liiilB BBEB EBB MW THE HARVARD CLASSICS The Five-Foot Shelf of Books Pascal \ THE HARVARD CLASSICS EDITED BY CHARLES W. ELIOT, LL.D. Blaise Pascal Thoughts TRANSLATED BY W. F. TROTTER Letters TRANSLATED BY M. L. BOOTH Minor Works TRANSLATED BY O. W, WIGHT W//A Introductions and 'Notes Volume 48 P. F. Collier & Son Corporation NEW YORK Copyright, 1910 By p. F. Collier & Son manufactured in u. s. a. CONTENTS THOUGHTS Section I PAGE Thoughts on Mind and Style 9 Section II The Misery of Man without God 24 Section III Of the Necessity of the Wager 68 Section IV Of the Means of Belief 90 Section V Justice and the Reason of Effects 103 Section VI The Philosophers 117 Section VII Morality and Doctrine ... 136 Section VIII The Fundamentals of the Christian Religion 181 Section IX Perpetuity 193 Section X Typology 214 2 CONTENTS Section XI page The Prophecies 233 Section XII Proofs of Jesus Christ 260 Section XIII The Miracles 279 Section XIV Appendix: Polemical Fragments 300 LETTERS 1 To His Sister Jacqueline 321 2 To Mme. Perier 323 3 To the Same 326 4 To Mme. and M. Perier 330 5 To M. Perier 341 6 To Mme. Perier 341 7 To the Marchioness de Sable 342 8 To M. Perier 342 9 To Mme. Perier 344 10 To the Same 346 11 To Mlle. de Roannez (nine letters) 346 12 To Queen Christina 359 MINOR WORKS 1 Epitaph of M. Pascal, Pere 365 2 Prayer, to Ask of God the Proper Use of Sickness 366 3 Comparison Between Christians of Early Times and Those OF To-Day 374 4 Discourses on the Condition of the Great 378 5 On the Conversion of the Sinner 383 6 Conversation on Epictetus and Montaigne 387 CONTENTS 3 PACE 7 The Art of Persuasion 400 8 Discourse on the Passion of Love 411 9 Of the Geometrical Spirit 421 10 Preface to the Treatise on Vacuum 437 11 New Fragment of the Treatise on Vacuum 444 NOTE Passages erased by Pascal are enclosed in square brackets, thus [ ]. Words, added or corrected by the editor of the text, are similarly denoted. The translation is from the text of Brunschvieg. PASCAL'S THOUGHTS TRANSLATED BY W. F. TROTTER INTRODUCTORY NOTE Blaise Pascal was born at Clermont in Auvergne on June 19, 1623, the son of the president of the Court of Aids of Clermont. He was a pre- cocious child, and soon showed amazing mathematical talent. His early training was scientific rather than literary or theological, and scientific interests predominated during the first period of his activity. He corre- sponded with the most distinguished scholars of the time, and made important contributions to pure and applied mathematics and to physics. Meantime, an accident had brought the Pascal family into contact with Jansenist doctrine, and Blaise became an ardent convert. Jansenism, which took its name from Jansenius, the bishop of Ypres, had its headquarters in the Cistercian Abbey of Port-Royal, and was one of the most rigorous and lofty developments of post-Reformation Catholicism. In doctrine it some- what resembled Calvinism in its insistence on Grace and Predestination at the expense of the freedom of the will, and in its cultivation of a thoroughgoing logical method of apologetics. In practise it represented an austere and even ascetic morality, and it did much to raise the ethical and intellectual level of seventeenth century France. Jansenism was attacked as heretical, especially by the Jesuits; and the civil power ultimately took measures to crush the movement, disbanding the nuns of Port-Royal, and by its persecutions affording to many of the Jansenists opportunities for the display of a heroic obstinacy. In this struggle Pascal took an important part by the publication, under the pseudonym of "Louis de Montalte," of a series of eighteen letters, attack- ing the morality of the Jesuits and defending Jansenism against the charge of heresy. In spite of the fact that the party for which he fought was defeated, in these "Provincial Letters," as they are usually called, Pascal inflicted a blow on the Society of Jesus from which that order has never entirely recovered. Pascal now formed the plan of writing an "Apology for the Christian Religion," and during the rest of his life he was collecting materials and making notes for this work. But he had long been feeble in health; in the ardor of his religious devotion he had undergone incredible hard- ships; and on August 19, 1662, he died in his fortieth year. It was from the notes for his contemplated "Apology" that the Port- Royalists compiled and edited the book known as his "Pensees" or "Thoughts." The early texts were much tampered with, and the material has been frequently rearranged; but now at last it is possible to read these 8 INTRODUCTORY NOTE fragmentary jottings as they came from the hand of their author. In spite of their incompleteness and frequent incoherence, the "Thoughts" have long held a high place among the great religious classics. Much of the theological argument implied in these