due credit; is no longer an authority, as he is entitled to be); for (if he had been—on the supposition that the enthymeme objected to is true,) he would not have enacted (as he did) a heavier penalty for an offence committed under the influence of intoxication'. The authority of Pittacus, which is of course maintained by the objector, is urged in opposition to the general principle laid down by the opponent, that indulgence should be granted to those who committed a crime in a fit of intoxication, because they were then out of their senses and had lost all self-control.

If this were true, replies the objector, Pittacus, one of the seven "wise men," would be no authority—which cannot be supposed—for he ruled the direct contrary, that drunkenness aggravated, not extenuated, the offence. The text, with the supplements usually required in translating Aristotle, seems to give a clear and consistent sense. Vahlen however, Trans. Vien. Acad. Oct. 1861, p. 141, objects to αἰνέτος on two grounds; first, the word itself, as belonging only to poetry; and secondly as inapplicable here; the meaning required being, that Pittacus is no wise man, for otherwise he would not have made such an enactment: that we must therefore read συνέτος for αἰνέτος. On the second ground I can see no necessity for alteration; for the first objection, there is more to be said. αἰνέτος is a very rare word: only two examples of it are given in Steph. Thes. (this place of Aristotle is strangely overlooked) and both from poets, Antimachus and Alcaeus. Whether this is a sufficient reason for condemning the word in Aristotle I will not take upon me to decide. It is retained by all editors; and Aristotle's writings are not altogether free from irregularities of grammar and expression not sanctioned by the usage of the best Attic writers. For instance, κυνότατος is quoted in Beekker's Anecdota, 1 101, as occurring in the peri poimēkhs—doubtless in the lost part of that work.

On this example, see Poste, Trans. of de Soph. El. Appendix c. p. 199.

On Pittacus, Diogenes Laertius i. 4. In § 76, νόμους δὲ ἔθηκε τῷ μεθύνοντι, εἰς ἀμάρτη, διπλῆν εἰνα τὴν ζημίαν ὑα μη μεθύωσι, πολλοῦ κατὰ τὴν νίκον εἰνον γενομένον, Lesbos to wit, famous for its wine. He was born at
Mytilene in 651 B.C., and died in 569 B.C. Mure, Hist. Gr. Lit. III 377. Clinton, F. H. sub anno. Aristotle also refers to this law of Pittacus, Pol. II 12, 1274 b 19 seq., where the reason for enacting it is given.

§§ 8, 9. The following two sections, 8 and 9, are a summary repetition of what has been already stated more at length, I 2. 14—19, inclusive: on the materials of enthymemes and their varieties.

Eight enthymemes being derived from four sources, or kinds of materials, probabilities, example, and signs certain and uncertain; in the first enthymemes being gathered (conclusions collected) from things which usually happen or seem to do so, that is, from probabilities; in the next (examples) from induction (by an incomplete inductive process), by means of similar (analogous, parallel) cases, one or more, when you first obtain your universal (the universal major, premiss or proposition, from which the conclusion is drawn) and then conclude (infer) the particular by an example' (on this process and its logical validity, see the account of παράδειγμα, Introd. pp. 105—107); 'and (thirdly) by means of' (through the channel, medium, instrumentality, διὰ with genit.) 'the necessary and invariable' (reading καὶ δὲν ὄντως, 'that which ever exists', unchanging, permanent, enduring for ever), 'by τεκμήριον that is; and (fourthly) by signs, universal or particular' (see on this, I 2. 16, the two kinds of signs: and the paraphrase of §§ 15—18, Introd. pp. 163—5), 'whether (the conclusion be) positive or negative (so Vici.); and the probable, (of which all these materials of enthymemes consist—with the solitary exception of the τεκμήριον, which is very rarely used—) not being what is constant and invariable (always occurring in the same way, uniform) but what is only true for the most part, it is plain that (the conclusion is that) all such enthymemes as these can be always disproved by bringing an objection; the refutation however is (very often) apparent and not always real; for the objector does not disprove the probability, but only the necessity, (of the opponent's statement)'. As none of a rhetorician's arguments is more than probable, this can always be done, but in a great many cases it is not fair.

The words δὲ ἐπαγωγής are put in brackets by Spengel as an interpolation. With the limitation which I have expressed in the translation,
it seems to me that ἐπαγωγής is quite justifiable, and may be retained: διὰ is at all events superfluous, and would be better away; Victorius and Buhle had already rejected it.

I have followed Vahlen (and Spengel in his recent Ed.) in supposing αἴε to have been omitted between καὶ and ὅντος in the explanation of τεκμήριον. Vahlen truly observes, Op. cit. p. 141, "that the τεκμήριον rests not upon the necessary and being, but upon the necessary and ever-being," (the permanent and invariable): referring to αἴε καὶ ἀναγκαίον in § 10; Phys. B 196 b 13, ὄντε τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ αἴε, ὄντε τοῦ ὅσ ἐπί τὸ πολὺ: Metaph. E 1026 b 27, ἐστίν ἐν τού τινι οὐκ δὲ ὡσάντως ἔχοντα καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης... τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν ὅσ ἐστιν οὐθ' αἴε, ὅσ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ: Ib. 1064 b 32, πᾶν ὅσ φαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὲν αἴε καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης: 1065 a 2 ff.—which seem quite sufficient to warrant the alteration.

καὶ τὸ ὅσ τὲ ὅσ τὸ μὴ (ὅν) subst. αὖ, a rare ellipse of the subjunctive mood of εἶναι: Eur. Hippol. 659, ἐς τ' ἃν ἐκδημος χθόνος Ὀθόνες. Λεσχ. Agam. 1318, κοινωνομέθα ἃν πῶς ἀσφαλῆ βουλήματε (γ'). Paley, note ad loc., supplies other examples; and refers to Buttmann (on Mid.-§ 14, n. 143, p. 529 ἂ, ἀφ' ᾧ ἃν ἢ γραφή), who gives two more, Antiphon de caed. Herod. § 32, ἐφ' οἷς ἃν τὸ πλείωτον μέρος τῆς Βασάνου; Plat. Rep. 11 370 E, ἃν ἃν αὐτοῖς χρεία.

Victorius offers an alternative translation of the above words, 'the real or apparent' sign: but I think his first rendering, which I have followed, is the best.

The contents of §§ 8—11 inclusive are paraphrased at length, with an explanation, in Introd. on this chapter, pp. 271—4; to which the reader is referred. § 10 (misprinted § 8) is translated on p. 272.

§ 10. ἐπὶ γὰρ... ὅ δὲ κριτής] On this irregularity, ἐπὶ with the apodosis ὅ δὲ,—a case of Aristotelian carelessness, his attention having been diverted from ἐπὶ to ὅ μὲν κατηγορῶν—see the parallel examples quoted on I I. 11.
δ' ἐξει ἑνστασιν τῷ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν εἰκὸς ἀλλ' ἄει καὶ ἀναγκαίον· ο̂ δὲ κριτὴς οὔτει, εἰ π. 109. οὖτως ἐλύθη, ἢ οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι ἢ οὐχ αὐτῷ κρίτεον, παραλογιζόμενος, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων δεὶ αὐτὸν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων· τούτῳ γάρ ἐστὶ τὸ γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστῃ κρίνειν. οὐκοῦν ίκανον ἂν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλὰ δεὶ λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκὸς. τούτῳ δὲ συμβηστει, ἐάν ἦ

11 ἡ ἑνστασις μάλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. ἐνδεχεται δὲ εἶναι τοιαυτὴν διχώς, ἢ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τοῖς πράγμασιν, κυριώτατα δὲ, εἰ ἀμφότεροι· εἰ γὰρ τὰ πλεονάκις οὔτως, Π. 1423. 12 τούτ' ἐστὶν εἰκὸς μάλλον. λύεται δὲ καὶ τὰ σημεία καὶ τὰ διὰ σημείου ἐνθυμηματα εἰρημένα, κἂν ἢ ὑπάρχοντα, ὥσπερ ἐλέγχθη ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις· ὅτι γὰρ ἀσυλλογιστόν ἐστι πᾶν σημείον, δὴλον ἢμιν ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν. πρὸς δὲ τὰ παραδειγματώδη ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις ἢν οὖτως ἐλύθη of course cannot stand, though Spengel retains it in his recent text. It must be either ἢν οὔτως λεβην, which seems the simplest and most natural alteration; or, as Bekker, εἰ οὖτως ἐλύθη.

On the dicast's oath, γνώμη τῇ ἀριστῇ, or more usually τῇ δικαιότατῃ, κρίνειν, see Introd. note 1, p. 273.