utterances has little appeal to the modern mind, but the acuteness of the observation of human life, the subtlety of the reasoning, the combination of precision and fervid imagi- nation in the expression, make this a book to which the discerning mind can return again and again for insight and inspiration. PASCAL'S THOUGHTS SECTION I Thoughts on Mind and on Style rHE difference between the mathematical and the intuitive mind. — In the one the principles are palpable, but removed from ordinary use; so that for want of habit it is difficult to turn one's mind in that direction: but if one turns it thither ever so little, one sees the principles fully, and one must have a quite inac- curate mind who reasons wrongly from principles so plain that it is almost impossible they should escape notice. But in the intuitive mind the principles are found in common use, and are before the eyes of everybody. One has only to look, and no effort is necessary; it is only a question of good eyesight, but it must be good, for the principles are so subtle and so numerous, that it is almost impossible but that some escape notice. Now the omission of one principle leads to error; thus one must have very clear sight to see all the principles, and in the next place an accurate mind not to draw false deductions from known principles. All mathematicians would then be intuitive if they had clear sight, for they do not reason incorrectly from principles known to them; and intuitive minds would be mathematical if they could turn their eyes to the principles of mathematics to which they are unused. The reason, therefore, that some intuitive minds are not mathe- matical is that they cannot at all turn their attention to the principles of mathematics. But the reason that mathematicians are not intuitive is that they do not see what is before them, and that, accustomed to the exact and plain principles of mathematics, and not reasoning till they have well inspected and arranged their principles, they are lost in matters of intuition where the principles do not allow of such 9 10 PASCALS THOUGHTS arrangement. They are scarcely seen; they are felt rather than seen; there is the greatest difficulty in making them felt by those who do not of themselves perceive them. These principles are so fine and so numerous that a very delicate and very clear sense is needed to per- ceive them, and to judge rightly and justly when they are perceived, without for the most part being able to demonstrate them in order as in mathematics; because the principles are not known to us in the same way, and because it would be an endless matter to undertake it. We must see the matter at once, at one glance, and not by a process of reasoning, at least to a certain degree. And thus it is rare that mathematicians are intuitive, and that men of intuition are mathe- maticians, because mathematicians wish to treat matters of intuition mathematically, and make themselves ridiculous, wishing to begin with definitions and then with axioms, which is not the way to pro- ceed in this kind of reasoning. Not that the mind does not do so, but it does it tacitly, naturally, and without technical rules; for the expression of it is beyond all men, and only a few can feel it. Intuitive minds, on the contrary, being thus accustomed to judge at a single glance, are so astonished when they are presented with propositions of which they understand nothing, and the way to which is through definitions and axioms so sterile, and which they are not accustomed to see thus in detail, that they are repelled and disheartened. But dull minds are never either intuitive or mathematical. Mathematicians who are only mathematicians have exact minds, provided all things are explained to them by means of definitions and axioms; otherwise they are inaccurate and insufferable, for they are only right when the principles are quite clear. And men of intuition who are only intuitive cannot have the patience to reach to first principles of things speculative and concep- tual, which they have never seen in the world, and which are alto- gether out of the common. There are different kinds of right understanding; some have right understanding in a certain order of things, and not in others, where ON MIND AND ON STYLE II they go astray. Some draw conclusions well from a few premises, and this displays an acute judgment. Others draw conclusions well where there are many premises. For example, the former easily learn hydrostatics, where the premises are few, but the conclusions are so fine that only the great- est acuteness can reach them. And in spite of that these persons would perhaps not be great mathematicians, because mathematics contain a great number of premises, and there is perhaps a kind of intellect that can search with ease a few premises to the bottom: and cannot in the least penetrate those matters in which