§ 11. The enstasis may be made more probable in two ways, either by the consideration of the time, (as an alibi for instance, shewing that at the time alleged the accused was elsewhere, see II 23. 6, the topic of time: this use of the topic may be added to that which is illustrated there,) or the circumstances of the case; or most conclusively (authoritatively, cogently, weightily), by both: for in proportion to the multiplication of events or circumstances similar to your own case as you represent it, is the degree of its probability'. If I am right in the interpretation of τῷ χρόνῳ—see Introd. p. 274—τὰ πλεονάκις refers to τοῖς πράγμασιν, 'facts and circumstances', alone. If 'the time' meant 'the number of recurring times', it would surely be τοῖς χρόνοις, not τῷ χρόνῳ.

§ 12. 'Signs (except τεκμηρία), and enthymemes stated or expressed by (i.e. derived from, founded on) signs, are always liable to refutation, even though they be true and genuine, bona fide, (ὑπάρχοντα, really there, in existence; not imaginary or fictitious,) as was stated at the commencement of this work (1 2.18, λευτὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, this as well as the first, κἂν ἀληθὲς ὑ· for that no sign can be thrown into the regular syllogistic form is clear to us from the Analytics'. Anal. Pr. II 27. Introd. pp. 162, 3. It wants the universal major premiss, except in the single case of the τεκμηρίων.
§ 13. In this section the clause, εάν τε γάρ ἔχωμεν τι, οὐχ οὕτω λέ-πλειόν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ τὰ πλεῖω ἃ πλεον-

1ἐχωμεν τι οὐχ οὕτω, λέυται, 2 om. τὰ

καὶ τὰ εἰκότα, εάν τε γάρ ἔχωμεν τι, οὐχ οὕτω λέ-

κυρίως, ὥστε οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ τὰ πλεῖον ἃ πλεον-

§ 13. In this section the clause, εάν τε γάρ ἔχωμεν...ἀλλως, should (it seems) be read thus: εάν τε γάρ ἔχωμεν τι οὐχ οὕτω, λέυται, ὥστε οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ πλεῖον ἃ πλεονάκις ἀλλως; and the succeeding, εάν τε καὶ...οὕτω, μαχετέον ἃ ὥστε κ.τ.λ. The first alteration of the punctuation, and εἰ καὶ πλεῖον ἃ ὥστε, appear first in Spengel’s reprint of the Rhetoric, in his Rhetores Graeci; the corresponding alteration of punctuation in the second clause occurs in his recent edition. Bekker, who had adopted the altered punctuation in his 2nd ed., has returned to the original one in his 3rd, whether by mere oversight, or intentionally, who can determine? At all events with the punctuation found in all the editions prior to Bekker’s 2nd, the sentences appear to be unintelligible. Vahlen, u.s., pp. 142, 3, has adopted the same alterations with the addition of the not improbable but unnecessary one of εάν τε γάρ ἔχωμεν ἐν τι. The connexion of the passage thus altered is this: There are two ways of meeting and refuting an opponent’s example, the rhetorical substitute for a complete induction: first, if we have an adverse or contradictory instance (οὐχ οὕτω) to bring against his general rule—a case exceptional to the example or examples that he has collected in support of it—this is refuted, at all events so far as to shew that it is not necessary, even though the majority of cases (πλεῖον καὶ πλεονάκις, ‘more of them and oftener’) of the same kind, or examples, are ‘otherwise’ (ἀλλως, are in another direction, or go to prove the contrary): or, secondly, if the great majority of instances are in conformity with his rule (οὕτως), and (which must be supplied) we have no instance to the contrary to adduce, we must then contend that the present instance (any one of his examples) is not analogous, not a case in point, that there is some difference either of kind and quality, or of mode, or some other, whatever it may be, between the example and that with which he compares it, which prevents its applicability here. The objection to this connexion and interpretation is of course the combination of οὐχ οὕτω with εάν; which may perhaps have been Bekker’s reason for returning to the original punctuation. But as the sense seems to require the alteration of this, we may perhaps apply to this case Hermann’s explanation ¹ of the conjunction of οὖ, the direct negative with the hypothetical εἰ, which may occur in cases where the negative is immediately connected, so as to form a single negative notion with the thing denied, and does not belong to the hypothesis: so that οὐχ οὕτως being equivalent to ἀλλο or ἐτέρον may stand in its place with the hypothetical particle: though no other example of this combination with εάν has been produced. In the choice between the two difficulties, the grammar, I suppose, must give place to the requirements of the sense. Neither Vahlen nor Spengel takes any notice of the grammatical irregularity.

With καὶ τὰ εἰκότα in the first clause πρὸς is to be carried on from πρὸς τὰ παραδειγματῶδη.

¹ Review of Elmsley’s Medea, vv. 87, 348. [Comp. supra Vol. I. Appendix C, p. 301.]
RHETORIKHE B 25 §§ 13, 14; 26 § 1.

άκις ἄλλως· εάν τε καὶ τὰ πλείω καὶ τὰ ἑπλεονάκις, οὕτω μαχετέον, ἢ ὅτι τὸ παρὸν οὐχ ὁμοιὸν ἢ οὐχ ἢ διαφοράν γέ τινα ἔχει. τὰ δὲ τεκμήρια καὶ τεκμηριωδή ἐνθυμίματα κατά μὲν τὸ ἀσυλλόγιστον οὐκ ἕσται λύσαι (δὴ λοις δὲ καὶ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν), λείπεται δ' ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχει τὸ λεγόμενον δεικνύναι. εἰ δὲ φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ ὅτι τεκμήριον, ἀλητὸν ἢ ἢ γίγνεται τοῦτο· πάντα γὰρ γίγνεται ἀποδείξει ἢ ἢ φανερά.

I. τὸ δ' αὐξεῖν καὶ μειοῦν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθυμίματος CHAP. XXVI. στοιχεῖον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπον ἔστι γὰρ στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπος, εἰς δ' πολλὰ ἐνθυμί-

1-1 πλεονάκις οὕτω, μαχετέον ἢ ὅτι

οὐχ ὁμοιὸν ἢ οὐχ ὁμοιῶν] represent similarity of quality, τὸ ποιῶν, the third category; and similarity of mode, conveyed by the adverbial termination -ως. "Non esse par, aut non codem modo geri posse." Victorius.

§ 14. τεκμήρια] 'Certain, necessary, signs, and enthymemes of that sort (founded upon them), will not be found capable of refutation in respect of their not being reducible to the syllogistic form—which is plain to us from the Analytics (An. Pr. I. 27), and it only remains to shew that the fact alleged is false (or non-existent). But if it be clear both that the fact stated is true, and that it is a necessary sign, then indeed it does become absolutely insoluble. For by demonstration (the τεκμήριον converted into a syllogism) everything is made quite clear'; when once a thing is demonstrated, the truth of it becomes clear and indisputable. On the τεκμήριον, I 2. 16, 17, 18, μόνον γὰρ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ ἢ ἀλητῶν ἔστιν.

CHAP. XXVI.

On the object and meaning of this short chapter, Victorius thus writes: "Omnibus iam quae posuerat explicatis, nonnulla quae rudes imperitosque fallere potuissent pertractat: ut bonus enim magister non solum quomodo se res habeat ostendit, sed ne facile aliquis a vero abduci possit, quae adversari vidcantur refellit." He not only states what is true, but also guards his disciples against possible error.

§ 1. 'Amplification and depreciation is not an element of enthyme-

mem: by element I mean the same things as topic: for elements or topics are so many heads under which many enthymemes fall. But amplification and depreciation are enthymemes or inferences to prove that anything is great or little (to exaggerate and exalt, or dis-

parage, depreciate, lower it), just as there are enthymemes to prove that anything is good or bad, or just or unjust, and anything else of the same kind'. Comp. XXII 13. On στοιχείον, and how it comes to be convertible with τόπος, see Introd. pp. 127, 8. αὐξεῖν and μειοῦν are in fact (one or two, under different divisions) of the κοινὸν τόπου, the loci
communissimi, which can be applied to all the three branches of Rhetoric; and they furnish (are, Aristotle says,) enthymemes applicable to all the eidos in the three branches, as the good and bad treated in I 6, the greater and lesser good in I 7, fair and foul, right and wrong, in I 9, just and unjust in I 13. Comp. II 18. 4, II 19, on the four koinoi topoi; § 26, peri megéthous kai mikròtítos, where he refers to the proeisymena, the chapters of Bk. I already quoted, for exemplifications of it: and II 22. 16. It therefore (it is here spoken of as one) differs from the topoi enthymimátov of II 23. 24, which are special topics of particular classes of enthymemes.