there are many premises. There are then two kinds of intellect: the one able to penetrate acutely and deeply into the conclusions of given premises, and this is the precise intellect; the other able to comprehend a great number of premises without confusing them, and this is the mathematical intellect. The one has force and exactness, the other comprehension. Now the one quality can exist without the other; the intellect can be strong and narrow, and can also be comprehensive and weak. Those who are accustomed to judge by feeling do not understand the process of reasoning, for they would understand at first sight, and are not used to seek for principles. And others, on the con- trary, who are accustomed to reason from principles, do not at all understand matters of feeUng, seeking principles, and being unable to see at a glance. Mathematics, Intuition. — True eloquence makes light of eloquence, true morality makes light of morality; that is to say, the morality of the judgment, which has no rules, makes light of the morality of the intellect. For it is to judgment that perception belongs, as science belongs to intellect. Intuition is the part of judgment, mathematics of intellect. To make light of philosophy is to be a true philosopher. 12 pascal's thoughts 5 Those who judge of a work by rule are in regard to others as those who have a watch are in regard to others. One says, "It is two hours ago;" the other says, "It is only three-quarters of an hour." I look at my watch, and say to the one, "You are weary," and to the other, "Time gallops with you;" for it is only an hour and a half ago, and I laugh at those who tell me that time goes slowly with me, and that I judge by imagination. They do not know that I judge by my watch. Just as we harm the understanding, we harm the feelings also. The understanding and the feelings are moulded by intercourse; the understanding and feelings are corrupted by intercourse. Thus good or bad society improves or corrupts them. It is, then, all-im- portant to know how to choose in order to improve and not to corrupt them; and we cannot make this choice, if they be not already im- proved and not corrupted. Thus a circle is formed, and those are fortunate who escape it. 7 The greater intellect one has, the more originality one finds in men. Ordinary persons find no difference between men. 8 There are many people who listen to a sermon in the same way as they listen to vespers. 9 When we wish to correct with advantage, and to show another that he errs, we must notice from what side he views the matter, for on that side it is usually true, and admit that truth to him, but reveal to him the side on which it is false. He is satisfied with that, for he sees that he was not mistaken, and that he only failed to see all sides. Now, no one is offended at not seeing everything; but one does not ON MIND AND ON STYLE I3 like to be mistaken, and that perhaps arises from the fact that man naturally cannot see everything, and that naturally he cannot err in the side he looks at, since the perceptions of our senses are always true. 10 People are generally better persuaded by the reasons which they have themselves discovered than by those which have come into the mind of others. II All great amusements are dangerous to the Christian life; but among all those which the world has invented there is none more to be feared than the theatre. It is a representation of the passions so natural and so delicate that it excites them and gives birth to them in our hearts, and, above all, to that of love, principally when it is repre- sented as very chaste and virtuous. For the more innocent it appears to innocent souls, the more they are likely to be touched by it. Its violence pleases our self-love, which immediately forms a desire to produce the same effects which are seen so well represented; and, at the same time, we make ourselves a conscience founded on the pro- priety of the feelings which we see there, by which the fear of pure souls is removed, since they imagine that it cannot hurt their purity to love with a love which seems to them so reasonable. So we depart from the theatre with our hearts so filled with all the beauty and tenderness of love, the soul and the mind so persuaded of its innocence, that we are quite ready to receive its first impressions, or rather to seek an opportunity of awakening them in the heart of another, in order that we may receive the same pleasures and the same sacrifices which we have seen so well represented in the theatre. 12 Scaramouch,' who only thinks of one thing. The doctor,' who speaks for a quarter of an hour after he has said everything, so full is he of the desire of talking. ' Stock characters in Italian comedy. 14 PASCALS THOUGHTS One likes to see the error, the passion of Cleobuline,* because she is unconscious of it. She would be displeasing, if she were not