§ 2. 'And all these are the subjects (or materials) of our syllogisms and enthymemes; and therefore if none of these (good and bad, just and unjust, &c.) is a topic of enthymeme, neither is amplification and depreciation'. This is the first of the two possible mistakes that require correction.

§ 3. The second is as follows. 'Neither are refutative enthymemes a distinct kind other than the demonstrative (those that prove the affirmative, construct, establish); for it is plain that refutation is effected either by direct proof, or by advancing an objection; and the proof is the demonstration of the opposite (the negative of the opponent's conclusion)—to prove, for instance, if the object was to shew that a crime had been committed, that it has not; or the reverse. And therefore this cannot be the difference, because they both employ the same kind of arguments (steps of proof); for both bring enthymemes to prove one the fact, the other the negation of it (§ 4). And the objection is no enthymeme at all, but, as in the Topics, to state an opinion (a probable proposition) from which it will clearly appear either that the syllogism is defective (the reasoning, logic, is defective) or that something false has been assumed (in the premises)' 7. See II 22. 14, 15. II 25. 1, 2, where díswullogízeovai stands for díswulpolleivn here. It was stated, c. 22. 14, that "there are two kinds of enthymemes," the deixiká and eléxytiká, founded on the distinction of constructive and destructive, affirmative and negative: in this passage that statement is so far corrected as to deny that this is not a sufficient foundation for a distinction of kinds; the mode of reasoning is the same in both, and therefore as enthymemes they are the same.

§ 4. On én tois topikois, see note on II 22. 10, and 25. 3.
ἐνεγκὼν, ἀνταποδεικνύουσι δὲ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, οἷον εἰ p. 110. ἐδείξεν ὅτι γέγονεν, οὕτος ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, εἰ δ’ ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, οὕτος ὅτι γέγονεν. ἀπέτε αὐτή μὲν οὐκ ἀν εἰ ἡ διαφορά: τοῖς αὐτοῖς γὰρ χρώματα ἀμφότεροι ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡ ἕστιν, ἐνυμήματα. 4 φέρουσιν: ἡ δ’ ἐνστάσις οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐνυμήμα, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς τὸ εἴπειν δύσαν τινὰ ἦς ἢ ἐσται δὴλον ὅτι οὐ συλλελόγισται ἡ ὁτι ψευδὸς τι εἴληφεν.

§ 5. ‘Now of the three departments of Rhetoric that require to be treated, of examples, and maxims, and enthymemes, and the intellectual (logical) part in general1, whence we are to obtain a supply of them, and how refute them, let us be satisfied with what has been already said: style and order (of the parts of the speech) remain for discussion’.

Dionys., de Comp. Verb. c. 1, divides the art of composition into two branches, δικτύωσιν ἀσκήσεως περὶ πάντων τοὺς λόγους, viz. (1) ἀ πραγματικός τόπος, the facts, or matter—Ar.’s πίστεις (in Rhetoric)—and (2) λεκτικός, the style or manner. The latter is again subdivided into σύνθεσις, ‘composition’, combination, construction of words in sentences, and ἐκλογή τῶν ὑφομάτων, selection of single words.

This (with the possible exception of τὰ λοιπὰ in II 18. 5) is the first notice we have in this work that there is anything to consider in Rhetoric beyond the proofs or πίστεις that are to be employed in persuasion; and the omission of any distinct mention of it up to this point is certainly remarkable. Of course those who regard the third book as not belonging to the system of Rhetoric embodied in the two first—(no one, except Rose, I think, goes so far as to deny the genuineness of the book as a work of Aristotle)—but as a separate treatise, founded on a different conception of the art, improperly attached to the foregoing, assume that the last words, λοιπὸν δὲ…τάξεως, are a subsequent interpolation added to connect the second book with the third. Vahlen, Trans. Vien. Acad. Oct. 1861, pp. 131, 2, has again shewn that arbitrary and somewhat dogmatical positiveness which characterises his criticism of Aristotle’s text. He pronounces, that of the last section, only the words which he alters into περὶ μὲν οὖν παραδειγμάτων—εἰρήθω ἢμιν τοῖσοι (omitting καὶ ἀλώς τῶν περὶ τὴν διάοιαν)—that is to say, only those which

1 With τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, comp. Poet. XIX 2. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλορημῆς κείσομ. τοῦτο ηὰρ ἔσοι μᾶλλον ἐκλύνης τῆς μεθόδου. ἐστὶ δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν τάστα, ὡσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεὶ παρακενσάθηκε: which is followed in § 4 by a brief summary of the principal subjects of Rhetoric. Instead of inferring from this correspondence—as seems most natural—the indisputable genuineness of the words in the Rhetoric, Vahlen (see below in text) uses this passage—to which I suppose he refers—as an argument against it; that the (assumed) interpolator borrowed his phrase from Rhet. III 1. 7, and ‘the Poetics’.
 happens to agree with his theory, that the third book did not form part of the original plan of the work, "are to be regarded as genuine Aristotelian." The promised proof of this theory, is, I believe, not yet forthcoming.

Brandis is much more reasonable, Tract on Rhet. [Philologus IV i.] p. 7, 8. He thinks that the second and third parts (the contents of Bk. III, λέξε and τάξις) are already presupposed in the conception of the art expressed in the preface to the work. (This is certainly nowhere distinctly stated, and the προσθήκαι and τα ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος of I i. 3 seem rather to refer to the exaggerations and appeals to the feelings and such like topics, of which the 'arts' of the earlier professors were mainly composed. Still, the tricks of style, introduced by Gorgias and his followers into their arts, may be included with the others, E. M. C). One of the hypotheses suggested by Brandis on the relation of this third book to the two others seems to me highly probable. It is that the third book—which is in fact complete in itself (E. M. C)—was written earlier than the rest, and before the author had arrived at his final conception of Rhetoric in its connexion with Logic; and was afterwards appended to the two others, instead of a new treatise written specially with a view to them; and this would account for the repetitions, such as that of III i. 17, which certainly are difficult to explain, if the third book be supposed to have been written after, and in connexion with the first and second. With regard to the references, as in cc. 1 and 10, to one of the preceding books, Brandis thinks they might easily have been introduced after the addition of the third to the two others. He altogether rejects the notion that any one but Aristotle could have been the author of it. (It has in fact all the characteristics of Aristotle's style, mode of thought and expression, and nothing whatever which is out of character with him: on the other hand let any two sentences in this book and the Rhet. ad Alex. be compared, and it is seen at once that the style, manner, and mode of treatment are all totally different. E. M. C.) Lastly he notes that it is characteristic of Aristotle's writings (this, I think, deserves attention) not to give a full account of the contents of the work at the beginning of it; and such omission of style and arrangement was all the more likely in the Rhetoric in so far as it was part of Aristotle's theory of the art that everything but proof direct or indirect was non-essential and completely subordinate. He concludes, "I think therefore that I need not retract the expression I ventured on above (Sie ist ein werk aus einem gusse) that the Rhetoric is, more than most of Aristotle's writings, a work made at one cast."

Spengel, in his tract on the Rhetoric, Mun. 1851, (Trans. Bav. Acad. p. 40), though he thinks the phraseology of the passage requires alteration in one or two points to bring it into conformity with Aristotle's ordinary manner, yet as the MSS all agree in giving the words as they stand in our text, says there is no ground for suspecting their genuineness. On the connexion of the third book with the others he gives no opinion. In the note to his recent edition, p. 354, he thinks
that it may have been added after the two first were composed. He pronounces strongly in favour of its genuineness, and against Rose, Pseudepigraphus, p. 3 and p. 137 note; adding, for the benefit of that critic, 

\textit{hace est nostrae actatis ars critica.}
APPENDIX (D)

ON

B 20 § 5.

εἰ δύνατ' ἄν.

On ἄν with optative after certain particles.

The attempt to control the free expansion of the Greek language by rigorous rules which forbade the deviation from set forms of speech, and allowed for no irregularities of expression by which nice shades and varieties of thought and feeling might be conveyed; rules derived mostly from a somewhat limited observation, often from the usages of the tragic and comic writers alone, the least departure from which was to be summarily and peremptorily emended; this attempt, which was involved in the practice of scholars like Dawes, Porson, Elmsley and Monk and their followers, has been happily frustrated, and we have learned, chiefly under the guidance of Godfrey Hermann, to deal more liberally and logically with Greek grammar. That Hermann was infallible; that he did not sometimes overreach himself by his own ingenuity; that his nice and subtle distinctions in the interpretation of grammatical variations are always well founded; or that he is always consistent in his explanations, I will not take upon me to assert: but it may at least be said that in this branch of scholarship, the application of logic to Greek grammar, he has done more than any other scholar, past or present.

On this principle, that of leaving the Greeks to express themselves as they please, let us not in the passage before us omit ἄν, though mss Q, Yb, Zh do so, but rather endeavour to explain it.

The facts of the case are these. There are numerous instances in the Greek poets and prose writers of ἄν joined with the opt. mood and various particles, in which ordinary usage would seem to require either the subj. with ἄν or the opt. without it. ἄν and the opt. are found (1) with relatives, as Thuc. viii 68, ἀ ἄν γροῦ ἐπείν, Plat. Phaed. 89 δ, οὐς ἄν ὑγρόσατο. Xen. Memor. iv 1. 2, μημονεύειν ἄ ἄν μάθοιεν, (this is immediately preceded by the ordinary grammar,
On ἄν with optative after certain particles. 337


In the first class of cases, where ἄν with the opt. follows a relative, the simple explanation seems to be this. Take, for instance, the passage of Xen. Mem. iv 1. 2, above quoted. μανθάνειν οἷς προσέχουν is “to learn whatever they gave their attention to”, the opt. indicating indefinite possibility, and the indefiniteness implying a liability to recurrence; an uncertainty as to when the thing will occur; a possible frequency, which we express by the addition of εἰς εἰς the relative; whatever, whenssoever. The addition of the conditional ἄν suggests some condition attached to the act, and the “whatever they attended to” becomes “whatever they would, could, or might, attend to”, under certain circumstances which may be imagined but are not expressed.

In class (2) ὡς ἄν, ὅπως ἄν with the opt. are usually explained by quomodo (Hermann), ‘how’, ‘in what way’, which is equivalent to ‘that’. Thus in the passage of Aristophanes, quoted, under this head, “Oh that I were changed into an eagle that so I might fly”, ὡς ‘how’, ‘in what way’, may be resolved into ὅπως οὕτως (see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 480, obs. 3) ‘that in that way’, ‘that so’; and the opt. with ἄν is exactly what it is in an independent sentence, a modified future
or imperative, as the grammars sometimes call it (Matth. Gr. Gr. § 515, β, γ), or rather a potential mood or conditional tense like that of the French and Italian verb. This is well illustrated by a passage of the Pseudo-Plat. Eryxias, p. 392 c, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν συμμετρῶν τούτων ἀν μᾶλλον ὁργίζοντο, οὕτως ὡς ἄν μᾶλλον χαλεπῶτατο εὑρεῖν, where the addition of οὕτως shows how ὡς is to be interpreted. Herm. de Part. ἄν, IV 11, 12, and III 4, p. 151 seq. divides these cases into two heads, the first, in which ὡς ἄν, &c. signify quomodo; the second, in which the conjunction retains its proper signification ‘that’, indicating the end or purpose, and the opt. with ἄν is used only “ubi finis est, ut possit aliquid fieri”—where it indicates possibility under certain conditions. In all the examples that he gives, III 11, the other explanation is equally applicable.

(3) Conjunctions of time, with ἄν and opt. Hermann in his treatise does not separate these cases from the rest, and deal with them as a separate class, as he does in the case of ὡς ἄν, &c., and the conditional sentence: the object of his first chapter on this subject, III 4, is summed up (p. 151) “apparet ex his reprehensione vacuum esse usum optativi pro coniunctivo, adiuncta particula ἄν;” from which it would appear that his object was rather the establishment of the fact than the explanation of it. But the ut quid possit fieri may be intended to extend to all cases of opt. with ἄν, though it is confined in expression to that of the particulae finales, ὡς, ὡτως, &c., p. 154. In his note on Trach. 2, he attributes the opt. θάνως to the obliqua oratio in which it occurs: which however leaves the ἄν unaccounted for. The time or tense of the preceding verb has at all events nothing to do with the explanation; the preceding verb is not always a past tense. Perhaps it may be sufficient to say, that it appears from numerous examples, that the optative with or without ἄν may be used in the same constructions with conjunctions expressing time, as the subjunctive with or without ἄν (ἄν being often omitted, especially in verse, with πρὶν, ἔσος, &c.) with a slight difference of sense; the subjunctive expressing as usual a future expectation, the optative the bare possibility, or the indefinite issue of an event, the ἄν, as usual, adding the notion of certain conditions to which it is subject.

These differences are so nice and subtle, that they are often hardly capable of being expressed in translation: unless it happen, as is not often the case, that there are words in the one language corresponding to those which we wish to render in the other, so far as to suggest exactly similar associations. Perhaps the differences between πρὶν θάνη or πρὶν ἄν θάνη, and πρὶν θάνως may be partially represented by ‘ere he shall or may be dead’, and ‘ere he might be dead’, implying uncertainty or mere possibility of the event; but when we come to πρὶν ἄν θάνως, where the condition, or circumstances under
which it may occur, is added, it seems impossible to convey the
whole by any tolerable English translation, since we have nothing
Corresponding to ἄν, a word of two letters, suggestive of associations
which would require in English certainly more than one word to
express.

(4) The same explanation may be applied to the rare cases in
which μή preceded by δέδουκα or something equivalent is followed by
the optative with ἄν.

On these cases Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 814 c, expresses a similar
opinion. "The opt. is also used in its secondary meaning to express
more decidedly a doubt as to the realization of the object, a
possibility only of its being so (this is Hermann’s explanation of the
signification of the mood): ἄν is added when the suspicion is supposed
to depend upon a condition: Xen. Anab. vi 1. 29” (quoted above).

The reason why the subjunctive after particles of purpose (ὡς,
ὁπότες, &c.), time, and fear (μή) is most usual, and the opt. com-
paratively rare, so as to appear even irregular, is that the former of
the two moods, which conveys merely the future expectation, is the
expression of the direct and immediate tendency of the impulse or
emotion; of that which the subject would naturally and usually feel:
whereas the notion of possibility and condition would be, in com-
parison with the other, very rarely suggested.

(5) The fifth class of cases of opt. with ἄν, with εἰ or other
conditional particles, is treated by Hermann in a special chapter,
u.s., c. 11, and abundantly illustrated. He distinguishes two varieties
of these, one peculiar to the Epic poets, “particulam (sc. ἄν) sic
adiectam habens, ut magis ad voculum conditionalem, quam ad
optativum pertineat: quare cultior sermo ut non necessarium omittit,”
p. 171. In the second, “nihil nisi particula conditionalis vel finalis
ad optativum rectae orationis cum ἄν coniunctum accedit,” p. 173.
That is to say, if the optative with ἄν can be used in an independent
proposition, as the conditional tense (see above), it may equally well
be so used with a conditional particle attached, which is the mere
addition, and nothing more, to the independent proposition, and
does not affect the construction: and this is the view I had myself
taken. And this is especially true when εἰ, as often happens, has
lost its conditional force, and become the mere equivalent of
‘that.’ It also is frequently used interrogatively, as πότερον (some
of my instances exemplify this); and as πότερον can of course be
joined with ἄν and opt. in their ordinary sense, so likewise can εἰ,
when it stands for the other. There is an actual example of this in
Pseudo-Plat. Eryx. 393 β, ἡρόμυν πότερον ἄν φαίη, ‘whether he would
or should say’.

Mr Paley, Appendix C to Aesch. Suppl. Ed. 2 with Latin Com-
mentary, has a note on “ὡς ἄν with opt.”, which is withdrawn
in the complete edition of Aeschylus, 1861. He there distinguishes two usages of ὡς, or ὑπως, ἀν with the opt., in one of which, the more usual, (where the particle is to be interpreted quomodo,) he says "ἀν semper pertinet ad verbum". This means, as I understand it, that when ὡς or ὑπως signifies ‘how’, ‘in what way’, ἀν is to be construed with the verb, and the two are to be understood in precisely the same sense and construction as they have in an independent proposition: as I have myself also explained it. But in the other, in which ὡς, ὑπως, are ‘in order that’, ἀν adheres closely to, and is to be construed with, the conjunction, ὡς—ἀν; so that the two combined may retain the ordinary sense of purpose, as in the case of ὡς ἀν with the subjunctive. It seems to me better not to make a difference in the explanation of idioms to all appearance identical, provided they can be explained in the same way; as I have endeavoured to shew. And also, I see no reason for supposing that the conditional particle can ever be separated from the verb that it conditions, and associated with anything else, either in conception or grammatical construction: the condition must accompany and modify the action, which is expressed by the verb.